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Concepts of Ethos in Classical and Modern Rhetoric

Corinne Thomley

Eastern Illinois University

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CONCEPTS OF ETHOS IN

CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORIC

(TITLE)

BY

CORINNE THOMLEY

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts in Speech Communication

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1978

YEAR

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CONCEPTS OF ETHOS IN
CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORIC

BY

CORINNE THOMLEY

B. S. in Speech, Northwestern University, 1951

Abstract of a Thesis

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts at the Graduate School
Eastern Illinois University

Charleston, Illinois
1978
Abstract

Statement of Purpose:

Ethos, or the character of the speaker, is a subject of interest to students of rhetoric. This study traces the concepts of ethos from classical to modern times, and identifies philosophical value systems on which these concepts are based.

Hypothesis:

The study explores the hypothesis that similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and that the concepts can generally be identified with philosophical value systems.

Criteria and Procedure:

The study is focussed by the following seven questions:

1. What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?
3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
4. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?
6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?
Materials:

Both primary and secondary sources were used in this study. Basic sources included classical and modern rhetorics plus philosophical essays. Articles providing critical analyses were also consulted.

Conclusions:

The conclusions reached in this paper are as follows:

(1) Classical value systems that could serve as bases for concepts of ethos were idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic.

(2) Ethics in classical periods largely saw education as productive of righteous life styles and rhetoric as advisory.

(3) Similarities in classical concepts of ethos are found in agreement on the importance of audience analysis, speaker wisdom, and speaker honesty or sagacity. Differences are seen in emphasis given to audience adaptation and speech content.

(4) Modern value systems that have related to the concepts of ethos in rhetoric have been predominately naturalistic and pragmatic.

(5) Education and rhetoric are more generally considered amoral, unrelated to value structures, by modern theorists.

(6) Modern theories of ethos emphasize the importance of the speaker's reputation and language usage. They differ on the importance of content, purpose, and forms of proof needed to gain credibility.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND ORIGIN OF STUDY

Aristotle defined rhetoric as a "faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion in any subject." The most effective of the artistic proofs used in persuasion is designated as the true and perceived character of the speaker..."we may practically lay it down as a general rule that there is no proof so effective as that of character."\(^2\)

The interpretations men have given to ethos are some of the most controversial to be found in the field of rhetoric. William Sattler gives us a commonly accepted interpretation of ethos. He points out that the Greek word Εθος (ethos) is derived from ἡθος which means a custom or habit.\(^3\) This habit becomes a standard of morally approved conduct discernible in social groups. Sattler states, "The traits or qualities which make up ethos are approved and respected by the society in question, but do not necessarily have the status of 'welfare principles.' Ethos is therefore a more comprehensive term, meaning 'totality of characteristic traits.'\(^4\) Sattler applies this ethos to rhetoric by pointing to the impression of the speaker gained by members of the audience through their

---

2 Welldon, pp. 10-12.
4 Sattler, p. 5.
view of his habits and customs in relation to their own. If the image created by the speaker agreed with that held most desirable by the audience, the speaker had established his "ethos."

Craig Baird, in *Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry*, points to the relationship between the character of the speaker and the ethos that will persuade the audience.

To Aristotle, the ethical proof is thus connected with the speech itself—one of the three elements of "proof". Ethical character produces belief in the realm of opinion—as produced in the speech itself. This ethos of the speaker is not an antecedent impression held toward the speaker by the audience, but consists of materials and persuasive details of the communication itself.\(^5\)

Arthur B. Miller, in a Speech Monograph article in November, 1974, takes exception with both these interpretations and a number of others as well. He most particularly notes the mistakes that have been made due to the failure of scholars in the field to apply the concept of both habit and character in ethos, as found in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, to the classical meaning of ethos.

Corts\(^6\) neglects to discuss Aristotle's statements in the *Nichomachean Ethics* about the relationship between ethos and eethos and neglects also the accompanying footnote. Most important, however, Corts misses the significance of the relationship between ethos and eethos to the *Rhetoric* and he wrongly argues that "ethos is morally neutral," and "that it is not vital to ancient rhetoric."\(^7\)

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Miller cites the *Nicomachean Ethics* when he explains the Aristotelian concept of the meaning of ethos. However, since the concept of intended meaning is derived from the meanings and relationships taken from the Greek language, it would be logical to assume that the meaning Miller found was closely allied to the true meaning in the minds of classical theorists.

...moral and ethical virtue is the product of habit (ethos), and has, indeed, derived its name, with a slight variation of form, from that word.⁸

Miller notes that the translator, Rackham, points out in a footnote to the above passage that it is probable that (ethos) "habit" and (eethos) "character" are kindred words in the original Greek. He proceeds to carry the interpretation even further.

Even more specifically, regarding the Greek term accompanying the citation above, the word for "moral or ethical virtue" is (eethikee)—from the same stem as (eethos) or "character," and (ethos) not only is translated "habit," but is also the key word referred to in the final phrase, "from that word." The point of Aristotle's statement is that (eethikee) (and thus eethos) is derived from (ethos). Therefore, the sense in which eethikee means "moral or ethical virtue" and "eethos" means "character" is understood within the context of "ethos" or "habit."⁹

The significance for this study is that this analysis shows the original meaning of "ethos" was more comprehensive than the often cited "custom" or "habit." By definition there is no room for the theory that the classical concept of ethos was amoral. Moral or ethical virtue, habit and character are all part of the same word stem and their close relation-

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ship was recognized and pointed to by Aristotle himself during his dis-
course on ethics. Ethos will be defined from this viewpoint for this study.

When the ethos is introduced into the rhetorical situation both the true character of the speaker and the ethos as perceived by the audi-
ence are present. Since it is the ethos of the audience that shapes their perception of the speaker, in rhetoric audience analysis has to be part of the picture. Since men are not always rational in their observations, often the rhetorician becomes involved in problems of man's relation to society and his environment in general in his efforts to determine what reactions might be expected in any rhetorical situation.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to survey concepts of ethos set forth by selected classical and modern rhetoricians. To give accurate interpre-
tations of ethos as seen in the eyes of respective rhetoricians, their philosophical approaches will first be identified, giving particular atten-
tion to their value systems. The paper will center around these questions:

1. What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?
3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
4. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?
6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?
Hypothesis

Similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and the concepts can generally be identified with philosophical value systems.

Review of the Literature

Wherever possible the most comprehensive and divergent views of the works of selected rhetoricians were consulted. This was done to give as broad a view of the area as might be possible in a paper of this scope. A review of the literature revealed two dissertations dealing with comparative views of ethos in rhetoric. The first was completed by Dr. Wilhelm Suss in 1910. Here the concepts of ethos are examined as taught by Corax, Tisias, Antiphon, Gorgias and from the viewpoint of the Rhetorica Alexandrum and the Rhetoric of Aristotle. Dr. William Sattler, author of the second study, refers to the Suss dissertation as having been of much benefit to his own preparation. The Sattler dissertation begins with Tisias and Corax and ends with Richard Whately.

Critical evaluations of the writings of selected rhetoricians were reviewed for this study. C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic; George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece; Craig Barid, Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry; Daniel Fogarty, Roots for a New Rhetoric; Sir Alexander Grant, The Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle; as well as a study


by J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion*, were among those that provided analyses of the concepts set forth in this study.

Anthologies of articles written by various rhetorical critics and edited by Lester Thonssen, Richard L. Johannesen, Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., and Joseph Schwartz and John Rycenga greatly facilitated the process of gathering diversified views from the field.

A thorough search of the speech journals added the opinions of such authorities as Everett Lee Hunt, Bromley Smith, Clarence Edney, and many others to the views already in hand. Others not listed here will be referred to in the course of this study.

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Significance of the Study

This study has rhetorical, philosophical and personal significance. The study is significant to the field of speech-communication in the areas of theory and practice. Nowhere can educators or practicing rhetoricians find in one source the collected and analyzed views of leading rhetoricians on ethos in classical and modern theory. This study will be useful as a source for existing theory and as a reference to use in the formulation of new theory.

The philosopher may gain insight into the rhetorical behavior of speakers. The examination of prevailing theory that molded the rhetorical precepts of the speakers along with the speech content may give a different final picture of the event.

The writing of this paper gives me, as a student of rhetoric, the opportunity to make discoveries, exercise research methods, integrate knowledge, and form some opinions about the theory and practice of rhetoric. As a teacher of speech I feel it is particularly important to have a thorough understanding of the ethical principles of my field. This study should provide that.

Finally, this study should indicate whether further investigations of this sort into similarities of concepts of ethos during different periods of rhetorical history are likely to prove fruitful. This work could serve as the basis for future studies.

Organization and Materials

The first chapter of this study is devoted to an introduction to and description of the investigation entailed in this analysis of ethos.
in rhetoric. The literature is reviewed and the hypothesis on which the work is to be based is formed.

The second chapter deals with Egyptian and Greek concepts of ethos. The third chapter deals with Roman concepts of ethos.

British concepts of ethos, beginning with a discussion of the philosophies developed by Thomas Reid, John Locke, and David Hume will be the focus of the fourth chapter. This is followed with an analysis of Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately. Their views of rhetoric in general and ethos in particular will be examined.

The fifth chapter deals with later modern concepts of ethos presented by I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke, and Richard Weaver.

Finally, charts answer all questions including: What similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos? Suggestions for further study in this area will be made.

The materials used in developing this study included translations and the original primary sources. More specifically, Plato's Euthydemus, Gorgias, and Phaedrus; Aristotle's De Rhetorica and Nichomachean Ethics; Isocrates' Works of Isocrates, Vols. I, II, III; Cicero's De Oratore; Ad Herrenium; Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria; Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres; George Campbell's The Philosophy of Rhetoric; Richard Whately's Elements of Rhetoric; I. A. Richards' The Philosophy of Rhetoric; Kenneth Burke's A Grammar of Motives; Richard Weaver's Language is Sermonic.

Other materials included, for the classical period, Alexander Grant's Philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, Craig Baird's Rhetoric: A Philosophical Inquiry, and J. Donald Butler's Four Philosophies and their
Practice in Education and Religion. For the modern period, James L. Golden and Edward Corbett's *The Rhetoric of Blair, Campbell and Whately*, and Daniel Fogarty's *Roots for a New Rhetoric* provided helpful source material.

Method and Procedure

The historical method will be used in this study. First the original source will be read and the ideas pertaining to ethos will be recorded. Next, the secondary sources pertaining to the concepts of ethos of that rhetorician will be read. The axiology of the rhetorician's concept of ethos will be identified and similarities and differences between the concepts will be noted. The methodology allows this study to fall into the category of research known as a "history of ideas," as identified by Auer. 19

After a brief sketch of historical background found in Egyptian records of Kagemni and Ptah Hotep, the study will deal with Corax and Tisias and the beginnings of Greek rhetorical concepts. Since philosophical views of "first truths" as opposed to "perceived probabilities" are basic to ethics in rhetoric and, therefore, to concepts of ethos in rhetoric, this study will, whenever possible, identify the stand of the rhetorician on these basic views. Protagoras of Abderra and Gorgias of Leontini will be viewed from this standpoint and the influence their philosophies had on the ethics of the rhetorician of that period will be explored. Socrates and Plato will represent those who held philosophies opposed to Protagoras and Gorgias. Aristotle and Isocrates will be

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be studied from the standpoints of their philosophical orientation, their ethical views of rhetoric, and, finally, their concepts of ethos in rhetoric.

The next section, the third chapter, will explain the philosophical stands of the Stoics and the Skeptics in early Rome. When looking at the works of Cicero and Quintilian and at the Ad Herrenium, the influence of these concepts will be seen in their views of ethics and ethos in rhetoric.

The fourth chapter will again be oriented in the leading philosophical arguments of the day. Thomas Reid, John Locke and David Hume will be explained in reference to the potential relationship of their philosophies to the field of the ethics of rhetoric. Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately will be reviewed and their orientations in ethics and concepts of ethos duly noted as well as any alliance they might show with the dominant philosophical thought of their day.

The fifth chapter will be devoted to three current rhetorical concepts of ethics in rhetoric and the role the speaker is to play in his relationship to his audience. The concepts used in this paper are those of I. A. Richards, Kenneth Burke and Richard Weaver.

The last chapter will summarize the findings on a series of charts designed to show the theories held by each of the rhetoricians in this study. The chart will give page references for the concepts credited to each rhetorician. This chapter will trace the development of some of the more persistent and dominant theories. Again page references will be given for each assertion.
Limitations of the Study

The study will be limited to rhetoricians in each period recognized as most significant for their era by teachers, texts and course outlines dealing with ancient and modern rhetoric. Secondly, it will be limited to rhetoricians who include statements pertaining to the concepts of ethos. The sources will be limited to classical and modern periods because the inclusion of those from medieval and renaissance eras would make the study too extensive.
CHAPTER II

THE GREEKS

This chapter will trace the beginnings of rhetorical concepts of ethos. The written records of Kagemni and Ptah Hotep, ancient Egyptians, date from 2900 B.C. and clearly show the interaction of audience and speaker in a rhetorical situation.

The Greek period begins with Tisias and Corax, the traditional founders of rhetoric, and proceeds with an analysis of the popular philosophies of the "sophistic" teachers of Athens. Two of the most outstanding, Protagoras of Abderra and Gorgias of Leontini, will be explored in depth. Critical evaluations of their views on the ethics of rhetoric will be cited and some tentative conclusions made about their contributions.

Next, the chapter will deal with the efforts of Socrates and Plato to establish the ethical footing for rhetoric. Plato carried ethics into his discussion of the character, or ethos, of the speaker. Richard Weaver's explanation of this application of ethics to rhetoric will be cited.¹

Aristotle and Isocrates were two of the first teachers of rhetoric to use ethics in teaching of speech and in making extensive applications of the theories to establish the concepts of ethos taught in their schools. Aristotle wrote extensively in the areas of both philosophy in general and ethics in particular. These writings will be applied to his concepts of

the ethos of the speaker so as to make considerations of ethos found in *De Rhetorica* consistent with what else we now know about Aristotle's views on man's relation to man and society, or ethics.

**The Early Egyptians**

A little more than one hundred years ago, an ancient scroll, supposedly the "oldest manuscript in existence,"

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was discovered by the French Egyptologist, N. Prisse d'Avignon. The eighteen pages of hieratic characters were designed for training young men in ways of living.

A few of the sanctions are related to the communication arts and demonstrate an awareness of the importance of ethos in speech.

**Kagemni**

Kagemni and his later proto-type, Ptah-Hotep, evidently wrote the scrolls as lessons for students in the courts of Pharaoh. The former, the earlier of the two teachers, relates in one section:

> The cautious man flourisheth, the exact one is praised; the innermost chamber openeth unto the man of silence. Wide is the seat of the man gentle of speech; but knives are prepared against one that forceth a path, that he advance not save in due season.\(^3\)

Though certainly aware of the effectiveness of a speaker who has gained the good will of his audience, Kagemni also realized different audience types do not react in the same manner. More particularly, there are those who cannot be reached by any means.

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\(^3\)Gray, p. 447.
If a man be lacking in good fellowship, no speech hath any influence over him. He is sour of face toward the glad hearted that are kindly to him; he is a grief unto his mother and his friends; and all men (cry): Let thy name be known; thou art silent in thy mouth when thou art addressed."^4

Ptah-Hotep

As vizier of King Isesi about 2675, B.B., two hundred years after Kagemni, Ptah-Hotep was described by James Baikie in *A History of Egypt*, as a wise old man who advised honesty as the best policy. Baikie, according to Gray, ventured the opinion that he had probably tried the other course and found it wanting. Honesty for the speaker and conduct "without defect" were cited as good attributes for the would-be effective speaker. Gray, in his *QJS* article, doubted that this was an indication of any philosophy other than, "This is the way to be if you want to succeed." Such a judgement of philosophy underlying teaching precepts is difficult to make. It must be remembered that what we have are a number of guidelines written for young people to follow. When teaching a child, reward-punishment is the most used system. Only in rare cases would philosophical rationale for the rules be incorporated into the lesson. That Ptah-Hotep recognized the value of education in leading one into a noble concept of living is shown by the following:

A well taught heart hearkenth readily; one hath remorse for even a little covetousness when his belly cooleth; Repeat not extravagant speech, neither listen thereto, for it is the utterance of a body heated by wrath; Let that which thou speakest implant true things and just in the life of thy children.^[5]

^4Gray, p. 447.

^5Gray, p. 454.
The thirty-sixth paragraph and the fifth dealt with honesty and good conduct. "If you follow these instructions, your conduct will be above reproach for 'the quality of truth is among their excellences.'"

The fifth paragraph cautions "that thine own conduct be without defect."

Evidences of the need to adapt one's speaking to the members of an addressed audience are seen in admonitions to keep silent when meeting a more capable debater and when unsure of your position in the presence of superiors.

If you meet a debater more capable than yourself, silence will be your best defense.

In council with your superiors, if you would be wise, avoid speaking of that which you know nothing. Silence is more profitable than abundance of speech. 6

The speaker is cautioned against undue manifestations of intellectual pride when speaking to people without educational advantages. He also advises one to guard against flaunting any superior talent or knowledge when debating someone of obviously inferior abilities.

Be not proud because thou art learned; but discourse with the ignorant man as with the sage, for no man ever reaches perfection. Fair speech is more rare than the emerald that is found by slave maidens on the pebbles.

Refute the false arguments of your equal in debate; you will thus appear wiser than he. But if your opponent is weaker than you, do not scorn him; let him alone; then he confound himself...it is shameful to confuse a mean mind. If you are tempted to ridicule, overcome it as a thing rejected of princes. 7

6Gray, p. 450.

7Gray, p. 450.
Obvious greed or covetousness was another trait to be avoided by the effective speaker. Specifically, Ptah-Hotep stated that, "...he that is covetous lacks persuasiveness in speech." Note here there is no mention of appearances. The state of "being covetous" is enough.

In conclusion, while reading these guidelines we must keep in mind the purpose for which they were designed--teaching the young. To arrive at a positive declaration of the philosophy behind them is not a practical possibility. There are indications that education is known to result in a more judicious and virtuous mode of behavior. Anything beyond this is more conjecture without adequate proof.

The Sophists

Conditions in Sicily during the days of Corax and Tisias were responsible for the development of a system of rhetoric designed to aid dispossessed landowners recover their property. Under a new government the citizen was given the right to appear in court to establish his claim to land a former tyrant had seized. The claimant was often at a great disadvantage without knowledge or ability to win his case. Corax and his pupil, Tisias, were the first to offer their services as teachers for those who needed their knowledge and could afford to pay their fees. Since their writings are extant, there is really nothing to learn of their ethics other than this: they sought to teach their clients how to win a decision in court.

There are two areas to be covered in a discussion of the views of Corax and Tisias on ethos in rhetoric. The first of these is their doctrine or probability. The second concerns the parts or divisions of speech.
Doctrine of Probability

D. A. G. Hinks explains the doctrine of probability as developed by Corax. He refers to two classes of argument.

...the form of reasoning is strict and only the doubtful truth of the premises makes the conclusion uncertain; and the arguments in which the form of reasoning itself is no more than probable, even if the premises are true. It is the importance to the orator of the arguments of the latter class that Corax recognized. 8

The line of argument is based on the reasoning that, "What will happen or has happened in a particular case is inferred from what usually happens." 9

In pursuing this line of argument, the speaker has accepted the fact that people generally are more easily convinced by what they have observed to be a truth than by pure logical reasoning. The speaker establishes his ethos in this type of argument through use of audience beliefs or experiences he cites as being identical to his own. The audience agrees with his premise, this he has established ahead of time, and therefore sees the speaker as a truthful, dependable type person.

...and far more people are impressed by admitted truth in the premises than by logical cogency in the reasoning. The orator who can adduce general probability but no particular evidence on his side appeals to a real sentiment in his audience when he urges them, however fallaciously, to prefer probability to testimony because it is incorruptible. 10

The writings of Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates left no doubt about their disapproval of the ethics of this approach. 11

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9 Hinks, p. 63.

10 Hinks, p. 63.

11 Hinks, pp. 61-69.
evaluations we must remember Corax was being classified with what was being labelled "undesirable" in the teaching of rhetoric. Just how accurate they were in their appraisal we cannot be too certain. They did all agree, and here there seems little reason to doubt the conclusion, that the line of reasoning they developed was designed for the courts and really not suited for any other use.

Parts or Divisions of Speech

Corax has commonly been given credit for observing and defining the parts of speech. Bromley Smith attributes the five-part division to Corax. These are: the proem (introduction), the diegesis (narration), the agon (proof or argument), the parekbasis (digression of subsidiary remarks), and the epilogos (peroration or conclusion). Hinks cites a four-part system as being generally attributed to Corax. Hinks, however, seriously doubts that there is enough evidence to make this claim.

Our concern is not for the validity of these claims, but rather the fact that there seems to be general agreement that Corax recognized the opening of the speech, the proem, to be the place to win the favor of the audience.

All that we know of this "Art" is that it laid down a regular form and regular divisions for the oration; above all, it was to begin with a distinct proem, calculated to put the hearers in a favorable train; and to conciliate their good will at the very opening of the speech.

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13Hinks, pp. 66-68.
In conclusion, then, we find the development of a system of rhetoric designed for use in pleading legal cases. Though strongly criticized by later writers, the doctrine of probability as developed by Corax and his pupil Tisias, was widely used in the courts. The proem was recognized as the place to gain the sympathy of the audience.

"Sophist Philosophy"

In the term "sophist" we have a word that has been so overworked and misunderstood as to render it almost useless as a label for any group or movement. For our purpose the term is used in reference to those who taught rhetoric for pay during the Fifth Century, B. C., in Greece or Sicily. No one philosophy could be called "sophistic." The teachers who allowed themselves to be called "Sophists" varied as widely in their ethics as in all else they said or did. Not all of them were primarily rhetoricians, but since this was a field of learning certain to attract clients of means, most of them included it in their course of study. Two of the most outstanding "Sophistic" teachers of rhetoric were, first, philosophers, and, second, teachers of speech. Although the claim is made that they attempted to keep their philosophies separated from the teaching of rhetoric,¹⁵ in actual practice this was not possible. The philosophical orientations of Protagoras of Abdera and Gorgias of Leontini colored much of the rhetorical teachings and practice in early Athens. These philosophical orientations will be considered in turn followed by a discussion of the impression they made on contemporary theories of ethics in rhetoric.

Philosophical Principles of Protagoras of Abdera

Protagoras was known as one of the earliest and greatest of the Sophists. He was rooted in a philosophy that starts with the spirit of Heraclitus that "all is becoming." Plato treats with this doctrine in the "Theotus" where he has Protagoras analyze this becoming into two sides, the active and the passive, or the objective and the subjective.

Nothing exists absolutely, things attain an existence by coming in contact with and acting on an organ of sensation, that is, a subject. Thus, all existence is merely relative, and depends in each case on the individual per-cipient, and, therefore, man is the measure of all things, of the existent that they exist, and of things non-existent that they do not exist.16

Grant goes on to point out that this is at once the germ or starting point of all philosophy is to lift men out of their absolute belief in the existence of external objects. It asserts that all knowledge, and therefore all existence, as far as we can conceive it, consists in the relation between an object and a subject, that every object implies a subject and every subject an object. From the standpoint of the philosopher, according to Grant, where Protagoras goes too far is in stating that objects exist only in relation to an individual's perception of them. This allows for an object being two things at the same time as observed by two different people. Any statement about an object or subject is meaningless for it will have to do only with the object as seen by the person making the statement--not with the way others see it. In other words, the same object may possess contradictory elements at the same time as seen by different individuals. This ethical precept affects rhetoric

16 Grant, p. 135.
and the entire role of the speaker profoundly. Grant claims Protagoras acknowledges this:

> What appears true to a person is true to him. I cannot call it false, I can only endeavor to make his perceptions, not true, but better, i.e., such as are more expedient for him to entertain. . . . Protagoras despairs of a theology and proclaims his despair, and falls back upon practical success.¹⁷

Hunt is skeptical of this extreme to the point of absurd interpretation of Protagoras.

> . . . scholars are far apart in their interpretation of the meaning of Protagoras; but they are generally agreed that the Platonic interpretation of it in the Theatus is quite unfair. Few interpreters now consider it to involve the degree of relativity and subjectivism with which Protagoras and the Sophists generally have been burdened.¹⁸

One authority with an entirely different point of view expressed his conviction that in Protagoras we have the roots of the only philosophy with any true meaning.

> Our only hope of understanding knowledge, our only chance of keeping philosophy alive by nourishing it with the realities of life, lie in going back from Plato to Protagoras, and ceasing to misunderstand the great teacher who discovered the measure of man's universe.¹⁹

Suggestions for projection of ethical orientation are lacking in our knowledge of Protagoras. It has been conjectured the man who is credited with being the originator of "sophistic philosophy," if indeed such a philosophy can be identified, would be pleased with the educational aims attributed to him by Plato:

¹⁷Grant, pp. 135-136.


If a young man come to me he will learn prudence in affairs private as well as public, he will learn to order his own house in the best manner, and he will be best able to speak and act in affairs of state.  

The Philosophy of Gorgias of Leontini

Another of the philosophers among the sophists was Gorgias of Leontini. Although his book, On Nature, the Non-Existent, is no longer extant, a sketch of the work remains in the Peripatetic treatise called, "Aristotle's, De Xenophone, Zenone et Gorgias," and also in "Sextus Empiricus." Grant, in his work, calls this one of the most startling utterances in antiquity. There are three premises: (1) Nothing exists. (2) If it does exist it cannot be known. (3) If it can be known it cannot be communicated. The difficulties facing a rhetorician who has devoted himself to this philosophy are obvious. Isocrates made this point in the opening of his Helen:

He is speaking of the inveterate habit of defending paradoxes which had for so long prevailed, and, he asks, "who is so behind-hand as not to know that Protagoras and the Sophists of that time left us compositions of the kind I have named, and even more vexatious? for how could anyone surpass the audacity of Gorgias...Elsewhere (De Permatat, page 268), he mentions as the "theories of the old Sophists," that, "the number of existences was, according to Empedocles, four; according to Ion, three; according to Alcmaeon, two; according to Parmenides and Melissus, one; according to Gorgias, absolutely none."  

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20 Plato, Protagoras, p. 318.
21 Grant, pp. 135-136.
22 Grant, pp. 136-137.
Grant goes on to compare the last two theses of Gorgias with the philosophies of Kant. Saying that we cannot know something even if it does exist, and, supposing we know something we are unable to communicate it, places an impassable gulf between the material world and the human mind.

Plato's treatment of rhetoric in the Gorgias dialogue is one of the most popularly used assessments of Sophistic style rhetoric and has been taken by many as a factual account of the teachings and practice of Gorgias. The unfortunate result has been the belief on the part of many that Gorgias' chief contributions to rhetoric were stylistic devices and that he was nothing more than a glib nihilist who advanced no positive theories and was unconcerned with ethics. R. L. Enos makes the statement that Gorgias himself denied that he had uttered any of the lines in the Gorgias—in fact, he dismissed the work as a humorous satire.

Everett Lee Hunt and Bromley Smith made scholars aware of the fact that Gorgias was, in fact, a participant in the philosophical arguments of his day and opened the door for further investigation of his ideologies. These studies and others have led to the work done by Enos that indicates Gorgias was influenced by both Empedocles and Zeno, the respective inventors of rhetoric and dialectic, and that he developed a


pre-Socratic dialectic and rhetoric that were at odds with the later
school. To understand the development of that conflict it is necessary
to look at some of the precepts of Empedocles. In these will be seen
the roots for a fundamental lasting disagreement on the nature of ethics
and, growing from this, on the nature of ethos in rhetorical practice.

There is found in the extant writings of Empedocles a profusion
of contradictory beliefs. These have drawn criticism from scholars.
Enos points out that these seeming contradictions are actually the "juxtapositi-
position of antithetical concepts," and were more a matter of "correlative
balancing of thesis and antithesis than of intellectual inconsistency."\(^26\)
This antithetical process was "anticipated by the philosophical inquiry
of the Pythagoreans and by the dichotomic method of Zeno." This notion
of contraries was the foundation for philosophical inquiry for Empedocles.

Empedocles rested his verification on the human sense mechanism.
He placed trust not with the gods but with human sense perception.

Man's ability to acquire knowledge, and for that
matter to perceive existence itself, was dependent
upon the degree of his sense-perception. Since
man's capacity for understanding reality was
finite, complete communication was impossible,
and required a system of probability which was
limited by sensory experience. Empedocles' view
of knowledge led him to dismiss the possibility
of perceiving the gods and of communicating with
them, for they were beyond the positivistic
reality of the senses.\(^27\)

These concepts were adopted by Gorgias while a pupil of Empedocles.
Later they were developed by him into a sophisticated system of rhetoric.

\(^{26}\) Enos, p. 40.

\(^{27}\) Enos, p. 41.
Another major influence for Gorgias was Parmenides. A good summary statement of his point of view follows:

Unlike Plato, Parmenides believed that the limited capacity of the human mind, and the inherent deception in communication, precluded man's acquiring certain knowledge of the existence of real truths and compelled an epistemology that secured convictions on probable opinions and not on certain knowledge.28

What developed was a dialectic that argued from contrary positions, proceeding from premises that have not been agreed on with conclusions resulting in a choice of probable positions. Thus, "contrary to the dialectic of Plato, conclusions expose contradictory positions in relative degrees of strength."29

When the initial concept of Gorgias' philosophy states that "nothing exists," he is not speaking of the material world, for this would be a contradiction of the fundamental beliefs of his teachers and of his own empirical observations of sense perceptions. Enos points out that Gorgias is using the verb "to be" in an intransitive manner to indicate existence itself and not in the material or physical sense. The concepts of the mind are the ones without real existence and Platonic notions of "ontological 'essences' such as the ideal rhetoric were absurdities to Gorgias."30 The world is ever-changing and man functions in this world with his manufactured ideas losing their existence the instant they pass from the mind of the thinker.

28Enos, p. 42.
29Enos, p. 43.
30Enos, p. 47.
Accordingly, ideals attain "existence" only through the extrapolations of the mind, and are dependent upon the referential perceptions of their creator. As such, they cannot therefore even attain this existence without a manufactured antithesis or anti-model, and by their very nature they can form no ideal at all since each individual predicated his own ideals upon personal experience. In this respect, each thinker's transient notion of the ideal rhetoric is an amorphous grouping of relative notions.31

The second precept of Gorgias, "That if anything actually did exist, it would be incomprehensible to man," refers to Gorgias' concept that an abstract idea has no referent for sense perception--man's only avenue for perception--and therefore, even if it did exist, man would have no knowledge of its existence.

The final precept, that even if he had the knowledge of such an idea he would be unable to communicate it, refers to Gorgias' observation again of the lack of a sensory referent for the abstract idea--there is no experience that can be communicated--only references to experiences which cannot be the same as those which the senses perceive and which actually exist. When rhetoric, song or poetry are used to arouse the emotions, this to Gorgias is deception--for the reaction is to words, not to experiences and the words are not the experiences and therefore emotions kindled by them are deceptive. However, to Gorgias, this deception was not necessarily morally wrong.

The possibility for deception is apparent when words, which have no uni-vocal meaning, are used within their context to guide the soul by interpreting and recreating an experience. Hence a persuasive speaker could use the power

31 Enos, p. 47.
of words to deceive listeners into becoming as frightened in the verbal recreating of a battle as they would be if they actually were in the encounter. 32

Gorgias was deeply aware of the power of persuasion to "mold souls" as it desired. As such it could be used for good or evil. He saw nothing in rhetoric indicative of a built-in moral code. Rhetoric itself was neutral. The motives for good or evil were to be found in the person using it. And so, the sophist who is known to have made no claims of his ability to "teach virtue" was fully aware of the potential for good or evil lying in the province of rhetoric.

Gorgias belonged to a strong philosophical tradition that stressed probablity, antithesis, relativism and sense-perception.

Athenian Rhetorical Practices

Another bit of "philosophy" popularly discussed in Athens at the time was a traditional piece of dialectic "older than Protagoras," that argued that it was impossible to speak falsely. If one were to speak falsely it would mean he was uttering the non-existent. The non-existent has no existence whatsoever. To conceive or utter it is impossible. 33

Plato maintains against this argument and against the doctrines of the Eleatics, that in some sense "not being" was an existence. We see then that to set the relative meaning of a word against its absolute signification, to play off the accidental against the essential, formed a main view of the Eristic art. 34

32 Enos, p. 49.


34 Grant, pp. 133-134.
Certainly these early theories of referrent, symbolization, perception and encoding-decoding messages are interesting to any modern student of interpersonal theory. The foundations for such schools of thought were laid generations earlier than the Socratic-Platonic systems to be discussed in the next part of this chapter.

These doctrines were popular in the Sophistic schools of Athens and the inquisitive minds of the early Greeks eagerly explored the various channels of reasoning now opening to them. When charges are brought against the early sophists for corruption of the youth, it was not an accusation that revolutionary thought was being taught. The accusations rather concerned the negation of the accepted social-moral values of Athenian society. Efforts of the teachers of rhetoric were often directed toward clothing old ideas in fresh words to make the trivial worthy of discussion. Often, through the use of an antithetical dialectic, called perverted by Plato, the basic values of society were attacked and destroyed. The students of the day were left without the steadying influence of traditional value systems to guide them and their teachers were neglecting to replace old concepts with ones of equal or superior worth.

The Platonic dialogue, *Euthydemus*, is written to show the effects on a young person "attacked" by such a system of dialectic as this. The young person depicted was without enough maturity or judgement to evaluate the worth of the arguments being advanced against him. Grant explores this facet of Sophistic teaching and gives this evaluation of the actual practices of the art of rhetoric during this period.

Prominent association connected with it (Sophism) is--fallacious reasoning. Plato and Aristotle both directly accuse the Greek Sophists or professional teachers of the practice of consciously using fallacious arguments to suit their own
purposes. These accusations seem to come in the later dialogues of Plato. *Euthydemus*, *Sophistes*, *Theoetetus*, are the three later works that show the Sophistic practicing a perverse dialectic. They are putting questions to people and trapping them through contradictions and verbal quibbles. The last of the trio talks of an Eristic with no regard for the truth but only for a victory as opposition for an honest dialectic whose object is the discovery of the Truth.  

Certainly from the discussion of antithetical dialectic as developed by Gorgias and his predecessors we can see that this was an honest appraisal of the actual practice of the dialectic of the day. The purpose was not to arrive at any truth—for man could not perceive truth in the realm of ideas even if such truth were to exist. The purpose of the dialectic being used was to arrive at opposing premises with varying degrees of probability assigned to them.

Isocrates also wrote about the influence of this "Eristic" art on the practice and reputation of rhetoric. Norlin explains in his translation of *The Works of Isocrates* that he was criticizing the same sort of dialectic dealt with in the *Euthydemus* of Plato. (It is interesting to note that to the best of our knowledge, Isocrates was a pupil of Gorgias.)

Indeed, who can fail to abhor, yes to condemn, those teachers, in the first place, who devote themselves to disputation, since they pretend to search for truth, but straightway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies? (Isocrates is referring to captious argument in the field of ethics.)

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35 Grant, p. 131.

These complaints with the practice of dialectic in the schools of the Sophists appear in Plato's later writings and other complaints against them are found in the earlier dialogues. *Gorgias, Protagoras,* and *Republic* are primarily critical of the Sophists' worldliness, habit of declaiming and making long speeches, ignorance of the art of argumentation, and inability to discuss a subject by means of short questions and answers.  

Grant makes the suggestion that there may have been a change in the practice of rhetoric that led to this change in the focus of criticism. Although Isocrates was not known for his overwhelming agreement with Plato on many subjects, here we do find common ground between the two.

If all who were engaged in the profession of education were willing to state the facts instead of making greater promises than they can possibly fulfill, they would not be in such bad repute with the lay public. As it is, however, the teachers who do not scruple to vaunt their powers with utter disregard for the truth have created the impression that those who choose a life of careless indolence are better advised than those who devote themselves to serious study.

Although not in agreement on the remedy for the plight of education, both critics are stating that the conditions as they saw them were in need of some corrective measures. It remains for other sections of this work to differentiate between the courses chosen by each to follow.

There is a passage in Grant's work that is comprehensive in its analysis of many of the problems besetting the practice of rhetoric in

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37 Grant, p. 132.

38 Isocrates, "Against the Sophists," p. 163.
ancient Greece. He points out that Plato's complaint is not that the
Sophists are teaching lax morality to their disciples, but rather that
they trifle with it.

The procedure of the Sophists was two-fold, either it was rhetorical or dialectical. They
would (1) trick out the praises of justice and virtue with citations from the old poets, with
ornaments of language, and with allegories and personifications...Such (like) compositions of
the Sophists form a sort of parallel to the popular preaching of the present day. Or else
(2) they gave an idea of their power and sub-tlety, by skirmishes of language, by opening
up new points of view with regard to common everyday duties, and making the old notions
appear strangely inverted.39

In his analysis of the Sophistic teachings Hunt pointed to the
fact that these varied with the individual. In general, however, sophis-
tistic education aimed at enabling the pupils to become leaders of men in
a democracy. The Sophists exerted much more influence on their society
than did Socrates or Plato. The public generally might have distrusted
the Sophists for their skill in speaking on either side of a question--
just as we may tend to distrust modern lawyers for the same reasons.
However, in matters of public concern, the Sophists were the conserva-
tives--the upholders of the status quo.

The Sophists as public orators illustrated and
reinforced the received dogmas of Athenian
society...Rhetoric, as we know, as the art of
persuasion, must always appeal to the people
upon the basis of whatever beliefs they have
...It was not likely then that it was the
rhetoric of the Sophists that led to the
charge that they broke down religion and
corrupted the youth.40

39 Grant, pp. 146-148.
40 Hunt, p. 17.
It was rather a problem of the Sophists devoting themselves enough to philosophy to incur something of the distrust with which speculative thought has always been viewed. It was this philosophical side that excited the general distrust of the Athenians toward all Sophists as well as Socrates and Plato. The quarrel between philosophers was unrelated to this outside distrust from the general public.

How would we look at that quarrel today? What would Plato have to say about our modern society? Hunt speculates:

The perversions of such education—half knowledge propaganda, demagogery, philistinism, worship of the appearance of success—are probably even more prevalent now than then. Whether they are worse than the perversions of Platonism is too large a question to be argued here. But whether for good or ill, the conceptions of the aims and purposes of the American liberal college as set forth by the most distinguished modern educators, is much closer to Isocrates and Protagoras than to Plato.

The Reformers, Socrates and Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates

The dissatisfaction with the moral tone of the teachings of the Sophists resulted in the emerging ethical theories of Socrates and his famous pupil, Plato. This portion of the chapter will describe the philosophical orientation of Socrates. This will be followed with the account of Plato's use of Socrates' approach in the formation of his own code of ethics. The section will conclude with the adaption of these theories to rhetoric and some comments on the practicality of these theories.

Hunt, p. 22.
Socrates

One of the first to make a departure from the philosophical orientation described in the preceding discussion of the Sophists was Socrates. In the writings of Aristotle we find many references to Socrates and Sir Alexander Grant points to the difference between the historical Socrates and the literary Socrates. Aristotle, as a pupil of Plato, is deeply rooted in the Socrates of literature. The Socrates of the Platonic Dialogues is mouthing the thoughts of Plato. As Socrates' pupil Plato has taken the teachings of the master and applied them to his own philosophy. The historical Socrates is quite distinguishable from this use of him and it will be our endeavor to discover these distinctions. Since Socrates taught by lecture and discourse rather than putting his views in writing, we must turn to secondary sources for our references. In Aristotle's Metaphysics I. vi2, XII. iv. 3-5, Grant points to passages that distinguish between the views of Plato and Socrates.

Aristotle is relating the history of the "doctrine of ideas." He tells us how it sprang from a belief in the Heraclitean principle of the flux of sensible things, and the necessity of some other and permanent existences, if thought and knowledge were to be considered possible. He proceeds, that Socrates now entered on the discussion of the ethical virtues, and was the first to attempt a universal definition of them—definition, except in the immature essays of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, having had no existence previously. "Socrates was quite right in seeking a definite, determinate conception of these virtues, for his object was to obtain a demonstrative reasoning, and such reasoning must commence with a determinant conception. There are two things that we may fairly attribute to Socrates, his inductive discourses and his universal definitions. But the Platonists made them transcendental, and then called such existence "ideas."42

42Grant, p. 159.
Socrates' Concept of the Ethical Virtues

This passage describes Socrates' subjects of inquiry—the ethical virtues. It also relates that his universal definition of these virtues would be established by means of inductive discourses using experience and analogy. This was a great deal more than anyone had attempted before—and, indeed, those adhering to the teachings of Gorgias, proclaimed this stance ridiculous. It was a syllogistic or one-sided concept.

His conceptions were definitely fixed so as to exclude one another. He knew nothing of that higher dialectic, which, setting aside the first limited and fixed conception of a thing, from which the contrary of that thing is wholly excluded, asks, "Is there not the same science of things contrary to each other? Is not a thing inseparable from, and, in a way identical with its contrary? Is not the one also many, and the many one?

Xenophon agrees with Aristotle in saying that Socrates always confined himself to ethical inquiries.

...he never ceased discussing human affairs, asking, What is piety? what is impiety? what is the noble? what is the bane? what is the just? what is the unjust? what is temperance? what is madness? what is a State? what constitutes the character of a citizen? what is rule over man? what makes one able to rule? (memor. I. i. 16).44

Because of this concentration in the areas of human behavior and the evaluation of what constitutes behavior of a certain kind, Socrates has been called the first moral philosopher. To say that he divided philosophy into logic, ethics and physics would not be correct. He had no concept of ethics as such and if asked the category of topics he was considering would have said "Politics" before anything else. In Plato

43 Grant, pp. 159-160.

44 Grant, p. 161.
there is no logic—only a dialectic that is really metaphysics. In Aristotle, logic still has no name and ethics is only becoming a study in itself. The subjects of ethics were Socrates' favorites.45

The thought of "Virtue as a science" was very far from the abstract. It was closely associated with life and reality and connected to education through the claims of the sophists that they taught virtue. (Gorgias was the notable exception.) Socrates agreed with the sophists that it could be taught but he gave a new dimension to such instruction. He wished to make action into a kind of art and to make self-knowledge and wisdom predominate over every part of life. It was later that Plato said, "No, virtue cannot be taught," and that aspect will be discussed in the next section.

The second thing to note about "Virtue is a science" is that it was related to Socrates' use of inductive reasoning or generalization. He brought the various virtues that had been enumerated by Gorgias under one heading—wisdom. These virtues were justice, temperance, courage and wisdom. The significance of the other three being reduced to the universal classification of "wisdom" should not be overlooked. In Socratic philosophical thought wisdom is co-equivalent with the other three virtues. Wisdom becomes the purpose of education and later the qualification for an orator.

The third aspect to consider is that the doctrine had two sides. The one side could be said to involve "habits." This means such statements as, "Courage consists in being accustomed to danger." The other

45 Grant, p. 162.
side of the doctrine had more to do with self-knowledge and consciousness of the law. Courage must have knowledge of good and evil and the presence of mind to keep hold of right principles even in the presence of danger.46

Next, there is the fact that Socrates felt that all politics was not learned through systematic study as were other crafts. (Politics is derived from "polis" and refers to society, the relationship of man to his organized society.) Socrates' view was that all human life must have its proper function within the polis or society and in this way virtue became the Science of Living. This can take a selfish turn and one offshoot of Socratean Philosophy did so. If Virtue is called the Science of Living it could be and was equated with pleasure. The Philosophy of Pleasure as an end for human existence has been the substance of several philosophies since the time of Socrates.

The fifth aspect of "Virtue is a Science" offered an appeal to a society beset by materialistic relativism. A foundation has been laid for a conscious morality in the preceding steps. The grounds for right and wrong are placed in individual reason and exist in and for the mind of the individual. The Sophistic saying that "justice is a convention," now gives way to "justice is a science." Justice no longer depends on society and external authority but exists as a constant value within the individual. This is a big step out of the morass that can characterize a completely relativistic or nihilistic society such as threatened Athens.

46Grant, p. 167. This doctrine is given in Aristotle, Ethics III. viii 6 and in Xenophon, Memorab III ix 2. The second doctrine is found in Laches and Plato's Republic.
Later, the Peripatetics would point out that this conception ignored all distinction between the reason and the will. Early ethics contained little psychology. Socrates did not perceive the difference between "what is good" and "what is right." He argued that everyone would do what is the "good" without realizing that there are two ways of looking at the "good." There is the "good" which is the end result. Certainly anyone looking at this would agree that this is what he wanted and would not knowingly do anything against the achievement of that good. The trouble begins when we consider the good that is the means of getting the other good. Here it might be more difficult to correlate the means with the end and there is no assurance that everyone will go along with the same proposition of means to the end. Later it will become evident that this is a basic difference in the ethical orientations of some of the leading rhetoricians.

Socrates on Education

The charges that were brought against Socrates stating that he had corrupted the youth could be traced to some of his educational policies. In the Xenophontean "Apology" Socrates is charged with inducing his pupils to disobey their parents. Parents traditionally have the last word in the education of their children. Socrates was in fundamental disagreement with this. He pointed out that when one was sick he consulted a medical doctor. When the country is at war it trusts the advice of generals in the fighting of battles. In affairs of state the statesman determines the course of action. When the question of education arises the educator should be the guide as to what is best for the youth. The
professional educator is trained in his pursuit--not the parent. The charge against him was that he constituted youths to judge of their own education and this they were unfit to do. Socrates was condemned.

On the surface certainly Socrates appeared to be a Sophist and he must have presented a purely sophistical image to many of his contemporaries. However, when his teachings are closely examined the differences become evident.

But from another point of view, looking at the internal character and motive of the man, his purity and nobility of mind, his love of truth, his enthusiasm, his obedience to some mysterious and irrational impulse, and his genius akin to madness,—we must call him the born antagonist and utter antipodas of all sophistry.47

Since Grant agrees that Sophists were not in any sense to be considered a homogeneous grouping, since we know they had no universal philosophy and that there were differences in their teachings, we must assume that "sophistry" here is referring to fallacious reasoning—the application of a perverted dialectic to everyday affairs. The kind of "sophistry" referred to in the Euthydemus of Plato would have been strongly opposed by Socrates.

Interpreting Socrates

Generally people have had trouble interpreting a paradox that develops in the study of Socrates. He states that injustice done voluntarily is better than injustice done involuntarily. Aristotle assumed the opposite stance and Plato defended it dialectically. The key is in the wording of the statement that inserts the phrase, "If it were possible."

47 Grant, p. 165.
By hypothesis it has already been established that it is impossible for any man to knowingly do wrong. In this system wrong is equated with ignorance. The wise man can only do what is seemingly wrong since to himself his actions have been justified as right. The effects of this proposition is to forcibly drive home the fact that wisdom and knowledge come first, action later.

Conclusions

Throughout this discussion it can be seen that Socrates had many things in common with the Sophists in addition to being called one of them. His dialectic disturbed the popular conceptions on moral subjects. He was convicted of corrupting the youth. However, there are three ways in which the dialectic of Socrates left the methods of the other Sophists and moved on to a newer concept.

(1) that there was a higher and truer conception to be discovered by thought and research; (2) it seized upon some permanent and universal ideas amidst the mass of what was fluctuating and relative; (3) it left the impression that the most moral view must after all be the true one.48

According to Grant, Plato saw in the method of Socrates' discourses indications of a philosophy that could rise above empirical generalizations. The inquiring spirit, the effort to connect a variety of circumstances into a general law and the efforts to test the law through application to new circumstances, were all potentially the beginnings of a philosophy that could be carried to a higher plane than Socrates himself had envisioned.

48Grant, p. 171.
...the conception formed by Socrates differed from the Ideas of Plato—that they had no absolute existence, they had no world of their own apart from the world of time and space. The historic Socrates was quite excluded from that sphere of contemplation on which the Platonic philosopher enters, where all hypotheses and all sensible objects are left out of sight and the mind deals with pure Ideas alone.⁴⁹

Plato

The conclusions of Socrates were the starting point for Plato. He appears to have carried forward all the many-sided arguments of the master through his dialogues. By imagining Socrates still on earth, Plato carries on perpetual conversations with him on the highest subjects. It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider any more than a fragment of these philosophies. Our area of concern is ethics, its development as it affected the concept of the orator and the practice of rhetoric.

The foundation for Plato's inquiries was, "Namely, that in the affairs of human life it is absolutely necessary to obtain universal conceptions; that to arrive at these a suitable dialectic, and the refutation of inadequate notions, are requisite; and that it is the general outcome of all such inquiries to show that "virtue is a science."⁵⁰

Plato and "Virtue is a Science"

The questions asked by Plato concerned the four cardinal virtues identified by Socrates and generally accepted by his contemporaries. These four were wisdom, justice, courage and temperance. The problem he saw was

⁴⁹Grant, pp. 159-160.
⁵⁰Grant, p. 183.
to determine whether the virtues were an entity or separate and distinct from each other. If virtue were an entity in itself, why and how did the different terms come into being? There should be but one name for a whole. He also seriously considered the question of virtue being a teachable subject. The question he posed was: "If virtue is a science (capable of being learned), then does it follow that vice is ignorance?" If this is true (that vice is ignorance), then it would follow that no man can be blamed for vice since no man can be held liable for wrongs committed in ignorance. This step was further emphasized by the previously stated hypothesis that no man is ever knowingly and willfully bad. These problems are directly discussed in Protagoras, Gorgias, Meno and the Republic. To find the answers Plato called on psychology and we find the first introduction of this discipline in ethics. 51

The first psychology was in a very rudimentary form. It resulted in Plato putting wisdom in a different category than the other virtues. The soul was divided into three parts: the Reason (rulers), Anger (soldiers), and Desire (working class). From this he argued that wisdom, or thought on moral subjects, enters as a guide for all of the other moral virtues. None of the others can exist without it. At the same time, thought or reason is one of the tripartite divisions of the soul, an intuitive faculty, possessed in some degree by all men. As an inherent quality it may be misdirected, it may be obscured, but it cannot be endowed by one man on another. According to Plato, the virtue of wisdom cannot be taught. The Platonic concept of wisdom is similar to our modern I.Q. Present at birth, the quality may be developed and directed or sub-

51 Grant, p. 185.
dued and diverted from the realization of its potential. Since this is the case Plato emphasizes the importance of turning the "eye of the soul" away from earthly vices toward higher purposes and a more noble life. While the child is young his direction of seeking for fulfillment should be turned to the acquisition of the other three virtues.

..."and hence," it is said, "while the other qualities (i.e., Courage, Temperance, and Justice) seem to be akin to the body, being infused by habit and exercise and not originally innate, the virtue of wisdom is a divine essence, and has a power which is everlasting, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable, and is also capable of becoming hurtful and useless."52

A reference is made to the "narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of the clever rogue." This is recognition that a man highly endowed with this "virtue of wisdom" may not treat it as though it is a virtue. Plato points out that a wisdom taken into the service of evil in this fashion is dangerous in direct proportion to the degree of intelligence possessed by the Individual. In the Republic Plato proposes how to avoid this unfortunate situation.

But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from the leaden weights, as I may call them, with which they were born into the world, which hang onto sensual pleasures, such as those of eating or drinking, and drags them down and turns the vision of their souls about the things that are below--if, I say, they had been released from them and turned around to the truth, the very same faculty in these very same persons would have seen the other as keenly as they now see that on which their eye is fixed." In this passage also is indicated the relation of at least one other of the cardinal virtues, namely temperance, to the virtue of wisdom or thought.

52 Grant, pp. 185-186.
"Had sensual indulgence," says Plato, "been checked in many a man when he was young, his innate divine power of thought would have turned around to the idea of Good, instead of fastening itself on Evil."53

The relationship of temperance to wisdom is that it conserves it and is a necessary condition to it. Courage is expanded from steadiness in the face of danger to steadiness in the face of pleasure and temptation. Both temperance and courage play important parts in preventing the disturbance of and misdirection of thought. At the same time that these qualities are necessary to the proper function of thought, they in themselves have no ethical value without thought being behind them. There is no virtue in blind instinct or in worldly and non-moral motives prompting courage or temperance. (Phaedo, p. 68 d.) Centuries later Quintilian writes about the qualities most needed in the earliest associates of the child. He is relating to the Platonic principles of early direction determining the direction the soul will take in later life.

In the Platonic concept, the three virtues of wisdom, courage and temperance are not separate but rather stand together and grow into a whole. This whole we may call virtue. Plato calls it Justice in the Republic where it is seen reigning over all the functions of the soul giving it supreme regularity, good order and sanity.54

Plato's Concept of Ethos in Rhetoric

When this philosophy is applied to rhetoric we have the development of the Platonic ideal rhetorician. When considering rhetoric the question...
that bothered Plato was, "If truth alone is not sufficient to persuade men, what else remains that can be legitimately added?" The answers are to be found through interpretation of Plato's Phaedrus.

Truth plus artful persuasion containing dialectic as its first process will give the serious rhetorician an ethical art. The virtuous rhetorician as envisioned by Plato will have a soul of such movement that its dialectical perception is consonant with that of a divine mind. There is no true rhetoric without dialectic having been used to determine the truthful orientation of the speaker. The true rhetorician is a noble lover of the good who works thorough dialectic and analogical association. The discourse of the noble rhetorician will concern itself with the unrealized future. The discourse of the exaggerator speaks of unreal potentiality. The noble rhetor has the insight to speak of real potentiality or possible actuality. This might also be called a responsible probability as opposed to idle conjecture. Understanding followed by actualization seems to be the role of the universe and the interpretation is the dialectician followed by the rhetorician.55

The kind of rhetoric that is condemned by Plato is that which is uttered without the support of a position adjudicated by reference to the universe of discourse. Rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect man by showing him better versions of himself, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can comprehend and only the soul have affection for.

A summary of Plato's theory for the rhetorician as described in Phaedrus includes these eight concepts:

1. The mind of the speaker should know the truth of what he is going to say.

2. The rhetorician must classify his subject with reference to his definitions as to possibility of debate upon them.

3. He must introduce a principle of order in presenting the topics.

4. He must see unity and plurality in nature so that he can classify particulars under a general head or break up universals into particulars.

5. He must know the nature of the soul.

6. He must speak of the instruments by which the soul is affected.

7. After having classified souls and speeches, he must point out the connection between them, showing why one is persuaded by one kind of argument and another by a different kind.

8. He will think little of the art of writing.

Through the various dialogues of Plato we are familiar with the shortcomings of sophistry. In the Phaedrus the concept of the "noble lover" gave us his ideal rhetorician described above.

Thus when we finally divest rhetoric of all the notions of artifice which have grown up around it, we are left with something very much like Spinoza's "intellectual love of God." This is its essence and the means and origin of its power. It is "intellectual" because, as we have already seen, there is no honest rhetoric without a preceding dialectic. The kind of rhetoric which is justly condemned is utterance in support of a position before that position has been adjudicated with reference to the whole universe of discourse—and of such the world always produces more than enough. It is love because it is something in addition to bare theoretical truth. That element in addition is a desire to bring truth into a kind of existence or to give it an actuality to which theory is indifferent.56

Richard Weaver admits that probably Plato had no intention of giving every meaning to his dialogue that has been imputed to him. He

56 Weaver, p. 25.
does say, however, that it fits nicely and the thought is certainly in line with Platonic reasoning. In this respect we might say that Weaver is to Plato as Plato is to Socrates. Each took the master, studied carefully his approach to rhetoric, then, using the master's own words proceeded on in the pointed direction to a more fully developed concept.

Conclusions

Before leaving this discussion of Plato it would be well to once more look to the pages of Hunt's article on the "Rhetoric of Plato and Aristotle" for an evaluation of the view of rhetoric developed by Plato.

At the conclusion of his earlier attacks...Plato offers an outline of a reconstructed rhetoric. Here, too, he shows his inability to conceive of rhetoric as a tool; the ideal rhetorician sketched in the Phaedrus is as far from the possibilities of mankind as his Republic was from Athens. 57

Aristotle

It remained for Aristotle, as the pupil of Plato, to further refine his ideas and make the practical application for rhetoric. During his years at Plato's Academy Aristocle became increasingly independent in thought and it is postulated that this resulted in his being passed over in the selection of a Scholarch for the Academy on Plato's death. 58 Aristotle left Athens for a time and it was on his return that he established the Lyceum as his own school. Later it would be known as the Peripatetic.

It became Aristotle's purpose to gather and systematize the writings of Plato.

57 Hunt, p. 42.
58 Grant, p. 181, see footnote.
Aristotle, with the greatest gifts for the analytic systematizing of philosophy that have ever been seen, unconsciously applied himself to the required task. He treated the Platonic dialogues as quarries out of which he got the materials wherewith to build up in consolidated form all the departments of thought and science so far as they could be conceived by the ancient Greek. He thus codified Plato, and translated him into the prose of dogmatic theory, at the same time that he carried further and completed many of his results and suggestions. 59

The aim of Plato was that of a Dialectician and Poet. Aristotle's aim was directed at being a man of science. The latter endeavored to collect all that could be known on a subject for the purpose of stating it in precise terminology. Plato had a strong moral earnestness that never lost sight of the importance of everything that might serve to improve or deteriorate the human soul. Aristotle endeavored to sift the truth of everything and express it as he saw it regardless of what the consequences might be.

This discussion of Aristotle will begin with his view of the Virtues and the ethical character of man. In Aristotle there is a clearly defined application of this ethical nature to the province of rhetoric and this application will be the subject of the second concern of this section. Finally, ethos as used in De Rhetorica will be examined keeping these first basic conceptions of Aristotle firmly in mind as being the basis for his application. The final section will be devoted to any conclusions pointed to at this point in the study.

59 Grant, p. 182.
Virtues and the Character of Man—Aristotle's Perspective

In reviewing the thoughts of Socrates and Plato there have been recurrent references to Virtue. Socrates held that "Virtue is Knowledge" or "Wisdom." Plato redefined Virtue as "Justice." Aristotle alters these concepts only slightly—but significantly. Virtue, to Aristotle, is "accompanied by thought" rather than being equated with thought. Aristotle then proceeds to divide thought or moral wisdom from philosophy. Plato requires that virtue is achieved by "flying as far as possible from the evil of the world—to be as much like God as possible." There is a requirement here that every act should take place in absolute consciousness and no distinction is made between physical acts and pure speculation. The Aristotelian concept places virtue in a more practical focus.

The Peripatetic (Aristotelian) account is that a moral consciousness must accompany every act, a sort of wisdom which is the center of all the moral virtues (Eth. VI. xiii. 6), but this kind of consciousness is quite distinct from the philosophic reason, it deals with the contingent and not with the absolute. The doctrine that Temperance preserves Thought (Eth. VI. v. 5), and that Thought without Virtuous habits may degenerate into cunning, is taken from the Republic. 60

Plato, it will be remembered, stated that through the development of courage and temperance in interaction with wisdom we will arrive at virtue in justice as governor of the soul. Aristotle rejects this concept and instead divides virtue into many categories. To more clearly define "virtues" he classifies, categorizes and looks at contraries. These are enumerated in De Rhetorica. 61

60 Grant, p. 194.

61 Aristotle, De Rhetorica (list virtues or give location in Rhetoric.)
The virtuous acts of man are to be first, conscious choices. To be classed as a virtuous act it must be, first, a human act and not merely an act of man. Secondly, the act must be habitual and not an isolated instance.

A human act as distinguishable from an act of man can best be described by illustration. Imagine someone walking through his neighbor's flower bed, stumbling and falling. He knows that in falling he is going to ruin some of the flowers. He did not intend to fall and there is no way he can help himself. In Aristotle's system this amounts to an act of man, not a human act.62

A truly human act proceeds from a rational agent who knows what he does and freely chooses to do it. Man is distinguished from beast by his reason. He knows the end of his actions, knows the means and knows the relationship. "To perform human acts we need knowledge and freedom of choice so that 'it is in our power to do or not to do, and to act in this way or in that, and...(to) know the reason why.'"63 Whenever a man is free to know the consequences of his act and refuses to avail himself of this information, he is considered to be liable for the consequences. Where the person did not realize his ignorance he is, in the Aristotelian system, judged innocent of the consequences.

It is important to note that a choice of alternative actions must be present. Aristotle's summary of his doctrine of choice is given in Ethics, III. iii. 19.

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63 Flynn, p. 116, from Magna Moralia 1189b7.
As when the object of choice is something within our power which after deliberation we desire. Choice will be a deliberate desire of things in our power; for we must first deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our deliberation. 64

Where external forces is used to get the desired action the imputability of the act to the agent is reduced or entirely removed. A man who is forced to give his friend's car to a thief at the point of a gun is not said to have committed a human act. When volition is removed from the act through some motivating force such as fear, the person cannot be said to have committed an imputable act. 65

Another basic tenet in considering the moral worth of a human act is the degree of habitual behavior it represents.

The agent must also be in a certain condition when he does them (acts): in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly, he must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly, his action must proceed from a firm, and unchangeable character. 66

The full meaning of this philosophy, according to Grant, cannot be adequately translated from the Greek to contemporary English. We can explain his meaning, but to get the full concept we have to feel rather than talk or read. A morally good act that is isolated is given little credit in Aristotle's system. Rather, it is an act that comes from the stable, set character of the person who consistently steers himself in that direction. This final condition is compared to the relationship of the flower to the seed or the statue to the rough block of marble. The orator who has

65 Flynn, p. 117.
66 Grant, p. 119, Magna Moralia, 1195a17.
achieved this state has answered his questions about ethics and set his
sights firmly on the truth in topics such as virtue. His actions will
consistently reflect this deep commitment to values.\textsuperscript{67}

Nor does Aristotle leave any room for misconceptions on the cir-
tuous choices his subjects are to make. First of all, we must realize
the one key premise in Aristotle's thinking on ethics is, "Man functions
in society--the political community--as a political animal."\textsuperscript{68} Next,
"Early in the \textit{Ethics} Aristotle asserts that '...the good of man must be
the end of the science of politics.'" (\textit{Ethics I ii 8}) \textquoteleft\textquoteleft This good
relates, of course, to that of the nation or state and equates with
happiness--the end \textit{at which} all actions aim.'" (\textit{Ethics I. vii. 8})\textsuperscript{69}
How does one obtain happiness within the context of the polis? Aristotle
states that:

\begin{quote}
...the Good (happiness) of man is the active
exercise of the soul's faculties in conformity
with excellence or virtue, or if there be
several human excellences or virtues, in con-
formity with the best and most perfect among
them. (\textit{Ethics I. vii. 15}).
\end{quote}

Thus, within the polis, a person's virtuous actions will aim at happiness.

There is certainly opinion expressed here that what is for the good of
the state or society as a whole is the same as the good or happiness of
the individual.

\textsuperscript{67} Grant, pp. 240-243.
\textsuperscript{68} Miller, p. 310.
\textsuperscript{69} Miller, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{70} Miller, p. 311.
Doctrine of the Mean

The individual is still confronted with choices to make among the virtues enumerated by Aristotle. How is he to suit his actions to make the most prudent choices from those alternatives available to him? Here is found Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Aristotle does not in any way diminish the difficulty inherent in choosing the mid-point between two extreme courses of action. There are three guidelines to aid one in finding that mid-point.

To aim at the mean we should use three precautionary rules:

1. Avoid the extreme most opposed to the mean ---take the least of the evils.
2. Notice errors in which we are most prone---steer wide of our own errors. (Our own errors are discovered by observing our own pleasure or pain.)
3. Must be on guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure. (Ethics II. ix 3-6.)

Miller closes his discussion of the ethical views of Aristotle with this observation:

...one may observe that man, the political animal, is to strive to live virtuously in the polis by aiming at the mean, that is, at perfection. If he lives by the mean he commits neither deficiency nor excess; that is, he lives according to moral virtue, and, combining that with experience, he makes prudent decisions. Therefore, prudence is the virtue of deliberation, and the prudent man, after deliberating (calculating), selects courses of action, 'then he consciously designs' them. Such courses of action repeated until well engrained become states or depositions. It is thus that habitual behavior or ethos is indicative of a man's character or eethos.

71 Miller, p. 312.
72 Miller, p. 313.
From this discussion it is evident why the "ethos" as conceived by Aristotle can be the most powerful form of persuasion available.

**Application of Aristotelian Concept of Ethos to Rhetoric**

When Aristotle applies the actions of this ethical person to rhetoric he recognizes three components. First, the object of the act; second, the intent of the agent; third, the circumstances. 73

First, the moral object of a human act is the quality that gives it a name or puts it in a class such as murder, theft, or charity donations. The object is that in which the act naturally culminates or terminates. It is a goal that man's freedom of choice gives him the opportunity to plan for himself.

When we think of the agent's intent, we are talking of his purpose, aim or motive in taking some action. Here is the classical concept that sees men always acting with good intent. Even when the choice is evil, men are acting from what they consider a good intent, "For mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good." 74 Aristotle requires an evil intent as an essential condition for a morally evil act. It makes no difference whether this intent is directly tied to the object of the act or more removed, as an ulterior motive. If the purpose is evil, the entire act is morally evil. Conversely, to have an act be morally good it is essential that there be a morally good motive for "all virtue implies deliberate choice...(that) makes a man choose everything for the sake of some end...which is the noble." 75

73 Flynn, p. 117.
74 Flynn, p. 120 (Aristotle's *Politicca*, 1252a2.)
75 Flynn, p. 121 (Ethica Eudemia, 1230a27-29).
In discussing what are to be considered virtuous intents, we have already explored the "doctrine of the mean." There is another concept in Aristotle that is particularly interesting in light of later observations of a correlative nature made by others.

...some (actions or passions) have names that already imply badness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions, adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things impy by their names that they are themselves bad...Nor does goodness or badness...depend on committing adultery with the right woman at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong...however they are done they are wrong.\(^{76}\)

Here Aristotle makes it clear that he repudiates the notion that the end can justify the means. Under no circumstances will the ethical person employ anything less than ethical means to reach his object.

It is not according to man's nature as a free deliberate agent to do evil for the sake of good. We have seen, moreover, that certain objects are evil in themselves, such as murder, theft and adultery. These and others cannot be whitewashed by good intentions, "because however they are done they are wrong." (Nichomachean Ethics 1107\(^{a}\)24) Since laws bind by nature or by precept (the former of which man will know instinctively: for there is a natural and universal notion of right and wrong; (De Rhetorica 1373\(^{b}\)6.) the latter we will learn from social contact) he should know right from wrong. Besides, a just man does just, noble and temperate deeds (Nichomachean Ethics, 1105\(^{b}\)5-12) so that human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. (Nichomachean Ethics, 1098\(^{a}\)15)\(^{77}\)

The question of circumstances involves all of the other accidental determinants accompanying a human act without which an act would

\(^{76}\)Flynn, p. 119 (Nichomachean Ethics, 1107\(^{a}\)10-25).

\(^{77}\)Flynn, p. 122.
not exist but which in some ways add certain morality other than that derived from the object and the intent. The circumstances included here are: who? what? where? why? when? and how? If John Brown were to commit a felony as a private citizen it would not be as bad as if he were to commit the same felony while serving as a Senator in the United States Congress. Again, Richard Nixon committing his Watergate indiscretions had the criminality of his actions intensified by the fact that he was the President of the United States at the time of the incident.

To summarize briefly, then, Aristotle took his ethical person who had developed a habitually virtuous character through repeated deliberate choice of the moderate course of action, and placed him in a position of interaction with his environment. Here he is held responsible for the object of his actions, his intent and the means he employs to attain his ends. Independent circumstances surrounding the event alone could alter the intensity of the moral imputations given to the act.

**Ethos as Viewed in De Rhetorica**

The first consideration here is to fix the degree of importance assigned to ethos in *De Rhetorica*. Next, the three aspects of ethos in the speaker will be analyzed and this will be followed with recommendations found in *De Rhetorica* for acquiring these attributes in the eyes of the audience.

The high character of the speaker is of paramount importance in subjects that do not allow absolute certainty in their resolution. When a decision could go either way the high moral character of the speaker
can in itself influence the audience to accept his position over his opponent's. The other modes of proof, pathos and logos, are also referred to in the following passage:

The proofs provided through the instrumentality of the speech are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral character of the speaker, or in the production of a certain disposition in the audience or in the speech itself by means of real or apparent demonstration. The instrument of proof is the moral character, when the delivery of the speech is such as to produce an impression of the speaker's credibility; for we yield a more complete and ready credence to persons of high character not only ordinarily and in a general way, but in such matters as do not admit of absolute certainty but necessarily leave room for difference of opinion, without any qualification whatsoever.\(^7^8\)

Unlike many others, Aristotle specifies that the impression of the ethos of the speaker be derived totally from the speech content itself, and not from preconceived ideas of character the audience may have about the speaker. Certainly this is an ideal that can seldom be attained. The speaker is identified in some way in the minds of the listeners and this identification is certain to affect their judgement of him and his message. However, when we remember Aristotle's views on virtue and morality, and apply them to the rhetorical scene, the moral rhetorician is going to consistently display that quality through consistently moral choices of topics, arguments, goals and maxims. These are all part of the speech and if not evident would indicate a lack of nobility in the speaker. When this noble nature is consistently manifested throughout the speech we have a highly effective mode of proof.

(It is requisite, however, that this result should itself be attained by means of the speech and not of any antecedent concept of the speaker's character.) For so far from not following the example of some authors of rhetorical handbooks, who in their art regard the high character of the speaker as not being itself in any sense contributory to his persuasiveness, we may practically lay it down as a general rule that there is no proof so effective as that of the character.79

There can be no doubt about the importance of ethos in speech from Aristotle's point of view. The question next arises of just how is this moral character to be manifested in the speech body.

He holds that there are three sources of personal credibility in orators: "or in other words there are three things, apart from demonstrative proofs, which inspire belief, viz., sagacity, high character and good will."80

To demonstrate what is involved in establishment of a high moral character and sagacity in the eyes of the audience, the discussion turns to the various virtues. As we have pointed out, Aristotle defines eighteen distinct virtues and proposes his doctrine of the mean. Since this is a practical application of the theory, reference is made to the delight felt by the audience when the speaker cites a particular quality everyone agrees is to be most desired and is assuredly a sign of good and high character. This can be done through the use of maxims.

A maxim is a declaration, not however relating to particulars, as ..., e.g., to the character of Iphicrates, but to universals; nor yet again to all universals indiscriminately, as, e.g.,

79 Aristotle, p. 12.

that straight is the opposite of crooked, but to all such as are the objects of human action and are to be chosen or eschewed in that regard.\textsuperscript{81}

Aristotle gives several examples of the pleasure given an audience when the speaker chooses a maxim involving something with which they are all familiar. To strengthen his ethical appeal these maxims will assume a moral tone.

It is proper, therefore, to conjecture what are the manner and character of their prepossessions, and, having done so, to put forward a general statement in regard to them. This is one advantage of the use of maxims, but there is another which is more important, as they impart an ethical character to our speeches. A speech is ethical if its moral purpose is apparent. But this is the invariable effect of maxims; for a speaker who gives utterance to a maxim makes a statement in general terms about the subject of his moral predilection, and hence, if the maxims are virtuous, they give the appearance of a virtuous character to the speaker.\textsuperscript{82}

The older or more mature speaker is more effective in his use of maxims. With age comes prudence and prudence is needed in making judicious determination of the mean through the use of the three precautionary rules cited earlier in the chapter.

The prudent man will avoid excess and deficiency by habitually taking the foregoing precautions. ...Aristotle does not consider prudence a quality of the young. Therefore, a young person has difficulty in the area of ethical proof with an older audience. The greater the age difference, the greater the difficulty.\textsuperscript{83}

\textsuperscript{81}Aristotle, p. 184.

\textsuperscript{82}Aristotle, pp. 180-190.

\textsuperscript{83}Miller, p. 312.
There are also indications that the use of maxims is simply unbecoming for a younger person, even without the foregoing considerations.

The use of maxims is suitable to elderly men, and in regard to subjects with which one is conversant; for sententiousness, like story-telling, is unbecoming in a younger man; while in regard to subjects with which one is not conversant, it is stupid and shows want of culture. It is token enough of this that rustics are the greatest coiners of maxims, and the readiest to set forth their views.84

The discussion of methods used in rhetoric to convey the feeling of good will to the audience is extensive, implicit, and remarkably modern in concept. Kenneth Burke's identification, the Heider balance theory and others seem to be echoes of these early descriptions.

They are friends, then, for whom the same things are good and evil, and who are friends and enemies of the same people; for they must need have the same wishes; and so, one who wishes for another just what he wishes for himself, appears to be that person's friend. Men like, too, those who have done good to themselves, or to those for whom they care;—whether such benefits were great, or zealously done, or done at such and such moment, and for the recipient's sake.85

The qualities of friendship are then enumerated in great detail. Aristotle has analyzed the human conception of what is pleasant in another person in a most thought-provoking manner. The speaker wherever possible should employ these methods to assure his listeners that he has their best interests at heart. All the indications of sagacity and character are useless if the recipients are left in doubt about the attitude of the speaker toward their best interests. The speaker should in no way pose himself or his actions as a threat to the listener's well-being. Rather


85Aristotle, Jebb trans., II, iv, l(1381a).
he should identify himself with their interests and desires and show how their goals naturally coincide with each other. 86

Conclusion

This section concerning Aristotle has traced his ethical orientation in the habitually moral character of the individual which follows the doctrine of the mean: in exhibiting his virtuous behavior. This person will have a moral goal and means of obtaining that goal. If either of these is not strictly virtuous in nature the act cannot be called morally and ethically demanding of approval. When these concepts are applied to rhetoric, Aristotle is practical in realizing the effectiveness of the speaker is going to be limited or enhanced by audience perception of him as an ethical person. The proper use of maxims and choice of topics should demonstrate intelligence and character, but without good will these attributes will be lost in the rhetorical situation. To establish this good will a bond of friendship is described as developing between the speaker and the audience. Although practical attention is given to the means of being perceived as an ethical person, in Aristotle we cannot separate the philosophical orientation of the ethical person from the ethical rhetorician. The rhetorician has special techniques to project his true and good character to the audience. Certainly there is nothing in Aristotle's writings to suggest that he seriously entertained any thought of this being a false representation. His insistence on ethos being established through the body of the speech alone is evidence of his basic assumption that truly ethical behavior, in the Aristotelian

86 Aristotle, Jebb trans., II iv, 1(1381a)-32(1382a).
sense, cannot be faked. A statement was made earlier in this study that Aristotle recognized rhetoric was amoral. If this be true, certainly the statement could not be carried over into his concept of the practice of rhetoric or to the qualities of the rhetorician.

Isocrates

Isocrates founded his school of rhetorical training ten to twenty years after Plato made his famous attacks on the sophists in _Protagoras_ and _Gorgias_. Aristotle came even later and is not directly referred to in Isocrates' writings. Isocrates is discussed here to give the alternate rhetorical theories of ethos developed in opposition to the Platonic system. Isocrates criticized his former master, Gorgias, in the area of ethics quite as severely as he did Plato. This coupled with definite Socratic influences place Isocrates in a definite niche of his own in rhetorical theory. There are some indications that Isocrates had some association with Socrates and was highly regarded by him. 87

This discussion will begin with Isocrates' concept of the true meaning of philosophy. This will be followed with a brief look at his attitude toward the lesser socratics and the members of the Platonic school. After thus showing his rationale for choosing what has been called "the middle course," the major concepts of Isocrates philosophy will be discussed. Two primary concepts can be easily identified here. The first is philosophy will provide a goal and that goal will be virtuous and noble. Secondly, philosophy is the salvation of the state and most primarily of the Athenian state.

Isocrates developed a philosophy that was above all practical and put it to work in his school. To assess his concept of ethos it is necessary to look at his concept of education. Talent or natural endowment, its value relative to education, and the value of education to the individual will be explained from Isocrates' point of view. Finally, Isocrates has some unique observations to make on audience evaluation and how best to adapt to the orientation of the masses of the people.

The Philosophy of Isocrates

In defining Isocrates' concept of philosophy, we should first consider the label given him by the moderns and then look at his own conception of the meaning of the word. Jaeger mentioned that Isocrates is the father of "humanistic culture."

Historically, it is perfectly correct to describe him (in the phrase used on the title-page of several modern books) as the father of "humanistic culture"—inasmuch as the sophists really cannot claim that title, and from our own pedagogic methods and ideals a direct line runs back to him, as it does to Quintilian and Plutarch.88

Isocrates, in his conception of the meaning of terms, attached different values to philosophy and sophism than those with which we are familiar.

...but he preferred to apply the title "sophist" only to theorists, whatever their special interests might be. He used it, among others, for Socrates and his pupils, who had done so much to discredit the name. His own ideal he called "philosophy." Thus, he completely inverted the meanings given by Plato to the two words.89

88 Jaeger, p. 84.
89 Jaeger, p. 88.
Norlin has a slightly different interpretation of the distinction made by Isocrates in the meanings of the two terms.

In the "Antidosis," especially, Isocrates terms his culture a "philosophy" and himself a "philosopher." He does not disclaim the title "sophist," but seems to prefer the other as more descriptive of his work. The appropriation of this term has been imputed to him for arrogance, as if he wished to set himself up as a Plato or Aristotle. However, the word has at this time no definite association with speculative or abstract thought, signifying only a lover of wisdom or a seeker after the cultivated life, and is in fact more general and modest than the honorable title of sophist which the sham pretenders who called themselves sophists were only just beginning to make invidious. Indeed, the use of this term by Isocrates may be nothing more than a protest against the preposterous claims made by certain sophists for the omnipotence of their instruction.90

During our analysis of the works of Gorgias, some of the sentiments of Isocrates were cited as instances of current opinion regarding philosophies and the practice of false dialectic among the sophistic teachers.

Here his criticism is centered upon two classes of sophists, the Eristics, who devoted themselves to theorizing in the field of ethics, and the sophists of the rhetorical school, who taught oratory as an instrument of practical success. Of these latter he singles out, finally, for special rebuke the authors of "the so-called arts (of oratory).

Both classes are called to account because of their impossible pretensions; the former for professing to teach an exact science of happy and successful living and then indulging in captious logomachies which have no relation to life; the latter for professing to teach the science or art of oratory as if it could be acquired by anyone by rote, regardless of

native ability or practical experience, as one learns the letters of the alphabet. Furthermore, the authors of the "arts" might have devoted themselves to a worthy oratory whose end is justice, whereas in fact, they emphasized only forensic skill, whose object is to defeat justice.\textsuperscript{91}

Isocrates' well-known translator, George Norlin, never specifically includes the teachings of Plato in those so vigorously attacked by Isocrates. Werner Jaeger, on the other hand, sees much in the writings of Isocrates indicating the strong disapproval he entertained for the type of abstract reasoning being developed in the Platonic school. There is also some indication that Isocrates, along with many of his contemporaries, found little to distinguish the "dialectic" of Plato from the "eristic" of the other sophists. Both were completely repugnant to Isocrates—perhaps useful as a gymnastic exercise for the mind, but nothing more.

Now is it possible, he asks, to put any trust in their yearnings for truth, when they themselves arouse so many false hopes? Isocrates names no names, but every word of his polemic is aimed straight at Socrates, whom here and elsewhere he contemptuously calls disputers. In Protagoras and Gorgias Plato had presented dialectic as an art far superior to the long winded orations of rhetoricians. His opponent makes short work of dialectic: he couples it with eristic—namely, argument for argument's sake....No wonder then that Isocrates does not see dialectic in the same favorable light as the socratics, who thought it was a perfect panacea for all spiritual ills. The infallible knowledge of values which they promise as a result of their teaching must appear to ordinary reasonable people to be something too great for mankind to attain. ("Against the Sophists," 2).\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{91} Norlin, trans., into., "Against the Sophists," pp. 160-161.

\textsuperscript{92} Jaeger, p. 96.
Jaeger makes a case for the subject of much of the attack against his contemporaries being aimed at the Socratics and their most notable exponent, Plato. He points to the fact that Isocrates has gathered together all the features that made Platonism repulsive to ordinary common sense. The method of controversy by question-answer, the almost mythical importance attached to "knowledge of true values" as a special organ of reason, the intellectualism that holds that knowledge is the cure for everything, and the supernatural enthusiasm that imparts "blessedness" to the philosopher. 93

Plato and the Socratics are among the foremost of the opponents whom Isocrates attacks, and since he attacks them with special violence and completeness, it is clear that he fully understands the danger that threatens his ideal from their teaching. His invective is entirely realistic. He never makes it a theoretical refutation of his opponent's position, for he knows that if he did he would lose his case. The terrain he chooses is that of ordinary common sense. He appeals to the instincts of the man in the street—who, without comprehending the philosopher's technical secrets, sees that those who would lead their followers to wisdom and happiness have nothing themselves and get nothing from their students. 94

According to Jaeger's interpretation, the second type attacked by Isocrates includes those who teach their craft without any sense of moral responsibility. A third group included those who taught nothing but forensic oratory through patterns of speech making and abstract forms, learned by rote to be called into play when needed. Because of the subjects used the topics could only be trifling and the techniques useless.

93 Jaeger, p. 86.

94 Jaeger, p. 99.
In finding his own solution to the problem, Isocrates attempts to take the middle road. Somewhere between the completely amoral quibbling of the Eristic discourse and the abstract realm of Plato's "Ideas," he forged a rhetoric pointed toward a moral, noble and completely practical goal.

**Primary Philosophical Principles of Isocrates**

It has already been mentioned that Isocrates was influenced by the Socratic movement for moral reform of rhetoric. Jaeger points out that he does not reject the doctrine of Ideas. "In fact, his writings show that he largely adopted that doctrine." (Plato's). 95 Jaeger goes on to point out that Isocrates felt rhetoric was the answer to bringing the abstract idealism of Plato into the real world. The goals to be found in philosophy were those that would lead to a successful life style in the society or polis of Athens. The nature of the person who has achieved the heights of the Isocratean philosophy of practical ethics is described in this passage:

*First, those who manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day;...next, those who are decent and honorable in their intercourse with all with whom they associate; furthermore, those who hold their pleasures always under control and are not unduly overcome by misfortune;...fourthly, and most important of all, those who are not spoiled by successes and do not desert their true selves and become arrogant...Those which have a character which is in accord, not with one of these things, but with all of them--these I contend, are wise and complete men, possessed of all the virtues.* 96

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95 Jaeger, p. 102.

In Isocrates' view the wise man would be a virtuous man. Just as the signs of virtue were completely practical, so were the reasons for assuming such traits.

...nothing in the world can contribute so much to material gain, to good repute, to right action, in a word, to happiness, as virtue and the qualities of virtue. For it is by the good qualities that we have in our souls that we acquire also the other advantages of which we stand in need.\(^{97}\)

After pointing to the fact that the good qualities of our souls are responsible for fulfilling our other needs, Isocrates continues in the same vein—expressing wonder that anyone should seriously believe there could be any other motive for virtuous actions than self-interest.

But I marvel if anyone thinks that those who practice piety and justice remain constant and steadfast in these virtues because they expect to be worse off than the wicked and not because they consider that both among gods and among men they will have the advantage over others. I, for my part, am persuaded that they and they alone gain advantage in the true sense while the others gain advantage only in the baser sense of that term. For I observe that those who prefer the way of injustice, thinking it the greatest good fortune to seize something that belongs to others, are in like case with animals which are lured by a bait, at the first deriving pleasure from what they seize, but the moment after finding themselves in desperate straits while those who live a life of piety and justice pass their days in security for the present and have sweeter hopes for all eternity.\(^{98}\)

A primary concern of Isocrates was his theory that philosophy was the salvation of the state. He realized the futility of the endless wars among the Greek City States and that their only defense from ultimate


defeat by foreign barbarians lay in unity. As Gorgias had done before him, he called for a cessation of inner hostilities and common purpose for all Greek States—the Hellenes—in their efforts to remain free. In this cause Isocrates saw a high moral purpose and goal for his education in discourse. The topics would be lofty, the prose in a style closer to poetry than to the practice of the forensic orator, and the benefits would go to Athens and to the newly trained statesmen of his school who were expounding these principles.

But I urge and exhort those who are younger and more vigorous than I to speak and write the kinds of discourses by which they will turn the greatest states—those who have been wont to oppress the rest—into the paths of virtue and justice, since when the affairs of Hellas are in a happy and prosperous condition, it follows that the state of learning and letters is greatly improved. 99

Jaeger points to the fact that in Isocrates the teachings of rhetoric became naturalized—part of the Athenian life style. 100 The dialogues of Plato and the attitude of the times gave respect to the great learning the sophists had in their own fields. However, they were foreigners to Athens, to the problems of Athens and to the easy refinement of the Athenian life style. Isocrates, the Athenian sophist, changed this and made himself and his art typically local in nature. "Isocrates' rhetorical teaching emerged as part of the great postwar educational movement of Athens, into which all the efforts of his day to reform and rejuvenate the Athenian state were inevitably destined to flow." 101

99 Isocrates, "On the Peace," 145, p. 97. (A footnote by Norlin to the above states, "The state of affairs and the state of learning are not disassociated in his mind; philosophy is the salvation of the state.)

100 Jaeger, p. 89.

101 Jaeger, p. 90.
The common national purpose needed to save Greece was equated with true statesmanship that saw the necessity of eradicating corruption and the cause of corruption—"the poisonous mutual hatreds of the separate states and parties." 102

But Isocrates did not, like the Platonic Socrates, believe that the sorely needed reformation could be achieved by the creation of a new moral world, a state as it were within each man's soul. He held that the "nation," the idea of Greece, was the point round which the new elements in the spiritual renaissance were to crystalize. 103

Educational Theories of Isocrates

These philosophical goals were to be reached through Isocrates' system of education incorporated into his school. We have only a broad sketch of his ideas on education, but some fundamental ideas do stand out. Elementary education had no serious fault as it stood. The study of eristic disputations served as good gymnastic exercises for the mind if not carried too far. Higher education should be devoted to more serious studies.

What, then, is the nature of higher education? It consists, says Isocrates, in the cultivation of the art of discourse...discourse is both the outward and inward thought; it is not merely the form of expression, but reason, feeling and imagination as well; it is that by which we persuade others and by which we persuade ourselves; it is that by which we direct public affairs and by which we set our own house in order; it is, in fine, that endowment of our human nature which raises us above mere animality and enables us to live the civilized life. 104

102 Jaeger, p. 91.
103 Jaeger, p. 92.
104 Norlin, trans., Isocrates, I, intro, p. xxiii.
Isocrates becomes quite eloquent in his evaluation of the importance of discourse to the human estate. Both outward and inward speech are necessary for the establishment and the maintenance of civilized life. It is necessary for the education of the ignorant, to persuade people on the best course of action and to debate subjects in our own minds.

...for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul...And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts, speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom. 105

Just how education in his school is to carry discourse in a direction to better meet these goals is discussed in the introduction by Norlin. Isocrates complains that rhetoric has been too limited in its scope.

Largely confined to the courtroom, there has been no consideration given to great causes and to large ideas.

He himself chose, he says, to write discourses which were Hellenic in their breadth, dealing with the relation of states, and appropriate to be spoken at the pan-Hellenic assemblies; akin more to the literature that is composed in rhythm and set to music than to forensic oratory...And it is oratory on this high plane, distinguished by breadth and view and nobleness of tone, by literary finish and charm, and by permanence of interest and value, which he proposes to cultivate in his students. They are to be led by their desire for praise and honor not to support causes which are unjust or petty, but those which are great and honorable, devoted to the general good and welfare of mankind. 106


106 Norlin, trans., Isocrates, I. intro., p. xxiv.
Isocrates in no way claims for his education the power to endow every man who comes to him with the powers to speak and think as described. Nor does he claim that through his education the correct answers will come to mind in every situation.

For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with studies for which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight. 107

Of the three attributes contributing to the success of a rhetorician, native ability, practice and education, Isocrates places ability first and education last. He admits that there is no education that can make a depraved nature noble, just as there is no education that can completely compensate for a complete lack of talent in the pupil.

He himself, at any rate, admits that formal training plays a minor part in the making of a successful man; first and most important is native ability; next is practice and experience, and last is education; and no education amounts to anything which does not involve hard work on the part of the student himself. 108

For those who go through the rigors of this hard work but do not possess the talent to be highly successful in discourse, there are still rewards. The "effort they make to write and speak on such themes will tend to liberate their minds from mean and selfish interests and so to enable their moral natures. 109

107 Norlin, intro., I, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
108 Norlin, p. xxvii.
109 Norlin, p. vviv.
Isocrates prides himself more upon the sound moral influence of his work and teaching than upon any other thing. The primary object of his instruction is right conduct in the man and in the citizen. Indeed, there are times when he seems to think of his influence expressing itself more worthily in action than in speech. He says in the "Panathenæicus" that he took greater pleasure in those of his students who were respected for the character of their lives and deeds than in those who were reputed to be able speakers.

Isocrates on Audience Analysis

Isocrates could never be labelled an idealist when it came to his assessment of the true natures of men. He did not share the Platonic ideal that no man would knowingly do a wrong act. He accepts the fact that few men will seek to do right even when given the opportunity to know right from wrong.

...they choose for their associates those who share in, and not those who dissuade them from their faults.

...people prefer to occupy themselves with each other's follies rather than with the admonitions of their teachers...if we are willing to survey human nature as a whole, we shall find that the majority of men do not take pleasure in the food that is most wholesome, nor in the pursuits that are the most honorable, nor in the actions that are the noblest, nor in the creatures that are the most useful, but that they have tastes that are in every way contrary to their best interests, while they view those who have some regard for their duty as men of austere and laborious lives.

When giving advice on the treatment of an audience composed of such beings, Isocrates is realistic in pointing out it does no good to tell them what is for their best interests—for they will not listen. He admits that all men

110 Norlin, p. xxv.

are not so difficult to approach as the ones described, but realistically we must accept the fact that this is the estate of many audiences.

This much, however, is clear, that those who aim to write anything in verse or prose which will make a popular appeal should seek out, not in the most profitable discourses, but those which most abound in fictions; for the ear delights in these just as the eye delights in games and contests.... With such models, then, before us, it is evident that those who desire to command the attention of their hearers must abstain from admonitions and advice, and must say the kinds of things which they see are most pleasing to the crowd. 112

Conclusion

Looking at the influence of these men of ancient Greece from a distance of twenty-five hundred years, there is a tendency to distort their relative importance during their lifetimes. It was the influence of Protagoras, Gorgias and Isocrates that most molded the rhetoric of the Greeks. Socrates and Plato were not highly thought of by their contemporaries. It has been postulated that Aristotle's Rhetoric was written as the outcome of a feud with Isocrates—who was already well established as a teacher of rhetoric.

The story says that during his first residence in Athens (347-367 B.C.) Aristotle sneered at the ideas of Isocrates and the method of their dissemination in bundles of speeches hawked by the booksellers. 113

Certain it is that there must have been some rivalry between the two giants of Greek rhetoric. Norlin points out that in spite of the fact that Isocrates charged a very large fee, he had more students than all of the other sophists put together.


Isocrates, says Dionysius, was the most illustrious teacher of his time and made his school the "image of Athens." The ablest young men of Athens and of Hellas came to study under him, and went out from his tutelege to become leaders in their various fields--oratory, history, and statesmanship.  

Plato's efforts to put rhetoric on a higher visionary plane required the services of an Aristotle to put into effect. While during their lifetimes Isocrates commanded the greater following, there can be no doubt but what the movement toward a morally responsible rhetoric resulted in greater emphasis on this element than would have otherwise occurred.

The course (Aristotle's) was a challenge to the professional teachers of speech; more particularly it was a gauntlet thrown down before the celebrated leader of the Athenian school, Isocrates, who had made the art of rhetoric both more elastic and more elaborate, and in whose eyes rhetorical education was synonymous with liberal education and at the same time a passport to a splendid political career. ...Aristotle's Rhetoric...breathes the same contempt for the fashionable--and presumably often successful devices as Plato's own polemic against rhetoric as an art of flattery or as the "artificer of persuasion" at all costs.  

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114 Norlin, intro., I, xxix.  
CHAPTER III

THE ROMANS

This chapter will show the developments and adaptations of concepts of ethos in rhetoric made by the Romans. Generally, the Romans believed in man's capability and method for discerning right and wrong, good and evil. If these concepts are rooted entirely in the sensations of each person, then the rhetorician is perfectly free to choose his topics, his arguments, his position on an issue, in the light of the particular situation or audience confronting him. He is free to adapt in any way he feels desirable to the "needs of the moment." If, on the other hand, the theorist has accepted the existence of certain unalterable "Ideas" of right and wrong, of moral constructs of society that are the same for all men for all time, then the orator is obligated to suit his discourse to these concepts. The allowable adaptations for audience acceptance of these ideas is problematical and certainly one of high interest to the speaker. Also, as these theories of man's perception of and relation to his society change and adapt themselves to the different cultures under consideration in this paper, recurrence, alteration or abandonment of early theories and their replacements with new can be identified. One of the primary questions to be answered by this paper is concerned with this philosophical approach to the concept of ethos. Detailed explanations are the only adequate means to answer this question. Anything less would result in incomplete and inconclusive answers. In short, it would defeat the purpose of the paper.
Keeping this in mind, before considering the writings found in the *Ad Herrenium*, the *De Oratore* of Cicero and the *Institutio De Oratoria* of Quintilian, the first consideration of this chapter will be to trace the development of two opposing schools of philosophical thought as they developed between the Fifth Century, B.C. and the First Century of the Christian Era. Most simply identified as the Stoics and the Skeptics, these two schools of thought influenced the thinking of the Roman rhetoricians in the fields of ethics in rhetoric and the ethos of the speaker.

The *Ad Herrenium*, author unknown, is the first Roman rhetorical work with which we are acquainted. Because of its structured form it has traditionally been associated with the Stoic School. The *Ad Herrenium* gives precise and, up to this time, unique instructions for projection of ethos under varying circumstances.

Becoming disillusioned after the death of Caesar failed to improve the political climate of Rome, Cicero withdrew for a time and devoted himself to the development of political and rhetorical theory. He used current schools of thought along with what he could learn of Isocrates. *De Oratore* gives detailed and practical advice for establishment of ethos for the rhetorician.

The last Roman to be included in this study is Quintilian. The discussion will consider the "good man speaking well" concept, the type of education proposed and the ways in which the "good man" projected his ethos or made it felt by the audience.

This will conclude the classical portion of the study. At this point, the questions asked about our concepts of ethos in rhetoric in the classical sources have been answered. These questions are:
1. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos found in classical rhetoric?

2. What concepts of ethos were set forth by classical rhetoricians?

3. What similarities and differences existed between classical value systems and classical concepts of ethos?

Page references will be given for each concept that is cited in this comparison study. These are found in reference tables included in Chapter VI.

Philosophies of Early Rome

The Greek Academy altered over the years with early philosophies changing, blending and losing the distinct differentiations of their earlier form. With these changes came the development of the Stoic and Skeptic schools of thought on perception.

The Stoic epistemology as developed by Zeno described four degrees of knowledge. This ascending order of validity was used as the basis for the Stoic standard of truth. Beginning with impression, it proceeded to assent, comprehension and finally, science. Epictetus states that, "We must remember clearly that man measures his every action by his impressions."

These impressions come to us in four ways:

...either things are and seem so to us; or they are not and seem not to be; or they are and seem not; or they are not and yet seem to be.

The further development of Stoic thought embodies the ideal of man's perception of the truth. A bit of Stoic writing by Aulus Gillius, a Latin grammarian, in Nostes Atticae reads:

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2Meador, p. 342.
Impressions by which man's mind is struck are at first sight of anything that reaches his intellect, and not under his will or control, but thrust themselves on the recognition of men by a certain force of their own; but the assents by which these impressions are recognized are voluntary and depend on man's control.

Meador explains that if the soul correctly accepts or recognizes the impulse the external object has been perceived. When this occurs it is a "cataleptic phantasm" involving immediate certain grasping of the external object after the sense experience. This is opposed to the Epicurean "grasping beforehand."

The soul must assent to an image which is faithful to the object it represents if "cataleptic phantasm" is to be absolute and moral progress is to take place. The mind, passive in the process, receives impressions of external objects. Hence, if it immediately grasps the true nature of the external world, an absolute correlation exists between perception and reality. By this means the gulf between the object in thought and the object in nature is bridged and their coexistensiveness is asserted. The adherence of this absolute correlation results in science.

Meador illustrates the relationship of the different levels of knowledge with different postures of the hand. With the fingers stretched out and the palm upward there is perception. Slightly closed fingers represent assent and the closed fist is comprehension.

There is high tension in assent. He who possesses the "cataleptic phantasm" truly comprehends in this sense. While all men share perceptive abilities, only the truly wise man--the one who possesses this insight--could know the truth with real assurance.

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3 Meador, p. 342.
4 Meador, p. 343.
According to the Stoics, this epistemological position, when combined with Stoic ethics of acquiescence, is able to produce the virtuous man—one free from emotions.\(^5\)

In his refutation of the Stoic position, Arcesilaus of the Academy agrees sense perception may be the source for human judgement. However, he firmly denies that such perception could yield "knowledge" and he introduces the formula of suspension of judgement into the Academy.

...subjective limitations prevent reliable recept-ability of an external object. He argues: The Stoic doctrine of immediate perception is inconsistent. There is no perception that has in itself the power to recognize truth, and could not possibly be deceived. Assent to an idea as true is an act of judgement, and like all judgements cannot rise above opinion. There can be no experience that bears the absolute impress of truth. An unerring criterion must not rest only upon an idea but upon a judgement, and a judgement cannot be a criterion of truth, for one has no criterion of judgement to prove that it cannot err. Arcesilaus further asserts that it is impossible to distinguish true perceptions from false perceptions.\(^6\)

The culmination of Academic Skepticism is seen in the writings of Carneades. He used four arguments against the Stoics. The first was that there are false perceptions. Secondly, these do not give us absolute knowledge. Thirdly, there is no difference between a false and true perception which we can detect. Finally, there is no true perception to which the false one may be opposed which differs in character.

Carneades maintains that no criterion of truth is possible through the reasoning powers, because all the material used by reason comes from experience through sense perception. Reason does not

\(^5\) Meador, p. 343.

\(^6\) Meador, p. 343.
begin with anything that is immediately certain; therefore, every proof presupposes other proofs for the validity of its premises, which brings about a regressus in infinitum, and leads to no definite result. 7

Even Carneades, however, agrees that there are different degrees of probability. The first degree is the "probable." This is the realm of the least degree of probability and belongs to a single idea, one that stands alone. The next level is the "probable and undisputed." These are ideas that can be united with other ideas without contradiction. The third level of probability is labelled the "probable, undisputed and tested." As the highest system that can be reached it is comprised of a whole system of connected ideas, all agreeing logically with each other. These observations are found in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* by Sextus Empiricus, translated by Meador, on pages 227 to 229.

In interpretation level one is adequate for everyday life. This level cannot be said to stand for knowledge. Association used to increase probability is important in development of understanding of relationships to the material world.

Carneades may be the first to realize the importance of the association of ideas in forming degrees of probability in perception. It is not in resemblance of sensations to objects one can find a criterion of truth, as it is impossible to verify it; neither is it in the power of the sensation of the senses, for that cannot be measured. But one can consider the combination and order of the sensations and produce the perception. Perception includes a family of related ideas. In the ordinary circumstances of life, it is impossible to take all the precautions and one is content with the first two degrees of probability. 8

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7Meador, p. 344.
8Meador, p. 345.
When the actual content of appeals to the probable is examined there is found the element, always represented, of what is going to afford light for practice. In this realm intellectual illumination is not represented as speculative curiosity, but as practical application to everyday affairs.

AD HERRENIUM

As the earliest known representative Roman writing on rhetoric, the Ad Herrenium has long held an honored position in rhetorical theory. The author is unknown to us and any theories about his motivating philosophy can be only theories. Ray Nadeau, the translator of the Ad Herrenium into English, has pointed to the organization of the work as distinctive from all other known contemporary writings of the period.

The Ad Herrenium represented Stoic flair for detail and classification, and as such, it was distinguished from other contemporary schools of rhetorical thought: the Attic ideal of Calvus, Calidius and Brutus, the Asianism of Hortensius, and the eclectic Rhodian of Cicero.9

The Ad Herrenium is also unique among its contemporaries in its use of Roman illustrations, the clarity of its approach and the method of the Greek rhetoricians.

The method of the Ad Herrenium is that of the Greek rhetorician and Hermagoras, but many illustrations from Roman history and oratory and the clarity of its approach give it a well deserved reputation for originality.10

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10Nadeau, pp. 57-58.
Since the identity of the author is unknown the consideration of this work will have to confine itself to the written pages themselves. Here we find a few general admonitions concerning the general practice of rhetoric. The subject of the exordium is treated at length and some suggestions are given for the winning of audience approval during the narration portion of the speech.

Concepts of Ethos in Ad Herrenium

The author of our study in rhetoric emphasizes, as had Isocrates before him, the importance of continuous practice in speech. Theory had to always be adapted to practical application. The first portion of the book also dealt with the educational qualifications of the orator as well as his nobility of character.

The duty of the orator is to be able to speak on all questions of civil order which are governed by customs or laws, and to conduct himself so as to obtain the agreement of the audience insofar as possible.\footnote{Nadeau, p. 59.}

With this efficient dispatch of these two questions, the author proceeds with the methods to be used in winning the favor of the audience for the speaker and for the speaker's case. Here the methods seem to overlap. To our writer it must seem self-evident that in winning approval for oneself the feeling is going to carry over to the case being presented. At the same time, gaining a favorable audience view toward the case being presented will also result in audience favor for the speaker and other representations made by the speaker.
The first consideration for the author is to point out that there are four kinds of cases requiring the use of two kinds of exordium. The four kinds of cases are respectable, shameful, those of doubtful classification, and those of slight importance.

The case is respectable when we defend the righteous or attack the wicked. The case is shameful when you defend a wicked man or prosecute a righteous one. When the case is partially respectable and partly shameful, it is doubtful and it is of little consequence when an unimportant or trivial matter is considered.

In the case of the respectable it is only necessary to use the simple exordium or introduction. In the matter of the shameful case, the use of the insinuatio is recommended. In the case of the doubtful case, the speaker will try to regain the good will of the audience, and in the case of the trifling case, he will attempt to get attention.

In using the simple opening, it is desirable to achieve the triple objective for an audience of having them amenable, attentive and well-disposed.

We shall be able to have amenable audiences if we carefully explain the basis of our case, and if we gain their interest; for he is amenable, who consents to listen closely. We shall get attention, if we promise to concern ourselves with things that are important, new and extraordinary, and with things which concern the State, the audience, or the worship of the immortal gods. We shall also get attention, if we ask for it, and if we bring out in proper order the points we are going to take up.

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12 Nadeau, p. 60. The material referred to in this section is taken from Nadeau's translation of the first book of Ad Herrenium and was published in Speech Monographs.

13 Nadeau, p. 60. Ad Herrenium, Book I, IV.
Winning good feeling or getting the audience well disposed toward us entails the judicious use of four possible courses. The one chosen will depend on the circumstances being dealt with. Good feeling is gained by talking about:

(1) ourselves, if we evaluate our services without arrogance, and if we discuss what we have done for the State, our parents, friends, or even for those who listen to us, provided that all these matters have a bearing on the matter in question. We also win good feelings if we discuss our difficulties, hardships, loneliness and misfortunes. Finally, we gain good feeling if we ask for the help of our hearers and make it clear that only in them are we willing to place our trust.14

Sometimes other methods are more easily adopted and suit the type of case better. The author recommends attacking the opponent to gain the same favorable audience reaction achieved through putting ourselves in a favorable light: (talk about)

(2) our opponents, if we can cause the audience to react against them with hate, envy, and contempt. We shall bring hate upon them, if we mention some infamous deed in their past—some deed in which they acted arrogantly, traitorously, cruelly, presumptuously, maliciously, or perversely. We shall bring envy upon them, if we emphasize their influence, power, the party backing them, their riches, inordinate ambition, nobility, the number of their clients, guests, friends, relatives, and if we show that they put their confidence in these things rather than in the truth. We can make them fall into contempt if we dwell upon their lack of energy, ignorance, bad habits and soft living.15

14 Ad Herrenium, Book I, V2-14.
15 Ad Herrenium, Book I, V, 15-33.
The next method for winning the good feelings of the audience involves recounting good things done by them in the past. The case can be aided through clever praise and through heaping abuse on the opposing case.

(3) the audience, if we recall cases in which their decisions gave evidence of courage, wisdom, mercy, and greatness of soul, and if we make clear the high esteem in which we hold them, and the suspense which awaits their decision. We can also make the hearer feel well-disposed by talking about (4) the case itself, if we bring it forth with clever praise for its merits and cover the case of the opponents with abuse. 16

When the case we are supporting is something less than honorable, the author of this work recommends use of the Insinuatio. This is the type case where the subject itself turns the hearer against the speaker. This type opening should be used when the listeners seem to already have been won over by the opponents. The third circumstance involves the members of the audience already being bored or tired from the speeches which have preceded ours.

When the case belongs to the shameful class there are five arguments to use:

(1) It is necessary to have regard for the charge and not the man; (2) or for the man and not the charge; or (3) those things said by the opposition are not pleasing to us and they are unworthy or wicked. Then, after having discussed the gravity of the offense at some length, we shall show that what we have done is nothing quite like it. (4) On other occasions, we shall bring up a decision made by other judges in a similar case, or a less important one, or a more serious one; then, we shall outline our case step by step and show the similarity between the two cases. (5) One can accomplish the same effect by declaring that he will say nothing

16 Ad Herrenium, Book I, V, 33-44.
about the opponents or some other matter, and then actually talking on these subjects by casually interjecting ideas in the course of the speech. 17

The author of this work goes to some length to show the means to win over the hearer who has already been convinced by the opponent. Among the different ways listed to "wind one's way into the argument," we find: Promise to talk first about the argument considered strongest by the opponent; start with one of the opponent's assertions—maybe the last; be hesitant, wondering which argument to give preference to and which of theirs to attack first.

When the audience is tired with attention wandering, the author of the Ad Herrenium suggests a large repertoire of attention-getting devices to bring them back to a condition of higher interest:

beginning with something to make them laugh, or even with an apology, a seemingly true story, an imitation, an accusation, a play on words, an insinuation, a suspicion, a mockery, some foolish allusion, an exaggeration, a summary, or a substitution of letters. It is especially effective to begin by exciting curiosity, or by offering a parable, something novel, an anecdote, or a bit of verse. We might well profit from some kind of interruption, or a laugh from somebody in the audience. We might also say beforehand that we are going to talk along lines other than those we had previously prepared, and that we are not going to express our thoughts just like others are in the habit of doing; and in this last instance, we shall explain in a few words the difference between their method and ours. 18

The next purpose of the author is to define five faults of the exordium to be avoided. First, he mentions the importance of speaking with a friendly expression without wandering from everyday language. A

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17 Ad Herrenium, Vol. I, VI, 14-34.
universal type exordium, one that can be applied to many cases, is to be avoided. A general exordium which the opponent can use without alteration is just as bad as a universal one. Even if the wording has to be slightly changed to use the exordium against you, it is still considered a poor choice. Finally, poorly chosen wording, lengthy, unrelated or backward exordiums, called detached, are to be avoided. They do more harm than good.

In the narration portion of the speech, the author goes into techniques used to gain the credibility of the audience. He mentions the importance of letting people imply what went before rather than repeating the obvious to them. He also gives advice on how best to gain credibility.

Narration will be credible, if we make our language conform to usage, general opinion and nature, and if we have regard for lapses of time, the dignity of individuals, reasons behind decisions, and the opportunities offered by certain places.

In conclusion, there is little to distinguish this author in the area of ethos from some of his Greek predecessors other than his organization and the introduction of the concept of insinuatio. What he has given us is a very readable, tightly organized system of rhetoric that shows the primary importance to the system of various methods for establishing and maintaining ethos for the speaker and good will and credibility from the audience.

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19 Nadeau, p. 62.

20 Nadeau, p. 63.
Traditionally Cicero was thought to be the author of the Ad
Herrenium. In recent years it has been determined that this is not so.
Although there are certain similarities between De Inventione of Cicero
and Ad Herrenium, the differences are even more significant. It is now
thought that the two probably had a common origin stemming from two
different teachers who were educated in the same school but who chose
to interpret the teachings in a different way.

This section will first be concerned with Cicero's concept of
probability. Rhetorical theories of ethos and ethics, virtue and educa-
tion will next be discussed. Cicero also gives applications of these prin-
ciples in actual rhetorical practice.

Cicero's Philosophy of Probability

Earlier in this chapter an explanation was given of Stoic and
Skeptic philosophy as it manifested itself during Cicero's early years.
We have seen how the arrangement and classification of the Ad Herrenium
led some to the belief that the author was probably Stoic in his orienta-
tion. Cicero commits himself to relative or approximate knowledge. He
expresses his belief that while he does not hold that nothing is true,
still he realizes that humans cannot perceive that which is true and that
which is not true. Cicero adopted the Carneadean theory that there is no
way to distinguish a true sensation from a false one. For all practical
theories man must operate under assumed propositions of probability because
he has no way of ascertaining absolute knowledge.

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21 Rhetorica Ad Herrenium, trans., intro.
While he does not deny the existence of absolute knowledge, he does maintain man cannot know it. For Cicero, the nature of man's perception is fallible. Put another way, Cicero's philosophical theory of probability is the pragmatic realization man can conduct his affairs without absolute knowledge as long as he utilizes probability.22

Cicero was a student of Philo and there is evidence that the degree of probability attributed to Carneades was the basis for the concepts of truths or accepted probabilities of truth adopted by Cicero. These concepts of probability carried over into his rhetorical theories of argumentation and of ethos.

**Probability as it Concerns Ethos in Rhetoric**

That this doctrine of probability carried over into rhetoric cannot be in the least doubted. We have seen the establishment of definite degrees of truth or accepted truth in the discussion of Carneades' degrees of probability. When the orator is preparing his arguments this relative degree of certainty attainable on certain issues must be kept in mind.

For the actual process of division, and those of defining and distinguishing the two different meanings of an ambiguous statement, and knowing topics of arguments and bringing the actual process of argument to a conclusion, and discerning what things are to be assumed in a line of argument and what consequence follows from these assumptions, and distinguishing and differentiating true from false and probably from untrustworthy statements or censuring bad assumptions or bad conclusions, and treating the same topics either with close analysis, as do those who are termed dialecticians, or with broad exposition, as befits an orator,

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all come under the exercises mentioned and are part of the science of subtle disputation and copious oratory.23

According to this system, man cannot always indicate a consistent, immutable visible connection between two ideas to demonstrate their basic agreement or disagreement. "So man, in the Ciceronian system, admits propositions as true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade him to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. Rhetoric is the instrument of such a process; having no infallible sign of truth, the wise man avails himself of probabilities."24

Cicero's concept of rhetoric as an art is also of interest in attempting to get an overall picture of his total rhetorical concept of ethos. In the discussion of rhetoric as an art in De Oratore the fact that since oratory is suited to the common understanding of the people and since this varies from time to time and place to place, there can be no exact science or art of oratory. The Ciceronian explanation of this is that "rhetorical principles lack universality because the rhetorical act is situationally conditioned. Rhetoric, in general, may be considered an art because it is capable of abstracting and systematizing the practices of effective orators. Nonetheless, rhetorical precepts are limited in their application, and thus lack absolute and universal certainty."25

One of the primary points of interest in the preceding chapter was the interpretation of the quality of virtue by various rhetoricians. Cicero had a distinctive viewpoint of this quality:

23Meador, pp. 347-348, taken from Cicero De Partitione Oratoriae 39. 139.

24Meador, p. 349.

25Meador, p. 349.
Virtue for Cicero is the highest good; yet, virtue requires activity in the realm of human affairs. He considers the assumption of civic obligations one of the fundamental "duties" of men (criticizing philosophers like Plato on this count). Such a genuine social commitment seems to account for his devotion to rhetoric and for his sense of interconnection among philosophy (heavily ethics), rhetoric (heavily social control), and politics.  

Baird notes that Cicero discussed the moral qualities of good nature, liberality, gentleness, piety, grateful feelings, freedom from selfishness and avarice. When the speaker has mastered the art of making the audience perceive these qualities in him he will also alienate the audience from those in whom those qualities are not evident. Cicero notes that these qualities must be genuine and not just an act.

It contributes much to the success in speaking, that the morals, principles, conduct, and lives of those for whom they plead, should be such as to deserve esteem; and that those of their adversaries should be such as to deserve censure and also that the minds of those before whom the cause is pleaded should be moved as well toward the speaker and toward him for whom he speaks.  

Another natural outgrowth of the theory of probability would be that the orator must be an educated man. To have any understanding at all of the relationships and degrees of probability that must be dealt with and judged, an orator would have to be well versed in many areas of knowledge.

Cicero, through his mouthpiece, Crassus, insists upon the orator's having virtually universal knowledge and skill. In the dialogue, Antonius holds that somewhat less learning is necessary, although he, too, urges broad familiarity with the field of

26 Meador, pp. 348-349.
knowledge. But he insists upon a more intensive training leading to the acquisition of oratorical excellence. Antonious would develop the orator's natural talents and capacities for oratory, even if his intellectual control over the field of learning were somewhat more moderate than Crassus believed essential.28

Just how extensive this knowledge ideally should be is brought out in the following passage. Although it sounds almost like impromptu speaking, actually the type of knowledge that was to be acquired held all the essentials for quite literally any subject in the memory of the orator. This fund of knowledge could be quickly drawn upon when the need arose.

If, therefore, anyone desires to define and comprehend the whole and peculiar power of an orator, that man, in my opinion, will be an orator, worthy of so great a name, who whatever subject comes before him, and requires rhetorical elucidation, can speak on it judiciously, in set form, elegantly, and from memory, and with a certain dignity of action.29

Cicero had found much in the works of Isocrates that he admired. The two both encouraged the development of statesmanship. They were practical in their approach to rhetoric and had no patience with the philosopher who refused to get involved in human affairs and matters of state. They were also alike in their efforts to broaden the field of rhetoric. Cicero in his day hoped "to restore rhetoric as a system of general culture which would train men to write and speak competently on all possible subjects. In this effort Cicero was guided by the doctrines of Isocrates whom he regarded as the 'father of eloquence.'"30


29Thonssen and Baird, p. 144, from De Oratore, I, xv.

30Thonssen and Baird, p. 142.
In Rhetorical Practice

It has already been mentioned that Cicero advocated that the orator live a life that would be above reproach. He recognized that it would be necessary to let the members of the audience know that this was the character of the person they were listening to and that there were ways for the speaker to project an ethical personality.

But the qualities that attract favor to the orator are a soft tone of voice, a countenance expressive of modesty, a mild manner of speaking; so that if he attacks any one with severity, he may seem to do so unwillingly and from compulsion.31

The value of this type of projected ethos was, in Cicero's opinion, unequalled by any other technique that might be employed.

To describe the character of your clients in your speeches, therefore, as just, full of integrity, religious, unpresuming, and patient of injuries, has an extraordinary effect; and such a description, either in the commencement, or in the statement of facts, or in the peroration, has so much influence if it is agreeably and judiciously managed, that it often prevails more than the merit of the cause. Such influence, indeed, is produced by a certain feeling and art in speaking, that the speech seems to represent, as it were, the character of the speaker; for by adopting a peculiar mode of thought and expression, united with action that is gentle and indicative of amiableness, such an effect is produced, that the speaker seems to be a man of probity, integrity and virtue.32

Conclusion

Cicero has taken the Skeptic theory of probability and accepted the standards needed for everyday truth. Virtue to him means nothing

31 Cicero, De Oratore, Watson, trans., 911, 43.
32 Cicero, De Oratore, 911, 43.
without action—and that action should be for the good of the state—the orator should be a statesman. He should also have attributes of honesty, piety, good naturedness and gentleness for these, when perceived by the audience can serve as his strongest form of proof. The education of the orator should be very thorough leaving him capable of speaking smoothly and intelligently in any subject that might be put to him.

QUINTILIAN

Paramount in the study of Quintilian's concepts of ethos are his theories on the constructs of the good man. He does not recognize that the study of this concept belongs exclusively to the field of philosophy. In fact, he feels the entire study is much more suited to the field of rhetoric than to philosophy. This discussion of Quintilian begins with an explanation of this good man theory. Following, an analysis of "speaking well" will complete this explanation of the definition of the orator—"a good man speaking well."  

Quintilian's system of education designed to produce this happy combination will be identified. It is outside the scope of this paper to go into great detail on this topic.

Finally, Quintilian has some interesting theories of application of these theories to the actual practice of rhetoric. These will be cited and the rationale behind them explored for possible ramifications.

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Quintilian's Good Man Theory

Philosophy during the time of Quintilian concerned itself with such questions as rights to the succession to the throne, hereditary rights to property and positions of power in the Empire, and related problems. Quintilian was in favor with the emperor and wisely chose to exclude himself from philosophical disputations of all kinds.

When, in the course of his writings, he expresses the desirability of having instructors and other associates of students well versed in philosophy, Quintilian is not speaking of those engaged in this sort of disputation. Neither is he thinking of a Platonic type philosopher taking refuge in flight from the real world to a place of "Ideas." For Quintilian, as Isocrates and Cicero before him, the orator was to be a man concerned in the practical affairs of men. His philosophy and his education were to suit him for the execution of his role as an effective member of society. These concerns were in the natural province of rhetoric, not philosophy.

For I will not admit that the principles of upright and honorable living should, as some have held, be regarded as the peculiar concern of philosophy. The man who can really play his part as a citizen and is capable of meeting the demands both of public and private business, the man who can guide a state by his counsels, give it a firm basis by his legislation, and purge its vices by his decisions as a judge, is assuredly no other than the orator of our quest.34

Above all other qualities, Quintilian held good morality and good character to be of primary importance. He flatly stated that an education

that does not emphasize and attempt to instill good morals in the pupils is "both dangerous and pernicious."

The orator, then, whom I am concerned to form, shall be the orator as defined by Marcus Cato, "a good man, skilled in speaking." But above all he must possess the quality which Cato places first and which is in the very nature of things the greatest and most important, that is, he must be a good man. This is essential not merely on account of the fact, if the powers of eloquence serve only to lend arms to crime, there can be nothing more pernicious than eloquence to public and private welfare alike, while I myself, who have labored to the best of my ability to contribute something of value to oratory, shall have rendered the worst of services to mankind, if I forge these weapons not for the soldier, but for a robber. 35

In quoting Cato's statement that the orator is a "good man, skilled in speaking," Quintilian takes this good man and gives him the qualities of a good speaker.

At the outset let us not think of rhetoric as something quite artificial and stultifyingly formal, for it can be defined simply as the study of the effective use of language or the art of clear, accurate, and skillful expression in speaking and in writing, an art crucially important in the communication of ideas. 36

Quintilian points out that speaking well does not simply involve the memorization and practice of the rules of good rhetoric. Just as Isocrates recognized the needs for certain rules, Quintilian states that he will lay them down. However, again, as with Isocrates, he cautions that

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35 Quintilian, xii, i, 1.

the rules are not rigid but are to be applied with discretion. There is no system that can be assured of working for everyone under every circumstance. From the practical standpoint it is necessary for the orator to recognize circumstances that require adjustments of standard procedure.

I will not deny that it is generally expedient to conform to such rules, otherwise I should not be writing now; but if our friend expediency suggests some other course to us, why, we shall disregard the authority of the professors and follow her.37

It is not enough, therefore, that the "good man" should know the rules of good rhetorical practice and be able to use them, he must also know when circumstances demand abandoning all rules and using common sense to meet the contingency at hand.

**Education of the "Good Man, Speaking Well"**

Without going into detail on methodologies used in Quintilian's system for education, it is important to look at a few of the major tenets making up his philosophy of education. First, unlike his contemporaries, Quintilian did not begin the orator's education with the higher education of the rhetor. This did not begin until age sixteen and by that time Quintilian recognized the "good man" part of the requisite would have to have been inculcated into the would-be orator. Nothing else speaks so clearly of Quintilian's serious efforts to effect his desired training as the detailed accounts given of proper care of the infant, best qualifications for the nurse, attitude for the parents, and other details of everyday living that inevitably will shape the developing personality of the child.

37 Quintilian, xii, i, 1.
He realizes that everything the child hears, the attitude of his associates, the approach to education, will ultimately affect the end product of the education system. The program described shows great insight and is surprisingly modern in concept.

Quintilian's educational doctrines, promulgated nineteen hundred years ago, represented the best thinking of the ancient world concerning education and culture. These doctrines reflect the ideals and practices of his time, as, for example, in their emphasis upon skills of communication and rhetoric, essential elements of higher education in the Roman Empire. Yet, Quintilian's educational philosophy was surprisingly modern in tone and character, antedating by nearly two millenia our contemporary respect for the rights and needs of children; and many of his views on learning, ethical training, and child development deserve to be studied and implemented in education today.38

The curriculum recommended by Quintilian could best be described as a broad humanistic basic liberal arts program. Not everyone would complete every subject and not everyone would become a rhetorician. The foundation for this education was literature, with liberal additions of grammar and linguistics. He recognized other advantages of this study of a more character-building nature.

Furthermore, literature (e.g., all branches of Greek and Latin poetry, history, philosophy, and oratory) was no less important in the paramount matter of character (morals) indicated above; for by the reading, analyzing and memorization of great literature, the student gained ideas and philosophies and examples of great heroes, actions, characters and ideals which should be imitated, and also examples of others which should be avoided. Thus literature would mold a boy's character and would provide a thesaurus upon which to draw throughout life.39

38 Wheelock, p. 1, intwo.
39 Wheelock, p. 16.
From a modern standpoint the curriculum lacked reference to any training for "trade skills." This was a society utilizing slave labor for menial tasks and on-the-job training for others.

...it was tradition that education should be liberal and should be based on what Cicero called the "liberal arts," subjects suitable for free men, which included literature and language, rhetoric, philosophy, music, mathematics, geometry and astronomy. Though the list might vary somewhat, literature and rhetoric predominated. Such is the origin of the liberal arts curriculum, which, with some variations and additions, has survived down to our twentieth century, sometimes under the name of the humanities in contrast to the sciences.40

Application of Ethical and Educational Concepts to Ethos in Rhetoric

Quintilian followed the concept that ethos of the speaker was one of the most powerful weapons he could possess. The nature of that ethos is described in the following passage:

The (ethos) of which we form a conception, and which we desire to find in speakers, is recommended, above all, by goodness, being not only mild and placid, but for the most part pleasing and polite, and amiable and attractive to the hearers; and the greatest merit in the expression of it is, that it should seem to flow from the nature of things and persons with which we are concerned, so that the moral character of the speaker may clearly appear, and be recognized, as it were, in his discourse.41

This ethos is not to be an act on the part of the speaker. Unless the qualities are genuine, the effectiveness is minimized.

40 Wheelock, pp. 16-17.

All this species of eloquence, however, requires the speaker to be a man of good character and of pleasing manners. The virtues which he ought to praise, if possible, in his client, he should possess, or be thought to possess, himself. 42

Another aspect of ethos is adaptation to the audience. Obviously still speaking of forensic type situations, Quintilian has this to say:

The favor of the judge we conciliate, not merely by offering him praise, (which ought indeed to be given with moderation, though it is to be remembered at the same time, that the privilege of offering it is common to both parties.) But by turning his praises to the advantage of our cause, appealing, in behalf of the noble to his dignified station, in behalf of the humble to his justice, in behalf of the unfortunate to his pity, in behalf of the injured to his severity; and using similar appeals in other cases. 43

Turning from forensic type oratory, ethos is rated of primary importance in deliberative oratory. Here the character and integrity of the speaker is directly related to the validity of his proposals in the eyes of the audience.

But what is of most weight in deliberative speeches is authority in the speaker; for he who desires everybody to trust to his opinion about what is expedient and honorable, ought to be esteemed, a man of the greatest judgement and probity. 44

Much of the good will of the audience and the projection of one's own good character is accomplished in the exordium. As with other classical writers, Quintilian recognized the advantage to be gained when the introduction of the speech effected this end.

42 Quintilian, VI, 2, 10.
43 Quintilian, IV, 1, 16.
44 Quintilian, III, 8, 13.
In giving the exordium at all there is no other object but to prepare the hearer to listen to us more readily in the subsequent parts of our pleading. This object, as is agreed among most authors, is principally effected by three means, by securing his good will and attention, and by rendering him desirous of further information; not that these ends are not to be kept in view throughout the whole pleading, but because they are pre-eminently necessary at the commencement, when we gain admission as it were into the mind of the judge in order to penetrate still farther into it.

While for the most part good character of the speaker is impressed on the audience through obvious manifestations of ethos, there are rhetorical effects to be used to gain the desired regard from the audience.

But as the character of the speaker becomes thus of the highest efficacy, if, in his undertaking the business, all suspicion of meanness, or hatred, or ambition, be far removed from him, so it is a sort of tacit commendation to him, if he represents himself as weak, and inferior in ability to those acting against him, a practice which is adopted in most of the exordia of Messala.  

Quintilian on Means to the End

One issue in Quintilian has caused some analysts distress and others downright confusion. The problem lies in the interpretation of the ethical concept of the proper means to be employed to reach a desired end.

But it is even true, although at first sight it seems hard to believe, that there may be sound reason why at times a good man who is appearing for the defense should attempt to conceal the truth from the judge. If any of my readers is surprised at my making such a statement (although this opinion is not of my own invention, but is

45 Quintilian, IV, 1, 8.
46 Quintilian, IV, 1, 8.
derived from those whom antiquity regarded as the greatest teachers of wisdom), I would have him reflect that there are many things which are made honorable or the reverse not by the nature of the facts, but by the causes from which they spring...I can see that there will be many possible emergencies such as to justify an orator in undertaking cases of a kind which in the absence of any honorable reason, he would have refused to touch.  

In the practical application of ethics in a rhetorical situation, Quintilian's "good man" may have to go further to attain his desired ends.

Is not this another case where the orator will not shrink even from lies, if so he may save one who is not merely innocent, but a praiseworthy citizen? Again, suppose that we realize that certain acts are just in themselves, though prejudicial to the state under existing circumstances. Shall we not then employ methods of speaking which, despite the excellence of their intention, bear a close resemblance to fraud. Further, no one will hesitate for a moment to hold the view that it is in the interests of the commonwealth that guilty persons should be acquitted rather than punished, if it be possible thereby to convert them to a better state of mind, a possibility which is generally conceded.

When reading these passages there are two things to remember. The first is the definition of an orator and the second is the political climate of Rome at the time under consideration.

No man, according to Quintilian, is an orator who is not first a good man. Anyone availing himself of this license to lie as an orator is wise enough and righteous enough to correctly assess relative merits of


\[48\] Quintilian, trans., Butler, XII, i, 41-42.
possible positions. Doubtful means would only be employed when others would end in disaster for the right cause.

Secondly, the political condition of Rome during the time of Quintilian was not conducive to the citizen being assured a fair or even reasonable trial under any kind of law. The Emperors that followed Nero were often utterly selfish, absolute, sometimes lunatic in the administration of justice. For the welfare of Rome circumstances could arise demanding that the counsel for the defense employ extraordinary means for the protection of a client condemned by the arbitrary rulings of a tyrant.

Conclusions

This discussion of Quintilian has explored the basic tenets of Cato's "Good man, speaking well." Education suited to the development of such a person will be in the liberal arts with a heavy emphasis on literature. The ethos of the speaker will be evidenced through the quality of the speech, and the adaptation to audience and subject matter. Because of circumstances, there may be times when the orator will use dishonorable means to attain an end that will prove to be for the good of the state
CHAPTER IV

THE BRITISH

It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an exhaustive study of British views of ethos in rhetoric. Time and space limitations will allow analyses of the representative works of Hugh Blair, George Campbell, and Richard Whately. For the sake of orientation and continuity three influential philosophers, Thomas Reid, John Locke and David Hume, will be discussed. These three are frequently mentioned by Blair, Campbell and Whately. Certainly the views of these philosophers colored the innovative approaches to rhetoric during the eighteenth century.

After briefly surveying the works of the three philosophers mentioned above, each of the three rhetoricians will be examined from the standpoints, first, of their philosophical and ethical orientations and approaches to rhetoric. Examples of specific applications of their concepts of ethics as exhibited in the ethos of the speaker and adaptations to be made to the audience will follow. A section of brief comment and conclusions will close the chapter.

THOMAS REID

The first consideration for this discussion of Reid's common sense approach to philosophy and rhetoric will first state exactly what Reid meant by "common sense." His reasons for preferring "common sense" to reason and methods for testing first principles will be explained. Finally,
some references will be made relating Reid's concepts with some already covered in the classical portions of the study.

The Meaning of Common Sense

Common sense can only be called a metarational approach to the truth. The process is fundamental to the reasoning process and yet it transcends reason. These two statements form the foundation for Reid's theory. About the first, the metarational approach, Reid has this to say:

If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.¹

These first principles are the ones that are lasting and accepted by all men everywhere in all ages.

We ought likewise to take for granted, as first principles, things wherein we find an universal agreement, among the learned and unlearned, in the different nations and ages of the world. A consent of ages and nations, of the learned and the vulgar, ought, at least, to have great authority,...There are many truths so obvious to the human faculties, that it may be expected that men should universally agree in them.²

In Reid's conception there can be no conflict between the reason and common sense. They are not the same but they go hand in hand.


Reid says, "It is absurd to conceive that there can be any opposition between reason and common sense. It is indeed the firstborn of reason; and as they are commonly joined together in speech and writing, they are inseparable in their nature." He adds further that, "A man who has common sense may be taught to reason. But if he has not that gift, no teaching will make him able to judge of first principles or reason from them." Common sense consists of self-evident principles which are universally taken for granted and which undergird true propositions. Perhaps inadvertently exposing his interest in rhetoric, Reid adds that "...the province of common sense is more extensive in refutation than in confirmation," and states further that "a conclusion drawn from true principles cannot possibly contradict any decision of common sense, because truth will always be consistent with itself. 3

Reid's concepts of first principles derived from common sense bear close resemblance to classical maxims and the first premises of dialectic—those concepts generally accepted by all as true.

There is no searching for evidence, no weighting of arguments; the proposition is not deduced or inferred from another; it has the light of truth in itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another. Propositions of the last kind, when they have been used in matters of science, have commonly been called axioms; and on whatever occasion they are used, they are called first principles, principles of common sense, common notions, self-evident truths. 4

Common Sense Preferred to Reason

Thomas Reid felt that too great reliance on reason resulted in hopeless entanglements of doubt and an actual cessation in acquisition of knowledge about our society and physical environment.


4Reid, p. 434.
The ancients seem to have had too high notions, both of the force of the reasoning power in man, and of the art of syllogism as its guide. Mere reasoning can carry us but a very little way in most subjects. By observation, and experiments properly conducted, the stock of human knowledge may be enlarged without end; but the power of reasoning alone, applied with vigour and through a long life, would only carry man around like a horse in a mill, who labours hard but makes no progress.5

Reid does not, it should be noted, account for the syllogistic basic premise in his writings. He does, however, deplore endless logical reasoning exercises that result in uncertain conclusions.

Guidelines for Testing Truth of First Principles

The understanding of common sense and its relationship to reasoning leads to the tests to be used for so derived first principles. This testing is a natural function of man.

But the power of judging in self-evident propositions, which are clearly understood, may be compared to the power of swallowing our food. It is purely natural, and therefore common to the learned and the unlearned, to the trained and the untrained. It requires ripeness of understanding, and freedom from prejudice, but nothing else.6

The first suggestion for differences of opinion concerning the validity of a first principle, is that each person put away his own prejudice and "approach the proposition with a sound mind, but when the first task proves futile, and when the opposing views still prevail, then the parties must seek the marks or characteristics of an illegitimate first

6Kelley, p. 47, quoting Reid.
principle." The most outstanding characteristic of the first false principle is:

that they are not only false but absurd; and to discountenance absurdity, nature hath given us a particular emotion—to wit, that of ridicule—which seems intended for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what is absurd, either in opinion or in practice.

The five methods for proving an argument absurd are these:

1. A good argument is to show a rejected principle stands on the same footing as an accepted one.
2. Any first principle will have a chain of consequences that proceed from it. If these consequences are absurd, then the first principle is also considered absurd and rejected.
3. The third method is authority that involves the consent of ages and the nations. A principle that has been universally recognized for many years by all of mankind may be accepted as a first principle.
4. Opinions appearing so early in the minds of men that they were not placed there by education are first principles.
5. Finally, a first principle is indispensible to the conduct of life.

Obviously, these tests could be ridiculed and exceptions made for each in turn. Kelley does this in his article and seems to indicate a preference for a more skeptical approach to our environment. Reid's philosophy could be carried to the point of absurdity. Its use lies in the fact that for all practical purposes it is accepted and used by most people. It is also an oft-cited fact for the rhetorician in his philosophical approach to the ethical position of truth and man's character in and through communication.

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7 Kelley, p. 48.
8 Kelley, p. 48.
9 Kelley, pp. 49-52.
In the writings of John Locke and David Hume the theories of degrees of probability used during the time of Cicero are further developed. These two reject the transcendental origin for concepts of right and wrong, good and bad in the human mind. They are grounded in the theory that all we know is gained through the senses. These sensory experiences are individual, cannot be transmitted, and the only knowledge that is truly passed from one person to another is that that can be verified by repeated sensory experiences. The mind can reflect on these experiences and draw inferences. It may speculate, establish degrees of probability, but in all cases all knowledge comes from sensory experience.

The intellectual climate of the seventeenth century was prepared for an epistemology of rhetoric that would call physical and experimental data the only genuine knowledge. The realms of values, beliefs and opinions crucial to traditional rhetoric were rejected as pseudo-knowledge.

Seen from this perspective, the Lockian epistemology rested on what W. T. Jones has termed "a drastic change in the conception of authority, from that of the written word, especially the inspired Word of God, to that of nature and empirical fact"...In short, Locke synthesized a variety of empirical inclinations into a thoroughly nominalist epistemology which eschewed concern for universal principles of values and "held that only particulars are real." The cataclysmic implications of this position for rhetoric become clearer as we examine the central features of Locke's thought.\(^{10}\)

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It was Locke's belief that the mind is like a blank, white sheet of paper in its original form. There are no words there, no references or ideas of things. From sensory experience references are accumulated and word symbols are attached to them. Locke's expression of these ideas sparked attacks on rhetoric as "fanciful" and heightened distrust of the medium.

Thus, by means of the basic postulate that words are separable from ideas, Locke supplied a principle which formed the cynosure of attacks on rhetoric as a "fanciful device" in the seventeenth century. Locke arrived at this decisive premise as a function of his belief that there were no innate ideas present in the mind. Indeed, his views on the issues of innateness contain the central tenet of what later evolved into general semantics, namely, that words have no meaning by themselves but rather are assigned a meaning arbitrarily as a result of social conditioning. 11

In dealing with the rhetorical significance of the Lockean position, we have to give attention to his criteria for "sensation" and "reflection."

The primary and most powerful means of experimenting is through the mind. "The mind," says Locke, "has several distinct perceptions of things" which result in ideas such as "yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities." Only if one senses the object in this direct manner can he have a genuine idea of what it is; ideas never precede the sensible perception of objects. 12

Reflection as the other aspect of experience has two distinct differences from sensation. Called an internal sense by Locke, it is, first, not directly stimulated by objects external to use. Secondly, it cannot occur at all unless it is secondary to other mental activities.

11 Patton, p. 15.

12 Patton, p. 16.
The assumption, however, that reflection could only occur following sensation is extremely vital from a rhetorical standpoint. Indeed, Locke's criticism of rhetoric is perhaps best understood when it is realized that he indicted rhetoric for engaging in reflection without the benefit of prior sensation.  

The implications for rhetoric were profound. Certainly, as suggested by Patton, the dual form of sensation and reflection suggests a constructive refinement for rhetoric; at the same time, it fosters serious drawbacks. Locke reinterpreted Aristotle, substituting authentic subject matter for the topics suggested in *De Rhetorica*. Wilbur Howell pointed out that he would remove topics as the vital center of rhetoric and dialectic and:

> recommend mathematics as a preferable pattern for arriving at probable truth. Thus did Locke lend heavy authority to the belief that the topics would have to be abandoned in the new rhetoric, and the procedures of science and scholarship established in their place.  

Here is a rhetoric concerned with the transmission of actual sensory experiences from one person to another. Words symbolize the sensory happening. There is no room for emotion and complete knowledge of the subject is an imposed requirement of the individual.

Locke seems to affirm, just as Aristotle did, that the speaker should "know" his subject as thoroughly as possible before speaking. He also holds that sensory experience is the only way for such knowledge to occur. While this may provide an adequate basis for rhetorical presentation of the predominately or purely informative sort, it can neither

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13 Patton, p. 17.

account for nor generate forms of speaking which transcend efforts to establish the mere existence or non-existence of events.\textsuperscript{15}

Locke has relegated "reflection" to a secondary realm of knowledge. This further raises the question of whether his approach leaves any room for persuasion. This art essentially has to do with influencing "beliefs," part of the realm of "reflection."

In other words, if rhetorical invention is restricted to sensory experience, can a speaker ever attempt to alter general attitudes, change firmly held beliefs, or motivate specific actions?\textsuperscript{16}

This is a system that quite justifiably demands that a speaker have knowledge about his subject of discourse. However, when you limit that knowledge to direct sensory experience you have also limited the subject matter. This precludes any discussion about the future, about what should or should not be, for these are matters that are barred from our personal realm of experience. So, too, are moral values, for there can be no sensory experiences that could in any way ascertain what these might be.

Indeed, by Locke's epistemology, it becomes virtually impossible to include propositions of value or policy within the domain of rhetoric. The upshot is a tendency toward a discourse void of ethical quality.\textsuperscript{17}

The Lockean epistemology has cleared the way for a system of what Wayne Brockriede calls "non-argumentative processes" such as description and classification.\textsuperscript{18}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Patton, p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Patton, p. 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Patton, p. 19.
\end{itemize}
Because questions of value and policy are precisely those which are most open to dispute (i.e., are debatable in the fullest sense), their omission under the guise of adhering to an apparently "scientific" and "verifiable" approach renders rhetoric lifeless by reducing, if not eliminating, its capacity for true advocacy.\(^{19}\)

The facts as seen by Patton indicate that what has happened to much of modern rhetorical scholarship is a result of this. The following is his illustration of just what has happened. He is speaking of Robert Jeffrey's dismay over the press handling of the Watergate episode of President Nixon.

Our own publications reflect a preoccupation with Nixon's predictability, his appeals to audiences, his mastery of the television medium, and so on. Few articles have analyzed the ethics or morality of his statements.\(^{20}\)

Other instances of modern abstinence from evaluation of ethical qualities in a rhetorical event could be cited. It could further be postulated that these instances are related to Lockean originated theories.

One more difficulty with this system comes in considering "identification." If sensory experience is the basis for all knowledge, then we are returned to the Gorgian problem of relating my referent to my correspondent's since we do not have identical referents for the message to be transmitted.

If the experience of the speaker, then, is fundamentally different from the experiences of the audience, the Lockean approach would not allow for the possibility of genuine communication. By Locke's analysis, cross-cultural communication, for example,

\(^{19}\)Patton, p. 19.

\(^{20}\)Patton, p. 20.
while not being a completely meaningless term, would yet be limited to communication based on common experiences alone.21

DAVID HUME

Like John Locke, David Hume stands firmly in the empirical tradition. Unlike him, he does not feel that pure sensory experience is sufficient for man to reason at his best and arrive at the best conclusion. Locke certainly had found a respectable basis for the transmission of information, but he made any further deductions from those experiences solely the responsibility of the individual. In short, he left no room for the persuasive powers of the rhetorician. Hume remedied this.

Hume rejected such zealous confidence in reason, concluding that the very elevation of reason as the contemporary god-term accounted in large part for the decline of oratory. Furthermore, it is precisely on these grounds that he contrasts ancient with modern rhetoric: "Ancient eloquence, that is the sublime and passionate, is of a much juster taste than the modern, or the argumentative and rational: and if properly executed, will always have more command and authority over mankind.22"

Hume notes that any subject can be suitable for debate, that reason is certainly not always the basis for argument, and that probability in different degrees is an element in persuasion.

Significantly, he ties this observation to his suspicion of experience-based reason and certainly, noting that the role of reason is not always dominate in rhetoric and that legitimate discourse can occur on other bases besides reason alone. Consequently, Hume maintains that, "Amidst

21 Patton, p. 21.
22 Patton, p. 22.
all this bustle 'tis no reason which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever des­pair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in favorable colors." ...Hence, whereas the Lockean epistemology confined the practice of rhetoric to the use of words as "sensible marks of ideas," Hume supplies the essential counterpoint for a full-bodied rhetoric by accentuating the realm of mental interpretation and persuasive discourse.23

In attempting to explain Hume's rationale for the reintroduction of passion and imagination into oratory, it is necessary to realize that he saw a difference in the "liveliness" of beliefs derived from sensation and those derived from fancy. This superior force of the idea allows Locke's sterile rhetoric to take on the life and vitality of a more viable form. He maintains that, "an idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy alone presents to us: And this different feeling I endeavor to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness."24

The introduction of degrees of liveliness among ideas sustains the imagination by supplying the essential raw material it requires. This opens the way for the formation of mental images not immediately present to the senses and for the synthesis of images derived from concrete experience. While degrees of liveliness remain empirically verifiable, Hume's doctrine of belief reshapes Locke's insistence on ideas derived only from sensory experience into a much more rhetorically viable concept. In sum, the way an idea "feels" incorporates a personal element into the epistemology of experience and the dynamics of language, leading toward a rhetoric which seeks to influence the fundamental beliefs and basic commitments of persons.25

23 Patton, p. 23.


Hume explained an assumption the mind must make when perceiving an object. This is that the object will continue to exist. The mind must jump to a conclusion of this kind to go beyond the momentary sensation of recognition. In fact it is inferring a double existence and supposes a relationship of resemblance and causation. This capacity makes possible the development of a full interpersonal and persuasive communication theory. Under Locke's orientation this lack of identical sensory experience prohibited true communication.

The role of the imagination, then, assumes paramount importance for Hume as the means by which objects are connected in the mind. Rhetorically this position suggests the possibility that the most effective communication is that which most directly engages and places the heaviest demand upon the image-making potential of an audience, a possibility beyond the scope of Locke's strictly defined sensory epistemology.26

Hume remained totally within the empirically oriented conception of origins for all subject matter for thought. In other words, he did not in any way assume Reid's philosophy that anything might be known by instinct. This became a controversial subject in discussions on religious questions. This awakening of science saw many doubts and questions raised on the authenticity of Biblical accounts of miracles. Hume was one of the first to voice these doubts and he devised a system for evaluation of testimony in the process. In an essay, "Of Miracles," and later in a book, Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding, two arguments on validity of testimony about events are presented.

The first argument stated that no testimony can be accepted as truth unless the falsity of the testimony would be more improbable than

the non-existence of the alleged fact. In substantiation, he points out that all inference is founded on our experience with the consistency with which certain events take place. These consistent experiences include the testimony of others who have observed them. When non-concurrent testimony is heard, this violates two accepted experiences--consistent testimony about an event and our own sensory experiences relating to the event. It is Hume's contention that in the case of miracles, the value of human testimony is reduced to an absolute zero through the employment of these known consistencies.27

Secondly, Hume contends that no miracle has ever been advanced to the status of "probability" let alone, "proven," status. There has never been a sufficient number of unimpeachable witnesses to a miracle. Widespread belief in "miracles" is accounted for by the universal "passion" for surprise and wonder. He points out, next, the "miracles" occur among primitive and barbarous people or else are handed down through the generations from a historical background of primitive and barbarous people. He finally states that since an infinite number of people testify against the miracle, not only does the miracle destroy the credit of the testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. This is made so by the fact that conflicting religions testify against each other's miracles.

The scope or adequacy of testimony for any event is determined by the number of witnesses who claim to have observed the event directly. Thus, the more unusual the event, the more improbable the testimony, and the more implausible the witness claims. The function of testimony is to gain "degrees of assurance" for a proposition rather than to establish

occurrences of events. Thus, the primary condition for accepting a witness-claim is plausibility. A witness-claim should be judged plausible only if it satisfies, rather than conflicts with, most of the listeners' "habitual expectations." The eventual value of testimony is primarily corroborative. A witness-claim, in other words, is not necessarily a sign (much less a proof) that event X occurred. It is a statement of what the witness either believes or wants the listeners to believe about X. It should be accepted only to the degree that it confirms what the listeners would expect to observe—had they been the witnesses.28

Locke and Hume both belong to the ranks of those who place the source of all we know in sensory experience. The two vary in their interpretations of associations and the ideas that may be arrived at through the utilization of these stored experiences. Locke trusts nothing to communication that cannot be mutually experienced while Hume allows emotion and feelings to have their place in human discourse.

Conclusions

The philosophies of the three that have been discussed in this chapter all influenced the rhetoric of Hugh Blair, George Campbell and Richard Whately. While there may be some indication of the individual writers leaning toward one philosopher more than the others, there are indications of Locke and Hume in all three and of Reid in at least two of them. Interpretations and adaptations vary, relative strengths fluctuate throughout the writings. Since this is not a completely comprehensive study from every possible aspect, some theories belonging to the

28Pomeroy, p. 66.
philosophers may be referred to that are not included in this paper. The theories that have been covered are those that seem most closely allied to ethos in rhetoric. The other references that are made are relatively self-explanatory.

HUGH BLAIR

Although living during the period of the Great Awakening and the evangelical movements on both sides of the Atlantic, Hugh Blair remained aloof from the religious controversies of his day. This was due, first, to his own convictions, and, secondly, to his awareness of the beliefs of his constituents. The skepticism of the day strongly affected his Christian teaching. Thomas Reid's philosophy of common sense was the basis for much of Blair's concept of "good taste" or the critical evaluation of any rhetorical work of art, whether written or spoken.

Ethos in rhetoric was of primary importance to Hugh Blair. This work will explain the two requirements for character in the speaker, methods for treating the audience, requirements of good taste, and the functions of the exordium in respect to ethos.

Ethical Principles of Hugh Blair

One of the outstanding qualities in Blair was his ability to assimilate many divergent philosophies and use them in the ways that best suited his ends. As a popular minister of the Presbyterian Church in the eighteenth century, he was faced with the decision of either joining the evangelical movements of George Whitefield and the Wesleys, or of staying in the mainstream of popular religious dogma of the day. Hugh Blair chose the latter course.
Blair made little, if any, reference to the vital religious issues paramount in the eighteenth century. While Whitefield, Wesley and many of the Scottish divines were preaching the doctrines of original sin and eternal punishment, the minister of St. Giles carefully avoided such controversial matters. 29

The probable reasons for this choice are two-fold. The first is explained below.

...important in determining Blair's choice of subjects were his own religious views. He freely admitted to Boswell that "he did not believe in the eternity of punishment." And at a time when the pious church leaders frowned upon such worldly amusements as card playing and the theatre, Carlyle reports that he taught Blair and Robinson how to play cards and dice, and that Blair visited the great actress Mrs. Siddons in private. 30

The second reason for his avoidance of religious controversy involved Blair's realistic assessment of the sentiments of his parishioners. The course chosen by Blair allowed for Christian ethics without offense to skeptical intellectualism.

The agnostic tendencies which characterized the thinking of the eighteenth century Scotsmen were so prevalent that in many communities the Church lost its influence. Men...now openly expressed their disbelief in the existence of a Divine Being. Since Blair preached to the "most refined congregation in Scotland" skepticism was a serious problem. 31

While being careful not to offend his listeners with a too fundamental approach to Christianity, Blair never wavered from high moral standards in his sermons or in his personal life.


From the organization of these sermons it is evident, according to Golden, that they were not written to tell the listeners what they wanted to hear, but rather to stimulate them to lead a better life.

Although seeming to join the skeptics in their questioning of basic Christian doctrines, Blair approved of George Campbell's refutation of Hume's attack on the validity of Biblical testimony concerning miracles. He also recognized an inborn instinct in every human that, when developed, results in relatively stable standards of what is considered "good taste" in art, literature and oral delivery.

To consider Blair's concept of good taste it is necessary to accept his definition of terms.

Blair begins his analysis by defining taste as "the power of receiving pleasure from the beauties of nature and art."33

This taste is more than a reasoning power of the mind. Since reception of a work that is in good taste gives pleasure, and since pleasure is not normally associated with reasoning powers, and since the same objects illicit pleasure from people of varying educational backgrounds, it is further noted there must be some innate characteristic of man determining the pleasant and unpleasant.


Hence, taste seems more closely allied to a feeling or sense than to a process of the mind. Although he believes that taste is ultimately founded on a certain natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty, Blair is careful to point out that reason is not entirely excluded from its exertions.34

This innate or instinctive sensibility is allied to Thomas Reid's "common sense" through its universal presence as an inherent quality. On the other hand, Hume influenced Blair in his explanation of the development and refinement of this good taste. Refinements of taste are cultivated through repeated exposures to highly respected works of art. The basis for those refinements remain indelibly engraved in the natural instincts of men.

Taste, in Blair's view, is far from being an arbitrary force which is subject to the fancy of every individual and which admits of no criteria for determining whether it is false or true. Its foundation is the same in all human minds. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which, in general, operate with the same uniformity as our other faculties. When those sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined by comparing them with the general taste of mankind.35

Ethos in Rhetoric

It can never be doubted that Hugh Blair placed ethos for the speaker in high priority both for himself and others.

The ethical appeal of the speaker was further enhanced by his virtuous character. As he stood before his auditors, he was regarded as a good

34Cohen, p. 266.
35Cohen, p. 273.
man who practiced as well as preached a high standard of morals. At no time did he deviate from high principles, and consequently his character was respected throughout his life.  

For the speaker himself, Blair's advice was two-fold:

1. Let it be kept in view, that the foundation of all that can be called eloquence, is good sense and solid thought.
2. In the next place, in order to be persuasive speakers in a public assembly, it is, in my opinion, a capital rule that we be ourselves persuaded of whatever we recommend to others.

Blair here voiced his disapproval of young speakers taking the weaker side of an argument for experience's sake. This only served the development of flimsy and trivial discourse. It also could lead to later imputations on character if done in public.

Ethos in Rhetoric — Audience

The audience should be treated with respect at all times. Even when the speaker has a rather low regard for their general intelligence level this is so.

Even the common people are better judges of argument and good sense than we sometimes think them; and upon any question of business, a plain man, who speaks to the point without art, will generally prevail over the most artful speaker, who deals in flowers and ornament, rather than in reasoning. Much more, when public speakers address themselves to any assembly where there are persons of education and improved understanding, they ought to be careful not to trifle with their hearers.


38 Blair, Lecture XXVII, p. 100.
Although conviction is not won without appeals to reason, Blair realized more than this is needed for persuasion.

For arguments may convince the understanding when they cannot conquer the passions. Irresistible they seem in the calm hours of retreat; but in the sense of action, they often vanish into smoke. There are other and more powerful springs, which influence the great movements of the human frame. In order to operate with success on the active powers, the heart must be gained. Sentiment and affection must be brought to the aid of reason. It is not enough that men believe religion to be a wise and rational rule of conduct, unless they relish it as agreeable and find it to carry its own reward.  

Blair showed his accurate knowledge of audience psychology in other ways. This was a day of sermons of interminable length by modern standards. Hugh Blair limited his discourses to one-half hour and further enhanced their acceptance.

Ethos in Rhetoric—Good Taste

Hugh Blair, as previously mentioned, felt good taste to be innate in human beings. This good taste must be developed and pointed in the right direction through exposure to highly regarded works of art. Passing fads may for a time distort this sense but the test of time will see the "tried" and "true" good taste again predominate. This is true with art, literature and all branches of oratory. Good taste in oratory will recognize that different types of speaking call for different manifestations of character.

The eloquence of a lawyer is fundamentally different from that of a divine or a speaker in parliament; and to have a precise and proper

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idea of the distinguishing character which any kind of public speaking requires, is the foundation of what is called a just taste in that kind of speaking. 40

Not only must one consider the type of speaking being done, he must also realize the type of speaking that is best suited to his person.

No one should ever rise to speak in public without forming to himself a just and strict idea of what suits his own age and character; what suits the subject, the hearers, the place, the occasion, and adjusting the whole train and manner of his speaking on this idea. 41

One aspect of taste is treated in general as a matter of taste and then more specifically as used in the exordium. The degree of vehemence or passion exhibited by the speaker must be considered carefully when conforming to good taste. In most situations "a temperate tone of speech" will be found to be the most useful. On the other hand, "he who is, on every subject, passionate and vehement, will be considered a blusterer, and meet with little regard.

There is also the question of age. A person in authority may use a vehemence that would be quite unsuitable for a younger person. The young are expected to be more modest in their presentation.

However, vehemence and passion expressed in speech can be effective when properly used. On these occasions, one who has mastered the technique can be truly an inspiring speaker. Occasions for such empassioned expression are described below."42

41 Blair, p. 99.
42 Blair, p. 104.
The very aspect of a large assembly, engaged in some debate of moment, and attentive to the discourse of one man, is sufficient to inspire that man with such elevation and warmth, as both gives rise to strong impressions and gives them propriety. Passions easily rise in great assemblies, where the movements are communicated by mutual sympathy between the orator and the audience.43

This type of eloquence, properly used, is certainly one of the highest types of oratory.

That ardor of speech, that vehemence and glow of sentiment which arise from a mind animated and inspired by some great and public object, from the peculiar characteristics of popular eloquence, is its highest degree of perfection.44

This passion and eloquence must be suitable to the occasion and the subject. The warmth should always be genuine, never counterfeit. The speaker should not in the expression of passion lose command of himself or go further than the audience is willing to tolerate. Finally, again Blair reminds us to retain the amenities proper for the time, place and character of the speaker.45

One final word should be said on this subject. The heights of good taste in rhetoric are shown in naturalness in manner and style.

Ethos in Rhetoric—the Exordium

The beginning of the speech can cause the speaker the most trouble and is at the same time the most important portion of the speech for acquiring the good will of the audience.

43 Blair, pp. 102-103.
44 Blair, p. 103.
45 Blair, p. 104.
It is always of importance to begin well; to make a favorable impression at first setting out; when the minds of the hearers, vacant as yet and free, are most disposed to receive any impression easily.\textsuperscript{46}

Generally speaking, there are two kinds of exordiums, the Principium, "where the orator plainly and directly professes his aim in speaking," and the Insinuato:

...where a larger compass must be taken, and where, presuming the disposition of the audience to be much against the orator, he must gradually reconcile them to hearing him before he plainly discovers the point which he has in view.\textsuperscript{47}

Since the first impression of the speaker is to be gained in the exordium, Blair explicitly states what should be done to make that impression as favorable as possible.

All appearances of modesty are favorable and prepossessing. If the orator set out with an air of arrogance and ostentation, the self-love and pride of the hearers will be presently awakened, and will follow him with a suspicious eye throughout all his progress. His modesty should discover itself not only in his expressions at the beginning, but in his whole manner; in his looks, in his gestures, in the tone of his voice....Indeed, the modesty of an introduction should never betray anything mean or abject. It is always of great use to an orator, that together with modesty and deference to his hearers, he should show a certain sense of dignity, arising from a persuasion of the justice or importance of the subject on which he is to speak.\textsuperscript{48}

The exordium should begin without full strength of voice or passion, leaving this for more full development later on. There are occasions and subjects


\textsuperscript{47}Blair, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{48}Blair, p. 110.
which are exceptions to this. Whenever starting vehemently, however, the speaker is cautioned to be certain he can maintain the degree of intensity throughout the discourse. These are the uses for a passionate exordium:

There are cases, however, in which it is allowable for him to set out from the first in high and bold tone, as, for instance, when he rises to defend some cause which has been run down and decried by the public. Too modest a beginning might then be a confession of guilt. By the boldness and strength of his exordium he must endeavor to stem the tide that is against him, and to remove prejudices, by encountering them without fear.  

GEORGE CAMPBELL

Campbell clearly reflected the classical influence as well as current philosophical theories being discussed by his contemporaries. As an ecclesiastic his writings are filled with procedures to be used in homiletics.

This paper will first look at the philosophical concepts that may have shaped Campbell's concept of ethos. Next, specific references to ethos will be referred to. Campbell recognized the different characters in the lawyer, senator and divine speaker. He treated each at some length. Adaptation for the audience will be looked at from the standpoint of Campbell as well as his views on the purpose of the exordium.

Philosophical Views of George Campbell

The philosophical views of Campbell were drawn from a number of sources. James Golden and Edward Corbett pointed to four tenets drawn from Locke, Hume and Hartley.

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49 Blair, p. 110.
1. The mind is separated into faculties.
2. Experimental method is superior to syllogistic reasoning.
3. Ideas are held together by laws of association.
4. Belief and persuasion are dependent on the liveliness of an idea and the force of emotional appeals.  

To these should be added a further discussion of words and their meanings that ties in closely with the association of meanings but goes a bit beyond this.

Even while accepting many ideas from these sources, Campbell found some of their basic conceptions untenable.

When Campbell stated that intuitive evidence consists in the immediate perception of conformity between "conception" and its "archetype," he disavowed, in one bold stroke, the representative theory of ideas which Locke had so reluctantly embraced and which lay at the heart of Berkeley's idealism as well as Hume's skepticism.  

In looking at Campbell's theories of logical truth, Edney also writes of Reid's assessment of Locke and Hume's skepticism.

Neither Locke nor Berkeley, nor Hume, Reid pointed out, produced any evidence for the assumption that all the objects of knowledge are but ideas in the mind. The theory of ideas as objects, he argued, is inconsistent with the "common sense" of mankind.

...It was with Thomas Reid that George Campbell joined hands. There is no question but that his Philosophy of Rhetoric supplemented what Mills calls the "world of argument and illustration" employed by Reid to refute the doctrine of perception by means of ideas.  

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52 Edney, p. 23.
In keeping with this adherence to the viewpoint expressed by Reid and to his classical orientation, Campbell gave his own meaning on "virtue."

One reduceth all the virtues to prudence and is ready to make it clear as sunshine that there neither is nor can be another source of moral good, a right-conducted self-love; another is equally confident that all the virtues are but different modifications of disinterested benevolence; a third will demonstrate to you that veracity is the whole duty of man; a fourth, with more ingenuity and much greater appearance of reason, assures you that the true system of ethics is comprised in one word, sympathy.\textsuperscript{53}

With these noted exceptions, which, as we shall see, are not the exceptions they would first appear to be, we can return to the four tenets derived from Locke and Hume and examine, in turn, the use made of them by Campbell.

1. First, the mind is separated into faculties.

There is some disagreement concerning the extent of Campbell's acceptance of "faculty psychology." Campbell classified the faculties of the human mind identified by the philosophers as the response aims of eloquence. These faculties included understanding and reason, will, appetite and affection, and imagination. While he recognizes the distinctness of these faculties in the collective minds of members of an audience, Campbell is also well-aware of the interrelationships.

On the surface, Campbell appears to be a faculty psychologist. His is not, however, a strict division of faculties. The faculties of understanding, imagination, passion, and will, blend into one another. The understanding assists the imagination, the imagination stimulates the passions, and

\textsuperscript{53}Edney, "Campbell's Lectures of Pulpit Eloquence," \textit{Speech Monographs} (March, 1952) XIX, 3.
the passions move to action. Any one discourse may be completely and thoroughly rational in nature; another may be predominately emotional. Any given speech may be located at any point between these extremes of emotionalism and rationality.\textsuperscript{54}

This use of the various functions of the human mind as the basis for Campbell's recognition of the different ends of speech, affected both the ethos of the speaker in the different situations, and the perceptions of the audience at the time.

Next, Campbell felt the experimental method to be superior to the syllogistic. Here is what may have been an internal inconsistency in Campbell. Though he insisted the mind held certain intuitive truths, he also insists these truths are arrived at by repeated consistent experiences.

There seems to be no question that Campbell confused the "intuitive perception" of truth with the "rational" acquisition of truth. We have noticed that he classified such generalizations as "the course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it is today" as "intuitive" truths. Actually, generalizations of this kind are inductive references, although probably no conscious process of "intel-lection" went into their apprehension. The same may be said if other "intuitive" truths furnished by our author.\textsuperscript{55}

Although Campbell used the uniformity of nature as a fundamental principle of induction, he did not admit the uniformity of nature as a suppressed major premise in reasoning. (As proposed by Richard Whately.) However, Campbell did recognize certain "first truths" on which all others were based.

\textsuperscript{54}Edney, "Campbell's Lectures of Pulpit Eloquence," \textit{Speech Monographs} (March, 1952), XIX, 3.

\textsuperscript{55}Edney, p. 24.
No attentive process of reasoning, he argued, is necessary to arrive at intuitive truth. Intuition furnishes us with first truths. Without first truths, knowledge would be in a sad plight; "the investigation of truth would be an endless and fruitless task; we should be eternally proving, whilst nothing could ever be proved."56

These first "truths" come from three sources: intellection, consciousness and common sense. The first, intellection, is the instant recognition we have of the truth of mathematical relationships, such as one and four make five. Consciousness is our assurance of our own existence—that we are living and breathing entities. It is also the source of mental judgements made by the mind "concerning resemblances or disparities in visible objects, or size in things tangible, darker or lighter tints in colors, stronger or weaker tastes or smells." From "common sense" we derive our assurance of such truths as "whatever has a beginning has a cause." "The course of nature will be the same tomorrow as it is today."

It is apparent that Campbell was in complete accord with Locke and with Mill on the empirical view that intuitionism consists in perceptions derived from sensation or reflection.57

Campbell's theory of "deductive evidence" is quite different from general to specific and in no way relates to syllogistic reasoning. It consists of uninterrupted series of axioms, a chain of intuitions or immediately perceived truths that in themselves mean nothing but together lead to a perfectly conclusive argument. "Assertions opposite to demonstrative evidence, being inconceivable and contradictory are not only false but absurd."58

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56 Edney, p. 24.
57 Edney, p. 24.
The second form of deductive evidence is moral evidence.

Moral evidence is that form of belief which is derived from the actual, though perhaps variable, connexions subsisting among things actually existing. Moral evidence is in reality a group of independent truths, each of which bestows a certain degree of likelihood upon the credibility of a fact....Recognizing, as had Locke, that we think and speak and act upon the basis of propositions that vary in degree from certainty down to improbability, Campbell pointed out that, although we reach toward actual truth or matter of fact through moral evidence, we achieve only variant degrees of likelihood.59

In every instance mentioned, syllogistic style has been abandoned in favor of the empirical or experimental.

Next, Campbell realized that ideas are held together by the laws of association. All we know is perceived through the senses. This is stored in the memory. These two faculties could give us only isolated facts from past or present that have no use without further function.

One could perceive thousands of similar individual facts and yet not perceive universal truth if the mind had not the power of focusing its attention upon qualities which the individual has "in common with the order" while other qualities of the individual remain unnoticed. Campbell agreed with Locke that the generals which remain after we have quit particulars "are only creatures of our own making: their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars....General and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use.60

This ability to associate ideas and impressions is essential to the development of language in Campbell's theory. In ordinary matters it


60 Edney, pp. 23-24.
is natural and easy for the mind to compare words with knowledge of things signified; in matters of an abstruse and intricate nature, or in matters treated in an uncommon manner, reference to fact is more difficult to achieve. There are three kinds of word usage in which we are likely to be imposed by words without meaning: "first, by an exuberance of metaphor; secondly, by the use of unfamiliar terms of a complicated nature (such as church, power, state); and thirdly, in kinds of communication in which the terms employed are very abstract, and consequently of very extensive signification."61

Mere sounds, which are used only as signs and which have no natural connection with the objects of which they are signs, convey knowledge to the mind even though they excite no idea of the things signified. This curious fact is accounted for by an explanation of (1) the connection that subsists among things, (2) the connection that subsists among words and things, and (3) the connection that subsists among words.62

The conclusion drawn from these observations compose Campbell's theory of propositions.

1. No idea is known in isolation—only its relationship to other objects, things or events.
2. "Association of ideas" means propositions to Campbell.
3. Inference is relationship within propositions and between propositions.
4. Propositions are traditional subject-predicate type.
5. Campbell didn't recognize either the hypothetical or disjunctive proposition.
6. Campbell's relation of things (resemblance, identity, equality, contrariety, cause and effect, concomitancy, vicinity in time and place).
7. Propositions are assertions respecting things not ideas of things.
8. He objected to the assertion that the predicate of a proposition is a "name of the same thing of which the subject is a name."63

61 Edney, "Logic," p. 22.
62 Edney, p. 23.
63 Edney, pp. 21-23.
The last point mentioned by Golden and Corbett as originating with Locke and Hume, described belief and persuasion as dependent on the liveliness of ideas and the force of emotional appeals.

Campbell classifies speeches according to the audience reaction desired. He identified the explanatory speech as purposing to inform the listener. The controversial speech is also addressed to the understanding for the purpose of "conquering error" and to produce belief. The commendatory speech pleases the imagination. Stimulation of passions in the pathetic discourse relies on heavy emotional appeal. Persuasive discourse, designed to influence the will, is the most complex form.

The speech to persuade includes all the ends of oral discourse; it informs, convinces, pleases, and moves. It is a combination or blend of reason and emotion which purposes to bring about action. To make me believe it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. In order to persuade, it is always necessary to move the passions. Passion is the mover to action, reason is the guide.64

Though much in the philosophy of George Campbell is directed toward rhetoric, and though many of these theories are derived from the writings of Locke and Hume, there still seems to be enough evidence here to show he had some leanings toward empiricism and even skepticism. However, Campbell recognized there were different levels for truth and our ascertainment of it. There are seen varying degrees of probability from the certainty of "first truths" all the way to the alternate propositions derived from

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64Edney, from Campbell's "Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence," p. 5.
moral evidence. He clearly recognized the different mental faculties but also sees them acting in consort during the rhetorical process called "persuasion."

Campbell's Views of Ethos in Rhetoric

In Campbell's eyes, ethos as proof carried this meaning: "By this we are to understand...that which is obtained reflectively from the opinion entertained of him by the hearers or the character which he bears with them."65 The importance of ethos for the public speaker was recognized by Campbell as being of primary importance.

It was remarked in general, in the preceding chapter, that for promoting the success of the orator, it is a matter of some consequence that, in the opinion of those whom he addreseth, he is both a wise and good man.66

Ethos, no matter what end of speech is sought, is best achieved through thorough education in relevant subject matter. For the preacher, thorough knowledge of the Scriptures is very important. Also included in this education should be the development of the capability allowing for relevant, comprehensive and mutually exclusive partitioning of speech content. The orator also must have a thorough understanding of "the natural and genuine grounds of reasoning...every public speaker should be conversant with the writings of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian...and for the paraphernalia for which these three rhetoricians are almost exclusively responsible."67

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65 McDermott, p. 497.
67 Edney, p. 9. (Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence)
Edney further explains the forms of logic with which the speaker is to be familiar as well as the essential differences in things. This is an understanding of "first truths" compared to those propositions derived from moral evidence. A speaker living in this newly skeptical age was more creditable to his audience when he clearly understood his own position on these factors.

In regard to liberal education, Campbell states emphatically that "whatever be the species of eloquence a man aims to attain, everything that serves to improve his knowledge, discernment and good sense, also serves to improve him as an orator. Also, he remarks that "true logic, it must be acknowledged, is best studied not in the scholastic system, but in the writings of the most judicious and best reasoners on the various subjects supplied by history, science and philosophy."68

The different types of public speakers were expected by their listeners to have different types of character or "ethos." Campbell recognized this and gave his readers an account of what was expected from the senator, the lawyer and the preacher. First, for the senator:

...reputation of sagacity, experience in affairs, and as much integrity as is thought attainable by those called men of the world, will add weight to the words of the senator.

For the lawyer:

...that of skill in his profession, and fidelity in his representation, will serve to recommend what is spoken by the lawyer at the bar.

For the "divine":

But if these characters in general remain unimpeached, the public will be sufficiently indulgent to both in every respect. On the contrary, there is little or no indulgence in regard to his own failings, to be

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68 Edney, p. 10.
expected by the man who is professedly a sort of authorized censor, who hath it in his charge to mark and reprehend the faults of others. And even in the execution of this so ticklish a part of his office, the least excess on either hand exposeth him to censure and dislike. Too much lenity is enough to stigmatize him as lukewarm in the cause of virtue, and too much severity as a stranger to the spirit of the Gospel. 69

The manner of speaking for the preacher is also a matter for discussion and explanation. The delicacy he speaks of should be evident in delivery.

There is a certain delicacy in the character of the preacher which he is never at liberty totally to overlook, and to which, if there appear anything incongruous, either in his conduct or in his public performance, it will never fail to injure their effect. 70

George Cambell shows a departure from the classical concept in his treatment of the audience. This is largely due to his classification of the ends of speech. He treats with "men in general" and then "men in particular" as Aristotle did, but he has a new list of the conditions that operate on the passions of men. These conditions include: probability, plausibility, importance, proximity of time, connection of place, relationship to the persons concerned and the degree of interest in the consequences. 71

When the audience had developed an unfavorable attitude toward the speaker, Campbell recommends the use of some specific techniques:

For this is only endeavoring, by the aid of laughter and contempt, to diminish or even quite undo, the unfriendly emotions that have


70 Campbell, 228.

71 Golden and Corbett, footnote, p. 10.
been raised in the minds of the hearers; or, on
the contrary, by satisfying them of the seriousness
of the subject, and of the importance of the
consequences, to extinguish the contempt, and make
the laughter, which the antagonist wanted to excite,
appear, when examined, no better than madness.\textsuperscript{72}

The exordium or proem of the speech should predispose the audience in favor of the speaker. However, Campbell does not see this as a function for the introduction of a sermon.

Although Campbell is in sympathy with Aristotle's suggestion that the proem remove any unfavorable prepossessions that exist in the minds of the audience, he does not accept it for the pulpit.\textsuperscript{73}

**RICHARD WHATELEY**

In analyzing the views of Richard Whately on concepts of ethos in rhetoric, surely the first thing to consider is his censure of just the type of analysis being given the subject in this work. Whately criticized the perspective that puts morals, politics, law and other subjects all in the realm of rhetoric. He claimed no such concerns for the rhetorician and further doubted any of his contemporaries would seriously consider these questions as being related to the subject.

...some of the ancient writers...even insisted on virtue as an essential qualification for the perfect orator: because a good character, which can in no way be so surely established as by deserving it, has great weight with the audience. These notions are combatted by Aristotle; who attributes them either to the ill-cultured understanding of those who maintained them, or to their arraogant and pretending disposition, i.e., a desire to extol and magnify the art they professed.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72}Golden and Corbett, pp. 221-223.

\textsuperscript{73}Edney, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{74}Golden and Corbett, p. 280.
Whately chooses to limit his work on rhetoric to "argumentative composition," generally and exclusively.\(^75\)

**Philosophy of Whately**

To Whately the province of philosophy included investigation leading to certain conclusions. When the conclusions are made known to others, this is the province of rhetoric. His views are most clearly seen in religious related writings and theories.

If a man begins (as is too plainly a frequent mode of proceeding) by hastily adopting, or strongly leaning to, some opinion which suits his inclination, or which is sanctioned by some authority that he blindly venerates, and then studies with the ultimate diligence, not as an Investigator of Truth, but as an Advocate laboring to prove his point, his talent and his researches, whatever effect they may produce in making converts to his notions, will avail nothing in enlightening his own judgement, and securing him from error.\(^76\)

His religious views held the Word of the Bible to be the truth for Protestants.

The principles that governed the stand he took in all religious controversies was Chillingworth's premise that, "the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of the Protestants. And it was this allegiance to the Scriptures that accounts for the emphasis he puts on testimony in his Elements of Rhetoric."\(^77\)

The skepticism of the day challenged his logical mind to realistically reestablish the validity of Biblical testimony of Miracles that had been questioned and repudiated by David Hume. Whately wrote "Historic Doubts"

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\(^75\)Golden and Corbett, p. 281.

\(^76\)Golden and Corbett, p. 282.

\(^77\)Golden and Corbett, p. 274.
using Hume's own criteria for acceptenace of testimony to prove that Napoleon Bonaparte never really existed. The work eloquently shows the application of Hume's tests for the truth of testimony can be used to prove even well-known facts to be mere myths.\textsuperscript{78}

\textit{Whately on Ethos in Rhetoric}

Quintilian's good man theory came under fire from Whately. He asserted the theory was not so wide spread as the classical writers had imagined—and certainly he felt the practice was even less wide spread. Whately feared the results of a theory that posed all orators as being good. This interpretation ignores Quintilian's statement that the "bad man" is not to be called an orator.

> It seems generally admitted that skill in composition and speaking, liable as it evidently is to abuse, is to be considered on the whole as advantageous to the public...because truth, having an intrinsic superiority over falsehood, may be expected to prevail when the skill of the contending parties is equal; which is more likely to take place, the more widely such skill is diffused.\textsuperscript{79}

Whately simply makes the doctrine of ethos conform to what he observes in orators. He demands excellent traits in the speaker, both because it is the judgement a "wise" man would make and because an audience, in most cases, esteems the good. He also views it as being of primary importance that the orator at least seem to feel the sentiments he is delivering are true and right. "The personal sympathy felt towards one who appears to be delivering his own sentiments, is such, that it usually

\textsuperscript{78} Pomeroy, p. 75.

rivets the attention, even involuntarily, though to a discourse that seems hardly worthy of it."

Whately recognized the same three general components in individual ethos assigned to it by Aristotle. Good character, good will toward the audience and knowledge or intelligence evidenced in the speech will all aid in giving ethos to the speaker.

The qualities of ethos are called good principle, good sense and good will. Whately is speaking of audience opinion, not the true character of the speaker. He does, nevertheless, advise that the speaker possess these qualities. 81

Whately recognized that there is often a "party spirit" or feeling present in the audience to be addressed. This "spirit" or possibly prejudice must be ascertained by the speaker and he must take appropriate steps to offset it. To do this there are strategies that can be employed and these are explained. 82

The ethos of the speaker can play so important a role in the rhetorical process that Whately sees it as a potential threat to an intelligent decision making process.

Whately views this audience preoccupation with character or personage of the speaker a primary cause of inability to judge accurately. He sees little hope for remedying the situation. He also holds with Aristotle on the advisability of projecting wise, amiable and generous sentiments toward the audience. 83

80 Whately, p. 377.
81 Whately, pp. 122-123.
82 Golden and Corbett, p. 145.
83 Golden and Corbett, pp. 145-150.
Other advice for the effective orator includes the concealment of any obvious manifestation of rhetorical skill. Obvious rhetorical devices serve to arouse suspicion in the audience. The natural and unaffected style of speaking is to be highly preferred to give the audience the impression of sincerity and spontaneity. Below is a summary of suggestions for establishment of ethos with an audience.

1. Speaker with the authority of Pericles may explicitly state his good qualities of character.
2. Maxims and truisms may not be used indiscriminately.
3. Speech must be adapted to the education, profession, nation and character of the audience.
4. To the degree the speaker's arguments disagree with the audience they will tend to depreciate his intellectual and moral worth. ⑧⁴

In regard to this last point Whately did not mean to say that no speaker should attempt a topic that was not already accepted by his audience. This would remove the purpose and all persuasion from rhetoric. He did mean to show the speaker the disposition of the audience to be overcome. The "divine" particularly will often find himself talking about a subject the listeners would rather ignore.

The preacher, who is bound to be asserting things the audience does not accept, should win people by degrees—not demand too much at one time. Begin speech with propositions most people will agree with. ⑧⁵

Whately, in conclusion, cautioned that weak arguments would not be enhanced by sublime language. To enhance ethos with the audience, speak because you have something to say. Moral excellence in the speaker is shown in lack of display or ostentation in manner. Delivery should be natural, not to the point of being careless, but at the same time not governed by strict rules.

⑧⁵Golden and Corbett, p. 282.
This discussion of Richards' philosophy will necessarily include his views on rhetoric. Inherent in Richards' view of man is his symbol-using power. This is the quality he has that sets him apart and above the other life forms. He speaks of this as the stimulus-response pattern that in its most primitive form is common to all life. The response may accept or reject the stimulus and on this basis it is stored within the memory for recall at will. Man recalls these past stimuli to compare with current ones in a constant search for similarity. Richards has defined four philosophies related to this pattern.

1. Sorting

The organization of these stimuli is needed to make them useful as references for future experiences. Sorting is a part of this process.

A sensation would be something that was just so, on its own, a datum; as such we have none. Instead we have perceptions, responses whose character comes to them from the past as well as the present occasion. A perception is never just of an it; perception takes whatever it perceives as a thing of a certain sort. All thinking from the lowest to the highest—whatever else it may be—is sorting.¹

2. **Abstraction**

Man's response to a stimulus can at one and the same time be biological, emotional and conceptual. It is in the use of language it becomes conceptual. All three responses may fight for dominance within the individual in any stimulus-response situation. The process of selecting one of these patterns is abstracting and is used as a basis for sorting. In other words, instead of a conceptualized, or worded response, the individual might make a completely emotional one. It is reason that makes the difference.

Richards' answer to this complexity of choice in the abstractive process is the reason whose function it is to control both the emotional and the conceptual elements in the process in a way that ensures the proper, realistic, and balanced whole meaning of the event. It is under the guidance and control of the reason that the process of abstraction can produce true and realistic abstract symbols.²

Inherent in this process is the context or environment of the event—where and under what circumstances the event takes place. From the observed environment of the event we may recall other circumstances in similar environments which will affect our immediate reason or judgement affecting the abstraction or choice of responses to make in the given situation.

Richards' final admonition about the abstraction is that we should remember it is a mental activity, and valid only in that sense. In the discussion of parts of context and the conflict between emotion and intellect, we tend to think of these elements as really separate and distinct. This is one of the liabilities of abstraction. The parts of the

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context are one, and the desiring of the emotions is never quite separable from the thinking of the intellect. As Richards puts it, "We cannot, in fact, wholly leave off wanting. No thinking can be motiveless." 3

3. An Approach to Metaphor

According to Richards' theory the best explanation for language theory is metaphor. In metaphor, a quality is abstracted from one reference and a quality from another put in its place for the purpose of clarification or vividness. In respect to this type of metaphor, Richards says, "in the simplest formation, when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose manner is a resultant of the interaction." 4

Two terms are adopted by Richards in his discussion of metaphor as a basis for language. "Tenor" is the underlying idea or principle subject in the instance. The term "vehicle" is used to refer to the selected characteristics used to make the tenor clearer or more vivid. The "ground" refers to the relationship between the two. With this background, Richards is ready to say that language is metaphorical.

Richards' most emphatic contention about metaphor, thus explained, is that language is naturally metaphorical. Since metaphor is just abstraction for the purpose of clearer and more vivid communication, since it seems to be the nature of our thinking to be perpetually busy with sorting and classifying references and comparing contexts and their parts, and since our language symbolizes this thinking, it seems to Richards that our language must be highly, habitually, and even naturally metaphorical. 5

3 Fogarty, p. 36.
4 Richards, p. 93.
5 Fogarty, p. 38.
Richards takes issue with Aristotle's contention that the art of metaphor cannot be taught to another but is a sign of genius. His counter-contention is that metaphor-making ability comes naturally to ordinary people and that we cannot get through "three sentences of ordinary fluid discourse without it."\(^6\)

4. Thought-Word-Thing Relationships

In discussing Richards' theories it is obvious that his emphasis is operational. Rather than concern for the nature of thoughts, words and things, Richards is showing an interest in "how words work."\(^7\)

Terminology used by Richards in this explanation has "reference" standing for thought, "symbol" for word or language unit, and "referrent" for the actual event or object. The reference will include not just the immediate thought but all the concommitant elements and those from past experiences that go along with it. The "sign" is the one stimulus in the whole event that serves to remind the subject of the rest of the details. The "context" is the whole event with the psychological portion occurring within the individual and the external referring to the actual event. The "engram" is the residual trace of some past excitation left in some psychological part of the organism. The relationships between the three primary terms, reference, symbol and referrent, are shown in the diagram below.

\(^6\) Richards, p. 92.

\(^7\) Richards, p. 8.
As can be seen in Richards' diagram, there is a causal relationship between the reference and the symbol. In other words, the communicator using a certain word or expression can cause his hearers to form a thought somewhat similar to his own. And, conversely, the thought or reference can cause, at least in part, the use of a certain symbol to express it.8

The second relationship, between the reference and the referent, is also causal and is so because the referent has acted on the organism in such a manner as to cause it to have some reference about it. This causation can be from either the current stimulus or it can be from past stimulations or the memory of such stimulations.

But the last relationship--and this is the important one for Richards--is not directly causal, nor is the relationship a real one in the sense of the other two. This "imputed" relationship points to the key principle from which stems Richards' theory of propositional truth, his value norms, his theory of definition, and the validity of his criteria for accurate interpretation. It is the principle stating that there is no referential relation between the symbol and the referent, between the word and the thing. To phrase it differently, the symbol, or word, does not really "refer to" the thing or referent except indirectly through the thought or reference. The symbol merely "stands for" the thing referred to by the reference. Whereas it symbolizes the reference it does not symbolize the thing.9

To Richards it is this relationship that accounts for much of the ambiguities and misunderstood messages in communication. When people mistakenly assume that the symbol and the referent are directly related they lose sight of the fact that the mental reference for the symbol can vary from person to person and within a person at different times. It is to

8Fogarty, pp. 41-42.

9Richards, pp. 10-12.
this reference that the symbol refers and not to the referent at all except by the indirect relationship existing between the two.

This key contention about the indirectness of the relationship between the symbol and the referent is of major importance to Richards, because a failure to understand and apply it is, for him, at the root of most of the problems of conceptual meaning. The confusions of ambiguity and word shifts, multiple meaning, and out-of-place definitions are, in his theory, at least partly ascribable to the making of direct relationships between symbols and referents.10

To understand the symbol one must constantly check the reference.

Richards deplores "any absolute doctrine of proper meaning which assumes a direct, stable and real relation between word and thing."11 From the standpoint of the public speaker, this can be a most important concept.

For one word or symbol there can be as many references or thoughts as there are persons to think them. The communicator faces as many interpretations of his symbols as he has hearers, and even each of these is momentarily changing. The hearer may be sure, when he hears a symbol, that it can mean something at least slightly different from any meaning it may have had at any other time in his hearing.12

Richards' Theory of Definition

Traditional definitions of words lead to four difficulties that should be avoided by a practical theory of definition. There are confusions between real and verbal definitions or the defining of words and things. Confusion of the symbol and the referent, forgetting the defini-

10 Richards, p. 2.
11Fogarty, p. 43.
12Fogarty, pp. 43-44.
tions are suited to the occasion in which they are used, and confusing
intensive with extensive definitions.

Richards' answer to these four problems is the
principle of indirect relationship between the
symbol and the referent. Whenever there is a
difficulty about what a symbol means, when there
is a question of definition, look for the refer-
rent. A referent common to all concerned, in a
discussion for instance, must be found.13

The range of definition is falsely limited because of the human persistent
tendency to assume words have unalterable meanings. Words are actually
defined according to their ultimate use. A definition designed for use in
a discussion may be quite different from one designed for operational pur-
poses. These speculative inquiries result in Richards' instruments of
comprehending.

Since Richards is concerned about words and their changing meanings,
it is at all times wise to define the terms he is explaining the way he
intended them to be interpreted. Here "comprehending," "meaning," and
"interpreting" are all of primary importance to the understanding of
Richards' theories.

"Comprehending," to Richards means, "an accurate and true under-
standing, but is described...as the nexus or context, or the network of
contexts, that connect a whole series of past occurrences of partially
similar utterances in partially similar situations. This comprehension
is the seizing of meaning."14 By meaning, Richards is talking about the
reference with its contexts. Interpretation includes both the processes
of seizing this meaning and having the comprehension.15

13 Fogarty, p. 45.
14 Fogarty, p. 48.
15 Fogarty, p. 48.
Richards lists seven speculative instruments that he hopes will be the basis for a new rhetoric. At various times he has called these "tasks of rhetoric," "aims of discourse," "language function," and "kinds of meaning."16

1. Indicating is pointing out the referent in the symbol situation.
2. Characterizing says something about the referent, sorts it out from others.
3. Realizing is the sense of understanding, having the reference before the mind more fully or vividly than in times of less realization.
4. Valuing assesses the saying from the standpoint of worth or obligation.
5. Influencing marks the state of wanting to change or preserve unchanged whatever the utterance in question concerns.
6. Controlling the instrument is making the decisions regarding the influence mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
7. Purposing is the measuring of the intention or motive of the utterance.17

There is no necessary set of relationships among or between these instruments. In Richards' speculation they may vary independently but they very seldom do so. The instruments actually have mutual control over each other. These instruments are, of course, used by the hearer. However, they can also be used by the speaker or originator of the message to clarify and objectivize his communication.

These instruments as components of his system of comprehension are the heart and the head of Richards' proposed new rhetoric, the core of a discipline that will take the place of the old rhetoric among the liberal arts. A grasp of such things and much practice and exercising in them is Richards' tentative answer to the

16 Fogarty, p. 48.

17 Fogarty, pp. 49-51.
rhetoric problem. As we saw in the early pages of this analysis of Richards' theory, he is dissatisfied with the way current rhetoric concentrates upon the mere devices of persuasive composition and speech. He wants a whole treatment of man's symbol-using power in prose, its philosophy as well as its practical application. He proposes that this wholeness should be reflected in a new teaching rhetoric for classroom use.\(^{18}\)

To Richards, rhetoric is the art of adapting discourse to its end. His entire philosophy is devoted to this purpose. Theories of ethos or character for the speaker, adapting oneself or discourse to the audience or listeners in question, are all equated with the clarification of meaning and nothing more. Certainly truth would seem, in this scheme, where values and definitions are changeable, an entity that is defined in terms of the purposes and needs of the communicants at the time in question.

His schematic idea of methodology is to start with whatever sticks up as the most urgent and pertinent element of a problem, and then work in any direction at all that has the scent of truth. The important thing, seemingly to Richards, is to be able to seek in any direction, at any time.\(^{19}\)

KENNETH BURKE

To Burke "man pours all his energies into establishing and maintaining his personal world of hierarchic order." He further elaborates on this same thought:

His survival depends on it. And rhetoric is his specific means of seeking or keeping that order. Not only in intrapersonal relations, where man uses his rhetoric on himself, where he holds inner parliament as both speaker and hearer,

\(^{18}\) Fogarty, pp. 54-55.

\(^{19}\) Fogarty, p. 32.
but, in all his interpersonal, intergroup, and interclass relations, he is striving for status in an accepted order, for survival by social balance with his inner self and with his world.\textsuperscript{20}

For Burke, entreaty, overture, politeness and diplomacy are all forms of rhetoric courtship employed for the sake of order. Rhetoric leads men through the conflicts and scramble of everyday competition for the necessities of life. Burke sees the possibilities for rhetoric to also be the conveyance that would mean new peace and order for a war-weary world.

Richards approached rhetoric from the psychological order, Burke's method is psychosocial. The scientific method that interested Richards is replaced by the dramatic approach of Burke.\textsuperscript{21}

There are six aspects to be explored in consideration of Burke's concept of rhetoric.

1. Burke's background and approach to rhetoric.
2. The pentad format.
3. The theory of abstraction and the negative.
4. The theory of identification and definition.
5. His philosophy of literary form.
6. The instrumental applications of the theory.\textsuperscript{22}

**The Pentad Format**

Burke was aware of a multi-dimensional view of every human, symbol producing act. There are always these five points of view:

Scenes, the environmental point of view; act, the thing itself as represented in an idea; agent, the derivational or efficient cause aspect of the thing;


\textsuperscript{21}Fogarty, p. 58.

\textsuperscript{22}Fogarty, p. 58.
agency, the "how" and "with what assistance" of the thing or act; and purpose, the agent's motivation.23

With this method Burke hopes to be able to ascertain the multiple aspects of the meanings of symbols used to organize and protect our position in the order of existence. Burke states that he often writes in "pantalogue" to be certain to cover all possible aspects of a situation.

Theory of Abstraction and Negative

Burke's ideas of word-thought-thing relationships give a condition of reality to the existence of ideas or thought as representing the object conceptually.

...Burke can be considered as having two things to say about abstraction. First, it is the characteristically human ability that makes a rational man specifically rational. Not only is this abstracting power, which Burke calls "generalization," the specific element of his essence as a man, but it lifts his nature, in kind as well as in degree, above that of other animals.24

The negative comes into play in the highest kind of symbol-using activity of which man is capable. This is symbol-using about symbols themselves or the conscious use of words to talk about other words. The theory of the negative comes into play here as the difference between human and animal sorting. With each idea reducible to the material there is no need for the metaphysical reality of ideas. Burke isolated or identified the idea that cannot be reduced to an image and materialized.


24 Fogarty, p. 65.
That idea was the idea of the "no" or "not," or, in other words, the negative. It is Burke's contention that "not" can be conceived, in an idea, and yet one can have no image of it. All the images one has in connection with it are not really its image but images of the real things of which it is the negation. 25

This gives the human being the unique capability of being able to conceive an idea for which there is not image. Earlier in this study (page 27), there is a reference to a sophisticated topic for disputation "older than Protagoras himself," that says there can be no spoken falsehood for the false has no existence. However, nothing can be conceived or spoken of that has no existence. It is impossible to speak of the non-existent. Here, 2500 years later, is the antithesis.

Though idea and image have become merged in the development of language, the negative provides the instrument for splitting them apart. For the negative is an idea; there can be no image of it. But in imagery there is no negative. 26

This leaves the negative as the sole example of an idea that cannot be reduced to material.

Theory of Definition and Identification

Burke's theory of definition is empirical in the sense that he looks realistically at the actual practice as used in rhetorical situations. From observation he has isolated and identified four types of ambiguity that may arise in the process of definition. He then states his position of the use that is made of these in the creation of meaning in speech.

25 Fogarty, p. 66.

The four types of ambiguity are:

1. Contextual definition describes a class or group in terms of their environment without taking into account the characteristics of members of the group.

2. Derivational definition defines by source. "Sources, however, are often so highly abstract in a definitional statement that they allow many different meanings. Burke examines the terms 'general,' 'generic,' and 'genitive' etymologically and finds ambiguity."\(^\text{27}\)

3. Circumference shifting in the tendency to shift the agreed on definition of a term to a new area as a discussion progresses.

4. Scope-reduction-deflection are used under varying circumstances to change the scene of the act.\(^\text{28}\)

These ambiguities are the symbol-user's way of getting away from kinds of meanings that do not fit his motivation. They are often used to retain ethos with the audience when getting a desired point accepted.

...the four kinds of definitional ambiguity... (make) for unclear communication and reception, but...they are the symbol-user's conscious or unconscious ways of getting away from the kind of meaning that does not fit his motivations. It is part of the fortunate richness of language that makes it possible for people to adjust themselves to reality. Personally and subjectively, it allows them to be blind to reality in one spot and not another. The great point about this kind of ambiguity, as about every kind of motivational manipulation of symbols, is that it must be understood thoroughly by those who wish to receive and communicate real meaning—motivational meaning.\(^\text{29}\)

To Burke, then, ambiguities are not undesirable in communication, but need to be studied with a view to clarifying the resources of ambiguity. For

\(^{27}\text{Fogarty, p. 69.}\)

\(^{28}\text{Fogarty, pp. 68-71.}\)

\(^{29}\text{Fogarty, p. 71.}\)
example, people in a dialectical give and take have subjective blind spots due to different motivations. In the give and take of discussion they may light up each others blind spots, fill out contexts, round out and unify circumstances, and generally come to some degree of mutual agreement in understanding and action. Burke lists motivational ambiguities used by people not, necessarily, to deceive, but often merely to fit the requirements of the moment. Pair terms such as love-duty, piety-impiety, the sacrifice and the kill, illustrate ambiguity of motivation and of terms in a similar fashion.

Often, too, the symbol-user will build what Burke calls eulogistic and dyslogistic labels for his acts, that enables him to indulge, whether consciously or not, for himself or for others, in limitless motivational window dressing. Depending on one's known or unknown motive or situation, he can describe industry either as "planned economy" or as "regimentation." Care with details can be labelled "fussiness" or "painstaking method."30

It is interesting to note here that neither alternative is given preference over the other. The terms are used to adapt to the necessities of the situation as they arise.

I am merely attempting to suggest that a terminology of motives is not evasive or self-deceptive, but is moulded to fit our general orientation as to purposes, instrumentalities, the "good life," etc.31

Identification

The identification Kenneth Burke speaks of is in reality consubstantiation. Two people, different in other ways, may have one common factor in which they are substantially the same.

30 Fogarty, p. 74.
31 Fogarty, p. 73.
A doctrine of consubstantiality, either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way of life. For substance, in the old philosophies, was an act; and a way of life is an acting together; and in acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial.32

When using identification or consubstantiality to persuade an audience, a speaker proceeds according to their way of thinking. When using emotion, the speaker feels the way the audience will be expected to feel. On another occasion he will identify with some characteristic of the audience. When talking to an audience of Boy Scouts, he might describe a scout troop he belonged to as a boy.33

It is division, or partisanship, within any group of people that creates a need for identification. It deals with one side of a proposition as opposed to the other. Within a partisan group members share an identification and in this way it serves union and cooperation.

Identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because there is division. Identification is compensatory to division. If men were not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.34

Fogarty sums up Burke's theory of identification as "temporarily and topically assuming the rational, emotional, and motivational level of one's audience for the purpose of communicating motivational meaning."35

33Fogarty, p. 75.
34Burke, "Rhetoric of Motives," p. 22.
35Fogarty, p. 76.
The Philosophy of Literary Form

The philosophy here alluded to deals with kinds of form, the literary symbol, ideology, eloquence, manner and style. In the area of form, Burke speaks of the innate, internal patterns of expectancy within humans that are part of psychological and psychobiological patterns. The patterns are the innate forms.

They involve the basic arrangements or processes like the succession of the seasons, stages of growth, contrast of opposites, and so on. Following these innate expectancies is the pattern of form in style of writing. Burke calls these forms of style or technical forms "an arousing and fulfillment of desires. That is, style has form when it builds up for an expectancy, with an innate form or pattern, and then answers that expectancy by satisfying it." 36

An exception that Burke makes to this general rule for building and fulfilling of desires comes in the informative communication.

Another thing to be noted is the antithesis between form and information in Burke's theory. When a literary product lacks form, it is usually because it is that type of communication which has as its purpose simply to relate facts as they are. Even though this kind of objective exposition is hardly possible in the strictest purity, present-day science aims at it as an ideal. Between this informational communication and literature of the richest form there can, of course, be literature with varying proportions of the two. 37

The literary symbol is seen by Burke as the "verbal parallel to a pattern of experience." 38 The actual experience being cited is not part of a pattern with which the listeners are personally familiar. However, some

36 Fogarty, p. 78.
37 Fogarty, p. 79.
38 Fogarty, pp. 79-80.
part of the experience will relate to a similar one that is more frequent and familiar. Through the recall and association, the audience receives the meaning from the speaker. The experience to which the audience relates may be of smaller magnitude than the one referred to by the speaker, but it allows the listener to understand what he is hearing. Mark Antony used this sort of symbol when he showed the ingratitude of Caesar's friends who had responded to his friendship with betrayal and murder.

Burke's understanding of ideology was that it was a general belief or judgment that the artist, orator, or writer can be sure the audience has.

The more popular type of newspaper makes use of such ideologies when its news articles on juvenile crime, let us say, imply that teenagers ought to obey and respect their elders; or its news articles on strikes imply two conflicting ideologies, the living wage and the need for public order. A symbol with the appropriate experience pattern and based upon an ideology is charged with considerable power. 39

Style and manner will tell the speaker what to put where and how much should go there. Eloquence, joined with the other two, serves to give the discourse the interest and appeal to gain acceptance from the audience.

Some Instrumental Applications of Burke's Theory

The pentad is cited as the means of interpretation of communication. In its broadest application it answers all questions that might be asked about a problem. The categories are broad and within their confines will be found room for every possible question that might arise. 40

39 Fogarty, p. 81.
40 Fogarty, p. 82.
Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose become the "pentad" for pondering the problem of human motivation. Among these various terms grammatical "ratios" prevail which have rhetorical implications. One might illustrate by saying that a certain quality of scene calls for an analogous quality of act. Hence, if a situation is said to be of a certain nature, a corresponding attitude toward it is implied. 41

The explanation given for this cites the speaker who implored that President Roosevelt be given "unusual powers" because the country was in an "unusual international situation." 42 This focus on circumstances as a determinant in the quality of the action is related to Aristotle's treatment of motivation.

Strongly allied with the classicists throughout all his works in both his ideas and his methodology, Burke shows indebtedness to Aristotle for his treatment of motivation. Taking a clue from Aristotle's consideration of the "circumstances" of an action, Burke concludes that "In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that means the act,...and another that names the scene;...also, you must indicate what person or kind of person performed the act, what means or instruments he used, and the purpose." 43

The ratio between the scene and the act may be used either to show that a certain policy had to be adopted, or that one should be adopted.

The application of the identification principles to rhetoric is two-fold. Identification may be used in persuasion and it may be used as an end in itself.


42 Nichols, p. 109.

43 Nichols, p. 109.
As for the precise relationship between identification and persuasion as ends of rhetoric, Burke concludes, "we might well keep in mind that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interests; and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience. So, there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion, identification (consubstantiality) and communication (the nature of rhetoric as 'addressed'). But, in given instances, one or another of these elements may serve best for extending a line of analysis in some particular direction."

The other purpose of identification in rhetoric, as an end in itself, is:

Identification, at its simplest level, may be a deliberate device, or a means, as when a speaker identifies his interests with those of his audience. But identification can also be an "end," as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other." They are thus not necessarily acted upon by a conscious external agent, but may act upon themselves to this end. Identification "includes the realm of transcendence."

In Burke's concept of rhetoric, the sense of "morals" or "ethics" is introduced on the intrapersonal level when the process of persuasion is turned inward in the process of justification for one's stand on some issue.

By considering the individual self as "audience" Burke brings morals and ethics into the realm of rhetoric. He notes that a "modern 'post-Christian' rhetoric must also concern itself with the thought that, under the heading of appeal to audiences, would also be included any ideas or images privately addressed to the individual self for moralistic or incantatory purposes. For you become your own audience...when you become involved in stylistic subterfuges for presenting your own case to yourself in sympathetic terms....Therefore, the "individual

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45 Nichols, pp. 101-102.
person, striving to form himself in accordance with
the communicative norms that match the cooperative
ways of his society, is by the same token concerned
with the rhetoric of identification.146

Ethos, as the character of the speaker, the total of habits,
customs, is thus very closely allied to Burke's theory of identification.
Whenever the speaker is using identification, interpersonally to an audi-
ence or intrapersonally to self, he is identifying and establishing ethos.

RICHARD WEAVER

There are two orientations that are considered essential to any
study of the writings of Richard Weaver. The first of these is his poli-
tical conservatism and the second, his Platonic idealism.

...Weaver championed the Agrarian ideal of individual
ownership of private property and disdain of science
as inadequate to deal with values. He desired in
society law, order and cohesive diversity. The just
and ideal society, he believed, must reflect real
hierarchy and essential distinctions. An orderly
society following the vision of a Good Purpose,
with men harmoniously functioning in their proper
stations in the structure, constituted Weaver's goal.47

The Platonic idealist in Weaver strenuously rejected the theories of the
general semanticist and progressive educator.

Secondly, Weaver was a devoted Platonic idealist.
Belief in the reality of transcendentals, the
primacy of ideas, and the view that form is prior
to substance constituted his philosophical founda-
tion. While not a Platonist in all matters, he yet

46 Nichols, pp. 105-106.

47 Richard L. Johannesen, Rennard Strickland and Ralph Eubanks,
eds., "Richard M. Weaver on the Nature of Rhetoric: An Interpretation,"
Language is Sermonic (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
looked for societal and personal salvation to ideals, essences, and principles rather than to the transitory, the changing, and the expedient. 48

This study of the writings of Richard Weaver will consider first, Weaver's conception of the nature of knowledge. Next, the nature of man in regard to the scientific interpretation opposed to the human qualities that defy scientific analysis will be looked at from Weaver's perspective. Here also will come a discussion of Weaver's observation that "as a man speaks so he is." Four sources of authority are the basis for this "classification" of men by argument sources. 49 The discussion of Weaver will conclude with statements of Weaver's concepts of rhetoric and the functions of the teacher.

The Nature of Knowledge

Central to understanding other theories developed by Richard Weaver is his concept of the nature of knowledge. His concept was complex but did note three orders of knowledge.

He partially agreed with Mortimer Adler that there are three "orders" of knowledge. First is the level of particulars and individual facts, the simple data of science. Second is the level of theories, propositions, and generalizations about these facts. Third is the level of philosophic evaluations and value judgements about such theories. At this third level, ideas, universals, and first principles function as judgment standards. Knowledge based on particulars alone and on raw physical sensations is suspect since it is incomplete knowledge. True knowledge is of universal and first principles. 50

48 Johannesen, p. 11.
49 Johannesen, pp. 21-25.
50 Johannesen, p. 12.
This knowledge of universals was to be arrived at in three ways: through dialectic, the ability to differentiate existents into categories, and through "intuition, the ability to grasp 'essential correspondences.'"\(^{51}\) Certainly Weaver's concepts of the "good" were part of his understanding of the nature of knowledge.

The ultimate "goods" in society were of central concern to Weaver. Reality for him was a hierarchy in which the ultimate Idea of the Good constituted the value standard by which all other existents could be appraised for degree of goodness and truth. Truth to him was the degree to which things and ideas in the material world conform to their ideals, archetypes, and essences.\(^{52}\)

**Nature of Man**

During the Nineteenth Century a belief in the all-powerful and revealing scientific method entered our way of thinking. The Industrial Revolution had already developed a method for use in study of the physical world and the resultant material advantages confounded the minds of the Nineteenth Century philosopher. Certainly it seemed desirable to apply the same methods to the humanities that had done so much for the physical side of our existence. The process began. Experimentation moved from the physics and chemistry laboratories into the psychology and rhetoric classrooms. Men were to be analyzed in the same manner as chemicals and physical forces. To do this men had to be reduced to chemicals and physical forces. The result, Weaver points out, has been to downgrade the study of rhetoric and to demean the "human" or "emotional" qualities of men.\(^{53}\)

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51 Johannesen, p. 12.

52 Johannesen, p. 12.

In this case we have to deal with the most potent of cultural causes, an alteration of man's image of man. Something has happened in the recent past to our concept of what man is; a decision was made to look upon him in a new light, and from this decision new bases of evaluation have proceeded, which affect the public reputation of rhetoric. This changed concept of man is best described by the word "scientistic," a term which denotes the application of scientific assumptions to subjects which are not wholly comprised of naturalistic phenomena.  

Weaver goes on to explain that this led to man's efforts to deny the emotional side of his being.

From this datum it was an easy inference that men ought increasingly to become scientists, and again, it was a simple derivative from this notion that man at his best is a logic machine, or at any rate an austere unemotional thinker. Furthermore, carried in the train of this conception was the thought, not often expressed, or course, that things would be better if men did not give in so far to being human in the humanistic sense.

What was included in this "humanistic sense" were the capacities to feel and suffer, to know pleasure, emotionality, the capacity for aesthetic satisfaction. It was generally felt any such experiences were to be mistrusted and such inclinations in the individual were better suppressed. Rhetoric had always recognized this "human" side of human beings and was therefore thrown into greater disrepute.

Under the force of this narrow reasoning, it was natural that rhetoric should pass from a status in which it was regarded as of questionable worth to a still lower one in which it was positively condemned. For the most obvious truth about rhetoric is that its object is the whole man.

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54 Weaver, p. 203.
55 Weaver, p. 204.
56 Weaver, p. 205.
Weaver recognized that man's fundamental humanness resides in four areas:

He held that man's fundamental humaness is founded in four faculties, capacities, or modes of apprehension. Man possesses a rational or cognitive capacity which gives him knowledge; an emotional or aesthetic capacity which allows him to experience pleasure, pain, and beauty; and ethical capacity which determines orders of goods and judges between right and wrong; and a religious capacity which provides yearning for something infinite and gives man a glimpse of his destiny and ultimate nature.57

Plato's influence on Weaver may in part account for his tri-partite division of man's nature. Though the divisions are not the same, both did adhere to the same type perception of the nature of man.

Weaver used a tripartite division of body, mind, and soul to further explain man's essential nature. The body, man's physical being, houses the mind and soul during life but extracts its due through a constant downward pull toward indiscriminate and excessive satisfaction of sensory pleasure....Man's mind or intellect provides him with the potential to apprehend the structure of reality, define concepts, and rationally order ideas....Man's soul or spirit--depending upon whether it has been trained well or ill--guides the mind and body toward love of the good or toward love of physical pleasures...58

It has been mentioned that central to Weaver's rhetorical theories was his political conservatism. This is reflected in his thinking about the nature of man as indicated from the stylistic characteristics and modes of argument he uses in his speech. Weaver pointed out that a frequent use of the word "but" indicated a balanced point of view toward world affairs.

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57 Johannesen, pp. 13-14.

The modes of argument were even more specific indicators of a person's philosophical orientation.

"A man's method of argument is a truer index of his beliefs than his explicit profession of principles," Weaver held as a basic axiom. "A much surer index to a man's political philosophy," he felt, "is his characteristic way of thinking, inevitably expressed in the type of argument he prefers." Nowhere does a man's rhetoric catch up with him more completely than in "the topics he chooses to win other men's assent." 59

Weaver looked to the Aristotelian topoi for the arguments that would determine the philosophy of the speaker. These topics, used as the basis for argument in persuasive speeches, Weaver ranked from most ethically desirable to the least. The basis for his judgement was the philosophic conception of reality and knowledge. The most ethically desirable topic was that that relied on genus or on definition.

A speaker would make the highest order of appeal by basing his argument on genus or definition. Argument from genus involves arguing from the nature or essence of things. It assumes that there are fixed classes and that what is true of a given class may be imputed to every member of that class...Definitions should be rationally rather than empirically sustained. Good definitions should be stipulative, emphasizing what-ought-to-be, rather than operative, emphasizing what-is...Weaver also included argument from fundamental principles and arguments from example...He believed that argument from genus or definition ascribe "to the highest reality qualities of stasis, immutability, external perdurance." 60

Argument from similitude or analogy was placed second in Weaver's order of the topics. He noted that some of our deepest intuitions about

59 Johannesen, p. 20.

60 Johannesen, p. 22.
the world around us are expressed in the form of comparisons. Although not able to portray the actual essence of the thing at the moment, the use of the comparison indicates an awareness of it.

In this mode of argument are embraced analogy, metaphor, figuration, comparison, and contrast. ...The user of an analogy hints at an essence he cannot at the moment produce. Weaver asserted that "behind every analogy lurks the possibility of a general term."61

Third in the hierarchy of topics is cause and effect. In this category Weaver includes argument from consequences.

This method of argument and its subvarieties, he felt, characterized the radical and the pragmatist. Causal argument operates in the realm of "becoming" and thus in the realm of flux. Argument from consequences attempts to forecast results of some course of action, either very desirable or very undesirable. The results are a determining factor for one in deciding whether or not to adopt a proposed action. Arguments from consequences, Weaver observed, usually are completely "devoid of reference to principle or defined ideas."62

The fourth and least desired of the topics is argument from circumstance. This is the mark of the true liberal in Burke's eyes. Here is one who is easily impressed by existing tangibles--with the status quo.

The arguers from circumstance, concerned not with "conceptions of verities but qualities of perceptions," lack moral vision and possess only the illusion of reality...."Actually," he explains, "this argument amounts to a surrender of reason. Maybe it expresses an instinctive feeling that in this situation reason is powerless. Either you change fast or you get crushed. But surely it would be a counsel of desperation to try only this argument in a world suffering from aimlessness and threatened with destruction."63

61 Johannesen, p. 23.


63 Johannesen, p. 25.
Weaver has been criticized for his narrow view of criticism for ascertaining the relative conservativeness or liberalness of a speaker. He has overemphasized the "agency" of Burke's pentad at the expense of the agent, act, scene and purpose. Nevertheless, the system was meant to show a basic quality of reason deeply rooted in the mind. Those who naturally turn to a principle and definition for their arguments have the cast of mind that is less likely to be swayed by changing circumstances. On the other hand, one who consistently chooses circumstance or expediency as the premise for argument is fully tuned to a society in flux and is ready to suit his arguments to the needs of the moment.

Weaver's Concept of Rhetoric

Richard Weaver saw rhetoric as necessarily concerning itself with the right and wrong of policies and actions. By its very nature, rhetoric has to function in an advisory capacity and those who practice it are advisors.

Rhetoric is advisory; it has the office of advising men with reference to an independent order of goods and with reference to their particular situation as it relates to these. The honest rhetorician, therefore, has two things in mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically, and a consideration of the special considerations of his auditors. Toward both of these he has a responsibility.64

Weaver, always the conservative, was deeply influenced by classic rhetoric in his conceptions of the nature of the art. He, at one point, widened the scope of rhetoric beyond the purely linguistic.

64 Johannesen, p. 17.
As his writings on rhetoric show, he was familiar with the ancient theories of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. And Plato's views on the subject held a special attraction for him. The influence of Kenneth Burke is also clearly reflected in Weaver's writings on rhetoric. At one point Weaver views rhetoric as a process of making identifications and he widens the scope of rhetoric beyond linguistic forms to include a "rhetoric of matter or scene," as in the instance of a bank's erecting an imposing office building to strengthen its image.65

The Platonic idealist in Weaver perceived rhetoric as constantly showing men "better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal which only the intellect can apprehend and only the soul have affection for."66

The Aristotelian influence manifested itself in his recognition of the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric.

Like Aristotle, Weaver perceived a close relationship between dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic, he maintained, is a "method of investigation whose object is the establishment of truth about doubtful propositions. ...Dialectic involves analysis and synthesis of fundamental terms in controversial questions. Both dialectic and rhetoric operate in the realm of probability."67

Inherent in the practice of rhetoric is the use of words. Weaver's concept of the place of words in the meaning of things was directly contrary to that of Richards. To Weaver, the meaning is in the word. To be sure at some time an object receives a name. That essence for which the symbol stands becomes so associated with the word that to change the meaning would be to shake the foundations of civilization itself.68 Weaver

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65 Johannesen, p. 16.
66 Johannesen, p. 17.
67 Johannesen, p. 19.
also recognizes words do change from time to time in their meaning. However, this is only done with the assent of the people belonging to the culture that uses the word.

Closely associated with this is the definition of that which is unique.

It must surely be granted that whatever is unique defies definition. Definition must then depend on some kind of analogical relationship of a thing with other things, and this can mean only that definition is ultimately circular... Such conclusions lead to the threshold of a significant commitment: ultimate definition is as Aristotle affirmed, a matter of intuition. Primal conception is somehow in us; from this we proceed as already noted, by analogy, or the process of finding resemblance to one thing in another.69

Weaver equates this loss of true definition of words with the decline of a culture in "Relativism and the Use of Language." He points to terms such as "freedom," "democracy," and others that no longer can be precisely defined for every occasion and draws some parallels with these confusions and those existing in sophistic Athens.

Certainly one of the most important relevations about a period comes in its theory of language, for that informs us whether language is viewed as a bridge to the monumental or as a body of fictions convenient for grappling with transitory phenomena.70

What can be done to restore the purity of the language? Weaver looks to the educator for the answer.

70 Weaver, "The Power of Words," p. 35.
Weaver's Views on Education

First, in a general nature, Weaver sees poetry as the vehicle to bring the scope of meaning again into the understanding of men. It takes minds with imagination and genius to give meanings to words. This is the realm of the poet.

In brief, the discipline of poetry may be expected first to teach the evocative power of words, to introduce the student, if we may so put it, to the mighty power of symbolism, and then to show him that there are ways of feeling about things that are not provincial either in space or time. Poetry offers the fairest hope of restoring our lost unity of mind. 71

With the instruction in poetry would come foreign languages. Here the student would be brought face to face with the concept of unchangeable meanings. He particularly favored the introduction of Greek into the curriculum. 72 Another aid in reestablishment of the concept of stable word definitions would be the study of Socratic dialectic.

The student will get a training in definition which will compel him to see limitation and contradiction, the two things about which the philosophy of progress leaves him most confused. In effect, he will get training in thinking, whereas the best that he gets now is a vague admonition to think for himself. 73

Progressive education with "student centered" instead of "teacher centered" learning is not conducive to teaching the true meanings of things in Weaver's view. The teacher is placed in charge of his class as a "definer" and the students should be able to look to him (or her) to fill this role.

71 Weaver, "Word," p. 53.
72 Weaver, "Word," p. 53.
73 Weaver, "Word," p. 55.
The teacher is, according to Weaver, a "definer," a "namer," and an "orderer," of the universe of meanings. After all, he argues, the "world has to be named for the benefit of each oncoming generation." Those who give the names have a unique role in ordering and controlling society.  

According to Weaver it was in the Fourteenth Century that a choice was made between teaching vere locqui (to speak the truth) and recte loqui (to speak correctly). The choice was made for recte loqui because if the "new" theories being disclosed by Francis Bacon. In *Advancement of Learning* he stated "the essential forms or true differences of things cannot by any human diligence be found out."  

Empiricism was gathering strength, and the decision was to teach recte loqui, as one can discover in the manuals of rhetoric of the Renaissance. Once the ontological referents were given up, however, this proved but an intermediate stage, and the course continued until today we can discover on all sides a third aim, which I shall take the liberty of phrasing in a parallel way, utiliter loqui.  

This utiliter loqui is described as the hand maiden of success. This is using language for betterment of position in the world. It is using "language as a tool which will enable you to get what you want if you use it well—and well does not mean scrupulously."  

Those who teach English on this level are the modern sophists, as the homely realism of the world seems to recognize. They are doing what the orators were once accused of doing, making speech the harlot of the arts.

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74 Weaver, "To Write the Truth," intro., Johannesen, p. 186.
75 Weaver, "Truth," p. 188.
76 Weaver, "Truth," p. 188.
77 Weaver, "Truth," p. 189.
More specifically, they are using the universality of language for purposes which actually set men against one another. They are teaching their students to prevail with what is, finally, verbal deception.\textsuperscript{78}

The teaching of recte loqui seems more respectable because it teaches a sort of \textit{étiquette}. Because it seems the better of the two, there is danger in its promotion.

...recte loqui requires the language of social "property." Because it reflects more than anything else a worldliness or satisfaction with existing institutions, it is the speech of pragmatic acquiescence. Whoso stops here confesses that education is only instruction in mores. Is it any wonder that professors have been contumaciously grouped with dancing masters, sleight-of-hand artists, and vendors of patent medicine?\textsuperscript{79}

The only alternative left is to teach people to speak the truth and this can only be done when the teacher recognizes the existence of the truth and the fact that the truth can be ascertained and transmitted to others.

This means teaching people to speak the truth, which can be done only by giving them the right names of things. We approach here a critical point in the argument, which will determine the possibility of defining what is correct in expression.\textsuperscript{80}

Weaver was not unaware of the arguments that would be brought to bear against this proposal. The idea of defining and clearly stating what is right and what is wrong has departed from the classroom. In the spirit

\textsuperscript{78} Weaver, "Truth," p. 189.
\textsuperscript{79} Weaver, "Truth," p. 191.
\textsuperscript{80} Weaver, "Truth," p. 191.
of "letting the child learn to think for himself," and the belief that there are many possible answers for any questions, the teacher has been impressed with his own inadequacy in making an accurate assessment of the truth of any situation. In light of this, he feels very inadequate when called on to make positive statements of definition of concepts that have become loosely defined.

I am not unaware of the questions which will come crowding in at this point. It will be asked: By what act of arrogance do we imagine that we know what things really are? The answer to this is: By what act of arrogance do we set ourselves up as teachers? There are two postulates basic to our profession: the first is that one man can know more than another, and the second is that such knowledge can be imparted. Whoever cannot accept both should retire from the profession and renounce the intention of teaching anyone anything.81

Much more could be written in explanation of these views of our modern-day Platonic philosopher. It is to be hoped that these summary statements of Weaver's views of rhetoric will serve our ends for comparison with other rhetoricians with similar and differing points of view.

Conclusions

This discussion of modern concepts of ethos has concerned itself with three contrasting and influential philosophical approaches to the field of rhetoric. It is relevant to the topic in the broad sense of ethos seen as the total character of the speaker. This would include his basic acquisition of knowledge and skills, his concepts of relativism or

81 Weaver, "Truth," p. 194.
permenance of value structure, and his ideas of the true purposes and goals of rhetoric. It must also involve the audience members' expectations and reactions to the speaker, both as individuals and members of a group. These are the ideas this chapter has dealt with.

The moderns have gone much further. Answers to modern concepts of ethos questions are not complete as presented here.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

It has been the purpose of this study to discover the similarities and differences that exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and to discover relationships of the concepts to philosophical value systems. The historical approach was used involving a search of literature to discover the philosophical orientations of the periods in question and of the rhetoricians writing during that period. Writings of selected rhetoricians were searched for specific concepts of ethos. The study was focused by asking seven questions that were to be answered during the course of the investigation:

1. What philosophical value systems provide the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?
3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
4. What value systems provide the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?
6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?
This paper has developed value systems of the ancients in some detail. As mentioned before, this is of primary concern in the study of ethics. A rhetorician who accepts the concept that each man has the ability to grasp the right and wrong through instinctive inborn knowledge must have a differently structured view of the relationship of the orator to his audience. Here there can be no compromise with the truth that remains constant for all men at all times and under all conditions. On the other hand, a rhetorician whose value system is colored by a viewpoint that "man is the measure of all things," will see nothing inconsistent with a speaker freely adapting his message, his audience appeals, evidence and his own character to the occasion at hand. When no man has the perception to distinguish right from wrong because he cannot verify the truth of his sensory perceptions, who can demand that the rhetorician display absolute reverence for a value system that has no other qualification than someone else's possibly false impression of right and wrong?

If each rhetorician fell neatly into his slot for one camp or the other, this portion of the paper would be simplicity itself. The originators of the concepts defined them clearly, and that is why they are included in discussion of the opposing stances. Rhetoricians are more practical than this, perhaps, and it is not unusual to find them using concepts from all camps as needed. Because of this complexity and possible confusion these concepts have been placed in chart form with page references.
### Similarities and Differences in Classical Philosophical Precepts Used in Bases for Ethos in Rhetoric

All impressions are gained through sensory experience. Reference in mind may/may not be same as fact, as another's reference. Cannot communicate references.

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Repeated sense perceptions result in assignment of degrees of probability to some constructs.

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Association of ideas from sense perceptions to form degrees of probability

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Inductive reasoning from repeated sensory experiences results in absolute definitions.

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Instinctive reaction to experience of the truth

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Metaphysical, instinctive transcendental knowledge gives men right and wrong concepts

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**Similarities and Differences in Modern Philosophical Precepts Used as Bases for Concepts of Ethos in Rhetoric**

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| | Kenneth Burke, 152, 153, 162 |
| Teachers should give rules for circumstantial definitions. | Kenneth Burke, 157  
| | I. A. Richards, 149, 150, 151 |
| Teachers should teach absolute definitions. | Richard Weaver, 173, 174 |
| Universals are creations of man from experiences. | David Hume, 114, 115  
| | John Locke, 109, 110, 111, 113  
| | George Campbell, 133 |
| Universals are part of "real" world outside man's experience. | Hugh Blair (taste), 121, 122  
| | Richard Weaver, 164, 165  
| | Kenneth Burke, 159 (form) |
| No image for the negative, man alone can conceive this. | Kenneth Burke, 154, 155 |
| Opposed to scientific study of humanities. | Richard Weaver, 164, 165, 166 |
| Prefer scientific approach to the humanities to the syllogistic. | John Locke, 109, 110, 111, 113  
| | David Hume, 114, 115  
| | George Campbell, 132, 133  
| | I. A. Richards, 144  
| | Kenneth Burke, 160 |
| Ambiguous definitions serve men's purposes. | Kenneth Burke, 155, 156, 157 |
| Ambiguous definitions are sign of deteriorating culture. | Richard Weaver, 172 |
## Similarities and Differences in Ethics in Modern Concepts of Education and Rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men are good, virtuous, when shown this is Christian, true happiness.</td>
<td>Hugh Blair, 119, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men express virtuous sentiments when needed.</td>
<td>Kenneth Burke, 152, 155</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Experience, true knowledge, education, before speaking.                   | John Locke, 109, 110, 111 
| Believe in what you say.                                                  | Hugh Blair, 122 
|                                                                           | Richard Whately, 140 
|                                                                           | Richard Weaver, 171 |
| Truth, right definitions are the object of education.                     | Richard Weaver, 175, 176 |
| Truth will prevail, all else being equal.                                 | Richard Whately, 141 |
| Broad education in literature, liberal arts.                              | Richard Weaver, 173 |
| Rhetoric is neutral, no built-in value system.                            | Richard Whately, 139 
|                                                                           | Kenneth Burke, 155, 56, 157 
<p>|                                                                           | I. A. Richards, 144 |
| Antithetical dialectic—alternatives of different degrees of probability. | George Campbell, 133 |
| Change definitions to suit purposes.                                      | Kenneth Burke, 155, 156, 157 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities and Differences in Modern Concepts of Ethos in Rhetoric</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modesty of expression promotes ethos, in youth especially.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 125, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodate to a skeptic audience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Burke, 156, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony an unreliable form of proof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Hume, 117, 118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony a preferred form of proof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weaver, 168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Campbell, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Whately, 140, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rules for use of testimony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Whately, 140, 141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument from definition most ethical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weaver, 168, 169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of speaking differs for different types of speaking to gain credit with the audience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 123, 124, 125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Campbell, 137, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use insinuatio exordium when needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too intense style lessens persuasibility—ethos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 124, 125, 126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If appropriate, intensity is most effective for ethos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Blair, 124, 125, 126, 128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Classical and Modern Philosophical Precepts Used as Bases for Concepts of Ethos in Rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All impressions are gained through sensory experience. Reference in mind may/may not be equal to fact, equal to any other reference held by someone else. References cannot be communicated.</td>
<td>Protagoras, 20, 21 Gorgias, 23, 25, 26 Arcesilaus, 79 Carneades, 79, 80 John Locke, 109, 110 David Hume, 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repeated sense perceptions result in degrees of probability, result in adoption of language symbols.</td>
<td>Corax, 17, 18 Gorgias, 24, 25 Carneades, 79, 80 Cicero, 88, 89, 90 John Locke, 109, 110, 111, 113 David Hume, 114, 115 George Capmbell, 129, 130, 133 I. A. Richards, 144 Kenneth Burke, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inductive reasoning from repeated sensory experiences results in first truths, definitions.</td>
<td>Socrates, 33, 34, 35 George Campbell, 129, 131, 132 Richard Weaver, (against, 168) Richard Whately, 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instinctive reaction to the experience of truth.</td>
<td>Cullus Gillius, 77, 78 Hugh Blair (taste) 121, 122 Meador, 77 Stoics, 77 Thomas Reid, 105 George Campbell, 129, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysical, instinctive, transcendental knowledge gives men right and wrong concepts.</td>
<td>Plato, 40 Isocrates, 66 Aristotle, 53, 54 Thomas Reid, 104, 105 George Campbell, 129, 131 Hugh Blair, 129, 131 Richard Weaver, 163, 164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Ethics in Classical and Modern Concepts of Education and Rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men are virtuous because, through education, they realize this is true happiness.</td>
<td>Plato, 41&lt;br&gt;Isocrates, 36, 67&lt;br&gt;Aristotle, 51  Hugh Blair, 119, 120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men are virtuous for own material gain.</td>
<td>Isocrates, 67&lt;br&gt;Kenneth Burke, 152, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer scientific approach to reaching conclusions in the humanities over use of syllogism.</td>
<td>Socrates, 34&lt;br&gt;John Locke, 109, 110&lt;br&gt;Isocrates, 61, 62&lt;br&gt;David Hume, 114&lt;br&gt;George Campbell, 129, 130, 133&lt;br&gt;I. A. Richards, 144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous definitions are sign of deteriorating culture.</td>
<td>Plato, 44&lt;br&gt;Isocrates, 29&lt;br&gt;Richard Weaver, 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous definitions aid in reaching ends.</td>
<td>Gorgias, 26, 27&lt;br&gt;Kenneth Burke, 156, 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No image for the negative, man alone can achieve this.</td>
<td>Kenneth Burke, 154, 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No image for the false or negative, therefore man cannot conceive it.</td>
<td>Sophists, 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric is advisory, shows men better versions of themselves.</td>
<td>Protagoras, 22&lt;br&gt;Plato, 45&lt;br&gt;Aristotle, 52, 53, 54, 55&lt;br&gt;Quintilian, Isocrates, 70&lt;br&gt;Hugh Blair, 119, 120&lt;br&gt;Richard Weaver, 170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Experience, true knowledge, education, conviction, before speaking. Believe in what you say. | Cicero, 91  
Socrates, 38, 39  
Plato, 41, 42, 43, 44  
Aristotle, 56  
Ad Herrenium, 82  
Isocrates, 70 | John Locke, 109, 110, 111  
Hugh Blair, 122  
Richard Whately, 140  
Richard Weaver, 171 |
| Truth, virtue, the objects of education. | Ptah-Hotep, 14  
Protagoras, 22  
Plato, 41  
Aristotle, 48, 49, 50 | Isocrates, 63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72  
Ad Herrenium, 82  
Cicero, 91, 93  
Quintilian, 93, 97  
Richard Weaver, 174, 175 |
| Nature of man to do good, truth will prevail. | Socrates, 37, 39  
Plato, 41  
Aristotle, 54 | (Truth will prevail)  
Richard Whately, 141 |
| Study and use of noble themes, study literature, poetry, foundation for broad and noble meanings used in rhetoric. | Isocrates, 70  
Cicero, 91, 92  
Quintilian, 98, 99 | Richard Weaver, 173 |
| Rhetoric is neutral, no built-in value system. | Gorgias, 27  
Corax, 17, 18 | Richard Whately, 139  
I. A. Richards, 144  
Kenneth Burke, 155, 156, 157 |
| Antithetical dialectic, alternative solutions of different degrees of probability. | Gorgias, 25  
George Campbell, 133 | |
| Nature of man to be skeptic, depraved, must adapt for this kind of audience. | Isocrates, 72  
Hugh Blair, 119, 120, 121 | |
| Adapting meanings and methods to attain any end. | Ad Herrenium, 83, 84, 85  
Quintilian, 101 | Kenneth Burke, 155, 156, 157 |
### Concepts of Ethos in Classical and Modern Rhetoric

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of ethos</th>
<th>Aristotle, 55, 56, 57</th>
<th>Quintilian, 93, 95</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>are sagacity, high character, and good will.</td>
<td>Isocrates, 66, 67, 70</td>
<td>Hugh Blair, 122, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ad Herrenium, 82</td>
<td>George Campbell, 136, 139</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cicero, 90, 91</td>
<td>Richard Whately, 142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethos gained during speech, not prior opinion.</th>
<th>Aristotle, 54, 55, 56</th>
<th>Cicero, 93</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weaver, 164, 168</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethos from whole of life, habits.</th>
<th>Ad Herrenium, 82</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isocrates, 63, 64, 66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cicero, 91</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Quintilian, 95</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aristotle, 52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethos can be strongest form of persuasion.</th>
<th>Aristotle (ethos during speech), 55, 56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Whately (reputation, prior ethos), 142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In youth, modesty aids ethos.</th>
<th>Aristotle, 58, 59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cicero, 93</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naturalness aids ethos.</th>
<th>Ad Herrenium, 87</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quintilian, 91, 94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Be a friend to audience, identify interests and character traits with them.</th>
<th>Aristotle, 59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Corax, 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plato, 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ad Herrenium, 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exordium used to gain good will of the audience.</th>
<th>Corax, 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ad Herrenium, 83, 84, 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Campbell, (no in homiletics) 139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quintilian, 101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insinuatio Exordium.</th>
<th>Ad Herrenium, 85, 86</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hugh Blair, 127, 128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quintilian, 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argument from definition is most ethical.</th>
<th>Plato, 45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aristotle, (Maxims and first truths) 56, 57, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Whately, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Richard Weaver, 164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCEPTS HELD IN COMMON BY CLASSICAL AND MODERN RHETORICIANS

**Man's Only Source of Knowledge is Sensory Experience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protagoras:</td>
<td>Each person knows only his own image of an object. Truth is individual perception. 20, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorgias:</td>
<td>No man can conceive or transmit images of ideas. There can be no communication of the abstract. 22, 25, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carneades:</td>
<td>There is no discernible difference between true and false perception, therefore, no way to know if experience is true or life or not. 79, 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Locke:</td>
<td>All we know is gained through sensory experience. Only this experience can be transmitted to another who has had the same experience. 109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Campbell:</td>
<td>Recognized thought-word-thing relationships. 129, 130, 133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. A. Richards:</td>
<td>Recognized the indirect relationship between object and mental image. The symbol, or word, is tied directly to the object on the one hand and the mental image on the other. Guides are given to communicants to identify references for symbols. 147, 148, 149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth Burke:</td>
<td>Different people will have varying definitions for words as circumstances change. 154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Weaver:</td>
<td>Loss of precise word definitions is a sign of a deteriorating culture. 172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Repeated Experiences Result in Recognition of "Degrees of Probability" for Constructs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosopher</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corax:</td>
<td>Recommended reasoning from probability in court. 17, 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorgias:</td>
<td>Antithetical dialectic arrives at counter propositions of varying degrees of probability. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socrates:</td>
<td>Repeated experience or observation results in absolute definitions. 33, 34, 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristotle:</td>
<td>Use the experiences of the audience to establish common ground in persuasion. 59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Isocrates: Experience and observation proves the value of virtue. 36, 67

Carneades: Established degrees of probability for knowledge experientially gained. 79, 80

Cicero: Argument based on degree of probability. 88, 89, 90

David Hume: Repeated experiences result in increasing probability for the truth of a phenomenon. 114, 115

George Campbell: "Deductive evidence" of repeated experiences and "moral evidence" lead to propositions of varying degrees of probability. 129, 130, 133

I. A. Richards: Associations of ideas along preconceived guidelines can aid in the determination of word meanings. 148, 149

Kenneth Burke: Different circumstances will result in different interpretations of the same term. Probability of definition determined by co-existing conditions. 160

Richard Weaver: Definitions or argument taken from circumstance or shifting of conditions—from associations—called the least ethical. If taken from historical, or cause to effect, since it happened this way before it should again, then this use of probability is second only to the least ethical. 168, 169

There is a Transcendental Area of True Knowledge of Pure Ideas, Removed from Sensory Perception, Which all Men Hold in Common But do not Always Use and May Not be Aware of

Plato: This universal realm of Ideas held holds truths for all men for all time that are "above" everyday sensory experience. Man should strive to live and theorize in this "Ideal Republic." 40

Aristotle: Recognized an ideal state of virtue, truth and happiness, unrelated to material gain or earthly power. These truths are the true goals men seek and the ones that ultimately triumph. 53, 54

Thomas Reid: Common sense of man is an innate trait. 104

Hugh Blair: "Good taste" is a common inborn trait of men. 121, 122
George Campbell: First truths are known intuitively to man (they are intuitively recognized when experienced). 129, 131

Richard Whately: First truths and virtue are not the concern of rhetoric. 140

Richard Weaver: True knowledge is a function of the mind, the reason, and is ideally colored by as few "experiences" as possible. Should be concerned with the transcendental realm of Ideas, not transitory experience. 172

Word Meanings are in People, Not Words

| Protagoras, 20, 21 |
| Gorgias, 22, 25, 26 |
| John Locke, 109, 110 |
| George Campbell, 129, 130, 133 |
| I. A. Richards, 148, 149 |
| Kenneth Burke, 156, 157 |

Meanings are in Words

| Plato, 40 |
| Aristotle, 53, 54 |
| (Thomas Reid) |
| (Richard Whately) |
| Richard Weaver, 170, 171, 175 |

Rhetoric is Advisory, Should Show Men Better Versions of Themselves

| Plato, 41 |
| Aristotle, 48, 49, 50 |
| Isocrates, 63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72 |
| Quintilian, 97, 98 |
| Hugh Blair, 119, 120 |
| George Campbell, 136 |
| Kenneth Burke (for peace and order) 152 |
| Richard Weaver, 170, 171 |

Rhetoric is Amoral

| Gorgias (omits) |
| Ad Herrenium, 84, 85 |
| John Locke |
| (Only experiences) 112, 113 |
| Richard Whately, 140 |
| I. A. Richards, 152 |

The Object of Education is to Teach Truth, Right and Wrong, Ethics

| Protagoras, 21 |
| Plato, 41 |
| Aristotle, 48, 49, 50 |
| Isocrates, 63, 66, 67 |
| Cicero, 90, 91, 93 |
| Quintilian, 97, 98 |
| Hugh Blair (religious speaking) 119, 120 |
| George Campbell (religious speaking) 129, 131 |
| Richard Weaver, 173, 174 |
Conclusions

This study explored the hypothesis that similarities and differences exist between classical and modern concepts of ethos and that the concepts can generally be identified with philosophical value systems.

It was focused by the following seven questions:

1. What philosophical value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
2. What concepts of ethos are set forth by classical rhetoricians?
3. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by classical rhetoricians?
4. What value systems provided the bases for the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
5. What concepts of ethos are set forth by modern rhetoricians?
6. What similarities and differences exist between the concepts of ethos set forth by modern rhetoricians?
7. What similarities and differences exist between concepts of ethos set forth by classical and modern rhetoricians?

In answering these questions the following conclusions were reached:

1. Classical value systems that could serve as bases for concepts of ethos were idealistic, naturalistic, and pragmatic.
2. Ethics in classical periods largely saw education as productive of righteous life styles and rhetoric as advisory.
3. Similarities in classical concepts of ethos are found in agreement on the importance of audience analysis, speaker wisdom, and speaker honesty or sagacity. Differences are seen in emphasis given to audience adaptation and speech content.
(4) Modern value systems that have related to the concepts of ethos in rhetoric have been predominantly naturalistic and pragmatic.

(5) Education and rhetoric are more generally considered amoral, unrelated to value structures, by modern theorists.

(6) Modern theories of ethos emphasize the importance of the speaker's reputation and language usage. They differ on the importance of content, purpose, and forms of proof needed to gain credibility.

**Recommendations for Further Study**

(1) In-depth studies of individual rhetoricians of the classical, Renaissance and modern periods should be done.

(2) Extensive studies should be made of current research in the area of ethos in rhetoric.

(3) Correlative studies of the interrelationships between historical, political, philosophical and rhetorical events should be made.
PRIMARY SOURCES


SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS


ARTICLES


