1-1-1985

The Diplomacy of William Jennings Bryan

Patricia Sue Chism

Eastern Illinois University

This research is a product of the graduate program in History at Eastern Illinois University. Find out more about the program.

Recommended Citation

http://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/2778

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE

TO: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses.

SUBJECT: Permission to reproduce theses.

The University Library is receiving a number of requests from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow theses to be copied.

Please sign one of the following statements:

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.

July 30, 19??
Date

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not allow my thesis be reproduced because ____________________________

________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________

_________________________  __________________________
Date                      Author

m
THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

(TITLE)

BY

Patricia Sue Chism

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1985

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

30 Aug 1985
DATE

DATE

30 Aug. 1985
DATE

30 Aug. 1985
DATE
William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925) was Secretary of State for the first two years of the administration of Woodrow Wilson, from 1913 to 1915. During that time he sought to implement his views of diplomacy which were based upon his political and religious beliefs. His emergence on the national political scene in 1896 had been based upon his commitment to the welfare of common man which was inherent in his espousal of Populist principles. As Secretary of State he promoted policies, especially in Latin America, designed to advance the democratic form of government, which he believed best served the interests of common man. His commitment to Christianity was always a factor in his life, but it was especially important after 1900, when he merged morality and his advocacy of various political issues, including world peace. He believed international peace was attainable if men would attempt to solve differences in the spirit of goodwill and brotherhood. When a potential conflict with Japan developed in 1913, he applied his ideas regarding the practicability of attaining peace through goodwill by his personal diplomacy with that nation's ambassador to the United States. He considered his most important work as Secretary of State to be his effort to make international peace attainable by establishing peace treaties which would develop a process of conciliation between the United States and the other
signatory nations.

Bryan, after the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, continually sought opportunities to end the conflict. He hoped to help restore peace and prevent the United States from becoming involved in the conflict. To attain the latter objective, he wanted American citizens traveling on belligerent ships in the war zone to be warned to do so at their own risk, but Wilson absolutely refused to do this. After the British liner Lusitania was sunk in May 1915 with the loss of more than one hundred American lives, Bryan worked hard to gain acceptance of policies he felt necessary to prevent the nation from becoming involved in the war. When it became obvious his views would not be accepted, he resigned in June 1915 rather than sign the second Lusitania note, which he was convinced would lead to involvement in the war. Afterward he continued to work to prevent the nation from becoming involved in the war, but when Congress declared war in April 1917, Bryan immediately gave it his support.

Following the war Bryan supported America's entry into the League of Nations believing that organization provided a way to prevent future wars. In the 1920's he actively opposed the teaching of Darwin's theory of evolution in schools supported by state funds because he
felt this led to a questioning of religious truths which in turn was destructive of morality, political reform and ultimately would threaten civilization itself. Bryan, who above all desired to be regarded as a Christian statesman, sought to bring Christian morality into the international arena, but in the end, as Secretary of State he essentially continued the policies of his predecessors.
To Orrison and Geraldine Chism
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENT ........................................ iii

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1

I. EARLY POLITICAL LIFE .............................. 3

II. ADVOCATE OF POLITICAL AND MORAL REFORMS ... 10

III. SECRETARY OF STATE .............................. 17

IV. RESIGNATION AND LAST TEN YEARS .............. 38

FOOTNOTES ........................................... 47

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 54
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Thanks to Dr. Raymond Koch for guidance in researching material for this work.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to describe William Jennings Bryan's approach to diplomacy as Secretary of State from 1913 to 1915. He was offered the position because he was a leader of the Democratic Party and had contributed his support to the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912. As a product of the values and ideals of Nineteenth Century America he sought, while directing foreign policy, to implement his belief that the nation had a mission in the world to provide an illuminating example of Christian morality and democratic government. However, his idealistic principles conflicted with the practical problems with which he had to deal, which forced him to compromise some of his ideas. Nevertheless, he refused to compromise his concern for the welfare of the people, and resigned in June 1915 rather than sign the second Lusitania note because he believed it would lead to American involvement in the First World War. All of his political life he sought to express the cause of the people, from 1896 when he captured the Democratic presidential nomination, to the Scopes trial in 1925 in Dayton, Tennessee. In dealing with Bryan both primary and secondary material has been utilized, including some of his articles, speeches and memoirs, as well as biographies, journal articles and volumes analyzing
events with which he was connected. In dealing with his record as Secretary of State, primary and secondary material regarding the Wilson Administration has been used, including Wilson's Papers, Foreign Relations Documents, several Wilson biographies and journal articles analyzing the administration's policies.
THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

William Jennings Bryan (1860-1925), emerged from an agrarian background, a fact which affected his personal and political beliefs. Born in Salem, Illinois, he received his education including law school, in that state. After beginning his practice of the law in 1883 in Jacksonville, Illinois, he moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, believing it might offer a better opportunity to advance in that profession. There he also began rising rather rapidly in politics and successfully ran for United States House of Representatives in 1892 and 1894 as a Democrat. Unsuccessful in his attempt to become a United States Senator from that state, he returned to the practice of law, but increasingly devoted his energy toward politics.

Bryan emerged on the national political scene with his unexpected nomination by the Democratic party for the presidency in 1896. The catalyst for his prominence was the silver cause which was deeply rooted in Western frontier religion and politics. Christianity on the frontier presented the world as a struggle between absolute good and evil with the inevitable triumph of goodness. The Populist party, founded in 1891 to seek political redress for agricultural grievances, perceived the existence of an evil conspiracy by the Eastern money power against the virtuous common man. Bryan, who had politically cooperated with the Populists throughout his
Nebraska career, attempted to repeat this on the national level in 1896 as he received their nomination for the presidency. Bryan's view of the world was more Populist than Democratic and the main issues of his campaign came from that party. He urged basic economic reforms, particularly free silver, which was presented as the key to alleviate financial difficulties and to restore the idyllic past. Political reforms were urged to enable the common man to gain control of the government.

In 1898, national attention focused on foreign problems as the Spanish-American War began on April 25 with a Congressional declaration of war. Bryan, like other men from the West, volunteered for duty on the same day, perceiving the war as a way to liberate the Cuban people from the Spanish. The military action in Cuba was short and the United States, having previously renounced any intention of annexing the island, eventually gave it minimal independence. During the war America began to take control of Spain's other colonial possessions. In the Caribbean, an area where the United States had already developed an influence, it established outright military control of Puerto Rico. In the Pacific, William McKinley's Administration favored the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and in July, Congress, citing the war as justification, passed a joint resolution annexing that
island. Bryan was one of the few Democrats to oppose this action, claiming it would be the precursor of a period of imperialism.

The Treaty of Paris, between Spain and the United States, was signed on December 10, 1898. According to its terms, America agreed to pay twenty million dollars for the Philippine Islands, which prompted the Filipine insurgents to resist American annexation. Congress debated the treaty early in 1899 and ratified it on February 6, 1899. The treaty officially ended the war and America acquired Guam, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands.

It was the conquest of the Philippines, which gave the Spanish-American War its imperialistic character, and immediately an anti-imperialist movement arose to challenge this development. This movement began during the summer of 1898 with individual protests against the course of the war. The intention of the McKinley Administration to annex the Philippines led to the organization in November, 1898, of the New England Anti-Imperialist League. The initiators of the League included some of the most noted men in Massachusetts, including Charles Eliot Norton, a Harvard professor and the first to speak out against the war, Gamiel Bradford, initiator of the movement, George Sewall Boutwell, and Erving Winslow, president and secretary of the League.
respectively, as well as Edward Atkinson and Moorfield Storey, both opponents of American action in the Philippines. The core of its leadership came from some of the upper middle-class families of Boston's established mercantile wealth, including Thomas Wentworth Higginson and Charles Francis Adams.\(^2\)

The anti-imperialist movement gained its strength from the fact that there was nation-wide opposition to imperialism. This was the case because it touched facets of the American experience. It arose from the sense that imperialism was inconsistent with America's democratic past. The impetus for the movement could be found in the social discontent surrounding the advancing industrial order. Industry was beginning to dominate the nation and industrialists found in imperialism a foreign policy that worked to their economic advantage. Conversely, the anti-imperialist opposition idealized the older mercantile-agrarian society which the new order threatened. The Anti-Imperialist League reached out to various groups to increase its strength and received support from those who felt they saw in the Philippine insurrection much of the reason for their own sense of estrangement from the social conditions. Men from the silver crusade, Populists, as well as Irish-Americans, who tended to view imperialism as being essentially English, joined the cause, as did blacks,
some labor union leaders and some unions. Various reformers from the clergy and intellectuals joined, also leaders of such diverse reforms as the feminist and pacifist movements, along with leaders of the new movement for urban reform. Socialists also joined in this opposition.³

The fact that the anti-imperialist movement was a diverse political movement made it difficult to agree on a common strategy. Particularly difficult to accept was Bryan's idea of accepting the treaty with Spain and then attempting to limit the imperialism it contained. Bryan had, at least in part, favored the treaty simply to bring the war officially to an end. Nevertheless, he quickly separated himself from most of his anti-imperialist allies by working for the treaty's ratification. In the East the most prominent political opponent of imperialism and the ratification of the treaty was Republican Senator George F. Hoar, of Massachusetts. While anti-imperialist strategy was to delay, Hoar was one of the men responsible for allowing the vote to be taken when it was. Nevertheless, he held Bryan as the man, next to McKinley, most responsible for passage of the treaty. While Bryan may have influenced a few votes, his role in the treaty's passage has been overestimated.⁴

The second part of Bryan's plan was thwarted by the narrow defeat of the Bacon resolution which promised ultimate independence to the Philippines. He had strongly
advocated granting independence to the Philippines, arguing that America had fought the war to liberate the Cubans and it was wrong to subjugate the Filipinos. For him, the defeat of the Bacon resolution was the beginning of a new and important political struggle.5

Bryan was one of the first public men in America to oppose imperialism, although he did not oppose expansion or taking territory which could be converted into states of the union. He rejected imperialism on moral, philosophical, social and economic grounds. Philosophically he rejected it because he believed that government derived its power from the consent of the governed and because of his commitment to Jeffersonian principles. He felt the American form of government would be threatened, since carrying out this policy would require a large standing army and the acquisition of subjects, which could only be accomplished by force. In addition, America would lose her prestige and influence around the world by abandoning her role as champion of self-government, liberty, human rights and the principles of the Declaration of Independence.6

Bryan received the Democratic nomination for President in 1900 on the first ballot. His campaign emphasized three key issues which he felt characterized the battle between democracy and plutocracy. He felt imperialism, the trusts, and the gold standard, represented closely
linked interrelated issues which he opposed individually and collectively, and which he believed would provide the essential key to his success. He devoted his acceptance speech to imperialism, which he declared the paramount issue. After this speech in Indianapolis, Indiana, he received aid from the anti-imperialist movement as it declared him its choice for President. Because both rejected the idea of control of the nation by the plutocracy, they could agree on imperialism and the trusts. The union between Bryan, as the Democratic candidate and a man of Populist sympathies, and the New England Anti-Imperialist League in opposing imperialism, represented the peak of the alliance of men with their vision of an older American society. Nevertheless, there were problems as some of the anti-imperialists rejected Bryan because of his position on bimetallism, and even on the issue of imperialism their vote was deeply divided. While there was some natural opposition to imperialism, it did not provoke undue concern among the electorate. Instead, the decisive factor in the election was the state of the economy. America was experiencing a prosperity brought on, in part, by the war. The Republican strategy, which proved successful, had been to impart fear that Bryan would destroy that prosperity by putting into effect his dangerous economic ideas. In the end, McKinley was re-elected with only a
one per cent increase in the popular vote over the previous presidential election. 7

After 1900, Bryan became increasingly concerned with religion and with earning a good living, both of which affected his political efforts. His merging of political and moral issues was reflected in his advocacy of social justice, popular government, peace and international arbitration as a method of achieving this. Both the Chautauqua lectures and his weekly newspaper The Commoner served the political objectives of keeping the Democratic party on a reform course. Moreover, on the Chautauqua circuit he made a direct appeal to the people essential to achieve the enduring transformation of society which he sought. He believed a transformation toward a humanitarian society with human rights as well as international peace could only be achieved after there had first been a change in the heart of each person. The traveling Chautauqua's provided an ideal setting for this because of its programs of lectures and entertainment which were designed to promote education and individual improvement. In addition, both the Chautauqua circuit and his newspaper provided lucrative sources of income. In 1900 and after, he was criticized as one who used politics to become one of the very plutocrats he fervently
denounced. By 1908, he claimed his wealth was between $125,000 and $150,000 and by 1909 he was earning about $100,000 annually from lectures.  

Throughout the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, beginning in 1901, Bryan criticized its foreign policies. He objected to his militarism, particularly in regard to establishing the Panama Canal. Roosevelt originally sought a diplomatic settlement with Colombia to gain access for an interoceanic canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific, principally for use by the American Navy. He believed naval power was the key to America's position in the world, which was his chief concern. Unable to gain the settlement he desired, he aided the Panamanian revolt by sending vessels to prevent Colombia from putting down the rebellion. In November 1903, America quickly recognized the new nation, and its leaders soon agreed to terms favorable to American construction of the canal. In the Far East, Roosevelt sought to protect American interests by maintaining a balance of power between Russia and Japan. To this end, he successfully arbitrated a conclusion to the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Bryan praised his efforts at ending the war and later urged him to make arbitration treaties with other nations the next step in his foreign policy, which Roosevelt refused to do. While some bilateral arbitration treaties were negotiated during his administration, Roosevelt,
unlike Bryan, believed in a limited number of issues to be adjudicated, and believed treaties viable only if power existed to back them up.9

Bryan received the democratic nomination for president for a third time in 1908. His opponent, William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's Secretary of War, had played a significant role in the foreign policy of that administration and was expected to continue its direction. The Republican policies of expansionism and a navy with an offensive capability were threatened by the Democratic party with its anti-imperialist tradition. Bryan played a central role in the construction of the Democratic platform, which called for eventual Philippine independence and pledged a navy merely sufficient for national defense. While domestic political and economic issues predominated in the campaign, the overriding issue was which man would best continue Roosevelt's policies. In the end, Taft won because many believed he would continue those policies and that prosperity would return more quickly with him since he had the support of the business community. Bryan suffered his worst presidential defeat in the election.10

The Taft Administration continued many of Roosevelt's foreign policies, but its main emphasis shifted to economic solutions for various problems and to achieving world peace. In Latin America, Taft sought both American
commercial success and the economic improvement of the region to gain the prosperity, political stability and peace he desired. Critics began to label his approach to problems as dollar diplomacy. Bryan, who toured Latin America for a few months in 1909 and 1910, was one of those who objected to his emphasis on economic solutions to the problems of the area, preferring moral persuasion to settle disputes. Bryan, who over the years had come to support the cause of peace, suggested to Taft the idea of establishing arbitration treaties as a method of achieving world peace. Taft, who also desired world peace, acted upon the idea and in the summer of 1911 unlimited arbitration treaties with both Britain and France were signed. While Taft had hoped the treaties would be the high point of his administration, the Senate excluded certain questions from arbitration, prompting him to refuse to send them to the nations for ratification.

Bryan, following his third presidential defeat, worked very hard to ensure that progressives would control the Democratic National Convention and thus nominate the presidential candidate. While he did not exclude himself from consideration, other men were rising as possible presidential contenders. He opposed the conservative-backed candidacies of Judson Harmon and Oscar Underwood, while describing James Beuchamp Clark,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Woodrow Wilson, Governor of New Jersey, to be equally progressive. In the months preceding the Democratic National Convention, Bryan increasingly began to favor Wilson, who had by 1910 converted from conservatism to a supporter of progressive reforms. By January 1912, Wilson's presidential campaign was under attack, including the publication of a letter he had written in 1907 containing an unfavorable reference to Bryan. Bryan chose to ignore the remark, accepting his conversion to progressivism and unwilling to aid the conservatives by creating division within the progressive ranks. At the Democratic Convention in June, Bryan was a delegate at large instructed for Clark. He sought from the beginning to establish a progressive dominated convention and to that end opposed the conservative backed Alton B. Parker as temporary chairman. While the move was unsuccessful, it highlighted the nature of the struggle at the convention and a progressive was ultimately named permanent chairman. On June 27, Bryan introduced a resolution, which subsequently was passed, declaring that the party would not nominate a man under the influence of or in obligation to John Pierpont Morgan, Thomas Fortune Ryan, or August Belmont, major American financiers. During the presidential balloting, Bryan voted for Clark, the leading candidate at the beginning of the
convocation. His candidacy received a large boost when New York cast its ninety votes for him on the tenth ballot since this gave him a majority of the delegates. Bryan assumed at first that New York would soon abandon him, but eventually began to worry that the Clark forces had made a deal with that state. On the fourteenth ballot Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, believing that sentiments about Clark had changed, demanded a poll of the Nebraska delegates, and Bryan, along with most of the rest of them switched to Wilson. Bryan explained that he refused to vote for any candidate which the New York delegates with their connections to the conservative financial and business elite were also voting. While his change of vote caused some loss of momentum for Clark, Wilson's subsequent nomination on the forty-sixth ballot came from securing the necessary additional votes, particularly those of the Underwood delegates.12

Bryan was pleased that the Democratic Party had named a progressive presidential candidate in opposition to the conservative Taft, the Republican nominee, and Roosevelt, who had bolted that party to become the nominee of the National Progressive Party on August 6. The following day, Wilson formally accepted the nomination by the Democratic Party. In his subsequent campaign he advocated reforms, principally regarding tariff and trusts to insure a "New Freedom" for America in which the nation would
regain its economic and political liberty. In emphasizing the value of democracy and economic opportunity for the common man, which were being threatened by the control of a few men of great wealth, he was continuing the populist and Bryan tradition. Bryan enthusiastically worked for Wilson's victory, vigorously campaigning for seven weeks, delivering as many as ten speeches a day. Bryan ultimately brought his large following to back Wilson which was critical since a coalition of support in the South and West was needed for victory.

In November, Wilson won the election with a plurality of the popular vote, although he swept the electoral vote. With his election came the problem of what to do with Bryan. While Wilson had come to respect and admire him, he held little confidence in his judgment. However, Bryan's position as titular head of the party and his help during the campaign, along with Wilson's desire to have his help in obtaining domestic legislation and to prevent him from criticizing the administration from the outside, left him little choice but to bring him inside his government. Unsuccessful in his attempt to interest him in an unobtrusive foreign position, Wilson finally offered him the position of Secretary of State in December 1912. Bryan, who had been interested in promoting international peace for some time, accepted the position since Wilson approved of his plan to negotiate
a series of peace treaties with other nations and to make them an integral part of the administration's foreign policy.\textsuperscript{13}

Bryan took the oath of office as Secretary of State on March 5, 1913, the day following Wilson's inauguration as President. He brought to the position certain beliefs and attitudes stemming from his deep commitment to Christian morality which affected his approach to foreign affairs, his perception of international relations and the policies he sought to pursue. He perceived international relations in terms of simple good and evil, believing that the same standards which applied to individuals were also applicable to nations. His moralism led to his pursuit of certain ideals including the viability of moral persuasion and the cultivation of goodwill and friendship to settle disputes between nations. His principle diplomatic goal involved his concern for mankind, particularly that for the welfare of common man whose interests were served by the establishment of democratic government and international peace. He believed that the spread of democracy would result in governments increasingly reflecting the people's welfare which was advanced by peace. He felt peace could be achieved by mediation of potential international conflict, and that his hoped-for social transformation would be made
meaningful by the establishment of a lasting peace between nations. Believing that war was only "evidence of man's surrender to his passions" he felt that "if peace is to come in this world it will come because people more and more clearly recognize the indissoluble tie that binds each human being to every other. If we are to build permanent peace it must be on the foundation of the brotherhood of men. . . ." To him "one of the tests of civilization is man's willingness to submit his controversies to the arbitration of reason rather than of force." In 1910 he proposed that the United States take the lead in promoting peace by "telling the world that it did not believe in war, that it had no disputes . . . it was not willing to submit to the judgment of the world. If this nation did that it not only would not be attacked . . . but it would become the supreme power in the world." 

The beginning of the new administration coincided with a number of impending foreign policy crises which Wilson and Bryan approached based on their similar ideas. The first foreign problem they faced was the question of whether to grant full diplomatic recognition to the new Mexican government of General Victoriano Huerta who had overthrown the elected president Francisco I. Madero on February 18, 1913. Madero was arrested and after "resigning" the presidency was killed under
suspicious circumstances. Nevertheless, the Taft Administration granted de facto recognition to Huerta. President-elect Wilson was shocked by the incident which was presented by the press with an implication that Huerta was responsible. This moral view affected Wilson's decision regarding the question of recognizing the new Mexican government. Wilson sought to promote peace and stability in the region of the Panama Canal and to help improve conditions within Mexico by reestablishing constitutional government. His stress on idealism and moralism was shown by his announcement, on March 11, 1912, emphasizing America's desire for a spirit of friendship and helpfulness to exist with Latin America, but he stressed that this needed to be based upon constitutional government in the area. He later stated that "the purpose of the United States is solely and simply to secure peace and order in Central America in seeing to it that the processes of self-government there are not interrupted or set aside. Usurpations . . . render the development of ordered self-government impossible . . . . It is the purpose of the United States, therefore, to discredit and defeat such usurpations whenever they occur." Therefore, the administration urged a mediation plan in which it would make available its good offices to conduct an election. However, the authorities in Mexico City objected to this American interference in Mexico's internal
affairs and the Constitutionalists refused to participate in the election.¹⁸

The administration, in spite of the rejection of its offer, believed Huerta had agreed to its condition that he not be a candidate, and looked forward to the scheduled election of October 26, 1913. Just before the election, Huerta, in an attempt to control the Chamber of Deputies, arrested several opposition members, dissolved the Mexican Congress, and thereafter ruled as a military dictator. Because of these events the Wilson Administration announced it would not recognize the result even before Huerta was "elected." From that time forward Wilson intended to eliminate Huerta from power. He first sought to cooperate with the First Chief of the Constitutionalist opposition forces, Venustiano Carranza, believing their victory would move the nation toward constitutional government, however, no accommodation could be reached because they refused to accept any American interference in the nation's internal affairs. However, by January 1914 Wilson believed they were the only alternative to an American intervention to eliminate Huerta. To that end, on February 3, 1914, he lifted the American embargo on arms to Mexico. In spite of this, Huerta was able to maintain himself in power over the next few months. By April 1914 Wilson believed the Constitutionalists intended to secure
serious economic and social reforms as well as establish constitutional government and found a way to intervene to advance these reforms. He stated that "I hold this to be a wonderful opportunity . . . to prove to the world that the United States of America is not only human but humane; that we are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions of our unfortunate neighbors, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty."\(^\text{19}\)

The administration found in an incident at Tampico the pretext it needed to intervene to eliminate Huerta. On April 9 a Huertista officer arrested several American sailors who had landed to load supplies in a militarily restricted area without permission. While the men were quickly released, accompanied by expressions of regret, the squadron commander at Tampico, Admiral Henry T. Mayo, viewing the Mexican action as unjust, presented several demands to them, including the firing of a twenty-one gun salute. Although the Mexicans were willing to negotiate a face-saving compromise, the administration insisted that Mayo's demands be met without condition. Wilson appeared before Congress on April 21, and cited the insult to the flag and lesser incidents as the basis for his request to obtain permission to use the nation's military forces to enforce the dignity and respect due the United States from Mexico. The authorization was granted on the
twenty-second but Wilson, who had actually intended to use the military to weaken the Huerta regime by preventing foreign military supplies from reaching him along the eastern ports, had already acted. To prevent the landing of a German ship loaded with military supplies which would aid Huerta in maintaining power, Wilson decided to prevent this landing by occupying key points within Veracruz. However, Mexican resistance to the Marine occupation was so strong that the entire city had to be occupied. The Constitutionalists, although the intended beneficiaries of the action, denounced this interference in Mexico's internal affairs and announced that they would militarily oppose any further American advance.20

Bryan, while having strongly supported Wilson's objectives and policy in Mexico from the beginning, opposed any further intervention in Mexico. He was relieved to be able to accept the offer of mediation of this crisis made by Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Since Huerta also accepted the offer, the danger of further American intervention was relieved. However, the mediation conference which was attended by representatives of the United States, Mexico and the A. B. C. Powers, as they were called, met from May to July 1914 but ended with little substance. Nevertheless, the United States control of the customs house at Veracruz bankrupted the authorities at Mexico
City, while the Constitutionalist forces continued to advance militarily, prompting Huerta to "resign" on July 15. The following month Carranza assumed executive authority in accordance with the previous agreement between the revolutionary leaders. Carranza completely rejected American efforts to play a role in the nation's internal affairs. The administration then began to hope General Francisco Villa, who had quickly rebelled against the new government, would succeed since he seemed to accept the political and social reforms the administration sought. This hope was abandoned when Villa suffered serious military losses in the spring of 1915. On June 2, Wilson issued a statement to the leaders of the factions in Mexico urging them to unite and establish a constitutional government and warning that the United States might be forced to employ the means to accomplish this in the event they did not do so. Bryan approved his course, but urged the way be left open to recognize Carranza, should his influence warrant such a move. By the fall of 1915 Carranza's military strength was such that the administration extended de facto recognition. Bryan, who had resigned several months before, applauded this as an indication of the success of the American objectives of ousting Huerta and opening the way for constitutional government in Mexico. Two years later in March 1917, the administration granted full diplomatic
recognition to the Constitutionalists. 21  

Bryan directed policy toward the rest of Latin America subject to Wilson's final approval, although, he had from the beginning gotten the administration to place a high priority on cultivating friendship in the area. His concern for this was shown by his desire to deal with Colombia's grievance about the support America had given the Panamanian drive for independence in 1903. In July 1913, Bryan discussed this question with the Colombian minister to the United States, John Belancourt, and in noting that American "honor [was] at stake in all matters which involve fair dealing with other nations," proposed their differences be adjusted by direct negotiation. 22  

Later in the year he sent a draft treaty to the American minister to Colombia, Thaddeus A. Thomson, which provided the basis for the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty signed on April 6, 1914. It was ratified two months later in Colombia, and Wilson quickly submitted it to the United States Senate. However, there was considerable opposition to the American expression of "sincere regret that anything should have occurred to interrupt or to mar the relations of . . . friendship . . . between the two nations" since this was viewed as an apology. 23  

There was also opposition to the United States agreeing to pay an indemnity of $25,000,000. Bryan attempted to gain
Senate approval, but had not been able to do so by the time he left office. Nevertheless, his efforts had helped to restore America's moral prestige in Latin America higher than it had been since 1903. It was another six years before an amended version of the treaty, omitting any regret, was approved by the United States and ratification in Colombia quickly followed.24

In Central America and the Caribbean, Bryan tried to promote friendship and democratic government while implementing policies to protect American interests by advancing peace and stability in the area. Security for the Panama Canal, completed in 1914, was of particular importance and American policy toward Nicaragua, strategically located near the canal and containing an alternate interoceanic route, reflected this concern. The Taft Administration had sent Marines to maintain order during disturbances in 1912 with the result that the Conservative Party of Alfonso Diaz was able to retain power. Bryan continued to support that regime believing the alternative was insurrection and chaos. However, the revolution had left the nation with serious economic problems and, in the fall of 1913, Bryan agreed to a loan from American bankers in Nicaragua which would provide funds to enable the government to continue operating. Bryan believed that the root of the problem was the presence of foreign investors and
attempted to supplant their influence by proposing that the United States government provide a loan to Nicaragua. He was seeking to extend the Monroe Doctrine to include American opposition to foreign investors in Latin America, however, he was forced to abandon the loan scheme because Wilson opposed it. He was able to provide financial help for Nicaragua by the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty signed on August 5, 1914 in which the United States agreed to pay $3,000,000 for, among other items, an exclusive right to an interoceanic canal route. Particularly concerned about possible German efforts to acquire this he was able to secure for America a permanent option on the alternate canal route to prevent any foreign power from acquiring it. Bryan had left office by the time both nations ratified the treaty in 1916, however, Latin America remained concerned that it would provide an excuse for more American intervention in the area.25

Bryan based American policies toward the Caribbean nations of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, occupying the Island of Hispaniola, upon concern for American security by promoting stability along the entrance to the Panama Canal and in helping to advance democratic government in the area. In both nations financial mismanagement and constant revolutions had contributed to serious economic problems, which led the United States to assume by treaty in 1907, a financial protectorate
over the Dominican Republic to prevent foreign intervention. Later, Bryan's concern about foreign involvement in Haiti led him to attempt, without success, to gain its agreement to some financial control. His effort to promote constitutional government led him to support the Dominican Provisional President José Bordas Valdés, who was threatened by rebellion in the fall of 1913. He gave rebel leaders an American guarantee that the upcoming constitutional election would be free. However, difficulty arose when Bordas, who was to call for a presidential election in April 1914, apparently intended to remain in power by controlling the voting. His opponents by late May united under the leadership of General Horacio Vásques and continued to advance militarily until the United States threatened naval bombardment if fighting continued. In August, the Wilson Administration presented a plan to reestablish governmental authority by means of a presidential election. Most of the leaders agreed to this and Juan Isidora Jiménez became President in December 1914. While Bryan was prepared to use American military force to support the government, he increasingly urged the Dominicans to accept more American control over both its finances and a constabulary. However, his efforts to reduce the nation's sovereignty alienated the people from Jiménez, thus reducing his ability to remain in
power. Bryan resigned in June 1915, but his policies quickly led to military intervention during disturbances in Haiti, which by treaty finally granted substantial control over its domestic affairs to America. Later, during disturbances in the Dominican Republic, America landed troops and in November 1915, placed it under military rule. Both nations remained protectorates of the United States for several years.26

Bryan had a major influence in formulating policy toward the Far East and was immediately confronted with the problem of maintaining cordial relations with Japan. That nation considered pending legislation in California to be directed toward its subjects in that state and viewed this as offensive and in violation of a 1911 treaty between the two nations. Bryan went to California hoping to gain sufficient moderation in the language of the legislation to prevent injury to Japan's sensibilities and to indicate the government's good intentions in the matter. On May 9 legislation was passed prohibiting ownership of land to aliens ineligible for citizenship and rumors of possible war between the United States and Japan followed. Because of this American military leaders urged ships be sent to help protect the Philippines and Hawaii from attack, but Bryan along with Wilson rejected this, believing it would merely
increase the chance of war. Bryan, applying his idea of dispelling crises by personal diplomacy and goodwill, talked on May 18 with Japan's Ambassador to the United States Viscount Sutemi Chinda. He expressed American friendship, but was unable to give assurances of any remedial action to be taken regarding the California law. This prompted Chinda to ask if the position was final, to which he responded that "there is nothing final between friends" and that the United States would consider any proposition the Japanese offered. The American response to the first Japanese protest was presented to Ambassador Chinda the following day. In the note Bryan expressed assurances of American friendship by stating it would cooperate "in every possible way to maintain . . . the understanding which bind the two nations together in honor and in interest," but did not concede any of the main points Japan had raised. In the fall of 1913, the Japanese proposed to resolve the issue by negotiating a treaty, but little progress had been made by April 1914 when a new Japanese government came to power urging a more aggressive foreign policy. The Japanese note of November 25, 1914, which stated it had received "little that appears to answer in a fundamental manner the main complaints," indicated the failure to arrive at any solution. The lingering hostility clouded relations and made agreement over problems
which arose in World War I more difficult.

Bryan's belief that America should do more to advance world peace than any other nation led him to propose a plan giving expression to his idea that Christian morality was applicable to the world. On April 24, 1913, he presented to diplomats of thirty-six nations with representatives in the United States a plan officially entitled, "Treaties for the Advancement of General Peace," which he believed would be the basis for an enduring peace. The United States and any nation signing these treaties agreed that any dispute including ones of vital interests and national honor arising between them, not settled by diplomacy and without recourse to arbitration, would be presented for investigation to a five-member international commission. The one-year period the commission would normally take to make its report provided time for cooling-off and reflection before resorting to hostilities or war. Bryan hoped that during the time of investigation reason would replace emotion enabling men to reach a solution and that in the year public opinion might form and express itself to reduce the likelihood of war. While there was no provision for enforcement and no obligation on the parties to accept the decision, he believed at the end of the time war would only be "a remote possibility." He wanted the parties to include in the treaties a prohibition
against military build-up, but this was to be determined in each agreement. By late 1914 thirty-six nations had adopted his peace plan in principle, representing over three-fourths of the world's population. Germany accepted the plan in principle; however, it refused to sign because its great military advantage would be reduced by a cooling-off period, which would allow other nations to mobilize their forces and reduce its bargaining power. Of the thirty treaties which were negotiated, twenty were ultimately ratified by the United States Senate, including those with Great Britain, France, Spain, China and Russia. 31

The outbreak of the First World War in early August 1914 led Bryan to continually seek an opportunity to offer American mediation as a way to restore peace. Bryan had urged Wilson before the war to offer mediation as Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, but instead Wilson consulted the British as to whether an American proposal of its good offices would serve any useful purpose. On August 4, with war existing between Austria-Hungary along with Germany against France and Russia, the United States issued a proclamation of neutrality. The same day, Bryan instructed the American ambassadors to deliver to the leaders of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia an offer of mediation. On August 5
Britain declared war on Germany and similar instructions were sent to that nation as well as France. However, all five nations rejected America's first formal offer of good offices prompting Bryan to note that "each one declares he is opposed to war and anxious to avoid it and then lays the blame upon someone else." He hoped more opportunities for mediation might arise and upon learning on September 6 that Germany might accept an American offer of mediation, immediately expressed to that nation the desire of the United States to bring "the parties into conference with a view to the adjustment by them of their differences." He conveyed to England and France through the respective American ambassadors the desirability of mediation, since he believed it would be beneficial if "the different nations would be able to explain . . . the reasons for continuing the war . . . and the terms upon which peace is possible. This would locate responsibility for the continuation of the war and help to mold public opinion." The United States on September 16 received Germany's negative reply, thus ending the effort, as Wilson would only offer mediation if assured of its acceptance. Bryan believing neither side would win the overwhelming victory necessary to dictate terms urged Wilson to make an open appeal to the belligerents asking for immediate peace talks to be held in the United States with all neutral and belligerent
nations attending. Wilson rejected this, but Bryan continued to urge an appeal for peace believing the United States as the leading exponent of Christianity and the foremost advocate of world peace had a responsibility to do everything possible to end the war.35

Bryan's greatest contribution to peace during the war lay in the effort he exerted to maintain American neutrality as a way to retain the nation's influence for reconciling the belligerents and to avoid its involvement in the war. Immediately after the war began, the administration was confronted with the possibility of American bankers extending loans to the belligerent governments. While such loans were not contrary to the precedents of international law, Bryan believed that "money [was] the worst of all contrabands because it commands everything else."36 He urged Wilson to oppose the granting of loans because it would lead to division within the nation as those who had lent money would favor one belligerent against another and this would make it more difficult to maintain neutrality. On August 15, he announced that the administration, although unable to prevent such loans, regarded them as "inconsistent with the true spirit of neutrality."37 As the war continued, the administration sought to prevent division within the nation by closely adhering to a policy of strict neutrality between the belligerents. This was reflected by Bryan's
changed attitude regarding loans, since in October he was willing to condone bankers extending short-term credit to the belligerent governments, which would enable them to purchase war materials in the United States. On October 15, he reaffirmed the administration's position that individual Americans had a right to sell military supplies to the warring nations. The administration believed the British proclamation of October 29 which increased the articles considered absolute contrabands and liable to seizure if destined for an enemy, was based upon international law, and did not send a formal protest although it infringed upon America's neutral trading rights. For the same reason, the administration did not formally protest the British proclamation of November 3 designating the North Sea a war zone in which neutral vessels could travel safely only by following certain routes.38

As the war continued the administration sought to protect America's neutral rights which were increasingly adversely affected by the escalating reprisals between the belligerents. Its previous decisions regarding neutrality had enabled Great Britain, given its naval superiority over the Central Powers and its efforts to restrict German shipping, to secure from the United States the supplies necessary to continue its war effort. This situation led Germany on February 4, 1915 to take
countermeasures by declaring the waters surrounding the British Isles, including the English Channel, to be a war zone in which, after the eighteenth, all enemy merchant vessels would be subject to attack by submarines without warning. It further noted that neutral ships would be in danger of destruction since submarines would not be able to adhere to visit and search before commencing an attack because of British misuse of neutral flags and its ramming techniques. The administration responded to Germany in a note of February 10 declaring that the loss of American lives or vessels by submarine attack without warning would be regarded as "an indefensible violation of neutral rights" for which it would be held "to a strict accountability." 39 Bryan believed the German reply offered some hope of obtaining an agreement between the belligerents relating to their respective maritime rules and on February 20 sent notes to both nations. He urged them to consider, among other items, that Britain allow food to be imported for German civilians under American supervision, in return for that nation agreeing to adhere to visit and search regarding merchant vessels, but no agreement was reached. The British Order in Council of March 11 declaring its intention to detain all ships presumed to be trading with Germany, prompted the administration's reply that it was expected "to make full reparation for every act, which
under the rules of international law constitutes a violation of neutral rights." Nevertheless, by the spring of 1915 relations with Germany had deteriorated as it believed America was unneutral, at least in spirit, because of its failure to oppose British measures while continuing to sell it military supplies.

The Wilson Administration was predominately concerned during the spring of 1915 with Germany's use of the submarine in enforcing its blockade of Britain. By early May Wilson had decided that while clearly opposing Germany's submarine warfare, he would be willing to postpone final settlement of the several incidents involving America until after the war. However, this was drastically altered when the British liner *Lusitania* was sunk without warning by a German submarine on May 7 resulting in the deaths of 124 Americans. Bryan, two days later, pointed out to Wilson that the ship had carried a cargo of ammunition and noted that "Germany has a right to prevent contraband going to the Allies and a ship carrying contraband should not rely upon passengers to protect [it] from attack." He urged Wilson to maintain strict neutrality by sending a note to Germany regarding the *Lusitania* incident and one to Great Britain protesting its interference with American neutral rights. He believed this would show the United States intended to defend "our rights from aggression
from both sides."\(^3\) He signed the first Lusitania note of May 13 which declared Germany would be held to "strict accountability" for infringing America's rights regarding travel and commerce as well as noting that the use of submarines against merchant vessels resulted in "an inevitable violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity."\(^4\)

Bryan believed a protest would be sent simultaneously to Britain, but Wilson refused to do this when a more serious controversy existed with Germany. As Wilson would later note, the "violation of neutral rights is different from . . . violation of the rights of humanity."\(^5\) Bryan, as he had done before, urged the administration to take action to warn Americans to avoid traveling on belligerent ships in the war zone, but Wilson rejected this, believing it would weaken the importance of the note and would appear as weakness before the threat to the right of Americans to travel the seas. To prevent a crisis from developing after the note was sent, Bryan urged a statement be issued at the same time indicating that "strict accountability" did not mean an immediate settlement. He believed since Germany had accepted a peace treaty in principle with the United States, agreement could be reached for a one-year investigation of the Lusitania incident with the final settlement postponed until after the war. Wilson ultimately refused to issue
a statement believing it would weaken the protest and that there was no need to engage in a prolonged discussion regarding some very simple facts. On May 31 the administration received Germany's reply and began to prepare a second note. Bryan believed "this may be our last chance to speak for peace, for it will be much harder to propose investigation after some unfriendly act than now," and again urged Wilson to approve the suggestions he had made believing without them the note being prepared would likely produce a break in diplomatic relations which might rush the nation into war.46

Bryan refused to sign the second Lusitania note instead submitting a letter of resignation to Wilson dated June 8, 1915. In the letter he noted that his resignation was to take effect when the note was sent, since he believed war could not be avoided if he waited until a harsh reply was received from Germany. While he realized his resignation might end his political career, he believed he had an obligation to the people who had put so much trust in him and could not join in action which they opposed and which might cause them so much suffering and loss of life. He hoped from outside the administration to contribute to the cause of peace by helping to bring the sentiments of the people against the war to the surface.47
There were a number of other reasons Bryan resigned in addition to the note. He had proposed, in dealing with Mexico and Nicaragua, the United States government extend loans to Latin American nations as a way to protect the Monroe Doctrine and to advance democracy in the area, but Wilson in early 1914 had rejected this idea. On a personal and diplomatic level, he was upset because he felt the influence of Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador to Great Britain, and especially that of Edward M. House, the President's personal advisor, was greater than his own. Immediately before he resigned, he told Wilson that "Colonel House . . . has been Secretary of State, not I, and I, have never had your full confidence." On many occasions Wilson had communicated directly with House and Page as well as other personal agents, thus bypassing Bryan, leaving him at times uninformed regarding the status of certain matters and causing foreign governments to disregard his comments. Finally, Wilson had continually rejected Bryan's advice regarding American neutrality during World War I, while accepting that of Robert Lansing, the Counselor of the State Department.

After his resignation Bryan worked to prevent the United States from becoming involved in the First World War. He argued that the nation should not become involved as a result of incidents not directed at the
United States, and urged the people to let the President and members of Congress know of their support for warning Americans against traveling on belligerent ships. In early 1916 Bryan's influence helped to produce resolutions by Senator Thomas P. Gore and Representative Jefferson McLemore, which were intended to prevent Americans from traveling on belligerent ships; however, Wilson's strong opposition prevented their passage. In the fall of 1915, Bryan proposed a popular referendum be held before the nation declared war. He continued to oppose the nation undertaking a program of military preparedness. He argued that "if preparation prevents war, there would have been no war in Europe. They spent twenty years preparing for it" and continued to insist that mediation was the way to end the conflict. However, Wilson had begun to favor preparedness after the Lusitania incident and urged the Congress to accept an increase in the nation's military defense, which was finally granted in June 1916. Even though Bryan was displeased with some of Wilson's actions, he decided to support his re-election as president in 1916 believing he seriously desired peace. During the fall, Bryan vigorously campaigned for Wilson, who won a narrow victory over his Republican opponent, Charles Evans Hughes. On December 18, 1916 Wilson sent identical notes to the belligerents asking that they state their war aims and
terms of peace, a course Bryan had urged from the beginning of the war. Germany accepted Wilson's invitation to a conference of belligerents without stating any terms, while the Allies demanded terms Germany could not accept. In January 1917 Germany announced its intention to resume submarine attacks against merchant vessels and Wilson, as he had earlier threatened to do, responded by severing diplomatic relations. Bryan, who had resigned believing this action would lead to war, traveled to Washington, D.C. to consult with Congressional leaders to find a way to avoid this occurring. In mid-March, three American ships were sunk and Wilson advanced the special session of the meeting of Congress to April 2. He went before Congress and asked for a declaration of war, which was granted on April 6, 1917.51

Bryan, believing laws enacted by majority rule should be obeyed, immediately began to support the war, although his offer of military service was declined. The fighting continued for more than a year before an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918 and Wilson soon traveled to Paris, France to attend the Peace Conference which began early in 1919. On June 28 the leaders of the Allied nations signed the Treaty of Versailles, which included the Covenant of the League of Nations. This organization was designed to join the member nations together to prevent
future wars. Bryan strongly supported the ratification of the treaty and America's entry into the League, recognizing that Article XII of the Covenant which provided for a period of investigation and attempted conciliation before resorting to war, was based upon the principle of his peace treaties. Nevertheless, he suggested several changes, in particular advocating that each nation be able to decide whether it would support the decisions of the Security Council, since he did not want the United States to go to war against its will or be forced to support an economic boycott against an aggressor as this was likely to develop into a war. In early 1920 he urged Democratic Senators to accept changes in the treaty to gain its ratification. However, Wilson refused to compromise and a treaty with the reservations of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was rejected on March 20, 1920. Bryan had urged the Democratic Party to reject Wilson's demand that the 1920 presidential election be a referendum on the League and, for the first time, did not campaign for the Party's presidential candidate. In November the Democratic nominee, James C. Cox, was overwhelmingly defeated by his Republican opponent, Warren G. Harding.52

During the early Twenties Bryan increasingly turned his attention to religious matters, although he continued to advocate a program of political and social reform.
However, the political conservatism and materialism of postwar America was not conducive to this spirit. Having always believed Christianity the basis for social and political change he came to view the apathy and indifference of the people as the result of increasing doubts about religion which arose from the theory of evolution. In his lecture "The Menace of Darwinism" he held that belief in God was weakened because the theory put "the creative act so far away that reverence for a creator is likely to be lost." By 1921 he had become convinced that teaching evolution as fact in schools caused youth to lose faith in the Bible and ultimately in Christianity. By 1922 he moved to Miami, Florida and began to address a succession of state legislatures, mostly in the South, in which he urged the passage of legislation to prohibit teaching evolution in tax-supported schools. He argued the majority of the people objected to this being taught.

In early 1925 the Tennessee legislature passed the Butler Act, which was the first law explicitly prohibiting the teaching, in a school supported by state funds, that man had descended from a lower order of animals. Bryan hailed this as the first step toward preventing the teaching of evolution as a fact in schools across the nation. While the state did not make an effort to enforce the legislation, opponents
of this act sought a test case. Because of this situation a biology teacher at Rhea County High School in Dayton, Tennessee, John Thomas Scopes, was arrested on May 7 after admitting he could not teach the subject without discussing evolution. Within days Bryan agreed to become part of the prosecution, which elevated the case to national attention.

Immediately before the trial began on July 10, 1925, Bryan declared that "the contest between evolution and Christianity is a duel to the death. . . . If evolution wins in Dayton Christianity goes . . . for the two cannot stand together." After Judge John Tate Raulston instructed the jury to decide if Scopes had violated the law, the prosecution presented four student witnesses who testified he had based his biology lectures on Darwin's theory. The defense wanted to base its case entirely upon the testimony of several scientists and theologians to prove the theory of evolution was valid and did not conflict with the Bible. However, the chief counsel of the prosecution, District Attorney-General Arthur Thomas Stewart, objected to the admissibility of such evidence and Bryan, in his only major address to the court, agreed that scientific testimony should not be admitted. He stated that any objections to the legislation should have been addressed at the time the bill was pending. He further contended that
not only was evolution wrong scientifically, but it had
given rise to philosophers like Friedrich Wilhelm
Nietzsche and recalled that Clarence Darrow, in defending
two clients charged with murder, had argued that profes-
sors who had taught these doctrines were partly respon-
sible for the crime. On July 17 the Judge excluded the
scientific testimony and on the following Monday, the
defense called Bryan as a witness and he consented to
testify. During questioning by Darrow, Bryan revealed
he did not always accept a literal interpretation of the
Bible, to the consternation of his Fundamentalist sup-
porters. On the following day, the Judge ruled his
testimony be stricken from the record and stated the
issue was whether Scopes had violated the law, not
whether man had been created in an evolutionary manner.
Darrow asked the court to instruct the jury to find the
defendant guilty and as the defense did not address the
jury, Bryan was prevented from delivering his closing
speech for the prosecution, which was to have been "the
mountain peak of his life's effort." 56 The jury quickly
returned a guilty verdict which Bryan hailed as a vic-
tory for Christianity. On Sunday, July 26, five days
after the trial ended, Bryan died, probably as the re-
sult of his steadily worsening diabetic condition. He
lay in state through Wednesday in the New York Avenue
Presbyterian Church in Washington, D. C., with two
Spanish-American War veterans standing guard and was buried, as he had requested, in Arlington National Cemetery.
FOOTNOTES


3 Groups which agreed with the anti-imperialist movement are in Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 8-21, 58-73; and Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, pp. x-xi.

4 Coletta, Political Evangelist, pp. 235-236.

5 Bryan's support for the Treaty of Paris is in Koenig, Bryan, pp. 288-293; Schirmer, Republic or Empire, pp. 108-110, 121-122; and Coletta, Political Evangelist, pp. 233-237.


The reasons for Bryan's 1908 presidential defeat are in Koenig, Bryan, pp. 454-456; and Coletta, Political Evangelist, pp. 430-444.


13 Bryan's role in Wilson's presidential campaign is in Koenig, Bryan, pp. 496-500; Link, Road to the White House, pp. 512-513; Baker, Governor, pp. 395-396; Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp. 79-85; and Anderson, Bryan, pp. 169-170.


15 Ibid., p. 145.

16 Ibid., p. 37.


29 Foreign Relations, 1914, p. 433.

30 Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 974-975.

31 Bryan's approach toward his peace treaties are in Koenig, Bryan, pp. 510-511; Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp. 239-249; and Link, The New Freedom, pp. 280-283.


34 Ibid., p. 99.


36 Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, p. 63.

37 Coletta, Progressive Politician, p. 264.


41 Bryan's efforts to maintain American neutrality in early 1915 are in Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 322-326, 344-347; Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp. 276, 286, 291-300; and May, American Isolation, pp. 138, 142-146.

42 Coletta, Progressive Politician, p. 313.

43 Ibid., p. 317.


45 Coletta, Progressive Politician, p. 332.

46 Bryan's efforts to reduce conflict with Germany before the second Lusitania note was sent are in Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 389-391, 414, 417; Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp. 319-321, 332-335; and Baker, Neutrality, pp. 341-344, 354-356.

47 Bryan's resignation because of the second Lusitania note are in Coletta, Progressive Politician, pp. 335, 340; Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, pp. 419-420; and Koenig, Bryan, p. 549.

48 Link, The Struggle for Neutrality, p. 422.


51 Bryan's efforts to prevent the nation's involvement in the war are in Coletta, Political Puritan, pp. 3-15, 25-35, 47-55; Koenig, Bryan, pp. 551-557, 567-569; and Curti, World Peace, pp. 223-225, 236-243.

52 Bryan's support for the League of Nations is in Coletta, Political Puritan, pp. 88-100; Koenig, Bryan, pp. 577-580; and Curti, World Peace, pp. 162-163, 248-250.


54 Bryan's opposition to the teaching of evolution is in Coletta, Political Puritan, pp. 228-232; Koenig, Bryan, pp. 606-609, 630-631; and Levine, Defender of the Faith, pp. 261-289.

55 Koenig, Bryan, p. 239.

56 Coletta, Political Puritan, p. 271.

57 Bryan's effort during the Scopes Trial is in Coletta, Political Puritan, pp. 251-252, 258-268; Koenig, Bryan, pp. 644-654; and Levine, Defender of the Faith, pp. 342-344, 348-352.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents


Books


———. "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a Mandate on Imperialism?" The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 24 (June 1937):43-52.


"Mr. Bryan's Address on Imperialism." The Outlook, August 1900, pp. 938-940.


Powell, Anna I. "Relations Between the United States and Nicaragua, 1898-1916." The Hispanic American Historical Review 8 (February 1928): 43-64.


Editorials


"The Effect of Mr. Bryan's Peace Treaties upon the Relations of the United States with the Nations at War." The American Journal of International Law 9 (April 1915): 494-496.
"Mr. Bryan's Proposed Commissions of Inquiry." The American Journal of International Law 7 (July 1913): 566-570.


"The Anti-Imperialist Resolutions." The Outlook, August 1900, pp. 943-944.

"The Arbitration Treaties." The Outlook, August 1911, pp. 801-802.

"Mr. Bryan's Acceptance." The Outlook, August 1900, pp. 903-904.