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The Battle for the University: The Vietnam-Era Student Movement at Universities in Central Illinois

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THE BATTLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY: THE VIETNAM ERA

STUDENT MOVEMENT AT UNIVERSITIES IN CENTRAL ILLINOIS

(TITLE)

BY

DAVID BELL

THESIS

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CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 1
II. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS URBANA-CHAMPAIGN ........... 8
III. EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY .................................. 37
IV. ILLINOIS WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY ............................. 66
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................... 91
SOURCES CONSULTED .................................................. 94
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

America in the 1960s ran the gamut of social, economic, and political changes, from the assassination of political leaders to the apocalyptic potential of the Cuban Missile Crisis; from President Lyndon B. Johnson’s promises of a Great Society, to the paralyzing effects of the Vietnam War. At the center of these domestic and international battles lay the “baby boomers,” the largest-ever generation of Americans, and, not coincidentally, the largest generation of college students to enter the “ivory towers” of higher education. Raised in an era defined by cries for civil rights and “participatory democracy,” these youths entered higher education determined to change the world. The difference between this generation and their predecessors, however, was that this group’s unprecedented size offered the potential to affect real change. Using the university as their battleground, these idealistic young men and women declared war on the patriarchal political and social structures imposed by collegiate administrations.

The Vietnam War undoubtedly played a major role in the explosion of student activism in the late sixties, but this only partly explains why students rioted in the streets of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, or why one-fourth of Eastern Illinois University’s enrollment marched on their president’s home. Instead, there existed this sense that American society in particular and the West in general were at a social and political crossroads; a feeling especially among students that they lived in a time of profound possibilities and promise; a consensus that demanded student action against an outdated “system” that included not only national policies, but especially collegiate issues.
that directly affected them. Students, perhaps unconsciously, sensed America slipping into a state of decline, or a “twilight age” as then University of California-Riverside sociologist Robert Nisbet called it, which was characterized by a loss of social authority and hierarchy, and a decline in attachment to political values, coupled, perhaps not paradoxically, with the spread of oppressive state machinery.¹

The movement initially commenced in part to prevent this downward slide. As evident in this case study of three Illinois universities, however, these student activists discovered that large-scale nationwide protests fell on deaf ears of the U.S. government. Yet this did little to dispel the rebelliousness pervading the college community. Students in the late sixties instead shifted their energy and focused on righting local campus wrongs such as dictatorially imposed rules and regulations, while concerns such as the Vietnam War sometimes fell to the background.² As one study of Southern Illinois University at Carbondale concluded, “local issues—the ones that clearly touched on their lives, their campus, and their right to express themselves and have a good time—galvanized many students to join the movements of the 1960s...at this level (in the Midwest and the South), the movement mixed national and local issues.”³

These battles between students and the university arose over the university’s transition to a new type of institution. Consistent with the tenor of the times, the larger

¹ For more on this see Robert A. Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

² Throughout this work, “local” or “neighborhood” issues will often include issues of race, women’s liberation, the drug culture, and student rights. I recognize that these topics were both national and global, but I use the word “local” because these students articulated and approached them in a very grass-roots manner. Students often addressed these issues only when they actually appeared on their own campus.

societal issues gripping the nation forced colleges and universities to abandon their traditional isolationism from society, their "ivory tower." The gradual intrusion of exterior pressing issues divided the college community and created an institution not of one, or "uni," but of many, or "multi." Coined by the founder of the University of California system, Clark Kerr, this appropriately titled "multiversity" consisted of multiple conflicting "nations" or cultures, the most important of whom were students, faculty, and administrators. These factions presided over their own territories, governments, and jurisdictions, and often declared war on one another. Kerr's ideal "multiversity" held as its goal coexistence rather than peace, and its leadership, the university president, acted as a "mediator," maintaining peace and ensuring progress.  

But many traditional university members did not embrace this new "multiversity," and university presidents especially despised their relegation from leader to coordinator. Meanwhile, students and faculty demanded greater "democracy" or shared governance. By the time antiwar activism occupied center stage on campuses, this old, patriarchal system clashed violently with Kerr's new "multiversity" and turned higher education on its head, setting the stage for the greatest war of the sixties: the Battle for the University. 

Yet, these issues have received little in-depth historical analysis and the historiography of higher education during the anti-Vietnam era is underdeveloped and frequently biased. Actual antiwar participants, or at least those that lived through the period, disproportionately have written on this topic. Among the more reputable literature is Todd Gitlin's *The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of Rage*, Tom Hayden's *Reunion: A Memoir*, and numerous publications by conservative "turncoat" David Horowitz. Insightful as such works may be, they remain too polemical, rarely offering

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balanced insights and analysis. Personal histories are often centered on the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) (unsurprising considering the extensive involvement of men like Gitlin and Hayden in the organization), and rarely do they discuss faculty and administration reactions, issues usually dismissed as unimportant or oppositional. Historian Andrew Hunt has noted this orientation, lamenting a biased historiography and contending that, "SDS provides an inadequate conceptual framework for understanding the breadth of protest activity in the 1960s and 1970s."5

A number of scholars have examined individual college campuses during this turbulent era, including case studies of institutions like Michigan State University and State University of New York at Buffalo. Kenneth Heineman's work, *Campus Wars: the Peace Movement at American State Universities in the Vietnam Era* serves as something of a model for this thesis, as he also compared antiwar activity at several non-elite universities. Incorporating a plethora of primary sources including personal interviews, underground newspapers, and archival material, Heineman exhaustively explored each of the three factions--administration, students, and faculty--to examine the motivation behind "the movement," as well as its opposition.

Although this study tests Heineman's conclusions that Vietnam-era student activism often manifested itself at the local level, it is not merely a repeat of Heineman's pioneering contribution. While Heineman correctly revises sixties' historiography by showing how non-elite schools like Kent State and Pennsylvania State University were just as instrumental in forging campus activism as Berkeley and Columbia, the schools he chose to study paralleled each other in size and nature, as most were large, public state

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universities. As such it creates an inherent flaw when attempting to generalize his findings since most American universities were smaller.

This thesis differs because the selected schools vary considerably with regards to student population and school structure. The three schools examined here represent a remarkably diverse sample of campus atmospheres not only in Illinois, but also nationally. Eastern Illinois University (EIU) represents the stereotypical conservative, isolated and parochial public institution. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) represents EIU’s opposite, and therefore must be included on the extreme radical end of the spectrum. Finally, as a small, private university remotely located over 150 miles from a major city, Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU) differs tremendously from the other two institutions. IWU’s 1960s campus activities compared to the other schools gives valuable insight into economic and religious influences on student activism.

Additionally, each selected school is located in one state, Illinois, whereas Heineman’s university choices span from New York to Michigan. In its historical development, Illinois offers something of a microcosm for the United States. Migration patterns from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries reveal that southern and central Illinois settlers came from the more conservative southern areas, like the Tidewater regions, which comprised slave-holders committed to individualism and state power. The northern section of the state, populated by migrants from the Great Lakes region, combined diverse cultures, beliefs, and economic orientation. Both groups slowly moved towards inner or central Illinois, carrying with them clashing ideas and customs, similar to those fought over during the Civil War. These complex patterns of migration

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and settlement continued into the twentieth century, making Illinois a remarkably diverse state—economically, racially, culturally, and socially. As such it offers ideal terrain for test cases and generalizations.

This comparative study involves relating not only the universities to one another, but also relating the university to itself. In short, before one can determine how the schools interrelate, one must determine how factions within the university fit together. These "factions" include the student body, the faculty, and the administration. From this analysis, general campus climates can be deduced, alongside the forces forging or preventing campus unrest and dissent. The final section offers a synthesis of the findings at the three universities. Here, these factional relationships will ultimately be compared to the other sample universities.

Imperative to this study is access to university archives, which include statistical data as well as correspondence amongst administrative members and faculty. Archival collections at UIUC and IWU contain such sources, including the school newspapers, a variety of contemporary newsletters and periodicals issued by student groups, minutes of faculty bodies, clippings from other newspapers, photographs, posters, administrative records, pertinent materials within collections of personal papers, and biographical information on selected individuals, and information concerning local demographics. Eastern Illinois University's University Archives, though much smaller and less extensive than the other sample schools, similarly contains correspondence between administration in the form of letters and memos addressing student conduct, community complaints, courses of action to be taken, petitions from Illinois interest groups, and official statements from the administration to the faculty. Also included are
actual pamphlets, flyers, and posters confiscated from students and faculty supporting anti-Vietnam demonstrations. The final pertinent primary source is interviews with members of all three factions at each university.

I spent endless hours examining such material—balancing opposing viewpoints and piecing together a fascinating yet complex piece of recent history. The final product is a mixture of intriguing stories and interconnected subplots that support the main conclusion that there existed an “aura of rebellion” on college campuses. The Vietnam War certainly ignited the student protest firestorm, but also underscored a growing sense of infinite potential among “baby boomers” that continued throughout the sixties. Analyzing these sources led me to several related conclusions. First, most campus activism stemmed not from opposition to the Vietnam War, but rather from disgust with the university administration. Although administrators eventually learned how to address student unrest, their initial strategies provoked “radical” protesters and perpetuated violent clashes. Secondly, growing student apathy towards all societal issues constantly acted as a thorn in the side of student activism. Even peaceful protests enjoyed relatively limited participation, thus seriously impeding this generation’s once-great potential.

This sociological/historical study teeters on the fence separating these two disciplines. People’s motivations for and reactions to campus unrest necessitate some sociological study into group behavior and leadership qualities, but cannot detract from the main question. This study seeks to address the question puzzling historians from Todd Gitlin to Kenneth Heineman: what drove student rebellion in the sixties?
CHAPTER II

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

Participation of any sort in the University community requires a commitment to the fundamental human rights of free speech and free inquiry... We are forced to coexist with an administration that freely undermines this most basic idea of a university. The channels have never been open to us. Violence is intolerable. What tactic is left?¹

The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign stormed through the Vietnam era as a frustrated minority of student and faculty "radicals" pushed the university to its breaking point. The Vietnam War, administrative infringements on perceived student rights, UIUC's military complicity with the U.S. Department of Defense, and numerous claims of police brutality galvanized anti-establishment advocates and brought the institution to its knees. While most Illinois college students protested issues in a general manner, UIUC activism differed because particularly controversial issues actually existed on campus. While the Indochina conflict provided the push for student activism, the university's acceptance of government research grants, its invitations to military-related recruiters, and heavy-handed administrative dealings with protestors offered targets for "radicals" and provided them opportunities to recruit other students and faculty to join their violent crusade against the war, the country, and the university.

But the university did not crumble under the weight of student activism. By 1970, both students and administrators discovered firsthand the terrifying specter of violence and unofficially agreed to avoid such destructive tactics. Both sides eventually learned

¹ Daily Illini, 12 March 1970, collections of campus newspaper clippings, Campus Unrest File, 1968-72, University Archives, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Champaign, Illinois (Henceforth UIUC Archives).
that democratic processes coupled with administrative restraint not only prevented violence, but also provided the first steps in achieving Clark Kerr’s “multiversity.”

**Rumblings of Rebellion**

Although the bulk of campus disruption occurred between 1967 and 1972, the pot of rebellion began boiling upon President David Dodds Henry’s appointment in 1955. The former president of Wayne State University followed the controversial resignation of liberal-minded President George D. Stoddard. Stoddard’s “radical” actions like recognizing a youth affiliate organization of the Communist Party in 1950 prompted the Board of Trustees to pass a “vote of no confidence” in 1953. The Board of Trustees, likely looking to reclaim institutional respectability, hired the safer, more conservative Henry. At the time, administrators appeared to have a definite bent toward conservatism and authoritarianism.

A split within the campus community was already evident when the Free Speech Movement came to UIUC in 1965. Amidst faculty publications labeling former President Kennedy a communist and administrative resistance to granting students their Berkeley-inspired demand for a free speech area on the quadrangle, the first local Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) chapter formed and joined the fray. The campus divisions continued in 1966 with the Board of Trustees (BOT)’s decision to deny recognition of the W. E. Dubois club, a youth group suspected to be communist-affiliated, set the scene for

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2 “Chronology of Campus Protest, ca. 1972,” Student Affairs, UIUC Archives.

3 Henry’s “conservatism” is reflected in his firing of a biology professor in 1960 for composing an editorial to the *Daily Illini* expressing his favoring of pre-marital sex.

4 Jim Holiman, interview by author, November 2003, unrecorded phone interview. Holiman explained how, following the University of California–Berkeley’s lead, UIUC students demanded that the administration allow the exercise of free speech at certain locations on the campus quadrangular.
future disenchantment with the administration as faculty in almost every college and nearly every student opposed the decision. With battle lines drawn and student and administrative stances established, the war on the administration began.

The Vietnam War Hits Home

National and local events in the fall of 1967 ignited the campus and focused attention of the Vietnam conflict. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s draft expansion policy infuriated students nation-wide, heightening student awareness and concern about a foreign war that could now claim their lives if the draft so determined. Newly invigorated with fear of induction, students raged against the military machine by organizing sit-ins and demonstrations against all Vietnam-related corporations and services.

Their first target was the Champaign draft board. Following the footsteps of the Draft Resistance Union, a loose grouping of militant anti-draft groups operating on the fringes of SDS and based in the San Francisco Bay area, Wisconsin, Boston, Cleveland and elsewhere, UIUC’s SDS chapter formed the Champaign-Urbana Draft Resistance Union (CUDRU) in 1967. This left-wing group instigated numerous marches and sit-ins on the Champaign Selective Service Board and sponsored the draft card burnings by two individuals. Inspired students marched to the Selective Service Office where eleven would be arrested for blocking the Selective Service office doorway in an attempt to close the building. One month later in November the DRU struck again, when four members donning hooded death masks and carrying a coffin draped in the U.S. flag attempted to storm the ballroom where John Hallmack, Illinois draft head, was speaking.5

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5 "Chronology of Campus Protest, ca. 1972," UIUC Archives.
Students also organized a December 4th 1967 protest including fasting, marching on the Draft Board, and defiantly returning draft cards. The Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Vietnam\(^6\) also lent its support, stating, “there was strong sentiment expressed by many at our last meeting in favor of our members supporting it as individuals.”\(^7\) The year’s final expression of draft resistance occurred on April 3\(^{rd}\), deemed the National Day of Non-Cooperation, where over 400 students gathered near the Illini Union to witness five men hand over their draft cards to Catholic priest Richard Mayer, who stated “I...do counsel and advise those who choose, on moral grounds, to resist the draft. To do otherwise would be to reject and profane my profession, my heritage, my religious commitment and my conscience.”\(^8\)

But the presence of a local draft board and Selective Service leaders were not the only opportunities for student demonstration in 1967. The administration’s invitation to Dow Chemical Company recruiters in October roused student sentiment and produced the largest mass protest on UIUC’s campus to date. Nearly 400 students, spurred by the DRU, SDS, and Committee to End the War in Vietnam (CEWV), marched to the Chemistry building to vent frustration about Dow’s military complicity with the U.S.

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\(^6\) Originally created in 1965 to facilitate occasional discussions and raise funds for the campus chapter of SDS, this committee included fifteen to twenty faculty members that perceived a growing student interest the Vietnam conflict.

\(^7\) “U of I Faculty Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam,” letter to UIUC community, 29 November 1967, Faculty Organizations, UIUC Archives. The UIUC faculty’s increased encouragement of student protests reflected national trends, according to Willis Rudy. Before 1968, most faculty and students supported Johnson and the Vietnam policy. By 1968, however, the continued escalation of this increasingly unpopular international conflict reversed faculty sentiment. Rudy found that professors supported over two-thirds of student demonstrations, while actively planning one half.

\(^8\) Walrus, underground campus newspaper, April 1968, Student Affairs, UIUC Archives Research Center (henceforth ARC). Campus ministries at many colleges engaged in and encouraged acts of civil disobedience like draft counseling and draft resistance.
Two hundred demonstrators occupied the Chemistry Building and forced Dow to cancel all interviews with those students interested in working for Dow. In the end, authorities arrested eight students, and a university disciplinary committee granted probation to seven while outright expelling the eighth.

While Vietnam-related demonstrations subsided until 1969, the university again created a situation around which students and faculty rallied: the disciplinary actions regarding the Dow sit-ins. Temporarily abandoning the traditional disciplinary system, the administration created a special Committee on Student Discipline comprised of a heavy majority of college deans and officials that completely excluded student representation. The Committee resolved “students participating in future actions comparable to those that took place on October 25, 1967, will be subject to immediate dismissal.”

Heavy student and faculty opposition to a student-free committee that predetermined “future” penalties regardless of circumstance ensued. An amendment requiring student representatives eventually passed and Law Professor Herbert Semmel addressed the “predetermination” issue, interpreting the statement as the committee’s unlawful seizure of power that illegally mandated all future acts of mass demonstration would result in the same penalty, regardless of context or circumstance. In a furious letter to Committee Chairman Orville Bentley, Semmel contended “The effect of the committee’s statement is to prejudge future conduct and must be regarded by the disciplinary subcommittee as a directive to expel students... The entire student body has

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9 DOW held numerous government defense contracts, particularly the NEPALM production.

10 “Chronology of Campus Protest, ca. 1972,” UIUC Archives.

11 “Report of Senate Committee on Student Discipline,” 15 November 1967, Senate Committee Reports and Correspondence File, 1940-83, ARC.
in effect been placed on conduct probation.” Semmel also argued that because such mass demonstrations were unprecedented and did not substantially interfere with the university’s operation, they therefore did not warrant the punishment of automatic expulsion. Additionally, such a threat would “have deleterious effects on student conduct in areas of political and social expression” and deter many from future acts of dissent. Finally, Semmel abhorred the committee’s preferential treatment of faculty members involved in such demonstrations, as future first-time faculty offenders received warnings, not dismissal.  

The draft resistance and Dow chemical sit-ins would be the last Vietnam-related demonstrations until the fall of 1969. The lapse in Vietnam-related protest in the 1968-69 school year reflected the “movement’s” wavering focus as the Radical Union (RU) replaced the struggling, fractured local SDS. As SDS nationally lost political focus and degenerated into the violent Weathermen faction, UIUC chapter leaders dissolved the organization and created the RU, which concentrated solely on local campus concerns. This small yet influential group soon generated waves of student activism that the university rode until it crashed upon the shores of the May 1970 Student Strike. Although the Vietnam War undergirded the “days of rage” that drew ever closer, the administration’s blatant and repeated repressions of student rights, coupled with the institution’s military ties, provided the impetus for student activism. Additionally, UIUC

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12 Herbert Semmel, letter to Orville Bentley, 15 December 1967, Administrative Subject File, 1963-85, ARC.

13 This information was gathered through various conversations with Michael Pollock, a former UIUC student and participant in groups like the Radical Union.
activists exhibited effective organizational skills that allowed groups such as the RU to flourish and operate in a coherent, unified manner.

**A “Disappointing” Moratorium**

The October 1969 Moratorium signaled the last truly peaceful and intellectual mass antiwar event focused solely on the Indochina conflict. The cooperative, peaceful atmosphere during those few magical days resulted directly from the vast consensus across the university campus about exactly how the event would transpire. Twenty-nine recognized student and community organizations—from the Civil Rights for Farm Workers to the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom—formed the Moratorium Coalition and symbolized the wide range of antiwar sentiment. The Faculty Ad Hoc Committee on Vietnam predictably and energetically threw its support behind the event. Rationalizing the need for such a Vietnam forum, the committee cited the university’s role as a center of intellectual endeavor, a leader of national sentiment, and a clarifier of issues about Vietnam; in sum, UIUC must be an intellectual beacon from which the light of reason illuminated the path of understanding. The Ad Hoc Committee requested that UIUC Chancellor Jack W. Peltason mimic Rutgers President Mason Gross, who supported a day of dialogue and cancellation of classes to “demonstrate the role of the university as teacher and guardian of civilized values, and as the critical and moral intelligence which compels this country to ponder its courses of action.”

The nationwide event manifested itself at UIUC in the form of a three-day series of rallies, Vietnam-related movies, lectures, and guest speakers. The dramatic expression

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14 U of I Ad Hoc Faculty Committee on Vietnam, letter to Chancellor Jack Peltason, 24 September 1969, Faculty Organizations, ARC.
of antiwar sentiment climaxed with a peaceful march of 9000 from the Auditorium to West Side Park. Police Chief Harvey Shirley marveled at the gathering's size and nature, stating “I can’t recall there being anything like this in the history of the city. And it was a very orderly march.” The only disorder came from two students attempting to disrupt the marchers by driving over them with their motorcycles, and from one student arrested for disorderly conduct. This last student’s arrest sparked another march, this time to the police station where 2000 students and faculty passed around a hat to collect bail money for the accused.\(^{15}\) The Moratorium, though not unanimously supported,\(^{16}\) garnered the largest peaceful gathering of students, faculty, and community members.

But questions about its effectiveness almost immediately surfaced in the *Daily Illini*. One student editorial woefully admitted “It [the Moratorium] may have shortened the war some small fraction of time, perhaps only one day...it is doubtful that Oct. 15 has accomplished anything significant in this area.”\(^{17}\) Consequently, a small group of impatient “radical” students, swept up in the rebellious air swirling around many campuses, shifted attention to local problems in the hopes of winning large victories and keeping student morale afloat. Fortunately for the RU the university provided many such polarizing issues and provided numerous “targets” that heightened student unrest. Issues such as free speech, student rights, and the university’s claim as a “neutral institution” that resolved itself to abstaining from officially commenting on the Vietnam War, surfaced as the main source of student discontent.

\(^{15}\) *Daily Illini*, 16 October 1969.

\(^{16}\) Chancellor Peltason agreed to a thirty-minute cancellation only because of immense student pressure, and the faculty Senate was similarly not adamant about the Moratorium, questioning the ability of the university to retain its objectivity about political issues.

\(^{17}\) *Daily Illini*, 28 October 1969.
Days of Rage

The 1970 spring semester proved the apex of student unrest, both nationally and at UIUC. Demands for “institutional neutrality” became the cause around which radical students rallied, rebelled, and, eventually, would strike. While President Henry and UIUC Chancellor Jack Peltason preached institutional objectivity regarding politics, *The Walrus*, the largest and most widely distributed underground student newspaper at UIUC, exposed the university’s complicity with the U.S. military, as well as their continued relationship with corporate recruiters who contributed in some capacity to the waging of the Vietnam conflict. Students protested UIUC’s relations with military-related corporations before in the 1967 Dow Chemical sit-ins, but such protest was relatively peaceful. After two more years of sustained military involvement in Vietnam, however, frustrations mounted, and “movement” radicals lost patience. After the administration ignored numerous RU appeals through university channels to assemble a student-faculty committee to “review the nature and direction of military and ‘defense’—related research on this campus,” frustrated students believed the time to strike had come.18

Three administration-induced events—the discovery of ongoing connections between UIUC and Illiac IV, a department of defense-funded “supercomputer;” the presence of GE recruiters; and the banning of “Chicago 7” defense attorney William Kunstler from speaking on campus—enraged students and propelled the antiwar movement into unfamiliar territory. While the Vietnam issue provided the glue that held these three events together, the actual local disruptions resulted from and targeted the university administration’s claim to being a “neutral” institution. A few students threw

18 "The University is not a Neutral Institution," Radical Union flyer, 14 November 1969, People Publications, ARC.
rocks at windows while most wielded a mightier weapon, the pen, but all those involved targeted the administration’s “totalitarian” actions, not national policies on Vietnam.

The offensive began in January when the *Daily Illini* revealed that the administration—particularly Daniel Slotnick, Illiac IV project director, and Daniel Alpert, dean of the Graduate College—purposely hid from the public plans to bring the supercomputer to campus. The Radical Union wielded these revelations as proof that the university did not maintain neutrality, and demanded Illiac IV’s immediate abolition, as it supported the military-industrial complex. Both students and faculty also claimed that funding for the project shifted priorities away human needs, such as education. Nevertheless, the Faculty Senate’s Committee on Educational Policy ignored student pleas and approved the Illiac project on February 23. Infuriated, radical students firebombed the Armory, site of ROTC drilling, causing $2,000 damage.19

The Illiac IV controversy temporarily subsided due to the more visible, pressing issue of the administration’s invitation to General Electric recruiters. The *Geek*, a less widely distributed but more left-wing underground newspaper, trumpeted the call for anti-GE protests by exposing the corporation’s military ties. The paper revealed that GE was the nation’s second-largest defense contractor and helped produce and sell numerous weapons and fighter planes used in Vietnam.20 RU planned a rally and demonstration against GE on March 2, and several students penned editorials in the *Daily Illini* warning

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20 *Geek*, underground campus newspaper, 23 February 1970, People Publications, ARC. The *Geek* claimed that GE received military-related profits totaling over $1.6 billion, with $500,000,000 contributing directly to the Vietnam effort. The *Geek* also indicted the company as racist and exploitative of their employees.
“there are strong sentiments against GE on this campus, and that the safety and well-being of the recruiter can not be guaranteed.”21

The warnings proved prophetic when GE appeared as scheduled on March 2nd and met heated student opposition. Students initially occupied the Engineering Building, site of recruitment, and after discovering the recruiters took an early lunch break, marched on Chancellor Peltason’s office, hurling bricks and rocks and smashing windows along the way. Police began arresting students, and a standoff resulted at the intersection of Green and Sixth Street. After regrouping for an RU-sponsored meeting later that evening, the group of 700 committed radicals resumed the rampage and marched through Campustown, hitting local businesses and shattering more windows.22 The activities resulted in twenty-one arrests.

The ensuing administrative actions further incensed students and unified them in their defiance. The Board of Trustees, disregarding Henry’s and Peltason’s apprehensions, banned William Kunstler from making a pre-approved appearance March 3rd. The BOT claimed Kunstler’s appearance presented a “clear and present danger” in light of both student riots at Kunstler’s previous speaking engagement at the University of Wisconsin, and the current GE demonstrations on UIUC’s campus.23

UIUC’s “radical” minority of 700 demonstrators protesting GE the previous night swelled to over 4500 persons on March 3 in response to Kunstler’s ban. The RU distributed leaflets to demonstrators explaining the proper and safest way to march

22 Ibid., 3 March 1970.
23 Ibid., 3 March 1970.
through the streets, and anticipated violent police resistance by suggesting that protestors “Tape a newspaper around each forearm. It gives some protection against clubbing...Carry a hankie or at least paper towel, in case of tear gas.” Students scuffled with state and local police at a Navy recruiting booth, another frequent site of demonstrations, and later 4500 students marched from the Union to President Henry’s mansion. Fifty state police officers greeted the marchers by forming an impenetrable defense line. About 2000 students then marched towards the Armory before turning towards Campustown and smashing nearly a dozen windows. The mayors of both Champaign and Urbana announced a National Guard-enforced 10:30 pm curfew, and guardsmen cleared the streets at 10:45. Ten more people were arrested for curfew violations.

Chancellor Jack Peltason’s statement condemning the “irresponsible behavior of a small group of our students” and praising the “law enforcement officers for an outstanding effort in holding the incidents to the point they did” did little to calm the situation. That same day 1800 people marched through Champaign-Urbana, breaking windows along the way at Bell Telephone, the Armory, and Green Street. Over 140 more arrestees lengthened the seemingly unending list of curfew violators while 700 National Guardsmen surrounded the campus. When GE finally left campus on March 5, they left behind over $20,000 in damages to both campus and neighborhood property.

24 Radical Union flyer, March 1970, People Publications, ARC.
26 Ibid., 4 March 1970.
27 “Chronology of Campus Protest,” UIUC Archives.
While violent protestors comprised a minority of total opposition to administrative and BOT decisions, nearly all those sympathetic to their cause blasted the BOT’s hypocrisy of allowing GE and other recruiters on campus despite heavy student opposition, while simultaneously prohibiting Kunstler’s appearance in the absence of such resistance. Students likewise pointed out that while the administration banned Kunstler on grounds that his talks induced student unrest elsewhere, such demonstrations had occurred against GE previously and yet the company did not suffer the same exclusion. The RU exposed the irony that “the Board has protested the right of free speech of the GE recruiters yet ignored this right of Kunstler.”

Sarcastic letters littered the Daily Illini, including one “praising” a particular BOT member for his “breakthrough in the realm of extra-sensory perception” that allowed him to “anticipate what another person [Kunstler] will say and what he will advocate.” The university “need concern itself no longer with the issue of freedom of speech.” Others leveled harsh critiques, for example that “intellectual suffocation is not yet dead in Champaign-Urbana.”

Behind the editorials lay an underlying feeling of betrayal; the university was not politically “neutral” as evidenced by the Illiac IV controversy, the allowance of GE (a defense department contractor), and the banning of Kunstler, who defended the acts of seven men accused of inciting the 1968 Democratic National Convention riots in Chicago. Many students felt that the BOT prevented the attorney’s appearance on campus because it disagreed with his political views, a statement that, if true, refuted the


university’s claim to “neutrality.” The *Geek* never believed the “neutrality” argument, editorializing “the so called neutrality of the university is just a line that Chancellor Jack [Peltason] and the rest of the administrators use to protest the true nature and purpose of the university, which is to serve and perpetuate the American corporate state.” One student pointed out the irony that “representatives of the business and military establishments have free access to recruit at this University while an anti-establishment lawyer, William Kunstler, is denied access to it.”

The March disturbances signaled the student body’s shift away from addressing national issues and towards the perceived evils in their own university. A demonstration initially against UIUC’s military complicity spiraled into student estrangement from the administration, as editorial letters addressing the disruptions focused primarily on administrative decision-making and student exclusion from that process. The student body’s yearning for a Senate with 50 percent student/50 percent faculty representation was nearly abandoned at this point, signaling the student body’s abandonment of change through official channels of dissent. Graduate Student Association Chairman John Ronsvalle complained that the call for this “50-50” Senate went out nearly a year beforehand, and enjoyed tremendous support from both the undergraduate and graduate population. Yet since that time, the effort produced only empty promises from Vice-Chancellor Frampton and sympathetic rhetoric from Peltason. Alienated, frustrated students like Ronsvalle observed that “many students understandably feel that no structural change will make a difference on this campus; for a campus senate to have

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effectient [sic] student involvement, it must be credible from the start.” He grimly resolved “I have been reduced to relying solely on prayer at this point.”

Undergraduate Student Association (UGSA) Chairman Jim Harms similarly bashed the university, explaining that the Senate would not address the issue of “open recruiting” until next fall, and that “working through channels, when they exist, is slow or impossible.” Regarding student involvement in the administrative processes, he quipped:

During the crisis situation in the last few days, the administration appealed to the students to help solve the problem by such means as staying in their dorms, staying out of crowds, playing it cool, etc. Yet the administration gave no indication that such help in solving problems such as recruiting, the Kunstler issue, the Union, the Assembly Hall, ad infinitum, will be asked or wanted.

The school’s only concern, according to Harms, was to restore “a good name” to the university, and return to the status quo.

Both undergraduates and graduates continued the assault on the administration’s complete exclusion of students, this time vis-à-vis disciplinary hearings. The *Geek* exposed what it believed were administrative attempts, during both the Dow sit-in hearings of 1967 and the 1968 hearings following demonstrations by black students in the Union, to gain complete control over the judicial proceedings and the university. The hearings related to the March 1970 campus disruptions underwent similar criticism. The *Geek* complained that Peltason circumvented the regular disciplinary committees—which consisted of subcommittees made up of three students and three faculty members—by convincing several deans to approve a special committee of thirteen deans and two

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32 *Daily Illini*, 24 March 1970. The “tremendous support” refers to a petition signed by 6000 graduate students during fall registration that supported a 50-50 Senate, and 14,000 undergraduates that indicated support for such a system at spring registration.

33 Ibid., 6 March 1970.
students. Additionally, Peltason hired an admittedly conservative hearings officer, Albert Jenner, to prosecute all the cases and make recommendations to the committee.

Student uproar surfaced immediately. The radical newspaper objected on legal grounds, stating that the Bill of Rights provided a trial by a jury of one’s peers and an administration-heavy committee hardly fit that description. The *Geek* also argued that since the university paid for the expensive, nationally renowned Jenner, it should also foot the bill for a student defender as well. Not that students approved of Jenner. Nothing could be further from the truth, as the *Geek* believed Jenner predisposed against even nonviolent demonstrations. The *Geek* denounced the administration for disregarding the very channels it expected students to employ, and woefully admitted, “the people who are most [sic] directly affected by this institution—students, faculty, and non-academic employees have no control over the policies and priorities of this institution.” Little did the administration realize its greatest threat had yet to come.

**Kent State Strikes the Match**

The May 1970 Kent State shootings sparked a call from the National Student Association for a three-day student strike to oppose all U.S. governmental policies deemed immoral and oppressive. UIUC students initially adopted the national goals, but the administration’s reactions to the strike and subsequent student protests quickly transformed the strike from one against Nixon and the American “corporate state” to a complete condemnation of UIUC governance. As Ed Pinto, chairman of the Undergraduate Student Association lamented in retrospect, “the original plan called for a

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34 *Geek*, 16-22 March 1970, ARC.
strike by universities against President Nixon’s policies but here it ended up a strike against the University administration.”

The strike was originally called for May 6-8; its demands “modestly” included the termination of U.S. involvement in Cambodia, freedom of all political prisoners, the termination of the repression of Black Panthers, Nixon’s impeachment, and an end to university complicity with the military. The UGSA and Graduate Student Association (GSA) avidly supported the strike and implored others to join in their crusade by simultaneously appealing to the senate and the university to take a political stand and close the school. President Henry’s rare public personal commentary deplored the war in Southeast Asia, but maintained his commitment to university objectivity, contending that closing the university accomplished very little, and suggested students employ the proper channels for expressing dissent. A general statement of Deans and Chancellors from all three schools in the University of Illinois system deprecating the war and the Kent State atrocities followed and included over one hundred faculty signatures pledging not to strike. The university Senate generally agreed with Henry, defeating History Professor Frederic C. Jaher’s resolution stating, “In view of the recent tragic events at Kent State University and the American invasion of Cambodia, the Champaign-Urbana Senate supports the current strike on this campus.” The Senate instead insisted that the faculty


36 Ibid., 5 May 1970.


38 Urbana-Champaign Senate Minutes, 11 May 1970, Senate Minutes, Agenda and Communications, 1901-1994, UIUC Archives.
adopt Peltason's statement opposing such university action and authorizing faculty to use class time as forums for discussing current events.\textsuperscript{39}

The strike, though not officially endorsed by the university, met "approval" at a rally of 2,000 students (out of a total enrollment of over 30,000) on May 5\textsuperscript{th}. Planned activities included teach-ins, rallies, marches, pickets on numerous campus buildings, and attempts to explain to the students and community the strike's goals.

But the likelihood of the community empathizing with strikers plummeted when the rally group inexplicably resumed the "trashing" that occurred during the GE and Kunstler demonstrations. Irate student radicals smashed windows and firebombed the chemistry building, causing thousands of dollars in damage.\textsuperscript{40} At least one was arrested as the administration enlisted the same "repressive" measures as during the March demonstrations. Administrative officials and Champaign Mayor Virgil Wikoff clamped down on the student body by setting curfews and requisitioning the National Guard. RU members wasted little time turning the strike agenda from one focusing on Vietnam to one aimed against the university. Calling for a "strike for solidarity," the RU stressed "by striking, the students are asserting their rights in an effort to change the oppressive nature of the university."\textsuperscript{41}

That "oppressive nature" reared its ugly head numerous times throughout the three-day strike. The deployment of 2000 National Guardsmen and state police to enforce the May 6th 8 pm curfew resulted in fifty arrests, while picketers at the Union

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Daily Illini}, 12 May 1970.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 6 May 1970.

\textsuperscript{41} "Strike for Solidarity," Radical Union Flyer, 7 May 1970, People Publications, ARC.
loading area faced similar consequences. In a small-scale version of the Civil War “Anaconda plan,” students picketed campus loading areas to cut off all supplies—including food—to the university, forcing it to shut down and heed student demands. Two arrested professors claimed that loading trucks attempted to back over students, and one instructor’s attempt to stop the vehicles earned him a police beating. Police “brutality” only encouraged student violence, as 2500 marched to the police station, pelting police cars with rocks before meeting stiff resistance from riot-clad police officers. In all, the day’s activities produced 20 arrests, a fact that only enraged students and augmented campus-wide strike support.\(^{42}\)

Support for the strike consequently grew among university student organizations and faculty departments. Cohorts included the UGSA, GSA, Black Coalition, the Interfraternity Council, the College of Commerce and Business; and the Department of Anthropology, Linguistics, Political Science, Sociology, and Urban Planning; and the Graduate Student Association of Philosophy. Groups like the Urban Planning Department signaled their participation by holding daylong teach-ins on the quadrangular on May 7, while the College of Law held fundraisers for the family of Edgar Hoults, a black man shot and killed by Champaign police officer on April 29\(^{th}\). Law students also held an informational meeting in the Union addressing any legal matters arising from the repressive actions of the authorities.\(^{43}\)

Chancellor Peltason’s efforts to stem the strike and the violence through press releases fell on deaf ears. Responding to the events at the Union loading area, he

\(^{42}\) *Daily Illini*, 7 May 1970.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.
officially announced an 8 pm curfew and the closing of all university buildings for the evening, while condemning the strike as a “disruption” of campus operation. The remarks galvanized the Daily Illini editorial board, which swiftly attacked Peltason’s statement, attacking his “gross insensitivity” to both national and institutional issues. The newspaper contended that the university’s indifference to the Kent State incident and black oppression legitimized the “disruptions” and suspension of “normal” university operations.44

The second day of the strike witnessed even more support; 10,000 students—nearly one-third of the total enrollment—gathered on the quad for a peaceful three hour rally. Ed Pinto, UGSA Chairman, informed the crowd that thirty-seven percent of all classes had been cancelled and that the class boycott enjoyed nearly 100 percent effectiveness. This tremendous support, coupled with the administration’s refusal to close the school and its repressive handling of the protestors, prompted calls for the strike’s continuation beyond May 8. Administrative actions later that day facilitated the strike’s prolongation. Nearly 1000 students gathered at the University Fire Station to request firefighters lower the flag to half-mast to mourn the Kent State killings. After a back-and-forth war of words, Paul Doebel, associate director of plants and services, accompanied by 100 State Police, arrived to “prod and shove” the crowd from the station. Students then marched to the Student Union upon Doebel’s announcement that that building’s flag would be lowered. Once students dispersed from the Union, however, National Guardsmen and State Police raised the flag, further vilifying them and the

44 Daily Illini, 7 May 1970.
administration. Peltason avoided statements or directives supporting the flag lowering; his reluctance to acknowledge the meaning behind the lowering heightened student disenchantment. Students complained that “it is highly ironic, but highly predictable here, that top-level administrators have again retrenched to the argument that they will not discuss the grievances that have prompted the strike while there is any threat of force” even though “the University has responded to mass and peaceful attempts at reform with...force itself.” The same student also supported the Strike Committee’s demand that Doebel be fired due to his handling of the pickets at the Union loading area the previous day. To the strike committee, Doebel’s actions represented everything against which the strike was now aimed:

His inability to do anything more than provoke a confrontation between the State Police, the National Guard and the student body of this campus is only indicative of the general malaise of insensitivity and actual negligence that characterizes this University’s administration.”

The firing of Doebel was just one of a fresh list of strike demands oriented towards the administration, rather than national policies. Of the fifteen new stipulations, only four dealt with military-related issues, and half of those condemned university complicity with the U.S. military. The remaining eleven issues centered on inadequate student representation, racist university policies, and acts of police brutality.

The UIUC administration finally succumbed to student pressure to formulate a statement about the strike and the war, though their declarations appeased few radicals. Both President Henry and Chancellor Peltason aired their apprehension about sending

45 Daily Illini, 8 May 1970.

46 Ibid.

47 “Strike Now,” Radical Union flyer, 8 May 1970, People Publications, ARC.
more troops into Cambodia, but neither supported the strike. Though not directly addressing the strike, Henry did acknowledge the possible inadequacies of current “channels” of dissent, stating, “if the present University mechanisms are not adequate, we shall develop others.”48

Students, however, felt they had exhausted those “channels” and turned again to violence. That day, May 8, nine more were arrested at Central Receiving for activating another installment of the “Anaconda Plan.” More faculty similarly grew tired of the administration’s broken promises regarding the effectiveness of university “channels,” as four more departments—English, Physics, Chemistry, and Linguistics—released statements supporting the strike and calling on the administration to “recognize the concerns expressed and the issues involved.”49

With faculty increasingly turning on the administration, and student support for the strike intensifying, chaos finally erupted, and university control dissipated with the infamous May 9 “quad bust.” The Illiac IV controversy vengefully returned as daylong protests against the “supercomputer” ignited skirmishes between students and police and eventually triggered an order somewhere in the chain of command for the National Guard and State police to corral over one hundred students—most of whom were not even demonstrating—onto the quad. After forcing all occupants in the Student Union outside, National Guardsmen encircled them as well as those already on the quad—innocent or not, protesting or not—and loaded the students onto three buses enroute to the football


stadium. Students were held overnight and booked for numerous charges before being released.\textsuperscript{50}

The "sweep" even caught the administration off-guard. University officials like George Frampton, Vice-Chancellor for Campus Affairs, admitted "he did not know why the students on the Quadrangle were arrested," and even he was denied entrance by "the guard at the door" to the recently converted jail, formerly known as the stadium. Dean of Students Hugh M. Satterlee expressed similar befuddlement when he informed the \textit{Daily Illini} that a special meeting of deans that very afternoon before the sweep offered an opportunity "on the part of the deans to deescalate the causes of the student strike." Satterlee commented on the situation asking, "How do you capture in print the sound of me throwing up?"\textsuperscript{51} The total lack of university control did not go undetected by students and faculty, who criticized "the inability of Chancellor Peltason and his staff to maintain control of this campus after they had made the decision to allow it to be turned into an armed camp."\textsuperscript{52}

After the sweep, a number of students and various faculty members abandoned all lingering shreds of confidence in the administration. Peltason's efforts to compromise met formidable resistance by a rather hefty growing minority. Students ridiculed his authorization of "Liberation classes," where faculty could gear their classes towards current societal issues while remaining within the parameters of their respective disciplines. The 6000 students who rallied on the quad scoffed at the chancellor's feeble

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Daily Illini} EXTRA, 10 May 1970.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 12 May 1970.
initiatives, mocking him by voting themselves “liberated” from the university. Students instead applauded a motion by UGSA steering committee member Ted Byers to “secede from the United States and declare war on the country.” Despite Dean Satterlee’s attempts to quell the discontent leveled at Peltason, the newly “liberated” crowd rejected his pleas. Although decreasing participation and a sense of “helplessness” overcame the strike and ushered its demise after May 12, marches targeting the many campus “repressive” and “racist” institutions continued throughout the month. Edgar Hoults’s death triggered a march to the police station, while the murders of black students at Jackson State generated more violence against what the Black Student Association labeled a “racist” institution.\(^{53}\)

Summer break ended the “days of rage,” but the standoff between the administration and the “radical” factions lingered like a dark cloud over the university. Law Professor Herb Semmel summarized “radical” student and faculty sentiment just before the semester’s end with this ultimatum:

> Is the real cause of disruption the demonstrators or the warmakers? The University does not exist in a vacuum; we will achieve the optimum conditions for teaching, learning, and research you [Peltason] desire, peace on this campus, after we achieve peace in the world, or at least end those wars which our own government is conducting...I will join with you in seeking peace on this campus if you will join with me in seeking peace in the world.\(^{54}\)

**Hell Yes, Peace is Best!**

When students returned the following fall semester, a cloud of uncertainty still hovered. Students feared a continuation of the previous spring’s violent downpour, and the increased police presence on campus did little to calm the community. Yet, these

\(^{53}\) *Daily Illini*, 16 May 1970.

\(^{54}\) Ibid., 19 May 1970.
apprehensions never met fruition as the “days of rage” proved a one-time occurrence. While protests and marches did not completely cease, their nature altered and their frequency diminished thanks to new administrative tactics and subdued student “radical” activity. Increasingly students adopted more peaceful, democratic tactics like referendums to challenge administrative decisions. But even as the “movement” disintegrated nationally and the ranks of the “radicals” shrank, demonstrations against administrative oppression and military complicity still peppered Champaign-Urbana’s academic landscape.

The school year’s first volatile issue, the presence of General Motors recruiters, signaled a changing attitude among both students and administrators. Once again opposed to the administration’s disregard for student sentiment regarding open recruiting on campus, students broke from their previous protest strategy of organizing mass rallies and picket lines that provoked police action and instead incorporated more democratic processes and organized coalitions and referendums opposing GM and the entire open recruiting policy. Students united with local, striking GM auto workers and made several demands on the university, including “the university end GM’s privilege to recruit on campus until it recognizes the democratic rights and economic needs of all the people it affects,” that the corporation transfer 44 shares of their stock to the local Danville auto workers strike fund, and that the university establish a policy of open admissions.55

While the students altered their protest strategy by garnering outside support from the Danville workers and urging a democratic referendum allowing students to decide on open recruiting policies, the administration also exhibited a break from their traditional

handling of such potentially explosive situations. Although university officials refused to concede to student demands, they responded to the consequent October 23 protest rally with much more restraint. Learning from their previous mishandling of student protests, the administration used the police not as a threat to students but as a deterrent to potential violence. By simply increasing the police presence and ordering that the authorities not impede non-violent student activity, the administration gave the students little reason to employ violent tactics. Consequently, the October 23 protest attracted only 40 picketing students and one student admitted that police restraint actually lessened participation. “We’d have a lot of people out here if someone would go downstairs and say ‘the police are out there busting heads.’” That revelation explained the peaceful nature of nearly every demonstration and protest that followed. Regardless of the reasons behind the protests, the lack of such tensions as police “brutality” meant “radicals” lacked that smoking gun they used to recruit so many students last spring. Additionally, administrative promises like Doebel’s to “work more closely with the people planning a demonstration” stymied anxieties.

As the year progressed the frequency, size, and aims of protests tapered, declined, and splintered. Administrative and police restraint created few tense situations around which “radicals” could spin a massive, violent demonstration. In the absence of administrative “targets,” students returned to protesting national events. Student

56 Daily Illini, 22 October 1970. Assistant Chancellor Lloyd called the demands “ill-considered” and lamenting, “I can’t think that any responsible person would support their implementation.” The referendum effort met a similar fate as Robert Brown, associate dean of student services and programs, indicated that Peltason would use such a measure only to gauge student opinion, but not as a binding agreement.

57 Ibid., 23 October 1970.

58 Ibid., 15 December 1970.
attendance at a rally against the 1971 U.S. invasion of Laos, for example, far exceeded the number of participants in the subsequent march on the Champaign U.S. Army recruiting station.\footnote{Daily Illini, 11 February 1971.} Demonstrations at local draft boards still enjoyed decent participation, but the revolving door of draftees and body bags had nearly closed by this point. The March 10\textsuperscript{th} demonstration at the Champaign Selective Service Office attracted even fewer participants,\footnote{Ibid., 16 March 1971. This protest included 50 students, while the previous month’s demonstration attracted 250.} as it appeared that the draft board and recruiting stations, the only concrete remaining remnants of student disgust, provided the sole opportunities for aggressive demonstrations.

In fact, one of the only demonstrations resulting in arrests unsurprisingly occurred against yet another recruiter, this time the Marines. Over forty students out of 200 total demonstrators received a free ride to the Champaign County Jail for blocking access to the Marines table in a May 7\textsuperscript{th} sit-in.\footnote{Chicago Tribune, 7 May 1971, UIUC Archives.} The arrests stirred the student population, as once again the administration became the enemy. Students disagreed with the decision to make arrests, stating “Not only was the decision [to arrest] ill-considered, but the way in which it was made shows that Chancellor Peltason has little regard for the channels which he so often praises, or for the administrators who can make those channels work.” This particular editorial expressed dismay that “not one administrator from the dean of students’ office was allowed to take part in the decision” and this omission exposed the chancellor’s complete disrespect for proper “channels.”\footnote{Daily Illini, 11 May 1971.}
But it appeared that the time of violent, relatively large demonstrations had passed. The 1971-72 school year was equally uneventful, and phrases such as “student apathy” and “student inactivism” dominated the *Daily Illini*. One student feared that “there is coming a time when student activists will look back to the ‘good old days’ of the sixties when students would protest against the war, racism, oppression, and environmental pollution.” She blamed the lack of “radical” leadership for the decline in activism, stating “the students who followed the radicals in the fall of 1969 and the spring of 1970 were simply not radicals themselves.” The UGSA’s commitment to a “cooperative-based alternative society...popularized the opposition to the war, and while anti-war activity still goes on, it is not the focal point of the movement like it used to be.”63 The aimless student reactions to Nixon’s resumption of the bombing campaign over North Vietnam in April 1972 epitomized the disintegration of both the “movement” and the “radical” faction. The *Daily Illini* depicted the resulting window-breaking extravaganza as a “street dance.” “The atmosphere at Saturday night’s disorder was all fun and games,” lamented one student, and the demand by marching students that the university end military complicity was groundless.64 Another student admitted that his interest in the protests lagged because “at the moment he was drunk” and decided to direct his energy elsewhere.65

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64 Ibid., 25 April 1972.

65 Ibid., 22 April 1972.
Conclusion

Although the violent performances of the ensemble of Vietnam-era UIUC “radicals” grabbed the most attention, they represented a growing choir of antiwar, anti-establishment students and faculty who matured in an environment conducive to fierce activism. Administrative repression and lies, coupled with the growing sense of rebellion on campus predestined the university to experience the tumultuous “days of rage” of 1970. Yet as the “movement” splintered and lost focus through the following years, so too did those fanatic few that attempted to bring a “revolution” to the academic community.

Not all was lost, however, as students and administrators discovered more suitable approaches to campus unrest. Administrators such as Paul Doebel and Chancellor Peltason helped prevent violent clashes by gradually opening communication lines with students regarding protests,66 and law enforcement authorities exhibited much more restraint in dealing with student activism. But it was the students who took home the most valuable lesson that navigating the road of change required avoiding potholes of violence and pursuing avenues of democratic processes.

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As a new generation of instructors and pupils passed through Eastern Illinois University's "ivory towers" during the antiwar era, they encountered a university more preoccupied with local campus issues than international conflicts. They discovered students, faculty, and administrators locked in an epic battle over whether the traditionally parochial institution should address the Vietnam War, or if it should retain its isolation from the outside world. Although a frequently maligned "poor student leadership" eventually failed to convince the student body to unanimously and actively oppose the Indochina conflict, this new generation still embraced a certain rebellious air gripping campuses nationwide. While this small, geographically isolated institution had little reason to stage massive protests against a distant international conflict, a dictatorial university administration provided numerous opportunities for student rebellion against more immediate injustices. The administration's denial of democratic processes led a small segment of the student body to act out its revolutionary tendencies in the local arena by focusing on insular problems such as housing conditions, tuition increases, and questionable campus governance.

While inadequate "radical" student leadership weakened protests against both local issues and the Vietnam War, a good number of these traditionally conservative youths and faculty still entered the realm of radicalism. Although the Eastern community seldom united behind such "rabble rousers," this "radical" center blind-sided the archaic, totalitarian structure imposed by the unsuspecting President Quincy Doudna.
Doudna as Dictator

Doudna inherited an expanding, cooperative and friendly university in 1956 thanks to his predecessor, Dr. Robert Buzzard. Academically, Buzzard transformed EIU from a simple liberal arts teachers college into a full-fledged university by establishing graduate programs in the early fifties such as the M.S. in Education, while expanding the variety of undergraduate degrees available. Administratively, Buzzard avoided tension between faculty and administrators by maintaining a hands-off approach to curricular and departmental governance. Department heads maintained relative autonomy regarding hiring of new faculty, for example, and Buzzard seldom interfered with each department’s operation.\(^1\) The respected president also established the first faculty governance group, the “Committee of Fifteen,” whose recommendations he almost always followed.\(^2\)

But the days of Eastern presidents sending faculty members individual birthday cards ended on October 1, 1956. When the institution’s captain, President Buzzard, retired, a stubborn, dictatorial Doudna ended Eastern’s tranquility, and steered the campus directly into the waves of rebellion and uncertainty. Marooning the institution on the shores of the sixties, Doudna continued to centralize power and make autonomous decisions. Faculty despised him because of his dramatic departure from Buzzard’s compromising, friendly approach, and the student body, swept up in the whirlwind of

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\(^2\) Ibid., 15.
rebellion engulfing campuses nationwide, threw off the blanket of *in loco parentis* and challenged every attempt by the stubborn Doudna to impede their freedoms.

Doudna, however, cannot be held completely responsible for the deterioration of relations between his position as president and the faculty and students. He encountered an unprecedented influx of new students and faculty with rebellious attitudes. Additionally, the university unwisely placed too much stock in Doudna’s experiences in rural settings and virtually ignored the fact that this particular presidential candidate had heavy administrative experienced and little time in a college classroom. For a teacher’s college on the brink of a societal wake-up call, Doudna fit in like a square peg in a round hole.

In sum, Doudna’s career spanned twenty-nine years prior to his presidency with only seven years of teaching experience, all of which came at the high school level. He spent his entire life in small Wisconsin towns similar to Charleston in size, receiving his Ph.D. in economics in 1948 from the University of Wisconsin. While completing his graduate work, Doudna worked in the high school sector, teaching Chemistry his first seven years out of college while attaining administrative positions at the secondary level for the next twelve. His first collegiate administrative experience came in 1945 at Wisconsin State College at Stevens Point, where he held the title “Dean of Administration” for ten years until his interview at Eastern. With only eleven years of exposure to the university setting, Doudna could not help feel a little overwhelmed when

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3 *In Loco Parentis* was a clause in university contracts that required the university to act as parents to the students, resulting in enforcing morals, limiting dorm visitation, etc. This came under direct attack during the sixties and was the focus of many student protests.

4 Tingley, 29-30.
he took the presidential reigns of Eastern Illinois University, especially when the student enrollment jumped from a little over 2,000 in 1956 to over 8,000 by the time of his retirement in 1971.\(^5\)

Doudna also faced the daunting task of balancing requests and demands of both veteran and rookie teachers. Many department heads, for example, reacted negatively to Doudna’s attempts to limit their power since over one-fourth had held their respective positions throughout the entire Buzzard administration. The fact that first-year instructors comprised one-fourth of the entire Eastern faculty in 1956 similarly strained the administrative tightrope along which Doudna walked.\(^6\)

Rather than appease the faculty, however, Doudna chose to lay down the hammer of presidential prerogative. The new president wasted little time centralizing control and alienating the faculty by leashing individual departments and interfering with the Faculty Senate. Doudna spread his tentacles through department chairpersons by renewing positions on an annual basis and forcing faculty to adhere to his demands. Lacking a faculty union or constitution, Doudna’s pawns kept untenured faculty in check, and as former faculty member Donald Tingley recalled, “the departments themselves were to have no autonomy.”\(^7\)

Doudna similarly infiltrated the Faculty Senate by “highly recommending” the selection of administrators to voting positions within this governing body. Already stripped of their autonomy, Doudna’s secrecy regarding the appointment of staff

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\(^5\) Tingley, 220.

\(^6\) Ibid., 38.

\(^7\) Ibid., 64.
members in 1967 and his disregard for the faculty’s opposition to an activity fee increase incensed the faculty.\(^8\) Finally, Doudna ignored the Faculty Senate’s advice and sought to establish an ROTC program on campus, though the U.S. Army ultimately refused his request, citing EIU’s meager resources compared to other possible institutions in housing such a program.\(^9\)

Besides dealing with a relatively young faculty accustomed to hands-off presidential practices, Doudna also encountered a much more independent-minded student body, especially during the later sixties. Previously in the forties and fifties, the university mantra revolved around “unity,” and students generally accepted *in loco parentis*. Students garnered additional responsibilities and power positions not because they demanded them, but because the administration and faculty felt such structure was appropriate.\(^10\)

However Eastern’s long tradition of institutional “unity” began crumbling in the late fifties and early sixties due to tremendous growth that stretched the campus and alienated students from administrators.\(^11\) Feeling abandoned by the university, students questioned the administration’s right to lord over them and decide their best interests. Consequently, *in loco parentis* came under heated attack in the early sixties, as the student body gradually demanded more autonomy regarding their own destiny and the destiny of the university.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Tingley, 65.


\(^10\) Tingley, 87.

\(^11\) Ibid., 88.

\(^12\) Ibid., 91.
The obdurate president refused to abandon *in loco parentis* and felt it was a “disservice” to students to let them sit on decision-making committees. Denying requests for meaningful student participation in university governance, Doudna alienated the student body, which later turned to their student government for help. First titled the Student Association and later named the Student Senate, this body originally worked cooperatively with the administration, but only on minor issues like organizing school dances. Although the student government experienced little success in affecting change in university policy in the fifties, Doudna’s repressive actions opened the doors for greater protests in the sixties. Nationwide demands for “student rights” further galvanized Eastern students politically as pupils tirelessly advocated changes in housing policies, student representation on disciplinary committees, and changes to the academic calendar.13

As the Vietnam War ensued and anti-Vietnam demonstrations rattled campuses from California to New York, Eastern Illinois University seemed another likely place for such rebellion. One survey of major issues before and after the formation of a student government, for example, revealed “the general feeling of trust and cooperation between students and university officials during much of the fifties, the increasing feeling of antagonism, even open distrust, beginning late in the fifties and extending throughout the sixties.”14 It was no coincidence that student “antagonism” began in the late fifties, the same time Doudna’s dictatorial reign commenced. Doudna’s interference with the student government’s restructuring, for example, brought accusations of “taking upon

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13 Tingley, 92-93.

14 Ibid., 92.
itself [the administration] the task of reorganizing student government without so much as a ‘howdy-do’ to the officers of that government.” Students sarcastically mocked the president, with comments such as “the great and benevolent Wizard of EIU has spoken.”\(^{15}\) When the student body president asked for Doudna’s retirement in 1968, the hard-line president’s refusal to defend his actions and his admission to charges of ignoring student opinion that he felt did not reflect the “best interest of the University as a whole”\(^{16}\) cemented his reputation as a “dictator.”

**A Divided University**

When the anti-Vietnam Movement exploded onto the college scene sometime between 1967 and 1968, EIU was already embroiled in a turf war between President Doudna and the students and faculty. Although infected with the bug of rebellion, students showed few symptoms of the disease when confronted by the Vietnam War. The Indochina conflict had little relevance to the insular institution, as most EIU students did not see their provincial community directly involved or threatened by the events occurring halfway around the world. The fiercest student antiwar demonstrations, after all, occurred at large, research-oriented institutions like University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), a school directly assisting the Federal Government by researching information used in Vietnam.

Instead, Eastern’s major battles occurred much closer, specifically within the campus itself. Public outcry against the Indochina conflict took a backseat to student government difficulties and anti-administration editorials. SDS-sponsored meetings

\(^{15}\) *Eastern News*, 30 April 1968.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 24 September 1968.
failed to arouse substantial interest in a local EIU chapter\textsuperscript{17} as students seemed more concerned with "oppressive" university administrative policies. Besides antagonism between university factions, the factions themselves—particularly students—remained ideologically divided over their role in society and in university governance. These divisions partly existed because of the "culture clash" of attitudes and ideas that resulted from the various backgrounds of students,\textsuperscript{18} and likely paralyzed any possibility of unified student agreement.

Eastern entered the 1969-70 school year enclosed in an atmosphere hardly conducive to cohesive antiwar activism. Eastern’s experiences during the October 15 Moratorium best reflected the university’s internal friction. On the eve of the largest one-day national protest in history and EIU’s largest antiwar protest to date, rifts among the event’s organizers—especially the students—impaired the occasion’s potential. Student schisms over the Indochina conflict and the university’s proper role in politics produced a subdued moratorium in which more faculty than students participated. In fact, EIU’s Student Senate remained sharply divided over the Vietnam War\textsuperscript{19} and actually officially supported a campus ROTC.\textsuperscript{20} Although they agreed to "endorse and co-ordinate" Eastern’s participation, senators expressed doubts about holding the event and exposed their conservative attitude towards student protest by equating demonstrations to "other such illegal activities." Some senators, including future Senate President Larry Stuffle,

\textsuperscript{17} Eastern News, 5 November 1968. Of the two SDS meetings on campus, attendance ranged from 35-40 students, respectively.

\textsuperscript{18} Nearly half came from the surrounding rural areas while the rest hailed from large cities like Chicago.

\textsuperscript{19} Eastern News, 29 June 1969.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 16 September 1969.
even opposed university class cancellation and insisted that the moratorium be “up to those who want to participate.”21 The resignation of Student Senate President Ken Miller a day before the moratorium iced the crumbling cake of unity within the student government; Miller concluded that “the present situation [in the Senate] of pettiness, bickering, and backstabbing is intolerable to me.”22

The student leadership’s self-destruction reflected the student body’s preexisting doubts about the moratorium and the war. Many voiced opinions both for and against the war, and editorials in the Daily Eastern News reflected divisions within the student body. Student H.O. Pinther spoke for campus hawks:

You, who choose not to fight for your country, put your tail between your legs, snap on your collar and whine loudly so all will know you for what you are. For those of courage and principal, who want to be free, stand up for total and complete victory.23

Winfield Nash, responding directly to Pinther’s accusations of cowardice, argued, “I would say this is true, but even so, it is better than putting your country before your logic, and being led around by a leash of propaganda,”24 implying that the U.S. government was misleading its citizens about the war’s conduct and progress in order to paint a rosier picture and boost public approval. An even harsher stance came from Student Senate Speaker Kenneth Midkiff, also responding to Pinther’s editorial:

22 Ibid., 14 October 1969.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 21 October 1969.
Every aspect of the Vietnam War is contrary to the American tradition. America has always represented freedom, independence, love and happiness, which are the very things the planners and participants of the moratorium are extolling. Ask yourselves then, you who are crying 'traitor, un-American and un-patriotic,' who is it that is unpatriotic, the opponents or the supporters of the War in Vietnam?25

Disagreements over the war by both the student populace and the Student Senate led to disenchantment with the proposed class boycott. The Interfraternity Council (IFC) refused to lend its support, stating “We’re not endorsing the war at all, we just believe there is a time and place for everything.”26 Doubts about student sincerity also peppered the campus newspaper. Students wondered whether protesters like Midkiff would “walk the walk” so to speak, and fully support or participate in the Moratorium. Eastern News opinionated editorials expressed fears that students would interpret the class cancellation as simply a vacation, rather than attend the Moratorium activities and express genuine aspirations for total U.S. withdrawal. Concerned students claimed that since two-thirds of all EIU students were not in class at a given time, a better message would be sent if these students voluntarily gave up free time to attend Moratorium activities, rather than attending merely as an excuse to skip class.27

Such student divisions and apprehensions left the Moratorium in the hands of the faculty. Already advocating student dissent by offering draft counseling and intentionally assigning higher grades so students qualified for draft deferments,28 a small core of “radical” instructors blazed the antiwar protest trail by organizing or participating in all of the moratorium’s activities. Philosophy Professor Dr. Robert Barford spearheaded

26 Ibid., 14 October 1969.
27 Ibid., 7 October 1969.
faculty activism and created an ad hoc Faculty Moratorium Committee to construct official faculty policy endorsing the Moratorium's activities and encouraging faculty involvement. The group circulated a petition to faculty members imploring their support by either signing a letter to President Nixon denouncing the war, or by actively participating in the Moratorium. This could be done by joining the faculty protest march, devoting the entire class period to Vietnam discussion, or simply making an initial classroom statement regarding the Vietnam War, which was acceptable for professors as "citizen-professors." Finally, while the Student Senate remained content with subdued activities like movies and lectures, the faculty organized the day's only protest march.

Like the students, these activist faculty members also had their share of critics. Anthropology Professor Lloyd Collins, for example, opposed the moratorium, insisting that such unpatriotic action provided the Viet Cong with psychological warfare and propaganda, possibly resulting in more U.S. casualties. He also feared active soldiers, upon hearing the anti-Vietnam action back home, would be demoralized and thus have their survivability weakened. History professor Dr. Lawrence R. Nichols also opposed faculty participation, but on less political grounds than Collins; faculty, Nichols argued, who used class time to discuss the incident, as Barford encouraged, violated the

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29 [Robert Barford], "EIU Faculty Vietnam Moratorium Committee: An Appeal to Conscience," memorandum to the EIU faculty community, 15 October 1969, Booth Library, Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, Illinois (henceforth "Booth").


31 Lloyd Collins, letter to President Richard Nixon, 13 October 1969, Booth.
American Association of American Professors (AAUP) teacher responsibilities by wrongly using their position to encourage propaganda and indoctrination.\textsuperscript{32}

Although the Faculty Senate mirrored the Student Senate in opposing a class boycott, a well-organized day of events still occurred thanks to a faculty organization specifically created to plan the one-day event. Student organizers, by contrast, never formed a “moratorium committee” completely independent from the student government. Instead, the Student Senate had the difficult task of coordinating an antiwar event while also representing the best interests of their constituents—the students, who already expressed disagreement over the class boycott and the war itself. Under the awkward circumstances, the Student Senate proved incapable of fully supporting an event that so obviously split the student body.

The animosity among the students aided President Doudna’s decision to reject class cancellation. Doudna’s advisory council—consisting of faculty chairpersons and student senate representatives—echoed student fears that many would not take the day seriously and simply perceive it as a vacation. It was radical faculty, after all, who instigated the Moratorium, while the students had circulated no petitions and had not yet mustered a single public demonstration. Doudna agreed. His campus community memorandum demanded that traditional rules and regulations regarding class absences be followed, meaning if a student missed class he/she would be penalized at the teacher’s discretion. The faculty, however, did not receive such leeway. Doudna explicitly stated that “faculty members have the same obligation to hold their classes as students have to attend them, except that their obligation is contractual,” implying that expectations for

\textsuperscript{32} Eastern News, 14 October 1969.
faculty to behave accordingly were higher. Surprisingly little outcry resulted from Doudna's decision to ignore the Moratorium. Even the fact that administrators comprised over 50 percent of his "democratic" twelve-person advisory council drew only minimal criticism.

Although Moratorium activities occurred, they received minimal student support. Faculty speakers headed six of the eleven total lecture sessions, while students spoke at only two. Only 308 students (4%) out of an enrollment exceeding 7000 signed a pro-moratorium *Eastern News* advertisement, as many students apparently agreed that the university was not the proper setting for expressing discontent or did not approve of the ad. A letter from the vice-president for Instruction revealed "a slight, but not alarming decrease [in class attendance] for the entire university," and found that no instructors missed classes because of Moratorium activity. While one-third of UIUC's campus attended the day's events, EIU assembled no more than five hundred for a candlelight procession. Even that event met heated opposition from several dorm residents who hurled both obscenities and projectiles at the marchers as the procession winded around the dorms.

Recognizing the inadequate student interest and leadership regarding the October Moratorium, EIU quickly abandoned hope for a repeat Moratorium in November and students turned instead to individual protest. Blaming term papers and tests for the

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33 Quincy Doudna, "Memorandum to the University Community," Office of the President, 10 October 1969, Booth.


36 Letter to Doudna, Office of Vice President for Instruction, 17 October 1969, Booth.

37 Barford, interview by author, 9 December 2003, Charleston, Illinois.
spotty, delayed organization, student Moratorium organizers stated, “this month’s [November’s] activities will be more on an individual basis, sort of a ‘personal thing.’” The schedule of events was noticeably shorter than October, with only three speakers, a march and rally, and a reading of Illinois casualties. Concerns over student commitment continued, and the moratorium suffered a slow, painful death. The extremely low student turnout at the November 11 Veterans Day memorial service for U.S. casualties of Vietnam prompted student Clyde Fazenbaker to attribute the disappointing attendance to a plurality of EIU students “who don’t give a damn, or wear a False Façade.” In other words, students articulate concerns about the welfare of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam, yet fail to actually act on those emotions and beliefs through physical attendance at antiwar events.  

The *Eastern News* nailed the coffin shut by including no articles about the November 14th events and failing to publicize December moratorium happenings until four days after they commenced. The Vietnam War seemed more a fantasy than reality to most Eastern students, but that would soon change.

**Raising Fees and Lowering Flags**

As the 1970 spring semester witnessed more internal bickering and controversy that deflated antiwar activity, local campus issues again surfaced as targets of student disaffection. Created in 1970, Eastern’s first and only underground newspaper, *The Fertilizer*, reflected the elevation of local concerns over national ones.

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38 *Eastern News*, 14 November 1969. After the October moratorium, the Eastern News started corresponding with a GI stationed in Saigon to get firsthand accounts to the war and reactions to antiwar activity in the U.S. Later that year, at least one Greek organization sent Christmas cards to Vietnam soldiers.

39 Ibid., 16 December 1969.
Champaign and delivered and distributed by several "anonymous" Eastern faculty members, this paper best represented the concerns of more "radical" students and faculty. A content analysis reveals that anti-administration articles more than doubled those about Vietnam, while the remainder focused mostly on other neighborhood issues concerning student rights, racism, drugs, and women's liberation.

But it was the proposed dorm fee increase that prompted the animal of massive student activism to finally brandish its claws in March. Despite promises to keep dorm fees constant, Doudna's decision to raise them directly affected all on-campus dwellers and ignited a fiery response. Over 350 students demanded and attained a meeting with Housing Director Albert Green to vent frustration about what students interpreted as blatant administrative dishonesty. Meanwhile, Doudna exposed his distance from student concerns by commenting: "I was surprised to read in the paper this morning about this meeting...I thought the question was settled." The fact the university president did not even realize that a subordinate administrator had conducted such a meeting only further convinced students of Doudna's incompetence.

Finally united behind a common problem and against a common enemy, Student Senate Speaker Ken Midkiff led 2000 students--nearly one-third of the total enrollment--in a march to Doudna's house. These students believed that the dorm fee fiasco revealed an inept, dictatorial administrator, and that the sequence of events leading to this unprecedented protest justified demands for a "50/50" government that would grant


41 The Fertilizer, February-May 1970. The actual numbers were 17 Anti-administration articles and seven anti-Vietnam pieces. 37 articles dealt with local issues, while 20 addressed national concerns.

students and faculty more decision-making power.\textsuperscript{43} Carl Greeson, father of the “50/50” plan, captured the feelings of other student leaders, stating, “we are beginning to understand after one or two years in student government that the whole problem is that the university is run by one man, Doudna.”\textsuperscript{44} The Student Senate again demanded Doudna’s resignation, signaling both its lack of confidence in his ability and a refusal to recognize his authority.\textsuperscript{45}

Though the protest achieved unprecedented participation, its aims never met fruition. Doudna virtually ignored the marchers, the fees continued to rise, and no “50-50” government resulted. Charges of poor leadership littered editorials in the \textit{Eastern News}, where one anonymous writer created a sarcastic march “chant” that lambasted the protest’s poor organization and lack of specific goals. He observed that upon arriving at Doudna’s house, they merely “yell and stomp, and shout and scream,” and possessed no contingent plan when Doudna refused their demands, only to “call him a dirty old man.”\textsuperscript{46}

The disgruntled writer’s point had merit. The Student Senate, for example, never queried the student body on their proposal demanding Doudna’s retirement. For a supposedly “representative” group, the Senate never polled its constituents to ensure it acted in their best interests. Editorials both for and against the motion spattered the \textit{Eastern News}, casting shadows of doubt over the Senate’s decision. One student, for

\textsuperscript{43} This “50-50” idea, prevalent at UIUC as well, referred to creating a university government of fifty percent student and fifty percent faculty representation.

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Eastern News}, 31 March 1970.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 3 April 1970.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 14 April 1970.
example, defended Doudna, stating “The major fallacy here is that everyone still holds Doudna accountable for everything within the university...Doudna’s real problem is getting his administrators to take additional responsibility which he has offered them. Clearly, the question of his resigning is out of the question.”

Despite possible substantial resistance to demands from the Senate for Doudna’s retirement, the Student Senate passed the motion anyway, 17-8-1. Citing what they considered “dangers to academic freedom,” the Senate accused Doudna of “censorship of the campus news media, stagnation of the university’s communication channels and unfair treatment meted out to professional men.”

Poor leadership and undemocratic processes radiating from the Student Senate alienated the student body, making it even more disinclined to adhere to Senate-organized protests that centered on non-university issues, like an international conflict. While an almost deterministic desire to protest something, indeed anything, pervaded the college culture, the Vietnam War fell to the background. “The only reason that Eastern didn’t have a war protest this month [April] is simple. In spite of the protest subculture...the Viet Nam war has become...a dead issue,” quipped one disappointed columnist.

Nevertheless, the dorm fee protests of March 1970 catapulted Eastern students onto the wave of student activism. When the May 4th 1970 Kent State shootings occurred, students were still in a hyped state over the previous Eastern protests and attempted to

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48 Ibid., 14 April 1970. The “unfair treatment meted out to professional men” refers to Doudna’s arbitrary hiring and firing of untenured faculty members that disagreed with his ideology or demands, according to Robert Barford.

49 Ibid.
bring a similar intensity in opposition to those tragic events in Ohio. Additionally, the previously parochial EIU community felt, closer than ever, the shockwaves of the previously distant and detached Vietnam conflict. No longer was campus violence confined to major east or west coast schools but instead became a frightening possibility even in the Midwest. As with the dorm fee increase, murder on midwestern college campuses directly affected EIU students, and they responded with intensity by finally commandeering the ship of antiwar protest navigated for so long by the faculty.

The reasoning for this shift from faculty to student-led antiwar activity is logical—students had been killed for protesting the Vietnam War. Other students, therefore, were both sympathetic towards the victims and upset that such actions could occur. Additionally, students blamed the Vietnam War for the catastrophe, reasoning that if the U.S. were not involved in the foreign dispute, the killings would not have occurred. To other students, Kent State victims became martyrs symbolizing the tragedies that the Vietnam War wrought on American civilians as well as soldiers. Such sentiment resulted in a series of student-led events including a candlelight procession memorializing the victims, student editorials condemning the National Guardsmen who fired upon students, and calls from the EIU College Democrats for a two-day student strike.\(^{50}\) One student, in a rare display of extreme discontent, was arrested and convicted of flag desecration by covering the stars of the American flag with a swastika and writing “Kent State” across the stripes, which he then proceeded to hang from his dorm window.\(^ {51}\)

\(^ {50}\) *Eastern News*, 12 May 1970.

\(^ {51}\) Ibid., 12 May 1970.
Yet, questionable decisions by the student government again foiled student unity. One student blasted the Student Senate’s hasty statement that “this country is quickly evolving into an oppressive, military state, aided and condoned by the President of the United States.” The confused respondent pondered how the Senate could pass judgment so quickly and reminded readers that the guardsmen responsible for the shootings deserved an opportunity to tell their story.

The distance between Senate decisions and student desires revealed itself during the tensest event of this period and the only instance of potential violence: the “flag controversy.” As at other schools, students implored the administration—specifically Doudna—to lower the flag to half-staff to mourn the Kent State victims. Responding simultaneously to the U.S. invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings, nearly 250 EIU students assembled at the university flagpole where Doudna lowered the flag to half-staff that day only to “deplore the hatred and conflict rampant on college campuses and throughout the world today.”

But divisions within the student body resurfaced to create a complex situation for Doudna. While some students demanded the flag stay lowered for the duration of the Vietnam War, decrying the ongoing death of college-aged U.S. citizen-soldiers, this request met considerable opposition from other students as the charge of a “false façade” remained. This latter group of students sarcastically labeled the protesters “children of the apocalypse” and was convinced that the flagpole protesters gathered only because

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54 Ibid., 8 May 1970.
they were “looking for something to do on a nice Tuesday afternoon.” Then Resident Director Louis Hencken supported this belief by pointing out that out of over 7000 total students, there were only 200-300 protesters at the flagpole. If Eastern students indeed cared so passionately about the rising Vietnam death toll, the paltry attendance at the flagpole certainly did not convince the skeptics.

There would be no student body backlash this time as the Student Senate, terrified of escalating a potentially violent situation, agreed to hold an all-campus referendum to decide the matter. Doudna, abreast of the violent student protests occurring just up the road in Champaign, agreed, and the Senate set up polling places and encouraged all members of the university to participate. Despite the Student Senate’s unforgiving condemnation of both the Kent State incident and the nation, nearly 50 percent of the university community jammed the voting booths to reveal the discrepancy between the Senate “radicals” and the students themselves. Only 34 percent of students favored keeping the flag at half-staff, and 86 percent of faculty and civil service voters favored the flag’s return to the top of the pole. These results halted the rising sea of Eastern student activism as the Kent State and Vietnam issues faded quickly.

A Wave Recedes

Kent State and its aftermath shocked EIU more than it enraged and radicalized it. It served as a wake-up call to the Eastern community that the lack of democratic processes made violent occurrences not only possible, but even probable. Doudna and


56 President Louis V. Hencken of Eastern Illinois University, Interview by author, 15 November 2002, Charleston, Illinois.

the Student Senate, perhaps conscious of student backlash from their past mistakes, recognized the national and local upward swing of student activism and avoided feeding this growing monster of rebellious youth. Instead, the student leadership and administration’s unprecedented agreement to hold a legally binding referendum prevented any confrontations that might spiral out of control. Employing such democratic methods lessened potential for “radical” or violent backlash against an oppressive, “dictatorial” regime.

The period’s only other rally besides the flagpole gathering, for example, occurred May 10, 1970 when 500 students gathered on the Booth Library Quad. The meeting encouraged a non-violent program to address current societal ills, and one speaker contended “intellectual action is much better than physical action because anyone can flex a muscle.” The mass assembly advocated “understanding sessions” to promote relations between all campus groups (Greek, independent, radical conservative), and urged students to orient classroom discussions towards these problems. The rally also encouraged heightened political awareness and participation at the state and national level, and announced a local door-to-door campaign and a telephone canvass asking support for pertinent bills currently in Congress.58 Eastern students and faculty ensured a nonviolent response to national issues and prevented campus disorder by immediately employing democratic tactics.

As the Illinois legislature called all public university presidents to discuss student protests that summer, community groups expressed fears about future campus violence. To ensure the administration reacted accordingly, the Mt. Vernon Chamber of Commerce

circulated a petition on 26 May 1970 signed by 4470 citizens denouncing the “communistic tactics” employed by EIU students regarding flag desecration, and stated that each student’s right to learn should not be infringed by such un-American zealots.⁵⁹ The Rich Township Republican Organization similarly felt that it was every student’s right to attend class as well as not attend, and the university should not contribute to “intellectual radicalism” by suggesting that protesting is more important than education.⁶⁰ Eastern’s preexisting apprehensions about violence and protests made such fears unfounded, but the community still made efforts to ensure a peaceful atmosphere. Both Doudna and the Student Senate strove to employ more democratic processes since such tactics effectively deflated “radical” initiatives the previous semester. Doudna announced plans to place students on several major policy-making councils, including Academic Affairs, Teacher Education, and University Planning and Budget.⁶¹ The Student Senate caught the “democratic spirit” by once again employing a referendum to help settle the debate over implementing term limits for university presidents. Although not a binding agreement as before, students stressed the importance of becoming more involved in the decision-making process by voting. “Today,” wrote one student, “young people are attempting to become an involved and concerned force in our society. This effort manifests itself in many ways in the university community.”⁶²

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⁶² Ibid., 13 October 1970.
Such maneuvers to avoid protests and demonstrations proved unnecessary as EIU lacked both the organizational vehicles that were present at schools like UIUC, and the unity of “radical” students, both necessary components to successful activism. The Student Senate resumed its infighting and further alienated the student body. Editorials complained that student leaders were “apathetic” and disrespectful of their constituents’ concerns, and the Senate continued to “play government” as several senators “boycotted” by absenting themselves to deny quorum and shut down the Senate. Students blasted the entire boycott situation and contended it “serves the purpose of dramatizing the displeasure of the nine senators [who boycotted], but its disruptive effect on necessary senate activity will only hurt the student body in the long run.” The impeachment of Senate President Larry Stuffle for alleged voter fraud the previous spring widened the gulf of disunity and swallowed whatever remained of the governing body’s reputation.

Besides constitutional and ethical issues, a conservative backlash tore the Senate apart as the impeached Stuffle referred to the Senate as “that paranoid panorama of political misfits” firmly allied with the “radicals.” Editorials mocked the “freak community,” as the EIU radicals were labeled, chastising its “heckling” of Stuffle. One editorial stated “it became apparent that those people only attended for the purpose of cat-calling, disruption, and making a general nuisance of themselves.” Any respect for campus “radicals” that existed beforehand quickly dissipated.

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64 Ibid., 20 October 1970.

65 These issues appear numerous in the *Eastern News*, but specifically in late October 1970.

These overlapping divisions crushed student unification and continued to haunt the campus throughout the following three semesters. The Student Senate scuffled over ideology and governmental procedure while the student body vented frustrations over the Senate’s meaningless turf wars. A fragmented student leadership coupled with deficient faith in that governing body to accomplish meaningful change blurred the future of student activism at EIU. Eastern radicals attempted to initiate another moratorium in April 1971, for example, but never garnered the support enjoyed during its parent event in October 1969. The Senate just barely granted official endorsement, voting 12-11-1 to help organize the event, and participation at the various marches, processions, and lectures were comparatively lower. While 500 marched with candles in 1969, only 200 participated now, and again dorm residents yelled threats such as “why don’t you go back to Urbana where you came from?” or “Come up here and make peace,” and finally “G---n it, this makes me so mad. My father’s a general.” The 300 who marched uptown to the Square met a few hecklers, but overall the community reaction was one of “amused tolerance,” according to the *Eastern News*.

The 1971 moratorium appeared to be the antiwar movement’s last gasp. Few took the protest seriously, and the campus quiet lulled the community into a sense of serenity. The draft’s gradual discontinuation further convinced the university and the students that EIU might escape the nation’s most tumultuous college protest period without so much as a riot-clad police officer or a disruption of normal activities. They were wrong on both counts.

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68 Ibid., 7 May 1971.
A Bang, Not a Whimper

The Vietnam War’s conclusion seemed all but official in 1972 as EIU students and faculty discussed the return of POW’s and the termination of the draft. Despite Doudna’s retirement after the 1970-71 school year, local issues that directly affected the students continued to dominate the Eastern News, including a rally to oppose a tuition hike by the governor, and the controversy over alleged discrimination by the county clerk against the newly enfranchised student population. But instead of a whimper, Eastern Illinois University bid farewell to the antiwar era with a bang by staging the school’s most aggressive antiwar protests and demonstrations in the spring of 1972. Although two full years behind the national trend, the EIU antiwar movement climaxed with illegal marches requiring both local and State police enforcement. The Student Senate’s prior ineptitude in formulating any unified, meaningful opposition to the war or the administration prompted inpatient “radical” activists to mirror their UIUC brethren and organize marches and present demands to the university president in response to Nixon’s escalation of the war in May.

The student body’s reaction to the arrest of three students in April for “illegally demonstrating” the Vietnam War inside a campus building foreshadowed the rising tide of anti-administration sentiment. On April 21, in cooperation with schools throughout the nation, Eastern students organized a day of antiwar activities which included three “idea-exchanging” sessions in the Library about how students could help end the

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70 For more on this see December 1971 Eastern News issues.
Vietnam War, and one protest in the University Union. But when the university police arrested several students for picketing inside the building, Eastern students laid blame on the administration’s doorstep, dismissing the charges as “administrative pettiness, stupidity, and close-mindedness.” Despite the lack of protests and the desire among all university factions to avoid violence and demonstrations, claimed the student, “the ridiculous move...points to the insecurity of administrators on this campus and elsewhere—an insecurity brought on by irrationality.”

Although the university eventually dropped charges against the students, the incident ignited campus activism and prompted students to finally stand up and oppose the “system.” Part of that “system” included the Federal government. Nixon’s mining of six North Vietnamese ports in May of 1972 propelled student activists out of their comfortable abodes and onto the road of dissent. That night, May 10th, 500 students spontaneously spilled onto Lincoln Avenue, the main road through Charleston, and proceeded to block the intersection at Fourth Street, a main street leading through campus. Approximately forty state, local, and campus riot-clad police confronted the demonstrators and threatened arrest if the bottleneck continued. 200 students then recrossed the street, creating a riot line. Protesters requested that motorists help by “accidentally” encountering car trouble and stalling in the middle of the road, but this tactic met mixed responses. Some complied while others drove through students, as one eyewitness attested. “When the car cleared the bulk of the protesters blocking it,” the unidentified participant explained, “there were two students who had been forced onto

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72 Ibid., 28 April 1972.
the hood. They were immediately thrown off after the driver speeded up and then slammed on his brakes throwing them to the pavement.” Although no arrests occurred and students eventually dispersed, the demonstrations created not only inconvenience for motorists, but resurgent debate over the “dead issue” of Vietnam.73

The following day, student protest leaders presented first-year University President Gilbert Fite with a list of demands. As had been the case all along at EIU, the list focused specifically on instilling campus changes, although the demands were far from unique to Eastern Illinois University as schools nationwide had made similar requests. Most of the six demands revolved around solely local concerns, such as relieving administrative “repression” including dorm and tuition freezes, elimination of rules regulating off-campus housing, and elimination of “unnecessary administrative posts.” Vietnam-related concerns also peppered the list, including the disarmament of police, a ban on military recruiters, the formation of a Peace Foundation on campus, university endorsement of the current nationwide protest, and condemnation of the recent escalation of the Vietnam War.74

Demonstrations continued the following two days, as protests devolved into “trashing” and rock-throwing extravaganzas causing $600 damage to campus property. Some fifty students peacefully distributed literature imploring motorists and passersby to “take the war home to mommy,” but not everyone accepted their offers graciously. One motorist actually got out of his vehicle and angrily confronted the demonstrators, but did not initiate physical contact. Demands for a Peace Foundation funded and supported by

74 Ibid., 12 May 1972.
EIU met defeat by Fite, who claimed such a foundation could not be financed by state funds from the operating budget, and suggested they take the idea to the Student Senate. The Senate again displayed its disenchantment with “radical” students by voting down the allocation of funds to the foundation, 11-5.\(^{75}\)

The protests proved to be the last gasp of the student “radicals.” Summer break dealt the activists a deathblow, and the disease of division debilitated the protest's longevity. The inability of the Student Senate and the protest organizers to work together likely split the campus and partly explained the woeful participation in subsequent rallies and lectures immediately following the May 10\(^{th}\) eruption. Additionally, many felt that the protesters employed ineffective demonstration tactics. A letter endorsed by over forty students and faculty pointed to the relatively small percentage of participants in the “street blocking” protests, stating “less than 5% of the student body feels that a disruption of traffic patterns in Charleston is the way to turn off a war half way around the world.” Signers instead suggested that the student movement had exhausted the effectiveness of demonstrations, and that letter writing, telephone canvassing, and lobbying accomplished more permanent changes. “Opinion should be directed toward President Nixon rather than President Fite and that the legislative power of our country is to be found on the banks of the Potomac rather than the banks of the [local river] Embarrass.”\(^{76}\)

Conclusion

In an era wrought with extreme campus unrest culminating with the Kent State shootings, Eastern Illinois University's anti-war protests never reached cataclysmic
proportions. Antiwar protests seldom materialized, thanks to a divided student body more concerned with immediate campus issues than with a conflict halfway around the world. Eastern's activists focused on an ultra-repressive administration that threatened student rights, rather than what many students perceived as a distant, inconsequential international conflict.

Regardless of the failure or success of Eastern's activists, there definitely existed a penchant to rebel against an outdated, totalitarian university structure. President Doudna rightfully shoulders much blame for this student backlash, but the general aura of revolution existent everywhere certainly wielded a heavy blow that nearly crumbled the "ivory towers" of Eastern Illinois University.
In February 1970, Illinois State University (ISU) held a statewide Vietnam Moratorium meeting. Students across the state packed up their belongings and ideas and headed to the beautiful rural community of Bloomington to discuss protest methods aimed at changing the tune of the U.S. foreign policy from one of dissonance to one of harmony. Previous moratorium successes propelled such bright-eyed youths out of their dorms and onto the road of change, with all signs pointing to ISU. The gathering focused on establishing new draft counseling techniques as well as future efforts to educate the community on the war’s futility and the economic crisis caused by the conflict. The Moratorium Committee viewed the effort as one step in a rising tide of antiwar activity that would peak in mid-April with a three-day fast and a massive demonstration at the Internal Revenue Service Centers. While cornfields dominated the scenery along the way, excitement intensified once students breached the city’s outer limits. Looking close enough, one might spot the turnoff for the small, quiet institution of Illinois Wesleyan University located just a few miles up the road.

While ISU became a locus for hawks and doves representing numerous constituencies debating war-related issues, delivering lectures, and initiating petitions and proposals opposing anti-demonstration laws on Illinois campuses, Illinois Wesleyan University (IWU), located within walking distance of ISU, remained comparatively silent. Instead, IWU approached the Vietnam War and the corresponding student

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1 Argus, 13 February 1970. Protesting the IRS served to place emphasis on the discontent of many concerning taxation for military expenditures.
movement cautiously and calmly due largely to the university's deeply rooted tendencies toward democratic processes. When the school did consider officially supporting Vietnam-related programs such as the Moratorium days in 1969-1970, for example, it did so only through thoughtful evaluation of such a program's purpose, as well as cooperative planning and approval among the faculty, students, and administration. Such meticulous dealings made rash, potentially violent situations less likely, and brought a campus consensus that limited community or student alienation from the university.

The low level of antiwar protests and marches, planned or spontaneous, in no way indicated a lack of antiwar sentiment. As the seemingly unending war continued and casualties mounted, IWU students and the entire campus community gradually adopted antiwar stances. While instances of disagreement occasionally surfaced, students and faculty generally agreed that U.S. involvement in the war should be terminated. This consensus, coupled with the administration's tolerance for student expressions of dissent and its truly legitimate claim of "neutrality" towards the Indochina conflict, produced a calmer, gentler antiwar movement at IWU. IWU provided few reasons, and even fewer visible targets against which students rebelled.

A Tradition of Democracy

IWU's cooperative atmosphere, which yielded few protests, is best explained in the context of faculty, administrative, and student relations in the fifties and sixties. The university aimed to encourage democracy and wisely kept abreast of trends in education and society and allowed curriculum changes and social events planning to fall to faculty and students. Former Student Senate President George Vinyard recalled the university's resistance to top-heavy administrative power by refusing to expand its administrative
staff and encouraging greater student and faculty participation in issues of governance.² The administration largely viewed its role as supervisory, which explains its relative invisibility during the antiwar years. Articles in the student newspaper *Argus*, rarely mentioned any administrative actions or statements on the war, save during the Kent State incident, suggesting that the university “leaders” left the issue to the students and faculty.

The curriculum development best symbolized this democratic approach. Instructors controlled the nature and type of instruction provided and largely dictated matters affecting the curriculum.³ This approach garnered respect from college educators, while rising tuition and higher salaries attracted many top-notch professors to IWU. This new professorate brought the most recent developments in education, including more interdisciplinary, specialized studies rather than superficial survey courses, as well as increased individualized projects and assignments.⁴ This student-centered approach appeased the “student power” demands for more student freedom and provided opportunities for individual expressions of non-conformity. It perhaps lessened the sense of student alienation so prevalent elsewhere and likely eased student anger since the classes themselves provided peaceful outlets for assertions of freedom from the *in loco parentis* policies of other schools.

The early inclusion of students in university governance similarly stifled reasons for rebellion of any nature. Instead of subjects to a ruthless dictator, the student body


³ Ibid., 33. Faculty constantly consulted with administrative members and participated in plenary meetings called by the administration.

⁴ Ibid., 15.
enjoyed participation and representation on administrative and faculty committees. By the end of the fifties, students sat on all standing university committees, and the student senate acquired complete control over activity fee expenditures.⁵

IWU’s liberalism regarding student and faculty involvement and autonomy provided a breeding ground for peaceful collaboration. The university reflected its power-sharing approach in the appointment of the presidency to Robert Eckley, an economist, rather than an individual with a background education or administrative affairs. When Eckley took the reigns in 1968, the Harvard graduate smartly avoided upsetting the democratic balance so deeply entrenched and set as his goals increased financial and academic strength, since that was “something I thought I knew how to do.”⁶ His decision to avoid administrative overhaul proved prescient. By increasingly allowing more democratic processes to prevail, IWU students never felt the need to rebel against an enemy that simply did not exist.

**The Antiwar Movement Begins**

While a democratic atmosphere discouraged violent clashes between the faculty, students, and administration, the IWU community still had its share of disagreements over the Vietnam War. As on most campuses, however, many at IWU initially supported the war. A November, 1967 *Argus* featured numerous student pro-war opinions, claiming that the war was “halting a Communist threat to strengthen democratic policy.”⁷ In fact, the lone group of antiwar advocates at the time originated from the religious

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⁵ Vinyard, 33.


⁷ Ibid., 178.
community. Long recognized as the “liberal” wing of U.S. Protestantism by its involvement in such antiwar groups as the National Council of Churches (NCC), Methodist denominational leaders actually criticized the NCC for not being activist enough, stressing the church’s mandate to actively pursue social and moral obligations. The United Methodist Church contended “a church lacking courage to act decisively on personal and social issues loses its claim to moral authority.”

In keeping with these traditions, Illinois State University Campus minister and director of the Wesleyan Foundation John Robert McFarland dedicated a 1967 Thanksgiving Day sermon in a nearby local church to those killed in the conflict. McFarland’s sermon served as a kind of apologia for the North Viet Cong; they continued their battle against the U.S. because “to admit defeat would be to surrender all pride,” which they struggled so hard to retrieve from the French years earlier. Here, according to McFarland, the Viet Cong “pride” symbolized honor, whilst the U.S. “pride” reflected only the greedy ambitions of the war contractors, who reaped the financial benefits of a prolonged conflict, while never themselves setting foot upon foreign soil. Recalling a story of a parent whose child returned to him in a coffin, McFarland stated the following:

Who then killed my son? ...I killed him. You killed him. Prideful and ambitious politicians killed him. The armed forces of his own nation killed him. The guilt of his death is upon us all. ...Each new day brings more oblong gray boxes to rest on our doorstep.

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8 This was predictable because the religious sectors were so deeply entrenched in the Civil Rights Movement.


“As Christians we owe our primary allegiance not to any race or clan, not to nation or flag,” but to “God, the provider of the only true liberty and freedom,” preached McFarland from the pulpit.11

McFarland’s decision to deliver such an impassioned sermon suggests the intensity with which some Methodists opposed the war specifically, and violence generally. A letter to Religious Studies chair Dr. Jim Whitehurst from a national emergency committee called the “Clergy and Laymen Concerned about Vietnam,” summarized the church’s position; the committee called the conflict “immoral, illegal, and against our national interests.”12 Carter instead encouraged Americans to sacrifice material and time to help rebuild Vietnam, rather than destroy it. Carter did not promote radical political change or violent revolution, but rather cooperation and friendship in ending the conflict.

Indifferent to the war’s outcome, the religious sector instead spoke out against the enormous casualty tolls and pleaded for the victory of the “human spirit.” Americans, according to a 1968 IWU sermon in the University Chapel by Charlie Watts, had become desensitized to the incredible loss of human life. “The war is served up on TV with the evening meal, and we hardly flinch at the piled-up bodies anymore,” argued Watts. Such an emotional disaster, Watts feared, led to an inability to distinguish right and wrong, good and evil. The main Christian problem was not the war itself, but this desensitization. Watts noted: “If we cease to regard horror as horrible, if we bear lightly


[on] other people’s sufferings, if we succumb to this numbness of conscience, then we may win a war, but lose our own souls.”

Rhetoric such as McFarland’s and Watts’s provided the campus’s sole voice of urgency in a crowd of passivity in the early years of the war.

It would be nearly a year before the students heard either Watts’s or McFarland’s cries, mostly because the students were not listening. While nationally 73% of college students believed in a Supreme Being or God in 1968, 64% did not attend church. Epitomizing the individuality pervading all aspects of the college community and curriculum, students had their own ideas about God, claiming that they could “reason” the need for a God, but not for a church. Many students became increasingly disenchanted with an out-of-date, conservative institution such as religion, and were more concerned with the “here” rather than the “hereafter.”

IWU students gradually looked elsewhere for guidance, creating such spaces as The Phoenix, a coffeehouse fashioned out of an old residence in an obscure part of campus. From 1966-1971, The Phoenix provided a haven for those inclined to folk songs, poetry, social concerns, and protests. This administration-tolerated, counter-cultural establishment promoted individual non-conformity, and led students away from the traditional mainstays like school dances and proms.


15 Ibid., 97.

Student disillusion with organized religion did not prevent IWU religious leaders like Chaplain William White from deploring the war and publicly stating the church’s moral objections, but the IWU religious community’s impact on the student movement appears limited. While White did help establish the Phoenix, IWU’s position as a private, Methodist institution had little other direct effect on the antiwar movement’s direction. While nationally the major religious antiwar groups like NCC and Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam (both of which viewed Methodists members as the most radical) flourished, such a consensus about the war never existed locally. Regarding NCC, historian Jill K Gill attested, “the NCC member denominations could not yet find a clear, theologically based moral center within the murky Vietnam issue around which to generate consensus.”17 The community churches were not very involved due to the divisive nature of the Vietnam War within their congregations. Draft counseling, so central to religious antiwar activity nationally, never mushroomed in the Bloomington community. While there were many pastors willing to counsel, very few students employed their services, and only one took advice and actually fled to Canada to avoid induction.18

The Rise of “Studentis Erectus”

It was not the church, then, that persuaded an increasing number of students to wholeheartedly oppose the war, but rather the tumultuous events of 1968, especially the May 3 Tet Offensive. The sudden attack in Vietnam ignited the first IWU protest event,

17 Gill, 273.

18 Chaplain William White of Illinois Wesleyan University, interview by author, 28 October 2003, unrecorded phone interview, Charleston, Illinois.
drawing over 600 students and ten faculty members to a discussion forum.\textsuperscript{19} The nationally televised protests at the Chicago Democratic National Convention in August 1968 also stirred the IWU student movement, but did not shake it. Students reacted slowly, first questioning the apathy of their peers and whether silence could be maintained during a time of profound change. An \textit{Argus} editorial criticized the student population for such inactivity. The spoof lambasted the Wesleyan student for being “too ‘cool’ to become involved, a brave non-conformist which will not buckle to outside pressure to become concerned about the world swirling around it.” The article further chastised the institution for remaining “calmly aloof—consorting only with the gods. At IWU, everything is done properly through ‘channels’…This eliminates the need for riots, demonstrations, and other such ‘messy’ approaches.”\textsuperscript{20} Here a student not only criticized the students’ reserve, but also the democratic university governing approach. As an alternative, he actually promoted riots and denounced peaceful channels of discontent.

Occasional calls for student action continued throughout the 1968-69 school year. “The Gadfly,” an anonymous weekly columnist, struck often, urging the student body to become “Studentis Erectus,” a force standing upright or “erect,” against its position at the bottom of the “evolutionary ladder.” This particular student warned against Nixon’s attempt to return the emerging “Studentis Erectus,” to its previous species, “Wormus Libris,” “crawling timidly on a lower stratum of society, its only activity was seasonal migration and avid pursuit of its sexual opposite or some portion thereof.”\textsuperscript{21} Student

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Argus}, 3 May 1968.

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 23 August 1968.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 18 April 1969.
body President Roy Hankins also took a lead criticizing his slothful constituents, insisting "nothing short of true STUDENT POWER (would radical student involvement seem milder?) will suffice to assure Wesleyan of being an institution with a future relevant to this and succeeding generations of students.” He demanded students sever the parent-child relationship the institution imposed, and actively participate in changing the political landscape.22

Indeed the IWU student body did embrace a more visible and assertive attitude as the first protest march occurred in May 1969. Over 2,000 Illinois State University and IWU students formed picket lines opposing the university-enforced female dorm hour regulations that they felt impeded their freedom.23 Nevertheless, campus administrators met the potentially “radical” act with calmness and cooperation. George Vinyard recalled that dialogue between the students and the administration seldom broke down as all university factions eagerly sought to extinguish any sparks before the campus became engulfed in the flames of violent student revolution.24 Even Student body President Hankins, despite his call for “radical” student power, advocated peaceful, democratic university-approved channels to accomplish change. He encouraged students to aspire to leadership positions, citing that students comprised only 13 per cent of the total membership in administrative-faculty-student committees. Hankins felt that students should inhabit 42 per cent of the membership.25

22 Argus, 25 April 1969.
23 Ibid., 17 May 1969.
24 Vinyard, 28.
A Splendid Little Moratorium

The tumult of the 1969-70 school year provided the opportunity for students to quash the apathy label while maintaining a cooperative, thoughtful approach to the Indochina conflict acceptable to both the campus and the surrounding community. Nowhere did IWU students and faculty epitomize this better than during the 1969 October Vietnam Moratorium. First, the student senate refused to approve a proposal supporting the Moratorium until it included an amendment requiring student committees to cooperate with the faculty committees.26 The Senate nearly unanimously agreed, passing the desired collaborative amendment as well as one supporting class suspension only after 11:00 am on October 15. This meshed with the faculty’s desire to “want an interruption, not a disruption, of procedures.”27

Secondly, the student body’s aversion to violence calmed any outstanding fears that the event would spiral out of control. Student demands for faculty involvement and careful, orderly planning eased lingering apprehensions, while their insistence on following the National Moratorium Committee’s goal of providing a day for discussion, not protest, silenced critics. Adhering strictly to the Moratorium’s ideals, the student senate almost unanimously passed a program that would showcase both sides of the debate, with faculty members holding objective discussions and student forums. The fact that almost every student senator agreed to produce a non-biased presentation exhibited a concerted effort to avoid possible backlash from pro-war students and community members, a situation that could result in violence. As Philosophy Professor John Vander Waal contended, “if it [the moratorium] is to be educational, all sides should be

26 IWU Student Senate minutes, 28 September 1969, Ames.
27 Argus, 10 October 1969.
presented. It’ll simply be a day of propaganda if SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] and pacifists are the only ones participating.”

Nevertheless critics abounded, especially amongst faculty, focusing particularly on whether the university itself should take an institutional stand against the war. Assistant Professor of Philosophy Larry Colter questioned the moratorium planners’ motivation. He wondered if the idea was to have the university go on record opposing the war or to spend time just thinking about it. Either way Colter quipped, “Is it the place of the university as an institution to adopt a political resolution?” Political Scientist Dr. Robert Leh raised similar concerns, stating, “it is not necessary to commit the university. It is important to become personally involved and committed.” Speech Professor Marie Robinson suggested holding classes and devoting discussions to Vietnam, while insurance Professor Donald Strand outright opposed the moratorium, holding that it would be ill-advised to show dissension during this crucial period of Vietnam negotiations.

Several faculty senators quickly quashed the two latter criticisms. History Professor Paul Bushnell directly contradicted Strand, arguing, “a stand is the only way to promote negotiations or settlement.” Robinson’s request met a similar fate, as a voice vote soundly defeated her amendment to devote class time to Vietnam discussion. Faculty agreed that Vietnam’s importance merited class cancellation, but only under faculty supervision. In the end the faculty senate adopted Leh’s proposal. Faculty voted to allow student-faculty committees to plan the day, but maintained that the institution itself remain objective. Dr. Whitehurst agreed, and stressed faculty commitment and involvement by circulating letters encouraging faculty participation. Whitehurst warned

28 Argus, 10 October 1969.
faculty not to succumb to the laziness or "numbness of conscience" that Watts feared, citing the rising Vietnam death toll and failed negotiations. 29

The October 15 Moratorium—which included faculty and chaplain-led discussion sessions, the reading of names of Illinois youths killed in Vietnam, several movies, and a student-faculty forum—transpired exactly as planned. The discussion forums were not mere outlets of dissent or provocateurs of violence but instead reflected the rational, controlled environment IWU epitomized. The faculty generally favored U.S. withdrawal, debating only how to accomplish such a feat with minimal human loss, and without abandoning the containment policy. 30 Follow-up Argus articles explained exactly what had been discussed at the forums, as well as praising the entire campus for a well-organized effort.

Yet something was missing from the follow-up articles: student letters to the editor. Devoid of any student comments on the Moratorium or the war itself, Argus depicted the students as passive observers while the professors and administrators spouted their beliefs regarding the Indochina conflict. The following day’s cover story, “War Moratorium Elicits Conflicting Views,” might have been re-titled “conflicting FACULTY views,” as the supposedly open forums turned into faculty debates. In fact, of the five immediate articles covering the Moratorium, four focused on the faculty’s critique, and the fifth on the administration’s discussion forum concerning the war’s impact on the IWU budget. 31 Possibly jaded by their exclusion from the debates, students

29 Argus, 10 October 1969.

30 The “Containment Policy,” unofficially adopted by the U.S. in 1948, suggested that if the U.S. simply contained Communism to those countries in which it already exists, eventually the ideology’s weaknesses would be exposed, and the entire system would internally collapse.

31 Argus, 17 October 1969.
sensed that their opinions and actions counted little. As a result, a sense of alienation developed for some.

The following month brought a serious shift in student activity, yet IWU’s reputation for rational thought and action triumphed. Instead of composing angry letters denouncing the university’s treatment of its students, the student body turned to its representative body, the senate. Finally taking a definitive political stance, the Student Senate proposed to:

endorse the policy of withdrawal of United States troops from Vietnam by June, 1971. Further, that the United States provide for the protection or any civilian peoples in South Vietnam...whose lives are endangered by terrorist or other threatening actions.\(^{32}\)

While the second part of the proposal regarding the U.S. protection of civilians was eventually eliminated, the call for withdrawal of troops passed 38-2, and the IWU students joined their comrades at colleges nation-wide in officially condemning the U.S.’s involvement in Indochina.

The National Moratorium Committee’s call for students to “take it to the community” in November resonated with students. Retaining their discipline and reputation as peaceful dissenters, IWU students distributed Vietnam materials promoting American withdrawal at local country clubs, churches, and downtown hot spots. They also encouraged residents to send committee-furnished cards to Nixon protesting the war.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{32}\) IWU Student Senate minutes, 9 November 1969, Ames.

\(^{33}\) Argus, 14 November 1969.
Students continued such peaceful protest throughout the school year. Joining other Illinois schools, IWU representatives delivered proposals to the Illinois Constitutional Convention meeting in Springfield, where state congressional representatives embarked on the complicated task of rewriting the state constitution. The proposals included “making the political process more democratic, ending political repression...the present collusion between the military, the corporations and the universities in this state.”\(^{34}\) Even as late as February IWU students remained involved in the State Moratorium Committee, though the moratorium failed to remain newsworthy, garnering only minor columns in *Argus* instead of previous front-page headlines.

The faculty, meanwhile, remained largely silent. A November Faculty Senate proposal condemning treatment of POW’s notwithstanding, faculty participation in moratorium activities sharply plummeted. This is unsurprising given the faculty’s stated aversion to taking an official, united institutional stand on the Vietnam War. As Physics Professor Gary Kessler stated, the university should retain its objectivity as well as encourage individuality and moral values.\(^{35}\) Additionally, the faculty possibly felt it had been over-involved in earlier antiwar protests and sought to step back and give students an outlet.

**Feeling the Heat of Kent State**

The cataclysmic events of May 1970 changed everything. It shook the tiny, insular IWU community and forced all students and faculty to sit up and take notice of a conflict that not only claimed lives abroad, but also now claimed lives merely two states

\(^{34}\) *Argus*, 12 December 1969.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 17 October 1969.
away. The U.S. invasion of Cambodia followed immediately by the murder of four Kent State students protesting that very decision brought the war home. As Chaplain White stated, the shootings “personalized” the issue by exposing the vulnerability of all student activists.36 IWU responded again with teamwork. Putting outstanding divisions aside, the university coalesced as IWU students worked with pastors and religious professors to set up rallies and memorial services aimed at mourning the dead and understanding the present situation. The Student Action Committee for Peace (SACP), a student organization formed through the Student Senate, oversaw the events and hoped to “educate and involve people of our campus and the community in the events of the world.”37

SACP activities included encouraging faculty class time discussions about the war, a special Argus issue about the situation, a memorial service conducted by Chaplain William White, petitions to cancel classes, and a student march to Bloomington Courthouse and the Selective Service Office at ISU.38 Playing on the religious community, SACP also composed a letter to local pastors requesting an entire sermon dedicated to the war, or at least the reading of a prayer both mourning war casualties and hoping for a speedy and immediate resolution.39 The SACP also planned a Friday rally, encouraging complete citizen attendance and participation. Unlike the last attempt to coordinate faculty, students, and administration, this effort featured speakers from every part of the university. Their backgrounds varied enormously, ranging from former and


37 Student Action Committee for Peace, statement for immediate release, 6 May 1970, Ames.

38 Argus, 7 May 1970.

39 Letter from IWU Student Action Committee for Peace to IWU pastors, 6 May 1970, Ames.
current student leaders from the Student Senate and the Black Student Association, to professors of Law, Religion, History, Speech, and even a Board of Trustees member. 40

The various reactions of these three factions require an analysis of each in turn, beginning with the faculty. Some professors like John Heyl of History, and Walter Wilkins, a Social Science librarian, walked the traditional, beaten path of merely providing objective information, for instance recounting Cambodia’s history and the turning points that brought the situation to its current state. 41 This fulfilled the “education” portion of the Student Action Committee’s purpose. Yet other, more “radical” faculty could not resist introducing their personal opinions. Dr. Paul Bushnell, a holdover from the Moratorium debates, condemned the U.S. government outright, dubbing the war a “new kind of recklessness” in foreign policy, while chastising Nixon for “abandoning” Congress in continuing the war without its approval. He also questioned America’s democratic institutions, claiming that indoctrination and repression existed as much domestically as in Communist-led countries. 42

Most faculty members did not speak out in such accusatory tones, nor did they habitually condemn democratic institutions. Professors Donald Strand of Insurance, Jerry Stone of Humanities, and Heyl from the History Department encouraged faith in the political system. Change must be made through the elections of favorable antiwar candidates, and patience in the current political negotiations must persist. 43

40 “Friday Rally,” Student Action Committee for Peace flyer, 8 May 1970, Ames.

41 Argus, 8 May 1970.

42 Ibid., 15 May 1970.

Students echoed these faculty convictions. Hankins, for example, repeated Bushnell’s statement that Congress never sanctioned the war, insisting without specification and that students should do something to stop it. Jim Boisclair, a political science major, poetically pointed out the irony that “Western man” glorifies himself in war while characterizing war as evil. Biology student Elbert Shaw called for outright revolution, though provided no strategy or ideology. Student Senate President Mark Sheldon offered somewhat detailed solutions, such as cooperation with ISU, community involvement and education, and resistance to wartime institutions like the draft.44

Some students, however, were not so quick to condemn the Kent State shootings. Student Dar Fort defended the National Guardsmen responsible for shooting the Kent State students, reminding IWU that the shootings did occur during a rather violent student protest and that the officers, scared and outnumbered, allowed chaos to triumph. She continued her onslaught by taking to task those demanding immediate withdrawal, stating that such a rash act would encourage communism’s unpreventable spread, and consequent murders.45 The IWU students themselves were not practicing democracy, according to student Renna Bussell, though they hypocritically called for it now:

Two weeks ago we were asked to write [IWU President] Dr. Eckley in order to get classes cancelled for May 9. The notice read, “Prove our Democratic system works.” This implies it would only be “proved” if President Eckley gave an affirmative endorsement. Is the Democratic system “proved” only when we get what we want from it? That is like saying our parents love us only when they say yes.46


46 Ibid., 22 May 1970.
Yet students maintained enough unity to influence the administration, particularly President Robert Eckley. Eckley, however, already held somewhat tolerant attitudes about student strife. As he stated in his memoir, “if the unrest takes no more serious form than blocking of facilities, if the operation of the University is not immediately threatened...our response should be mild and not resort immediately to physical methods of removal.”

IWU students never reached such drastic levels of disobedience. Typical of many universities (including EIU), IWU’s most heated event was the “flag controversy” where students demanded—or in IWU’s case politely requested—the campus flag be lowered to half-mast to mourn all Vietnam-related deaths. Instead of hundreds of students defiantly and dramatically marching on the flagpole or the president’s house like at ISU, the SACP obediently employed proper protest channels by asking Eckley’s permission. Initially denying the request, Eckley offered to reconsider his decision if the students garnered enough student body support. Again the unfolding event reflected a respect for democracy. Student Senate President George Vinyard quickly polled the senators, who favored the action 28-4. Eckley then consulted with the Faculty Advisory Committee who concurred with the Senate, leaving little doubt about the campus sentiment. The flag was lowered, according to Eckley, for four Students killed at Kent State and for all those killed in Southeast Asia.

Yet IWU could not escape the tumultuous month of May 1970 without a parting shot of controversy. The wall of unity and camaraderie, built throughout the school year

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47 Meyers Jr., 181.

48 Argus, 8 May 1970.
through “calm reasoning” and “communicative action among the different groups within the university,” cracked. Student Ronald Klipp’s decision to attend the Honor’s Convocation donning a shirt depicting an upside-down American flag highlighted the generational split between students and faculty that lay hidden like fault lines. Just as constant pressure causes eruptions along such faults, Klipp’s action tipped the Richter scale and released a full-fledged earthquake of retorts. The faculty, though generally antiwar, disapproved and denounced Klipp’s actions as “infantile attention-getting mechanisms.” Community members similarly complained of Klipp’s disrespect for the flag, citing it as blatant disregard for freedom.

Klipp and other students viewed the flag’s symbolic meaning differently. Klipp contended that because the flag represented freedom, it was his right to “freedom of expression” that allowed him to wear the flag as he did. Other students blasted the professorate for directly attacking Klipp personally and not allowing him the “freedom” to explain his actions. As student Chuck Bonney editorialized, the faculty “disregarded Mr. Klipp’s Constitutional and human rights.”

Kai Nielson summarized the consequence and meaning of the Klipp controversy:

When this university can no longer tolerate peaceful dissent, when tradition becomes more important than relevant action, and the reaction to this gesture has further shown its relevance, when academic threats are used to stifle free expression, then this university is indeed in distress.

49 Argus, 29 May 1970.

50 Ibid., 29 May 1970.
A Return to Normalcy

IWU adjourned for summer break not a moment too soon. With the Klipp controversy following closely behind the Kent State situation, only the dismissal of classes defused the bomb. Even Chaplain White acknowledged the detrimental affect of summer break on the continuity of the student movement, claiming that the months of student absence “voided the experience” of the previous year.\(^{51}\) Students returned in August refreshed and relaxed, choosing to walk the more familiar path of rational, democratic and intellectual antiwar activities, while avoiding the cracks of disunity created at the tail end of the previous school year.

Perhaps unwilling to provoke another controversial incident, possibly frightened by the near campus implosion several months prior, or convinced that Nixon’s withdrawal of troops signaled the ending of the war, the following school year saw the majority of IWU students and faculty saying little about the Vietnam War. Students did not engage in massive letter-writing campaigns to senators and representatives, as Vinyard had urged. Nor did the campus respond either way to the expansion of the Vietnam conflict to a Southeast Asian war, with the invasions of Laos and Cambodia. Vinyard’s request for a moratorium-like protest took nearly a year to materialize,\(^{52}\) and any serious discussions about Vietnam or other pertinent student issues occurred only at ISU. Antiwar student commentaries disappeared, and the Argus resorted to reprinting more Associated Press releases about the war. The five-part Scranton Commission’s National Report on Campus Violence, for example, repeatedly occupied front-page news,

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\(^{51}\) Chaplain William White, interview by author, 28 October 2003, Charleston, Illinois.

\(^{52}\) Argus, 8 January 1971.
as well as discussions about a United States National Students Association-backed peace
treaty calling for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces. Talk of an all-volunteer force
that would replace the draft also garnered headlines, while IWU students, faculty, and
administration seemed to take a vow of silence.

Not all students remained quiet, however. Some students still insisted on peaceful,
subtle protest, and sought practical democratic solutions. A small coalition of students
formed a new antiwar organization, the Movement for a New Congress (MNC), to assist
peace candidates in running in the 1970 congressional elections. Students campaigned
for certain candidates opposed to the war and violence, and consequently learned the
inner-workings of the political web—lobbying, campaigning, and publicizing the
candidate’s platform. Because the MNC promoted education along with a political
agenda, the IWU faculty fully supported member students, and even approved their class
absence during the two weeks leading up to the election.

Despite this genuine attempt to engage students in antiwar activities, the campus
silence proved deafening. History major Benjamin Keylin, IWU Chairman of MNC,
expressed amazement at “the vast number of students who are completely unaware or
apathetic about events that surround them.” Regarding the “Vietnam conflict,” Keylin
challenged the apathetic community to question the war’s constitutionality and morality,
while encouraging students to “take action.”

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53 Argus, 30 April 1971.
54 Ibid., 18 September 1970.
55 Ibid., 9 October 1970.
IWU students and faculty ignored Keylin’s requests as the 1971-72 school featured even less Argus coverage of the Vietnam conflict and less student commentary. Finally, Nixon’s bombing campaign in May 1972 stirred some campus activity, and ignited interest in a national student strike and emergency moratorium. Although hardly national leaders, a segment of the IWU student body ardently supported the protest.

The animal of student awareness had apparently returned, and its prey turned out to be the IWU students and faculty. Nixon’s escalation of the Indochina conflict generated an underground student newspaper titled, El Lobo, translated “The Wolf.” Far left-wing articles abounded, chastising the faculty’s silence on the war, Nixon, and former President Lyndon B. Johnson. It beseeched students to participate in the upcoming student strike, calling again on “Studentis Erectus” and “students in all American universities to assert themselves and make their position on the war known.” The paper even encouraged students to deduct the federal excise tax on student bills, calling it a “war tax.”56 But the vigor with which students opposed the war in 1969-70 never reemerged. Like many other campuses, IWU’s activism plummeted following that turbulent year as other social issues took precedence and apathy towards the war ensued.

Conclusion

Throughout the antiwar era, Illinois Wesleyan University followed a similar pattern of student activism found at most universities—mostly non-violent, and seldom radical. The university still saw its share of controversy, including a protest on the university quad where students collectively laid down, motionless, symbolizing the Vietnam death toll. There was also one commencement ceremony where many graduates

56 El Lobo, underground student newspaper, 19 April 1972, Ames.
spattered peace signs atop their mortars, provocative enough that one faculty person simply refused to participate in the ceremony.\textsuperscript{57} But the majority of radical student action did not rise directly from opposition to the Vietnam War. Instead, those few confrontations between faculty, students, and administrators centered on issues like student rights, infringement of the democratic processes students enjoyed, the school’s role in politics, Klipp’s freedom of expression statement that split students and faculty, and the silence of both faculty and students throughout much of the war years. These internal—that is, campus-based problems--galvanized “radical” student unrest more than any international or domestic event.

Yet IWU’s occasions of thoughtful dissent—the moratorium, the Movement for a New Congress, and the peaceful “flag-controversy”--symbolized the lost opportunity of the student antiwar movement. IWU’s devotion to peaceful protest, national programs, and democratic expressions proved admirable in a time when many schools abandoned such approaches. It is intriguing to ponder the movement’s potential had all schools followed IWU’s patience and cooperation. Would violence have erupted? Would buildings have burned? Would four more students have graduated from Kent State? Regardless, the fact remains that IWU had an historical bent toward peace, order, and cooperation. Already a “democratic” institution committed to student and faculty rights and representation, and completely isolated from direct or indirect involvement with the U. S. government and Vietnam, the IWU administration provided little firepower for

\textsuperscript{57} Chaplain William White, interview by author, 28 October 2003, Charleston, Illinois. The dates of these events are unknown, but White suggests that they likely occurred in May 1970.
"gun-toting" student radicals. The "spirit of the campus"58 had already promoted "participatory democracy" well before the Student for a Democratic Society, and provided the mechanisms for a peaceful, intellectual student movement.

58 Chaplain William White used this phrase to explain the university’s general preferences for peace and abhorrence of violence.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION

By the mid-seventies, the student “movement” had lost momentum and direction. U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam was nearly complete, and much of the pioneering, “radical” baby boomer generation completed its journey through higher education. While this enormous and powerful graduating class continued to address similarly controversial issues such as environmental concerns, feminism, and political deception, the sense of urgency and destiny that they had to save America from the “age of twilight” no longer existed. This is due to the fact that students, despite their many misgivings about higher education, actually did acquire significant life-long lessons that cannot be measured by tests or recounted in textbooks.

They learned the importance of a unified front in accomplishing change. Student apathy, for example, thwarted activist attempts to challenge the university administration. Like an infectious disease, it spread quickest when left unchecked such as at EIU, and it exhibited immunity to calls for “Studentis Erectus” at IWU. UIUC experienced flashes of conquering this debilitating virus, at one time garnering one-third student participation in antiwar protests, but inevitably fell well short of achieving a majority. Without a majority, students learned not only that change was slow, but nearly impossible.

Students also learned how to pick their battles. For nearly a decade, Illinois students witnessed and participated in protests against national policies such as Civil Rights, Free Speech, and the Vietnam War, but with only minor success. Impatient students infused with the “aura of rebellion” realized that perhaps they had overestimated
their power, and did not possess the resources to affect national change, at least not from central Illinois. Local campus concerns replaced national issues, and the university administration replaced the U.S. government as the target of student “radicals.” EIU’s largest protest, for example, revolved around broken administrative promises regarding tuition. Local campus issues like ROTC’s presence and the university’s military complicity with the U.S. Department of Defense dominated the list of grievances presented by UIUC activists during the May, 1970 Student Strike.

But IWU offered the greatest lesson of the era: the importance of democratic processes. Illinois Wesleyan’s long tradition of ensuring student and faculty participation in university governance helped IWU avoid attacks on the university that occurred at EIU and UIUC. Only through trial-and-error did EIU and especially UIUC’s administration grasp the necessity of disregarding in loco parentis and including all university factions in the decision-making process. Their reluctance to do so earlier in the sixties played a significant role in generating violent student outbursts. UIUC students rioted in the streets in the March of 1970, for example, because the university failed to consider the student body’s position regarding both the presence of General Electric Company recruiters, and the appearance of controversial speaker William Kunstler.

But administrations at both EIU and UIUC learned from their mistakes. Police forces at UIUC showed more restraint regarding protesters, prompting one student’s confession that “we’d have a lot of people out here if someone would go downstairs and say ‘the police are out there busting heads.’” Chancellor Jack Peltason made concerted efforts to discuss issues with students in hopes of avoiding miscommunication that could lead to violence, and also to reopen the university-approved “protest channels.” EIU’s
President Quincy Doudna similarly enlisted democratic processes, enthusiastically approving a campus referendum regarding whether or not the U.S. flag should be lowered on campus to mourn the Kent State victims. By utilizing an all-campus vote, the university administration avoided charges of "dictator" that dominated Doudna's reign, while simultaneously preventing violent student backlash. In short, university administrators found a cure for 1960s student unrest—democracy.

Student apathy, shifting targets of "radicals," and the installation of more democratic processes helped dispel the sense of rebellion rampant throughout the antiwar years, while the mass exodus of "baby boomers" from campuses nailed the coffin of student activism shut. The victor of "the Battle for the University," however, is not so easily identifiable. Students had their share of successes, the most prominent being the dissolution of in loco parentis. The administration cannot be charged with a loss, however, as they retained much of their power over university operations. Instead, the real winner of this epic struggle was the university itself. Bitter conflict at each of these three Illinois institutions hastened the transition to Clark Kerr's "multiversity," and created an educational atmosphere conducive to free speech, political activism, and the basic exercise of civil rights. In the end, these universities achieved the multiversity's goal of "coexistence rather than peace," and ushered in the modern system of education. Students, faculty, and administrators waged the war and suffered the casualties, but today's society is the true beneficiary of "the Battle for the University."

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