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The Impact of Pacific Lutheran on Collective Bargaining at Catholic Colleges and Universities

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I. Introduction

In December 2014, the National Labor Relations Board abandoned the “substantial religious character” test it previously used to apply the 1979 Supreme Court decision Catholic Bishop of Chicago, and in its place set forth a test that will allow the Board to assert jurisdiction over bargaining units of professors at religiously-affiliated colleges and universities without creating a risk of entanglement between government and religion. The test established in Pacific Lutheran University turns on a university’s own public statements regarding its religious environment and the specific religious roles of faculty, putting to rest the specter of an intrusive, constitutionally problematic inquiry into whether a school is “sufficiently” religious.

The new test comes at a moment when faculty at colleges and universities across the country, including Catholic institutions, are taking collective action to demand investment in students and instruction. On February 25, 2015, faculty drew national media attention by walking out, rallying, and conducting teach-ins on “National Adjunct Walkout Day,” which started out as an anonymous call to action on the Internet. On April 15, the “Fight for 15” came to hundreds of campuses, bringing the story of highly-educated, poorly-compensated professors into the global movement for fair pay and the right to form unions.

The Pacific Lutheran test meets that moment, promising stability in an area of Board law that has been controversial for decades. Costly hearings and appeals under the previous Catholic Bishop doctrine had delayed union campaigns for years, and chilled organizing activity among faculty at religiously-affiliated colleges. On some Catholic campuses, sincere concerns with the doctrine had prompted attacks on faculty organizing efforts, attacks at odds with tenets of Catholic teaching that honor the rights of all working people to act collectively.

The new test does away with the source of principled opposition to faculty organizing pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act. The test creates a constitutionally sound, workable means of ensuring that the Board will not take jurisdiction of a unit that includes faculty members who are held out as performing specific religious functions. It also creates a pathway for lay faculty to exercise their federal statutory rights.
This paper lays out the history of Catholic Bishop and the NLRB’s assertion of jurisdiction over units of teachers at religiously-affiliated schools, culminating in the Board’s decision to revise its test in Pacific Lutheran University. We then explain why the Pacific Lutheran test is constitutionally sound, and why collective bargaining at Catholic universities and colleges does not lead to constitutional entanglement.

II. Faculty Organizing Rights at Religiously-Affiliated Schools

A. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop and the Board’s “Substantial Religious Character” Test

In Catholic Bishop, the Supreme Court considered “[w]hether teachers in schools operated by a church to teach both religious and secular subjects are within the jurisdiction granted by the National Labor Relations Act.”3 The case concerned the Board’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over units of lay teachers at two groups of Catholic high schools. In its decision, citing concerns stemming from the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court invoked its prudential policy of constitutional avoidance and construed the Act to exclude teachers in church-operated schools.4

The Court discussed two potential ways in which Board jurisdiction over teachers would present a risk of entanglement with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.5 The Court first suggested that because the teachers could be terminated or disciplined for religious reasons, the Board’s adjudication of unfair labor practice charges might require it to judge the religious good faith of the administrators in making such decisions. Second, because the teachers’ jobs involved “the propagation of a religious faith,” the Board’s determination of which terms and conditions of employment were mandatory subjects of bargaining would involve the Board in religious matters. The Court held that it was “the teacher’s function in a church school”—the “critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfilling the mission of a church operated school”—that led to the “danger that religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction.”6

The Court commented on the “substantial religious character” of the church-operated high schools in the case, but only by way of explaining why the parochial teachers’ job functions were inherently concerned with religious instruction. The “admitted and obvious fact that the raison d’etre of parochial schools is the propagation of a religious faith,”7 was relevant because it explained why “[t]he church-teacher relationship in a church-operated school differs from the employment relationship in a
public or other nonreligious school” and therefore why the Board’s exercise of jurisdiction would present constitutional problems.8

Subsequent decisions by the Board and the courts clarified the limited scope of the holding in Catholic Bishop. The doctrine has no application to employees other than teachers, and does not “exclude church-operated schools, as entire units, from the coverage of the NLRA.”9 And Catholic Bishop exempts from jurisdiction only teachers who are under an “obligation . . . to imbue and indoctrinate the student body with the tenets of a religious faith.”10

When the Board began to apply Catholic Bishop to colleges and universities, it recognized that indoctrination is not inherent in the jobs of professors at religiously-affiliated institutions of higher education. It thus announced that it would apply Catholic Bishop to colleges and universities only on a “case-by-case basis.”11 In many early cases the Board continued to focus on the job functions of the petitioned-for unit of teachers.12 Over time, the Board more frequently analyzed the “substantial religious character” of the school as a whole,13 asking whether the entire “entity is . . . exempt from Board jurisdiction under Catholic Bishop.”14 That test involved the Board examining all relevant aspects of the school’s organization and function, including “the purpose of the employer’s operations, the role of unit employees in effectuating that purpose, and the potential effects if the Board exercised jurisdiction.”15

**B.  The D.C. Circuit’s Rejection of the NLRB Test in University of Great Falls**

In reviewing the Board’s University of Great Falls and Carroll College decisions, the D.C. Circuit rejected the Board’s “substantial religious character” test as excessively probing and wide-ranging. In Great Falls, the D.C. Circuit formulated a three-pronged test: First, does the school hold itself out to students, faculty, and the community as providing a religious educational environment; second, is it a non-profit; and third, is it affiliated with, owned, operated, controlled, directly or indirectly, by a recognized religious organization or with an entity whose membership is determined at least in part with reference to religion.16

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8 Id. at 504.
9 NLRB v. Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1991).
12 Livingston Coll., 286 NLRB 1308, 1309 (1987) (“Of more significance is the fact that faculty members are not required to conform to AME doctrine or promote the ideals and objectives of the AME Church.”).
13 Univ. of Great Falls, 331 NLRB 1663, 1664 (2000), rev’d, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
14 Carroll Coll., 345 NLRB 254, 257 (2005), rev’d, 558 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
15 Univ. of Great Falls, 331 NLRB at 1664–65.
16 Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Building on then-Judge Breyer’s 1986 First Circuit opinion in Universidad Central de Bayamon, the D.C. Circuit relied on its bright-line test to ensure that the Board would not delve into “matters of religious doctrine or motive.”17 The D.C. Circuit intended to avoid the problems with the “substantial religious environment” test, which it feared could involve the Board in assessing the good faith of positions asserted by clergy-administrators,18 or in “trolling through the beliefs of [schools], making determinations about [their] religious mission, and that mission’s centrality to the ‘primary purpose’ of the [school].”19

C. The NLRB’s New Test in Pacific Lutheran University

In Pacific Lutheran, the Board announced that it would decline jurisdiction over a unit of faculty members at a college or university if the institution both 1) “demonstrates, as a threshold matter, that it holds itself out as providing a religious educational environment,” and 2) “holds out the petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining the school’s religious educational environment.”20 This two-part test addresses the concern of the D.C. Circuit and amici regarding the constitutionally appropriate bounds on an inquiry into a religious school’s environment. It also meets the Board’s statutory obligation to enforce the National Labor Relations Act.

1. The First Prong: Religious Educational Environment

In this threshold inquiry, the Board accepts the D.C. Circuit’s concern that “corroboration of a university’s claim that it is a religious institution cannot involve an inquiry into the good faith of the university’s position or an examination of how the university implements its religious mission.”21 Rather, the Board will rely on the school’s contemporary presentation of its religious environment, including mission statements, its website, and information given to students, faculty, and the public—as “an accurate, but nonintrusive, way for the Board to assess a university’s assertion that it provides a religious educational environment.”22

The Pacific Lutheran test reflects the Board’s conviction, shared with the D.C. Circuit, that it must “err on the side of being over-inclusive and not excluding universities because they are not ‘religious enough.’”23 The test also incorporates the Great Falls holding requiring that the college or university to be organized as a non-profit.24 However, the Board did not adopt the element of the D.C.

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17 Id. at 1345.
18 Carroll College v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
19 Id. at 572 (quoting Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1341–42).
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id. at 6–7.
23 Id. at 7 (citing Univ. of Great Falls, 278 F.3d at 1343 (2002)).
24 Under a line of cases distinct from Catholic Bishop, the NLRB has declined jurisdiction over all employees of some churches and religious organizations based on its conclusion that those organizations are not engaged in commercial activity.
Circuit’s Great Falls test requiring the university be affiliated with, owned or operated by a recognized religious entity, reasoning that multidenominational or nondenominational colleges might also hold themselves out as providing a religious educational environment.\textsuperscript{25}

The first prong removes the Board from the business of assessing the religious “character” or “environment” of the institution as a whole.\textsuperscript{26} As this is now the threshold, rather than the entire, inquiry, the test is less vulnerable to the suggestion—made by some—that if a college or university is “sufficiently” religious then all its employees, regardless of their function, are not covered by the Act.\textsuperscript{27}

2. The Second Prong: Specific Role in Creating or Maintaining the Religious Educational Environment

Once the threshold requirement is met, the Board will examine “whether the university holds out its petitioned-for faculty members as performing a specific role in creating and maintaining that environment.”\textsuperscript{28} The Board drew on language from Catholic Bishop in crafting this prong of the test, noting that “the key role played by teachers in such a school system has been the predicate’ for its concern about ‘creating an impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement.’”\textsuperscript{29} Only when the teachers in the unit play a “critical and unique role” in creating and maintaining the religious environment that the assertion of jurisdiction could open the door to potential interference with management rights or conflict between management and the Board on religious matters. Absent those circumstances, “it is appropriate for the Board to assert jurisdiction for the same reasons that it is appropriate to assert jurisdiction over employees at other types of religious organizations, that is, because assertion of the Board’s jurisdiction does not raise concerns under either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.”\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{See, e.g., Riverside Church}, 309 NLRB 806 (1992) (declining jurisdiction over service and maintenance employees at church); cf. \textit{The First Church of Christ, Scientist}, 194 NLRB 1006 (1972) (asserting jurisdiction over electricians and carpenters employed by church for magazine publishing operation exceeding $1 million). As a general matter, the NLRB has long asserted jurisdiction over non-profit entities that meet its discretionary standards for commercial activity. For private, non-profit colleges and universities, that threshold is a gross annual revenue of $1 million. 29 C.F.R. § 103.1 (2014). The private non-profit higher education sector takes in over $160 billion in net revenues annually. Data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, National Center for Education Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/. 25 \textit{Pacific Lutheran Univ.}, slip op. at 7. 26 \textit{Id.} 10 (quoting \textit{Univ. of Great Falls}, 278 F.3d at 1346 (stating that limiting the Catholic Bishop exception to religious institutions “with hard-nosed proselytizing” might violate the Establishment Clause command not to prefer some religions to others)). 27 \textit{See Saint Xavier Univ.}, No. 13-RC-092296 (NLRB). The employer has argued that Catholic Bishop precludes Board jurisdiction over a unit of housekeepers, despite stipulations that housekeepers have no religious functions. After Pacific Lutheran, the case was remanded by the Board to the Regional Director and is currently pending. 28 \textit{Pacific Lutheran Univ.}, slip op. at 7. 29 \textit{Id.} at 7 (citing \textit{NLRB v. Catholic Bishop}, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)). 30 \textit{Id.} at 8.
The Board acknowledges that an examination of the actual functions of the faculty members in the petitioned-for unit could itself raise First Amendment concerns. Accordingly, in order to avoid “‘trolling’ through a university’s operation to determine whether and how it is fulfilling its religious mission” it simply will “decline jurisdiction if the university ‘holds out’ its faculty members, in communications to current or potential students and faculty members, and the community at large, as performing a specific role in creating or maintaining the university’s religious purpose or mission.”

The Board will not inquire into the university’s beliefs or how effectively it inculcates those beliefs. Nor will it require or even allow an inquiry into the faculty member’s actual performance of duties.

The Board is clear, however, that the religious function must be specific. Generalized statements that faculty support the goals or mission of the university are not enough; nor are generally held commitments to diversity or academic freedom. The Board can consider how the employer holds out faculty functions in public-facing statements including employment contracts, statements to accrediting bodies, and statements to students and current faculty. If those and other sources show that faculty members are expected to perform specific religious functions, the Board will decline jurisdiction.

3. The Dissent

The dissenting Board members in Pacific Lutheran University criticize the Board’s new test still involves the Board in “‘trolling through religious beliefs,’” and argues that the Board should end its inquiry after conducting a test similar to the D.C. Circuit’s Great Falls test. They object to the second prong of the test, which Member Johnson claims “amounts to an analysis of what is ‘religious’ as opposed to what is ‘secular,’” thereby placing the Board in the untenable position of deciding what can, and what cannot, be deemed a sufficiently religious role or a sufficiently religious function. Moreover, assuming the test itself were not problematic, to the extent that an unfair labor charge involves an employer decision made for religious reasons, the Board’s inquiry would necessarily examine the validity of the church doctrine. Member Johnson suggests that jurisdiction is particularly problematic in this case because Lutheranism is one of the “religions that believe fundamentally that there is no role for a civil institution like the Board in solving their disputes,” and there can be no avoiding excessive entanglement when the Board gets involved.

31 Id.
32 Id. at 8-9.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 26 (Miscimarra, dissenting); id. at 30 (Johnson, dissenting).
35 Id. at 31 (Johnson, dissenting). Seattle University, in its recent request for review to the Board in one of six pending Catholic Bishop cases that were remanded after Pacific Lutheran, also objected to the second prong of the test, warning that it would result in “unavoidable entanglement problems.” Brief for Appellant at 11, Seattle Univ., No. 19-RC-122863 (NLRB Mar. 17, 2015).
36 Id. at 34 (citing NLRB v. Bishop Ford Cent. Catholic High Sch., 623 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1977))).
37 Id. at 34 (noting that Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694 (2012) involved a Lutheran school that fired a “called teacher” for failing to abide by internal dispute mechanism, and citing other Lutheran
The dissent’s line of reasoning suggests two extraordinary propositions: First, any court effort to delineate the scope of religious exemptions across our labor and employment laws that involves an inquiry into the religious function of the employee—even if based upon on objective representations made by the employer itself—risks improper government intrusion; and second, Board jurisdiction over any employees of a bona fide religion, particularly those employers whose religious doctrine requires internal dispute resolution, risks Constitutional problems. As described below, courts have not endorsed the logic supporting either of these propositions.

III. Neither the Pacific Lutheran Test Nor Collective Bargaining at Catholic Universities and Colleges Risks Infringement of the Religion Clauses

Under the Pacific Lutheran test, the Board will decline jurisdiction over teachers at religiously-affiliated schools who perform specific religious functions. For the majority of faculty at Catholic universities and colleges who do not perform specific religious functions, collective bargaining can proceed without risking the speculative constitutional concerns described in Catholic Bishop, as demonstrated by actual bargaining experience between unions and religiously-affiliated employers. This is so because the Board’s role in enforcing the NLRA is geared towards protecting the rights that help the collective bargaining process function rather than prescribing the substance of those bargains.

A. The Pacific Lutheran Test is Validated by Hosanna-Tabor and Other Court Decisions Concerning Employment Discrimination

Courts have rejected the categorical view that the First Amendment prohibits courts from inquiring into the religious function of employees or adjudicating any disputes that involve employer religious objections. First, with regard to court inquiry into the religious function of employees, the Board noted that the Supreme Court adopted an approach similar to the Pacific Lutheran test in its 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision. In Hosanna-Tabor, a “called teacher” at an elementary school operated by a church was terminated after she took disability leave. The EEOC brought suit claiming that her

doctrinal documents). The record in Pacific Lutheran University does not indicate that the employer claimed that resolving university employment disputes outside of internal processes would violate church doctrine.

38 See id. at 34 n.11 (Johnson, dissenting) (acknowledging that line of reasoning would lead to conclusion that Board jurisdiction over any employees of a bona fide religion would raise significant risk of Constitutional concerns, but declining to reach this question).

39 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (finding that Ohio Civil Rights Commission’s investigation into a sex-discrimination claim brought by teacher against church-operated school does not violate constitutional rights, given that employer will have opportunity to raise constitutional concerns in state-court judicial review); Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, 772 F.3d 1085, 1091 (2014) (denying employer Catholic school’s collateral-order request for Seventh Circuit to review district court’s decision to allow plaintiff’s Title VII claim to proceed to a jury trial, noting that neither “Title VII [religious] exemptions or the First Amendment more generally provides an immunity from trial, as opposed to an ordinary defense to liability.”

termination was in retaliation for her exercise of her rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The employer maintained that the teacher was a “minister” and that her termination was for a religious reason.

In concluding that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception, the Court did not simply take the employer at its word that the teacher in question was a “minister.” Rather, the Court inquired into the specific “religious functions that she performed for the church.” Her job description made clear she had “ministerial responsibilities”; that she had undergone a significant amount of religious training and a “formal process of commissioning”; that she held herself out as a minister; and that her job duties “reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission.”

_Hosanna-Tabor_ demonstrates that making a determination as to whether a teacher performs a religious function based on objective facts does not improperly entangle the Board or the courts with the employer’s religious beliefs. In _Pacific Lutheran_, the Board similarly concluded that “an examination of employee’s roles is permitted when the question presented is whether employees of a religious organization are exempt from Federal law.” Indeed, the majority of circuit courts analyzing whether the ministerial exception applies in a given case have, at a minimum, looked at whether or not the employee performs a religious function.

Second, courts have not endorsed the position that First Amendment concerns preclude adjudicating claims altogether when the employer offers a religious reason for an adverse employment action. In _Dayton Christian School_, the Supreme Court did not enjoin the Ohio Civil Rights Commission from adjudicating charges against a church-operated school under the state sex discrimination law. The Court found that “the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating the circumstances of [plaintiff’s] discharge in this case, if only to ascertain whether the ascribed religious-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.”

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41 The Court’s majority did not adopt the argument proposed by Justice Thomas, writing separately, that the Religion Clauses require courts to “defer to a religious organization’s good-faith understanding of who qualifies as a minister. _Hosanna-Tabor_, 132 S.Ct. at 710.
42 _Id._ at 708.
43 _Id._ at 707–08.
44 _Pacific Lutheran Univ._, slip op. at 10–11. The _Pacific Lutheran_ test is arguably more deferential than the _Hosanna-Tabor_ approach, in that the Board has decided to look only to whether the employer “holds out” the employee as performing a specific religious function.
45 See, e.g., _Petruska v. Gannon Univ._, 462 F.3d 294, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In evaluating whether a particular employee is subject to the ministerial exception, other circuits have concluded that the focus should be on the ‘function of the position.’ . . . [W]e agree that a focus on the function of an employee’s position is the proper one.”); _Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago_, 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (“In determining whether an employee is considered a minister for the purposes of applying this exception, we do not look to ordination but instead to the function of the position.”); _Starkman v. Evans_, 198 F.3d 173, 175–76 (5th Cir. 1999) (“To determine whether Ms. Starkman qualifies as a ‘spiritual leader’ for purposes of the ministerial exception, this court will examine the employment duties and requirements of the plaintiff as well as her actual role at the church.”); see also _Hosanna-Tabor_, 132 S. Ct. at 711 (Alito, J., concurrence) (“[C]ourts should focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies.”).
Courts are capable of making principled accommodations to adjudicate the underlying discrimination charges against religiously-affiliated employers without prompting concerns of First Amendment infringement. The majority of circuit courts have found that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as applied to religious institutions and to lay teachers more specifically, does not pose a serious risk of excessive entanglement. The Second Circuit recognized that the pretext inquiry is not inherently intrusive, as it “normally focuses upon factual questions such as whether the asserted reason for the challenged action comports with the defendant’s policies and rules, whether the rule applied to the plaintiff has been applied uniformly, and whether the putative non-discriminatory purpose was stated only after the allegation of discrimination,” none of which requires an examination of religious doctrine. The Third Circuit has similarly concluded that “when the pretext inquiry neither traverses questions of the validity of religious beliefs nor forces a court to choose between parties’ competing religious visions, that inquiry does not present a significant risk of entanglement.” The Board can make principled accommodations to adjudicate unfair labor practice cases in the same manner.

B. Long Bargaining Experience Between Unions and Religiously-Affiliated Employers Suggests Constitutional Infringement Risks Are Speculative and Unlikely to Materialize

Actual experience does not support the conjecture that mandatory collective bargaining with religiously-affiliated employers would result in inevitable First Amendment infringement. While many examples could be cited, the ones below, based on collective bargaining relationships involving affiliates of the Service Employees International Union, illustrate how infrequently religious issues actually arise at the bargaining table—and how well the system allows parties to accommodate them.

Bargaining typically involves a core set of practical subjects that are not inherently religious, such as wages and benefits, hours or scheduling, job stability, and dispute resolution procedures. The precise scope of bargaining and the specific content of bargaining proposals differ across bargaining relationships, but many employers—not just religiously-affiliated employers—have “restrictions on bargaining due to outside influences” that must be factored into bargaining as part of the employer’s “bottom-line.” Experience does not support the proposition that the concerns of religious employers are uniquely immune to resolution at the bargaining table.

47 See DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing cases).
48 Id. at 171; see also Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1168–69 (1985) (holding that New York State Board could proceed with resolving unfair labor practice charges involving a unilateral decision to discharge 226 teachers by Catholic school association so long as the State Board’s inquiry does not raise the “recurrent questioning of whether a particular church actually holds a particular belief”).
49 Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 324, 330 (3rd Cir. 1993) (ADEA applies “so long as the plaintiff does not challenge the validity of the doctrine or practice and asks no more than whether the proffered religious reason actually motivated the employment action”).
50 Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 NLRB 152, 164 (1999) (“e.g. contracts an employer may have with other concerns that require the employer to conduct its business in a specific manner, or specifications in a contract that limit what an employer may or may not do.”).
Across New England and the Mid-Atlantic, SEIU Local 32BJ represents 1,500 non-teaching staff, including cleaners, cafeteria workers, and security guards at over a dozen religiously-affiliated colleges and universities. These schools are often major employers in their metropolitan areas. They include Boston College, St. John’s University, Fordham University, Duquesne University, Villanova University, Georgetown University, and Catholic University. Local 32BJ also represents workers at secular colleges and universities in the same geographic areas. The workers Local 32BJ represents perform the same functions—cleaning, preparing and serving food, and providing security services—whether they work at religiously-affiliated universities or purely secular universities. These workers have bargained, both with universities and with contractors, over the same issues whether the schools are secular or maintain a religious affiliation, including: wages, benefits, hours of work, just cause protection, layoff and recall rights, grievance and arbitration systems, and seniority.

For many years, SEIU locals across the country have represented health care workers who work for religious or religiously-affiliated health care employers. For example, SEIU Local 1199-United Healthcare Workers East represents health care workers in the Northeast, including employees at Catholic institutions like Good Samaritan Hospital. In California, SEIU United Healthcare West represents health care workers at Dignity Health, formerly known as Catholic Healthcare West. These and other SEIU health care locals have long bargained with religiously-affiliated employers around the same topics typically discussed in negotiations with secular health care employers, including: pay, benefits, staff development, scheduling and hours, health and safety, and labor-management committees.

On rare occasions religious concerns have been raised—and resolved—in bargaining. For example, SEIU Local 1199 bargained a resolution to a concern regarding contraceptive coverage for employees of a religiously-affiliated hospital in New York by offering to make accommodations in the health care plan so long as they complied with state and federal laws. The employer, after getting advice through an internal ethics process, reached an agreement with the union to offer an employee health care plan that comported with its religious beliefs.

In 2009, representatives from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, the Catholic Health Care sector, and labor jointly issued a document titled *Respecting the Just Rights of Workers, Guidance and*

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51 In the District of Columbia, for instance, Jesuit-affiliated Georgetown University is the largest non-governmental employer, and Catholic University is the tenth. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 2013 COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT, 184, available at http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/Demographic%20and%20Economic%20Information_0.pdf.

52 One illustration of the irrationality of a rule that would exempt religious universities as a whole from the Board’s jurisdiction comes from the fact that many universities contract out the work of cleaners, food service workers, and security guards. The job functions of those workers do not change whether they are employed by the university itself or by private contractors; nor should the workers’ rights to form a union.
Options for Catholic Health Care and Unions. The document, which established models for effective relationships between unions and Catholic employers, describes a process for reaching consensus that underscores the spirit and potential of collective bargaining: “Participants respected [] differing perspectives and did not abandon strong convictions and positions in these areas. Nonetheless, we worked diligently and persistently to find agreement on other practical alternatives that all the participants could support.”

SEIU Local 500 has organized the majority of adjunct faculty in the Washington, D.C. metro area, currently representing faculty at schools including George Washington University, American University, and Georgetown University which is a Jesuit Catholic university. At Georgetown, faculty organized their union without delays or opposition pursuant to the University’s Just Employment Policy, a 2005 document that affirms its commitment to “fair and competitive compensation packages” and “the right to freely associate and organize.” Consistent with Georgetown’s identity as a Catholic and Jesuit institution, the Just Employment Policy specifically states that “the University will respect the rights of employees to vote for or against union representation without intimidation, unjust pressure, undue delay or hindrance in accordance with applicable law.”

Georgetown faculty reached their first contract in October 2014. They negotiated the same subjects as faculty at secular schools, including: course rates, job security, evaluations, professional development, labor-management committees, and participation in the academic community. In fact, Local 500’s previous experience in bargaining with faculty units at other universities enabled the union to make proposals that anticipated and accommodated the kinds of concerns that Georgetown might raise. No religious issues arose during bargaining.

The examples from SEIU’s experience are not unique; collective bargaining with religiously-affiliated employers is well-established. Concerns about collective bargaining’s intrusive impact are “needlessly pessimistic” and “gives little credit to the intelligence and ingenuity of the parties.”

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53 Respecting the Just Rights of Workers: Guidance and Options for Catholic Health Care and Unions, 4 (June 22, 2009) (on file with author). The guidance document also recognizes there can be no “one size fits all solution” for the diversity of local issues and experiences that employers and employees face, and invites Catholic Health Care employers and unions to explore other approaches tailored to issues at the local level.
55 Id.
57 See Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 NLRB 152, 165 (1999) (asserting jurisdiction over medical interns, residents and fellows as employees and rejecting the contention that collective bargaining would improperly intrude into areas involving academic freedom).
C. The National Labor Relations Act Creates a Framework for Mutual Agreement

The Wagner Act, passed in 1935, established a legal framework to allow workers to act jointly and bargain collectively over the terms and conditions of their employment. The Act promoted stable, effective collective bargaining relationships, providing an alternative to the labor unrest of the early 20th century. “The basic theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.”

The Act also created the National Labor Relations Board to enforce the NLRA—not to drive towards substantive standards or outcomes in employment relationships, but to maintain the integrity and legitimacy of the collective bargaining framework. In *Boston Medical Center*, the Board described exactly why speculative fear regarding collective bargaining’s “intrusion”—in that case, into areas involving academic freedom—is misplaced:

“This argument puts the proverbial cart before the horse. The contour of collective bargaining is dynamic with new issues frequently arising out of new factual contexts: what can be bargained about, what the parties wish to bargain about or concentrate on, and what the parties are free to bargain about, may change. But such problems have not proven to be insurmountable in the administration of the Act.”

Three principles in federal labor law significantly limit the possibility that collective bargaining could intrude on employers’ ability to make religious or ecclesiastical decisions. First, mandatory topics of bargaining—contrary to the Catholic Bishop Court’s conjecture—are not unlimited in scope. The Board and the courts have interpreted mandatory topics to exclude those decisions that “lie at the core of entrepreneurial control,” or involve “a change in the scope and direction of the enterprise” even if the decision necessitates terminating employment.

Clearly, employer prerogatives that implicate constitutional rights are extremely important, and the Board is capable of recognizing those situations when they occur. In *Peerless Publications*, the Board affirmed that “protection of the editorial integrity of a newspaper lies at the core of publishing

61 See *First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB*, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981). The Supreme Court gave considerable deference to employers’ interests and solidified a more narrow interpretation of “terms and conditions of employment,” motivated by the concern that “management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent essential for the running of a profitable business.”
control” and found that the employer newspaper was free to implement a journalist Code of Ethics despite its clear impact on the terms and conditions of employment, so long as those rules were tailored to the protection of the “core purpose of the institution.”

The Board later explained that this “core purpose of the institution” exception to the employer’s obligation to bargain was due in part to the recognition that “editorial control and the ability to shield that control from outside influences are within the First Amendment’s zone of protection and therefore entitled to special consideration.”

Second, even if religious issues were incidentally raised during the course of bargaining over mandatory subjects, such as contraceptive coverage in a health care plan, the employer is under no obligation to agree to union proposals. The employer need only bargain in good faith, and can insist on its position to the point of impasse. If the parties reach a bona fide impasse, the employer can implement its final offer and the union has no recourse under the law. Additionally, all employers have the right to bargain for “management rights clauses” which are express agreements that the employer retains the unilateral ability to make decisions over certain topics. For example, one collective bargaining agreement between the Lay Faculty Association and the Catholic High School Association in New York specified that “there are certain areas of Canon Law, ecclesiastical decrees and religious obligations that cannot be the subject of negotiations.” In practice, collective bargaining does not encroach on managerial prerogatives.

Third, the Board “may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements.” The Board’s enforcement role is focused on protecting those rights that are integral to the effective functioning of the collective bargaining process. As the Supreme Court has stated: “The Act does not compel agreements between employers and employees. It does not compel any agreement whatever. . . . The theory of the Act is that

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62 Peerless Publ’ns, 283 NLRB 334, 335 (1987) (citing Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia v. NLRB, 636 F.2d 550, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). When faced with a conflict between the employer’s freedom to make decisions regarding the basic direction of the enterprise and the employees’ right to bargain over decisions that impact the terms and conditions of employment, the Board has sought to strike a balance that takes into account the relative importance of the proposed actions to the parties.

64 See H. K. Porter Co., 397 U.S. at 102 (1970) (“While the Board does have power under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, to require employers and employees to negotiate, it is without power to compel a company or a union to agree to any substantive contractual provision of a collective-bargaining agreement.”); NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 412 (1952) (“Certainly the Board lacks power to compel concessions as to the substantive terms of labor agreements.”).
65 See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 412 (1982) (“[A]n impasse may be ‘brought about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further, rather than destroy, the bargaining process.’”) (quoting Charles D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 243 NLRB 1093, 1094 (1979)).
66 See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 238 (1996) (“[T]he Board and the courts have held that, after impasse, labor law permits employers unilaterally to implement changes in pre-existing conditions, but only insofar as the new terms meet carefully circumscribed conditions.”)
67 See Am. Nat’l Ins., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (declining to find employer had not bargained in good faith when it insisted on a management functions clause over work scheduling, a mandatory topic of bargaining).
68 Catholic High Sch. Ass’n of the Archdiocese of N.Y. v. Culvert, 753 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1985).
69 Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. at 404 (1952); see also supra, note 64.
free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel."

Given the speculative nature of collective bargaining’s intrusion into the constitutional arena, the Board is right to craft a test that strictly limits exemptions under Catholic Bishop. In other First Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has declined to create exceptions to the application of a rule or law based on attenuated or speculative claims of infringement. For example, in Associated Press v. NLRB, the Court rejected the employer news agency’s claim that application of the NLRA intruded on the freedom of the press—namely, the freedom to hire and fire employees who edit the news so as to maintain an unbiased and impartial news agency. Noting that the employer had failed to show that this consideration was, in fact, the reason for discharging a union activist, the Court observed, “Courts deal with cases upon the basis of the facts disclosed, never with nonexistent and assumed circumstances.”

IV. Conclusion

With the NLRB’s new Pacific Lutheran jurisdictional test, lay faculty members at religiously-affiliated colleges and universities will enjoy unburdened access to collective representation, an important vehicle for collective action and voice on their campuses. At Catholic colleges and universities, faculty members may well make important contributions to the ongoing debate over the state of higher education, including the critical question of standards for and investment in instruction.

General experience under our federal labor and employment laws as well as specific experiences in bargaining with Catholic employers show that collective rights for employees do not come at the cost of the religious freedom of their employers. To the contrary: “[i]f there is anything we have learned in the long history of this Act, it is that unionism and collective bargaining are dynamic institutions capable of adjusting to new and changing work contexts and demands in every sector of our evolving economy.”

70 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Congress also amended the NLRA to make this point clear: “... but such obligation [to bargain collectively] does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
71 See Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); see also Univ. of Pa., 493 US 182 (1990) (finding that EEOC subpoena process requiring peer review tenure materials from employer university in a race or sex discrimination case did not infringe First Amendment rights, where infringement was attenuated and speculative).
72 Assoc. Press, 301 U.S. at 132 (1937).