2019

Authoritarianism Both in Venezuela and Turkey

Furkan Burcu Yildiz
Eastern Illinois University

Recommended Citation
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/theses/4458

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Theses & Publications at The Keep. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of The Keep. For more information, please contact tabruns@eiu.edu.
Thesis Maintenance and Reproduction Certificate

FOR: Graduate Candidates Completing Theses in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree
Graduate Faculty Advisors Directing the Theses

RE: Preservation, Reproduction, and Distribution of Thesis Research

Preserving, reproducing, and distributing thesis research is an important part of Booth Library's responsibility to provide access to scholarship. In order to further this goal, Booth Library makes all graduate theses completed as part of a degree program at Eastern Illinois University available for personal study, research, and other not-for-profit educational purposes. Under 17 U.S.C. § 108, the library may reproduce and distribute a copy without infringing on copyright; however, professional courtesy dictates that permission be requested from the author before doing so.

Your signatures affirm the following:

- The graduate candidate is the author of this thesis.
- The graduate candidate retains the copyright and intellectual property rights associated with the original research, creative activity, and intellectual or artistic content of the thesis.
- The graduate candidate certifies her/his compliance with federal copyright law (Title 17 of the U.S. Code) and her/his right to authorize reproduction and distribution of all copyrighted materials included in this thesis.
- The graduate candidate in consultation with the faculty advisor grants Booth Library the nonexclusive, perpetual right to make copies of the thesis freely and publicly available without restriction, by means of any current or successive technology, including but not limited to photocopying, microfilm, digitization, or internet.
- The graduate candidate acknowledges that by depositing her/his thesis with Booth Library, her/his work is available for viewing by the public and may be borrowed through the library's circulation and interlibrary loan departments, or accessed electronically. The graduate candidate acknowledges this policy by indicating in the following manner:

  [ ] Yes, I wish to make accessible this thesis for viewing by the public

  [ ] No, I wish to quarantine the thesis temporarily and have included the Thesis Withholding Request Form.

- The graduate candidate waives the confidentiality provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99) with respect to the contents of the thesis and with respect to information concerning authorship of the thesis, including name and status as a student at Eastern Illinois University. I have conferred with my graduate faculty advisor. My signature below indicates that I have read and agree with the above statements, and hereby give my permission to distribute my thesis. My advisor's signature indicates concurrence to:

Graduate Candidate Signature

Printed Name

Graduate Degree Program

Faculty Adviser Signature

Ryan P. Burge

Printed Name

5/29/2019

Date

Please submit in duplicate.
Authoritarianism Both in Venezuela and Turkey

(TITLE)

BY
Furkan Burcu YILDIZ

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF ARTS 

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY 
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS 

2019 
YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING 
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

4/23/19
DATE

4/24/19
DEPARTMENT/SCHOOL CHAIR 
OR CHAIR'S DESIGNEE

DATE

4/24/19
THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

4/24/19
THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE

THESIS COMMITTEE MEMBER

DATE
Copyright 2019 by Furkan Bucu YILDIZ
Abstract

In this paper, I undertake a comparative analysis of the authoritarian process in Venezuela and Turkey. In both countries, there are signs of political and economic instabilities. Therefore, I examine Turkey's and Venezuela's politics and economy to understand the reasons for authoritarian regimes. The comparison reveals that both countries are en route of authoritarianism; however, the motives are different. As for Venezuela, comparison grounds the argument that their authoritativeness relies on economic instability. On the contrary, Turkey has a stable economy while it has been struggling with political upheavals.

The result of this study pinpoints different ways for authoritarian regimes. Even though authoritarian motives originated from different reasons, both countries approach an authoritarian regime. As a result, research suggests that Venezuela and Turkey are disadvantaged countries as democracies.
Dedication

This study is wholeheartedly dedicated to my mother, Canan BAYKAL, who dedicated her life for my education.

To my husband, Mustafa Alper YILDIZ, who has been always supported my decisions along our togetherness.

And lastly, I dedicated my grandmother, Nesibe BAYKAL, who raised me since I was born.
Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Professor Ryan P. Burge for his distinguished advising during this research. Dr. Burge's guidance throughout the entire thesis process was a great asset to me. Dr. Burge regularly read my drafts of the research, and improved the quality of the thesis. I would like to thank Dr. Melinda Mueller and Dr. Kevin Anderson who served on my thesis committee, reading the drafts and providing useful feedbacks.

I would also like to thank my husband, Mustafa Alper YILDIZ for his support. Whenever I lost my motivation, he was there for me. This thesis would not be possible without him and my family. Finally, I would like to thank Political Science Department for their financial support. This chance has meant the world to me.
## Table of Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Introduction</td>
<td>7-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Literature Review</td>
<td>12-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: Hypothesis and Methodology</td>
<td>32-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4: Findings</td>
<td>37-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion</td>
<td>76-78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>79-100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Total Petroleum Production of Venezuela 42
Figure 2: Venezuela GDP Per Capita 1960-2014 49
Figure 3: Venezuela GDP Per Capita 1990-2014 54
Figure 4: Compared Inflation Rate Turkey-Venezuela 58
Figure 5: Voting Rates of Chavez 59
Figure 6: Voting Rates of Erdogan 72
Figure 7: Compared Growth GDP Turkey-Venezuela 75
Chapter 1: Introduction

One of the most difficult challenges is to describe and measure democracy because it has been defined in many different ways (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Coppedge 2012). Coppedge (2012) claims that definition of democracy fits into one of six overlapping models: liberal, deliberative, representative, participatory, socioeconomic and people's democracy. Therefore, agreeing on a definition of democracy is difficult. What we know is that the dictionary definition of democracy is "a system of a government, in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by every citizen directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free election to vote and elect its governmental officials." (Merriam-Webster 2018). However, as Coppedge claimed that the elections are not the only component to being a democratic country; more is needed for a country to be called a democracy (Coppedge et al. 2011). Although various credible international institutions define democracy differently, it is generally measured by five categories: electoral process, executive-legislative relations (functioning of government), political culture (corruption, lack of press freedom), judiciary and public-government relations (Eckhardt 1991).

In comparison to democracy, authoritarianism is a form of government characterized by a strong central power and limited representation for citizens. A pioneer in the study of authoritarian systems of government, Luan J. Linz, examined authoritarian regimes using four characteristics: political pluralism, legitimacy, social mobilization and shifted executive power (Francisco 2001).
Since democracy and authoritarianism are direct opposite forms of each other, authoritarian regimes and the democratization process have attracted political science scholars for decades. After the democratization process began in the world, scholars shifted their studies to how authoritarian governments develop into democratic ones. However, numerous democratic countries have begun to turn toward authoritarianism. In recent days, some scholars, like Diamond and Plattner, believe that "Authoritarianism Goes Global" (Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016). Therefore, it can be said that the struggle for democracy is intensifying in many places around the world.

In that case, it can be inquired: While democracy is a popular form of government in the contemporary world and it gives freedom to choose to the people, why are there still some authoritarian or semi-democratic (hybrid regimes) countries in the world (Ekman 2009)? Economics, politics, and religion could account for the transition from democracy to authoritarianism. So, what are the dynamics beyond this tendency of authoritativenss then?

Birth Of Democracy

The debate between authoritarianism and democracy originated from the debate between idealists, like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and realists, like Thomas Hobbes. Rousseau argued that our natural condition is one of peace and harmony and that democracy is the way we make our social life reflect our egalitarian nature (Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1762). Thomas Hobbès claimed in his book, Leviathan
that “the war of all against all” (Hobbes 1651, chap. XIII)\(^1\) is the human condition. Individuals are born as enemies and pursue only their own interest with eagerness (Hobbes 1651). Both philosophers would be right because like a child, each person cries for both freedom and security. The need for security makes humankind miserable and enemies. The need for security necessitates the creation of an institution-government that takes care of the needs of people. However, Thomas Jefferson clearly stated in the American declaration of independence that human beings are free and equal by nature, and government as an institution serves only to guarantee those natural rights (The Declaration of Independence 2001). This debate also demonstrates that the struggle within humanity turns out to be the struggle for democracy.

Democracy is not well-ordered. It is rough, blusterous, a messy form of political life but it is its nature. Montesquieu even claimed that when one finds an orderly and quiet place, one will find the tyranny. "Whenever voices are raised in a debate, where there are uproar and unceasing talk, where men and women bewilder their way to solve for permanent problems for themselves, we can feel assured that we are on the way of precious democracy" (Secondat Charles de 1748, Quated in Struggle for Democracy,1988 ). Democracy is finally- more than any other form of government- about people, just plain people.

\[^1\] In Latin, "The war of all against all" is *Bellum omnium contra omnes*. This phrase was written in *De Cive* (1642) and *Leviathan* (1651) by Thomas Hobbes to describe human existence in the state of nature.
The birth of democracy occurred centuries ago. Historians believe that evolution through tyranny to democracy dates back to the sixth century B.C. (Robert K. Fleck and Hanssen 2010). In these somber times, when the governance was in privileged aristocrats' power, many things started changing with the election of a statesman, Solon, who had an idealist vision (The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica 1998). By his idealist vision, he introduced many reforms that initiated the transformation of Athens and the world (Fornara and Samons II 1991). The most important factor was that his reform provided the dispersal of the tribes and clans which had always driven the Athenians into conflict. Granting citizens the option to manage their own debts was the first freedom for citizens. (The Editors of Encyclopadia Britannica 1998). Although those reforms did not bring complete democracy, the ground was prepared for it (Fornara and Samons II 1991, 38). After Solon and his successor Pisistratus’s reforms, Greece was still under the domination of Persians in 508 B.C. In that time, Athens' last law-giver, Cleisthenes, appeared (Robinson 1945). While Solon and Pisistratus diminished the power of clans, it can be claimed that Cleisthenes changed the way of using power. He separated the clans and tribes, creating specific places for each of them. He created artificial tribes and each tribe was divided into demes. Those demes were spread throughout Athens (Bradeen 1955). Each man born in that deme was a citizen of that deme. Other than deme, there was an assembly which governed the demes. The impressive part of this period of Cleisthenes is that he obligated all citizens to participate in the Assembly. No law could pass without the Assembly's approval (Barber and Watson 1988). Hence it can be said that the rule by
hereditary king and the gifted tyrants was over. Democracy-kratos, or rule, of the
demos, the people of the deme- was finally born.

As it is seen above, even the birth of democracy originated from keeping
freedom in the hands of the citizenry. Therefore, freedom can be linked with
democracy. Rousseau once wrote “Freedom is a food easy to eat but hard to
digest” (quoted in Baber and Dimon 2013, 218). Whether democracy comes
suddenly by violence and revolution or slowly through an accretion of an institution
that extends and protects liberty, achieving freedom, in other words consolidating
democracy in the first instance may not be so difficult. Preserving, enhancing and
securing it against its myriad and tireless adversaries are much harder (Jean-
Jacques Rousseau 1762).
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Contemporary Democracy

Democracy must be more than a desire or disposition to be able to apply it. It depends in practice on a constitution and the institutional arrangements. It can vary a great deal from nation to nation and era to era. Democracy is not simply an ideal to be realized once and for all, or a project reproduced again and again around the world because governments are as mortal as people. After all, thousands of years since the Athenians disappeared from history, government had been experienced many forms of regimes. Yet, the Athenians handed down some fundamental factors for modern democracy:

- Assembly democracy: citizens participated in assembly without representatives
- Citizen Juries: justice became a responsibility of citizens by elections
- The appointment of citizens to politically based on a merit (Blackwell 2003)

These institutions take a place as crucial democratic devices in modern days like: representation, party government and federalism (Kaiser 1997). However, these devices cannot operate in a void. They need an environment which allows people to feel safe and free.

Modern democracy represents freedom and equality. Credible institutions, like the Freedom House, measure a country’s democracy based on their criteria. It is critical to keep in mind that democracy is not a destination- it is a journey; a way in which people walk together; meanwhile they may traverse many different terrains. The journey of democracy has a natural progression. The progression
toward democracy typically follows a roadmap: First, the centralized power would be taken by elites. Then the desire for democracy, equality, and liberty takes power from those elites and places it in the hands of the citizens. Finally, the use of law to protect individuals from the abuse of that power—whether it is in the hands of elites or of the people at large. (Barber and Watson 1988).

Although law and democracy have not always existed in harmony, they were initially integrated into each other in the systems. Sometimes, however, the application of the law coincides with justice. In the creation of modern democracy, which means the victory of parliament over the king, the law served democracy by placing the function of legislation in the hands of the people's representatives (Waldron 2008). Besides, law maintained its essence, which is the law of nature which protected the rights of individuals to liberty and equality against every encroachment—whether from other individuals or from the state, even the democratic state (Çeçen 1989). So, the tension between law as a protector of individuals against the state and law as an instrument through which the state establishes community justice remains. Yet, as Rousseau mentioned that while we obey the law, we could be free only if we prescribe order for ourselves (Dent 2006).

In the light of these thoughts, Americans attempted to create a balance between freedom and security to maintain both liberty and self-government and to govern themselves autonomously and lawfully. Therefore, in the end they established a federal constitution which assigned powers to a powerful central government but at the same time they aimed to protect themselves from abuse by every tyranny, including the potential tyranny of democratic government. As
consequences of this aim, they had set lawful restraints on government—dividing its power into three co-equal branches (executive, legislative and judicial) and establishing a legal wall around it, which they called the Bill of Rights (Lloyd 2013). This division can be accepted as a good definition of democracy. On the other hand, democracy does not mean that people can do whatever they want. While the power is given to the representatives, it is also protected by the judiciary for equality and freedom. Yet, the system was not enough to persuade citizens to feel free. They also insist on selecting their states judges in a democratic way. It was the introduction of judicial review, which led the demand for term limits. Like Thomas Jefferson, many founders believed that this would bring the balance of power in favor of a judicial elite (Frank 2012).

It must be understood that being subjected to the law does not make democracy safeguarded because if the law in a democracy is just a codification of the will of the majority, then there is nothing that the law can do for freedom and equality. Nazi legislation is proof that applying the rule of law is not a democracy (Esgün 2018). Anything can be made legal by the legislative enactments of an elected parliament: the abrogation of freedom of opinion and expression, violation of the right to work, discrimination, expropriation, and even genocide. Nazi legislation was an unprecedented example of demolished liberties and social justices. John Dryden stated that, “Laws are vain, by which we right enjoy, if kings unquestioned can those laws destroy” (Dryden 2017, I. 763). The key words here are right and efficiency, the contest is between a law that secures the rights of the individual and a law that enforces the community’s common interest in legislating
on behalf of the public good, even at the cost of individual liberty. Thus, democracy can succeed, if law is subjected to democracy.

Modern-day democracy pays attention to not only having a rule of law but also how close citizens are to making law through participation in legislation and elections for both representatives and another official administrators. Besides, the other subject of modern-day democracy concerns about maintaining universal human rights (Moravcsik 1998).

Even though countries claim that they are governed by democracies, claiming does not make countries truly democratic. Yet, on the one hand countries are sovereign, on the other hand declaration of human rights remind us how governments should protect their citizens' rights. Therefore, human rights are not only an aspiration to universal justice but also a guiding spirit for democratic countries. Providing human rights to the citizenry is essential because they are rights inherent to all human beings regardless of nationality, ethnicity, language, race, sex, or any other statues (Human Rights 2016). Even if a country does not describe itself as a democratic one, it is expected to ensure human rights. Having and maintaining human rights is not easily controllable.

Even though democracy means citizens governing themselves, democratic regulations can be easily abolished. Therefore, citizens should stake a claim on it and express their judgement in the public. The classical tendency about the meaning of democracy claims that the measurement of how many people vote, and how often they go to the ballot box is enough to acknowledge a country as a democratic one (Kennedy, Nagao, and Liu 2018; Kesselman 2011). However, it
should not be forgotten that the voters merely vote and go home and leave the elected governors to govern. Yet, the active citizen, on the other hand, actually governs or participates in governing using institutions (Dahl 2005). In recent times, it is cleared that without participation, democracy may become corrupt and deteriorate into a fictitious democracy then to authoritarianism (Huntington 2012). The key definition of modern-day democracy is whether a person has a vibrant sense of themselves as citizens— as a part of body politic rather than just as self-interested individuals. If they are capable of expressing public judgment rather than just voicing their private needs and wants freely, it can be expressed that democracy makes itself presence felt (Axtmann 1996). Therefore, pressure groups, local party organizations, and voluntary associations of the kind of participations are essentials of the democracy to be an active citizen.

As a result, the concept of modern-day democracy is inclusive of self-governing, an active citizenry, and human rights and more. The prospective criteria for countries will be discussed in the next chapter.

Prospective Criteria for Democratic Countries

There is not a measurement that can help scholars assess the rate of democracy; however, it is clear that while some countries are democratic, others are not. The hardest part of the measurement of democracy is to determine a finer distinction. Besides, it is also difficult to distinguish whether countries within their new policies are prone to democratic or authoritarian governance. Therefore, under the leadership of Michael Coppedge, social scientists around the world, and credible institutions like Freedom House, Kellog Institute and the Economist
Intelligence have been working on the idea that there should be criteria to measure democracy (Democracy | Kellogg Institute For International Studies 2018; Democracy Index 2017; Freedom in the World 2018). Though there is still ambiguity surrounding the definition of democracy and the concept; thereby, same ambiguity for criteria too. So, institutions, which have been working on the progress of democracy over years have specific focus points to indicate democratic countries.

Besides the vagueness of the definition of democracy, Human Development Report states that "The democracy a nation chooses to develop, depends on its history and circumstances" (Human Development Report 2002, 4). Thus, in this sense, democracy has a variety of different appearances. Besides, it is necessary to have common things that scholars can account for a country as a democratic one. In this concept it has to be specified at what the core traits of democracy are, and how they should appear.

As stated above the credible institutions can come together at many points; however, multifariousness can be identified in their measurement criteria. Even though their discrepancy, it can be claimed that almost all of them are using the below main criteria: nature of electoral processes (e.g. free elections), functioning of government (e.g. checks and balances on government authority), political participation (e.g. voter turnout), democratic political culture (e.g. popular support for democracy) and civil liberties (e.g. a free press, independent judiciary) in a country (Democracy Index 2017).
Past, Present, and Future of Authoritarianism

For most people democracy means government for by and of the people-government by free and equal individuals. Yet, the liberty of individuals can fall prey to the equality of individuals—mere voters vote and go home and leave the elected governors to govern. So, the rule of the majority can become so cruel, so wrong, so oppressive to individuals and to minorities, that it perverts democracy itself, and the rule of the people becomes the tyranny of the mob.

While the last several decades led to a mushrooming of studies focusing on democratic regimes, prominent studies examine authoritarian regimes. According to Geddes, Wright and Frantz, dictatorships govern more than 40% of the countries in the modern world (2014). In addition, Freedom House’s 2018 report demonstrates that democracy has suffered 12 sequential years of decline (Freedom in the World 2018). Moreover, scholars claim that since the collapse of communism, the world has been shattered by three trends; “a democratic surge, a backlash and an authoritarian surge” (L. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016). Hence, it is obvious that instead of dying out, authoritarianism is on the rise.

Before analyzing the process of the authoritarianism, it is crucial to understand the meaning of the term. In the literature, 'authoritarian' has two different meanings. While in comparative politics, it refers to a regime, which does not offer free and fair elections; in political psychology, authoritarianism is related to the psychological profile of people, which is “characterized by a desire for order and hierarchy and a fear of outsiders” (Feldman and Stenner 1997). According to Feldman and Stenner (1997) governments’ authoritarian personalities can be
discussed based on countries' values and voting behavior. Besides, almost all authoritarian regimes hold elections, however those elections lack oversight and transparency. So, elections are no longer fundamental parts of democracies. When authoritarian governments hold an election, they are used as a tool by the government to prolong their rule. Moreover, leaders of those governments often promote elections as democratic values to conceal their realities (Kennedy, Nagao, and Liu 2018).

It is well known that different meanings come from different exhibition of authoritarianism because not only the definition of authoritarianism has changed in centuries but it also has been taken on different focal points than previous ones. In the last century researchers not only focus on an authoritarian surge but also new forms of authoritarianism because prospective candidates of autocrats take advantage of their predecessors' and peers' experiences. Learning from their mistakes, they have been trying to increase the durability of their power of the regime at home and from abroad. This has been called "political technology" (Wilson 2005) and the "authoritarian toolkit" (L. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016) or a "menu of manipulation" (Schedler 2002). While earlier authoritarianism studies mostly focused on how brutal authoritarian and totalitarian governments are, current studies lean towards their appearances. Therefore, studies display that the modern authoritarianism emerges like a democracy and is called a hybrid regime (Ezrow 2018).

Hybrid regimes sometimes are called "Competitive Authoritarian Regimes" (L. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016) because while there is still competition
for elections between parties, the president has the power to erode the checks and balances system. Hence, the new type of studies on democracy and authoritarianism are more concerned with who holds power and how the power may impact the development and stability of the governments (Geddes 1999). Therefore, scholars argue that studies on authoritarianism in the 21st century concentrate not only on the function of governments within the light of quasi elections but also on the power of media, the sustainability of legitimacy, pluralism, kinds of elections, and reflection of all to the citizens and international order (Ezrow 2018). Moreover, academics should be able to judge the ‘authoritativeness’ of governments not solely by how they came to power, or by the supposed personality traits of the electorate, but also by what they do once they are in power.

The literature posits that rather than meaning and appearances, the classification of dictatorship can lead us to avoid making inaccurate assumptions of the path from democracy to authoritarianism (Conroy-Krutz and Frantz 2017). The classification can be divided into two categories: categorical and continuous (Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Categorial can be divided as civilian, monarchic and military; or personalist monarchic, dominant-party, and military (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010; Geddes 1999). By contrast, continuous classification considers authoritarianism as a continuum. In this system, such a country can be placed on a scale from fully democratic to fully authoritarian. Therefore, the concepts like competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002), hybrid regimes (L. J. Diamond 2002), and electoral authoritarian (Schedler 2007) in this category. The second categorization also allows institutions to measure
democracy or authoritarianism (Freedom in the World 2018). In addition to measurement, using the second category, scholars can easily posit whether a country is moving towards democracy or authoritarianism (Conroy-Krut and Frantz 2017).

As stated above authoritarian regimes appeared in different ways and in different forms. The period of Nazi’s government, which brought World War II, was named as totalitarian regimes. Following World War II, a similar but different domination of the idea of authoritarian governments emerged as the Single Dominant Party. Around the 70s and 80s, during the Cold War, military dictatorships came to the surface. Following the end of the Cold War, globalization allowed democracy to spread easily; however, it changed the appearances of democracy (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014). Today, even though countries have an option to elect their governance, a regime is questionably called as democracy because citizens cannot enjoy the freedom of media, civic association, right to speak etc. (Gandhi and Lust 2009).

Because authoritarianism would appear in different forms as in hybrid regimes, citizens of authoritarian regimes may perceive that they are governed by democratic regimes. In many modern types, authoritarian regimes adapt their rule to some aspects of democratic institutions. Thus, they shaped their regime with democratic basics to impress the citizens (Slater and Fenner 2011). Since this shaping is successful, Ezrow claims that authoritarian governments are good at concealing their nature; therefore, they are more resilient than ever (2018).
The first common characteristic of quasi democratic countries is that they hold elections without democratizing. Padrigu and Ezrow call this type as "cosmetic democracy" (2018; Padrigu 2002). It means that while strong governments apply their rules behind the scene, they provide elections to citizens. The second widespread choice of current authoritarian countries is that the way of controlling the media. Some authoritarian regimes figured out the importance of the media, which allows the government to control the flow of information. The main point of controlling media is that while previous authoritarian governments did not put limited pluralism on media, the new ones pay lip service to independent media to control the adversaries in the sector (Heinrich and Pleines 2018). Quasi pluralism in every sector seems to promote civil liberties, elections, freedoms; however, it more dangerously endangers the incomes of democracy. Ezrow posits that the recent systems are neither fully democratic nor autocratic (2018).

As has been described, the evolution of authoritarianism makes things harder. As Diamond stated in his article, hybrid regimes are more prevalent than ever (2002). Even though hybrid regimes clearly originated from flawed democratic regimes, they are more prone to authoritarian regimes (Mufti 2018). Mufti describes hybrid regimes, which has some democratic features, as authoritarian regimes (2018).

Even though measurement, progress or categorization of authoritarianism is not related to this article aim, they allow us to understand the possession of the two topic countries, Turkey and Venezuela.
Reasons for Authoritarianism

As mentioned above, authoritarianism means that there are limited rights for the public; therefore, for people who have been shifting their countries government towards authoritarianism need reasons. To understand the reasons for moving towards authoritarianism necessitates describing the basics of authoritarianism. First, research shows that authoritarianism is correlated with conservatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity (Adorno 1982). According to William Eckhardt (Eckhardt 1991), Lentz’s studies show that conservatives do not like change in any way. A summary of his study shows that “The conservative [ideology] was more conventional, religious, moralistic, capitalistic, militaristic, nationalistic, admittedly racially prejudiced, and presumably sexist.”(Eckhardt 1991, 100). Eckhardt’s unifying article on this subject shows that not only Lentz but also numerous scholars have researched this field and got similar results. Therefore, it can be noted that Eckhardt’s demonstration on the essential elements of authoritarianism as conservatism, militarism, nationalism, and religiosity. It is necessary to take these dimensions into consideration.

Secondly, candidate preference, party preference, national and foreign policy orientation and political behaviors are also important factors for authoritarianism. David J. Hanson examines these factors in his article (Hanson 1975) as a variable in political science studies. Even though Eckhardt and former scholars have established links between conservatism and authoritarianism, Hanson (1975) believes there is more to authoritarianism than conservatism.
Hanson suggests that the socioeconomic status of the public, family traditions in countries, and social pressures also contribute to authoritarianism.

Along with researching the democratization process and dimensions of democratic and autocratic regimes, scientists also study a country's stability. One of the scholars who studies the transition from authoritarianism to democracy is Myron Weiner. His research is a valuable reference in the field. For example, Weiner (1987) gathered practically every democratic theorist's ideas in his article to show the transition of countries to democracy. His main questions are "What coalitions against authoritarian rulers are most likely to succeed? Is popular support sufficient or is it also necessary to win over sections of the military and if so how is that to be done?" (Weiner 1987, 861). He answers these questions by focusing on some countries which are still authoritarian. He also gives examples from countries which are in the transition process. Despite this, many countries go back to the process of democratization. Weiner and authors like him have not realized this backward direction. To understand democracy, scholars are more inclined to analyze countries, which had transition from authoritarian to democratic regime; however, the opposite approach can be helpful to understand the dimensions of the backward direction.

While scholars have contributed to our understanding of the contemporary democracy and authoritarianism, very little research specifically focused on reasons of returning authoritarian regimes by comparing countries. Even though countries are on their way to an authoritarian regime, they do follow different paths than each other. So far, scant research exists that compares and contrasts the
reasons for authoritarianism in recent years. I explore the incentives of authoritarianism by comparing Venezuela and Turkey to see if my argument actually has merit.

Turkey

Past research indicates Muslims do not have any negative feeling about living under liberal-democratic principles (Peucker 2018). However, some scholars posit that Muslim countries are disadvantaged across all democracies and democratization process (Fish 2002). They argue that the concept and ideology of democracy is at odds with the values of Islam (Smock 2002). According to Steven M. Fish’s hypothesis (2002), “Muslim countries are democratic underachievers” (p 4). As Turkey is a majority Muslim country, it should be analyzed in the light of this information.

As has been discussed, many definitions and techniques of the measurement of democracy can be practiced. However, there is neither a specific definition nor limit to measure democracy in the world. Reliable institutions have at least a common criterion to measure for democracy. According to scholars who believe that Muslim countries cannot pursue democratic achievement, these criteria are an independent judiciary, economic development, free and fair elections, freedom for press, etc. In this regard, while a few scholars and philosophers, such as Montesquieu, Samuel Huntington and Steven Fish, assume that Islam cannot comply with democracy, other scholars would dissent from the issue. One of the oldest political philosophers, Montesquieu, discussed Islam and democratization over a 250 years ago. Montesquieu claimed that while
Christianity presents its own justice, Islam only speaks with its sword (Secondat Charles de 1748). Some scholars, like Samuel Huntington (1996) have maintained Montesquieu’s ideas about Islam and democracy. Fish (2002) has found out that Muslim countries are not good at the democratic process and their understanding of judicial system lacks the ability to democratize. With his empirical test, Fish argues that "Muslim countries are markedly more authoritarian than non-Muslim societies."(Fish 2002, 37). This research demonstrates that while some scholars claim the presence of conservatism creates negative effects on countries en route to democratization, other scholars believe that Muslim countries have barely any chance to continue their existence under a democratic regime.

In terms of the alleged fact between democracy and Islam, Turkey may be the subject of the issue. International Religious Freedom Report 2017 states that according to the Turkish government, 99% of the population of Turkey is Muslim (Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 2017). Besides, data from KONDA's, one of the leading data collectors of Turkey, supports the international report. According to KONDA, 97.8% (KONDA 2009) of Turkish people define themselves as Muslim. However, this percentage does not represent how the country has been governed. Most of Muslim countries, though, either has been fully or partially governed by sharia2 (Hurriyet 2016; Johnson and Sergie 2014). While some of Muslims apply the sharia personal statues, like marriage, divorce and child custody, others apply the sharia both for personal status and criminal procedure (Otto 2008; Steiner 2002). However, Turkey is not one of them (Guercio

---

2 Shari is known Islamic canonical law based on the teachings of the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet Mohammad.
Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state. Thus, religion and government are two separate issues in Turkey. However, even though Islam is not a formal element of government, it is used by political parties to get support (Karakas 2007, 1). As a result, Turkey’s political climate has been defined as a complex mixture since its foundation. Therefore, in order to understand Turkey’s political climate, the relationship between Islam and democracy must be examined in terms of Turkey’s position toward democracy.

If so, what are the conditions for democracy in Turkey? To understand Turkey’s political position today, consulting Turkey’s history is essential (Guercio 2017a). Turkey’s political disturbance began after the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the Turkish Republic was founded. During the Ottoman Empire, society was governed by sharia like most of today’s Muslim countries. However, after the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, introduced a new system to the Turkish people in 1928. This system was called secularism, which is known as laicism in Turkey (Cumhuriyet 2016). While sharia was used as the fundamental rule of law by the Ottoman Empire, laicism separates religion and the affairs of state. Laicism is a political system which excludes religious influences from the government. Not only does laicism discourage religious involvement in governments but also forbids the government to be involved in any religious activities. Thus, the system was unfamiliar to the people who had been governed by Islamic leaders for almost 400 years. Although almost 100 years passed since the foundation, secularism has been creating a political disturbance. Conversely, scholars who focus on Turkey, democracy, and
democratization argue that laicism is fundamental for democracy and Turkey (Sağlar 2016). Therefore, it can be claimed that the authoritarian approach in Turkey is derived from political disturbance, in other words, the Turkish people do not understand laicism in the proper cultural context.

Venezuela

Since the relationship between economic development and democratic improvement is seen as correlated, the relationship between these two factors must be considered in order to understand Venezuela's democratic position. Numerous political scientists claim that increasing economic power will lead countries into a more democratic position. In this case, we can say that capitalism promotes democracy and vice-a-versa. Scholars, who focus on the effect of the economy on democracy indicate strong evidence to support this theory (L. Rivera-Batiz 2002). According to Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, democracy can improve in the highly capitalist governments because those governments have undergone dramatic industrialization, which brought bilateral relations between countries. Correspondingly, bilateral relations countries have to communicate with each other to trade, which entails mutually respected relations (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In addition, outstanding scholars like Lipset and Przeworski claim that economic development would also bring political freedom and democratic participation in governments (Lipset 1994; Przeworski 2004). On the other hand, authors like Neubauer and Jackman found that there is no causal relation between economic development and democracy (Jackman 1973; Neubauer 1967). In her research, Arat found that democracy is not affected by
economic development (Arat 1988). Ulubasoglu and Doucouliagos assert that economic freedom and political stability relate to democracy whether directly or indirectly. Moreover, some scholars posit that an advanced economy requires more political rights (Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi 2007).

Like Turkey, Venezuela has been subjected to democratic consolidation. However, unlike Turkey, Venezuela has been put under the microscope because of its economic crisis. In the 1950s, as the rest of Latin American countries were struggling with economic depression, Venezuela had the second fastest growing economy till 1980 (Desjardins 2017; Di John 2005). Yet, Venezuela has one of the largest proven oil reserves, it has been perceived as a broken country, though (OPEC: OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves 2017). Therefore, it has to be scrutinized to understand its position towards democracy from the point of economic development and democracy relation.

If so, what are the economic conditions for democracy in Venezuela? Since the colonial era, Venezuela has been a nation defined by its production of raw materials for export. Hence, the source of their wealth has been always described by Venezuelans as the production of raw materials. With the extraction of the first oil in 1914, oil became the symbol of Venezuela’s wealth and it still keeps its role (Coronil 1997). Lombardi describes the value of oil for Venezuelans both as a curse and a blessing because as a colonized country, it has two dilemmas. First, it has been dependent on foreign oil companies. Second, Venezuelans do not know how to spend the wealth (Lombardi 1982). At the beginning of the 1930’s, the production of agriculture had decreased 18% of GDP and oil represented 70%
of all exports and by 1940, Venezuela became a net importer of food (Salas 2005). Since that time Venezuela's economic policies have been questioning because while high international oil prices mean social and political stability, falling prices not only would affect the economy but also bring political instability.

Even though the research is limited from 1989 to 2010, it is important to remember the oil industry has been effective since 1914. Even today, Venezuela's economy is derived from the international oil trade (Desjardins 2017; Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). Hence, the foundation of OPEC, the Punto Fijo period, the nationalization of oil reserves and the neoliberal economic politics before the 90's are parts of today's political stance of Venezuela.

When oil began to rain along Venezuela's border, people believed that this black rain would be an absolute end of the dependency on foreign powers, however, it was the beginning of the permanent dilemma. Venezuelan intellectual and historian Arturo Uslar Piteri stated "Venezuela would become an unproductive and idle nation, an immense petroleum parasite, swimming in a momentary and corrupting abundance propelled toward and imminent and inevitable catastrophe" (quoted in Coronil 1997, 105)

With a 25.2 economic freedom score, Venezuela is ranked 179th freest country in the world. This score is even worse than Cuba which is ranked 178th (The Heritage Foundation 2018). In 2017, GDP contracted 12%, inflation skyrocketed to 1087.25% (See in Figure-4 below). At the end of the September 2018 consumer prices rose 488.86 percent. According to the IMF’s estimation this rise could reach 1000000% at the end of 2018 (Reuters 2018).
The economic instability in Venezuela also has been creating a political disturbance since the extraction of oil; however, the last issues almost lasted longstanding democracy which endures since 1958. Therefore, it can be claimed that the authoritarian approach in Venezuela is derived from economic instability.
Chapter 3: Hypothesis and Methodology

Hypothesis

Democracy and democratic consolidation have been questioned since the birth of democracy. There is still ambiguity whether democracy is the best system to govern countries or not. Yet, the key concept is that the authoritarian regimes do not offer exact freedom. However, while democracy research and discussions lose their value in the field, discussion on authoritarianism and its proliferation are on the rise. Therefore, the articles, news and popularity of authoritarianism lead to a discussion of the dimensions of authoritateness.

As Diamond stated in his book if “authoritarianism goes global” (L. Diamond, Plattner, and Walker 2016), the requisite is that to find out the fundamental structures of authoritarianism. Focusing on Turkey and Venezuela, the weight of recent evidence points toward the following hypothesis:

\[ H_1: \text{While authoritarianism in Venezuela is related to economic issues while authoritarianism in Turkey is related to politics.} \]

Research on democracy and authoritarianism tested the building blocks of these institutions; however, I believe that rather than testing abstract terms, testing the application of abstract terms would be more effective. Even though the world is definitely increasingly authoritarian, there is an ambiguity whether reasons of all countries are same. Therefore, my hypothesis will provide not only
insight for the reasons of authoritarianism but also will enlighten the specific reasons of authoritarianism for the subject countries. Therefore, to understand why Turkey shifted from democracy to authoritarianism, I will compare it with Venezuela, which is in the same category and has a similar background.

Data And Analysis

Turkey and Venezuela are countries that have a low level of transparency. Therefore, the most valuable data to understand their political stance may be newspapers, NGOs research, social media discussions and quantitative data which are taken from IMF, World Bank etc. Even though this research includes quantitative parts, it will mostly be based on a case study comparing the two countries political and economic progression. According to White "A lot can be learned from comparing two cases, especially when they differ in some interesting ways. The key issue is selecting two or more cases that are comparable in some interesting way-similar circumstances but different results, a success and a failure, contrasting circumstances" (White 1999, 117).

White's description of comparative case study guides my research, given well-documented differences in economy and political disturbance, one of which failed and one of which achieved marvelous success. Besides, Keohane, Verba and King posit in their book "appropriately marshaling all the thick description and rich contextualization in a typical qualitative study to evaluate a specific theory or hypothesis can produce a very powerful research design" (King, Keohane, and Verba 2010, 122). Moreover, Yin (Yin 2003, xi) addresses that "Case study research is appropriate when investigators either desire or forced by circumstances a) to
define research topics broadly and not narrowly, b) to cover contextual or complex multivariate conditions and not just isolated variables, and c) to rely on multiple and not singular sources of evidence." All three statements are pertinent to my research. First, since the definition does not merely rely on democracy but also authoritarianism, the broad definition provides a deep understanding of the countries today’s distance from democracy. Second, my research topic cannot be attributed to only one or two variables because focusing on just one-two variables can mislead me. Finally, since my sources are multiple, the case study should be the first method of my research.

Revival of authoritarianism arises in the aforementioned countries after the 2010s. The discussion about authoritarianism in Venezuela arose with the reelection of Chavez in 2006, while the same discussion begun with a referendum which was held in 2010 in Turkey. It is obvious that, the beginning of the Chavez administration and the Erdogan administration will be the starting point of my research to clarify these discussions. In addition to this, the summaries of their history are in the literature review part. Therefore, as a time limitation, I will conduct my research for Venezuela from 2006 to 2017, for Turkey 2010 to 2017. I will use the news reports notably from Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal (Turkish Newspaper), The Washington Post, New York Times, Guardian etc. Many books have been also written about the Hugo Chavez Administration and Recep Tayyip Erdogan administration, most notably: Venezuela (2010), Dragon in the Tropics (2015), Venezuela: Hugo Chavez and the Decline of an “Exceptional Democracy”(2007), Chavez’s Legacy (2014), Bad News From Venezuela (2018), Hugo Chavez and The Bolivarian Revolution: Populism and
By relying on such a massive array of book sources, I am able to gain valuable perspective toward countries. By analyzing the countries, I will be able to compare the countries’ progression. Hence, these collections of the books will form the foundation of my comparative case study.

Also in this section of my thesis, I will apply my observations. The most important part of observation will come in view within analyzing the coup attempt in Turkey (2016) because I was an eyewitness to this attempt. The newspaper and other resources did not publish what I experienced on the streets in July 15th, 2016. My observation about the process and mechanism help me to understand the way that countries become authoritarian. Brady, Collier, and Seawright mentioned “the strength of casual-process observation lies not in the breadth of coverage, but the depth of insight” (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 24).

Moreover, to reveal an inclination towards authoritarianism, the following indexes will be tested in findings: the nature of electoral processes (e.g. free elections), functioning of government (e.g. checks and balances on government authority), political participation (e.g. voter turnout), democratic political culture (e.g. popular support for democracy) and Civil liberties (e.g. a free press, independent judiciary) in a country. These indexes are gathered from Freedom House (Freedom in the World 2018) and the Democracy Index (Democracy Index 2017). As discussed
more than several times, there is no common ground for the measurement of democracy; however, the above criteria are the things that all institutions and countries can agree on those that are the fundamentals of democratic countries.

While the largest portion of my research will rely on qualitative analysis, I will also test my hypothesis using graphs and charts. Using those data, I will gather a few indexes together to demonstrate Turkey's and Venezuela's economic progress. These statistical pieces of evidence will incorporate countries' GDP, inflation, economic freedom and democratic ranking. They will assist me in seeing the big picture of the research. Therefore, both the case study and statistical analysis support my hypothesis.
Findings

Venezuela

From the 1960s to 1989

"Venezuela had been promoted as a model of democracy for Latin America" (Ellner and Salas 2007, XIII); however, it is obvious that the Venezuelan government had become insufficient to respond to the needs of the general population in terms of politics and economy. So, while Venezuela was a democratic model, then what happened in Venezuela in one night to trigger this dramatic change?

Like Barber and Watson mentioned, "Democracies are rarely destroyed from the outside" (Barber and Watson 1988, 24). Hence, internal activities should be the reason of transition from democracy to authoritarianism. However, there is not a chance that the transition happened in one night neither in Venezuela nor in Turkey. Therefore, in order to understand the Venezuelan's today's regime, its history needs to be analyzed first.

As is the case for all countries, the economy is a condition that empowers the governments or vice versa. Although poverty dominates the country since the colonial periods, Venezuela had ample natural resources that reduce the poverty. These exportable natural resources have been influenced Venezuela's economy and politics since the colonial period.
While cacao has the most important role in the colonial period, coffee took the cacao’s role in the 19th century. Beginning with the 20th century, oil built the national economy forsaking agricultural and industrial economic diversity (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). The most important factor is that while coffee and cacao can be count as luxury goods, oil is a kind of necessity that is used for industry, transportation, and even for the food production. Even though export products vary, Venezuela’s economic dependence to those products remains unchanged since colonial time. The unchanged economic dependence on export products means a national economic dependence on international pricing (Alvarez and Hanson 2009; Amaro 2018). Thus, higher oil prices paved the way for the good conditions for Venezuela’s Economy. Besides, when the oil prices are high, which means the flow of money to Venezuela is high, Venezuelan Presidents took advantages investing oil revenues in social spending. In this point, the economic rise brought the stable politics to Venezuela.

The oil defines the Venezuelan economy in the 20th and 21st century. Wealth meant to Venezuelans agricultural terms before oil; however, oil quickly became Venezuelan’s present and future (Salas 2005). In 1935, while agriculture had fallen to 18% of GDP, the oil took 70% of all GDP (Coronil 1997, 117–18). However, in earlier, Venezuela could not get enough profit from royalties of the oil extraction. Even though extracting oil began in 1917, the economic influence of oil came to play in 1943 (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010; Wilpert 2003). During the Trienio³-Betancourt’s administration, the oil ministry negotiations

³ Trienio; Three years democratic period from 1945 to 1948.
resulted in 50% profit sharing between Shell, Gulf and Standard-and Venezuelan state (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010, 55). Betancourt’s main objective was the nationalization of the oil industry, the nationalization did not become a reality until 1976 (The New York Times 1976). Betancourt and his party AD (Accion Democratica-Democratic Action) believed that Venezuela’s economy and politics would become stabilized if Venezuela would trade its oil by itself. Romulo Betancourt, who is also known as the founding father of modern democratic Venezuela (Hecimovich 2017), began to advocate a democratic change in Venezuela since 1936. He also believed that Venezuela could be governed democratically over a more diverse economy by using oil resources (Hellinger 1991). In a nutshell, Betancourt’s government promoted democracy through the oil wealth and favorable relationships with the companies. Even though his first term in office was short, the most important democratic politicians and policies began in his term (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010).

Trienio did not last forever. Marcos Perez Jimenez began to rule the country as a first unelected military leader, then as president from 1948 to 1958. Perez believed that the good relationships between Venezuela and the North Atlantic could make Venezuela’s economy better. Thus, cooperation between the companies and government were based on the illustration of U.S capital by Jimenez. He made concessions to the U.S. By 1957, while the oil production was rising up, Venezuela simultaneously imported $695.4 million in consumer goods from the USA (Salas 2005, 158). By 1955, Venezuela earned $232 million from Carole alone, the leading oil company, and $7 billion totally from all the companies
between 1948 and 1957 (Salas 2005, 159). Although Venezuela sacrificed high profit in order to maintain good relations with the USA, the USA proceeded to explore new oil resources. While the new resources meant more profit to the USA, it meant risk for Venezuela's economy. The fluctuation of oil policies increased the instability in Venezuela. Besides, when Jimenez's regime ended, the government was in $1 billion recallable debt (Hellinger 1991, 98). Moreover, the urban population boomed because Jimenez's administration spent the oil profits mostly on urban construction projects. The increased population in urban areas created urban middle classes. However, the gap between the rich and the poor got larger (Ewell 1984). Most importantly the ranchitos⁴, which were started to be built on the Caracas valley during Jimenez's administration will be the building blocks for the Hugo Chavez's dictatorship.

After the dark times, Jimenez's regime unchecked corruption which was the beginning of social inequality and political oppression, Venezuelan enjoyed the longest period of democracy between 1959 and 1989 which is called particracy (The New York Times 1992). It cannot be claimed that it was a flawless democracy; however, it can be said that those were the longest stable years since independence (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010; Irazábal and Foley 2010). The period started with signing the Pact of Punto Fijo (Gomez Ramirez 2015; Gunson 2010). The parties, individualist groups, the military, and the churches realized that the lack of unity during the Trienio provided an opportunity to Perez Jimenez to seize the power. In order to secure democracy, therefore, parties

---

⁴ Houses in which the poor people live and those houses were made from cement blocks.
including AD (Accion Democratica), COPEI (Comite de Participacion Electoral Independiente-Social Christian Party) and URD (Union Republicana-Democratic Republican Union) admit to sharing the governance signing the Pact of Punto Fijo (Ewell 1984; Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010; Gomez Ramirez 2015; Hellinger 1991).

Because Jimenez administration was so busy filling their pocket through construction projects, the first *partidocracia* government inherited the largest budget deficit (Ewell 1984). Therefore Betancourt, the first president of the period, increased lower international oil prices to close the budget deficit. Besides, he raised tariffs on imports product to encourage producing other industrial goods like steel and aluminum. By that time the USA, a close ally of Venezuela, declined Venezuela's request for sharing of global imports. Thus, one rejection paved the way for an international organization for countries that export petroleum. So, OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) was founded under the leadership of Venezuela (Coronil 1997). During the foundation of OPEC, Venezuela's share of the global oil market was diminishing. While Venezuela was producing 38.4% of the world's crude oil in 1955, this percentage became 24.3 in 1965. Consequently, the average price per barrel dropped from $2.65 to $1.81 between 1957 and 1969. Venezuela could have rectified this mistake by increasing production to a high of 3,708,000 a day in 1970. So, the percentage of oil representation became 66.4% of in 1967 (Hellinger 1991, 100). As a result, the establishment of the OPEC’s aim was to control both the oil production and

![Total Petroleum and Other Liquids Production - Venezuela](image)

**FIGURE-1:** Total petroleum and other liquids production – Venezuela

*Source: Author's calculation based on data from U.S Energy Information Administration, Accessed November 25, 2018*

Beginning with the USA's desire for another preferred supplier, the relationship between the USA and Venezuela was oscillating until the USA's decision to change its preferred oil supplier to Canada. Then Venezuela gave up playing with the USA; rather it strengthened its relations with OPEC. As a result, OPEC gained the right to set prices on international oil and established the fixed production level. When the Arab-Israeli Wars began, OPEC's power was at its peak. The price of crude oil for Venezuela exploded to $10.31 per barrel and the government's revenues reached 170%. These years were called the Golden Age.
of Oil (Hellinger 1991, 122–23). During the Golden age, the Perez administration increased government expenditures relying on high petroleum income. Between 1974 and 1978, the public expenditures grew 96.9% and by 1978 only 10% of the people lived under poverty in Venezuela (The Global Economy n.d.). Consequently, while the current account balances had $8 billion surpluses in 1974, it had a $6 billion deficit in 1978 (Kazokoğlu 2017). By 1974, OPEC took one more step away from global oil prices regulation and moved toward nationalization of the oil reserves. Even though all politicians in Venezuela did not agree on the issue, the nationalization law was approved in 1976. Perez thought that nationalization might be a solution to the huge deficit (Kazokoğlu 2017).

The nationalization created PDVSA (Petroleos De Venezuela Sociedad Anonima-Petroleum of Venezuela). Nevertheless, PDVSA maintained a reliance on foreign technical expertise. Besides, the USA was still the primary buyer of the country’s crude oil. Associated with nationalization, a commercialization agreement was signed between companies and Venezuela. According to the agreement, the oil companies were allowed to receive 88% of PDVSA’s production proportional to their status prior to the nationalization. Therefore; the nationalization left a small percentage of profit share to Venezuela. Moreover, Venezuela had to increase its oil production level to raise its profit share. Thus, the nationalization made Venezuela dependent solely on oil production. As a result, the nationalization of oil prevented Venezuela from diversifying their economic resources (Hellinger 1991, 122–24). Despite all of these, the government continued to spend money unconcernedly on public expenditures. The
government pursued populist policies and invested its income in health care, nutrition, water supplies, and finally advanced rural housing. Moreover, the government emphasized the importance of education and invested money in public education. While the literacy rate had been 60.8% in 1958, it rose to 89.8% in 1990 (Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) | Data n.d.). In addition, higher education became important and the government made an investment for it too. Even more, working-class Venezuelans enrolled in universities in the 1980s. The percentage of university students who came from a working-class background was 36% in 1991 (Reimers 1991). Because of economic rise, according to political scientist and historians, Venezuela had experienced exceptionalism during the 20th century. That exceptionalism brought stabilized and healthy democracy; however, the direction of the democracy veered when the money stopped flowing (Ellner and Salas 2007, 8–13). Yet, there is one thing that should not be forgotten; even though social spending created the middle class, the gap between the poor and the rich grew too.

In the 1970s government propped up public expenditures in education, health care, and social security. Moreover, the government subsidized the fuel and food industry. Therefore, people not only could buy stable foods, like milk and flour easily but also used the transportation anytime conveniently. So, the 1970s were known as the era of richness for Venezuelans. However, the oil boom did not last forever and when the calendar showed the 1980s, the international demand for oil was decreasing. So, the oil income was inadequate not only to satisfy the people’s need but also in order to produce profits from the heavily capital-intensive oil
industry. Therefore, the government borrowed heavily from the World Bank, IMF, and foreign lenders like Citibank (Ellner and Salas 2007). While Venezuela's industries acquired 60% of their capital from credit, only 19% was from its own earnings (Hellinger 1991, 146). Venezuela was in a difficult political position because it had to find a way to pay for loans while satisfying the people's need. For that reason, the government had to borrow more money with higher interest rates to pay old debts. Though the Campins's administration made a commitment to increase public expenditures to allay growing poverty 74% by 1983, the government began to devaluate Bolivar (1983) and cut the public expenditures in health care and education (Rosati and Zerpa 2018). With climbing unemployment, the people could not send their children to schools. Therefore, the literacy rate was decreasing among the poor again. The increasing debt number skyrocketed from $9 billion to $24 billion during Campins administration (Coronil 1997, 370). Moreover, in order to compensate for some social spending, the government reduced agricultural subsidies which increased food prices. The poor, who works with minimum wages could not afford to buy some staple foods (Ellner and Salas 2007).

On one hand, the growing economic crisis became more public in 1989. The poorer grew poorer and the middle class disappeared; where the rich grew richer. Between 1981 and 1997, the income share of the poorest 40% of the nation fell from 19.1% to 14.7%, while the income share of the wealthiest 10% of the nation increased from 21.8% to 32.8% (Roberts 2003, 60). On the other hand, with the democratization Venezuela experienced its economic liberalization between
1989 to 1998. In the increasing division between classes, the people were hoping to see a bright future with next president Carlos Andres Perez, who became a hope for them (Marquez 2003, 200). He was re-elected to take Venezuelans back to the good times like he was the president in the 1970s. Even though he was accused of corruption, Venezuelans were very reluctant to believe him. Besides, he was a charismatic leader who would claim international organizations like the IMF and World Bank as a reason of Venezuelan economic crisis. Once he called the IMF "a bomb that only kills people" (Coronil 1997, 375). However, he made an agreement with IMF and accepted IMF's austerity program, which is called "El Paquete" behind closed doors. At that time, Venezuela owed $33 billion to international creditors (Coronil and Skurski 1991, 293). With the package, Perez reduced tariffs, began privatization in 64 public entries (Hellinger 1991, 146), most importantly increased the price of the fuel by 30% (Roberts 2003). Moreover, these austerity reforms caused increased inflation and unemployment. In this regard, corruption and differences of distribution of income increased.

Because of these factors, the public took the streets to protest Perez and his economic reforms. This protest, which is called Caracazo was a kind of riot against the government because the liberalization period not only affected Venezuela's economy but also created an uncertainty and a political tension. Thousands of people participated in the protest in Caracas and other major cities. The military deployed during demonstrations to protect wealthy people from any predicament (Coronil 1997, 114). Further, the state described the people who were in the riots as drug dealers, thugs, and urban guerillas. The people, who were
masked (suspected to be the undercover police officer) shot people escalating the general state of terror (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 117). In the end, according to official reports, 277 Venezuelans died; however, the suspected real number is 1,000 people (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 85).

By 1989, the Caracazo riots displayed that the system which was created in 1959 was not working for the poor people. During the protest, writing on the walls identified that socioeconomic problems created political problems and the poor people which are the greater part of the population demanded solutions for them (Coronil and Skurski 2006, 110-11). The system was working until the decreased oil demand. It was absolutely obvious that corruption existed; nevertheless, power sharing between parties, investigating in health, and increased education gave hope to the people between 1960s and 1970s. Though the democratic system was impressive for all Venezuelans, since the end of the oil boom poverty significantly increased. Between 1984 and 1989, the poverty rate increased from 46% to 62%. Moreover, the percentage of the population who lived in extreme poverty rose from 14% to 30% (Roberts 2003).

The riot was the first strike for a democratic government. The second strike came with the coup attempt which was generated by Movimiento Revolucionario Bolivariano (MRB-Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement) group under the leadership of Lieutenant Hugo Chavez Frias and Francisco Arias Cardenas on February 4, 1992. They portrayed themselves as a group which was against corruption and unjust distribution of power and money. However, the government overrided the attempt and jailed almost all of the plotters. Even though the coup
failed, Chavez and his friends would get support among the Venezuelan people. Further, the citizenry was happy to see that there was still a hope to be recovered economically and politically (Marquez 2003). As a result, the strikes beginning with Caracazo established a ground for new political landscape.

By 1993, Perez was impeached for corruption and adultery accusations. During that time, Rafael Caldera emerged as a leader who was opposed to the neoliberal economic policies. He even claimed that "it is difficult to ask people to burn for freedom and democracy while they think freedom and democracy are not able to feed them..." (Hellinger 2003, 32). However, Venezuela still experienced neoliberal reforms until "the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a president in 1998" (John 2005, 111) and poverty continued to increase.

Hugo Chavez and his team were free to run for the next election in 1998. His campaign was spectacular. He based it on a Bolivarian doctrine⁵, is also known as Bolivarianism, and portrayed himself as a "man of the people" (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010, 87). In his campaign, Chavez used election music which had anti-elite and anti-oligarchic rhetoric. (Di John 2005, 116). The citizens accepted him as one of them because he was not highly educated, and his parents were not one of the elites. Because he wanted to show that he was one of the lower classes, he used language like how the poor people use. Finally, he promised to change the constitution in favor of the poor citizens. Therefore, the people believed that Chavez was the leader who will bring whole change for Venezuela. In the end, Chavez won the election with 56% majority in 1998 (Left-

⁵ Bolivarianism is an idea against imperialism, inequality and corruption. It also describes the dream of United Latin American Countries (Tavukcu 2019).

Starting with the constitutional change, Chavez forever changed Venezuela's policies. When he was elected, changing the previous system was not difficult for him because the country was struggling economically. The GDP had reverted to the level of the 1950s in 1998.

![Figure-2: GDP per capita growth between 1960-2014](image)

Source: Author's calculation based on data from Central Bank of Venezuela

By 1998, extreme poverty increased from 44.4% in 1989 to 57.6% and the price of oil per barrel was the lowest (see in Figure-1) in decades-almost $8 dollar per barrel (Corrales and Penfold 2015, 18). Though he could have begun the changes with economic policies, he preferred to focus on rewriting the constitution looking for more presidential power. Thus, Chavez first active movement was to sign a decree which called for a referendum to change the constitution or to call the Constitution Assembly (Partlett 2013). At that time, in order to change or reform
any article in the constitution, the two-thirds vote of the Congress was a requirement. However, there were not enough seats in the chamber or senate. So, he called for a consultative referendum. Even though the decree for a consultative referendum was challenged by his opponents, the court decided that it would be "bound to the spirit of the constitution in force, and therefore is limited by the fundamental principles of the democratic state of law" (Partlett 2013, para. 4). With the consultative referendum, Chavez bypassed the Congress to rewrite the constitution. As a result of the court’s decision, the referendum was held in April 1999 and approved by over 87% of the national vote. Thus, Chavez got the power to hold the Constitution Assembly and he could elect delegates to the assembly (Corrales and Penfold 2015, 19; Rohter 1999). Furthermore, the Supreme Court suspended the Congress because the court would not feel powerful enough to reject the wishes of the popularly elected president (Lansberg-Rodriguez 2016). Even though the judiciary fought for protecting checks and balances, they were too late.

At the end of the election for the new constitutional assembly, Chavez’s movement won 121 of the 131 seats. This triumph gave seats to Chavez’s wife, brother, his former military colleagues and his former cabinet members (Rohter 1999, para. 10). Soon after the new Constituent Assembly approved the "national declaration of emergency" (Partlett 2013, para. 6). By the emergency declaration, the assembly dismissed many judges who had been accused of corruption, with their replacements being more supportive of the Chavez administration. (Partlett 2013). With the majority, it was not hard to draft the new constitution, which is
called the Bolivarian constitution. According to the new constitution, the president would have more power than the other branches of government and the traditional parties. The presidential term expanded from 5 years to 6 years, reelection was enabled, and the president alone could give promotions without legislative approval. Because the Senate was eliminated, the checks and balances were lost. Moreover, the president achieved limitless power to call a referendum. As it is seen, the new constitution was designed way far from political reconciliation and democratization (Brewer-Carias 2010). After the long period of democratic government, the first act of Chavez developed suspicion about the fairness of official institutions (Karl 1987).

After ratifying the new constitution, Chavez was capable of being reelected. He desired to clean not only national level seats but also state level seats under his leadership. Therefore, he called for a mega-election in July 2001. Chavez and his party acquired 59% vote for the presidency and 60% seats for the National Assembly (Corrales and Penfold 2015). By that time, the most important factor was his election rhetoric. While he was still mentioning the solutions for poverty and class divisions, his rhetoric of opposition parties had racist undertones (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). After the mega election, the Chavez administration introduced a project, Plan Bolivar 200. The project aimed to solve social problems, like sanitation, health care, housing, and transportation. Within Plan Bolivar, social spending on education increased by 4.3% between 1998 and 2001 (Ellner and Salas 2007). Although the project was effective in the short-term, it was terminated by coup attempt which is held in 2002. After the coup attempt, Chavez tendered
his resignation from the presidency. Since he resigned, all his plans, including Plan Bolivar, were reversed to pre-Chavez period by the interim president, Pedro Carmona.

Chavez aimed to cooperate with all countries which were developing nations. However, he refused to be a provider of raw materials. He even questioned trade agreements with NAFTA. His policies were called independent foreign policy which was the exact opposite of the previous democratic government since 1959. His stance towards the US, the international economic institution like IMF, and World Bank strengthened his support among the poor.

At the end of 1999, when Chavez was elected president of Venezuela, its political ratings in Freedom House worsened from 2 to 4, its civil liberties from 3 to 4, and its status changed from Free to Partly Free. The given ratings were understandable when Chavez was examined for what he did. He dismantled checks and balances, dominated the constituent assembly, ratified a new constitution, made it possible to stay in power until 2013, and finally dismissed the Congress and the Supreme Court. Therefore, even though the regional and presidential elections were held freely and fairly, those circumstances made Venezuela from a free country to a partly free country (Freedom House 1999).

The most important factor in controlling power by Chavez occurred in December 2001. When Chavez was elected, he wanted to revitalize the economy without foreign institutions' aid. For his desire and his new programs, he increased the revenues which came from oil. Thanks to the new legislation system, Chavez had authority to direct oil policy. He, therefore, assigned to PDVSA a new
president, Ali Rodriguez who was a sympathizer of Chavez. Ali Rodriguez also appointed many new board members who were sympathizer of Chavez too (Gackstetter Nichols and Morse 2010). While some people appreciated that the PDVSA would have more closely controlled the PDVSA, others questioned the qualification of the new management board members. The opposition parties took advantages of PDVSA’s current position and they called for an indefinite general strike (See in Figure-3). The managers who were working in the PDVSA but not the sympathizer of Chavez began the strike. Not only did PDVSA shut down the industry, but also other companies did. Businessmen in the elite and middle classes organized in favor of opposition against the Chavez administration (Thompson 2003). The members of the opposition owned all the major media, except state-owned radio and television. They used the media to organize the protest for the strike. Using the media power proved that the populism was not fundamental for Chavez’s dictatorship; rather he used the economic conditions to take under control of the nation. The strikes that happened in 2002 and 2003 served his purposes. In the protest, two groups- the poor and the elite met, and violence erupted. The chaos allowed military to detain Chavez on April 11, 2002 (An Opposition Gagged 2007). Although the majority of the population, the poor, turned against the military demanding the releasing of the president, their protest was not sufficient to bring back Chavez. One night later, the FEDECAMARAS leader Pedro Carmona was accepted as the president (Forero 2002) Even though the USA recognized his presidency, the international pressures and some armed
forces who were unwilling to support anti-democratic presidency forced Carmona to resign. As a result, Chavez returned to the presidency.

The opposition, however, were determined to take Chavez’s presidency. They called the second strike in December 2002. This strike lasted more than the first attempt - two months. Therefore, oil and gas production almost stopped. PDVSA and other oil companies produced 40,000 barrels oil in a day rather than producing 3.2 million barrels (The Economist 2003, para. 2). Therefore, the revenues from oil decreased and food shortages began. In January 2003, the economic data showed that Venezuela’s economy lost $50 million a day (Thompson 2003). Moreover, the production equipment damages cost around $3 billion (Camacho 2005, paras. 6–7). During the strike, some PDVSA employees

FIGURE-3: GDP per capita of Venezuela between 1990-2014

Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Central Bank of Venezuela
lost their jobs. Thus, people realized that they were going to lose whatever they had economically if they had another strike.

After a while, businessmen were forced to close their businesses. Once Chavez realized the situation, he reopened the oil companies using military power. The citizens were happy because the production of oil increased to 2 million barrels a day (Ellner 2003). In total, the country lost $12.8 billion during the strike (Camacho 2005). Since the nation suffered from the strike, the people believed that the oppositions were not willing to empower the country, rather they were destructive. Further, Chavez’s rhetoric during the strike brought advantages to him. During the strike, Chavez claimed that the oil was the legacy of the nation, PDVSA should not govern the oil economy without government control. As a result, at the end of the strike, Chavez subjugated the PDVSA and hired all employees who were loyal to him. Getting control of the PDVSA meant controlling the oil income for Chavez. Chavez used the PDVSA’s revenues for social spending. In 2007, PDVSA spent $14.4 billion for social expenditures like education and healthcare (Alvarez and Hanson 2009). Corrales (2006) claims that Chavez updated authoritarianism controlling PDVSA’s revenues. In other words, Venezuela’s authoritarianism began with becoming an oil-based country (Egilmez 2017).

In 2004, Chavez won one more victory against the opposition taking advantages of his economic aid to the poor. The opposition collected more than enough signatures- 3.4 million in December 2003- to recall for a presidential referendum (Corrales 2006). Nevertheless, though the opposition collected enough votes-3.7 million votes “YES” to reelect the president, “NO” votes
outnumbered the "YES" votes by 5.8 million (Carter Center 2005). Many analysts and researchers including Sujatha Fernandes claimed that Chavez held power because the poor loved him. Moreover, Fernandes (2007) posits that Chavez's subsidized social programs were a decisive factor for his victory in 2004 (Corrales 2006; Fernandes 2007). According to Freedom House 2005 report, the 2004 victory directed Chavez to increase "his influence over the judicial system, media, and other institutions of the society" (Freedom House 2005). High oil prices in 2004 allowed Chavez to increase social expenditures which were the highest in Latin America in 2006. While 8.2% of the GPD was social spending in 1998, Chavez increased this number from 8.2% to 21.9% of GDP by 2006 (Weisbort and Sandoval 2007). After 2004, Chavez aimed to change all economic policies related to oil. If the foreign oil companies would like to maintain trade in Venezuela, they had to give 60% share to the state. Further, PDVSA's employees were chosen by him (Ellner 2003).

In 2006, Chavez won the election with 63% of the vote while the turnout rate was 75% (Al Jezeera Turk 2013). From time to time, Chavez claimed that the nationalization of other oil companies along with PDVSA would increase the government's profit from 40% to 60% (Alvarez and Hanson 2009). After the election, in 2007, relying on the increased number of share and his voting rate, Chavez wanted one more reform on the constitution. The draft of this reform included the indefinite elections for president, the presidential appointment of states governors, and declining unlimited states of emergency; however, for the first time since 1999 Chavez could not win the election (see in Figure-5). Despite
his first defeat, Chavez's program on social spending with good oil prices made him irreplaceable in the eyes of the poor (Hellinger 2003). His social spending proved his promises towards the poor. Offering the unreachable social programs, Chavez was able to manipulate the poor. Though the people and Chavez gained benefit from the social expenditure program, they were not in the best interest of the nation (The Economist 2006).

Moreover, the state turned its neoliberal economic policies to socialist policies in 2006. As a result of the change, the government nationalized not only the oil companies but also phone company-CANTV in 2006 and Steel Company-SIDOR in 2009. Further, Chavez's named his economic policies "Socialism in the Twenty-First Century". He guided the monetary and banking policies regarding to socialist policies. When crude prices were $100 per barrel, neither economic nor political problems came to the surface. Since oil prices were high, the VEB (the official currency of Venezuela) was valuable. While using the valuable VEB on social spending was easier, it made Venezuela import-based economy (Eğilmez 2017).

After the general strike, Chavez promulgated a new series of social packages called misiones for the poor. These social reforms were Chavez's fundamentals. There were 27 missions which provided healthcare, education, scholarships, and food funding. By 2007, funding for the missions in total accounted for 3.5% of Venezuela's GDP which may be the largest social spending program in Latin American history (Corrales and Penfold 2007). Although programs are successful, they were not sustainable because they were dependent
on oil prices around the world. As it is seen in Figure-1, the country experienced incredible oil production in its history during the Chavez administration. That rise in oil production explains how Chavez used oil revenue until 2008. As a consequence of economic crisis in 2008, social expenditures had been cut. The administration tightened economic policies, exchange and interest rate. Strict controls on economic policies caused for food shortages and economic slowdown. The inflation rate doubled (see in Figure-4). Today, the economists predict that by the end of the year Venezuelan inflation can hit one million percent (Amaro 2018).

FIGURE-4: Average consumer prices inflation rate

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Accessed November 25, 2018
The opponents of Chavez won the referendum with slight vote difference in 2007. Chavez was determined to pass the new legislation and he proposed the referendum package one more time in 2009. Despite his declining approval rate, he won the referendum in 2009 (See in Figure-5). As a result of the referendum, Chavez would stay forever in the presidency. Unlike the referendum held in 2007, where Chavez just tried to remove the term limit for the presidency, in 2009 he widened the referendum package referring that not only the president but also mayors and governors would not be term limited. Therefore, he received 54.85% of constituent approval (Venezuela'daki Referandumda Chavez Zaferi 2009). This change decreased Venezuelan Political rights score from 4 to 5 in Freedom House (Venezuela 2010 Scores 2010).

![Voting Rates of Chavez](image)

**FIGURE-5**: Voting rates of Chavez

After getting all power in his hands, Chavez could not control the economic problems. Since he cut the social expenditures, the food shortages exacerbated the problems. The citizens not only had food problems but also suffered from electricity and water shortages. In short, people could not meet their basic needs. As a result of the circumstances, Chavez’s party lost its majority in 2010 parliamentary elections. That means he would not be able to legislate whatever he desired. It is clear that whenever Chavez could not afford buying people’s votes through social expenditures, he lost his popularity. Yet, the citizens did not abandon him totally because they were in faith that Chavez was ceased by external forces (Hugo Chavez ve Venezuela seçimleri üzerine 2012). His announcement about his illness softened opposition. When he declared his candidacy for the next election, the people supported him (Carroll and Lopez 2012). Consequently, he received 55.1% of votes. He was supposed to take an oath in January 2013; however, his cancer relapsed. Though the inauguration ceremony postponed, he could not take an oath. He died on March 2013 at the age of 58.

Even though this analysis is to the Chavez administration, it is important to indicate that Chavez passed on all his authoritarian policies to his successor. When Chavez declared Nicolas Maduro as his successor, it was obvious that he was willing to make the country more authoritarian. Therefore, Nicolas Maduro took over the government temporarily. He was elected as president in April 2013.
When Maduro came into power, he devalued Venezuela's currency. This situation increased the price of staple goods (Caracas 2013). In 2014, a huge economic decline took place in Venezuela. Venezuela had the world's highest inflation rate in 2015 (Flannery 2015). The economic problems also increased the rate of crime and corruption. Venezuela encountered popular protests across the country, and the hundreds of protesters were killed in those protests between 2015 to 2017 (Turkce 2017). As a result of the changes, the Freedom House ranked Venezuela as a "Not Free" country in 2017 (Freedom House 2017) because Chavez made easier for Maduro to take everything under control.

According to Freedom House, Venezuela's democratic institutions began to deteriorate since 1999 when Chavez was elected for the first time as president. Maduro desired to expand it one step further by expanding all rights granted to the president in the new constitution. The Supreme Tribunal Justice annulled the National Assembly in 2017. Even though the decision was reversed, Maduro superseded the National Assembly with a National Constituent Assembly whose members were chosen despite the opposition boycott. Many political adversaries were imprisoned. The number of imprisoned exceeded 600. Finally, there is not a thing that can be related to human rights or democracy. Today, Venezuela is a place where its citizens eat rotten meat (BBC News 2018).

Turkey

The Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 after the collapse of Ottoman Empire. As a unique country, Turkey incorporates European and Middle Eastern cultures together. The complexity of those cultures has been one of the major
issues in Turkey since its foundation. Another issue is nationalism. Nationalism and religion became the corner stones of the new republic (Karakas 2007). These religious-national identities of Turkey originate from Kemalism. Kemalism is a kind of ideology that its followers believe Ataturk’s main ideas and his practices should shape the Republic of Turkey (Hanioglu 2012). In this regard, the Turkish Constitution describes Turkey as democratic, secular and loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk (TBMM 1982). These corner stones paved the way for the current president Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become authoritarian.

The founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is known as the builder of the division between piety and non-piety citizens in Turkey. Since he removed religion from politics accepting a laic regime in 1928, Ataturk’s supporters believe that he shifted Turkey to more modern world, where his adversaries contend that he disenfranchised Turkish by taking away their freedom of religion (Oztig 2018). Since the foundation of the republic, laicism determined to modernize the Turkish people; however, rather than performing its real objective, laicism caused higher polarization between conservative-religious and Kemalist-secular (Hale and Ozbudun 2011). Ataturk dictated a single party regime to apply a secular regime in the future. Thus, he adopted new secular laws. He closed the religious schools-medrese and religious courts-kadilik müessesesi, adopted the Gregorian calendar, changed the Ottoman alphabet to the Latin alphabet, made Sundays as a holiday instead of Friday which is a holy day for Muslims and the Ezan, which is Islamic call to worship was made Turkish rather than Arabic for a short time, but it has begun to be recalled in Arabic later. Moreover, he believed in modernized
institutions. Therefore, he replaced Islamic laws with western style-civil laws (ATA TSK n.d.). The Turkish people acknowledged almost all changes except the change of the dress code which is related to the headscarf and Turkish Ezan.

Since the Ataturk administration's ruling elite was formed by political bureaucrats, military actors and civil servants and they were secularist while the conservatives were excluded from the administration. (Hale and Ozbudun 2011). In addition, since Turkey experienced many military coups to protect laicism, the Turkish military became the advocator and protector of Kemalist ideas (Selçuk 2016). Until 2013, the headscarf ban stayed active. Therefore, it had caused political turmoil. Solving the headscarf problem paved the way for the dictatorship of Erdogan (Hakan 2013).

Secularism is a kind of Western ideology which allows people to escape from religious pressure (Hallward 2008). Even though aim of secularism was to organize the relationship between religion, politics and society, the different kinds of interpretation occurred in societies (J. Butler et al. 2011). Moderate secularism is interpreted freedom of religious expression, and it also allows the separation of religion and politics (Ertit 2014; Lovell 2009). However, the laic version of secularism was never interpreted as freedom of religion until 2013 in Turkey. On the contrary, laicism accepted that the display of any religious emblem is forbidden. As a result, beginning with the leadership of Ataturk, subsequent military leaders felt as a guardian of laicism accepted the extreme interpretation of secularism. Since secularism is interpreted with an iron fist, it was not only effective in the military, but also was effective in schools, universities and public offices in Turkey.
The public face of Ataturk principle's became headscarf ban. The ban also divided society between religious and secular.

After a long single party regime, Turkey politics was transferred into a two-party democracy in 1950 (Musil 2015). The DP (Democrat Party), which was center-right party won the election held in May 1950. Because of their political stance, they showed concern about freedom of religion. The party criticized the interpretation of secularism and emphasized the importance of Islam for Turkish culture. Thus, they reopened the Imam Hatip high school, which were schools of theology, based on Islamic discipline (Karaman 2015). However, a Junta administration took the government under their control in 1960 pretending application and legislation of the new laws were against the Ataturk's principles, so against secularism (Alkan 2016). The administration returned to civil authority in 1961 with the elections. Moreover, a new constitution, which is known as the most liberal constitution ever in Turkey, was written. The new constitution transformed the two-party system in multi-party system (Karpat 1970; Ozbudun 1996). Even though the new constitution was the most libertarian one, secularism kept its position. The military coup gave the memorandum for resignation of the old government in 1971. The following government was not able to produce political stabilization. As a result, a military coup occurred one more time in September 12, 1980 (12 Eylül darbesinin öncesi ve sonrasında yaşananlar 2015).

After the coup, a new constitution was established. The new constitution took out the libertarian part of the 1961 constitution and strengthened the presidency of the republic. With the 1980 coup, the headscarf ban became more
strict. Junta leader Kenan Evren began a headscarf ban in universities using the Iranian revolution as a reason. He even stated that "if showing the women's hair is sin, God would create them bald." (Hakan 2013; Kenan Evren'den törbana ilginç çıkış 2008). However, conservative people, especially women, were not pleased with the change. When the military regime ended center-right liberal party ANAP (Motherland Party) came to the power under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. Without analyzing Turgut Ozal administration, it cannot be understood how Erdogan has been changing Turkey towards democracy to authoritarianism. Turgut Ozal is known for his liberal economic policies because his neoliberal policies completely created new political identities. Conservative-religious groups became stronger and got a voice to raise both in politics and in industry (Yavuz 2009). Ozal was the first prime minister, who disagreed with extreme Kemalism, which means extreme secularism and nationalism (Ataman 2000). In his term, Ozal consolidated a relationship not only with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) but also with the European Union (EU) (Ataman 2000). Some posited that what Ozal did was an incomprehensible dilemma. However, advanced relations with the OIC and the EU decreased the one-way dependence relations among Turkey, EU, the USA and Middle East (Ataman 1999). While he modernized Turkey based on EU provisions, he increased the visibility of Muslimism. One time, he even indicated that "I am not going to quit Namaz because I am the president" (Çok özel fotoğraflarla Turgut Özal 2013). When he was a prime minister, legislation was passed to liberalize the headscarf in universities in 1988. However, the president

---

6 Worship that has to be done in five times a day for Sunni denomination of Islam.
of the period, Kenan Evren vetoed the bill claiming that it was against laicism (Türban tartışmaları 60'lardaki başlamıştı 2010). As a result, Ozal became the advocator of the conservative-religious people and he began to pave the way to today's politics.

After Ozal's death, Islamic-rooted parties was on the rise. From 1993 to 1996, the right-center parties formed the government. In 1996, the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party-RP) Islamist political party came to the fore under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, who is known for his Islamic agenda. Deputies of RP made statements regarding the importance of Islam and Sharia. One of the deputies, Ibrahim Halil Celik stated that “I will fight to death to introduce sharia. Therefore, being a member of RP’s is the only way to be a good Muslim because this party is the Islamic jihad army”. Another member of the party, Hasan Huseyin Ceylan said that “the country is our country; however; the regime is not ours. The regime and Kemalism is others.” (Refah’ı yakan 7’li 1998). Because of all these statements and the party’s manner, the National Security Council gave to the party a memorandum to change their manner on February 28, 1997 (28 Şubat post-modern darbesine giden süreç 2016). After the memorandum, prime minister Erbakan resigned without a military coup; nevertheless, this memorandum is called a post-modern coup in Turkish politics (Milliyet 2018).

Following the February 28 provisions, the Council of Higher Education strengthened the dress code in universities. Students who did not take headscarves off before entering the university buildings were expelled from the universities. Moreover, the university presidents who did not strictly apply the
headscarf rules were dismissed (Tahaoglu 2013). Once again Islamic based Imam-Hatip secondary schools were closed. In early 1998, the RP was banned from the politics. Today's president Recep Tayyip Erdogan was a member of the RP. He was even elected as a Mayor of Istanbul between 1994 to 1998 from that party. Also, the former president Abdullah Gul was a deputy leader of the party.

The RP's successor was Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party-FP) won seats at the parliament. One of its deputies Merve Kavakci, who was wearing the headscarf, was elected as a parliamentarian; nevertheless, she was not allowed to make an oath by the prime minister of the period (Kinzer 1999b, 1999a). The prime minister, Bulent Ecevit indicated that:

"No one interested in any women's dress style in their private life; however, here is not a place where anyone can live their private life. This is the supreme institution of the country. Anyone who hold an office at the parliament has to obey the state's laws. This is not a place that can be dared to fight with the constitution. Please bring her into the line."(Utanç görüntülerı 1999).

After all, the president Suleyman Demirel also indicated that Merve Kavakci is a threat to the laic and the powerful Republic of Turkey (Kinzer 1999b). As a result of the incident, the FP was banned from the politics with the constitutional court's decision in 2001 (Hurriyet 2001).

By the middle of 2001 a new party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party-AKP) was founded under the leadership of Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. As a 15-month old party, AKP won the next election with 34.63% of the vote. Because Erdogan recited a poem which has verses with Islamic essence during his mayorship, he was banned from the politics and imprisoned for 4 months. Therefore, even though AKP had a higher voting rate, Erdogan could not be the prime minister at that time. With AKP's outstanding effort and with the help of the main opposition party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—Republican People's Party), the parliament made an amendment in the constitution and annulled Erdogan's ban from the politics. Thus, in 2003 Turkish parliament held a by-election in a city which is called Siirt, and Erdogan became a prime minister winning that by-election (Yavuz 2009). This was the first enthusiastic political tactic of Erdogan.

Even though the party adopted more secular attitude when it is compared its predecessors, it was sure that the part desire to lift the ban of headscarf in universities. Almost all of the party leaders' wives were wearing headscarf. During the 29th of October Republican Day Reception, the president Ahmet Necdet Sezer who is extremely secularist did not allow the leaders' scarf-wearing wives entrance to the presidential palace. Moreover, the commander of the Turkish armed forces Hilmi Ozkok gave Sezer full support (Yilmaz, Babakan, and Saydamer 2003). Despite the all of the oppositions, the AKP stayed calm and maintained its democratic stance.

In 2007, before the general elections, there was a presidential election in April 27, 2007. The AKP announced that their candidate would be Abdullah Gul whose wife was wearing a headscarf. Because of that issue, on the same day, the
military announced an e-memorandum in their website. The Council of Ministers gave a response to the military indicating that "the unity and integrity of our country, the notability of our nation and the qualifications of Turkey as a secular, democratic and social State of law. Turkey's national unity and integrity and the welfare of the Turkish Nation is possible with the protection of those values. It is not possible to approve any behaviors and acts that are revealed from time to time by real and legal persons against the basic qualifications of our Republic, the Constitution as well as the laws" (Ural 2012, 731). In the same year, the new president of the state appointed a new president to the Council of Higher Education. With this change, wearing a headscarf was liberated virtually.

Since the citizens did not want the military intervention anymore, the e-memorandum caused the increased vote rating in the next elections in July 2007. The AKP received 47% of the vote. The party took more seats than before in the parliament. Therefore, Abdullah Gül became a president on 29th August 2007. However, the E-memorandum stayed the military's web site until August 2012 (Bugün 27 Nisan e-muhtirasının yıl dönümü 2018).

The increase in voter turnout and Abdullah Gül's presidency strengthened the AKP's position not only in the parliament but also in the eyes of the public. Thus, the party proposed an amendment to change the headscarf ban in universities in 2008. The Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Movement

---

7 E-memorandum: Turkish General Staff released a statement on the military's website after the presidential election in 2007. In the statement, the General Staff indicated that elected president whose wife wears the Islamic headscarf is a threat to the secular system (Turkey's former chief of staff rejects 'coup attempt' in e-memorandum testimony - Turkey News 2015)
Party-MHP), supported the change in the constitution. Hence, the amendment was approved by the parliament. As a result of approval, the tension increased in the secularist society. They protested saying “Turkey is laic and will stay laic” (Anayasa Mahkemesi Başörtüsü Düzenlemesini İptal Etti 2008). Relying on the protest, Abdurrahman Yalcinkaya, the Chief Prosecutor applied to the constitutional court claiming that the amendment was against the constitution’s cornerstone, laicism. Even though the constitutional court did not abolish the AKP, the court annulled the amendment (Anayasa Mahkemesi türban düzenlemesini iptal etti 2008).

In the same year, 2008, Ergenekon which is known but less spoken secularist-ultra nationalist organization was being investigated. Even though the investigation remained until 2013, it played an essential role for AKP’s power. According to the investigation, a group of people who were in the military or had possible ties with the military organized many terror operations for last 30 years (Jenkins 2011). The investigation resulted in the hundreds of military officers conviction (D. Butler 2014). It was the beginning of transfer of power from the military to the AKP, in other words, to Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Consolidating his power, Erdogan offered a referendum to make some changes in the constitution. The conservative-religious people believe that with this change they would finally get their freedom of religion. The reform package not only included liberalization of the headscarf but also rights for the Kurdish people. Like the headscarf problem, Turkey has had a Kurdish problem since Ataturk’s death. However, the Kurdish problem came to light after 1960s liberalization. The
libertarian environment made the extreme left wing stronger. The Left wing gave support to the Kurdish people who could not find a chance to become organized previously. Moreover, within economic liberalization in 1980s, the Kurdish people who live in the east part of the Turkey believed they were not being treated equally with western Turkish people. In the beginning of 1970s, The Kurdish's Workers Party (PKK) was founded.

According to the Turkish constitution, all people have equal rights. So, the Kurdish people have been protected like Turkish under the constitution and they were given the same rights as any other (TBMM 1982, l. 10). However, the organization claimed in their founding statemen that the Kurds do not come from the same race as the Turks and since the foundation of Republic of Turkey, the Turkish state has been trying to assimilate and exploit them (PKK nasıl kuruldu ve güçlendi? 2013). Relying on these assertions, PKK aimed to establish a new state in the Turkish Eastern Border including Turkey’s southeastern part. Since then, the Turkish government believe that the PKK is a terrorist group and has to be destroyed. Moreover, after the 1990s PKK had organized many attacks not only the Turkish soldiers but also on civilians in the eastern part of Turkey. Therefore, the Turkish military has been battling with the PKK (Deli 2013; PKK nasıl kuruldu ve güçlendi? 2013). The military was in power for the nationalist problem, just like in the religious headscarf issue. However, with the democratic reform package, Erdogan provided a different point of view for the Kurdish problem. He asserted that those battles are not the solutions, the Republic of Turkey have a power to bring peaceful solution to this issue. Thus, the democratic reform package, which
was offered by Erdogan would give the recognition of the right to education in one’s mother tongue, open a new TV channel in Kurdish language, and the any changes in their name of villages would be accepted (Hacaloglu 2013). Those reforms ensured the Kurdish people vote to reelect Erdogan. The reform package was accepted by 57.88% of the voters. As a result, the headscarf ban was annulled and the promises given to the Kurdish people were put in force (Cumhuriyet 2014).

![Voting Rates of Erdogan](image)

**FIGURE-6: Voting rates of Erdogan**

Source: Author’s calculation based on Newspaper official statements for Venezuela’s election, R: Referendum

After the referendum, the general elections were held in 2011. Erdogan received 49.83% of votes. This voting rate and his accomplishment gave Erdogan more power. So, after the constitutional changes, Erdogan abandoned liberalization. Instead, he gradually focused on monopolizing his power in Turkey. In the Turkish national elections, the AKP became Turkey’s predominant party in 2011 (Gumuscu 2013).
While becoming stronger, The Fettullah Gulen’s\(^8\) Cemaat\(^9\) had been a supporter of Erdogan. Cemaat had a strong influential in conservative parties since its foundation. Like any other predecessors, AKP were in a communication with Gulen who lives in the USA. Both Gulen and Erdogan come from same cultural background. "They are both known as pious Muslims who opposed secularism and army's role in politics" (Gol 2016). Therefore, Gulen's followers supported Erdogan all the time. Erdogan's higher voting rate mostly came from Gulen's followers. As the voting rates displayed, Gulen was the strongest person in Turkey until 2013 (Guercio 2017b, 55). While Gulen’s followers supporting Erdogan, Erdogan was giving privileges to Gulen’s school and its foundations. However, this relationship came to a dead end. When Erdogan won the 2013 elections, he decided to close down Gulen’s prep-schools for the university entrance exam (Dershaneler resmen kapatıldı haberi 2014). The schools were a huge money resource for the Cemaat. Thus, the mutual cooperation turned into fierce hatred. This hostility met in the coup attempt in July 15, 2015. Erdogan claimed that Gulen movement was behind this attempt (Kasapoglu 2016).

The public went out to the streets to protect democracy, or so it seemed. At first, some citizens thought that they would honestly protect democracy; however, the majority shouted out "I am going to die for Erdogan" (Ebebi Ehver 2016) Erdogan gave a direction to the public to protect their country. He mentioned that if someone dies for their country, they will be "Şehit" (according to Islam, Şehit

---

\(^8\) The political figure in Turkey. He is known as a preacher. He founded the Gulen movement.

\(^9\) Also known as the Gulen movement. It is an international Islamic and social movement. It has been effective in Turkey since 1969.
people will go directly to Heaven) (Yeni Şafak 2018). He took advantage of the majority to protect his position. This was the next to last attack to take Turkey towards authoritarianism.

Although he declared a state of emergency for a period of three months after the coup attempt, this declaration stayed in force until the last election. With this declaration, Erdogan ruled Turkey by decree. The government closed down 3 news agencies, 16 television stations, 23 radio stations, 45 newspapers, 15 magazines and 29 publishers. Thousands of people have been arrested as coup suspects and this has been continuing (The Government’s Deepening Assault on Critical Journalism | HRW 2016). This failed attempt had given Erdogan what he wanted. He also rewrote the Turkish constitution via referendum in 2017. This is the last attack up against democracy. The Turkish Parliamentary system has been changed to the presidential system (Anayasa değişikliği ve Başkanlık sistemi maddeleri nelerdir? - 2017). Although the AKP and Erdogan have emphasized that these amendments will create democratic stabilization in the country, the amendments show that Erdogan will have all power in his hand. The new constitution annulled the power of the parliament; hence Erdogan has more room for his supporters under the roof of the parliament. Moreover, the control power of jurisdiction over the president was weakened. As a result, checks and balances in the Turkish system was diminished.

Turkey's economy is still under control. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s 2017 data, Turkey is an emerging market (IMF 2017b). As it is reported by World Bank Statistics and IMF’s Statistics, Turkey has the world’s
18th largest nominal GDP (IMF 2017a; World Bank 2016). Whereas Venezuela's inflation rate, after 2013, has been increasing restrain, Turkey's inflation rate is stable. It can be seen in the Figure-4 (above). As it is seen in the Figure-7, although both countries have economic fluctuations, Turkey's Real GDP growth has never experienced a trough since the election of Erdogan, like what Venezuela have been experiencing since 2016. These statistics demonstrate that there is not a chance that Turkey is en route of authoritarianism as a result of economic crisis.

FIGURE-7: Real GDP growth (Annual percent change)

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Accessed November 25, 2018
Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion

DISCUSSION

Democratization is a challenging process for countries. Even if a powerful democratic country demands to maintain its democratic position, it has to put in the effort. However, leaders are not willing to give up their seat.

Chavez, Madura, and Erdogan are representatives of this argument. For example, whenever Erdogan realized he had more power, he rewrote the Turkish constitution to change the parliamentary system to the presidential system in 2017 through a referendum. He got all his power depending on people who has sensitive political issues. He received 51% of the vote as yes to change the Turkish Constitution (NTV 2017). Like Erdoğan, when Chavez had the power, he also rewrote the constitution of Venezuela. In 2000, Chavez got all the power and diminished parliament. Although the military attempted the coup, they failed in 2002. There were so many supporters of Chavez in that time (Canache 2012). Because of his popularity, he was elected as president getting 58% of the public vote. He did anything for the public to maintain his popularity. However, his popularity did not bring wealth to the country, rather Venezuela is a country that while its citizens starve to death, it has the largest oil reserves in the world. Because Chavez took advantages of under-represent parts of society, he easily managed to become an authoritarian leader.

Another main point of the thesis is what the dynamics of authoritarianism in both countries is. These findings and articles demonstrate that both Venezuela and
Turkey are on their way to authoritarian regimes. There are many ways to diverge from democracy. Political and economic policies can count one of them. Whereas Venezuela took steps to become an authoritarian country by using economic policies, Turkey’s steps were on political policies. When statistics, taken from reliable institutions and information are taken from articles and newspapers are put together, they stand behind my hypothesis.

Relying on the results, I would assert this research is valuable for studies of authoritarianism and democratization. It reveals what kind of dynamics can lead the countries toward authoritarianism. Therefore, the paper would assist researchers of democratization and authoritarianism. However, without exception, all research has limitations in many ways. Not only is this study limited by two countries data but also is limited by countries’ data. There might be the countries which would have the same problems display different results. Therefore, the generalizability of the results is scant. In addition, this study is not elaborative of the quantitative data. Since the indicated countries lack government transparency, the accessibility of the quantitative data was almost insignificant. Moreover, some of Venezuela’s official government web pages were in only Spanish. It raises accessibility problems. Since the research is mostly done with qualitative methods, I used newspapers and magazines as my main data; however, the media would not be objective in such countries. While partisan presses glorify governments, opponents have more negative interpretation than it is.

Since democratization still is a popular issue, my research also has many implications for future researchers, specifically for the researchers who are
interested in authoritarianism and democratization. Even though Venezuela’s and Turkey’s authoritarianism derive from different reasons, the findings display that the steps towards authoritarianism are almost exactly the same. Therefore, the inclusion of the other counties will allow more accurate results. In addition, during analysis of the findings, the rhetoric of the leaders on indicated policies (economic and politics) draw attention. In the next research, the hypothesis would be analyzed in two steps to set a broad sample. In this case, the first step should be analyzing the effect of the rhetorics on the economy and politics. Afterward, it should be analyzed whether the policies determined by rhetoric change the country regime. However, such extensive research requires more time and resources.

In conclusion, although both countries have free elections, their policies do not support democracy anymore. However, the Venezuelan and Turkish masses still support democracy. The public of both countries are not the supporters of the authoritative regime. It is ambiguous how the support of democracy by the public will affect the countries. The returning back to democracy will not be easy for the countries, if they persist on their current policies.


Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan.


——. 2017b. World Economic Outlook.


Kasapoglu, Cagil. 2016. "15 Temmuz Girişiminin Arkasında Kim Var?" *BBC Turkce*.


KONDA. 2009. *RELIGION, SECULARISM AND TÜRBA N IN DAILY LIFE.*


TBMM. 1982. "CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY."


