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Diplomacy and Prejudice; A Seventy-one Year Survey of Japanese-American Relations

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BY

Craig M. Chambers

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I Japanese-American Relations Prior to 1906

The beginning of Japanese-American diplomatic relations occurred on July 5, 1853; when Commodore Matthew Calbraeth Perry sailed into Yedo Bay and demanded an audience with the Shogun. Perry's arrival ended two hundred plus years of Japan's isolation from the rest of the world.

Japanese isolation resulted from the attempt of Tokugawa Ieyasu and his heirs to achieve stability within their governments. Tokugawa, in 1600, had become the third man in the history of Japan to gain complete control of all Japan. The two rulers prior to that time had failed to establish a permanent line of succession for their heirs. Maintaining the status quo became the main emphasis for all the Shoguns in the Tokugawa line.

Tokugawa believed that the dogma of Christianity contained such a threat. He proceeded to drive out the Christian missionaries and all the western merchants who had been closely associated with them. The Dutch, a Christian nation, in no way had attempted to seek converts to their faith received permission to trade at the port of Nagasaki. The Chinese, due to a similar cultural background as the Japanese, also received the same benefit as the Dutch.

These two countries represented the only contacts that Japan had with the rest of the world. The year 1641 represented the beginning of Japan's isolation.[1]

Japan's geographical location greatly aided her in following the policy of isolation successfully. She was the most distant country from Europe. Further advances in technology, desire of other countries to trade with her and the development of the United States broke down this isolation. The United States did, in fact, provide the key to the opening of Japan. Japan stood in the path of American traders on their way to trade with China.

Japan's isolation eventually came to an end. As all events in history, it did not happen at a precise moment. The first record of an American visiting Japan mentioned the visit of Lady Washington, captained by John Kendrick of Wareham, Massachusetts. He visited the little seaport Kashinoura in May, 1791, in an attempt to sell sea otter pelts to the local merchants.[2] Another event occurred in 1797 when the American ship Eliza, captained by Robert Steward, landed at the port of Nagasaki. It had been charted by the Dutch. Captain Steward, in 1803, attempted to trade with

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[1]Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (New York: The Viking Press, 1957), pp. 7-8. Also, Edward M. Barrows, The Great Commodore (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1935), p. 207.

[2]Foster Rhea Dulles, Yankees and Samurai (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 1-5.

Japan on his own, but received no satisfaction. Also that same year a Russo-American firm chartered an American ship to trade at Nagasaki but the venture was unsuccessful.[3]

Several years later, 1837, seven Japanese seamen had been rescued off the coast of Macao. Charles W. King, of the American trading firm of D. W. C. Oliphant and Company, hoped to return these men in exchange for the privilege to trade with Japan. He arrived at Edo Bay at midnight of July 30th. The port officials immediately ordered his ship fired upon and it left. In 1842 the Shogun decreed that under certain special circumstances foreign ships entering Japanese waters might be supplied with food and water. Japan's fear of an open clash with the Western powers resulted in this minor concession.[4] An American whaler, _Manhattan_, in 1845 did rescue and return ten Japanese seamen. The Shogun, after he had expressed his thanks, ordered the ships refueled and resupplied.[5]

That same year the United States government began to awaken to the possibility of trade with Japan. Congressman Zadoc Pratt (Democrat-Connecticut) in February 1845 offered a resolution proposing a trade mission to Japan. President Polk ordered Alexander Everett to visit Japan, after he had delivered the ratification of the first trade treaty with China, to see if trade relations could be established. Before Everett could carry out his mission he became ill. James

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[3]Hikomatsu Kamikawa, _Japan-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era_ (Tokyo: Pan Pacific Press, 1958), pp. 5-6.

[4]Dulles, _Yankees and Samurai_, p. 23.

[5]Kamikawa, _op. cit_.

Biddle, Commodore of the East Indian Squadron, who had negotiated the China trade treaty, replaced Everett. Biddle arrived at Uraga, on July 20, 1846, and spent nine fruitless days there. Commodore Biddle received much criticism for his lack of forcefulness in dealing with the Japanese officials.[6] He not only appeared badly to the government at Washington but he had been literally pushed or bumped into the bay by seaman. In the eyes of the Japanese this loss of dignity cast a bad light upon himself and the government in Washington.[7]

Other events led the United States to seek the opening of Japan. Several times Americans had become shipwrecked off the coast of Japan and were rumored to have been mistreated and kept in prison. At the time of Biddle's visit to Japan, seven shipwrecked American seamen had been rescued and confined by the Japanese authorities. Six of these men suffered mistreatment at the hands of their rescuers due to their rebellious behavior. The Japanese after having detained them seventeen months turned them over to the Dutch.[8] The other American seaman Ranald MacDonald, taught his hosts English and these men later became interpreters for their government during the Perry visits.[9]

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[6]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[7]Inazo Oto Nitobe, The Japanese Nation (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1912), pp. 269-70.

[8]Dulles, Yankees and Samurai, pp. 35-38.

[9]Kamikawa, op. cit., pp.7-8. Also cited in Herbert H. Gowen, Five Foreigners In Japan (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1936), pp. 175-178.

Events began to move quickly toward a determined effort upon the part of the United States to acquire a trade treaty with Japan. Pressure began to grow from official sources. The Chief of New York Foreign Affairs Bureau, Aaron Haight Palmer urged in 1849 treaties with nations in the East.[10] Two years later Commodore John Aulick urged the United States to use seventeen rescued Japanese seamen to force a deal. Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, drafted a letter to the Mikado to be presented should a favorable opportunity to discuss trade present itself but before Aulick could proceed on his assigned mission, the government had second thoughts about the matter and relieved him of this assignment. Instead of Aulick the job of seeking a treaty with Japan became the task of Commodore Perry. However, Perry did not depart upon his historical voyage until more careful provisions had been made for the success of his mission than had been made for Biddle's.[11]

After much careful planning and lengthy preparation Commodore Perry arrived, as earlier mentioned, at Yedo Bay. Perhaps he did not know at the time but he had an old Japanese ballad working for him. The Japanese peasant, fisherman and villager had remained wholly ignorant of the world beyond their shores. Superstitious about the barbarians and their

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[10] Kamikawa, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[11] Ibid.

Christian religions renewed their fears when Perry's ships arrived, two of them belching black smoke. The ballard read:

> Through a dark night of cloud and rain;
> The Black Ship plies her way--
> An alien thing of evil mien
> Across the waters gray.[12]

A letter from President Fillmore to the Shogun stated the purpose of his mission. It said, in part: "These are the only objects for which I have sent Commodore Perry, with a powerful squadron, to pay a visit to your imperial majesty's renowned city of Yedo (Tokyo); friendship, commerce, a supply of coal and provisions, and protection for our shipwrecked people."[13]

Perry, as others before him, did not receive any formal welcome by the Japanese. His persistent refusal to leave and the backing of his squadron finally accomplished the purpose of his mission. After three weeks of waiting the Shogun, understanding that Perry would not leave, agreed to receive President Fillmore's letter on July 25.[14] Perry delivered the letter and promised to return the next spring to negotiate a treaty with Japan.

Perry returned to Japan early the next year. On March 31, 1854, the Treaty of Peace and Amity became a fact. It

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[12] Dulles, Yankee and Samurai, pp. 51-52. Also cited in Willis Fletcher Johnson, America's Foreign Relations, (New York: The Century Co., 1916), I, p. 485.

[13] Lindsey Russell, editor, America to Japan (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1915), p. 313.

[14] Kamikawa, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

provided for the protection of shipwrecked sailors and opened two more ports in addition to Nagasaki. A residence could be established at the port of Shimoda and it granted Americans all privileges which might in subsequent treaties be granted to other nations.[15] The Treaty, as compared with other formal treaties between nations, contained very little but it accomplished what no other nation could or would do for over two hundred years. The treaty represented the beginning of Japan's intercourse with the rest of the world. Japan had taken the first step away from isolation and it would never return to such a policy again.

To really appreciate the above events, a brief look at the ancient political structure of Japan, a look at the events in Japan between Perry's first and second visits, and the events following the signing of the treaty becomes necessary. Prior to the rule of Shoguns the spiritual and political power centered on the Emperor. His rule could be described as feudalistic in nature. A separate military class developed under the control of one man called the Shogun who owed allegiance to the Emperor. The Shoguns eventually became more powerful than the Emperors because of their control over the military. As earlier mentioned, the Shogun Tokugawa and his heirs managed to control all of Japan from 1600 to 1868. The structure established by the Shoguns consisted of the Bakufu--his administrative arm; the daimio--the equivalent of Dukes and Lords under the English feudal system; and finally

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[15]Johnson, op. cit., I, p. 490.

included the Samurai--warriors or knights. However, the Emperor still remained as the spiritual leader and presided in his palace at Kyoto. The Shogun presided at his palace in Yedo (Tokyo). The Shogun's power became so strong he rarely consulted the daimio but ruled mainly through the Bakufu which meant he ruled absolutely. The various incidents which threatened to violate the enforced isolation of Japan and finally Perry's success in achieving a treaty of friendship greatly weakened the Shogun's authority.

After Perry's first visit, the greatly troubled Shogun Iyeyoshi died and his son, a moron, Iyesado succeded him. Iyesado had an able adviser in Abe Masahiro but when the evidence became apparent that the Shogun would be forced to negotiate a treaty with Perry on his return trip; the supporters who wished to see the political power returned to the Emperor began to challenge the attempt to remove the policy of isolation.[16]

A group of the Shogun's followers suggested delay and equivocation until such time adequate military arrangements could be made and the door could then be resecured from foreigners.[17] Two things finally influenced Japan's desire to sign such a treaty. There existed a group of influential Japanese merchants who could foresee the possibility of

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[16]Dulles, Yankees and Samurai, pp. 145-147. Also cited in Herbert H. Gowen, An Outline History of Japan (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1930), p. 297.

[17]Dulles, Yankees and Samurai, p. 59. Also cited in Gowen, An Outline History of Japan, p. 297.

expanding trade with other peoples besides the Dutch and Chinese. These Japanese merchants wielded no little influence in persuading the Shogun to sign. The ultimate factor which finally forced the Shogun to sign centered upon the poor state of the defenses of the country. Japan's ancient weapons were no match for Perry's guns. The short period between Perry's two visits would not give them time to prepare adequate coastal defenses.[18]

Following the signing of the treaty of 1854 Japan became torn by internal unrest. A very conservative and powerful group agitated so strongly against those persons who had taken part in the negotiations that everyone of them fell at the hands of assassins.[19] Civil war shortly followed, but nothing changed Japan's course in her dealings with foreign nations.[20] Japan had committed herself to a foreign policy of international trade which could not be stopped.

Despite the troubles Japan had overcoming the shock of opening her doors to foreign trade she remembered and greatly respected Commodore Perry. The Japanese commissioners, during the exchange of ratifications of the treaty on February 21, 1855, assured Perry that "...his name would live forever in the

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[18] Kamikawa, _op. cit._, pp. 22-23.

[19] Nitobe, _op. cit._, pp. 281-282.

[20] _Ibid._ Also cited in Dulles, _Yankees and Samurai_, pp. 145-147.

history of Japan."[21] The Japanese erected a statue of Perry in 1901, on the spot where he had first landed.[22]

The United States quickly followed up the ratification of the treaty by sending Townsend Harris, the first American Conculor General, the following year. Harris observed before leaving for Japan, "I shall be the first recognized agent from a civilized power to reside in Japan. This forms an epoch in my life and may be the beginning of a new order of things in Japan. I hope I may so conduct myself that I may have honorable mention in the histories which will be written on Japan and its future destiny."[23]

Harris's goals in Japan consisted of establishing a strong bond of friendship, trust, and a treaty of commerce. Harris became successful with all three goals and on December 12, 1857 he achieved an interview with Lord Hotto. Lord Hotto proved to be one of the most enlightened of the Shogun's officials.[24] Harris, after this meeting, wrote, "I may be said to be now engaged in teaching the elements of political

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[21] Johnson, op. cit., I, p. 490.

[22] Ibid.

[23] M. E. Cosenza, editor, The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1930), p. vi. This entry was dated August 17, 1856.

[24] Payson J. Treat, Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Japan, 1853-1895 (Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 1932), I, p. 50. Hereinafter referred to as Treat, 1853-1895.

economy to the Japanese and in giving them information as to the workings of commercial regulations in the West."[25]

The task of negotiating the treaty became a long one and it took twenty sessions before the final draft received approval. During the sessions they would exhaustively discuss clauses of the treaty and would reopen discussion on those clauses that had already been agreed upon.[26] The treaty provided for trade regulations and allowed American consuls at the open ports and Japanese consuls in American ports. It also established July 4, 1859 as the effective date for the treaty and set July 4, 1872 as the date for revision of the treaty should either side desire it revised.[27]

The United States did get the benefit of another clause which it had not intended to receive. A statement had been approved to the effect that should Japan give any additional tariff benefits or other specific agreements to another foreign nation; the United States would also obtain such privilege or privileges. The treaty had provided for a conventional tariff but, due to the numerous treaties which Japan later made with other countries, she became tightly bound by the various additional stipulations.[28] Japan's handling of her treaty

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[25]Cosenza, op. cit., p. 490.

[26]Treat, 1853-1895, I, p. 57.

[27]Ibid., pp. 58-60.

[28]Ibid., p. 62.

negotiations with the other nations also tied her fast to the United States treaty of 1858 beyond the revision date of 1872. No treaty could be revised unless all the other nations would consent to change their treaties.[29] Another unanticipated hardship hit Japan economically. She had agreed to the export of gold and silver in payment of goods received. For some time the balance of trade against Japan drew heavily on her gold and silver reserves.[30]

The treaty of 1858 did provide a just basis for the development of trade and friendship between the two countries. The United States had not knowingly devised a treaty to hinder Japan. Japan, after two hundred years of isolation, became so affected by this involvement in world trade that she sent a large delegation to the United States in the spring of 1860 to formally present the English copy of the treaty to President Buchanan. The voyage from Japan to the United States and the presentation followed according to the highest standards of protocol. The envoy included Ji Kamon-no-kami Naosuke, Tairo of Japan (prime minister); Buyen-no-kami Masaoki, 1st Ambassador; Tanso Awaji-no-kami Muragaki, 2nd Ambassador; Oguri Tadomas, censor; and numerous lesser officials.[31] The envoy traveled

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[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Tanso Muragaki, Kokai Nikki (Tokyo: Foreign Affairs Ass. of Japan, 1958), p. 1. The diary of the Japanese embassy to the United States in 1860.

in the American ship Powhatan and the Japanese ship Konrin Maru accompanied them with Kimura Settsu-no-kami Nobutaku, Superintendent of Warships, in charge.[32]

Ambassador Muragaki kept a very complete diary of the events from the time of their departure to their return home and their audience with the Shogun. The diary included American newspaper articles which seemed to please the Ambassador. One article from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, dated May 29, 1860 read: "The importance of the Embassy from above thirty millions of wealthy, ingenious and industrious people cannot be overrated...."[33] Another article entitled, "The Japanese Embassy, and What Will Come of It," New York Illustrated News, May 26, 1860 also appeared in the diary and it stated:

> We cannot fail to be proud of our prospects, therefore, with this singular, and most interesting people--and it is no slight national honor that the first accredited political embassy which has left their shores, has been sent to the capital of this great Republic.[34]

Upon their return to Japan, Ambassador Muragaki wrote:

> The Shogun summoned us to his private living room. When he had us tell of the United States of America and other foreign countries, he looked highly pleased and spoke to us in a most gracious manner.[35]

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[32] Ibid., p. 3.

[33] Ibid., p. 200. The article was entitled "Our Japanese Guest."

[34] Ibid., pp. 198-99.

[35] Ibid., p. 177.

The diary further explained that the Shogun gave numerous gifts to them. The Shogun had very rarely ever given gifts to his government officials. The Ambassador realizing the rarity of such an event wrote:

> I, therefore, had a casket made for these gifts so that with a record written by myself, they might be handed down to my posterity as one of our family treasures.[36]

Officially Japan existed on a peaceful basis with the rest of the world. However, unofficially certain Japanese groups did not like coming out from behind closed doors. One last effort occurred in mid-1863, by the Cha-Shiri clan, to withdraw from the world. This clan closed the Strait of Simonoseki between the Inland Sea of Japan and the China Sea. An American merchant ship came under fire. United States Minister R. H. Pruyn, Townsend Harris's successor, sent the warship Wyoming which also came under attack but it sunk one ship, damaged two others, and engaged the land batteries. An expedition of 9 British, 4 Dutch, 3 French, and 1 American ship reopened the straits and the four nations divided a $3,000,000 indemnity among themselves. After this event foreigners received better treatment and respect in Japan. The United States, twenty years later, paid back its share of the indemnity.[37] This may have been the precedent for the return of the Boxer Indemnity which the United States received in 1900.

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Johnson, op. cit., I, pp. 495-96.

Japan began to carry on diplomatic relations with other countries. On November 24, 1869 she instituted the practice of stationing ministers in foreign lands. Mori Arinori, the first minister to the United States, was charged with the "...social responsibilities and the supervision of the Japanese students abroad."[38] Japan had come full circle; from isolation to representatives in foreign capitals. She had not achieved equality among nations due to her entangling treaties, but from the time of Perry's arrival to November 24, 1869 a gigantic step in that direction had resulted

Japan took the opportunity in 1869 to request the revision of the treaty of 1858. Nothing came as a result of this request.[39] Japan, late in 1871, dispatched a mission under Prince Iwakura Tomoni to visit the United States and the rest of the treaty nations. The Iwakura Mission arrived at San Francisco on January 15, 1872. The Iwakura Mission did not attempt to revise the treaty of 1858 until after it had visited the other treaty nations.[40] The Iwakura Mission visited England, France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, some of the German States, Italy, Austria, Hungary and Switzerland.[41] The United States had been the

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[38]Kamikawa, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 73.

[39]Treat, <u>1853-1895</u>, I, p. 393.

[40]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 420.

[41]<u>Ibid</u>., p. 449n.

only nation willing to revise it's treaty while the rest wished to keep their special privileges. It would not be until 1894, that Japan could obtain the desired revisions. Consequently the central feature of Japan's foreign policy consistently pushed for revision.[42]

The special privileges, mentioned above, should be understood before proceeding. The other nations, not including the United States, had not only received the benefits of special tariffs but had maintained extraterritorial jurisdiction over their nationals. This meant any crimes committed by their nationals would be tried in the respective courts of the country which the accused claimed as his native country. The judges would also be from the same country.[43] Japan thus felt strongly about both the tariff and extraterritoriality.

The United States consistently favored revision, but it either did not or could not influence any of the other treaty powers to come to the same conclusion. United States Minister to Japan, John H. Bingham, received permission from Secretary of State Evarts to negotiate a separate tariff treaty in 1878. Japan and the United States signed it on July 25, 1878, but the

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[42]Treat, Japan and the United States, 1853-1921 (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928), pp. 114-115. Hereafter referred to as Treat, 1853-1921, (1928).

[43]Johnson, op. cit., II, p. 226.

tenth provision would not allow it to go into effect until the other treaty powers had agreed to revising their treaties. It failed to become effective, but it did add to the goodwill between the two countries.[44]

The Japanese government made another unsuccessful attempt in 1882 to persuade the treaty nations to revise their treaties.[45] Again in 1886, Japan held a diplomatic conference of all the treaty powers in Tokyo. Japanese officials achieved a small gain in regards to the tariff but not extraterritorial jurisdiction. Native judges would be allowed to sit on the bench but the majority of each court remained in control of foreigners appointed by the diplomatic body and these latter would control all the rules and procedures of the courts.[46] This event so aroused the Japanese; that Count Inouze, Japan's Foreign Minister, resigned. The United States had been the only nation to favor Japan and had signed a treaty of extradition.[47]

One more attempt was made to revise the 1858 treaty, on February 20, 1889. Richard B. Hubbard signed a new treaty of amity and commerce. Before this treaty reached Washington

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[44]Treat, 1853-1921, (1928), pp. 123-24. Also cited in Johnson, op. cit., II, p. 226.

[45]Johnson, op. cit., II, p. 226.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ibid.

the administration had changed and the Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, reserved the convention for further consideration.[48]

The treaty revision came about finally in 1894 at the onset of the Sino-Japanese War. Great Britain became the key country to break the old treaties. Great Britain had the most to lose concerning the tariff and she also had the most nationals residing in Japan.[49] Also, Great Britain had numerous holdings in China and felt she could best protect herself in the event that Japan should control China after the war. The treaty became a fact on July 16, 1894. The United States quickly followed by ratifying its proposed treaty of 1878, on November 22, 1894. By 1899, Japan had freed itself of all obligations and became a peer among nations.[50] The United States had constantly set the pattern for revision but it took the influential Great Britain to break the deadlock.

Shortly after Great Britain signed the treaty revision, on July 25, 1894; China and Japan went to war. Japan claimed that the annexation of Korea by China would endanger her security.[51] At that time, both China and Japan requested the United States to take charge of their archives and protect

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[48]Treat, 1853-1921, (1928), p. 129.

[49]Ibid., pp. 130-131.

[50]Johnson, op. cit., II, p. 229.

[51]Keyoshi Karl Kawakami, Japan in World Politics (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1917), p. 169.

the interests of their nationals in the enemy country. The United States did so with satisfaction expressed by both China and Japan.[52] The United States held the trust of both China and Japan to the extent that each side employed an American as advisor during the peace negotiations which followed the war. John W. Foster advised the Chinese mission and H. W. Denison advised the Japanese.[53] On April 17, 1895, the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty became effective. On May 12, Emperor Meiji wrote a letter to President Cleveland, thanking the American diplomats for watching Japanese interests in China and for bringing about the peace negotiations.[54]

Japan's victory in China increased her reputation as a new and powerful nation. This victory then placed Japan almost as an equal among the world powers. With this knowledge and the feeling of power would cause Japan to distrust any nation that might appear to obstruct her goals. However, Japan's rise as a world power caused the other world powers to become suspicious of Japan's intentions. Distrust of Japan grew within the United States also. Japan's attitude toward the annexation of Hawaii by the United States seemed to confirm American uneasiness. The cause for suspicion, to a certain extent, was justified.

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[52]Treat, 1853-1921, (1921), p. 154.

[53]Ibid., p. 156.

[54]Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 169.

The first Japanese contact with Hawaii occurred when the mission which brought the treaty of 1858 to Washington stopped in Hawaii for water and fuel. The king of Hawaii, Kamehomeka IV granted an audience to Masaoka and expressed a wish to negotiate a treaty with Japan. Americans and other Westerners controlled the sugar industry and a need existed for oriental workers.[55]

The emigration of Japanese to Hawaii did not start for twenty years but the opening of negotiations had begun. In 1871 Japan signed a treaty of friendship with Hawaii and in 1876 the United States and Hawaii signed a trade treaty which made Hawaii economically dependent upon the United States. Hawaiian King Kalakaua invited in March, 1881 the emigration of Japanese nationals to Hawaii and Japan later sanctioned this emigration. Finally, on January 28, 1886, in Tokyo, Hawaii signed an emigration treaty which provided that after one years residence, the Japanese would have the right to vote and after three years, the right of citizenship. However, in June, 1887, pressure from Western citizens only allowed Hawaiians, Americans and Europeans the vote.[56]

The next ten years in Hawaii events occurred that changed Hawaii's status from an independent country to one of complete dependency upon the United States. King Kalakaua died in 1891 and his successor, Queen Liliuokalani tried to

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[55]Ibid., p. 127.

[56]Ibid., pp. 129-130.

assume absolute control over her government but instead lost her throne. A provisional government came into being on January 17, 1893. Sanford B. Dole, son of a missionary and leader of the fight for Hawaiian annexation, became the president of the Provisional government. Later he became the first governor of the Territory of Hawaii from 1900-1903.

The question of Hawaiian annexation became a hotly debated subject which could not be trusted to withstand a two-thirds vote of the Senate was passed by a joint-resolution of Congress which required only a simple majority. The annexation of Hawaii received the backing of such expansionist as Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican-Massachusetts). They believed that Hawaii could be a naval station on the way to control the Pacific and trade with the Far East.[57] The significant factor which assured annexation came on the vote of Senator George F. Hoar (Republican--Maine) the leading isolationist. He hoped that annexation would help promote trade and commerce but mainly he felt Hawaii would be good for national defence. He feared possible war with Japan and he didn't believe annexation to set precedent for United States imperialism.[58]

President McKinley, on June 16, 1897, signed the treaty of annexation. However, Japan's minister to Hawaii lodged

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[57]Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), pp. 22-24. Also cited in Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 65-67.

[58]Dulles, America's Rise to World Power, pp. 43-44.

a formal protest against such action. The annexation would void the Japanese-Hawaiian treaty of 1886. Japan feared the status quo would be disturbed in the Pacific and the interest of some 25,000 Japanese in Hawaii would be jeopardized.[59] Japan further added that it did not have any designs of its own against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of the islands.[60]

The United States countered that though the Japanese-Hawaiian treaty would fall, the Japanese living in Hawaii would not lose any rights that they had already acquired but this still meant no vote and no citizenship. The Japanese-United States treaty of 1894 would replace the Japanese-Hawaiian treaty. The United States further added that annexation represented the logical culmination of events of the past years.[61]

Not all Americans favored Hawaiian annexation. An article in Forum, August, 1897, believed that Japan and Great Britain desired to attack the United States and that annexation of Hawaii would provoke it.[62] The German-American press often acted as the main outlet for German propaganda in the United States. Germany hoped to increase her holdings in the Pacific

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[59] Thomas Andrew Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), p. 474.

[60] Johnson, op. cit., II, p. 183.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Steven M. White, "The Proposed Annexation of Hawaii", Forum, XXIII (August, 1897), 723-736.

and due to this the United States became distrustful of her actions. Shortly following Commodore George Dewey's successful defeat of the Spanish Navy at Manila; the Germans defied the American blockade and went into Manila to remove their nationals. Dewey became angry and threatened war with her commander.[63] On July 27, 1898, John Hay, then Ambassador to Great Britain wrote, "The Vaterland is all on fire with greed, and terror of us. They want the Philippines, the Carolines, and Somoas---they want to get into our markets and keep us out of theirs.... I do not think they want to fight.... But they want by pressure, by threats, & by sulking and wheedling in turn to get something out of us and Spain."[64] The following German journals opposed annexation: 1) Volksblatt, (Rep), Cincinnati, Ohio; 2) Anzerger des Westerns, (Ind), St. Louis; 3) Volks-Zeitung (Socialist), New York; 4) Freie Presse (Independent and Free Silver), Chicago; and 5) Staats-Zeitung (Gold Democrat), New York.[65]

The foreign press generally recognized the right of the United States to annex Hawaii. The Home News, London, specifically agreed to the right of American annexation. The Celestial Empire, Shanghai, urged the United States to "...hurry on with

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[63]Thomas Andrew Bailey, The American Pageant (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1961), pp. 620-621.

[64]Beale, op. cit., p. 336.

[65]"Foreign Views of the Annexation of Hawaii", Literary Digest, XV, No. 12 (July 17, 1897), 352.

annexation." The Chinese objected to any form of Japanese expansion.[66] Regardless of opinion, Hawaiian annexation became a fact on August 12, 1898.

The following year the United States became more deeply involved in the Far East. China, the powerless giant, had been quickly eaten up by so-called spheres of influence. These foreign controlled spheres threatened to make China a closed corporation. China would not only lose control of its trade but also of its political integrity.

Six of the then most powerful nations in the world held privileged spheres in which no other nation could trade except by permission of these six. Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, Italy, and France held these spheres. The United States, who held no such spheres, became worried lest it be shut out of China. Secretary of State, John Hay, wishing to keep China's doors open to trade and to protect China's sovereignity, sent a note to each of the above six to get them to agree on such an idea. Later these notes became known as Hay's Open Door Notes.

On September 6, 1899, Hay sent his first notes to Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. These three wished to wait and see how the rest of the holders of spheres stood on the matter. On November 13, Hay sent a note to Japan; on November 17, to Italy; and on November 21, to France. Italy agreed unconditionally to such an open door agreement. The rest,

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[66] Ibid., No. 20 (Sept. 11, 1897), 578.

not exactly accepting, would go along with such a proposal should all six agree to the plan. Secretary Hay then quickly declared these answers to be acceptances of his proposal and announced on March 20, 1900 that the United States would accept the Open Door Notes as policy in its dealings with China.[67]

The Japanese became worried, at this time, about the intentions of the United States in China. The year before, the United States had eliminated the Japanese influence in Hawaii. The phrase, in the Open Door Notes, that bothered Japan read, "...equal trade opportunities for all nations."[68] Japanese Minister to London, Matsui, hinted at American ambition for large scale expansion in China. The ambiguous phrase could mean anything. Would it mean that those holding large spheres of influence be forced to give up part of their spheres or share them with other countries. Japan had one of the larger spheres in China. If that phrase meant what she feared it to mean; she would lose a great deal. Japan's fear did not come about. At the time she did have a justifiable worry concerning United States intent due to the ambiguous wording.

Two months later, on June 20, 1900, the Boxer Rebellion started. A strong anti-foreign group within China had established so-called athletic clubs as a front while this

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[67]Treat, 1853-1921 (1921), p. 171.

[68]Kamikawa, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

group plotted to forcefully remove all resident foreigners from China. Thus when the fifty-five day rebellion occurred the name Boxer Rebellion became attached to it. Six nations combined forces to relieve the legations trapped in Peking. Japan sent the largest number of troops, with token forces from Russia, Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States. After the rebellion had been suppressed, Russia, Germany, and France received the largest indemnity. Great Britain, United States, and Japan, who all received an indemnity for their part, notably wanted only a moderate indemnity to be established. The United States, who had forced the adoption of the Open Door Policy, did not want to see this policy ended. Great Britain and Japan feared the other three countries intentions and argued for a moderate indemnity.[69] The United States later returned its share of the indemnity to be set up as a fund for Chinese students to attend American universities.

A significant phrase, which came out of the Boxer Rebellion, originated at the time of this rebellion by European newspapers in the Far East. The phrase, Yellow Peril, meant danger from the Chinese race.[70] It would be later used by Americans to mean danger from the Japanese.

The spectre of the Japanese Yellow Peril raised its head in 1904. Russia and Japan existed as close, bitter rivals in

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[69]Treat, 1853-1921, (1921), pp. 171-178.

[70]Chang Yow Tong, "A Chinaman on the Yellow Peril", Review of Reviews, XXX, No. 1, (September, 1904), 337-338.

China and Korea. Russia held Manchuria and desired to expand into Korea and other parts of China. Japan's influence in Korea existed as paramount and she wished to extend her influence into Manchuria and parts of China that Russia desired. Using the pretext that Russia presented a threat to her security in Korea Japan, without warning, on February 8, 1904, attacked Russia. Elihu Root, then a trusted adviser to President Theodore Roosevelt, wrote to the President what seemed to be the consensus of opinion by both the vocal public and the United States government. He said, "Was not the way the Japs began the fight bully?"[71]

The Russo-Japanese War proved to be more than just a war between two countries but one of international importance. France and Germany seriously contemplated helping Russia in exchange for further expansion of their spheres of influence. When word of such action reached Roosevelt, he quickly promised Japan that the United States would remain neutral and he warned France and Germany that should they join with Russia, the United States would come to the aid of Japan.[72] The United States believed that the Open Door policy would better be served by backing Japan.

Roosevelt did believe, however, that should Japan win, she might also be a threat to United States interests in East

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[71]Beale, op. cit., p. 236.

[72]Elinor Tupper and George E. McReynolds, Japan in American Public Opinion (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1937), p. 6. Also cited in Hikomatsu Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 203.

Asia. Throughout the entire war, Roosevelt urged both Japan and Russia to halt the war and come to a negotiated agreement. Neither side wanted to consider peace terms; but Japan, prior to the battle of Mukden, talked of security in Korea, cession of Port Arthur, and the return of Manchuria to China. After the battle of Mukden, she then desired an indemnity and Russian territory. However, Japan did not push for a peace settlement just then and Russia decided to fight Japan with Rojestvensky's fleet. Japan met and conquered the Russian fleet on the 27th and 28th of May. Then on May 31, Japan cabled President Roosevelt and asked him to mediate negotiations between them and Russia.[73]

Japan believed that not only would Roosevelt be fair in negotiations, but that he might favor them. He had, as previously stated, warned France and Germany not to come to Russia's aid. Roosevelt, however, did not completely trust Japan should she become the sole power in East Asia. He did not wish Russia to be destroyed for it would upset the balance of power in Asia. He wanted to leave Russia strong enough, so that, "...each may have a moduating [sic] action on the other."[74] Later, after the treaty had become effective he wrote to Senator Eugene Hale that, "...I was also influenced by the desireability of preventing Japan from driving Russia

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[73]Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), VI, p. 138.

[74]Ibid., p. 153. T. R. to Lodge, June 16, 1905.

completely out of East Asia. This object was achieved, and Russia stands face to face with Japan in Manchuria."[75]

Russia and Japan, after much discussion over where to hold the conference, finally agreed upon Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Events had changed since Japan had made its tentative proposals for a settlement of the war. Japan had captured the southern half of Sakhalin and she now wished also a large indemnity; for the cost of the war had strained her financially. These two issues literally stopped the conference from proceeding. Russia refused to consider both issues and Japan would not drop them. The conference almost failed; but at the last moment Russia agreed to let Japan keep the southern half of Sakhalin but it would not pay anything toward an indemnity. Japan in turn agreed to Russia's proposal and both sides signed the treaty on August 30, 1905. Senator Lodge wrote to Roosevelt that, "The peace is wise for Japan, salvation to Russia, excellent for us, good for the world and a noble triumph for you."[76]

The Portsmouth Conference had been successfully completed, but the relations between Japan and the United States had become strained. Japan felt that the United States had betrayed them on the indemnity issue. The United States felt that Japan had been too mercenary but officially both countries remained friends. The so-called public opinion became aroused; rioting broke out in Tokyo due to the failure of their negotiators

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[75]Theodore Roosevelt, Letters, edited by Elting Morison (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-54) V, p. 474.

[76]Roosevelt and Lodge, *op. cit.*, I, p. 193.

to obtain the indemnity which had been intended to reduce the heavy tax burden brought on by the expense of the war.[77]

The long drawn out debate over the indemnity stirred the American press to oppose Japan and to defend Russia. Russia's chief negotiator at the conference, Count Witte, purposely exploited this issue. Later, in his memoirs he wrote, "By my course of action, I gradually won the press over to my side and consequently also to the side of the cause which the will of my monarch had entrusted to my charge, so that when I left the trans-Atlantic Republic practically the whole press was on our side. The press, in its turn, was instrumental in bringing about a complete change in the public opinion of the country--in favor of my person and of the cause I upheld."[78]

The United States had traditionally been a friend of Japan. At the beginning of the war the vocal opinion makers generally praised little Japan upon her attack against the stumbling giant of Russia. The Outlook, Living Age, and Nation favored Japan. In the newspaper realm, the major newspapers of New York also favored Japan, such as; New York Herald, New York Times, and New York Tribune. In the south and mid-west the, New Orleans Times-Democrat, St. Louis Globe Democrat, Cleveland Plain Dealer, Louisville Courier-Journal, and Denver Daily News supported Japan. On the west coast, San Francisco Call, San Francisco Examiner, and Los Angeles Times also encouraged

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[77]Roosevelt, Letters, V, pp. 13-14.

[78]Treat, 1853-1921, (1928), p. 188. Also quoted in Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p. 13.

Japan's efforts. Later the New Orleans Times-Democrat, Louisville Courier-Journal, San Francisco Call, and San Francisco Examiner switched to anti-Japanese articles.[79]

In March, 1904, an editorial appeared in the Independent. It suggested that the Yellow Peril would be a political one and that, "When self-consciousness comes to all the yellow race, as it has to Japan, no infringement of their possessory rights will be allowed."[80] Warnings began to appear in newspapers. They did not, however, express anti-Japanese feelings. The New York Herald, in September, 1904, wrote, "Army and navy officers who have recently returned from the Philippines and the China station report that at present the Japanese have not a friend in the east among mercantile, military, or naval men of white extraction. Their success has made them insufferably overbearing and insolent."[81]

The Japanese realized that they needed to stem the tide of adverse opinion; Baron Kentaro Kaneko wrote in the North American Review, in November, 1904, that, "In the light, therefore, of what has been said, the alarm about a 'Yellow Peril' takes on the character of a golden opportunity for Europe and America to become acquainted with the real strength and ambitions of Japan. The same cry, moreover, intended to work us injury and disgrace, provides Japan with a golden

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[79]Tupper & McReynolds, op. cit., p. 6.

[80]"The Yellow Peril", Independent, LVI, No. 2883 (March 3, 1904), 514-15.

[81]"Has Japan Lost Our Sympathy," Public Opinion, XXXVII, No. 12 (Sept. 22, 1904), 360.

opportunity to show the world that selfish ambition has no part in the aspirations of her people."[82]

The first newspapers began to change. Japan had beaten the Russians at the battle over Port Arthur. The Savannah News, the Mobile Register and the Los Angeles Times expressed their sympathies for the Russians.[83]

The New York Tribune, in February, 1905, then recorded; that a "revival of oriental peril", had begun to develop and they further added, that Germany also feared such a peril.[84] At the same time, Lord Wolsely reported in the New York World, "Should Japan win and she could develop China and under an army out of the Chinese the so-called 'yellow peril' would endanger Japan first."[85] The Louisville Courier-Journal took a different view; "...if she (Japan) should emerge victorious from a long and arduous fight with Russia, she would be too far exhausted to dare to undertake new conquests."[86] Whether Japan wished to make new conquests or not; her failure to obtain an indemnity at least proved the above author partially correct.

Mr. E. Fitger wrote about what the possibilities of Japan's success would do to the United States as a Pacific

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[82]Baron Kentaro Kaneko, "The Yellow Peril is the Golden Opportunity for Japan," North American Review, CLXXIX, No. 576 (November, 1904), 641-648.

[83]Tupper & McReynolds, op. cit., p. 7.

[84]"Is there a 'Yellow Peril' in the War?", Public Opinion, XXXVIII, No. 8 (Feb. 25, 1905), 234-36.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid.

power. "Should Russia," he wrote, "on the other hand, be the vanquished party, the rise of Japanese power must be reckoned with as a possible menace."[87]

J. Gordon Smith in World's Work mentioned the fact that he had been a news correspondent of the London Morning Post assigned to General Oku's army. He disliked the close censorship that the Japanese army used concerning news coming out of their war with Russia. The above information appeared only in passing, for his entire article criticized the Japanese merchants for putting cheap imitations of the products of the British, American, German, Austrian and Dutch merchants on the markets in China. The imitations did not appear to be even good replicas of the genuine articles; but due to their cheapness these products outsold their competitors. The article attempted to document Smith's arguments with photographs of Japanese markets within China. One picture purported to show an imitation of an American tooth powder, though this writer could not tell by the picture if it did or did not look like an American or Japanese product. It would seem then, the only value this article had would be to help inflame those who might emotionally dislike the Japanese.[88]

On the issue of the indemnity, an article in the June, 1905, issue of World's Work warned that, "If Japan secures a war indemnity from Russia, a large portion of this will

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[87] E. Fitger, "The United States as a Pacific Power," Review of Reviews XXXI, No. 5, (May, 1905), 624.

[88] J. Gordon Smith, "Japan's Closing of the Open Door," World's Work, X, No. 2 (June, 1905), 6267-6273.

undoubtedly be expended on increasing her fleet."[89] The article, in looking backward, criticized the United States for not backing Russia. It believed the United States would have been in a better commercial advantage in China, Korea, and Manchuria because the Japanese would be a more formidable competitor than the Russians.[90]

The final article criticized Japan for being an upstart. It said, "Their (Japanese) advance is a borrowed one,--not like the Western, reached by slow, painful stages. They are at bottom barbarians whose spiritual growth has not kept pace with their material development."[91]

No matter how good or bad the arguments had been presented by the vocal opinion makers; they did exist to discredit Japan. Officially the United States and Japan stayed on best of terms, but unofficially, both became disturbed by the distrust created in both countries. The stage had been set for the next incident--the San Francisco School Board decision of 1906. The events surrounding the school board decision and the resultant Gentlemen's Agreement becomes the focal point of this paper. The question of the importance of the Gentlemen's Agreement and the resultant furor over the so-called Yellow Peril will be discussed. Did this period in

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[89] John Hays Hammond, "The Menace of Japan's Success," World's Work, X, No. 2 (June, 1905), 6273-75.

[90] Ibid.

[91] "Is Japan Preparing the Yellow Peril," Review of Reviews, XXXII, No. 2 (August, 1905), 218-219.

American-Japanese relations witness any long range ramifications which might have greatly affected their continued friendship; or did the period, prove to be only a small incident in time where the differences, once settled, remained closed?

II The Gentlemen's Agreement And The Yellow Peril

Japanese-American relations had been slightly strained when Japan had failed to receive an indemnity at the Portsmouth Conference. However, there had been no reason to believe that the friendship between these two countries would not continue. The two nations had a great deal in common. Both had become a world power with no little prestige in Asia and the Pacific. Japan, through her defeat of both China and Russia, established herself as the power in Asia and in the West Pacific. The United States, through its victory over the Spanish at Manila, had obtained the Philippines and an influential role in the East Pacific. Now that these two nations had become influential, they both became more sensitive toward each other.

The decision of the San Francisco School Board, in October, 1906 to segregate all Orientals from the regular public schools acted as an irritant to the sensitive relations of the United States and Japan. The San Francisco School Board's decision did not originate a new situation. This decision had occurred as an outgrowth of a continuing immigration problem. The immigration of Orientals had been going on for approximately forty years. The Burlingame Treaty of 1868 allowed the immigration of Chinese coolies to help build the trans-continental railroad. This treaty became the first of such treaties to allow extensive immigration of Orientals.

The period of the seventies developed into one of great labor unrest in California. There existed in California by 1870, fifty thousand Chinese and by the end of the decade the total had risen to seventy-five thousand.[92] These figures represented nine percent of the total population of the state, but since these figures represented men mainly, the percentage would be double that in relation to the total number of laborers.[93] The Chinese laborer, though his standard of living had improved when he came to the United States, still could work for a lower wage than the American laborer who purportedly would starve on the Chinese pay. Therefore, the responsibility for the large number of California's unemployed fell upon the Chinese coolie. Added to all this, the Chinese made no attempt to accept American customs and standards. San Francisco developed a large Chinese quarter and the city became the center of political and economic unrest.

During the summer of 1877, San Francisco had become overcrowded with unemployed laborers in various occupations. The atmosphere seemed to seeth with labor unrest due to national labor troubles and depression. On July 23, a meeting took place in a vacant lot across from the city hall to express sympathy for the railroad strike in Pittsburgh. The meeting turned into one of denouncing the capitalists and Chinese. A disreputable, unemployed sailor, Denis Kearney became the most popular speaker of the day. He spoke heatedly against

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[92] John D. Hicks, The American Nation, (3d ed.; Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 1958) p. 174.

[93] *Ibid.*

the Chinese. Out of this meeting grew the Workingmen's Party. Kearney, as the figure head of the party, wielded great influence in California politics for a few years. He led the fight to adopt a new state constitution which was enacted in 1879. However, the various interest groups, who had lost power by this new constitution, attached various amendments to it, which in effect reestablished the old California constitution. Kearney attempted to get his ideas accepted elsewhere but failed and he latter disappeared from the political scene.[94]

Congress, in 1879, made an attempt to slow the immigration of Chinese. It passed a bill that would prohibit ships from carrying no more than 15 Chinese on a single voyage to the United States. President Hayes vetoed the act.[95] Hayes, the following year, sent a commission to negotiate with China. China agreed to allow the United States to regulate, limit, or suspend but not absolutely prohibit the immigration of Chinese laborers. In 1884, the Chinese Exclusion Act became law. It banned coolie labor for a period of 10 years. A treaty, in 1894, with China, further banned coolie labor for another 10 years. After that period had expired the Congress continued exclusion unilaterally until the Immigration Law of 1924 made control automatic.[96]

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[94] Ibid., pp. 175-176.

[95] Ibid., p. 201.

[96] Philip Caryl Jessup, Elihu Root, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1938) p. 7.

The exclusion of Chinese laborers did not end the problem of Oriental labor immigrating to the United States. After the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1884, the California landowners discovered that Japanese laborers could successfully take the place of the Chinese, so they began a recruiting program for such labor.[97] After 1884, the Japanese coolie began to come to the United States in steadily increasing numbers.

After 1890, over a thousand Japanese entered the United States every year. The majority of the immigrants were young men seeking employment in agriculture.[98] Due to the opportunities for employment of Japanese labor in California, the immigrants not only came direct from Japan, but those who had previously sought employment in Mexico, Hawaii, and Canada started immigrating to the United States. After the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, many ex-Japanese soldiers decided to seek employment in California which added to the increase in immigration from Japan.[99] This great influx of Japanese immigrants to California became a source of apprehension as had the Chinese a few years before. Japan, in 1900, upon the request of the United States, agreed to curb her immigration to this country.[100] This arrangement proved effective only for one year and then the immigration tended to increase again. (See Appendix A)

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[97]Kiyoshi Karl Kawakami, American-Japanese Relatinns, (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912) p. 286.

[98]Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p. 20.

[99]Ibid.

[100]Ibid.

American labor along the Pacific coast, became the most vocal group that opposed the influx of cheap labor. At that time, several individuals and organizations voiced their opinion in public newspapers and periodicals. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, wrote an emotional plea in the _American Federationist_, September, 1903. He wanted the immigration of Japanese to Hawaii stopped. His argument followed that they worked for lower wages than the white laborer.[101] A San Francisco newspaper, in 1904, printed a series of articles warning of the results of the Japanese influx.[102] That same year a movement began which would include the Japanese under the Chinese Exclusion Law.[103] The American Federation of Labor meeting in convention at San Francisco November, 1904, also recommended that the Chinese Exclusion Law be applied to the Japanese.[104]

The following year, the San Francisco _Chronicle_ published a nine column article on the perils of Japanese immigration. Immediately after this article appeared, an anti-Japanese resolution passed in the California legislature.[105] During

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[101]Samuel Gompers, "Japanese Invasion--Its Dangers", _American Federationist_, X (September, 1903), 834-835.

[102]George E. Mowry, _The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912_ (New York: Harper & Row, 1958) p. 187.

[103]Kamikawa, _op. cit._, p. 263.

[104]Jessup, _op. cit._, p. 8.

[105]_Ibid._

that year, two exclusion leagues organized in an attempt to achieve political action toward excluding Japanese labor. Olaf Tueitmore, a member of the Labor Council of San Francisco, formed the California Exclusion League on March 10.[106] Mayor Schmitz of San Francisco, in May, along with various trade unions, organized the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League with a view to applying the Chinese Exclusion Law to the Japanese. The San Francisco Chronicle became the organ for the above movement, and publicily propagandized anti-Japanese feeling.[107] That same month another appeal appeared in the American Federationist, to exclude Japanese labor.[108] The trouble in California did not go unheeded in Washington.

President Theodore Roosevelt wrote Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, an old friend and adviser, repeatedly of this problem. Roosevelt criticized the California Legislature for insulting Japan by excluding its laborers from California. He further added that the Senators and Congressmen from the Pacific states had, only the year before, refused to vote for funds to strengthen the navy, which would defend the Pacific Coast should war break out between the United States and Japan. Why then, he wondered, should these people antagonize the Japanese, especially with the Russo-Japanese War "...going on before their eyes."[109] Senator Lodge answered, that the

[106] Ibid.

[107] Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 263.

[108] Augusta H. Pro, "Exclude Japanese Labor," American Federationist, XII (May, 1905) 274-276.

[109] Roosevelt and Lodge, op. cit., I, p. 122.

California resolutions came about as a result of labor unrest. Lodge suggested that an agreement should be made with Japan to exclude her labor from the United States and the United States to exclude its labor from Japan. He added that Japan must be treated as an equal and "...these idiots by raving do all they can to make arrangements impossible."[110]

Roosevelt and Lodge agreed in principle, that the immigration of Japanese labor should be stopped but not necessarily all Japanese immigration. They further agreed that the means to this end must be done with care. Roosevelt wrote that the Pacific Coast people wanted to exclude the Japanese on the grounds that these people existed as an "...immoral, degraded and worthless race." Then, as if to shake his head in disbelief, Roosevelt pointed out that the Pacific Coast people wished to have special privileges in Oriental markets, wished to disarm the United States Navy, and at the same time, antagonize the Japanese.[111] Labor unrest continued to grow but nothing of great importance had occurred to alleviate the problem.

Two events during the following year, one a natural disaster, the other a political disaster, brought the Japanese immigration issue to the forefront. The first event occurred in April, 1906. The San Francisco earthquake, of that month, turned thousands of people into the streets. Many Japanese

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[110] *Ibid.*

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

in search for new homes and businesses invaded so-called white districts. Anti-Japanese feelings began to increase. Actions taken against the Japanese ranged from boycotts of their stores and restaurants, assaults on individuals, window smashings, etc.[112] These events followed after Japan had contributed $100,000 for the relief of the earthquake sufferers. This amount represented more than any other foreign nation's contribution.[113]

The other event that brought the Japanese immigration problem to the attention of official Washington occurred on October 11, 1906. No one in Washington had realized what had happened until the Japanese Ambassador brought it to the attention of the State Department. On that date, the Board of Education of San Francisco adopted a resolution in these words: "Resolved: That in accordance with Article X, Section 1662, of the school law of California, principals are hereby directed to send all Chinese, Japanese, or Korean children to the Oriental Public School, ...on and after Monday, October 15, 1906."[114] Section 1662 of the California school law read in part: "Trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases, and also to establish separate schools for Indian children and, for children of Mongolian or Chinese

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[112] Jessup, op. cit., p. 8.

[113] Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President, 1899-1909, Vol. XVIII, of Works (24 vols.; New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1923-26) p. 453.

[114] Elihu Root, Addresses on International Subjects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1916) p. 10.

descent. When such separate schools are established, Indian, Chinese, or Mongolian children must not be admitted to any other school."[115] This event, which would cause so much diplomatic effort on the part of Japan and the United States, went unnoticed in San Francisco itself. At that time, the Henry Burns investigation of corruption in the administration of Mayor Schmitz had held the headlines and the attention of San Franciscans.[116]

President Roosevelt became faced with a multi-sided problem. First, he wanted to have the Japanese children re-enrolled in the public schools in order to bring harmony between Japan and the United States. Roosevelt did not have immediate information available as to the intent of the Japanese nation. He wondered if the Japanese flush from their recent victory over Russia might not wish to attack the United States. There did exist an element within Japan who favored such action, but they held no influence in official government circles. Secondly, Roosevelt wished to exclude Japanese laborers from coming to the United States; although he welcomed students, merchants, and professional people. Finally, in order for Roosevelt to accomplish the above, he could not dictatorially order the above solutions to take place. The Constitution would not allow the President to step in and alter a state law, and the Senate at that time would not agree to a new treaty between

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[115]*Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

[116]Jessup, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

the United States and Japan over the exclusion of Japanese laborers. A powerful lobby existed, in Washington, that desired to have Japanese laborers admitted. Earlier that year, James J. Hill, President of the Great Northern Railroad Company, wrote to Ambassador Takahira. Hill wrote that he had 1200 Japanese laborers on the payroll and that the Great Northern and the Northern Pacific could use three to five thousand more.[117] The railroads held a very strong influence in Washington. In Hawaii, the businessmen there argued that their businesses, especially sugar, would be ruined if Japanese immigration stopped.[118]

Roosevelt attempted to solve the problem or problems through various procedures. He immediately sent the Secretary of the Navy, Victor H. Metcalf, a native Californian, to San Francisco to determine the cause of the trouble and to remedy it if possible. Secondly, Roosevelt directed the Attorney General to test the School Board's ruling in the courts. The Japanese had filed their complaint on the basis of the first article of the United States-Japan treaty of November 22, 1894. It read in part:

> The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel or reside in any part of the territory of the other contracting party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property....
>
> In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel; to the possession of goods and effects of any kind; to the success to personal estate, by will or otherwise, and the disposal

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 16 & 17.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

> of any sort and in any manner whatsoever which they may lawfully acquire, the citizens or subjects of each contracting party shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same privileges, liberties, and rights, and shall be subject to no higher imposts or charges in these respects than native citizens or subjects or citizens or subjects of the most favored nation.[119]

A court case might be lengthy and might not obtain the desired result of ending the segregation. It might not appear to the courts that the rights of the Japanese had been violated through segregation of the school children. After the executive agreement or Gentlemen's Agreement had been reached by Japan and the United States, Roosevelt ordered the Attorney General to drop the case.[120]

Roosevelt attempted to have Congress pass different legislative measures to end the Japanese problem along the West Coast. In his Sixth Annual Message to Congress, he asked for a special law that would allow the naturalization of the Japanese.[121] Thus they would come under the protection of the federal government. The next day, Roosevelt sent another message requesting Congress to amend and supplement the civil and criminal law of the United States so that the President might take some measures in the name of the government, to protect the rights of foreigners resident in the country.[122]

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[119] Root, op. cit., p. 8.

[120] Etling E. Morison, edited by, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Vol V, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952) p. 521n.

[121] Roosevelt, Works, Vol XVIII, pp. 454-455.

[122] Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 266.

The Japanese liked this but Congress did not. Two weeks later in a special message to Congress, he wrote that he had authorized Secretary Metcalf to inform California that if the persons and property of the Japanese did not receive protection that he, Roosevelt, would use all means provided by the Constitution to insure these people protection.[123] Three days later in a letter to a friend, Roosevelt referred to his special message and gave two reasons for this message. He wanted to inform the rest of the United States as well as California that no political reasons would stop him from using the army. He wished also to soothe Japan and put them into a frame of mind to negotiate an agreement to keep laborers of both countries from immigrating to the other.[124]

The problem Roosevelt had to face could not be settled easily and it did not receive satisfactory settlement. An executive agreement could only be reached; which legally remained in effect only as long as Roosevelt remained in office. What understanding of the situation did the President have at that time? Roosevelt knew the domestic situation. He wrote to Senator Eugene Hale, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, on October 27, 1906, that:

> Under the lead of the trade unions the San Francisco people, and apparently also the people in certain other California cities, have been indulging in boycotts against Japanese restaurant keepers, have excluded the Japanese children from the public schools, and have in other ways threatened, sometimes by law and sometimes by the action of mobs, the rights secured to Japanese in this country by our solemn treaty engagements with Japan.[125]

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[123]Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, p. 532n.

[124]Ibid., p. 532.

[125]Ibid., pp. 473-74.

Later in December, Roosevelt wrote to England's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey that the California situation hinged upon the labor problem. The American laborer objected, as did Roosevelt, to the entrance of the Japanese laborer. He wrote; "If the influx of Japanese laborers to the United States goes on it is certain to be stop [sic] by law within a few years; and very possibly the stoppage will be accomplished by acts of international bad breeding which will make trouble."[126]

The question, of what motivated Japan and what their reactions to the problem would eventually be, bothered Roosevelt. Roosevelt did not have available, information to guide his actions toward Japan. However, he speculated on various steps that Japan might take. He wrote to Senator Hale on October 27, 1906 concerning Japan's attitude. "I do not think that they will bring it (war) about at the moment but even as to this I am not certain, for the Japanese are proud, sensitive, warlike, are flushed with their recent triumph, and are in my opinion bent upon establishing themselves as the leading power in the Pacific."[127] Roosevelt further added that it had not only been his desire to achieve peace during the Russo-Japanese War, but to keep Russia strong enough to counter balance any ambitions of Japan. However, he concluded, Russia no longer presented a menace to Japan and he did not know Japan's attitude toward the United States or anyone else. Roosevelt wrote to Secretary

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[126]Ibid., pp. 528-29.

[127]Ibid., p. 474.

Metcalf in November, concerning Japan's attitude. Roosevelt had talked to the Japanese Ambassador, Baron Kogoro Takahira, about allowing only students, travelers, businessmen and the like to enter the United States. Takahira readily agreed to this; and further stated that he had never favored allowing Japanese coolies to come to America. Both agreed, however, that as long as the irritation in San Francisco existed it would be difficult to get an agreement with Japan.[128] Even with this optimistic note on the part of Takahira, Roosevelt still did not have available, sufficient information as to what the government of Japan really intended to do about the situation.

Roosevelt again discussed the matter with Foreign Secretary Grey on December 18, 1906. At that time he still did not know Japan's intention and he speculated further about war with her.[129] By the end of 1906, he knew that his main concern would be to solve the problem of the segregated Japanese children. He wrote, "The conduct of the San Franciscans in barring the Japanese children from the schools has a permanent consequences in just one way, namely by inciting great resentment in Japan and making it far more difficult for me to secure an agreement for keeping out Japanese laborers."[130]

At the close of 1906 the problem on the West coast had not been settled. Emotions ran high along the Pacific coast but to what extent could it be determined that the rest of the

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[128] *Ibid.*, p. 510.

[129] *Ibid.*, p. 528.

[130] *Ibid.*, p. 530.

country did or did not feel the same way as did California? How great did the Yellow Peril appear to the Midwest and the East? Generally not too much notice had been given by the Midwest newspapers. The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote about the situation but took no emotional stand on the subject. On the East coast the New York Times covered the situation in great detail but did not try to stir emotions either. The New York Herald, on the other hand, attempted to make the situation appear more urgent than it had really been. On certain aspects of the situation it became interesting to note how these newspapers stood.

The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote, "Furthermore there is growing sentiment in favor of a law specifically excluding Japanese. There is nothing to prevent this as far as our treaty with Japan is concerned. That agreement was negotiated by Secretary Gresham as far back as 1894...."[131] Late in October, the New York Times wrote; "So far the demand for such a law (Japanese exclusion) has come only from the Pacific Coast and has received scant attention from the representatives of other States."[132] The public opinion, if such existed then, on the West coast might further be shown to be hostile toward the Japanese. On December 7, 1906, Governor Mead of Washington pronounced, "I am unalterably opposed to such a course. Naturalization of the Japanese would tend to degrade the American workman. The sacred right of American citizenship,

[131]Chicago Daily Tribune, December 1, 1906, p. 1.

[132]New York Times, October 27, 1906, p. 6.

acquired by the blood of our forefathers, should not be lightly handed over to another, and especially to foreigners of the Asiatic coast."[133] The New York Times, on the same issue. wrote, "A treaty embodying Japanese naturalization and Japanese labor exclusion ought not to encounter serious opposition in this country."[134] The New York Herald wrote, in an editorial, "American public opinion, on the contrary, is unanimously in favor of California.... It is the trumpet tone of patriotism, 'Our country, right or wrong'."[135]

On the question of Japan's protest to the School Board's decision the Chicago Daily Tribune quoted first, the phrase from the treaty that Japan believed to have been violated. "In 'whatever relates to rights of residence and travel' they are put on a parity with native citizens. They are not specifically granted the right to enter the public schools. It can be claimed only as one of the 'rights of residence,' and that would be stretching the words too much."[136] The New York Times would only say, "We are confident that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root will do all in their power to prevent any grave misunderstanding with a nation as friendly heretofore and the object of such friendship as the Japanese. And the great body of the American people will heartily sustain them."[137] An

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[133] Ibid., December 7, 1906, p. 3.

[134] Ibid., p. 10.

[135] New York Herald, December 6, 1906, p. 10.

[136] Chicago Daily Tribune, December 6, 1906, p. 10.

[137] New York Times, October 29, 1906, p. 6.

article in the Nation magazine sympathized with Japan. "That the protest of the Japanese is in accordance with their treaty rights is indisputable. Were the boot on the other foot, we know how quickly an indignant State Department would rise up on behalf of injured Americans."[138]

The question that eventually arose concerned the possibility of war with Japan. The New York Herald suggested that a war with Japan had possibilities. They blamed the war on Japan's attempt to dominate Asia economically and politically. It also suggested that, "For every warship that Japan adds to her naval forces we must add two."[139] On November 30, the New York Times quoted United States Consul General at Yokohoma, Henry B. Miller, that the Japanese felt they would be able and ready to fight over the school board decision.[140] A staff correspondent in San Francisco for the Chicago Daily Tribune wrote, "Nobody here apparently trusts either the good faith or honesty of the Japanese in the matter. While at the Japanese consulate the idea of war is laughed at, at the University of California today one of President Benjamin Ide Wheeler's leading educators predicted war. The professor was S. B. Christy, Dean of the College of Mines."[141] It seemed difficult to understand how a professor in mining could be quoted as a leading educator and thus make him an expert on foreign affairs. However, it

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[138]"The Japanese Protest," Nation, LXXXIII (November 1, 1906) 364.

[139]New York Herald, December 13, 1906, p. 8.

[140]New York Times, November 30, 1906, p. 1.

[141]Chicago Daily Tribune, November 30, 1906, p. 1.

appeared that to quote some individual with an academic title, therefore, would lend authority to an article in the newspaper. This type of reporting might have led the public to believe that actual war did seem imminent.

An article in the Nation magazine seemed to best sum up the war scare. It said sarcastically, "Japan has suddenly taken the place of Germany as the country that 'we must fight next.' Of course we have got to fight somebody. That is one of the fixed points. To let our Navy rust unused would be sinful--a manifest--impairment of the vested right of our shipbuilders." Then the Nation concluded, "No one has advanced a single credible reason why the Japanese should want a war with the United States."[142]

The year ended with certain facts evident. A depression existed and unemployment prevailed. The earthquake had made many homeless and had destroyed many businesses. The Orientals could perhaps exist on lower incomes than could others but the problem that existed was to find jobs not too eliminate labor. Labor unrest, however, turned upon the small oriental as the cause of its problem. The chief reason for the school board decision centered on Mayor Schmitz and the corruption investigation of his administration. Schmitz deliberately ordered the school board decision in order to shift the public attention to this so-called evil rather than have them view the corruption of his own office. The issue quickly became

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[142] "The Next War," Nation, LXXXIII (December 6, 1906) 395-396.

race prejudice centered and it had nothing to do with the overcrowding of the public schools.[143] Secretary Metcalf issued his report, and the Chicago Daily Tribune, pointed out the absurdity of the segregation. Metcalf stated in his report, that after the earthquake in April that year thirty-one of the seventy-six school buildings had been destroyed. This left forty-five schools to absorb all the students that had survived. There also existed at that time a total of ninety-three Japanese students. This would mean, that on the average, each school would have at the most two Japanese students.[144] The influence of two Japanese per school would hardly be enough to influence anyone as to their habits and customs or morals. Nevertheless, the emotional impact would continue the problem well into the next year.

The beginning of 1907, found the situation in California unchanged. Roosevelt believed it to be necessary to allow the Japanese residents the franchise and the use of the schools but at the same time to keep out the coolie. The Japanese government readily agreed to this but the dominant sentiment of the Pacific Coast prevented the passage of any law permitting naturalization of Japanese.[145] The State Senate of California passed a resolution that the President's actions in California

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[143] Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 264-265. Also cited in Albert Q Maisel, They All Chose America, (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957), pp. 129-130.

[144] Chicago Daily Tribune, December 19, 1906, p. 2.

[145] Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, p. 537n.

had been illegal.[146] The Atlantic Monthly attempted to put the situation in a less emotional light by attempting to clarify the true reason behind the uproar in California. It wrote, "The political agitation in California for the exclusion of Japanese laborers, and the more recent diplomatic inquiry as to the exclusion of Japanese pupils from San Francisco schools, as evidence that prejudice and narrow-mindedness... are active among us."[147]

Early in February, after a lengthy trip, Mayor Schmitz and a delegation from San Francisco arrived at the White House upon the request of Roosevelt. He told them, under secrecy, that war seemed probable and promised that he would force Congress to pass a law barring Japanese laborers seeking to enter the United States by way of Hawaii, Mexico, Canada, and the Canal Zone. In return, San Francisco would remove the educational restrictions.[148] On February 15, 1907, Congress amended the immigration law to meet the requirements that Roosevelt had desired and the San Francisco School Board rescinded their order. Roosevelt then notified Secretary Root to start negotiating a new treaty with Japan.[149] The press, throughout February, changed their positions very little.

The New York Times, on February 2, 1907, in an attempt to point out the absurdity that Japan wished war, compiled a list of items from various Japanese newspapers. The New York

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[146] Chicago Daily Tribune, January 30, 1907, p. 7.

[147] James S. Leroy, "Japan and the Philippines Islands," Atlantic Monthly, XCIX (January, 1907) 24-34.

[148] Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956) p. 286.

[149] Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, p. 589.

Times wrote, "The position of the press of Japan so far as indicated by the papers down to the 1st of January, is one of implicit trust in President Roosevelt. They are supported in their confidence in him by the tone of his message to Congress on the California question, by his sending Secretary Metcalf there to investigate the conditions, and by all of his subsequent acts."[150]

After the passage of the Immigration Law, the Chicago Daily Tribune wrote, "... there is no special reason why anyone should find fault with the curious and complicated method of reaching an agreement."[151] After what seemed a good beginning the situation had not changed. The New York Times, on February 20, then reported that Japan did not like the amendment to the Immigration Law. It added insult to injury they claimed.[152] The Chicago Daily Tribune, three days later, carried a states right article by Catholic Archbishop Patrick W. Riordan. He disagreed with Roosevelt's actions. "The prerogatives of the individual state," he said, "have been slipping away from it gradually, but I think this one we should guard zealously."[153] On the other hand, an Englishman wrote, that the Federal

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[150]New York Times, February 2, 1907, p. 2.

[151]Chicago Daily Tribune, February 18, 1907, p. 8.

[152]New York Times, February 20, 1907, p. 1.

[153]Chicago Daily Tribune, February 23, 1907, p. 6.

Constitution failed to allow the United States to guarantee treaty obligations which it had made with Japan.[154]

The California Assembly, meanwhile, tended to hinder the negotiations of a new treaty. Early in March, the California Assembly had passed a bill limiting ownership of land to five years by Japanese and another bill to be passed excluding 10 year olds from white schools. Roosevelt immediately wrote to Governor James Norris Gillett objecting to these bills. Governor Gillett informed the Assembly of Roosevelt's objections and it dropped both measures.[155] Roosevelt wrote to Governor Gillett on March 9, telling him that the extremist in San Francisco who profess to exclude Japanese laborers are actually hindering such efforts. He added that it appeared that these extremist desire not to solve this problem. It would take away one of their political assets. They would lose noteriety and influence when the situation became settled. Roosevelt further said he now could keep out all the Japanese laborers except those coming to the United States with passports direct from Japan. Japan meanwhile would agree not to give passports to laborers if there existed no discrimination against Japanese children in the schools. If not, immigration would continue.[156]

The California Assembly still believed it needed to enter the situation. Governor Gillett wrote Roosevelt stating, that

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[154]Sydney Brooks, "Englands View of a Possible American War with Japan," Harpers Weekly, XI (February 16, 1907) 242.

[155]Morrison, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 609n.

[156]Ibid., pp. 608-609.

the assembly wished to hold an election to let the voters decide whether to exclude Japanese laborers or not. Gillett asked if this would hinder his work. Roosevelt said it would and that the Constitution provided that only the federal government could regulate immigration.[157] President Roosevelt did approve of a plan as set forth by Mayor Schmitz and the School Board. It stated, in part, that "...all foreign children, whether Japanese or of other nationalities, should be kept in separate schools or classes when either their age or their lack of understanding of English rendered this course advisable."[158] The school board rescinded its order on March 11, and Roosevelt wrote his congratulations to Mayor Schmitz and Governor Gillett.

This victory by Roosevelt represented an unique step in diplomacy. The New York Times quoted President Walsh of the San Francisco Board of Education, "Not only the people of San Francisco and of California, but all the people of the United States are taken into the confidence of the Government in its diplomatic operations. It is a startling novelty in procedure. But in this case it seems to have worked."[159]

With the necessary steps taken it appeared that the California situation had ended. However, in April, new outbursts followed in California.[160] Also in May, a series of

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[157] Ibid., p. 614n.

[158] Ibid., p. 611.

[159] New York Times, March 14, 1907, p. 6.

[160] Jessup, op. cit., p. 21.

attacks had occurred in San Francisco on the Japanese and their property. Roosevelt, in a letter to Baron Kentaro Kaneko, attempted to use these attacks as examples as to how poorly the laborers of both the United States and Japan could not exist together in harmony. Roosevelt further pushed to have Japanese laborers excluded.[161]

Other events throughout the summer added to Japan's unrest. The San Francisco Board of Police Commissioners had refused to license six Japanese to conduct employment bureaus. After the federal government gently interceded, this decision became null and void.[162] The unrest continued but not only in the United States. In Tokyo, a riot took place over the failure of the government to obtain an indemnity from Russia. This riot occurred in August, and one source blamed the unrest in California as the basis to keeping the indemnity issue alive.[163] England, also, had its anti-Japanese problems. Anti-Japanese feeling existed in British Columbia, New Zealand and Australia. On September 7, rioting broke out in Vancouver over the protest of the veto of a provincial exclusion bill. The mob had attacked Orientals and damaged their property.[164]

The magazines and newspapers reported and discussed the events that took place throughout the summer of 1907. The

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[161]Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, p. 671n.

[162]Ibid., p. 700n.

[163]Kawakami, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

[164]Jessup, op. cit., p. 29, and Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, pp. 787-88.

Chicago Daily Tribune reported on the riots in May and a raid on a Japanese restaurant.[165] Another article, that same month, reported that the Japanese had been sneaking into the United States from Canada and Mexico, and that they had been selling their passports to new arrivals.[166] During June, the New York Times and the Chicago Daily Tribune reported on the Japanese press and the opposition party in Japan. The New York Times reported that "... Tokio sic dispatches of the last few days do unmistakably show that certain demagogues in Japan and certain classes of the people there are seeking, evidently for reasons of domestic politics, to exaggerate the recent San Francisco incident to a degree quite beyond its actual importance...."[167] The New York Times further reported that, "Count Okuma, the well-known popular leader, is the particular demagogue and Opposition leader who is seeking to make political capital out of the San Francisco affair."[168] Three days later, the Chicago Daily Tribune reported that the Opposition leader in the House of Peers, Viscount Tani, had made a fiery speech urging Japan to go to war against the United States.[169] Both

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[165] Chicago Daily Tribune, May 26, 1907, p. 7.

[166] Ibid., May 31, 1907, p. 7.

[167] New York Times, June 4, 1907, p. 8.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Chicago Daily Tribune, June 10, 1907, p. 1.

newspapers agreed that these men and the yellow press held no influence over the government of Japan. Vice Minister Wakatsuki blamed the politicians and the yellow press for the yellow peril. He believed the war talk to be "absurd" and that the feeling over the incident in San Francisco to be one of "regret."[170]

The month of July found the talk of war ever increasing. Speculation ran high over whether or not Japan and the United States would go to war. President Roosevelt in a letter to Senator Lodge wrote angrily about the San Francisco mob, press, and especially mentioned the New York Herald. He said, "I do not believe we shall have war; but it is no fault of the yellow press if we do not have it."[171] The New York Times reported on an address given at a metting of the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce. "The ill treatment of the Japanese in San Francisco has produced no little irritation in Japan. It is unnecessary to say that trade is not promoted by irritants."[172] The New York Times later wrote that, "The rank absurdity of the war talk is best demonstrated, however, by a consideration of the lack of any cause of war."[173]

Other newspapers held the same position as the New York Times. The Cleveland Plain Dealer called it an "irritating incident" that would give trouble when the United States attempted to negotiate a new treaty with Japan in four years.

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[170]New York Times, June 16, 1907, p. 1.

[171]Morison, op.cit., Vol 5, pp. 709-10.

[172]New York Times, July 2, 1907, p. 8.

[173]Ibid., July 6, 1907, p. 6.

The Baltimore American believed the Philippines should be disposed of to Japan's ally, England. The Philadelphia Ledger wrote that, "Japan and the United States are not going to be embroiled as long as both nations are represented, as they are, by civilized men." The San Francisco Chronicle, one of the leading papers that helped to create the situation in California, did not believe war would come about. It wrote, "The Japanese are making unmitigated nusiances of themselves by their fussiness in such things."[174] The month of July witnessed the peak of the war talk. The excitement died down to the point, where in August nothing of significance appeared. The subject would have remained closed had not the riots in Vancouver taken place. Then the papers wrote anew on the subject but this too subsided.

The majority of the magazine articles, at this time, wrote about the absurdity of a war with Japan. A few attempted to discredit Japan. One such article in the Harpers Weekly tried to represent that the Japanese did not protect the rights of foreigners within their own country. It cited that a British club had been searched, without a warrant, for tobacco that had not been taxed.[175] Another cynical article by the same author and magazine, appeared the next month. It said, "... if the Japanese don't want to have all mankind laughing at them they will cease shrieking over all the unpleasant acts of a few handful of idiotic Americans in San Francisco. The Japanese

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[174] Current Literature, XLIII (July, 1907) 6-10.

[175] John Poindexter, "How Japan Does Unto Others," Harpers Weekly, LI (July, 1907) 1090-1103.

know as well as anyone in the world that these acts were purely local, and they must know, too, that to keep on howling when they are not hurt will make them the laughing stock of mankind."[176]

Most magazines seemed to believe that the war talk had no foundation. One wrote, "As for the talk about war, it can only be said that it is mischievous if it is serious, and it is in very bad taste if it is a mere form of political humor. There is an element in the country always ready for war. Its sleep is haunted by nightmares of German invasion, of the violation of the Monroe Doctrine in South America, of combinations in Europe to hinder the development of American trade."[177] Another article believed that "... the intrusion of the yellow races into the American field of labor has reached a stage which threatens the peaceful relationships of the United States and Japan. Actually war may not be imminent, for both Governments are extremely anxious to avoid it...."[178] The Outlook reported that United States Ambassador to Japan, Luke Wright, upon his return put the whole matter in one sentence. He said, "The talk of war between this country and Japan isn't even respectable nonsense."[179] One other article needs to be mentioned. Mary C. Frasser wrote a portrait of Admiral Togo in the Fortnightly Review. It mentioned nothing of the

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[176]Poindexter, "The Menace of Japan," Harpers Weekly, LI (September, 1907) 1317.

[177]"Japan and America," Outlook, LXXXVI (June 1, 1907) 230-232.

[178]Cruiser, "Conditions of A Japanese War," Contemporary Review, XCII (September, 1907) 366-374.

[179]Outlook LXXXVIII (February 29, 1908) 470-471.

problem existing then. However, it did create a favorable impression of Japan. This article could be classified as a soft sell for Japan.[180]

The warnings, of certain elements of the press, magazines, and individuals, about war proved to be unnecessary. Japan never had any intentions of going to war. William Howard Taft, on July 2, sent Roosevelt a report submitted by a Major Reber, dated May 23. Major Reber had traveled incognito throughout Japan and found no hostile feelings toward Americans. He added that Japan was not planning to make immediate preparation for war with the United States. He believed that Japan's sole interest lie in developing their commercial interest and that a war would cut off certain sources of finances.[181] Taft, himself, seemed to prove the correctness of the above report. On September 28, Taft visited Japan on his way to the Philippines. In a lengthy cable, on October 18, he wrote that the Japanese government did not want war. The people of Japan had little interest in immigration, but there existed certain business interests concerned with supplying coolie labor and that these interests had political influence.[182] This cable convinced Root and Roosevelt that a treaty could no longer be obtained, due to these political influences.

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[180] Mary Crawford Frasser, "Admiral Togo," Fortnightly Review, LXXXVII (September, 1907) 387-397.

[181] Thomas Andrew Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese American Crises, (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1934) p. 232.

[182] Jessup, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

Prior to this time Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Root about the immigration problem. He quoted Japanese immigration statistics for the months of May and June. He pointed out that they had been higher than the preceeding year and had been even higher than March and April. Roosevelt warned that if the flow could not be stopped by the executive branch, then Congress would put a stop to it.[183] Secretary Root, after the arrival of the Taft cable, on November 9, sent instructions to Ambassador Thomas J. O'Brien in Tokyo. He told O'Brien to warn the Japanese Foreign Minister that Congress would attempt to obtain exclusion legislation "... of Article II of our treaty with Japan whereby is reserved to each country the right of legislation concerning the immigration of laborers from the other country."[184] Root added that three considerations would justify Congress's action. First, the influx of Japanese laborers differed wholly from "...that usual and casual travel and residence contemplated in the treaty," which had been injurious to the American workmen. Japan herself had recognized the exclusion principle by barring Chinese and other foreign labor. Finally, the general provisions of the Immigration Law of 1907 barred contract laborers from all countries of the world and this provision had been clearly violated by the Japanese immigration companies.[185] Root further suggested that if the President's power to restrict Japanese coming from Hawaii and Japan's

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[183]Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, pp. 717-18.

[184]Jessup, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

[185]Ibid.

willingness to reverse the flow of its laborers proved effective then this might forestall Congress.[186]

Secretary Root began to change his tactics. Instead of trying to negotiate for a treaty he next attempted an executive agreement. He sent a note to Ambassador O'Brien on November 18. Since Japan did not wish to negotiate a formal agreement "... this government invites Japan to join in fresh efforts adequately to meet the situation...."[187] This note became the first note in a series of notes that became known as the Gentlemen's Agreement. Root, on November 22, sent O'Brien another note. It read in part: "Refrain from any further suggestion of a treaty.... Maintain hereafter an attitude of entire indifference whether the adoption of such regulations by Japan is or is not accompanied by a further treaty." Root wrote firmly, but with a just attitude, that the above did not represent anti-Japanese feelings but economic reason only, due to labor competition.[188] The Gentlemen's Agreement went into effect and the Japanese voluntarily withheld passports from coolies.

The statistics of 1908 proved the agreement to be working. In January, 1908, the Japanese arrivals in the continental United States had dwindled to 495, as against 1,359 in January 1907. Two weeks before Secretary Root left

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[186] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[187] *Ibid.*

[188] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

the State Department a report had been released showing that in December, 1908, only 126 Japanese arrived on the mainland and of these, 62 had been returning residents and relatives. In the same month, 812 Japanese left the United States for Japan and 195 left Hawaii, as compared with 174 arrivals of whom 151 had been in the relative or returning resident classes.[189] Generally speaking the farmers, merchants, professional men, higher state officials, lumbermen, and the more responsible commercial organizations agreed with the report and with Japan's part in carrying out the Gentlemen's Agreement. However, the labor unions, the Asiatic Exclusion League, local politicians, congressmen and certain patriotic associations remained determined upon the exclusion of the Oriental to avoid the dangers of a yellow peril and upon complete control of the immigration situation by law.[190]

Another event took place at this time. The war talk made the public as well as official Washington concerned about war preparation. The key military arm of that day centered about the navy. It provided the strategic mobility that proved necessary for a world power. When the war talk became the heaviest; writers began to discuss the ability of the navy to meet the Japanese in battle. One such article pointed out that the United States outnumbered Japan in ship tonnage but that the navy needed to operate in two oceans.[191]

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[189] Ibid., p. 30.

[190] Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p. 45.

[191] Walter Scott Merwether, "Our Navy and Japans," Harpers Weekly, LI (June 1, 1907) 800.

President Roosevelt, a former Asst. Secretary of the Navy, constantly strove to have the best navy in the world. He believed it important to negotiate from a position of strength. He knew that the navy needed a training exercise to see whether or not it could operate effectively for long periods of time at sea. Roosevelt felt that the navy could be used to impress Japan and the rest of the world by sending it around the world but he knew he would have to unveil his plan carefully in order to receive public support as well as Congress's support. The Chicago Daily Tribune, on July 8, 1907, contained three articles relating to the transfer of 16 battleships to the Pacific. It speculated that Roosevelt intended these ships as a warning to Japan.[192]

Roosevelt began to write to his friends concerning the possibility of sending the fleet around the world. He wrote to Senator Lodge on July 10, about his proposal.[193] He wrote also to Secretary Root on the thirteenth, about the same matter.[194] The Chicago Daily Tribune wrote, "All talk of war between the United States and Japan simply gush of jingoes; two nations in perfect accord; no quarrel over fleet."[195] However, Herman Speck von Sternberg, a friend and German Ambassador, wrote to Roosevelt that Japan had been organizing

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[192]Chicago Daily Tribune, July 8, 1907, pp. 1 & 2.

[193]Morison, op. cit., Vol 5, pp. 709-10.

[194]Ibid., Vol 5, pp. 717-18.

[195]Chicago Daily Tribune, July 16, 1907, p. 1.

its army and had a sizeable force in Mexico. He further warned that war between the United States and Japan would occur in a few years, and Japan appeared to be a 5-4 favorite to win. Roosevelt wrote Secretary Root about this letter and said he believed that it had become more imperative that the fleet be sent around the world to impress Japan and to give the navy a practice mission.[196]

When Roosevelt's final intentions became known he received mixed reactions. The <u>Chicago Daily Tribune</u> hailed it to be a "... remarkable trip without precedent in naval history."[197] Generally the President faced more opposition than encouragement in the beginning. He wrote often of his disagreement with Senator Hale, Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. Roosevelt believed that a strong navy held the key to peace. Senator Hale, however, believed a strong navy or army would not achieve peace.[198] Opposition to Roosevelt centered on five points: 1) the Atlantic Coast would be undefended, 2) partisan opposition, 3) precipitate war with Japan, 4) would strain or damage the fleet, 5) cost too much. The final cost proved to be $1,619,843,32.[199]

The fleet started, in December, 1907, from Hampton Roads. Before the fleet reached Japan, Roosevelt speculated about

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[196]Morison, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Vol 5, pp. 724-25.

[197]<u>Chicago Daily Tribune</u>, August 26, 1907, p. 1.

[198]Morison, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., Vol 5, pp. 727-28.

[199]<u>Ibid</u>., Vol 5, p. 738n.

the necessity, on February 21, 1908, to keep the White Fleet in the Pacific longer in order to be ready in case of an outbreak with Japan.[200] However, by April, Roosevelt had received an invitation from the Japanese government to have the fleet visit Tokyo. Roosevelt felt better after he received the invitation.[201] When the fleet's trip had ended Roosevelt wrote, "My policy of constant friendliness and courtesy toward Japan, coupled with sending the fleet around the world, has borne good results."[202]

Roosevelt's plan proved highly successful. He had intended to impress Japan, and did so. He had intended to provide the navy with a practice cruise, of moving it from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and did so. The cruise might have aroused the Japanese jingoes but they took it very calmly and this venture turned out to be a great success.

The visit of the White Fleet to Japan proved to be a remarkable goodwill visit. It prompted Foreign Minister Komura to instruct Ambassador Takahira to negotiate with the United States to remove the causes of the anti-Japanese feelings.[203] The Root-Takahira Agreement, dated November 30, 1908 provided that Japan had no political designs on Hawaii or the Philippines. Both nations agreed on policies in the

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[200] Ibid., Vol 6, p. 952.

[201] Ibid., Vol 6, pp. 995-96.

[202] Ibid., Vol 6, p. 1432. The italics are Roosevelts.

[203] Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 269.

Pacific and the maintenance of friendly relations. To reassure China that Japan had no ambitions in their country and to counter China's attempt to win the United States over to oppose Japan in her country.[204]

The Root-Takahira Agreement ended the unrest between the two governments. It did not stop discriminatory practices against the Japanese in California, but both countries trusted each other to attempt to settle any disputes should they arise. The California legislature attempted to keep the issue alive. In January, 1909, it started to pass more restrictive laws against Japanese concerning land and school segregation. One such bill allowed the Japanese to hold land if they became citizens within five years. The California Legislature allowed this, knowing that the Japanese, under the existing treaty, could not become citizens. President Roosevelt, Governor Gillett and Speaker Philip A. Stanton of the California Legislature co-operated in defeating these bills. It took these men the entire year and well into 1910 before they accomplished their purpose.[205]

The Gentlemen's Agreement did successfully operate in excluding Japanese laborers or coolies. The weakness of the agreement lay in it being only in effect as long as President Roosevelt remained in office. However, each President until the Immigration Law of 1924, agreed to abide by it. What then

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[204]*Ibid.*, pp. 274-75.

[205]Morison, *op. cit.*, Vol 6, p. 1477n.

caused the great change in attitude of the American people toward Japan; a nation heretofore considered to be a friend?

Japan prior to the Sino-Japanese War had been a small underdeveloped country which the United States had helped to grow into a significant and powerful structure in the Far East. Once Japan had gained its powerful position, by defeating China and Russia, it became evident that she could control the entire Far East and at least the western half of the Pacific. At this point she would put the other nations, such as England, France, and the United States on guard. The question arose as to how far would Japan go? Japan had reached a very high peak of prestige, and any error she might make would create a feeling of distrust toward her by these other world powers. The seed of distrust had been formulated and if not careful it might grow into hatred and then into war.

The direct cause of the irritation in California came about as a result of the rapid growth of population in Japan and for economic and military reasons as well. Japan had fought two expensive wars. These wars, coupled with the failure to receive an indemnity after the Russo-Japanese War, left Japan strained under a heavy tax burden. Wars often had been fought for economic gain and not necessarily to conqueror and control a country for political reasons. Japan failed to receive such gain. Secondly, Japan feared that should she go to war with the United States; Russia and China might combine against her and regain everything they had lost. Japan believed, that to fight a two fron war would be impossible. The third and most direct cause of Japan's trouble in

California came about as a result of her large population. The Ambassador to Japan, Thomas J. O'Brien wrote, "The growth in population of Japan was such that in the recent past the problem of finding room for the excess was serious. This difficulty had, however, became in a measure, modified through the acquisition of Korea and the territorial rights obtained in Manchuria through the then recent war with Russia."[206] Hawaii, Canada, Mexico, and the United States necessarily became the safety valve which helped to lessen the overcrowding of Japan.

It is interesting to note that the Secretary of State said that the central trouble in California arose as a result of labor unrest and not over a fear of Japanese intentions in the Pacific. Elihu Root wrote that there had existed "...much excited discussion of the subject in the newspapers and in public meetings and in private conversation."[207] Root further wrote; "It was not a question of war with Japan. All the foolish talk about war was purely sensational and imaginative. There was never even friction between the two governments. The question was, what state of feeling would be created between the great body of the people of Japan as a result of the treatment given to the Japanese in this country?"[208]

As to the question of the school board crises itself, Root believed the situation could not be settled over legal

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[206] Russell, op. cit., p. 54.

[207] Root, op. cit., p. 11.

[208] Russell, op. cit., p. 179.

rights or wrongs; nor did it represent a question of power or states right. It rested upon policy, a conflict of state and national interest.[209]

The preceeding events ended relatively successfully. Root did not believe that the people of the United States at that time would break friendship with the Japanese. He did leave the world a prophetic warning. He wrote, "The people who permit themselves to treat the people of other countries with discourtesy and insult are surely sowing the wind to reap the whirlwind, for a world of sullen and revengeful hatred can never be a world of peace."[210]

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[209] Root, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[210] *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

III The Termination of the Gentlemen's Agreement

The fear of the yellow peril did not die in 1910, but remained just below the surface of events; waiting for an opportune moment to appear again. The last report of that year, appeared in the Literary Digest. It stated that the Tokyo Nippon reported on a meeting, held by the Oriental Economic Society, at which the leader of the Constitutionalist Party, Mr. Takehoshi Yosshiro spoke. He said, "... Japan is looking forward to a war to the death with the United States." He warned that the White Fleet had been sent to Japan to reconnoiter; the next fleet to visit Japan would be an invasion fleet. The Literary Digest further reported that The Japan Chronicle of Kobi only laughed at Mr. Yosshiro.[211] The article failed to stir the yellow peril to a new pitch.

The United States-Japanese Treaty of 1894 came due for revision the following year. The 1894 treaty remained basically unchanged by the new treaty of 1911. The only significant change that took place allowed the Japanese to regulate their own tariffs.[212] Another change to the 1894 treaty had occurred earlier when the United States and Japan had agreed to the Gentlemen's Agreement. The Gentlemen's Agreement had allowed Japan to control the flow of its emigrants

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[211] "Why Japan Increases Its Navy," Literary Digest, XLI (September, 1910), 338.

[212] Treat, op. cit., (1921) p. 207.

to the United States. This feature, of course, did not satisfy the people along the Pacific Coast. Several newspapers, as had newspapers following previous treaty agreements with Japan, opposed the 1911 treaty. The Chicago Inter Ocean favored California. The Knoxville Sentinel believed it to be dangerous to leave immigration restrictions to the good faith of the Mikado's government. The United States may renounce the treaty within six months, wrote the Harrisburg Telegraph. However, a few prominent papers of the day favored the new treaty. The Boston Advertiser, Baltimore Evening Sun, Chicago Daily Tribune, Brooklyn Eagle, and the Washington Herald, favored the treaty.[213]

Nothing significant followed, until in November, 1912, when the Asiatic Exclusion League issued a bulletin. It read in part:

> ...the Japanese owned and controlled fertile land in California equal to a strip five miles wide, running the entire length of the state, but that ten years from now, at the present rate of increase, the Japanese will be in absolute possession of the agricultural resources of the State of California.[214]

Shortly following this bulletin, the State Assembly of California, on January 6, 1913 received thirty bills that would discourage Japanese immigration.[215] The one proposed bill that received close attention became known

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[213]"The New Treaty With Japan," Literary Digest, XLII (March, 1911) 395-396. All the above mentioned newspapers appeared in this magazine.

[214]Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p. 57.

[215]Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 299.

as the Alien Land Law of 1913. It contained two provisions that greatly irritated the Japanese: "Foreigners not citizens of the United States, may acquire the right to acquire, possess, use and transfer real property only within the limits stipulated by treaties between the United States and the home governments of such foreigners. This includes corporations of majority controlled by foreigners. Foreigners could rent land for agricultural purposes for periods not longer than three years."[216] The treaty of 1911 did not possess a provision that would allow the possession of real property, and it further only stipulated the rent of land by Japanese for the "purpose of dwelling and trade."[217]

Japan quickly recognized the dire circumstances under which the Japanese farmer would have to work. The Japanese Ambassador Baron Chinda requested President Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox to prevent the passage of this bill. President Taft would be leaving office shortly, and he asked the Ambassador to wait until after Woodrow Wilson's inauguration. Wilson promised he would use his influence to meet Japan's request. On April 12, Chinda met with Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan. Three days later he met with Wilson. Wilson, on April 22, sent a protest to Governor Hiram Johnson. At the same time, he sent Secretary Bryan to California. Henry White of the State Department, appealed to ex-President Roosevelt to use his influence in California. Roosevelt sent two telegrams to Governor Johnson.

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[216] Ibid., p. 300.

[217] Ibid.

He warned that an individual state must not pass laws that interferred with the foreign policy of the United States.[218] The arguments, by Roosevelt and Wilson did not prevent Governor Johnson from signing the Alien Land Law on May 19.

Governor Johnson, a well known Progressive, seemed to appear out of character when he signed the Alien Land Law. Johnson became a Progressive when the political mood wanted Progressives. He had been elected on his reputation as a sharp prosecutor of Boss Abe Ruef and Mayor Schmitz. His campaign platform centered around his dispute with the Southern Pacific Railroad. Being a good politician he moved with the emotions of the time. Californians disliked Orientals, so Johnson disliked Orientals. On question of race the Progressive did not see how that had anything to do with their political philosophy. A progressive paper, California Weekly, wrote on January 29, 1909, "Our legislature should limit Mongolian ownership of soil to a space four feet by six. A white population and a brown population regardless of nationality or ideals, can never occupy the same soil together with advantage to either. Let us dwell apart and in amity, for we cannot dwell together that way."[219] There existed limits to competition. To the Progressive mind, one of these limits should be set at the color line.

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[218] Allen Nevins, Henry White (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930) pp. 316-317.

[219] George E. Mowry, The California Progressive (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951) p. 154.

Japan filed three separate protest following the passage of the Alien Land Law. The United States said it had done all it could to prevent the passage of the law, that the law had an economic basis and not a political one, and it did not violate any treaty provisions.[220] Japan's second protest claimed that it did violate a treaty provision and further suggested that the Naturalization Law be amended. Bryan answered that the law did not violate any treaty provisions and that conditions in Congress would not permit the amendment to the Naturalization Law.[221] The United States offered however: 1) every facility for the favorable progress of law suits by Japanese, 2) pay reparation for damages done to Japanese, 3) would pay the Japanese residents the land price, prior to the law, should prices fall. Japan did not like this and filed a third protest. She regarded the law as being based on social prejudice rather than economic reasons. At that time, Japan realized the Democrats controlled Washington and the Republicans controlled the State Assembly of California; therefore, she decided to wait and hope for an eventual settlement of the problem.[222]

Japan never did receive satisfaction. The Alien Land Law of California came under the scrutiny of the United States Supreme Court in 1923. The Court upheld the Law in Porterfield vs. Webb and Webb vs. O'Brien. The New York Tribune
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[220]Kamikawa, op. cit., pp. 301-02.

[221]Ibid., pp. 304-05.

[222]Ibid., p. 306.

paraphrased the opinion of the Court: "It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and who cannot become one lacks an interest and the power of effectually working for the welfare of the state, and, so lacking, the state may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its bounderies."[223]

Prior to the signing of the Alien Land Law some newspapers wrote optimistically that it would not pass. The Buffalo Enquirer wrote "... memory of that episode (School Board decision of 1906) should aid it to go slow." The Indianapolis News wrote, "... what is demanded is fairness, and this doubtless will be forthcoming."[224] The Tokyo Asahi wrote, "This anti-Japanese agitation will impress us with a keen sense of humiliation which will require many years to efface. Americans must be prepared for a cool reception when they come to Japan as tourists or settlers."[225]

The pro-California newspapers believed otherwise. The Indianapolis Star believed that California "... surely has the right to guard its own territory from any peoples it deems undesirable by any legal means."[226] The Sacramento Bee attempted to hide the real issue. It wrote, "As a matter of fact, the alien land bills before the legislature have

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[223]Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., pp. 180-81.

[224]"California Anti-Alien Land Bill," Literary Digest, XLVI (April, 1913), 878.

[225]Ibid.

[226]Ibid.

no more application to the citizens of Japan than to those of any other nation."[227] A final remark from a newspaper that disagreed with California's action seemed to be the most significant. "The curious notion," wrote the New York World, "seems to prevail at Sacramento that the United States must be governed by the acts of the legislature of California."[228]

The magazines also carried articles on the Alien Land Law. One such article wrote that the American farmer could compete with the Japanese farmer but refused to, because the American farmer refused to live next door to the unclean, immoral, and generally socially unacceptable Japanese.[229] Another article wrote, however, "... the real explanation of the present outburst of anti-Japanese legislation is to be found in race prejudice." It further blamed the creation of the issue on the yellow press.[230]

A few prominent men of both countries wrote articles and made speeches on the issue. They attempted to reach logical and well thought out conclusions that might have been used to help reach an understanding between the peoples of Japan and the United States. Professor Shigeo Suyehiro, of the Law School at Kyoto Imperial University wrote, "Such friendship (Japan's) is, as I believe, not valueless to America. If she

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[227] Ibid.

[228] Ibid.

[229] Peter Macfarlane, "Japan in California," Colliers Weekly, LI (June 7, 1913), 5-6, 20-23.

[230] Edwin Maxey, "Japanese-American Relations," The Forum, L (July, 1913), 66-76.

lost it now, she would someday or other realize to her great regret the disadvantage of dealing with an unfriendly Japan in this part of the globe."[231] Sei-Ichiro Terashima, graduate of the University of Pennsylvania and Secretary to Foreign Minister Count Hayoshi in 1905, wrote, "Supposing that the Japanese are as bad as the worst of the newcomers from Europe? The Japanese question is simply a question concerning the 50,000 Japanese in the Pacific States. The number is only one fifth of the red Indians whom America is generous enough to let alone in their reservations. That, therefore, she is so hard upon the Japanese as to deprive them of their land the right to own land, is a matter that I can hardly understand."[232] Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University wrote, "It would remain for each nation to say who might or who might not, through the acquisition of citizenship, share in the political life of the country and in choosing its officers of government; but in his civil relations the alien resident should be put on precisely the same plane as the citizen. He should be granted no rights or immunities other than those which the citizen enjoys, and he should be subjected to no limitations or disadvantages that are not shared by him with citizens generally."[233]

The troubles in California abated for the next few years while public attention was directed toward the war in Europe

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[231]Naoichi Masaoka, compiled by, Japan to America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914) p. 61.

[232]Ibid., p. 68.

[233]Russell, op. cit., p. 4.

and our troubles in Mexico. Japan received little attention. In 1914, she, as a member of the Allied coalition, sought to increase her empire by seizing the German held coastal province of Shantung, Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Archipelagoes. The event that aroused the United States occured after Japan's defeat of the Germans at the port of Tsingtao. After Japan began its attack upon the German installations at Tsingtao; China declared a war zone around the port. When Germany lost the battle, on November 7, 1914, China withdrew the zone and asked Japan to leave Tsingtao. Japan refused to leave without some reward for her efforts. She, on January 18, 1915, presented a list, containing twenty-one items, to China demanding certain things before she would leave the port. The list became known as the Twenty-One Demands.[234]

Japan had wished to achieve certain goals. She wanted to secure the German interests in Shantung Province with the same recognition by China as had the Germans prior to their defeat. Japan wished also to consolidate the status of her special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria.[235] The Twenty-One Demands signaled an alarm to the rest of the world of Japan's imperialistic designs upon China. The United States quickly entered the discussion for fear of losing its interest in China, and the defeat of the Open Door Policy.

On March 13, 1915, the United States sent a formal protest to Ambassador Chinda. The United States opposed

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[234]Treat, op. cit., (1928) pp. 215-16.

[235]Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 309.

the demand that China would obtain certain munitions from Japan or set up an arsenal with joint control between China and Japan. Japan's actions had a tendency to infringe upon equal opportunities for all nations for she demanded that China employ Japanese political, financial, and military experts. Basically, however, the United States feared that if China accepted all these demands her political independence and administrative entity would be clearly impaired.[236] Japan softened its demands, left out the objectionable ones, and remained in the Shantung Province.

As the war in Europe progressed, the United States moved closer to involvement in Europe. On May 12, 1917 Secretary of State Robert Lansing asked Ambassador Sato to request a special envoy to come to the United States. Secretary Lansing wished to discuss the supplying of goods to the Allies and to decide on a policy to defend the Pacific in order to allow the United States to withdraw her fleet, and send it to the Atlantic.[237]

Japan readily accepted this invitation for she hoped to use the opportunity to settle Japanese-American roles in China and the problem of the unfair treatment of Japanese in the United States.[238] Secretary Lansing refused to discuss anything except the war effort. The document, known as the

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[236]*Ibid.*, pp. 312-313.

[237]*Ibid.*, pp. 339-40.

[238]*Ibid.*, p. 340.

Lansing-Ishii Agreement went into effect on November 2, 1917. It read in part: "As both Japan and the United States recognize the fact that there exists a special relation between nations neighboring on each other, the government of the United States recognizes Japan's special interests in China, especially in the areas adjacent to Japanese territory."[239] Thus the United States agreed to recognize Japan's special interest in China and Japan promised to recognize the Open Door Policy.

One aspect of the agreement failed to reach satisfactory interpretation. The United States only interpreted "special interest" to mean that Japan's special interest lie in her geographical nearness to Japan. The United States did not presume to concede to Japan's imperialistic aims.[240] The Japanese, however, interpreted the phrase broadly to mean approval of Japan's economic and political interests in China.[241] The agreement served its purpose during the war. It was terminated on April 14, 1923.

Japan at the Paris Peace Conference obtained disposition of the German possessions north of the equator and transfer of German leaseholds and other interest in the Shantung Peninsula. President Wilson reluctantly agreed to this after Japan refused to join the League of Nations unless she obtained the above dispositions.[242] Japan further wanted a statement

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[239] Ibid., p. 346.

[240] Tupper and McReynolds, op. cit., p. 122.

[241] Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan, 1914-1939 (Tokyo: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941) p. 24.

[242] Ibid., p. 28.

concerning racial equality embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, but could not get it.

Why did Japan receive what she did? In 1917 the British and French had been hard hit by German submarines in the Pacific. They wanted desparately to have Japan supply destroyer escorts for their ships. Japan agreed to this if she could have all the German held islands north of the equator and the German economic holdings in Shantung. England agreed and for her part would receive the German islands south of the equator and France would have her rights secured in China.[243] During the war Japan captured Shantung and the islands in the north Pacific. When Japan arrived at Versailles she had all ready occupied these possessions four years.[244]

The order in which Japan received these holdings at the peace conference seemed to work in her favor. She first received the German islands under a mandate of the League of Nations. This meant that Japan could not fortify them. Wilson attempted to keep Japan, England, and France from carrying out their secret treatys of 1917 but none of the three would give up their holdings. Wilson would only allow the Japanese to have these islands as a mandate of the League instead of receiving them as fee simple which would allow Japan to fortify them.[245] Next Japan attempted to have a racial equality clause inserted in the covenent. This met

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[243] Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York: MacMillan Co., 1944) pp. 143 & 176.

[244] Ibid., pp. 173-78.

[245] Ibid.

opposition by Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia who was having immigration problems at home. The British did not wish this clause for fear of trouble in their African colonies. Wilson did not wish this for he doubted he could get the Senate to agree to this. Senator Hiram Johnson of California and the West Coast leaders would not vote for the League. After much effort on the part of Japan she agreed to a clause in the preamble which stated the "principle of the equality of Nations and the just treatment of their nationals."[246]

Japan lost this fight but used this defeat as a lever to insure her claim to Shantung. She not only had the secret treaty of 1917 in which to base her arguments but also two treaties with China, in 1915 and 1918. On various grounds the Chinese then declared them to be invalid. Japan threatened to walk out of the conference should she fail to get these. Wilson, under much strain, felt it better to save the League than to refuse Japan Shantung.[247] Wilson's enemies at home grabbed this as a sell out of 40,000,000 Chinese. Hiram Johnson, who knew better, but who also knew the prejudices of his California constituency branded this as "the blackest page in all our history."[248] Japan received the economic holdings of Germany but did not desire the political control of these people. Japan promised to withdraw her troops and to restore Shantung in full sovereignty which she did in 1922.[249]

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[246] *Ibid.*, pp. 272-276.

[247] *Ibid.*, pp. 276-285.

[248] *Ibid.*, p. 283.

[249] *Ibid.*

While the Peace Conference continued deliberations, war had not ended in Russia. Japan, under the pretext of protecting Czech prisoners from the Bolsheviks, sent its army west into Siberia. After she had accomplished her goal, she remained in Siberia with an eye toward further conquest. The Siberian exploits added further to the distrust of Japan by the United States. The United States sent troops to Siberia in order to watch Japan.

Though the United States had good reason to distrust Japan, the Japanese had good reason to distrust the United States. The United States, after authoring the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, rejected them. Immediately following the war the United States Navy continued its drive to build an even larger navy.[250] Troubles began to arise again in California. The anti-Japanese feelings in 1919, caused the passage of a new Alien Land Law in November 1920. The Japanese liberals lost ground at home and the military parties gained strength.[251]

The period from 1919 to 1920 represented a bitter struggle for the Japanese resident in California. Two anti-Japanese bills appeared in the California Legislature in January 1919. The first bill wished to deprive all foreigners from renting land if they could not become citizens of the United States. The second bill would have forbidden marriages between people living in the United States and Japan. It had been the practice, due to the large male Japanese population in

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[250] Treat, op. cit., (1928) p. 231.

[251] Ibid., p. 232.

California, for a Japanese man to apply to a marriage broker in Japan for a wife. The broker would collect all necessary information plus photographs of the man and in turn would find a propsective bride in Japan and collect the same information about her. The broker would send this information and picture to the prospective bridegroom in the United States. Should both agree to the marriage, they would be married by proxy and the bride would then go to live with her husband in the United States. The two bills never reached the voting stage. Through pressure from President Wilson the bills had been withdrawn.[252]

New attempts began to take place in California to persuade the General Assembly of California to discourage the Japanese from immigrating to the United States. A group organized the Anti-Japanese Association of California in September, 1919. Due to the Association's pressure, Japan, on December 8, promised to prohibit picture marriages. Still not satisfied the Anti-Japanese Association, on January 13, 1920, requested the Governor of California to call a special session of the General Assembly to enact an anti-Japanese law.[253] On May 20th the Anti-Japanese Association published a proposed Alien Land Law and requested a referendum vote. The proposed Alien Land Law purportedly did not interfere with the United States-Japanese Trade Treaty of 1911. The backers of the bill claimed that it neither represented racial discrimination

[252]Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 413.

[253]Ibid., p. 414-415.

nor did it mention immigration.[254] The Democrat Party indirectly helped the anti-Japanese group. The Party published its platform on July 2; which included support for anti-immigration of Asians.[255]

The Alien Land Law went into effect on December 9, 1920. It provided that no foreigner, unable to become a citizen, could rent land. The 1913 Alien Land Law had allowed foreigners to rent land for at least three years. Secondly, foreigners could neither work for nor invest in real estate companies. Finally, no adult foreigners could be guardians of the property of minors.[256] Japan filed a formal complaint on January 3, 1921. The United States answered that the law did not violate the 1911 treaty. The United States expressed sympathy but said it could do no more.[257]

The United States could have done more under different circumstances. The Alien Land Law did not technically violate the 1911 treaty. It did violate the spirit of the treaty. The law had no justifiable reason for existing. The different circumstances, as suggested, might have been during a time when the people of the United States felt more inclined to be aware of international problems. California, whether by design or not, passed their law when the people of the United States were waiting for the inauguration of President Harding.

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[254] Ibid.

[255] Ibid., pp. 416-417.

[256] Ibid., p. 415.

[257] Ibid., p. 418.

Wilson remained in office but had little power to act. Harding would do nothing for he knew nothing about foreign affairs. The general public no longer concerned themselves with international affairs. World War I, failure to make the world safe for democracy, and the repudiation of the Treaty of Versailles contributed greatly to the public attitude.

The situation in California proved to be magnified out of proportion to the rest of the United States. The 1920 census showed, that out of 105,710, 620 people in the United States only 111,010 were Japanese. The United States total increase in population in the past decade had been 13,738,354. The Japanese population had increased by only 38,853.[258] Also the period from July, 1908 to July 1919, 79,738 Japanese had entered the continental United States, but 68,770 had departed. The net increase had been 10,968 or an average of less than a thousand a year.[259] The emotions and fear that had been aroused by such anti-Japanese groups existed only in the minds of the people and never in fact. Naturalization became the only avenue left to the Japanese. The courts offered the only chance left for the Japanese. However, the Supreme Court ruled, on October 13, 1922, the ineligibility of Japanese and Hindus to become citizens.[260]

The final steps in the complete exclusion of Japanese began to take place. The Japanese problem became involved

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[258]Treat, op. cit., (1928) pp. 282-283.

[259]Ibid., p. 282.

[260]Ibid., p. 226; and Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 448.

within the context of the overall immigration of aliens. During World War I, many feared that the United States would receive more immigrants than she could assimilate, and a strong feeling existed that the United States would be overrun by those wishing to escape post war distress in Europe. The Congress, in 1921 shifted to a policy which restricted the number of immigrants who might enter. The 1921 Immigration Act, intended as an emergency measure, assigned a quota to each country except those of the Western Hemisphere.[261] The Immigration Act of 1921 carried an expiration date of June 30, 1924. It became necessary for Congress to legislate a permanent immigration law.

President Calvin Coolidge signed, on May 26, the Immigration Act of 1924. The bill did not entirely meet his wishes but on the whole he favored it. He saif, "If the exclusion provision stood alone, I should disapprove it without hesitation, if sought in this way at this time. But this bill is a comprehensive measure dealing with the whole subject of immigration and setting up the necessary administrative machinery. The present quota act of 1921 will terminate on June 30 next. It is of importance that a comprehensive measure should take its place and that the arrangements for its administration should be provided at once in order to avoid hardship and confusion."[262]

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[261]Virgil Salera, U. S. Immigration Policy and World Population Problems (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Association, 1960), pp. 5 & 6.

[262]"End of the Melting Pot Theory," Literary Digest, LXXXI (June 7, 1925), 14-15.

The Immigration Act of 1924 contained two provisions which did more too stir public comment and international dissensions than any of its other numerous provisions.[263] Basically the Act changed the provision of the 1921 Act, which limited the annual immigration from any transatlantic country to three per cent of the number of its nationals residing in the United States as determined by the census of 1910, to two percent based on the 1890 census.[264] The date represented the beginning point when more immigrants began to arrive from those countries in eastern and southern Europe than those from the British Isles, Germany, France, and Scandinavia.[265]

The second provision, Section 13, Article C, of the Act became the most discussed provision in the newspapers in 1924. The provision stated that, "No alien ineligible for citizenship shall be admitted to the United States...."[266] This provision referred only to one country and that being Japan which took great offense at such an insult. China had been excluded by the Chinese Exclusion Law of ~~1884~~, as earlier mentioned, and Korea belonged to Japan and would be excluded since the law affected Japan and her possessions. The provision did not come as a complete surprise; for as early as February, 1905, the San Francisco _Chronicle_ had, as previously mentioned,

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[263]Hereinafter the Immigration Act of 1924 will be referred to as the Act.

[264]Preston W. Slosson, _The Great Crusade and After, 1914-1928_ (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1931), p. 299.

[265]_Ibid_.

[266]U.S. Bureau of Immigration, _Immigration Laws and Rules of March 1, 1927_ (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1927).

initiated an anti-Japanese campaign and demanded a Japanese exclusion law.

The State Department tried unsuccessfully to prevent the exclusion provision from being inserted. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes wrote to Albert Johnson, Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization in the House of Representatives, "I am unable to perceive that the exclusion provision is necessary and I must strongly urge upon you the advisability, in the interest of our international relations, of eliminating it."[267]

When the bill came before the Senate, Ambassador Hanihara wrote to Secretary Hughes concerning Japan's displeasure toward this bill and asked that this letter be transmitted to the Senate. The Ambassador included a rather unfortunate phrase within his statement which Secretary Hughes did not take either particular notice of or due to haste overlooked it but the statement read in part: "...I realize as I believe you do, the _grave consequences_[268] which the enactment of the measure retaining that particular provision would inevitably bring upon the otherwise happy and mutually advantageous relations between our two countries."[269] The Senate quickly grasped the phrase "grave consequences" as a veiled threat to the United States. Ambassador Hanihara quickly wrote that

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[267] U.S.--Treaties, etc., _Diplomatic Relations Between the U.S. and Japan, 1908-1924_, (CCXI; New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1925), p. 190.

[268] The italics are mine.

[269] U. S.--Treaties, etc., _op. cit._

this statement had not been intended as a threat. Hughes in writing his reply to the Ambassador said he realized this to be true.[270]

On May 31, 1924, after the Act became law, Ambassador Hanihara wrote, "Unfortunately, however, the sweeping provision of the new act, clearly indicative of discrimination against Japanese, have made it impossible for Japan to continue the undertakings assumed under the gentlemen's agreement."[271] Secretary Hughes, now placed in the position to defend the Act, reluctantly agreed to release Japan from the Gentlemen's Agreement.[272] The former Secretary of State, Elihu Root, who had done a great deal to establish the Gentlemen's Agreement, stated that he "was shocked and saddended by the needless affront to Japan in the Immigration Act of 1924...."[273] Dr. Inazo Nitobé, the first exchange professor from Japan to the United States, wrote, "The repercussion of this legislative act on Japan was profound. She felt as though her best friend had, of a sudden and without provocation, slapped her on the cheek."[274]

What evidence, then, can be found to help determine the attitude of the American public toward the Immigration Act of

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[270] Ibid., pp. 191-194.

[271] Ibid., pp. 197-198.

[272] Ibid.

[273] Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1954), p. 172.

[274] Inazo Nitobé, Lectures on Japan (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 287-288.

1924? There exist various newspapers and magazines who expressed different views on the subject. It will be determined through use of various articles, what groups favored or disapproved of the Act of 1924 in relation to the Japanese-American immigration problem. The vote in Congress helped also to determine voter sentiment. First, the opposition will be looked at.

Members of the religious community in the United States opposed the Act. The Missionary Review of the World, a protestant magazine that carried articles and information on various protestant churches, stated, "...it adds considerably to the difficulties of the Christian missionaries who have so unselfishly gone to offer the Japanese the benefits of the Gospel of Christ. Naturally, by the uninformed, Christianity is looked upon as an alien religion and in Japan the anti-American feeling extends to American goods, American institutions, American customs and ideals and what is looked upon as the religion of America."[275] The Catholic World wrote an article concerning the same matter.[276]

In referring to Section 13, the New York Herald Tribune expressed concern that "...the country as a whole will regret that the unnecessary affront to Japan was not avoided as the President desired."[277] The Philadelphia Ledger blamed, "the American Senate's handling of the delicate immigration issue

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[275] "Japanese Exclusion and Missions," Missionary Review of the World, XLVII (August, 1924), 589-91.

[276] "Immigration Peril," Catholic World, XLVIII (May, 1924), 401-6.

[277] "End of the Melting Pot Theory", op. cit.

which more than any private reason, caused Cyrus E. Wood's resignation as Ambassador to Japan."[278] In addressing a Tokyo audience after his resignation, Ambassador Wood said that the Act was "not what you want or what I want." It "does not represent the wishes of the American people as a whole."[279]

The part that greatly affected the Japanese was the way the Act established an arbitrary racial classification of desireable immigrants. The newspapers of the times centered most of their attention on this aspect of the Act, though their opinions varied. The newspapers who favored the Act as a whole but disapproved of Section 13 could be classified as moderate on the subject of approval of the Act. The St. Louis Globe Democrat believed the Act in general to be necessary. It also added, "We are unable to see that anything could be gained by a veto, much as we would approve the purpose of a veto, in so far as it applied to the Japanese provision."[280] "Apart from the Japanese feature," wrote the New York Herald Tribune, "the new law will command national approval."[281] The New York Times followed in the same manner, "This legislation no doubt embodies the sentiment of a large majority of our people, though and deserved criticism has been leveled against

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[278] Ibid.

[279] Ibid.

[280] St. Louis Globe Democrat, May 27, 1924, p. 14.

[281] The Herald Tribune (New York) May 27, 1924, p. 12.

Congress for its needless affront to Japanese sensibilities."[282] The New York Times would not let Japan off with just that comment. In reference to Japan the editorial further commented, "No powerful voice has been raised there to point out that immigration is and must remain a domestic problem, and that America has just as much right to keep out Japanese laborers as Japan has to keep out Chinese or, for that matter Americans."[283]

The moderates discussed the question of whether the Japanese could be assimilated into the American society. One moderate wrote, "The best protection of the Pacific Coast against the Japanese population now in America is in a policy, not of pin-pricks, but of conciliation--a policy that will raise the standard of living of the Japanese now here and coordinate them to American life."[284] Another moderate wrote that the Japanese should have been given quota privileges as the other major countries had. This would have meant approximately 250 Japanese immigrants a year. He further argued that the Japanese had not been excluded due to being an inferior race but on the grounds of racial unassimilability.[285] In this writer's estimation, the Japanese must have been either superior to or inferior to the Americans if he could not assimilate. It would also be questioned as to how many Americans considered

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[282]The New York Times, May 27, 1924, p. 20.

[283]Ibid.

[284]Raymond L. Buell, "Gentlemen's Agreement Among Gentlemen," Asia, XXIV (July, 1924), 519-23.

[285]"Slap At Japan," Current Opinion, LXXVI (June, 1924), 758-9.

themselves inferior to the Japanese or to any other nationality? It would seem then that the Japanese had been excluded on the basis of alleged race inferiority.

The attitude of the Japanese press should be looked at not so much for its opinions but to see what influence they might have carried with the American public. Excerpts from their newspapers appeared in the Living Age. It appeared, however, that since the Act became law they did not create much influence against it. It should also be pointed out that the American public has always had a tendency to tell foreigners to mind their own business but these excerpts exist and should not be overlooked.

The Japanese press agreed with each other in denouncing the Act and the United States. The Osaka Asahi wrote, "Our respect for America is cooling into scorn." It's competitor, Mainichi, warned that, "The might of the United States is a calamity for mankind." A "masterpiece of jingoism" wrote the Kakumin, while the Yarodza wondered, "Should the Japanese patiently tolerate this insult, their national existance and independence will be seriously endangered." "It will excite the ill feeling of the colored races toward the United States," warned the Tokyo Nichi Nichi. At the same time the Yamato could not believe the United States had done such a thing. It wrote, "This is not what Americans, who profess themselves defenders of equity, justice, humanity, and equality, should do." The Tokyo Asahi placed the responsibility for future international disunity upon the United States. "If the movement for international peace retrogrades and suffers a setback we hold

that the jingoism of the United States is solely responsible," it wrote.[286] The Nichi Nichi later added, "It is an insult such as Japan has never before received in her history, and even those of our statesmen who are most Americanized cannot accept it passively."[287]

The United States had chartered a course which eventually would collide with Japan. The London Times in 1924 would not predict war but it added that "... the seeds of conflict are there--on either side of the Pacific Ocean...."[288] Hikomatsu Kamikawa, a Japanese historian, in 1958 wrote, "There is no doubt that the Immigration Act of 1924 put the peace of the Pacific area in jeopardy, nipped the bud of international friendship and constituted a fundamental cause for the Pacific War."[289]

The Act had a great many vocal proponents in general. The proponents used five main arguments. The first type of argument could be classified as patriotic. The Chicago Daily Tribune hailed the Act as "a second Declaration of Independence; not less significant and epoch making for America and the world than the Declaration of 1776."[290] A second argument

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[286] "Japan and the Immigration Law," Living Age, CCCXXI (May 31, 1924), 1023-24. The above quotes from Japan all appeared in this magazine.

[287] "Conflict in the Pacific," Living Age, CCCXXII (August 30, 1924), 395-9.

[288] The Chicago Daily Tribune, May 31, 1924, p. 8. It quoted the London Times.

[289] Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 454.

[290] "End of the Melting Pot Theory," op. cit. See also, "So Far So Good," The Saturday Evening Post, CXCVI (June 28, 1924), 24; French Strother, "Immigration Peril," World's Work, XLVI (October, 1923), 633-7; and Roy L. Garis, "How the Immigration Law Works," Scribner Magazine, LXXVI (August, 1924), 183-8.

could be classified as race prejudice. "If our race is worth saving" it cried, "it is worth saving at all cost."[291] A third argument stressed assimilation or the failure of immigrants in general to adapt to America and its customs.[292] Labor favored the Act for it believed that more jobs and higher wages would be available.[293] Finally, World's Work printed an article stressing the higher crime rates among immigrants than among non-immigrants.[294]

The publications and other sources that supported the Act in regards to Japanese immigrants existed mainly on the Pacific Coast. One newspaper that supported the Act in regards to Japan, oddly enough appeared in the East. The Boston Evening Transcript defended the actions of the United States toward Japan. The Transcript wrote, "Its purpose, broadly speaking, is similar to that which animates the Japanese, for they, as is their right wish to keep their country Japanese, and we wish to keep ours American."[295]

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[291] J. F. Rowland, "Connecticut Yankee Speaks His Mind," Outlook, CXXXVI (March 19, 1924), 478-80. See also, Willet M. Hays, "Immigration and Eugenics," Review of Reviews, LXIX (April, 1924), 405-6; L. Stoddard, "New Realism of Science," The Saturday Evening Post, CXCVII (September 6, 1924), 38; Madison Grant, "Racial Transformation of America," North American Review, CCXIX (March, 1924), 343-52; and H. H. Powers, "Grave Consequences," Atlantic Monthly, CXXXIV (July, 1924), 124-33.

[292] "How Far Should the Gates Open," Woman Citizen, LVII (February 23, 1924), 14.

[293] James H. Colling, "Who Will Do Our Dirty Work Now?" The Saturday Evening Post, CXCVII (September 6, 1924), 26-30.

[294] "Immigrants and Vice," World's Work, XLVIII (July, 1924), 248.

[295] Boston Evening Transcript, May 27, 1924, p. 14.

The most significant barometer of voter attitude toward the Immigration Act of 1924 in relation to the Japanese immigrant can best be presented through the vote of the Congress. (See Appendix C) The Senate voted 69 for, 9 against, and 18 did not vote. Not one Senator from the Pacific Coast voted against the Act. Those that voted against the Act came from either the industrialized east or from the center of the United States. Those Senators that did not vote and who were evidently present did not represent an area where Japanese immigrants lived in quantity. The House of Representatives voted 308 for, 62 against, and 63 did not vote. Again those representatives that voted against the Act came from eastern or middle western states. However, Congressmen Curry (Republican-California) and Congressman Julius Kahn (Republican-California) did not vote. Curry did list himself as favoring the Act. The House did not list anyone as being absent. Seventeen of the nineteen Congressmen and six Senators from Washington, Oregon, and California voted for the Act. The strength of the vote of the Pacific Coast Congressmen would establish fairly conclusively that the majority of their constituents favored Japanese exclusion.

The Immigration Act of 1924 in general received a majority of support by those who gave the immigration problem any consideration. Congressman John C. Box (Democrat-Texas) submitted a list of the individual organizations and societies that favored and those that opposed the Act. (See Appendix D) The ones that opposed the Act consisted of the patriotic, social fraternal, farm and labor groups. Especially notable on the list appeared the Native Sons of the Golden West,

California. That organization opposed Japanese immigration and had as one of its illustrious leaders--Senator Hiram Johnson.

The Act greatly satisfied the American Pacific Coast for the people no longer needed to worry about Japanese immigration. Japan, on her part, had been greatly insulted for the Act had discriminated against her people and along with discrimination it had made them appear to be inferior to the people of the West. Japan, who had been forced to open her doors to the world by the economic interests as the child of the United States, had become disinherited. She had watched the colonial policies of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States and had learned the lessons well.

Japan desired to develop herself economically based on the same patterns of the West. Japan had been held in check from 1858 to 1894 by the various trade treaties which had bound her to the West. The Sino-Japanese War freed her from these restraining treaties. The Russo-Japanese War assured Japan of her key role in the Far East. However, the overzealousness of her demands following the war and her desire to develop militarily caused the West to become more concerned about Japanese expansion and the treat to their colonies. The United States became increasingly concerned about Japan's intentions in China and in the Pacific.

Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, Japan began to show stronger interest in China and in the Pacific. She became concerned over the annexation of Hawaii by the United States. Then she worried about what the effects of Hay's Open Door Policy would have on her holdings in China. Her effort to

restore order during the Boxer Rebellion helped to confirm her intentions to remain in China.

Following the Russo-Japanese War the attention of Japanese-American Relations centered mainly on the immigration problem. The problem resulted from labor unrest but the responsibility for making the issue an emotional one must be placed on Mayor Schmitz of San Francisco and political boss Ruef. They purposely fanned the racial prejudice of their people in order to hinder the corruption investigation of their administration. The resultant Gentlemen's Agreement and the visit of the Great White Fleet calmed the situation temporarily. Though the Great White Fleet had been received welcomingly by Japan; it too further emphasized to Japan the need for a strong military machine to obtain and hold colonies successfully.

Immigration of Japanese to the United States continued and the emotional prejudice of the people along the Pacific Coast kept burning. The so-called 21 Demands did nothing to alleviate the prejudice in California. The anti-Japanese prejudice declined during World War I while the United States fought in Europe but it revived following the Paris Peace Conference especially when Japan received the German leaseholds in China and the former German islands in the Pacific north the Equator. The Act ended American domestic furor but left the relations between Japan and the United States strained.

The question that would follow in the light of history remains to be decided at a later time. However, it can be discussed with some thought. What effect did the Immigration Act of 1924 have on later events that occurred between the

United States and Japan? Did the Act represent a cause of World War II--as claimed by one Japanese historian quoted earlier? This writer believes that the Act could only be an indirect cause of World War II.

Japan, since the time for the Sino-Japanese War intended to increase her influence and power in China and in the Pacific. It needs to be mentioned that following the successful wars the Japanese warlords increasingly gained in political importance. When the Japanese, civilian diplomats failed to keep the territory Japan had won in China; and when they failed to receive the desired indemnity following the Russo-Japanese War; and when they failed to prevent Article 13, Section C from being inserted into the Act; the military gained strength at home. Finally prior to World War II the military controlled Japanese foreign policy. The Act through helping to weaken the civilian government of Japan and only through this process could it be said to be a cause of World War II. The cause would have to be placed directly upon the aggressive colonial policy of Japan and her warlords.

What judgement can be made on the immigration issue? First, the racial prejudice of the people on the Pacific Coast could never be accepted as proper behavior. The discrimination against the Japanese school children and against their right to own and lease land deemed unwarranted. Secondly, Section 13, Article C of the Act should have been left out as should have the entire quota system. The system rested upon quantity of immigrants not quality of immigrants.

The overall judgement to be made on Japanese-American relations from the beginning could be summed up as one of a conflict of self interests on both sides of the issues. First, it had been the desire of the United States to increase its economic interests around the world that had opened Japan in the first place. Then came Japan with her desire to do the same for her economic interests. Both became distrustful of the other and the immigration issue would only be considered an issue of minor importance in the overall conflict. This did not give California, Washington, and Oregon the right to act as they did but nevertheless the Pacific Coast problem resulted from the international dealings of both.

Appendix A

Immigration Statistics

Year		European Immigrants		Japanese Immigrants
1880		348,691		4
1881		528,545		11
1882		648,186		5
1883		522,587		27
1884	(Chinese Exclusion Law of 1884)	453,686		20
1885		353,083		49
1886	(Landowners needed laborers	329,529		194
1887		482,829		229
1888		538,131		404
1889		434,790		640
1890		445,680		691
1891		546,085		1,136
1892		608,472		1,498
1893		429,139		1,380
1894		279,052		1,931
1895	(Sino-Japan War ended)	250,342		1,150
1896		329,067		1,110
1897		216,397		1,526
1898	(railroads hire Japanese)	217,786		2,230
1899		297,349		2,844
1900		424,700	(Include Hawaii's figures)	12,635
1901		469,237		5,269
1902		619,068		14,270
1903		814,507		19,968
1904		767,933		14,264
1905		974,273		10,331
1906		1,018,365		13,835
1907		1,199,566		30,226

Keyoshi Karl Kawakami, American Japanese Relations (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912). Also these same statistics appeared in Inazo Ota Nitobe, The Japanese Nation (New York: G. P. Putnam's sons, 1912). The years 1900 to 1907 agree with these same years in Appendix B.

Appendix B

Immigration Statistics
(Japanese)

Year	Immigration	Emigration	Net Change
1900	12,635		
1901	5,269		
1902	14,270		
1903	19,968	No official figures available	
1904	14,264		
1905	10,331		
1906	13,835		
1907	30,226		
1908	15,803	5,323	+ 10,480
1909	3,111	3,894	- 783
1910	2,720	4,377	- 1,657
1911	4,520	3,354	+ 1,166
1912	6,114	1,485	+ 4,629
1913	8,281	731	+ 7,550
1914	8,929	756	+ 8,173
1915	8,613	840	+ 7,773
1916	8,680	770	+ 7,910
1917	8,991	750	+ 8,241
1918	10,213	1,583	+ 8,630
1919	10,064	2,195	+ 7,869
1920	9,432	4,249	+ 5,183
1921	7,878	4,375	+ 3,503
1922	6,716	4,368	+ 2,348
1923	5,809	2,869	+ 2,940
1924	8,801	2,155	+ 6,646
1925	723	1,212	- 489
1926	654	1,208	- 554

Eliot Grinnell Mears, Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928) p. 409. He took these from United States Immigration Reports.

Appendix C

Immigration Law of 1924

Senate Vote

Names of those voting yea

Adams (Dem.-Colo.)
Ashurst (Dem.-Ariz.)
Ball (Rep.-Del.)
Bayard (Dem.-Del.)
Borah (Rep.-Idaho)
Brandegee (Rep.-Conn.)
Brookhart (Rep.-Iowa)
Broussard (Dem.-La.)
Bruce (Dem.-Md.)
Bursum (Rep.-N. Mex.)
Cameron (Rep.-Ariz.)
Capper (Rep.-Kans.)
Caraway (Dem.-Ark.)
Cummins (Rep.-Iowa)
Curtis (Rep.-Kans.)
Dale (Rep.-Vt.)
Dial (Dem.-S. C.)
Dill (Dem.-Wash.)
Edge (Rep.-N. J.)
Fess (Rep.-Ohio)
Fletcher (Rep-Fla.)
George (Dem.-Ga.)
Glass (Dem.-Va.)
Gooding (Rep.-Idaho)
Hale (Rep.-Me.)
Harreld (Rep.-Okla.)
Harris (Dem.-Ga.)
Harrison (Dem.-Miss.)
Heflin (Dem.-Ala.)
Howell (Rep.-Nebr.)
Johnson (Rep.-Calif.)
Johnson (Farm Labor-Minn.)
Jones (Dem.-N. Mex.)
Jones (Rep.-Wash.)
Kendrick (Dem.-Wyo.)
Keyes (Rep.-N. H.)
Lodge (Rep.-Mass.)
McKellar (Dem.-Tenn.)
McKinley (Rep.-Ill.)
McNary (Rep.-Oreg.)
Mayfield (Dem.-Texas)
Neely (Dem.-W. Va.)
Norbeck (Rep.-S. Dak.)
Oddie (Rep.-Nov.)
Norris (Rep.-Nebr.)
Overman (Dem.-N. C.)

Names of those voting yea

Pepper (Rep.-Pa.)
Phipps (Rep.-Colo.)
Pittman (Dem.-Nev.)
Ralston (Dem.-Ind.)
Ransdell (Dem.-La.)
Reed (Rep.-Pa.)
Robinson (Dem.-Ark.)
Sheppard (Dem.-Texas)
Shields (Dem.-Tenn.)
Shortridge (Rep.-Calif.)
Simmons (Dem.-N. C.)
Smith (Dem.-S. C.)
Smoot (Rep.-Utah)
Stanfield (Rep-Oreg.)
Stephens (Dem.-Miss.)
Swanson (Dem.-Va.)
Trammell (Dem.-Fla.)
Wadsworth (Rep.-N. Y.)
Walsh (Dem.-Mont.)
Warren (Rep.-Wyo.)
Watson (Rep.-Ind.)
Wheeler (Dem.-Mont.)
Willis (Rep.-Ohio)

Names of those voting nay

Colt (Rep.-R. I.)
Frazier (Rep.-N. Dak.)
Gerry (Dem.-R. I.)
Ladd (Rep.-N. Dak.)
McLean (Rep.-Conn.)
Owen (Dem.-Okla.)
Shipstead (Farm Labor-Minn.)
Sterling (Rep.-S. Dak.
Walsh (Dem.-Mass.)

Appendix C (Contd.)

Senate
<u>Names of those not voting</u>

Copeland (Dem.-N. Y.) Absent (No) Robinson
Couzens (Rep.-Mich.)
Edwards (Dem.-N. J.) Absent (No) Robinson
Elkins (Rep.-W. Va.)
Ernst (Rep.-Kentucky)
Fernald (Rep.-Me.)
Ferris (Dem.-Mich.) Absent (Yes) Fess
Greene (Rep.-Vt.)
King (Dem.-Utah) Withheld because Spencer was absent
La Follette (Rep.-Wis.)
Lenroot (Rep.-Wis.) Absent due to illness
McCormick(Rep.-Ill.)
Moses (Rep.-N. H.) Absent (Yes) Broussard
Reed (Rep.-Mo.)
Spencer (Rep.-Mo.) Absent
Stanley (Dem.-Ky.)
Underwood (Dem.-Ala.) Absent (Yes) Robinson & Lodge
Weller (Rep.-Md.)

Yeas--69, Nays--9, & Not Voting--18

House of Representatives

<u>Names of those voting yes</u>
Abernethy (Dem.-N. C.)
Ackerman (Rep.-N. J.)
Allen (Dem.-W. Va.)
Allgood (Dem.-Ala.)
Andrew (Rep.-Mass.)
Anthony (Rep.-Kans.)
Arnold (Dem.-Ill.)
Aswell (Dem.-La.)
Ayres (Dem.-Kans.)
Bacon (Rep.-N. Y.)
Barbour (Rep.-Calif.)
Beedy (Rep.-Me.)
Begg (Rep.-Ohio)
Bell (Dem.-Ga.)
Bixler (Rep.-Pa.)
Black (Dem.-Texas)
Bland (Dem.-Va.)
Blanton (Dem.-Texas)
Bowling (Dem.-Ala.)
Box (Dem.-Texas)
Boyce (Dem.-Del.)
Brand (Dem.-Ga.)
Brand (Rep.-Ohio)
Briggs (Dem.-Texas)

<u>Names of those voting yes</u>
Britten (Rep.-Ill.)
Browne (Dem.-Wis.)
Browning (Dem.-Tenn.)
Brumm (Rep.-Pa.)
Buchanan (Dem.-Texas)
Bulwinkle (Dem.-N. C.)
Burtness (Rep.-N. Dak.)
Burton (Rep.-Ohio)
Busby (Dem.-Ala.)
Butler (Rep.-Pa.)
Byrns (Dem.-Tenn.)
Cable (Rep.-Ohio)
Canfield (Dem.-Ind.)
Cannon (Dem.-Mo.)
Carter (Dem.-Okla.)
Chindblom (Rep.-Ill.)
Christopherson (Rep.-S. Dak.)
Clague (Rep.-Minn.)
Clarke (Rep.-N. Y.)
Cole (Rep.-Iowa)
Cole (Rep.-Ohio)
Collier (Dem-Miss.)
Collins (Dem.-Miss.)
Colton (Rep.-Utah)

Appendix C (Contd)

House of Representatives

Names of those voting yea

Connally (Dem.-Texas)
Cook (Dem.-Ind.)
Cooper (Rep.-Ohio)
Cooper (Rep.-Wis.)
Crisp (Dem.-Ga.)
Croll (Dem.-Pa.)
Crowther (Rep.-N. Y.)
Cummins (Dem.-Pa.)
Dallinger (Rep.-Mass.)
Darrow (Rep.-Pa.)
Davey (Dem.-Ohio)
Davis (Rep.-Minn.)
Davis (Dem.-Tenn.)
Deal (Dem.-Va.)
Dempsey (Rep.-N. Y.)
Denison (Rep.-Ill.)
Dickinson (Rep.-Iowa)
Dickinson (Dem.-Mo.)
Dominick (Dem.-S. C.)
Doughton (Dem.-N. C.)
Dowell (Rep.-Iowa)
Drewry (Dem.-Va.)
Driver (Dem.-Ark.)
Dyer (Rep.-Mo.)
Elliott (Rep.-Ind.)
Evans (Rep.-Iowa)
Evans (Dem.-Mont.)
Fairchild (Rep.-N.Y.)
Fairfield (Rep.-Ind.)
Faust (Rep.-Mo.)
Favrot (Dem.-La.)
Fish (Rep.-N. Y.)
Fisher (Dem.-Tenn.)
Fitzgerald (Rep.-Ohio)
Fleetwood (Rep.-Vt.)
Foster (Rep.-Ohio)
Frear ((Rep.-Wis.)
Fredericks (Rep.-Calif.)
Free (Rep.-Calif.)
French (Rep.-Idaho)
Frothingham (Rep.-Mass.)
Fulbright (Dem.-Mo.)
Fuller (Rep.-Ill.)
Fullmer (Dem.-S. C.)
Garber (Rep.-Okla.)
Gardner (Dem.-Ind.)
Garner (Dem.-Texas)

Names of those voting yea

Garrett (Dem.-Tenn.)
Garrett (Dem.-Texas)
Gasque (Dem.-S. C.)
Gibson (Rep.-Vt.)
Gifford (Rep.-Mass.)
Glatfelter (Dem.-Pa.)
Goldsborough (Dem.-Md.)
Graham (Rep.-Ill.)
Graham (Rep.-Pa.)
Green (Rep.-Iowa)
Greene (Rep.-Mass.)
Greenwood (Dem.-Ind.)
Griest (Rep.-Pa.)
Hadley (Rep.-Wash.)
Hammer (Dem.-N. C.)
Hardy (Rep.-Colo.)
Harrison (Dem.-Va.)
Hastings (Dem.-Okla.)
Haugen (Rep.-Iowa)
Hawes (Dem.-Mo.)
Hawley (Rep.-Oreg.)
Hayden (Dem.-Ariz.)
Hersey (Rep.-Me.)
Hickey (Rep.-Ind.)
Hill (Dem.-Ala.)
Hill (Dem.-Wash.)
Hoch (Rep.-Kans.)
Holaday (Rep.-Ill.)
Hooker (Dem-Va.)
Howard (Dem.-Nebr.)
Hudson (Rep.-Mich.)
Hudspeth (Dem.-Texas)
Hull (Rep.-Iowa)
Hull (Rep.-Ill.)
Hull (Dem.-Tenn.)
Hull (Rep.-Ill.)
Humphreys (Dem.-Miss.)
Jeffers (Dem.-Ala.)
Johnson (Dem.-Ky.)
Johnson (Rep.-S. Dak.)
Johnson (Dem.-Texas)
Johnson (Rep.-Wash.)
Johnson (Dem.-W. Va.)
Jones (Dem.-Texas)
Jost (Dem.-Mo.)
Kearns (Rep.-Ohio)
Keller (Rep.-Minn.)

Appendix C (Contd)

House of Representatives
Names of those voting yea

Kelly (Rep.-Pa.)
Kendall (Rep.-Pa.)
Kent (Dem.-Pa.)
Kerr (Dem.-N. C.)
Ketcham (Rep.-Mich.)
King (Rep.-Ill.)
Kopp (Rep.-Iowa)
Kurtz (Rep.-Pa.)
Lampert (Rep.-Wis.)
Lanham (Dem.-Texas)
Lankford (Dem.-Ga.)
Larsen (Dem.-Ga.)
Larson (Rep.-Minn.)
Lazaro (Dem.-La.)
Lea (Dem.-Calif.)
Leatherwood (Rep.-Utah)
Leavitt (Rep.-Mont.)
Lee (Dem.-Ga.)
Lilly (Dem.-W. Va.)
Lineberger (Rep.-Calif.)
Linthicum (Dem.-Md.)
Little (Rep.-Kans.)
Longworth (Rep.-Ohio)
Lowrey (Dem.-Miss.)
Lozier (Dem.-Mo.)
Lyon (Dem.-N. C.)
McClintic (Dem.-Okla.)
McDuffie (Dem.-Ala.)
McKenzie (Rep.-Ill.)
McKeown (Dem.-Okla.)
McLaughlin (Rep.-Mich.)
McLaughlin (Rep.-Nebr.)
McReynolds (Dem.-Tenn.)
McSwain (Dem.-S. C.)
McSweeney (Dem.-Ohio)
MacLafferty (Rep.-Calif.)
Madden (Rep.-Ill.)
Mager (Rep.-Pa.)
Major (Dem.-Ill.)
Major (Dem.-Mo.)
Manlove (Rep.-Mo.)
Mansfield (Dem.-Texas)
Mapes (Rep.-Mich.)
Martin (Dem.-La.)
Michener (Rep.-Mich.)
Miller (Rep.-Wash.)
Milligan (Dem.-Mo.)
Mills (Rep.-N. Y.)
Montague (Dem.-Va.)

Names of those voting yea

Moore (Dem.-Ga.)
Moore (Rep.-Ill.)
Moore (Rep.-Ohio)
Moore (Dem.-Va.)
Morehead (Dem.-Nebr.)
Morgan (Rep.-Ohio)
Morrow (Dem.-N. Mex.)
Murphy (Rep.-Ohio)
Nelson (Rep.-Me.)
Nelson (Rep.-Wis.)
Newton (Rep.-Minn.)
Newton (Rep.-Mo.)
Nolan (Rep.-Calif.)
O'Connor (Dem.-La.)
Oldfield (Dem.-Ark.)
Oliver (Dem.-Ala.)
Paige (Rep.-Mass.)
Parker (Rep.-N. Y.)
Parks (Dem.-Ark.)
Patterson (Rep.-N. J.)
Peery (Dem.-Va.)
Perkins (Rep.-N. J.)
Pou (Dem.-N. C.)
Purnell (Rep.-Ind.)
Quin (Dem.-Miss.)
Ragon (Dem.-Ark.)
Rainey (Dem.-Ill.)
Raker (Dem.-Calif.)
Ramseyer (Rep.-Iowa)
Rankin (Dem.-Miss.)
Rathbone (Rep.-Ill.)
Rayburn, (Dem.-Texas)
Reece (Rep.-Tenn.)
Reed (Dem.-Ark.)
Reed (Rep.-N. Y.)
Reid (Rep.-Ill.)
Richards (Dem.-Nev.)
Roach (Rep.-Mo.)
Robinson (Rep.-Iowa)
Robsion (Rep.-Ky.)
Rogers (Rep.-Mass.)
Romjne (Dem.-Mo.)
Rubey (Dem.-Mo.)
Salmon (Dem.-Tenn.)
Sanders (Rep.-Ind.)
Sanders (Rep.-N. Y.)
Sanders (Dem.-Texas)
Sandlin (Dem.-La.)
Schall (Rep.-Minn.)

Appendix C (Contd)

House of Representatives
Names of those voting yea

Scott (Rep.-Mich.)
Sears (Dem.-Fla.)
Shallenberger (Dem.-Nebr.)
Sherwood (Dem.-Ohio)
Shreve (Rep.-Pa.)
Simmons (Rep.-Nebr.)
Sinnott (Rep.-Oreg.)
Sites (Dem.-Pa.)
Smith (Rep.-Idaho)
Smithwick (Dem.-Fla.)
Snell (Rep.-N. Y.)
Speaks (Rep.-Ohio)
Spearing (Dem.-La.)
Sproul (Rep.-Ill.)
Sproul (Rep.-Kans.)
Stalker (Rep.-N. Y.)
Steagall (Dem.-Ala.)
Stedman (Dem.-N. C.)
Stephens (Rep.-Ohio)
Stevenson (Dem.-S. C.)
Strong (Rep.-Kans.)
Summers (Rep.-Wash.)
Strong (Rep.-Pa.)
Sumners (Dem.-Texas)
Swank (Dem.-Okla.)
Swing (Rep.-Calif.)
Swoope (Rep.-Pa.)
Taber (Rep.-N. Y.)
Taylor (Dem.-Colo.)
Taylor (Rep.-Tenn.)
Taylor (Dem.-W. Va.)
Temple (Rep.-Pa.)
Thatcher (Rep.-Ky.)
Thomas (Dem.-Ky.)
Thomas (Dem.-Okla.)
Thompson (Rep.-Ohio)
Tillman (Dem.-Ark.)
Timberlake (Rep.-Colo.)
Tincher (Rep.-Kans.)
Treadway (Rep.-Mass.)
Tucker (Dem.-Va.)
Tydings (Dem.-Md.)
Underwood (Dem.-Ohio)
Vaile (Rep.-Colo.)
Vestal (Rep.-Ind.)
Vincent (Rep.-Mich.)
Vinson (Dem.-Ga.)
Wainwright (Rep.-N. Y.)

Names of those voting yea

Watkins (Dem.-Oreg.)
Watson (Rep.-Pa.)
Weaver (Dem.-N. C.)
Werts (Rep.-Pa.)
White ((Rep.-Kans.)
Williams (Rep.-Ill.)
Williams (Rep.-Mich.)
Williamson (Rep.-S. Dak.)
Wilson (Dem.-Ind.)
Wilson (Dem.-La.)
Wingo (Dem.-Ark.)
Winslow (Rep.-Mass.)
Wolff (Dem.-Wyo.)
Wood (Rep.-Ind.)
Woodruff (Rep.-Mich.)
Woodrum (Dem.-Va.)
Wright (Dem.-Ga.)
Wurzbach (Rep.-Texas)
Wyant (Rep.-Pa.)
Zihlman (Rep.-Md.)

Names of those voting nay

Aldrich (Rep.-R. I.)
Bacharach (Rep.-N. J.)
Beck (Rep.-Wis.)
Berger (Socialist-Wis.)
Black (Dem.-N. Y.)
Bloom (Dem.-N. Y.)
Boylan (Dem.-N. Y.)
Buckley (Dem.-Ill.)
Carew (Dem.-N. Y.)
Casey (Dem.-Pa.)
Celler (Dem.-N. Y.)
Clancy (Dem.-Mich.)
Cleary (Dem.-N. Y.)
Connery (Dem.-Mass.)
Crosser (Dem.-Ohio)
Cullen (Dem.-N. Y.)
Dickstein (Dem.-N. Y.)
Eagan (Dem.-N. J.)
Fenn (Rep.-Conn.)
Freeman (Rep.-Conn.)
Geran (Dem.-N. J.)
Griffin (Dem.-N. Y.)
HILL (Rep.-Md.)
Jacobstein (Dem.-N. Y.)
James (Rep.-Mich.)

Appendix C (Contd)

House of Representatives

Names of those voting nay

Kindred (Dem.-N. Y.)
Knutsen (Rep.-Minn.)
Kunz (Dem.-Ill.)
La Guardia (Rep.-N. Y.)
Lindsay (Dem.-N. Y.)
Logan (Dem.-S. C.)
Luce (Rep.-Mass.)
McFadden (Rep.-Pa.)
McLeod (Rep.-Mich.)
Magee (Rep.-N. Y.)
Mead (Dem.-N. Y.)
Merritt (Rep.-Conn.)
Minahan (Dem.-N. J.)
Mooney (Dem.-Ohio)
O'Connell (Dem.-R. I.)
O'Connor (Dem.-N. Y.)
O'Sullivan (Dem.-Conn.)
Oliver (Dem.-N. Y.)
Perlman (Rep.-N. Y.)
Prall (Dem.-N. Y.)
Quayle (Dem.-N. Y.)
Sabath (Dem.-Ill.)
Schafer (Rep.-Wis.)
Schneider (Rep.-Wis.)
Seger (Rep.-N. J.)
Sinclair (Rep.-N. Dak.)
Sweet (Rep.-N. Y.)
Tague (Dem.-Mass.)
Tilson (Rep.-Conn.)
Tinkham (Rep.-Mass.)
Underhill(Mass.-Rep.)
Vare (Rep.-Pa.)
Voigt (Rep.-Wis.)
Watres (Rep.-Pa.)
Wefald (Farm Labor-Minn.)
Weller (Dem.-N. Y.)
Young (Rep.-N. Dak.)

Names of those not voting

Alman (Dem.-Ala.)
Anderson (Rep.-Minn.)
Bankhead (Dem.-Ala.)
Barkley (Dem.-Ky.)
Beers (Rep.-Pa.)
Boies (Rep.-Iowa)
Browne (Dem.-N. J.)
Burdick (Rep.-R. I.)
Byrnes (Dem.-S. C.)

Names of those not voting

Campbell (Rep.-Pa.)
Clark (Dem.-Fla.)
Connolly (Rep.-Pa.)
Corning (Dem.-N. Y.)
Cramton (Rep.-Mich.)
Curry (Rep.-Calif.)
Doyle (Dem.-Chicago)
Drane (Dem.-Fla.)
Edmonds (Rep.-Pa.)
Funk (Rep.-Ill.)
Gallivan (Dem.-Mass.)
Gilbert (Dem.-Ky.)
Howard (Dem.-Okla.)
Huddleston (Dem.-Ala.)
Kahn (Rep.-Calif.)
Kress (Rep.-Pa.)
Kincheloe (Dem.-Ky.)
Kvale (Rep.-Minn.)
Langley (Rep.-Ky.)
Lehlbach (Rep.-N. J.)
Mc Nulty (Dem.-N. J.)
Mac Gregor (Rep.-N. Y.)
Michaelson (Rep.-Ill.)
Miller (Rep.-Ill.)
Moores (Rep.-Ind.)
Morin (Rep.-Pa.)
Morris (Dem.-Ky.)
Mudd (Rep.-Md.)
O'Brien (Dem.-N. J.)
O'Connell (Dem.-N. Y.)
Park (Dem.-Ga.)
Peavey (Rep.-Wis.)
Phillips (Rep.-Pa.)
Porter (Rep.-Pa.)
Ransley (Rep.-Pa.)
Reed (Rep.-W. Va.)
Rogers (Dem.-N. H.)
Rosenbloom (Rep.-W. Va.)
Rouse (Dem.-Ky.)
Sears (Rep.-Nebr.)
Snyder (Rep.-N. Y.)
Stengle (Dem.-N. Y.)
Sullivan (Dem.-N. Y.)
Upshaw (Dem.-Ga.)
Vinson (Dem.-Ky.)
Ward (Rep.-N. Y.)
Ward (Dem.-N. C.)
Wason (Rep.-N. H.)
Welsh (Rep.-Pa.)

Appendix C (Contd)

House of Representatives
Names of those not voting

White (Rep.-Me.)
Williams (Dem.-Texas)
Wilson (Dem.-Miss.)
Winter (Rep.-Wyo.)
Yates (Rep.-Ill.)

Yeas--308, Nay--62, Not voting--63

U. S. *Congressional Record*, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 9, 8589 & 8652.

Appendix D

List of Organizations favoring the Immigration Act of 1924.

Sons of the American Revolution
American Legion
American National Grange
American Defense Society
American Federation of Labor
Accepted Scottish Rite Masons
Allied Patriotic Societies
Immigration Restriction League of New York
Daughters of the American Revolution
Native Sons of the Golden West, California
Patriotic Order Sons of America
Junior Order of United American Merchants
Fraternal Order of Eagles
Immigration Restriction League of Princeton University

U. S. Representative John C. Box (Democrat-Texas) submitted the above list on March 15, 1924. He also included a list of 59 manufacturers associations and 162 foreign clubs, societies and organizations that opposed the Act of 1924. On April 8, 1924, U. S. Representative Patrick B. O'Sullivan (Democrat-Connecticut) also submitted a list of 59 business, industrial association that opposed the law.

U. S., Congressional Record, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 9, 4265-4266, & 5900.

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