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Voting Behavior of Rules Committee Members: An Analysis of Constituency Influence

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VOTING BEHAVIOR OF RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS:

AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE

(TITLE)

BY

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PREFACE

The House Committee on Rules is one of the most powerful groups in Congress. This study examines the relationship between Committee members' floor roll-call voting and the rural-urban majority in their constituencies. Selected agricultural and urban roll calls for the 90th and 91st Congresses (1967-1970) are used to test three hypotheses. Percentage of electoral margin for each Committeeman is also presented to determine its impact on members' voting.

Congress as a legislative system first caught my attention in 1970 when I was a student in Dr. Joe Connelly's Legislative Process class. The Rules Committee became a special interest in March, 1971; at that time I began research on the subject for a book co-authored by Congressman Spark Matsunaga and Professor Ping Chen.

Many people have assisted me in writing this thesis. Although only a few of them are acknowledged here, my thanks are to all.

I am grateful to teachers and friends for encouraging my interest in Congress, to Dr. Chen for providing the opportunity to study the Rules Committee, to Harold Widdison and Richard Hummel of the Sociology Department for their instructions on

research methods, and to Faye Nease, my roommate, and Linda Grove, a neighbor, for countless favors.

A special debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Thomas Scism for introducing me to behaviorialism and for his editing of the manuscript. Mrs. Frances Willis proved to be invaluable in typing the final draft.

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Diana Nichols
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May, 1972

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The House sits...to sanction the conclusion of its Committees....It legislates in its committee-rooms; not by the determinations of majorities, but by the resolutions of specially-commissioned minorities; so that it is not far from the truth to say that Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work.¹

Many political scientists have written about the power and autonomy of congressional committees. Each of the committees is viewed as a political subsystem of its larger body--the House of Representatives or the Senate. One standing committee in Congress functions in a different capacity than the others. It has been credited with having "more to say about the final legislative output than any other group on Capitol Hill."² This subsystem is the House Committee on Rules.

The Committee was not originally supposed to function as a legislative committee, but rather as a "traffic cop" which would objectively sift out the relatively important legislation from the

¹Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 69.

²James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1963), p. 2.

comparatively unimportant and allot priority time and more favorable discussion rules to the more important bills. However, time and human nature have changed the Committee's primary role. The "traffic cop" function has given way to what might be termed a "roadblock" role, whereby the Committee often judges a bill's floor agenda status not by its overall significance but by the way a majority of the Committee's members react politically to the purpose or substance of a bill. Consequently, the Committee does function as a de facto legislative committee, and a very powerful one which judges other committees' labors.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the voting behavior of Rules Committee members. More specifically, the goal is to explore the possible impact of constituency interest on Committee members' roll-call voting on the House floor.

The second chapter explains the theoretical framework of this research. We shall introduce a model illustrating the relationship between constituency characteristics and congressmen's voting behavior. Chapter three will review the literature relevant to this model; it covers research and research techniques used to study constituencies and the effects they may have on representatives' roll-call voting.

Chapter four is divided into three parts: a separate discussion of the three hypotheses. Each section will define the terms and operationalize the variables needed for testing the validity of the particular hypothesis.

The Rules Committee is considered one of the three top committees in the House. Chapter five will examine its power.

Sixth chapter presents the findings as they are applicable to the hypotheses and subhypotheses tested. A final chapter draws certain conclusions based on the results of this study. It will, in addition, suggest some areas of research that remain to be explored.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

There have been a number of studies which suggest paradigms for explaining political behavior.¹


While the range of influencing factors can be regarded as infinite, some variables are clearly more important than others. For example, severe weather may keep a congressman from voting on one given day, but over a wide range of non-voting, other factors are more useful as explanatory tools. Thus, a congressman may regularly avoid voting because of a narrowly divided constituency, and he doesn't want to antagonize anyone.

We will select certain variables from this infinity and limit our discussion to them. Matthews and Prothro have developed a model which can be adapted to this study.

¹Three of the most prominent are: John C. Wahlke, The Legislative System (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 3-28; Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, II (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), pp. 31-53; Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966), pp. 25-29.

Figure 1

A Paradigm of Rules Committee Members
Voting Decisions on Floor Roll Calls



According to this model, a Rules Committee member's socio-economic attributes, constituency characteristics, and institutional characteristics are factors which cause his attitudes and cognitions. These attitudes and cognitions in turn cause his voting behavior.

Socio-economic attributes include such variables as age, education, occupation, or income. Examples of constituency characteristics are such variables as average age of voters, average number of years in school, average income, percentage rural and urban, percentage Blacks, number of young people in voting group, presence of major industry, or congressman's electoral margin. Institutional characteristics refer to such factors as tenure, seniority, committee, party, leadership demands, state delegation pressures, or demands from the executive branch.

Within the context of this theoretical orientation to explaining behavior, this study will attempt to measure the importance

of rural/urban constituency, electoral margin, party membership, and ideology as factors affecting behavior.

The model described above suggests that committeemen who hold similar values and come from like districts will make their voting decisions in similar ways. Moreover, rural and urban committee members are prone to oppose each other not only because of a difference in characteristics of their respective constituencies but also because of a difference in the problems which arise in rural and urban districts, and a difference in the means by which these problems may be solved.

Electoral margin may be associated with subsequent voting behavior in two ways.

1. If public opinion is more influential among legislators who are insecure because of narrow election victories, the representatives with low electoral margins will alter their voting positions in response to fluctuations in public sentiment. Therefore we would expect to find no consistent relationship between electoral margin and agricultural or urban policy behavior by committeemen.

2. It is the contention of this paper that the committeemen who hold low electoral margin seats cannot afford to be unconcerned about their constituents' desires nor offend any group of constituents, and this concern will be reflected in their voting records. Those lawmakers with high electoral margins, however, can afford to be less concerned with their constituents' wishes and can pursue a more

independent course of action.²

In the next chapter we shall see that a number of scholars have described these as more-or-less crucial (or key) explanatory factors. What we, in effect, seek to do is control the Committee influence on behavior. In other words, are these factors directly influential, or are they filtered through and diminished in importance by the member's perception of his committee's importance?

²Throughout this study we will assume that if constituency interests are not revealed in members' voting behavior then the members are more likely to support their party leaders.

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

The major work to date on the Rules Committee is James Robinson's, The House Rules Committee.¹ He examined the previous congressional experience and constituency backgrounds of members of the Committee from 1937 to 1962. Correlation of those two factors with members' voting decisions as reflected in roll-call votes was made in an effort to determine if an apprenticeship period, a safe or competitive constituency, and/or urban or rural residence affected their decisions. Data indicated that rural districts were more often represented on the Committee than urban constituencies based on the rural-urban split on the Committee itself, and rural representatives tended to be Republicans. A majority of the Rules' membership during this period was elected from safe districts as opposed to competitive ones (based on the safe-competitive proportion on the Committee).

Robinson concluded that those factors, while important, were not overriding. Committeemen demonstrated a concern that

¹Many sources were read in preparing for this study. Only those most helpful in understanding the role of the Rules Committee in the legislative process, and those useful in analyzing roll-call votes are presented in this chapter.

their votes on the floor coincide with the majority of votes or at least with the leadership of their particular party.

There is a considerable amount of research which is both analytically and methodologically important to congressional studies. Our principal concern in this chapter will be to examine methods of analysis, rather than the analysis itself. We will address ourselves to the conclusions in these studies in the next chapter.

One method of examining constituency impact on congressional behavior is to correlate characteristics of the constituents--census data such as population density, ethnic background, occupation, wealth --with roll-call votes. Duncan MacRae, Jr. compared House roll-call voting patterns in the 81st Congress with the percentage of district population engaged in farming and professional or managerial occupations.² He concluded, among other things, that members' votes corresponded most closely to interest groups in their constituencies on agricultural matters, in which party, regional and ideological influences have less impact than in the case of other issues.

Lewis A. Froman, Jr. correlated the voting of nonsouthern representatives in 1961 with socio-economic status (percentage of owner-occupied dwelling units), race (percentage of nonwhite population), population density (average population per square mile),

²Duncan MacRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1958).

and place of residence (percentage urban).³ Northern Democrats tended to represent districts with a smaller percentage of owner-occupied dwellings, higher percentages of nonwhite population and urban residents, and a higher average population density than Republicans. Constituency characteristics, in other words, tended to reinforce patterns in roll-call voting according to party lines. Using Congressional Quarterly scores for roll-call support of President Kennedy on domestic issues, Froman found that support tended to be higher in both parties in districts with greater population density, higher percentages of nonwhites and urban residents, and lower percentages of owner-occupied dwellings.

W. Wayne Shannon found constituency differences reinforcing party differences.⁴ He attempted to explain deviations from party positions on roll calls by examining characteristics of the constituencies. Scores for voting scales on a variety of issues in 86th and 87th Congresses were compared with selected constituency factors --urban population, percentage of blue-collar workers, and median income for the northern Republicans and Democrats, and median income and percentage nonwhite population for southern Democrats.

³ Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Congressmen and Their Constituencies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963).

⁴ W. Wayne Shannon, Party, Constituency and Congressional Voting (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968).

Shannon concluded that urban-rural constituency differences did not account for intraparty voting differences. Detailed analysis of socio-economic differences indicated that these factors do not aid in explanation of dissent from party positions (however, party differences were greatest in the case of representatives from safe districts).

Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes correlated congressional actions and attitudes with constituent opinion expressed in interviews following the 1958 elections.⁵ A representative sample of one hundred sixteen House districts made-up the survey. Incumbent congressman, his opponent (if any), and a sample of constituents were interviewed to determine their basic attitudes on federal government action in three areas: social welfare, U. S. involvement in foreign affairs, and civil rights for Blacks. District opinion and representative's roll-call votes were ranked on those issues. Considerable agreement existed on social welfare, a high level of agreement on civil rights, and no significant relationship on foreign policy.

Furthermore, Miller and Stokes identified the paths through which constituency opinion influences congressional voting. Apparently the importance of small increments of votes in elections, the role of informed local leaders in influencing other voters, and the threat that an opponent will publicize unpopular actions tended to bring the representative's roll-call votes into agreement with the basic

⁵Miller and Stokes.

attitudes of his constituents. This harmony was achieved by voters selecting a man whose own attitudes were already similar to theirs, and by representatives being guided by their perceptions of constituent opinion.

It should be noted that Miller and Stokes developed their constituency data from interviews, while the data developed by MacRae, Froman, and Shannon came from the aggregate data in the U. S. Census.

Julius Turner used Rice indices of cohesion and likeness in studying the 1921, 1931, 1937 and 1944 sessions of the House.⁶ Analysis of the roll-call votes for those years showed Republicans being generally less divided along urban-rural lines than Democrats. Overall, the political party of a member was more closely associated with voting behavior than any other factor. Tendencies of congressmen to vote with their party or to cross party lines were associated with the similarity or dissimilarity between party policy and presumed interests of constituencies.

⁶Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951). Cohesion is defined as the extent to which the distribution of votes on a legislative roll call deviates from the distribution that would be expected if all influences operated randomly. The index of likeness measures the difference between two groups in their response to a roll call.

David Truman, like Turner, found party membership to be the most reliable indicator of congressional voting behavior.⁷ He studied both congressional parties and their leaders' roll-call votes on the floor of the House and Senate during the 81st Congress, using the technique of voting bloc analysis. This consists of counting the number of agreements in each House between each party member and every other party member on a series of selected roll-call votes, ordered on the basis of their index of party cohesion. Blocs were compared with the personal characteristics of members and their constituencies, majority and minority party status, leadership influence, state delegation, and regional cohesion. One of Truman's major points was that although the Republican party had a higher party cohesion score in the House, their leaders were more divided than were their Democratic counterparts.

Another examination of party and constituency influence on legislative voting behavior is David Mayhew's, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen.⁸ Representatives were classified as either "farm" congressmen, "city" congressmen, "labor" congressmen, or "Western" congressmen according to the principal characteristic of their district. They were then categorized into "interested" and relatively

⁷David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: Wiley, 1959).

⁸David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

"indifferent" congressmen on the basis of their roll-call voting behavior on bills which could be categorized along the same four dimensions.

Mayhew used the Rice index of likeness as a measure of the similarity between two voting blocs such as Democratic "farm" and "nonfarm" congressmen. Rice index of cohesion was used to measure the degree of unity exhibited by any one voting bloc. Democrats from "interested" districts maintained higher cohesion than Democrats from "indifferent" districts. The reverse was true for Republicans; members from "indifferent" districts demonstrated greater unity than members from "interested" districts.

CHAPTER FOUR

HYPOTHESES

This research will explore three hypotheses concerning Rules Committee members and the effect their constituencies may have on members' roll-call voting on the House floor.¹

Hypothesis I

Lewis Froman, Jr. suggested that because constituents vary, the impact of issues upon constituents varies. Therefore, "congressmen from different types of constituencies are likely to vote differently on matters of public policy, and those from similar constituencies are likely to vote in similar ways."² Note that Froman's study did not control for committee membership. Does Rules Committee membership weaken his conclusion about the relationship between constituency and congressman?

Hypothesis I. If an issue is seen to affect substantial interests in a Rules Committee member's constituency, then he will support those interests.

¹In analyzing the relationships between variables, it is expected that no single test of a hypothesis will show that two concepts are unrelated; but will only indicate that certain operational definitions are not associated with each other. Several negative tests, utilizing a variety of operational definitions for the same concepts, would be required before concluding that there is no relationship between or among the concepts.

²Froman, p. 85.

The measure of "substantial interests" to be used is the predominance of rural or urban interests in a congressional district. Then "Rules Committee member's constituency" is characterized as either rural or urban. An indicator of "support" is the floor roll calls on selected rural and urban issues for the 90th and 91st Congresses in which members' votes show if they are pro or con on an issue.³

Division of constituencies into rural and urban was accomplished according to Robinson's definition of "rural districts." That is, rural districts are those having four or more counties, "unless a large metropolitan area obviously dominates several outlying counties."⁴ All other districts are treated as urban. This technique produces eight rural and seven urban districts on the Committee. Congressmen from these districts will be known as "rural Committee members" or "urban Committee members" depending on their particular population distribution.

Rural members include Democrats Colmer, Sisk,⁵ Young, Matsunaga, and Anderson; Republicans Martin, Quillen, and Latta. Urban

³Members paired for or announced for a roll call are treated as supporting it while those paired against or announced against are opposed to it.

⁴Robinson, p. 101.

⁵Although only two counties are included in Sisk's district, he is identified here as a rural member because he also serves on the Agriculture Committee.

constituencies are represented by Democrats Madden, Delaney, Bolling, O'Neill, and Pepper; Republicans Smith and Anderson.⁶

The final step necessary to examine the hypothesis is selecting those roll calls which affect rural and urban activities. Roll calls are included if they are on matters considered to be of special concern to the designated interested representatives on the Rules Committee. Any of those roll calls on which ninety percent or more of the House voted on the same side of the question are excluded. When two or more roll calls for the same bill show all members voting identically, only one of those roll calls is selected for analysis. Votes were collected from the 1967, 1968, 1969, and 1970 editions of the Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

Agricultural roll calls cover farm support programs, cotton import quota reduction, agricultural fair-trading practices for commodities, farm loan interest rates, peanut acreage allotment, fruit market, and potato market. Roll calls which affect urban life include urban renewal projects, public housing programs, and urban mass transportation systems.

Obviously, not all of the agricultural issues discussed affect every rural Committeeman equally since a particular farm program may be more relevant to his constituents. One of the "givens" in the body

⁶Anderson (Il.) is classified as an urban member although he has more than four counties in his district. The proximity of Chicago to the district, and the location of the second largest Illinois city in his district accounts for the classification.

of knowledge about congressional voting, however, is that a congressman will vote for another representative's bill in hopes of getting additional support from him for his own legislation. If this norm applies to the House membership in general then it is probably even more true of a particular subsystem--the Rules Committee membership.⁷

Two subhypotheses are generated from the main hypothesis.

Subhypothesis I. Rural Committeemen are more likely to support agricultural programs than are urban members.

Subhypothesis II. Urban Committeemen are more likely to support programs designed for the cities than are rural members.

Measurement of these concepts is possible by applying the definitions discussed in the hypothesis. Then the decision as to which group is more likely to vote for rural or urban programs is based on the number of times each member supports his bloc's issue. Data will be expressed in terms of mean percentages of support.

⁷Of course, in the case where one farm program is forced to compete with another for funds or attention, then a member's loyalty would be to the program which would have the greatest effect on the people "back home." To make this determination requires a more detailed study of the constituencies than is undertaken in the present analysis. These comments apply equally to urban roll calls. A cursory inspection of the data in this study suggests very strongly that this occurrence is quite rare insofar as Rules Committee members are concerned.

If the mean percentage is higher for rural than urban Committeemen on farm issues, then the first subhypothesis will have been validated. But if the mean percentage is greater for urban than rural members then this may be an indicator of the invalidity of the assumption. A similar analytical assumption holds for the second hypothesis.

For the hypothesis to be valid, both subhypotheses must hold true. If only one secondary proposition holds true then the major hypothesis will have been only partially validated. Moreover, if both subhypotheses remain in doubt then the hypothesis too will not have been proven (although it may be validated by a more refined construction of variables).

How significant are the differences between the voting-blocs on each issue? Turner recommended the use of Rice's index of likeness as the best measurement of party difference on a set of issues.⁸ This index will be adapted to rural and urban blocs rather than party affiliation. Then, the index of likeness will measure the similarity between rural and urban members on agricultural roll calls, and urban and rural members on city-oriented roll calls. In other words, it will show the quantitative difference in support between the two groups on each set of issues.

⁸Turner, p. 36.

Hypothesis II

Does the fact that some congressmen are in greater danger of losing office since they come from competitive districts affect their voting in Congress? If congressmen are influenced by their constituents, then a natural corollary is that a congressman from a highly competitive district will be even more attentive.⁹ Again, we seek to determine if Rules Committee membership exerts an independent influence on a congressman's attention to his constituents.

Hypothesis II. The more competitive the district, the more likely Committeemen will support constituency interests.

In defining "the more competitive the district" is meant the percentage of electoral victory for a Rules member averaged over the last five elections (1962, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970) as recorded in Richard Scammon's America Votes and the 1970 edition of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. Electoral victories or margins are classified into high and low categories by rural-urban membership. Rural members with high margins include Colmer, Young, Anderson (Tennessee), and Quillen; those with low are Latta, Sisk, Matsunaga, and Martin. Urban members with high margins include O'Neill, Pepper, and Smith; those with low are Anderson (Illinois), Delaney, Bolling, and Madden.

⁹Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies," Legislative Behavior, ed. John C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), 197.

"Support constituency interests" denotes a rural or urban Committeeman's floor roll-call vote in favor of agricultural or city legislation. (See Hypothesis I above for description of issues and roll-call selection.)

With Hypothesis II thus defined, it will be operationalized by applying these definitions to two subhypotheses.

Subhypothesis I. Rural Committeemen with low electoral margins are more likely to support agricultural programs than are rural members with high electoral victories.

Subhypothesis II. Urban Committeemen with low electoral margins are more likely to support city programs than are urban members with high electoral victories.

These assumptions will be tested by calculating the mean percentages for rural members of high and low electoral margins and urban members of high and low margins. Then the significance of these relationships will be tested by the index of likeness. It will measure the similarity between rural Committeemen of high and low margins on farm roll calls, and urban Committeemen of high and low margins on city roll calls.

If the mean percentage for rural members with low electoral margins on agricultural roll calls is greater than that for those with high margins, then Subhypothesis I will be valid. But if the mean percentage for rural Committeemen with high electoral margins on farm roll calls is greater than that for those with low margins, then the validity of the proposition will be questionable. A similar line of reasoning will hold for the second hypothesis.

The central hypothesis will have been proven if both subhypotheses are valid. If only one subhypothesis is valid then the hypothesis will be only partially true. However, if both subhypotheses are found to be invalid then the hypothesis should be rejected.

Hypothesis III

Charles O. Jones in "The Agriculture Committee and the Problem of Representation" found that, "If a measure is seen to have little or no direct effect on interests in a representative's legal constituency, then he will tend more readily to look to his political party for a cue when he acts in regard to this measure."¹⁰

When a program does not affect a Rules Committee members' constituency directly, he is more likely to vote with his party. Froman hypothesized the following.

The more competitive the district, the more likely constituency preferences will be reflected in legislative roll-call votes. This proposition follows from the idea that representatives from competitive districts, because of the greater heterogeneity of their constituents, are more likely than representatives from safe districts to find the interests of some of their constituents to conflict with party pressures. Because their electoral margins are close, these representatives may feel compelled to submit to these pressures and hence will be less likely to vote with their party.¹¹

Combining the second hypothesis with Jones and Froman's comments, a new hypothesis can be formulated:

Hypothesis III. The more competitive the district, the less likely it is that the representative will vote with his party.

¹⁰ Charles O. Jones, "The Agriculture Committee and the Problem of Representation," New Perspectives on the House of Representatives, ed. Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby, II (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), 172.

¹¹ Froman, p. 85.

"Vote with his party" means that a Committeeman's vote agrees with his leadership's position.

To test this hypothesis, two subhypotheses are examined.

Subhypothesis I. Rural Committee members with high electoral margins are more likely to support their party leaders on agricultural issues than are rural members with low margins.

Subhypothesis II. Urban Committee members with high electoral margins are more likely to support their party leaders on city issues than are urban members with low margins.

Leaders of the Democratic party in 90th and 91st Congresses were Carl Albert-Oklahoma, majority leader, and Hale Boggs-Louisiana, majority whip. For the Republicans, the leadership during this period was Gerald Ford-Michigan, minority leader, and Leslie Arends-Illinois, minority whip. (See Hypotheses I and II for definitions of other terms.)

In analyzing members and leaderships' votes, roll calls were selected from the original forty-six on which both leaders of a party agreed, or if one leader was absent then the vote of the other leader was used to indicate a party's position. Both parties' positions are known for thirty-five roll calls. On seven extra roll calls the Democratic (but not the Republican) stand can be ascertained. Three additional roll calls are useful in gauging rural and urban Republicans' agreement with their leadership. In all, forty-two roll calls will be compared for the Democrats and thirty-eight for the Republicans.

Roll calls will be analyzed by calculating the percentage of times Committeemen agreed with their leadership. If the percentage of agreement for rural Committee members with high electoral margins is higher on agricultural issues than it is for rural members with low margins, then the first subhypothesis will have some validity. But if the percentage is higher for rural members with low margins then the proposition's concepts (as operationally defined) are not valid. A similar generalization applies to the second hypothesis.

Thus, both subhypotheses will have to hold true for the main hypothesis to be proven. If only one subhypothesis is true then the hypothesis will have been partially validated. And if both assumptions are proven incorrect, then the original proposition will have to be rejected.

CHAPTER FIVE

RULES COMMITTEE IN PERSPECTIVE

Rules Committee has existed as a standing committee since 1880; its principal responsibility lies in its power to schedule business to be considered by the full House and to suggest rules to govern such consideration (such as the amount of time budgeted for debate on bills and the number of amendments that can be offered from the floor on each bill). Beginning in 1892 Committee reports were designated matters of "special and high privilege" with only a motion to adjourn and no other dilatory motions in order during their considerations.

Committee assumption of its authority received a boost in the 1930's. Chairman John J. O'Connor and his colleagues came to believe that the Committee should play a definite role in the writing of legislation, and that issuing rules should become a secondary function outweighed by substantive control of measures. A bipartisan conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans on the Committee were successful in blocking several of Franklin Roosevelt's proposals including the Wage and Hour bill.

The power of the Committee continued to be felt in succeeding sessions. This was accomplished primarily by members refusing to relinquish their right of independent judgment.

Combining his influence as the unofficial leader of the southern delegation and head of Rules, Howard W. Smith was able to block, delay, and weaken legislation he opposed, both in the Committee room and on the floor. Liberals gained another vote and increased their majority to nine when Smith left the Committee. Since then, the Speaker has been given stronger support from the Committee, although the members still occasionally steal the legislative show in their role of independent representatives.

Committee on Rules has jurisdiction over the rules, joint rules, order of business of the House, recess, and final adjournments of Congress. Its primary jurisdiction is over proposals to make or change rules of procedure, for the creation of committees and authorizing and/or directing them to make investigations.

What makes this fifteen-member subsystem's power appear so awesome? It commands the power to perform the following functions:

1. Give or withhold hearings for rules.
2. Give or withhold rules.
3. Trade a change in a bill for a rule.
4. Permit or forbid amendments and set the length of debate.
5. Take advantage of time constraints near the end of a session.
6. Arbitrate differences between legislative committees.
7. Initiate action in the absence of legislative committee decisions.

Some of the decisions made by the Committee include what bills will be considered in the House, and when. A controversial bill gets onto the House agenda when its legislative committee chairman writes a letter to the Rules Committee requesting a hearing to obtain a rule so the bill can be considered on the floor. The power to decide whether the bill should be considered by the House at all rests with the Rules Committee. Even if its decision is affirmative, it still may specify the length of time a bill will be debated, what motions may be made, and whether or not amendments may be proposed on the floor. Nevertheless, the Committee's authority is not limited to the role of "traffic cop," but also includes discussing each bill's merits, and occasionally the decision to grant a rule depends on whether or not Committee members favor the bill itself. Committeemen have even been known to bargain with leaders of legislative committees to ensure that certain objectionable features of a bill are eliminated before they are willing to grant a rule.

Rules Committee's frequent delays in granting rules to controversial legislation has built itself into the House rule system often-times to the point of affecting the nature of bills reported by the substantive committees in advance of Rules Committee screening. For example, if a committee majority sensed the tendency of the Rules Committee to question all or part of a bill being considered by the legislative committee, it is not unrealistic to expect the legislative committee to modify its position on a bill to informally accom-

moderate Rules Committee attitudes in advance of the bill's formal appearance before the Committee.

Thus, the controversy over the Committee's assumption of a substantive role in addition to its formally assigned duties stems from general House reluctance to interfere with established Committee prerogatives, even though these prerogatives sometimes alter the fundamental role of the House itself.

One committee may at times appear more important or newsworthy than others. However, this attention will last only a season or two; and then another committee will emerge from the wings and become the new star on Capitol Hill. Regardless of who is center stage at the moment, Rules Committee members still have some say about how the show is finally written and produced, because of a committee system which requires that important acts receive the approval of the Committee on Rules.

CHAPTER SIX

DATA ANALYSIS

Testing of the hypotheses produce the findings presented in this chapter. The dependent variable is voting behavior. Factors that might cause this behavior include the independent variables of rural/urban constituency, and a member's electoral margin. We will control for party membership and ideology.

Rural Committeemen do support agriculture more often than urban members (Table 1). Both rural and urban legislators voted for agricultural programs more often during the first two years of the Nixon administration (91st Congress) than in earlier Congresses. In the 90th Congress, for example, urban members opposed agriculture 53 percent of the time. Although they do not give agriculture as much support as rural members in 1969 and 1970, urban members sustain farm programs with greater regularity than that with which they oppose them.

Urban Committeemen's support of urban issues is greater than that of farm representatives (Table 2). City programs are treated more favorably by both groups in 1967 and 1968. There is only a two percent difference in support-opposition for rural congressmen. This bloc is evenly divided in their position for the 91st Congress.

The likeness index reveals a higher unification of support by Rules Committee members for 1969 and 1970 on both agricultural and urban roll calls.

Table 1

Roll-Call Votes on Agricultural Programs
By Rules Committee Members, 1967-1970

<u>Votes</u>	<u>Committeemen</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Committeemen</u>	
	Rural (N=8)	Urban (N=7)		Rural (N=8)	Urban (N=7)
90th Congress			91st Congress		
Support Agriculture	72%	47%	Support Agriculture	75%	56%
Oppose Agriculture	28	53	Oppose Agriculture	25	44
Total	100%	100%	Total	100%	100%
Likeness Index	65.8%		Likeness Index	80.8%	

Table 2

Roll-Call Votes on City Programs
By Rules Committee Members, 1967-1970

<u>Votes</u>	<u>Committeemen</u>		<u>Votes</u>	<u>Committeemen</u>	
	Urban (N=7)	Rural (N=8)		Urban (N=7)	Rural (N=8)
90th Congress			91st Congress		
Support Cities	73%	51%	Support Cities	66%	50%
Oppose Cities	27	49	Oppose Cities	34	50
Total	100%	100%	Total	100%	100%
Likeness Index	72.2%		Likeness Index	85.8%	

The Influence of Rural-Urban Factor

Individual support for farm and city programs by rural members in both Congresses is examined in Table three. Young has the highest score on agricultural roll calls with 92 percent, while Martin's 43 percent indicates that he rejects farm programs more often than he sustains them. Overall, the other members choose to support rural interests.

Table 3

Percentage of Support by Rural Committeemen
On Farm and City Programs,
90th and 91st Congresses

Rural Members	Programs	
	Farm (N=31)	City (N=15)
Colmer	71%	0%
Sisk	85	100
Young	92	74
Matsunaga	89	100
Anderson (Tenn.)	80	80
Martin	43	13
Quillen	70	33
Latta	55	7
Mean	73%	51%

Members do not vote as a bloc on city issues. Sisk and Matsunaga have 100 percent support. Anderson (Tenn.) and Young vote in favor of cities on most occasions. These programs receive no assistance from Colmer.

Table 4 measures an urban congressman's support for city and farm programs in the 90th and 91st Congresses. Most members display overall support on city votes. Congressmen Smith and Anderson (Il.) are exceptions. Pepper's record demonstrates the greatest strength (100 percent); Smith's, the least (7 percent). Referring to Table 3, we find that all but two rural members support city interests more often than urban Committeeman Smith.

Table 4

Percentage of Support by Urban Committeemen
On City and Farm Programs,
90th and 91st Congresses

Urban Members	Programs	
	City (N=15)	Farm (N=31)
Madden	87%	44%
Delaney	80	25
Bolling	93	69
O'Neill	93	62
Pepper	100	74
Smith	7	24
Anderson (Il.)	27	53
Mean	70%	50%

In regard to voting on farm issues by urban members, three are against and four are in favor. So while rural members take a divided stand on city matters, the urban bloc generally sustains

farm interests. Pepper not only has the highest percentage of support on urban affairs, but also he shows the greatest strength on agricultural matters. Rural interests received the least favorable consideration from Smith and Delaney.

The Influence of Party

What role does party allegiance play in a member's decision? Figure 2 illustrates rural and urban Committeemen's support of agricultural and urban concerns for both Congresses with party membership being controlled. Democrats vote for rural and urban programs more often than Republicans. The bulk of Republican support goes to rural programs.


On 83 percent of the agricultural roll calls, the rural Democrats yielded to their constituent majorities. Urban Democrats appear to support farm measures rather than oppose them. In fact, the closeness of Republican rural and Democratic urban members' percentage of support indicates that Democrats generally favor agricultural interests, or more so than Republicans.

Urban roll calls receive greater support from Democrats too; their rural membership follows urban Democrats in casting 71 percent of their votes for cities. Republican urban members show little interest in urban interests. Republican rural members actually show a slightly higher percentage of support for urban programs than Republican urban members (18% to 17%).

These findings suggest that party identification may be an important factor in explaining membership behavior.

Figure 2

Rules Committee Members Mean Percentage of Support on Agricultural and City Roll Calls
By Party, 90th and 91st Congresses




Democratic Rural-Urban Likeness Index	69.7%	74.7%
Republican Rural-Urban Likeness Index	64.6%	87.6%
Democratic-Republican Likeness Index	60.4%	33.7%

The Influence of Ideology

Does a member's political philosophy affect his voting? We will explore this possibility by controlling for ideology. The Americans For Democratic Action's 1968 rating is used to classify Committeemen as liberal or conservative (see Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3


Relationship Between Ideology and Agricultural Support,
90th and 91st Congresses



An examination of Figure 3 does not produce evidence for the argument that conservatives and not liberals support agriculture. The reverse is true of the Rules Committee membership. Figure 4 suggests that as the mean percentage of support for city programs increases, both urban and rural representatives have a tendency to be more liberal.

Figure 4

Relationship Between Ideology and Urban Support,
90th and 91st Congresses



We conclude that liberal Committeemen (rural and urban) are more likely to sustain agricultural and city projects than conservatives. Therefore, ideology is a consequential factor in explaining voting behavior.

The Influence of Elections

District competitiveness is measured by Rules Committeemen's electoral margin. Data in Table 5 shows representatives of rural constituencies voting for farm programs whether their percentage of victory is high or low. Rural Congressmen from the less competitive districts (high electoral margins) give agriculture greater support than rural members from the more competitive districts (low electoral margins). So rural members opposed to agriculture usually come from the more competitive districts.

Table 5

Comparison of Roll-Call Votes on Agricultural Programs to Percentages of Electoral Margins of Rural Committeemen, 90th and 91st Congresses

Votes	Rural Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	Low (N=4)	High (N=4)
Support Agriculture	68%	78%
Oppose Agriculture	32	22
Total	100%	100%
Index of Likeness	81.7%	

Urban representatives, regardless of electoral margins, support urban programs (see Table 6). Cities get a higher percentage of assistance from the more competitive urban constituencies. Opposition is more likely to come from Committeemen who have scored greater victories at the polls.

Table 6

Comparison of Roll-Call Votes on City Programs to
Percentage of Electoral Margins of Urban Committeemen,
90th and 91st Congresses

Votes	Urban Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	Low (N=4)	High (N=3)
Support Cities	72%	67%
Oppose Cities	28	33
Total	100%	100%
Index of Likeness	85.2%	

The difference between those with high and low "wins" is more significant for rural congressmen on agricultural roll calls (18.3 percent) than for urban members on city issues (14.8 percent). Therefore, urban representatives are more united in their support of constituent interests than rural Committeemen.

Figure 5 gauges the support of agriculture by rural and urban Committeemen based on their electoral margin. Party membership is the control variable.

Rural Democrats with lower margins--Sisk and Matsunaga--give the highest percentage of support to farm programs (87 percent). Anderson (Il.) is an urban Republican with a low margin who supports




Figure 5. Committeemen's Support of Agricultural Roll Calls




Figure 6. Committeemen's Support of Urban Roll Calls

rural concerns. Those voicing their approval on the high margin side include rural and urban Democrats Colmer, Young, Anderson (Tenn.), O'Neill and Pepper, and rural Republican Quillen.

The Republican rural members from the more competitive districts--Martin and Latta--are less likely to vote for agriculture than is Quillen with a high margin. O'Neill and Pepper with higher constituent strength and Anderson (Il.) with a low margin display higher percentages than Martin and Latta from low margin districts.

Party membership is important as an explanation of the behavior of Committeemen from the more competitive rural constituencies (refer to Table 5). It is less relevant in understanding the relationship between constituency influence and roll-call voting for rural Congressmen with high electoral margins.

Urban roll calls receive their greatest strength from Democrats (see Figure 6). Coming from rural constituencies does not stop rural Democrats from voting in favor of city programs. They support all fifteen roll calls. While these rural members are giving urban affairs a boost, their compatriots with high margins show almost 50 percent opposition.

Republican congressmen vote as a bloc against urban projects. Ironically, what Republican support exists comes mainly from Quillen, a rural member who demonstrates a high percentage of electoral plurality. At the same time rural Republicans with low margins, Martin and Latta, show the most opposition.

Controlling for party is a more fruitful exercise for urban members who post high electoral victories than it is for representatives from the more competitive urban constituencies. The importance of electoral margin accounting for a Committeeman's voting stand is limited by his degree of party loyalty.

Another effect that a Committeeman's party may have on his behavior is proposed in our third hypothesis. Presumably, a Congressman possessing a high electoral margin is less likely to vote with his party leaders.

Table 7 describes this relationship for rural members voting on agricultural issues in the 90th Congress. Data examining this generalization for the 91st Congress is contained in Table 8. We discover that in 1967-1968, representatives having a lower percentage of constituent votes, follow their party's position more often. The reverse occurs in the next Congress, high electoral margin rural Committeemen record 94 percent of their roll-call votes in agreement with party leaders.

Table 7

Percentage of Party Support on Farm Issues for
Rural Congressmen by Electoral Margin,
90th Congress

Agricultural Votes	Rural Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	High (N=4)	Low (N=4)
Support Party	79%	92%
Oppose Party	21	8
Total	100%	100%

Table 8

Percentage of Party Support on Farm Issues for
Rural Congressmen by Electoral Margin,
91st Congress

Agricultural Votes	Rural Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	High (N=4)	Low (N=4)
Support Party	94%	78%
Oppose Party	6	22
Total	100%	100%

The next series of tables present an urban member's party support on city roll calls (see Tables 9 and 10). Support of party leaders is greater for those receiving higher percentages of election victories. This relationship applies to both periods.

Table 9

Percentage of Party Support on City Issues for
Urban Congressmen by Electoral Margin,
90th Congress

City Votes	Urban Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	High (N=4)	Low (N=3)
Support Party	100%	94%
Oppose Party	0	0
Total	100%	94%

Table 10

Percentage of Party Support on City Issues for
Urban Congressmen by Electoral Margin,
91st Congress

City Votes	Urban Committeemen Electoral Margin	
	High (N=4)	Low (N=3)
Support Party	94%	83%
Oppose Party	6	17
Total	100%	100%

Which party receives the greater allegiance from its rural associates? Data found in Tables 11 and 12 suggest that regardless of their electoral margins, Republicans win this honor in the 90th Congress. Democratic Committeemen in the 91st Congress surpass Republicans in party loyalty. Young and Matsunaga lead Democrats in backing party leaders. Quillen and Martin spark the defensive line of support for Republicans.

Table 11

Party Support of Agricultural Roll Calls
For Rural Committeemen, by Party

Rural Members	Congress		Mean
	90th	91st	
High Electoral Margin Democrats			
Colmer	56	100	71
Young	89	100	93
Anderson (Tenn.)	83	100	89
Republican			
Quillen	88	78	84
Low Electoral Margin Democrats			
Sisk	83	100	89
Matsunaga	89	100	93
Republicans			
Martin	100	56	84
Latta	94	56	80

Table 12

Party Support of City Roll Calls for
Urban Committeemen, by Party

Urban Members	Congress		Mean
	90th	91st	
High Electoral Margin			
Democrats			
O'Neill	100	83	93
Pepper	100	100	100
Republican			
Smith	100	100	100
Low Electoral Margin			
Democrats			
Madden	88	83	86
Delaney	100	50	79
Bolling	88	100	93
Republican			
Anderson (Il.)	100	100	100

Urban Republicans join their party leaders in opposing city projects. Democrat Pepper with a high electoral margin and both urban Republicans, Smith and Anderson (Il.), record 100 percent support of their respective parties during both Congresses. In addition, O'Neill and Delaney are in complete agreement with the Democratic leadership in the 1967-1968 period. Bolling shows 100 percent support of his party for the 91st Congress.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

This analysis has examined possible causes for legislative decisions. Rural/urban constituency characteristics were studied to determine their affect on Rules Committee members' voting behavior. Other factors included: Committeemen's percentage of electoral margin, party loyalty, and ideology.

The following findings were drawn from the analysis:

1. Members from rural districts voted for agricultural programs more often than representatives of urban constituencies.

Urban members supported rural interests only in the 91st Congress. Democrats, rural and urban, favored agriculture with greater regularity than Republicans who also supported farmers. Ideologically, liberals were better boosters than conservatives. Liberals were Democrats, but not all Democrats were liberal.

2. City roll calls received greater support from urban Committeemen. Rural members were divided over urban issues. Generally, Democrats voted for urban programs, Republicans opposed them. Liberals, rather than conservatives, preferred these measures.

3. Rural Committeemen with high electoral margins lent their support to agricultural programs. Those from the more competitive rural districts usually opposed rural interests.

4. Urban members from the more competitive districts recorded a higher percentage of support for city programs than their colleagues with high electoral margins.

5. Rural members with low electoral margins supported their party leaders' positions on agriculture in the 90th Congress more often than rural congressmen who had scored high electoral victories. Agreement with party on agricultural issues in the 91st Congress was greater for rural Committeemen with high electoral margins.

6. Urban Committee members with high electoral margins supported their respective parties' stands more times in both Congresses than did urban representatives with low margins.

The degree of competitiveness of a Rules Committee member's district did not affect his voting decisions to the same extent that they were influenced by party, rural/urban constituency, or ideology. If an issue was seen to affect substantial interests in a representative's constituency, then he supported those interests. Generally, this support can be better explained by the variables of party loyalty, and ideology rather than by the rural/urban constituency characteristic. This conclusion provides further evidence to support earlier studies which reported similar findings.¹

¹Refer to the works written by Robinson, Froman, Shannon, Turner, Truman, and Mayhew which were discussed in Chapter Three.

Additional research is needed to determine the reliability of these findings. Are the results limited to the four years or do they have broader applicability? A similar study should be conducted which would include other periods and other committees. We would suggest that the variables be re-examined by using more sophisticated techniques of analysis. Finally, the remaining causal factors described in the theoretical model could be defined and tested for validity. For example, the study of institutional characteristics, such as seniority and state party delegation are factors which might provide additional explanations of behavior.

In undertaking this research, we realized the limitations imposed upon our data by using roll-call votes. They contain certain inherent ambiguities. For instance, two members may cast a "nay" vote for exactly the opposite reasons: one because the legislation is too far-reaching, and the other because he thinks the bill does not go far enough. However, our independent variables were selected for the specific purpose of explaining these differences in behavior.

Thus, Rules Committee members, as do other congressmen, rely upon many factors in responding to issues. We intended that this study should be beneficial in explaining certain factors which cause legislative voting behavior.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 13

VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1967

Congress	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number						
	10	66	117	187	188	192	226
Colmer	?	A	F	?	?	F	?
Madden	F	F	A	F	F	?	?
Delaney	F	F	A	F	F	?	A
Bolling	F	F	A	?	?	F	F
O'Neill	?	F	A	A	F	A	A
Sisk	?	F	A	F	F	F	A
Young	F	F	F	?	?	F	?
Pepper	?	F	F	F	F	F	A
Matsunaga	F	F	F	A	A	F	?
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	F	F	F	F	F	A
Smith	?	A	A	F	F	A	F
Anderson (Il.)	F	A	?	A	A	F	F
Martin	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Quillen	F	A	F	F	F	F	?
Latta	F	A	A	F	F	F	F
Albert	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ford	?	A	?	F	F	?	F
Arends	?	A	F	F	F	F	?

F = Voted, paired, or announced For
A = Voted, paired, announced Against
? = Not voting

TABLE 14

VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1968

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number						
	6	32	33	36	37	57	143
Colmer	A	F	F	F	F	F	?
Madden	F	?	A	F	F	A	F
DeLancy	A	F	A	F	F	A	F
Bolling	F	A	A	F	F	A	F
O'Neill	F	F	A	?	F	A	F
Sisk	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Young	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Pepper	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	A	A	F	F	A	F
Smith	A	F	F	F	A	F	A
Anderson (Il.)	A	F	F	A	A	F	F
Martin	A	F	F	F	A	F	F
Quillen	A	F	F	A	A	F	F
Latta	A	F	F	A	A	F	F
Albert	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Ford	A	F	F	F	A	F	A
Arends	A	F	F	F	A	F	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

TABLE 14 (Cont.)

VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1968

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number						
	165	166	167	194	202	172	219
Colmer	A	F	F	A	F	F	F
Madden	?	A	A	F	A	A	F
DeLaney	F	A	A	A	F	A	F
Bolling	A	F	F	F	F	?	F
O'Neill	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Sisk	A	F	F	F	?	F	F
Young	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Pepper	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	F	F	F	?	F	F
Smith	F	A	A	A	A	A	A
Anderson (Ill.)	F	A	A	A	A	A	A
Martin	F	F	F	A	F	A	A
Quillen	F	F	F	F	F	F	A
Latta	F	F	A	F	F	F	A
Albert	A	F	F	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F	F	F	A
Ford	F	F	A	A	F	F	A
Arends	F	A	A	A	F	F	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

TABLE 15

VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1969

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll-Call Number			
	28	101	125	133
Colmer	?	F	F	F
Madden	F	A	A	A
Delaney	F	A	A	A
Bolling	F	A	F	F
O'Neill	F	A	F	A
Sisk	F	F	F	F
Young	F	F	F	F
Pepper	F	A	F	A
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	F	F	F
Smith	?	A	A	A
Anderson (Il.)	F	F	F	A
Martin	?	?	F	F
Quillen	F	A	F	F
Latta	F	A	F	A
Albert	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F
Ford	F	F	F	F
Arends	F	F	F	F

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

TABLE 16

VOTES ON AGRICULTURAL ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1970

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number					
	173	174	194	210	241	260
Colmer	A	F	F	F	F	F
Madden	A	F	A	A	F	F
DeLaney	A	A	A	A	A	A
Bolling	F	F	F	F	F	F
O'Neill	F	A	F	F	F	F
Sisk	F	F	F	F	F	F
Young	F	F	F	F	F	F
Pepper	F	F	F	F	F	F
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	A	F	F	F	F	F
Smith	F	A	A	A	A	A
Anderson (Ill.)	A	F	F	A	A	A
Martin	A	A	A	A	A	A
Quillen	A	F	F	A	F	A
Iatta	A	A	F	A	F	A
Albert	F	F	F	F	F	F
Boggs	A	F	F	F	F	F
Ford	F	F	F	A	A	A
Arends	A	F	F	A	A	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

TABLE 17

VOTES ON URBAN ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1967

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number			
	55	56	176	182
Colmer	A	A	A	A
Maddox	F	F	F	?
DeLaney	F	F	F	F
Bolling	F	F	F	F
O'Neill	F	F	F	F
Sisk	F	F	F	F
Young	F	A	F	F
Pepper	F	F	F	F
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	F	A	F
Smith	A	A	A	A
Anderson (Il.)	A	F	A	A
Martin	A	F	A	A
Quillen	A	F	A	A
Latta	A	A	A	A
Albert	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F
Ford	A	A	A	A
Arendt	A	F	A	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

TABLE 18

VOTES ON URBAN ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1968

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll Call Number				
	64	127	128	129	160
Colmer	A	A	A	A	A
Madden	F	F	F	F	F
Delaney	F	F	F	F	F
Bolling	F	F	F	F	?
O'Neill	F	F	F	F	F
Sisk	F	F	F	F	F
Young	F	A	F	F	F
Pepper	F	F	F	F	F
Matsunga	F	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F	F	F	F	F
Smith	A	A	A	A	A
Anderson (Il.)	A	A	A	F	F
Martin	A	A	A	A	A
Quillen	A	A	A	F	F
Latta	A	A	A	A	F
Albert	F	F	F	F	F
Boggs	F	F	A	F	F
Ford	A	A	A	F	F
Arends	A	A	A	A	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

TABLE 19

VOTES ON AN URBAN ROLL CALL
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1969

Congressional Quarterly Roll-Call Number	
Congressman	138
Colmer	A
Madden	F
Delancy	A
Bolling	F
O'Neill	A
Sisk	F
Young	F
Pepper	F
Matsunaga	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	F
Smith	F
Anderson (Il.)	F
Martin	F
Quillen	F
Latta	A
Albert	F
Boggs	F
Ford	F
Arends	F

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

TABLE 20

VOTES ON URBAN ROLL CALLS
BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PARTY LEADERS, 1970

Congressman	Congressional Quarterly Roll-Call Number				
	103	133	158	182	246
Colmer	A	?	A	A	A
Madden	A	F	F	?	F
Delaney	A	F	F	A	F
Bolling	F	F	F	F	F
O'Neill	F	F	F	F	F
Sisk	F	F	F	F	F
Young	A	F	F	F	?
Pepper	F	F	F	F	F
Matsunaga	F	F	F	F	F
Anderson (Tenn.)	A	F	F	F	F
Smith	A	A	A	A	A
Anderson (Il.)	A	A	A	A	A
Martin	A	A	A	?	A
Quillen	A	F	A	A	A
Latta	A	A	A	A	F
Albert	F	F	F	?	F
Boggs	F	F	F	F	F
Ford	A	A	A	A	A
Arends	A	A	A	A	A

F = Voted, paired, or announced For

A = Voted, paired, or announced Against

? = Not voting

APPENDIX B

FIGURE 7

Matrix of Agreement Between Democratic
Rules Committee Members on 46 Roll Calls

	Col	Mad	Del	Bol	O'Ne	Sis	Yon	Pep	Mat	And
Colmer		7	11	15	14	19	23	18	20	21
Madden	7		31	28	26	27	21	28	25	27
Delaney	11	31		23	28	23	21	26	22	23
Bolling	15	28	23		32	35	31	34	35	32
O'Neill	14	26	28	32		35	30	38	35	31
Sisk	19	27	23	35	35		35	40	39	36
Young	23	21	21	31	30	35		36	39	35
Pepper	18	28	26	34	38	40	36		40	36
Matsunaga	20	25	22	35	35	39	39	40		36
Anderson	21	27	23	32	31	36	36	36	36	

FIGURE 3

Matrix of Agreement Between Republican
Rules Committee Members on 46 Roll Calls

	Smith	Anderson	Martin	Quillen	Latta
Smith		29	31	23	29
Anderson	29		29	33	32
Martin	31	29		32	29
Quillen	23	33	32		36
Latta	29	32	29	36	


APPENDIX C

TABLE 21

PERCENTAGE OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT VOTES
RECEIVED BY RULES COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Committeeman	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	Average
O'Neill	73.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	94.6%
Colmer	100.0	100.0	70.0	100.0	90.0	92.0
Young	70.4	77.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	89.6
Pepper	57.6	65.7	99.8	76.6	100.0	79.9
Anderson (Tenn.)	81.7	78.4	79.6	59.4	82.0	76.2
Quillen	53.9	71.7	87.1	85.2	68.0	73.2
Iatta	70.4	65.9	75.3	71.2	71.0	70.8
Smith	70.6	67.9	73.4	69.4	70.0	70.3
Sisk	71.9	66.8	71.3	62.5	68.0	68.1
Anderson (Il.)	66.9	56.4	73.0	73.0	68.0	67.5
Natsunaga	63.6	61.1	67.7	66.6	73.0	66.4
DeLaney	58.7	65.9	53.5	49.7	92.0	64.0
Bolling	58.9	67.9	61.2	65.4	62.0	63.1
Martine	65.6	52.8	73.0	67.8	58.0	61.4
Madden	60.5	63.7	58.3	56.7	66.0	61.0

FIGURE 9
CONTINUUM OF ADA RATING



Based on the percentage of times Rules Committee members agreed with the ADA position on 12 selected votes in 1968

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