

1972

# Cook County Regular Democratic Organization

Richard Hamilton

*Eastern Illinois University*

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COOK COUNTY REGULAR

DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION

(TITLE)

BY

RICHARD HAMILTON

**THESIS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

Chicago, Illinois is the second largest city of the United States. Chicago also has a unique political organization called a machine. What is a machine in a political sense? Edward C. Banfield provides an excellent description.

A political "machine" is a party organization that depends crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material. A specific (as opposed to general) inducement is one that can be offered to one person while being withheld from others. A material inducement is money or some other physical "thing" to which value attaches. A machine, like any formal organization, offers a mixture of these various kinds of inducements in order to get people to do what it requires. But it is distinguished from other types of organization by the very heavy emphasis it places upon specific, material inducements and consequent completeness and reliability of its control over behavior, which, of course, account for the name "machine."<sup>1</sup>

Political machines are hard to understand. The Chicago machine is no exception. The formal name for it is the Cook County Regular Democratic Central Committee. Regular is a word used by the

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<sup>1</sup>Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

organization to distinguish it from "independent" democrats. The word regular is found on the front of the various ward offices in Chicago.

The machine has not been adequately described in literature to date; this paper is an attempt to fill in the void. The machine is still very popular among news commentators, as the 1972 Democratic convention showed. Every day, however, new aspects come to light. This is by no means the final description of the Cook County Organization.

This paper is descriptive in nature because of the difficulty in quantifying the data collected. No attempt was made to describe the relationship between the Cook County vote and the State of Illinois vote as a whole. About one half of the total population of the State of Illinois is within the Chicago city limits.

Literature for study was somewhat less than abundant. Scholars such as Fenton, Banfield and Wilson have contributed the majority of the information currently available for study. Newspaper articles were helpful in many instances, along with books written by journalists, like Royko and Gleason. Journals and periodicals contributed some insights into the formal structure of the machine's activity, but not into the machine itself.

In the body of the paper, the first chapter will deal with a brief history of political machines in general, and the social factors which led to their formation. The second chapter will describe the current functions of machine politics in Illinois.

Next an attempt is made to distinguish the current Daley organization from the "old style" political machines of the past.

The formal structure and inner-working of the machine are described in the following chapters. Two chapters describe the basis of Mayor Daley's power. The mayor of Chicago has little formal power; the city council possesses most of the real authority under Chicago's "weak mayor-strong council" charter of government. The mayor gets his authority from the party, and he is its chairman. He has strong central authority because of the extra-governmental party structure which he heads. When Daley makes party decisions, he will be referred to as "chairman" Daley instead of "mayor" Daley. This will help make clear the difference between the roles played by the mayor.

The next chapter will examine the subject of patronage, the fuel that fires the machine. Patronage is important for party discipline in Cook County and this will be explained. The last three chapters deal with specific examples of how a political machine operates in modern society. One chapter will describe Chicago's role in the 1960 election and the priorities of Mayor Daley. The next chapter, dealing with voting behavior, describes some important findings about voters in Chicago which dispute some current popular themes in voting theory, mainly that a higher turnout favors the Democratic Party. The 1960 election was used for this study.

The next to last chapter uncovers some of the hidden wiring which connects the various First Ward machine politicians with the

crime syndicate. This is an evasive subject, but enough information was found to shed some light on the subject. The last chapter suggests two things: 1) areas for further research and 2) an evaluation of the machine's future.

The central theme of the paper will be what makes Chicago's government work. The main hypothesis is that Chicago is indeed governed by a political machine.

In dealing with the structure of the Democratic machine, several aspects of it had to be left out. For example, one of these is the role played by the organization with regard to the state legislature. Not enough pertinent material was found to include it in this paper. For the most part, the Illinois General Assembly is controlled by the Republicans and the Chicago legislators are chiefly concerned with bills or money for the city.

The goal of this paper is to give the reader a general view of the machine from top to bottom and what role it has in Chicago today.



## CHAPTER II

### WHY A MACHINE?

"Organization, not machine. Get that? Organization, not machine."

"The only reason that other party called the Democratic Organization a machine is because they don't have one."

Richard J. Daley

One of the oldest and most traditional of the images associated with urban politics in the United States has been the political machine. Along with the machine, the term "boss" has been widely used since the middle of the nineteenth century to describe basic political organizations in American cities. These terms have acquired pejorative overtones, because too many times Bosses and Machines in politics connotated corruption in government, boodle, vice and organized looting of public treasuries by dishonest public officials. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the character of machines varied somewhat from city to city, but all were basically sustained by quick political socialization of the poor and recent immigrants to this country. In almost every case, the Democratic Party adapted itself to house these new citizens so most machines were under the control of the Democrats. The central question of why the cities remained boss-ridden has been examined

by other scholars. Burns and Peltason advanced five basic reasons as explanation:<sup>2</sup>

1. Lack of public interest and the refusal of leading citizens to take part in public affairs.
2. The influx of immigrants who found that ward leaders and precinct workers were their friends.
3. Politics offered the main means of climbing the economic and social ladder.
4. Faulty structural organization of the city leading to such weak government that some political leader had to take charge.
5. Business interests that stood behind the bosses used them to secure favorable franchises and contracts and protection from regulation.

This explanation needs amplification. First of all, the newly arrived immigrants knew very little of the democratic process. In Europe, the people were ruled by Kings and Queens, the Bill of Rights was unknown to most of these people. In many European countries, the majority of the citizenry were not allowed to vote. If they arrived in New York, Chicago or Boston, they were soon allowed to vote for the Democrat of their choice. As more and more immigrants poured into the cities, the Democratic organizations became stronger. To these people the ward heeler and precinct captain were the government. The precinct captain was visible. He knew how to fill out

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<sup>2</sup>James Burns and Jack Peltason, Government by the People (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), p. 813.

the forms, cut through the red tape, and how to find a job. He was there in case of fire, finding new lodging for the homeless. He did favors everyday of the year for the new Americans and asked only one favor in return--their vote. Since the immigrants knew little and cared less about voting, the request for their votes was usually granted.

The main problem for the early bosses was organizing the Irish, Poles, Germans, Slavs, etc., into one big political party. This was no easy task, because the new immigrants carried over to this country all of their old prejudices and got along over here about as well as the nation states of Europe. This problem was quickly solved; each ethnic group was allowed to have one of their own as a local leader in their ward or ghetto, but the overall boss was always Irish. An old Chicago proverb tells the story: "A Lithuanian won't vote for a Pole, and a Pole won't vote for a Lithuanian. A German won't vote for either of them--but all three will vote for a 'Turkey' (Irishman)."

There is another reason for the dominance of the Irish in Chicago. The newly-arrived Irish immigrants knew something of the democratic process of government. Their native land was governed by the British Parliamentary system and the Irish leaders knew more about the value of voting than other immigrant groups. The Irish were also in the United States before the so-called "New Immigrants" came over during the latter part of the nineteenth century. The second big immigration came fifty years after the potato famine drove

the Irish to the new world. It consisted mainly of Slavs, Serbs and other Eastern European groups. When they arrived in the American cities, the Irish were in the process of taking control of the political process from the old-line "Yankees." The Irish politicians quickly found that all votes counted the same in the ballot box regardless of who cast them. The newly enfranchised citizens were not allowed to vote in the "old country" as a rule, but in the new land they voted for the Irishman of their choice.

The ethnic vote was, and still is, important in Cook County politics because its members made political decisions as members of the ethnic group. The foreign language press helped the voter decide their political affiliation because most new voters did not know how to read, write, or even speak English. When the voters looked at the ballot, they would see names like their own, with a "ski" on the end of it, for example, and gave their vote to one of their own countrymen.<sup>3</sup>

A political candidate's ethnic background is probably more important in Chicago, than in say, New York or Los Angeles. As late as 1968, for example, the ethnic question was used as the determining factor in the slating of one candidate, Edward V. Hanrahan, for the office of States Attorney for Cook County.

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<sup>3</sup>John M. Allswang, A House for all Peoples (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1971) and Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957). Allswang does an excellent job of describing ethnic politics in Chicago during their formative period and Merton describes how almost all of an individual's social decisions were made in a frame of reference produced by the group to which he belongs. These are two excellent sources for more details of ethnic voting behavior in general.

Once the immigrants settled down in their own areas, the first important political action taken was to elect an alderman from their group to serve in the Chicago City Council. This part was easy, because the ward boundaries more often than not coincided with the ethnic make-up of the ward. It is not surprising, then, that the Poles elected Poles; the Germans elected Germans; and the Jews elected Jews. What was surprising, however, was that the Irish were able to play each group against the other and in mixed wards become the compromise candidates. Everybody would vote for an Irishman. Before 1927, the Irish held elected positions out of proportion to their numbers. When Tony Cermak gained control of the Cook County Regular Democratic Organization, the "balanced ticket" was born for county and city-wide elections. Mayor Daley's election reflected a return to the good old days; however, once more the Irish are in the saddle of leadership. The three most important posts in Cook County--State's Attorney, Assessor, and County Board President--are held by people whose names are Hanrahan, Cullerton, and Dunne. It is no surprise that the annual St. Patrick's Day Parade has become synonymous with a display of Democratic might.

Out of the various groups that settled in America came the political leaders who built up strong political organizations--the machine. The Crokers, Tweeds, Hagues and Crumps took advantage of some preconditions that existed in American society and culture during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Fred Greenstein



describes five of these conditions: 1) Massive urban explosion, 2) disorganized forms of urban government, 3) needs of businessmen, 4) needs of dependent populations and, 5) unrestricted suffrage. The early bosses saw to it that the immigrants were fed and working. Businessmen received favors from city hall and everyone able to, voted on election day. In many cases, poor people were paid for their votes. This practice continues today in many areas of Chicago (and several other cities as well).<sup>4</sup>

The political parties were able to get patronage jobs in government for the needy, thus acting as an informal relief organization. These same patronage employees provided the doorbell pushers at election time, crucial if the machine were to function. Jake Arvey, retired boss of Cook County, once estimated that forty thousand patronage employees could deliver two hundred and forty thousand votes on election day, with each patronage worker getting about six votes out of his family. There is a lot of truth in the old adage: "patronage oils the machine."

As each new nationality arrived in Chicago, the politicians rapidly brought it into the mainstream of political participation in the community. Usually after a generation or so, the immigrant groups could start electing one of their own for a local representative, but it was always the Irish who held the leadership positions.

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<sup>4</sup>Fred T. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics," in Political Parties by David W. Abbot and Edward T. Rogowsky (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971), p/ 87. For an excellent account of this practice in Chicago and a history of two of Chicago's most famous ward bosses, see Lloyd Wendt and Kerman Kogan's Bosses in Lusty Chicago (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1943).

The start of the machine in Chicago began with the formation of "Mike McDonald's Democrats" in 1873. It was Mike McDonald who gave Chicago the Carter Harrisons, both junior and senior. McDonald, who was a professional gambler and saloon keeper, put together an organization which elected Carter Harrison, Sr. five times and Carter Harrison, Jr. four times to the position of mayor of Chicago. It could hardly be called a "machine" then, however. Each ward was ruled by a single man or group of men whose main goal, apparently, was to line their pockets. Many times there was no unity at all, with the aldermen constantly fighting each other for "boodle" or cash. At the turn of the century the aldermen were known as the "grey wolves," constantly on the prowl to make a buck. It was with this group that "Foxy Ed" Cullerton roamed, along with "Hinky Dink" Kenna, "Bathhouse" John Coughlin, and Daniel Ryan. Many years later, as late as 1972, their heirs would still be part of the machine. P. J. (Parky) Cullerton, is Cook County Assessor today, a chip off the old block. His father was also known around town as "Foxy Ed", one of the original boodlers.<sup>5</sup>

Today, the machine is strongest in the uneducated low-income Black areas of the city. The Blacks are the new immigrants. As the white voters flee to the suburbs, their place is being taken by Blacks; therefore the machine is just as strong in the inner-city or river

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<sup>5</sup>See Harold F. Gosnell's Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937) for a description of the present machine during its formative years in the 1920's and 1930's.

wards today as it was thirty years ago. The lower the average income and the less education, the more reliably Democratic is the ward on election day.<sup>6</sup> In these wards, on the west and south sides, fantastic totals are delivered when the votes are counted. (They are called "river" wards because they border the Chicago river). These wards, the 1st, 11th, 25th, 26th, 27th, and 42nd provided the margin for John F. Kennedy's victory in Illinois in 1960.

% Dem. 1960 for President

Ward 1	80.24
11	76.98
25	85.63
26	79.16
27	85.38
42	60.88

Source: Tables from Chicago Municipal Reference Library

In these wards, Kennedy ran over 70,000 votes ahead of Nixon. His state-wide total for victory was less than 9,000 votes, so once again the "river" wards delivered.

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<sup>6</sup>Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 244.



## CHAPTER III

### THE FUNCTION OF MACHINE POLITICS

"Chicago ain't ready for reform yet."

Alderman Faddy Bauler after Richard J. Daley's first mayoral victory.

All city governments are supposed to fulfill the wants of the people, but very few do. Chicago, because of its unique dual structure, is able to keep the vast majority of its people and interest groups satisfied. The machine-style government with its boss on top, can, in the words of Edward J. Flynn, "...survive only so long as he (the boss) wins elections, and it is equally obvious that the only way to win elections year after year is to know what the voters want and give it to them.<sup>7</sup> The Cook County Democratic Organization has managed to produce victory after victory for its candidates, because it recognizes the fact that interest groups have to be satisfied and neighborhood feelings kept sedate. It always keeps an ethnic balance on the slate, (it recently ran a Black for a city-wide office in Chicago). Newsweek magazine (Apr. 5, 1971) pointed out some other aspects of Chicago which emphasize the function of the machine:

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<sup>7</sup> Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 221.

1. Chicago's streets are probably the cleanest and best illuminated on the metropolitan scene.
2. Its police and fire departments are ranked by professionals as among the most effective in the world.
3. Chicago witnessed a slight dip (.4 percent) in its crime rate.
4. Chicago has not had a budget deficit in sixteen years, when Daley became mayor.
5. It boasts one of the few expanding tax bases among U. S. metropolises.

The dual structure of government in Chicago functions as a result of its popular support from the voters. One arm of the structure is visible, the other--invisible. The visible portion is made up of the formal governing institutions, like the offices of mayor, city collector, city clerk, city treasurer and the fifty aldermen who make up the city council. The invisible portion is made up of the chairman of the party, the fifty ward committeemen, the precinct captains and 40,000 or more patronage workers. Many times it is impossible to tell them apart because many people hold positions in both arms. Mayor Richard J. Daley is also known as Chairman Daley, the beloved leader of the Cook County Regular Democrat Organization. The city clerk, John C. Marcin, is also known as Committeeman Marcin, top party leader in the 35th ward.

The Democratic party in Chicago is arranged like a paramilitary organization with Chairman Daley on top. There is little dissension among the ranks, and all orders come directly from the chairman who expects obedience from his committeemen.

## POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Before going into the structure and inner-workings of the machine, it is necessary to go through the political geography of Illinois.

There are two distinct political areas in the state of Illinois, Cook County on one side, the rest of the state on the other. Cook County can be divided into the City of Chicago and the "county towns" such as Franklin Park, Chicago Heights and River Forest. "Downstate" is the term used to describe all of Illinois outside of Cook County. "Downstate is white, Protestant, Anglo-Saxon, rural and normally Republican. It elects the governor (usually) and it (usually) controls the General Assembly."<sup>8</sup> There are some Democratic areas in downstate, such as East St. Louis, but these areas are few and far between. Downstate has produced some Democratic leaders such as Paul Powell and Paul Simon, but most of the outstanding Democratic leaders come from Chicago. Downstate usually does not get along with Cook County, which it regards as an alien land.<sup>9</sup>

Chicago, on the other hand, is Democratic. It is also a neighborhood city in which fifty ward boundaries coincide with fifty small local communities. The wards are usually based on socio-economic, religious, and racial grounds. In the lower-income Black wards, the

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<sup>8</sup>Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 242. This chapter is heavily indebted to Dr. Banfield's work, especially, chapter 8.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 242.

machine is dominant. Upper-income, middle-class white areas usually show some degree of independence. The ethnic wards of Irish, Italians and Polish are almost all Catholic; they have an alderman who is of the same ethnic background as the majority of the voters in the ward. The more impoverished the ward, the greater control the machine has over it. The slum areas in the inner-city produce so many Democratic votes that Republicans usually do not bother to campaign in them. A Republican candidate for office often receives as few as five votes to several hundred for his Democratic opponent in the machine wards.

The farther one goes from the inner-city the more Republican the wards become. Wards on the fringe of the city sometimes manage to elect an independent or Republican alderman. In these areas, the influence of the Democratic ward committeemen and their precinct captains is relatively weak since the people living there do not need all the services that the machine provides. They do not need city jobs, and many of these people seem to follow the advice of the newspapers and "split" their ticket, a mark of middle-class America. Fortunately for the Democrats, many of these independent voters are heading for the suburbs and their place is being taken by Negroes and poor whites, who do not, as a rule, follow the advice of such groups as the League of Women Voters. These newcomers are heavily Democratic and give the machine its greatest support.

We have noted that the towns surrounding Chicago in Cook County usually vote Republican, this despite the fact that these people who moved into them voted Democratic when they lived in the

city. These people are the upward-mobile types who "have absorbed the idea that 'independence', i.e., splitting the ticket, is a mark of middle-class sophistication."<sup>10</sup>

A Democratic candidate for a state-wide office does not have to worry about the city of Chicago going his way on election day. Normal campaign strategy is to hold one's own downstate, and try to cut down the heavy Republican vote in suburbia. In a state-wide Democratic primary, all that is needed to win is the support of the chairman of the Cook County Regular Democratic Organization. The following example proves this point.

In 1960 Chairman Daley decided that Cook County Judge Otto Kerner would be the Democratic candidate for the office of governor. Stephen A. Mitchell and Joseph D. Lohman decided to challenge the wisdom of the mayor. A state-wide Democratic primary, one of the few ever held by the Democrats, demonstrated the machine's power: Otto Kerner received over seventy percent of the vote in Cook County and buried Lohman and Mitchell so deep they never rose again. Lohman and Mitchell were not able to get downstaters to vote in Democratic primaries at the same rate as the people of Chicago.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 242.

<sup>11</sup>Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 230. It should be pointed out that the 1972 Primary between Daniel Walker and Paul Simon was unique in that over 300,000 Republicans were allowed to cross-over and vote in the Democratic Primary.



## SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE MACHINE

Robert K. Merton, a sociologist, has offered an analysis of the political machine in society. He states that:<sup>12</sup>

The key structural function of the Boss is to organize, centralize and maintain in good working condition 'the scattered fragments of power' which are at present dispersed through our political organization. By this centralized organization of political power, the Boss and his apparatus can satisfy the needs of diverse subgroups in the larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally devised and culturally approved social structures.

The political organization performs three important social functions according to Merton. First, it humanizes and personalizes all manner of assistance to those in need. This might be a summer job for a college student or instructions on how to receive food stamps for the poor. The local representative for the machine is the ward committeeman and his precinct captains. The captains know the problems of everyone in their precincts and can personally help people out. In some wards he might be an errand boy to go downtown while in others he might provide an income tax service. The voters know someone personal to take their problems to and he "is forever a friend in need."<sup>13</sup> Second, the machine provides the business community with privileges that often lead to immediate economic gain. Public buildings and highway construction work is awarded to certain companies. These companies, says Chicago Daily News writer Mike Royko,

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<sup>12</sup>Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957), p. 72.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 72.

make billions off the city and return millions to the Democratic Party's war chest. The following example illustrates this point.

The Chicago Sanitary District awards a lot of electrical contracts to the Garden City Engineering Company. The president of that company is "Mossie" Cullerton, whose cousin is none other than P. J. Cullerton, Democratic committeeman for the 38th ward and Cook County Assessor.<sup>14</sup> The Garden City Engineering Company would be a good investment for anybody, despite the fact that it has been involved in some of the "better" scandals in the Sanitary District.

The third social function of the machine is that it provides channels for upward social mobility for those people who are excluded from the usual avenues of advancement. This argument is used by machine politicians to defend the vast use of patronage. People can be appointed into big positions with little or no qualifications. Minority groups benefit from this also because they do not have to take civil service exams to land high-paying jobs with the city.

Merton warns us that unless due recognition is given to the importance of these and other functions of the machine, attempts at reform are likely to be "social ritual rather than social engineering."<sup>15</sup> One has to wonder if reform is really needed, however. The Chicago system works, while the other large cities that were "reformed" flounder. The people of Chicago can reform their own city by voting

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<sup>14</sup>Ovid Demaris, Captive City (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969), p. 203.

<sup>15</sup>Edward C. Banfield (ed.), Urban Government (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 134.

the machine out of office, but they do not. To the poor and uneducated, the machine is the visible government, while the government agencies set up to help them are just something to read about in the newspapers.



## CHAPTER IV

### THE STYLE OF THE MACHINE

"Hey perfesser, how would ya like me to fix ya a Mickey Finn?"

Alderman Paddy Bauler to then Alderman Paul Douglas,

This chapter is heavily indebted to Fred A. Greenstein, James Q. Wilson, Edward Banfield and Harold F. Gosnell. All these distinguished political scientists have contributed important descriptions of how a political machine operates, what fuels it needs to keep it operating and what future it has in modern society.

Greenstein lists four characteristics of "old style" party organizations:<sup>16</sup>

1. There is a disciplined party hierarchy led by a single executive or a unified board of directors.
2. The party controls nominations to public office and, through this, it controls the public officials of the municipality.
3. The party leadership does not usually hold formal party office. That is to say the official position is not the primary source of the leadership's strength.
4. Rather, a cadre of loyal party officials and non-ideological psychic rewards--such as personal and ethnic recognition, camaraderie, and the like.

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<sup>16</sup>Fred A. Greenstein, "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics," in Political Parties by David W. Abbott and Edward T. Rogowsky (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1971), p. 85.

To call the Daley organization "old style" would mean acceptance of these characteristics. These four points might describe some other "old style" political organization, but they do not fit the Cook County Democratic Regular Organization of today. Both Banfield and Wilson found that it is "material rewards" which are the overriding factor which ties people to the machine; non-ideological "psychic rewards" are hardly ever used to gain the support of the people for the organization.<sup>17</sup> Greenstein counters with Edward J. Flynn's book in which Flynn attempts to change his reputation as "Boss of the Bronx" to that of a political statesman.<sup>18</sup> Although the points made by both authors are valid, Edward Banfield comes closer to the truth when he and Martin Meyerson find evidence in Chicago which in many ways dispute some of Greenstein's findings. They conclude that definite material rewards are needed because a person who is ideologically motivated to join a political organization is apt to quit after his ideals are satisfied.<sup>19</sup>

The idea that the party leadership does not hold any public office or formal party office is invalid. To get to the top of any

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<sup>17</sup>James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Patronage," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 59 (August 1951), p. 370, states quite clearly that non-material incentives are not enough to sustain the membership of a political organization.

<sup>18</sup>Edward J. Flynn, You're the Boss (New York: Viking Press, 1947).

<sup>19</sup>Edward C. Banfield and Martin Meyerson, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (New York: The Free Press, 1955), Chapter 3.

political organization requires high ambition on the part of the leader, and there are always people right behind him ready to take over. Mayor Daley's main source of strength comes from his formal party office as Chairman of the Cook County Regular Democratic Central Committee. If he did not have that position in the party, he would be a little-known public official and certainly would not be mayor of Chicago.

Although the Cook County Democrats have a disciplined party hierarchy and that leadership exercises control over all Democratic office holders, the present machine in Chicago cannot justifiably be called "old style" in the true sense of the term. The "old style" of Crump, Hague, etc., was dishonest in several respects. Some "old style" bosses, like Pendergast, ended up in prison. Daley is often called a boss, but it must be remembered that he has to be clean enough to face the voters.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>Edward Flynn does a good job of clearing up many popular impressions of political bosses in the last chapter of You're the Boss (New York: Viking Press, 1947). During the period when Ed Kelly and Pat Nash ran the Cook County Organization, from 1931-1947, the machine could have been described as "old style", as indeed it was. Harold Gosnell's Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), does an excellent study of how the "old style" political machine operated, but as the times changed, so did the machine. John H. Fenton, in Midwest Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1967), gives a brief description of the Daley machine as does David Kenny in Basic Illinois Government, A Systematic Explanation (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970). The best and most up-to-date description of the Daley organization is found in City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) by Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson. Several newspapermen have written about Daley's life and his machine and these include Mike Royko's Boss (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971) and Bill Gleason's Daley of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970). These works give an excellent account of Richard J. Daley's life history, but are rather shallow in their analysis of the machine itself.

If the Daley machine is not "old style", then what is it? The current machine pictures itself as the "City of Chicago." Mayor Daley does not make the maintenance of his organization in an "old style" sense his most important business. The Mayor is a leading figure in Democratic politics on the state and national levels. The candidates the machine runs for office have to be able to win state-wide and county elections.<sup>21</sup> Many times, the machine uses the coattails of leading Democrats to pull their lesser candidates into minor offices. In 1948, Jake Arvey ran Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson for U. S. senator and governor. They both won smashing victories. These two men are not usually associated with "old style" politics. The fact of the matter is that by running these two "blue ribbon" candidates, Arvey saved the machine from falling apart like other machines across the nation at that time. The newspaper writers, like Royko and Gleason, claim Arvey ran these two to lose with Harry Truman. If anything Douglas and Stevenson pulled Harry Truman through Illinois. Douglas and Stevenson both carried the state by over 400,000 votes. Truman got by with 30,000 votes. Even today, Arvey claims that men like Douglas and Stevenson "set a political pattern in the country."<sup>22</sup>

Mayor Daley has made it clear that he will not tolerate corruption in office and that he is an effective administrator.

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<sup>21</sup>Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 245.

<sup>22</sup>Newsweek, (Apr. 5, 1971), p. 12.



He presents the public with the image of a man interested in the welfare of all citizens and not just the machine itself. His massive public works programs have met with voter approval. He is a constant "booster" for the city, always building things and announcing even bigger plans for the future. He has the city's business establishment in the palm of his hand with his "progress before politics" slogan. When he helps the businessmen, he feels that he is helping everyone. The businessmen, who should be his natural enemies, return the favors by helping him and the city. James V. Cunningham notes that:<sup>23</sup>

Mayor Daley displayed a few of the surface characteristics of an entrepreneur. He possessed a great energy and invested it in his job. With considerable genius he held together different elements of the Democratic organization to win the election in a volatile city. His public utterances showed considerable artistry as he dangled visible services and attractive public works before the electorate and kept the more explosive and difficult issues buried as long as possible. He scores high on form.

Tied in with the life of the machine are several other factors which make it "new style." Pride on the part of its membership is very important. Low-cost reform, like public projects, the use of patronage and support from all segments of the community make the Chicago machine different from the "bossed" machines of yesteryear.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>23</sup>James V. Cunningham, Urban Leadership in the Sixties (Cambridge: Schenkman Co., 1969), p. 45.

<sup>24</sup>John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 132.

## CHAPTER V

### WARD BOSSES AND PRECINCT CAPTAINS

"Unbreakable, aren't they? Unbreakable!"

Former Mayor Edward Kennelly after Richard Daley defeated him in the Democratic Primary in 1955.

What is a ward boss? What formal powers do they have? What informal powers do they possess? These and similar questions will be discussed in the following pages.

A ward boss is the committeeman for a ward. Each party has an elected committeeman in each of Chicago's fifty wards. Each of the thirty townships which make up the rest of Cook County has a committeeman. These committeemen have three official duties as prescribed by law. First, he is a delegate to the judicial conventions which nominates judges for election in the county. Second, the committeemen send delegates to the state party convention. Third, the committeemen are members on the congressional, state, senatorial and representative district committees and have the power to fill vacancies and manage campaigns.<sup>25</sup> Those are the formal powers of the ward boss. If a ward committeeman has only trivial power by law, then why are they called bosses? The answer is simple--the

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<sup>25</sup>John Dreiske, Your Government and Mine: Metropolitan Chicago (New York: Orlana Publications, Inc., 1959), p. 54.

committeemen are the heads of their party in their ward or township. They "own" their wards. They are responsible for getting out the vote for their party on election day. They decide who will run on their party's ticket within the ward for the office of alderman. They are an integral part of the "invisible" government of Chicago.

Most, if not all, of the Democratic officeholders in Cook County and Chicago are also ward bosses. This list also includes state-wide offices and membership in the state general assembly. No salary goes with the office of committeeman, so most of the ward rulers are on one or more public payrolls. If their public salaries aren't high enough, they can always run businesses which are profitable because of their political connections.<sup>26</sup> Those who are lawyers have lucrative law practices.

One of the most successful of the lawyer-ward bosses is Thomas Keane. His standing in the machine is said to be second only to Daley's.<sup>27</sup> Keane's power comes from the fact that the 31st ward delivers thumping majorities for Democratic candidates at election time. He also is one of the more wealthy citizens of Chicago. The Chicago Daily News once estimated his fortune at above \$10 million, coming from real estate deals, a lucrative law practice and a substantial inheritance from his father.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup>Edward C. Banfield and Martin Meyerson, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest (New York: The Free Press, 1955), p. 68.

<sup>27</sup>Mike Royko, Boss (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971) p. 13.

<sup>28</sup>Ovid Demaris, Captive City, (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969), p. 179.

While Keane may not be a typical ward boss, he is what many ward committeemen would like to be. He was born 66 years ago into a powerful political family. His father was a ward boss in his own right, being a member of the state legislature, city collector and alderman until his death in 1945. Young Tom got his start in the state Senate, serving from 1935-1945. (Also in Illinois' highest law-making body during those years were Richard J. Daley and Federal Judge Abraham Lincoln Marovitz.) In 1945, his father, Thomas P., died and young Tom inherited his father's position as committeeman and alderman. Eventually, he became chairman of the city council's Finance Committee. He also became the majority floor leader and chairman of the council's committee on committees and rules, which determines council rules and the composition of its committees. This allows him to hand-pick every committee's chairman. Keane also has the investigative power to review all city contracts but he exercises this power in reverse. He does not allow any investigations which might disrupt the status quo.<sup>29</sup> Keane manages the council members for Mayor Daley and if any member gets out of line, Keane moves to the attack. "Sit down or I'll knock ya down" is one of his standard one-liners when some minority alderman criticizes the Democratic administration.<sup>30</sup> Thomas Keane's brother, George, is a member of the Board of Tax Appeals. The mark of Keane is found in all areas of city government. The Chicago Daily News once described

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<sup>29</sup>Ibid., (Demaris), p. 179-182.

<sup>30</sup>Newsweek (Apr. 5, 1971), p. 80.



him as the administration's leading orator, parliamentarian and constitutional authority. His speeches are heavy with caustic remarks about state and national Republican leadership, repeated contentions that Chicago has "the best government of any municipality in the United States" and allusions to "The Almighty." In his last election "battle" he defeated his Republican adversary 16,938-915.

There are other ward bosses like Keane, and many are almost as powerful and rich as is the boss of the most autocratic of the fifty "banana republics" (wards). The ward bosses who are not lawyers can always sell insurance in their wards. George Dunne and John D'Arco have large insurance businesses. Dunne has the insurance on McCormick Place, Chicago's largest convention hall. He is also president of the Cook County Board and many large property owners feel better being protected by either his insurance or by the policies issued by another ward boss, P. J. Cullerton, the Cook County Assessor. John D'Arco sells his insurance in the Loop, the richest piece of real estate in the Midwest.

For the most part, the ward bosses reflect the ethnic make-up of each ward. The boss is responsible for the distribution of patronage and other services to the voters in his area. The amount of patronage each boss has at his disposal is directly proportional to the Democratic turnout of each election. Some writers claim that each Democratic committeeman has about 500 jobs at his disposal.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup>Lewis Chester et. al., An American Melodrama (New York: The Viking Press, 1969), p. 509.

This is not always the case; the stronger the ward, the more patronage and other material benefits available to the committeeman.<sup>32</sup> The use of generous portions of patronage allows the ward boss to take care of his followers. The ethnic make-up of all patronage employees is roughly proportional to each groups' voting strength.

The ward committeeman could have himself nominated and elected alderman if he chose to have that office. In the strong Democratic wards, the alderman and committeeman are partners and collaborators. If the alderman angers the committeeman or the administration, it is up to the committeeman to dump the alderman at the next election.<sup>33</sup> This actually happened in 1971, when Committeeman Vrdolyak of the 10th ward dumped Alderman Buchanan and substituted himself.

If an alderman became powerful enough to take over the ward from the committeeman, the machine could quickly regain control. Chairman Daley can destroy any ward organization by firing city employees sponsored by the new committeeman or withholding patronage in general. As a last resort, the Democratic state's attorney could start looking into "deals" the ward boss was in on. This happened to Frank Keenan, who once was Assessor for Cook County. He bucked Daley when Daley ran for mayor in 1955 and ended up in prison for income tax troubles.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>op. cit., (Royko), p. 61-62.

<sup>33</sup>op. cit., (Banfield and Meyerson), p. 69. Banfield describes the role of the ward boss quite well in Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest, Chapter 3.

<sup>34</sup>op. cit., (Royko), p. 94-95.

Although ward committeemen are important, the most important gear in the machine is the precinct captain. The precinct captain has been called the "cogwheel of democracy" and he or she truly is.<sup>35</sup>

The precinct captains in Cook County are all appointed by the committeeman. Each ward has between 40 and 60 precincts and each precinct has a Democratic captain. Each captain is responsible for 400-600 voters on election day. Precinct captains are not paid a salary for their jobs, but many expect to receive material gain,<sup>36</sup>

The precinct captain is the "salesman" who goes door to door selling his party's candidates. Vito Marzullo has 48 precinct captains in his ward, (25th). He claims he is the president of a sales company and his captains are the salesmen. Every one of Vito's captains has a patronage job. If the captain does not deliver his precinct, he loses his job, just like the president of any company would fire a non-producer.

The job of a precinct captain, then, is to get out the vote for his party's slate. The ward boss rates each precinct captain's performance according to how reliable party voting is in his precinct.<sup>37</sup> The good precinct captain spends a lot of time talking to his neighbors and doing little favors for them. He is the voter's

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<sup>35</sup>Some excellent background material about precinct captains is found in Sonya Forthall's Cogwheels of Democracy (New York: The William Frederick Press, 1946).

<sup>36</sup>Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 119.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 118.

direct link with government, the visible government that cares about the individual. He does favors everyday of the year and asks for only one thing in return--people's votes. He is the mayor of his precinct and goes to the weddings and birthday parties of the voters. He knows all the voters by name and what their feelings are. He is a friend to all. He puts in the fix, picks up the building permit, finds the summer job for the student.

A precinct captain is the bottom rung on the political ladder. Every ward boss got his start as a captain, even Richard J. Daley. Many captains look forward to the day when they can move up the ladder, run for an office, increase their power and position. Some are in politics for the fun of the game, but most are there to earn a living. This suggests that a ward boss will not long tolerate a captain who is issue-oriented. He wants the professional party man.

For the precinct captain and ward boss, the pay-off is election day. All political debts are called in at this time. Any citizen who had favors done for him will be expected to show his gratitude in return. When the polls open, at 6:00 A.M., the captain will be there making sure the election clerk and judges are ready. Rain or shine, the captain will be out hustling votes. A precinct captain does not want just anybody's vote, only the "sure" vote. When the polls close and the voting machines are tabulated, he reports to his ward committeeman. When the ward boss has all his totals, he trots down to the Sherman House Hotel, headquarters for

the Cook County Regular Democratic Central Committee. Next, each ward boss presents his totals to Chairman Daley, precinct by precinct.<sup>38</sup> This is where life or death decisions are made. Non-producing precinct captains lose their patronage jobs. If Chairman Daley is displeased, he will take it out right there on the ward committeeman. The lines of power, then, culminate in Chairman Daley, but the work gets done in the precincts. If Daley is the generalissimo, the precinct captains are top sergeants.



List of Ward Committeemen and the Positions They Hold in Government

<u>Ward No.</u>	<u>Committeeman</u>	<u>Position</u>
2	William Harvey	County Board of Commissioners
3	Ralph Metcalfe	Congressman
4	Claude Holman	Alderman
5	Marshall Korshak	City Collector
6	Eugene Sawyer	Alderman
7	James Ronan	Chairman, State Central Committee
8	John Stroger	County Board of Commissioners
10	Edward Vrdolyak	Alderman
11	Richard Daley	Mayor
12	Theodore A. Swinarski	State Senator
14	Edward M. Burke	Alderman
17	William Shannon	Alderman
19	Thomas Fitzpatrick	Alderman
20	Cecil Partee	State Senator (leader)
21	Bennett Stewart	Alderman
22	Lillian Piotrowski	County Board of Commissioners
23	Frank Kuta	Alderman
24	George Collins	Congressman
25	Vito Marzullo	Alderman
26	Mathew Bieszczat	County Board of Commissioners
27	Edward Quigley	City Sewer Director
29	Bernie Niestein	State Senator
31	Thomas Keane	Alderman
32	Dan Rostenkowski	Congressman
34	Wilson Frost	Alderman
35	John Marcin	City Clerk
37	Thomas Casey	Alderman
38	P. J. Cullerton	County Assessor
39	Anthony Laurino	Alderman
40	Seymour Simon	Alderman
41	Roman Pucinski	Congressman
42	George Dunne	County Board of Commissioners
43	Daniel O'Brien	State Senator
44	John Merlo	State Representative
45	Thomas Lyons	State Senator
46	Robert Cherry	State Senator
49	Neil Hartigan	Candidate Lt. Gov. Illinois
50	Jermone Huppert	County Board of Commissioners

## CHAPTER VI

### CHOOSING THE BOSS

"It's an honor I never dreamed would have been given to me."

Richard J. Daley after being informed he would be the organization's candidate for mayor in 1955.

How does an urban political machine choose and elect its boss? It does not. The boss just takes over the machine when he is strong enough to kick out the incumbent boss. That is how Richard J. Daley became chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee.<sup>39</sup>

Richard J. Daley's powerful position as boss of Chicago comes from two sources: 1) He is mayor of Chicago, and 2) He is chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee. Of the two positions, the second one is the more powerful and since Daley attained this plum first, it will be described.

The Cook County Central Committee is made up of the fifty Chicago ward committeemen and the thirty township committeemen in

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<sup>39</sup>The process which Daley used to get control of the organization is described by Bill Gleason in Daley of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971), and Mike Royko in Boss (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971). Edward Banfield gives a good review of the problem of picking a leader in Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), but Banfield leaves out much of the detail.

Cook County, elected by the voters in the Democratic Party primary held in presidential years. The committeemen choose their chairman, with each committeeman's vote weighted according to the number of Democratic votes cast in each district in the previous general election.<sup>40</sup> Inner-city ward committeemen deliver votes in such overwhelming fashion that they are able to dominate the chairmanship selection process.

This is the body which Richard J. Daley leads. How did he make it to the top of the highest political organization in the world? The answer to that is found in the man himself and his life. Edward Banfield lists several criteria which theoretically are used by the committeemen in choosing a leader.<sup>41</sup> They are:

1. Identification with the inner-city wards (he has to be Catholic, of course, and one whom ward politicians will feel is "their kind").
2. The leader's nationality must not disturb the balance between the Italians and Poles. This usually means he must be Irish.
3. He must know the inner-workings of the organization from top to bottom and be a man who is felt to have "earned" his promotion.
4. He must have a "clean" record and a creditable record of public service.
5. He must have demonstrated sufficient vigor, force, and shrewdness to maintain the organization and lead it to victory at the polls.

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<sup>40</sup>Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961), p. 249.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., (Banfield), p. 249.



Daley's rise to power was anything but jet-propelled. He had ambition, luck and was a shrewd political operator, but most of all he had the patience to wait until an opening appeared before he tried to move up the ladder. He wanted power, and took it whenever the opportunity arose.

Daley became a precinct captain at the age of twenty-one in the ward organization run by Big Joe McDonough. Two years later, in 1925, McDonough had Daley as the Secretary of the Chicago City Council. In 1939, McDonough was elected County Treasurer, and Daley moved into that office as an administrative assistant. In 1936, he was elected to the state general assembly; 1938 elected to the Illinois State Senate; 1949 he was Illinois State Director of Revenue; in 1950 he was elected Clerk of Cook County. From this position he launched his campaign for mayor in 1955. Meanwhile, in the party organization, Daley became committeeman for the Eleventh Ward Regular Democratic Organization in 1947; and Chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee in 1953.

Today, Daley holds two positions in the Democratic Party-- chairman and committeeman. He holds one position in government-- Mayor of Chicago. In his lifetime he went from the bottom to the top in both party and municipal government. That explains his campaign slogan, "Good government is good politics and good politics is good government." To him they are one and the same.

The committeemen run the party in their wards. They select who will run for alderman and many times the committeeman is the

alderman. Mayor Daley has been able to control the City Council because he is mayor. If any Chicago Democratic alderman gets out out of line, Daley goes through the ward committeeman to get even --this is very important to understand when studying the Chicago Machine. That is what the boss is: County Chairman. It is the seat of "clout" (raw political power, the ability to get things done) and patronage. Daley has had it from 1953 and it took him a long time to get it.

As far as I know or have been able to find out, no political scientist has ever attempted to describe or analyze how Richard J. Daley was able to get control of the machine and cement its various factions together.

The information here comes primarily from Royko and Gleason. Banfield seems to have ignored the story altogether, although he mentions it in passing in Political Influence.

The story begins following World War II. In the post-war years, political machines all over the country were falling apart. In Jersey City, Mayor Hague was almost finished. In Boston, Mayor Curley was going to prison. In Memphis, Boss Crump was losing control and in Chicago Ed Kelly was finishing his third term. Kelly was an old-fashioned political boss in every sense; He ruled Chicago with an iron hand and the consent of Pat Nash, party chairman until his death in 1943.

Jake Arvey was given control of the party. The ward bosses wanted someone who would give new life to the machine and they gave

the job to Arvey, a Jew from the West Side's 24th ward. (Jake Arvey is undoubtedly one of the most fascinating politicians alive today. He was still Democratic National Committeeman from Illinois in July, 1972, despite the fact that he now lives in Florida).<sup>42</sup>

Arvey decided that Kelly could not win re-election again, so he brought in Edward Kennelly, a political newcomer. Kennelly won big in 1947. Many members of the Central Committee did not like Kennelly winning at all; they resented that one of them, a ward boss, could have won. Furthermore, they did not like Arvey, a Jew, running a machine made up of Catholics. Most of these committeemen came from the South Side, and Arvey further angered them in 1948 by putting Adlai Stevenson and Paul Douglas on the ticket. There was a split in the organization between the "old style" and the "new breed." Daley was with the "new breed" although he still had ties with old-guard South Side Irish, because he was one of them by birth. Daley stayed with the organization and Arvey. Also in 1947, the Republicans elected 17 members to the City Council. One of the Democratic incumbents who lost was the Democratic committeeman from Daley's Eleventh Ward, Babe Connley. Daley took over as committeeman from Connley, who retired to Florida following his defeat. When the elections for the 1950 county offices came up, Daley wanted to go for President of the County Board. Instead, John Duffy, arch-rival from the South Side, got the nod. Daley was slated for clerk, leaving Governor Stevenson's cabinet to run for the patronage-filled office. Daley won the

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<sup>42</sup>Newsweek (Apr. 5, 1971), p. 12.

election for clerk and Duffy lost. The main reason for the defeats of Duffy and other Democratic hopefuls was Senator Estes Kefauver's crime investigating committee which discovered that Tubbo Gilbert, who was the organization's candidate for sheriff, was the "world's richest cop." Gilbert dragged the whole Democratic state ticket down with him, including Scott Lucas, a senator from downstate. Arvey was finished and he knew it. He quit.

Next, another county chairman had to be elected. Daley wanted it, but because of the split he knew he could not get it without an inner-party fight. Nobody wanted that after the 1950 disaster, so Joe Gill, a North Side ward boss from the 46th ward, was elected chairman until someone else could take over. In 1953, Daley decided he wanted two things: 1) Mayor of Chicago, and 2) Chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee. To get the first (mayor) he would have to get the second. In 1953, Joe Gill resigned and the split was as wide as ever. The South Side wanted their man, Clarence Wagner, as chairman. Wagner died in an accident and so Daley walked in unopposed. The machine has never regretted this, although some people believe that if Clarence Wagner had lived, Daley would have lost in committee. The people who believe this myth are all South Side Irish. The concensus of opinion was: nobody could have stopped Daley in 1953. He wanted power and went after it. He got it.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE ROLE OF PATRONAGE

"There will not be a single, solitary patronage employee in Chicago and there is not now."

Thomas E. Keane, 1971

If there is one secret ingredient which holds the machine together, that ingredient is patronage. Nobody knows how much patronage is available in Cook County except Chairman Daley. There have been guesses about the number of political jobs and the most quoted figure is about 35,000. Alderman Leon Despres, a Daley critic, argues that Daley controls between 30,000 and 35,000 jobs, including county and city jobs, not to mention the jobs available to him through industry.<sup>43</sup> Jake Arvey once estimated the figure at 40,000 jobs, but that was in 1950. Thomas Keane, official Daley spokesman in the City Council, claims there is no patronage in Chicago. But then, Keane is probably one of the last comedian-politician-lawyer-ward bosses left in Chicago. Adding in jobs in private industry and jobs available to the machine in independent agencies, like the Chicago Sanitary District, there are about 40,000-50,000 patronage jobs in Cook County.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Tolchin and Tolchin, To the Victors (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 44.

<sup>44</sup>A good study of political patronage in the United States and Chicago is found in Martin and Susan Tolchin's To the Victors (New York: Random House, 1971).



What role does patronage play in the machine? According to Jake Arvey, patronage is a "necessary evil" if you want strong organization, because the patronage system permits discipline, and without discipline, there is not party organization.<sup>45</sup> To people who do not understand the relationship between patronage and party discipline, a West Side ward boss offered the following explanation in a pre-election pep talk to his precinct captains: "You and I know what a political machine is: It's jobs and more jobs, and if you want to keep yours, you'd better come across with your precinct. The Central Committee expects me to carry the ward, and I expect you to land every voter in your precinct."<sup>46</sup> What the ward boss is saying is, if you do not carry your precinct, do not come to work.

Mayor Daley's army of precinct captains is a well-organized array of vote-producing talent whose loyalty is reinforced by the number of material rewards available. Daley keeps a lot of patronage positions for himself to distribute. His ward probably has more patronage employees living in it than any other in the city. He takes care of his family and friends--they all always have jobs. By decentralizing his patronage down to the ward bosses, he has secured party workers who owe him not only their personal jobs but their entire power base as well,<sup>47</sup> hence, the devotion of ward bosses to Chairman

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<sup>45</sup>op. cit., (Tolchin), p. 36.

<sup>46</sup>Sonya Forthal, Cogwheels of Democracy (New York: The William-frederick Press, 1946), p. 41.

<sup>47</sup>op. cit., (Tolchin and Tolchin), p. 37.



Daley. Daley has the power to withhold patronage from any committee-man he chooses. He can fire city employees from their jobs and wreck any ward organization. The committeemen know this, so they stay in line. When the Central Committee meets to plan strategy, the meetings usually reach the heights of a "Te Deum Laudamus." Everyone praises the chairman's leadership; City Council meetings are often the same kind.

On paper, Mayor Daley's patronage powers are small. The Christian Science Monitor says that 97% of all government jobs in the City of Chicago come under civil service protection.<sup>48</sup> This may be true, but if it is, then Daley has a method of working around civil service laws. Many of the patronage employees are "temporary employees." These "temporaries" can usually stay on the job as long as they can produce votes. Many times Republican officeholders have Democratic patronage jobs for themselves or members of their families. This produces some interesting results in interesting places. One example will suffice;

In 1961, the Republicans held a one-vote majority in the Illinois House of Representatives. Unknown to the Republican leadership, several "Republican" legislators held patronage jobs in the Sanitary District in Chicago, but in the Park District, the Board of Health, and the Sewer District have thousands of patronage positions open to the Trustees, always in the hands of the machine. Walter McAvay, a Republican, cast the vote that allowed Democrat Paul Powell to be elected Speaker of the House. Peter Miller,

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<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

another Republican, said he was too ill to vote. Later it was discovered that both McAvay and Miller both held Democratic patronage jobs in the Sanitary District.<sup>49</sup> To this day, there are still Republicans in the House that continue to hold Democratic patronage jobs. Miller still has his.

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<sup>49</sup>Ovid Demaris, Captive City (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969), p. 191.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE 1960 ELECTION

"They stole the White House."

Republican Party comment after the 1960 election in Chicago.

One of the most fascinating aspects of the machine is that it not only elects the mayor of Chicago, but also effects state and national politics. The presidential election of 1960 is a good example. There has been much conjecture about the role of the Chicago machine in electing John F. Kennedy president; it was John F. Kennedy who once said, "Daley's the ballgame."

The organization was in top form when election day rolled around in November of 1960. Besides electing a President, the voters of Cook County would be electing a governor and more important than that, a State's Attorney. For the Daley organization, a proper sense of priorities should be explained. The governor's office had over 10,000 patronage jobs under it, all held by Republicans. The State's Attorney from 1956 to 1960 was Benjamin A. Adamowski, a one-time Democratic power who switched parties after Daley defeated him in the mayorial primary of 1955. Adamowski was elected in the Eisenhower landslide of 1956 and was turning up scandal after scandal in Chicago. The police scandal of 1960 had

rocked the machine and now it was running scared. The State's Attorney's office had the power to investigate city hall, and this was proving to be embarrassing for the Democrats. They would go all out to defeat Adamowski. Electing Kennedy president would not be as important as defeating Adamowski or electing Otto Kerner governor. The reason for this is that the machine is interested primarily in its own existence, not in national affairs. If Kennedy and Kerner could win, the machine stood to get improved treatment from the state and national governments in the form of grants and other financial aids, but the real battle would be for State's Attorney.

To run for State's Attorney, Daley tapped Daniel P. Ward, who was Dean of the De Paul University's Law School and a political newcomer. The De Paul University Law School provides a great number of judges in Cook County because Richard J. Daley graduated from there himself.

Tuesday, November 8, 1960, was a damp and overcast day in Chicago. Early in the morning a phone call was placed from Sidney Holtzman<sup>50</sup> to John F. Kennedy. Holtzman reported that despite the weather, he expected a 93% voter turnout.<sup>51</sup> This would be a great bonus for Kennedy. The precinct captains were out early that

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<sup>50</sup>Chairman, Board of Election Commissioners.

<sup>51</sup>Theodore H. White, Making of a President, 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961), p. 22.

morning giving people rides to the polls and reminding the voters to stop by the polling places on their way to work. The patronage army was off work that day also because nobody expects the patronage worker to do anything on election day except get out the Democratic vote. In downstate Illinois, in places like Newton, Villa Grove, Salem and Anna, the Republican workers were marching to the polls. (Later after the 1960 census was studied, several downstate Republican county chairmen would be embarrassed when more votes than voters turned up in their counties. This same situation was discovered in 1970).

Meanwhile, in Chicago, in neighborhoods like Rogers Park, Gage Park and Hyde Park, Bronzeville, Douglas and Bridgeport, the ward bosses were checking the precincts, making sure the turnout was high. For on that day, while the nation wondered who would have the highest job in the country the following January, 35,000 patronage workers were working to have a job to go to on Wednesday. This was the real thing, what it's all about, and the precinct captains were fighting for their livelihoods, their jobs. In the ward offices, stacks of absentee ballots stood bundled up, already marked with one X on top of the Democratic column, ready to be thrown in if needed.<sup>52</sup> In the Second Ward, Congressman William Dawson sat listening to his precinct captains, not worried about his own re-election, which was taken for granted, but hearing how many lever A's were

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<sup>52</sup>Mike Royko, Boss (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971), p. 71.



being pulled--the straight party vote. He was not known as "the Congressman" in Chicago, but as "the MAN." The man who controlled five wards, the old-time ward heeler, back from Washington, performing his primary function, that of making sure the Blacks in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th and 20th wards voted "right."

On the North Side, in the heart of the Polish neighborhood, another congressman sat in his headquarters in the 32nd ward. He was very grim that day because the Polish voters were splitting their tickets to vote for Adamowski. Dan Rostenkowski was lucky--his precinct captains held the line. His ward would lose about 2300 votes to Adamowski. In the 35th ward, another Polish area, the City Clerk of Chicago was terrified. John Marcin, the ward committeeman, would have to explain to Chairman Daley that Adamowski was going to carry HIS ward by 5,000 votes. This was to hurt Kennedy also, because the Polish voters were in such a hurry to vote for one of their own that many pulled lever B--the whole Republican ticket. Kennedy carried the ward by only 5,500. Mayor Daley might not want City Clerk Marcin on the city ticket next time.

Professor Banfield once stated that next to the Negro, the Polish vote was the most "deliverable." This is not true, at least when there is a Polish name on the ballot. In 1960, the Polish vote split. Adamowski carried most of the Polish wards, while Nixon lost them.

By 8:00 p.m., most of the vote had been tallied. The major network news commentators were giving Illinois to Kennedy because of the early lead Kennedy piled up in Cook County. Most of the voting

in Chicago is done with machines, so the totals are known early. Chairman Daley announced a 300,000 Kennedy plurality by 9:00 p.m. Downstate takes most of the night to tally, because it is done on paper ballots. Chairman Daley knew this and so he planned accordingly.

At this time, Bobby Kennedy called Chairman Daley to check the news broadcast. Daley told him not to worry--Daley knew which of his precincts were out and which of theirs were out, and it was going to be all right.<sup>53</sup> Richard M. Nixon described what happened next in Six Crises.<sup>54</sup>

Len Hall came into the room at 2:30. Illinois, he reported, was getting closer. Kennedy's lead had been whittled down to 35,000, and UPI had reported that in each downstate precinct--with 1700 of them still to go--I had been gaining about 100 votes per precinct. At such a rate, Illinois could not yet be conceded to Kennedy. UPI also began to carry reports out of Chicago on alleged vote frauds in Cook County. Len commented, "The Democrats are holding back about 200 Cook County precincts, waiting to see what the count is downstate. We are trying to get them to throw them in but they refuse to do so. Unless they do, they will be able to count us out, no matter what happens downstate."

These were not just any 200 precincts. These were the true "machine" precincts in wards under bosses with names like Vito Marzullo, Thomas Keane, William Dawson, Claude Holman and Richard Daley. In these precincts there were 80,000 votes for Kennedy.

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<sup>53</sup>op. cit., (White), p. 35.

<sup>54</sup>Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (Boston: Doubleday, 1962), p. 422.

(It is interesting to note here that Vito Marzullo and Claude Holman have declared themselves and their wards for Richard Nixon because of George McGovern and his followers action at the 1972 Democratic National Convention).

It appeared that Daley waited until the whole state voting returns were tallied so he could see how many votes the machine needed in Chicago to elect the ticket. They swept all offices except one. Charles F. Carpentier was elected Secretary of State for the lone Republican victory. There was irony in the defeat of Adamowski. He had been an able State's Attorney and when Ward took over his office, he found evidence of some shady financial doings which were used against Adamowski when he ran for Mayor against the machine in 1963.<sup>55</sup>

In 1960, Richard Nixon carried 93 out of the state's 102 counties. He lost the election by 8,858 votes. If he had received 2 votes more in every precinct in Cook County, he would have carried Illinois. This is very good proof of the hypothesis that precinct captains win elections and the candidate with the best organization wins.

As soon as the total vote was counted and declared "official," the Republicans cried "foul." Adamowski lost by only 26,000 votes in the county, out of 2.4 million cast.<sup>56</sup> Charges and countercharges flew. The Republicans claimed that this time the machine had not only

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<sup>55</sup>Bill Gleason, Daley of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 338.

<sup>56</sup>Ovid Demaris, Captive City (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969), p. 193.

bamboozled Cook County, but the entire country. Democrats countered with "sour grapes" and "sore losers." The G.O.P. decided to prove their vote fraud claim by contesting the defeat of Adamowski. There would have to be a recount. The machine's man on the election board, Sidney Holtzman, said he would conduct the recount at a rate of one percent per day. The Republicans discovered Adamowski had been cheated out of 9,000 votes in precincts where paper ballots were still being used. Nixon was not gaining much in the recount, so the Republican National Committee dropped its charges. Adamowski could not pay the cost of the recount so he quit. In 1963 he lost to Daley for Mayor, and in 1970 Farky Cullerton defeated him for County Assessor.

The fraud was so obvious that charges were brought against 677 election officials and precinct captains. It was then that the machine pulled out the stops.

Daniel Ward disqualified himself from the investigation. Morris Wexler, a Democrat, was appointed special prosecutor by the Chief Justice of the criminal court. In 1960, Richard B. Austin was the Chief Justice, as in Richard B. Austin, Democratic candidate for governor in 1956, and Richard B. Austin, currently a federal judge, appointed by President Johnson.

Judge Thaddeus V. Adeski, the county judge, was also a candidate in the election so he disqualified himself. He in turn appointed a downstate judge, John Marshall Karns, to hear the cases. They had to appoint someone from out of town, so the voters would not

think the "fix" was in. Karns was a regular Democrat from East St. Louis and politely wiped out the charges on a technicality.<sup>57</sup>

Within forty-five days, everyone was in the clear and nobody went to jail. Such service in combat with Republicans does not go unrewarded by the machine. Today, Daniel Ward is on the Supreme Court of Illinois. Thaddeus Adesko is on the State Appeals Court and told this author that he never had a political sponsor for a judgeship. He then asked me if I would like to meet Vito Marzullo, who admitted sponsoring several attorneys for judgeships.

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., (Demaris), p. 193-194.



## CHAPTER IX

### VOTING BEHAVIOR

"The lower the average income and education in the ward, the greater control the machine has over it."

Professor Edward C. Banfield

The main concern of the Chicago machine is electing its own local candidates. This was partially substantiated when the recount of the 1960 election showed that the largest amount of vote fraud was directed against the incumbent Republican State's Attorney and not for the Democratic presidential candidate. Another interesting characteristic of the voters of Chicago is that they are Democrats with local candidates running in purely local elections, while these same voters show a trend towards Republicanism in national elections.

The methodology used to examine this hypothesis was to find areas in Chicago where the voters tended to split their tickets or show a higher percentage of Republican votes in a national election and compare them to a local election. The two elections used were the 1960 national election and the 1959 mayoral race. These two elections were used because there was little or no population change between them and the ethnic make-up of the wards were basically the same. The wards used in the

study sample were the 49th, 48th, 46th, 44th, 43rd, 1st, 11th, 26th, 27th and 42nd. These wards were picked because wards 49, 48, 46, 44 and 43 are considered "newspaper" wards. These are the middle-upper class residential areas of the city where the high-rise apartment dwellers live. They have been called "newspaper" wards by both Banfield and Gosnell because the voters in these areas tended to "split" their ticket the way Chicago newspapers advise. The 1st, 11th, 26th, 27th and 42nd wards are called the "river" wards because they border the Chicago River. These are working-class industrial areas for the most part and contain the Loop, skid-row, and lower-class working people. The 27th ward was 61.3% black in 1960, so the study contains mainly white voters. The "river" wards give the machine its greatest strength year after year.

	Democratic in 1960 National Election	Democratic in 1959 Local Election
River Wards	76.53	86.34
Newspaper Wards	54.68	69.53

Source: Tables from Chicago Municipal Reference Library.

From looking at the cell, it is easy to see that the "river" wards are heavily Democratic in any election. In 1959, when Daley ran against the Republican County Chairman, Tim Sheehan, the "river" wards were 86.34% Democratic. They dropped only 10% in 1960 to vote for John F. Kennedy. The "newspaper" wards barely went Democratic in 1960, the mean percentage being only 54.68. However, these same voters returned to the Democratic Party when Daley was running for re-election in 1959, giving the Democratic city ticket almost 70%

of the vote. That is a jump of 15%. The voter turnout was much higher in the 1960 national election, so the higher turnout favored the Republican Party. Even in the "river" wards the higher turnout favored the Republicans. A complete breakdown of the voter turnout follows:

	Ward	1960		1959	
		Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.
River Ward	1	16,984	4,182	16,227	2,450
	11	20,107	6,013	19,223	2,868
	26	15,406	4,055	14,469	2,049
	27	17,958	3,073	14,102	1,481
	42	16,406	10,542	13,661	3,481
Newspaper Ward	43	13,582	10,777	10,821	3,835
	44	15,784	14,179	11,379	4,869
	46	16,748	13,317	11,904	5,361
	48	16,352	14,756	11,571	5,892
	49	21,491	16,408	13,882	6,358

Source: Tables from Chicago Municipal Reference Library

It is interesting to note that in the "river" wards the total number of people voting Democratic remains somewhat static in both elections. There was only a slight increase in the number of Democratic votes cast in the national election. In the "newspaper" wards there is a marked increase in the total number of Democratic votes cast. There is even a more remarkable increase in the Republican totals. Part of the reason for this might be that many "educated" voters felt that nobody could stop Daley in 1959 but Nixon had a chance against Kennedy in 1960. What is even stranger is that nationally a higher turnout usually favors the Democratic Party, but this does not hold in Chicago among

predominantly white voters. In the "river" wards it is possible to "get away" with more vote fraud because in these areas there are not many Republican poll watchers. It is doubtful that the machine could steal that many votes away.

## CHAPTER X

### A LOOK AT THE FIRST WARD

"If we knew the root of all this, we'd know the answer to all the questions about the mysterious half-world of Chicago."

Chicago Daily News

For a close-up view of how a ward organization works at election time, let us look at the First Ward alderman's race in 1963. This election had all the makings of a political melodrama complete with one candidate endorsing his opponent, a pre-election favorite bowing out only five days before the polls opened, the regular Republican organization running one candidate against another put up by the Republican sheriff (Richard Oglivie), post-election threats, the intervention of the United States Attorney General, a write-in campaign for the winner and the surprise that the newly-elected alderman did not even live in the city. Add this to the disappearing typewriter, the strange platforms, the anti-campaign of one candidate (a relative of Sam Giancana), and one gets a view of the hidden wiring that connects the crime syndicate with the First Ward Organization. This was undoubtedly the strangest election in the history of Chicago, and probably the entire United States.

The story starts on November 29, 1962, while the incumbent alderman and First Ward Democratic Committeeman, John D'Arco, was

enjoying a late lunch with crime syndicate boss, Sam Giancana. An F.B.I. agent happened to walk in and shake hands with the startled John D'Arco, which presumably upset Giancana's digestion, for he quickly left the restaurant. D'Arco muttered something to the F.B.I. agent and the next day entered Mother Cabini Memorial Hospital suffering from a heart attack. Within a week D'Arco announced that he was too ill to run for his fourth term as alderman, but would stay on as First Ward Democratic committeeman.

With the aldermanic elections coming up in February, Giancana decided that his nephew-in-law, Anthony DeTolve, would be the next alderman. He reportedly issued his orders through Pat Marcy, secretary of the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization.<sup>58</sup> The Organization was already familiar with DeTolve, who had been re-elected to a third term in the State Senate five weeks earlier. Political insiders figured that sooner or later DeTolve would make the big move from the State Senate to the City Council because he succeeded John D'Arco in the Senate in 1951 and had an outstanding record in the state legislature--he voted against every single crime control bill before him. He was now ready to make his bid for a seat once held by such distinguished aldermen as "Bathhouse" John Coughlin and "Ninky Dink" Kenna.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup>John H. Fenton, Midwest Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1967), p. 204, Mike Royko, Boss (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1971), p. 66, Ovid Demaris, Captive City (New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1969), p. 55, Bill Gleason, Daley of Chicago (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 248.

<sup>59</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 204.



To the organization, DeTolve was a perfect choice. He was a proven vote-getter. To the local residents, he was a home-grown product of the large Italian community in the First Ward. To the crime syndicate, he was a member of Sam Giancana's family. A look at his voting record produced some strange findings:

1. He was the lone member of a twenty-eight man legislative committee to oppose a bill outlawing the manufacture of slot machines.<sup>60</sup>
2. DeTolve suggested that the "stool pigeon" be named the official state bird.<sup>61</sup>
3. He was very effective in delaying action on anti-crime bills.<sup>62</sup>

His courage to protect the status-quo was rewarded and he filed for election to the non-partisan office. Mayor Daley was questioned by newspaper reporters on DeTolve's candidacy and he replied that it was none of his business--the voters of the First Ward would decide the issue and who was he to question the wisdom of the voters?<sup>63</sup> He would not be held responsible for the endorsements of the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization. Meanwhile, DeTolve launched himself into the campaign with blinding speed--he disappeared.

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<sup>60</sup> op. cit., (Demaris), p. 190.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., op. cit., (Fenton), p. 204.

<sup>62</sup> op. cit., (Demaris), p. 190

<sup>63</sup> op. cit., (Fenton), p. 205.

Even though the office of alderman is non-partisan by definition, few people have ever been elected to that position without the support of one of the two major political parties. The political parties supply the money to run the campaign and doorbell pushers to get out the voters. DeTolve had the support of the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization and that is all that is needed to win in the First Ward.

Meanwhile, the Republicans put up their token aldermanic candidate. (Sometimes the Republican Organization does not even go through the motions of contesting the Democratic candidate for the First Ward seat. In 1971, the Democratic incumbent, Fred Roti, ran unopposed.) The G.O.P. standard-bearer was Thomas J. Curran, a former member of the West Side Bloc in the state legislature, who had voted to legalize bingo "for the benefit of the poor people."<sup>64</sup> In order to insure DeTolve's election, Curran pleaded illness and politely refrained from any active campaigning. Curran did manage, however, to campaign harder than DeTolve. Curran made exactly one speech during the entire campaign.<sup>65</sup> DeTolve's only public statement came when he decided to withdraw from the race and keep his old seat in the Illinois State Senate. DeTolve would have been elected except for the fact that the press could never find him. He just disappeared. One newsman, Sam Blair, tried in vain to

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<sup>64</sup>op. cit., (Demaris), p. 155.

<sup>65</sup>"Reporter," p. 42, David Kenny, Basic Illinois Government: A Systematic Explanation (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), p. 252.

interview DeTolve without success. DeTolve said, "I'm busy, all the time busy." From then on he became known as Anthony J. (Busy-Busy) DeTolve and was mercilessly lampooned by the Chicago press.<sup>66</sup> Four weeks before the election, Sam Blair reported that DeTolve had not made a single speech, put up a single poster, had no meetings with ward workers or talked to the press.

Ovid Demaris describes how Mayor Daley handled the problem of DeTolve's candidacy.

Interviewed by the "Tribune" on the reports that DeTolve's selection had been dictated by crime syndicate leaders, Mayor Daley insisted it was a matter for the voters to decide. Asked if following Blair's articles he had "second thoughts on DeTolve," Daley said, "The greatest Democracy is when the people have the right to select their leaders. This is the right of the people, I repeat. I talked to Mrs. D'Arco and she said that because of his health he would not run." Did the mayor understand that D'Arco would remain as the ward's Democratic committeeman? "Yes, I haven't heard otherwise. Is there anything wrong with DeTolve? Has he a record? He is a member of the Illinois Senate." Would DeTolve remain on the staff of the City Corporation Council's office where he had been a patronage payroller for more than twelve years? "Yes," said Daley, "I assume that, like every other city employee, he's doing a great job." (Busy-Busy was busily "moonlighting" as a lawyer, a violation for which he had been briefly fired from that same office in 1951.)

The reporters brought out the fact that DeTolve had won renown in Springfield for his proficiency at playing the piccolo. The newspapers seemed to enjoy DeTolve's antics in Springfield, but decided that his buffoonery would not do in the Chicago City Council, so they set out after him.

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<sup>66</sup>op. cit., (Kenny), p. 252.

Finally, both Mayor Daley and Giancana tossed DeTolve the black-ball. The Mayor might have been looking towards his own re-election, coming up in April. Giancana did not need anymore public speculation about the First Ward tie-ups with the crime syndicate. The publicity-shy syndicate was trying to "cool-it," so with fifty-five hours to go before the polls were scheduled to open, DeTolve announced his withdrawal before over two hundred precinct workers at a downtown hotel ward meeting. The party workers were shocked, for three days before the election, they were left without a candidate. DeTolve withdrew, so he claimed, to protect his party from further embarrassment. What he did not say, though, was he had been dumped.<sup>67</sup>

Next the First Ward Regular Democrats were informed that their eleventh-hour candidate would be Michael Fio Rito, a fifty-three year old lawyer and decorated war veteran who was a political unknown. John D'Arco quickly endorsed the candidate and the First Ward precinct captains approved, despite the fact none of the precinct captains knew which precinct Fio Rito lived in. This was to be a grave error, as later events will show.

There was another eleventh-hour candidate also. For many years state and local Republican leaders had been trying to "purge" the First Ward of its Republican leadership represented by its G.O.P. committeeman, Peter Granata. Granata, known as the "Dean of the Illinois House" for his long term of service in the State General

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<sup>67</sup> op. cit., (Fenton), p. 252.

Assembly, is an accomplished West Side blocater in Springfield. (This purge of the West Side bloc became a reality in the at-large election of 1964 for the lower house of the State General Assembly.) As a late entry into the race, Richard Ogilvie, the Republican Sheriff of Cook County, backed Florence Scala, a housewife who led an unsuccessful neighborhood revolt against the Chicago branch of the University of Illinois being placed in the First Ward.

So now there were three candidates running for the job of alderman of the First Ward: Thomas Curran, backed by the regular Republican Organization; Mrs. Scala, backed by Sheriff Ogilvie; and Mike Fio Rito, backed by John D'Arco and the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization. It would seem that if the Republicans could have got together, they might have had a chance to capture the First Ward seat in the City Council, but they were too busy knifing each other to put up a united front against the machine. Commenting on the line-up of potential hopefuls in the First Ward race, the "Chicago Daily News" concluded: "If we knew the root of all this, we'd know the answer to all the questions about the mysterious half-world of Chicago."<sup>68</sup>

Fio Rito's candidacy presented some serious problems. First of all, it would have to be a write-in campaign, because with the election coming in a few days, the ballots had already been printed up. This problem was compounded by the fact that many citizens of

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<sup>68</sup>"Reporter," p. 42., op. cit. (Demaris), p. 157.



the ward did not know how to read or write or even speak English.<sup>69</sup> John Fenton says that "The staggering dimension of the job that faced the First Ward organization may be appreciated from the fact that fifty-five of the sixty precincts had voting machines and the voter was forbidden to use stickers or stamps with Fio Rito's name on them. Consequently, to write in his name on the machine, the voter had to push back the slide above the aldermanic candidate. On the paper ballots in the other five precincts, the voter had to write Fio Rito's name and address on the aldermanic ballot and place a box with an "X" on it before the name."<sup>70</sup> This was not all because DeTolve's name was still listed along with Curran's and Cgilvie was mounting a write-in campaign for Florence Scala. The machine had its back to the wall, or so it seemed.

The second major problem, which was not brought out until after the election, was that Fio Rito did not even live in the City of Chicago, but in Wilmette, a suburban community outside the city limits. The organization had a contingency plan for this though; Fio Rito would claim he "had established a legal residence more than a year before at an Uncle's home on the North West Side, which satisfied the requirement of a year's residence in the city, and had moved into the Conrad Hilton the previous month, which gave him the necessary thirty days in the ward."<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 252, op. cit., (Demaris), p. 157.

<sup>70</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 205-26.

<sup>71</sup>op. cit., (Demaris), p. 157.

Those were the two major problems confronting the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization. D'Arco and Fio Rito had a few things going for them, however. Number one, the Republican Organization was bending over backwards to make sure that the non-partisan seat on the Board of Aldermen went to anybody except one of their own. This collusion between the two political parties was made "unusually visible" when Peter Granata issued a statement which said, "I don't know much about Fio Rito, but I've met him and he is a high-class fellow."<sup>72</sup> This was not the first time a Republican Ward Committeeman endorsed a candidate put up by the Democratic Ward Committeeman, nor would it be the last. Granata was a typical "tame," Republican leader in a Democratic stronghold. D'Arco gives Granata some patronage and does a few small favors for his G.O.P. counterpart, otherwise Granata would have nothing. Number two, the Chicago Election Board handed down a ruling that if the write-in name sounded like that of any candidate, it was acceptable and any spelling of the name, in any language, would suffice. This caused some comic relief when the votes were tallied, because Chinese spellings of "Michael Fio Rito" were almost impossible to read, but they were accepted anyway. Number three, the Chicago City Council would seat any Democratic alderman, no matter how he was elected, since the machine controlled forty-seven of the fifty aldermanic seats at that time. With all of these safeguards, it appeared that the machine would not lose.

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<sup>72</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 206.

There were fifty-five hours to go before the polls opened when the precinct captains spread out like army ants in the ward, teaching the illiterates how to write "Michael Fio Rito," or something that sounded like "Michael Fio Rito" on the ballots. These "magnanimous foot soldiers," as DeTolve called the ward workers, instructed in Spanish, Italian, Greek, Chinese--even English, how to write in Fio Rito's name.<sup>73</sup>

The challenge was virtually unprecedented in American politics, and the precinct captains rose to the occasion. The prospects of victory for their eleventh-hour candidate inspired them to even greater efforts. The mayor of Chinatown, Jimmy Wong, led the write-in drive in the Chinese section of the First Ward. He was president of the On Leong Association, which carried a lot of "clout" in Chinatown.

Fio Rito's campaign slogan was "Make the First Ward Chicago's Number One Ward in Civic, Social, and Cultural Improvement."<sup>74</sup> John Fenton describes one veteran precinct captain as being excited over the fact that the cultural platform would bring out voters in the swank high-rise hotels on Michigan Avenue and these "educated" voters would not have to be taught how to write in "Michael Fio Rito."<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>"Reporter," p. 42, op. cit., (Demaris), p. 157.

<sup>74</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 206.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., p. 206.

On February 28, 1963, the voters of the First Ward went to the polls. Sheriff Oglivie had poll watchers and voters in many precincts, but the organization was ready for this roadblock also. An "amazing number" of voters asked for and received pink affidavit forms at the polling places and declared themselves illiterate. This was the catch: a Republican and Democratic election "judge" was allowed to go inside the voting booth and "assist" the illiterate in exercising his constitutional right. Florence Scala had not had enough time to register any of her supporters as judges, since she did not declare her candidacy until after DeTolve's unexpected withdrawal. The "Republican judges" were working with Democrats, so this neat little trick allowed all the "illiterate" voters to vote for Fio Rito.<sup>76</sup>

The final totals, which surprised nobody, were 9304 write-in votes for Fio Rito, 1320 for Michael Curran, the Regular Republican backed by Sheriff Oglivie, and 390 for Anthony "Busy-Busy" DeTolve.<sup>77</sup> It appeared that the battle was over and everybody could go home happy. Mayor Daley attended the First Ward victory party and told the precinct captains, "You were given a write-in candidate only fifty-five hours before the election and I'm sure you edified the entire city by your work in seeing that he was elected."<sup>78</sup>

Immediately following the election, in typical Chicago fashion, the cry of "foul" was screamed by Mrs. Scala and Sheriff Oglivie. The

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<sup>76</sup>"Reporter," p. 42.

<sup>77</sup>op. cit., (Fenton), p. 207.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 207.

whole city was impressed by the education programs that the First Ward precinct captains came up with which enabled illiterates to write in Fio Rito's name. The common joke in the First Ward following the election was the only words many people ever learned how to write in their entire lives were "Michael Fio Rito." There is little doubt that if professional educators adopted the methods of the precinct captains, illiteracy could be wiped out in a few days throughout the world.

Mrs. Scala later revealed in confidence to a high official that following her election defeat D'Arco's brother-in-law told her, "You know, if anybody really had a chance they would wind up in a sewer. We knew you could not win and we let you have what you got."<sup>79</sup>

Sheriff Oglivie called for a grand jury investigation of the new alderman's registration credentials when obvious alterations of the Conrad Hilton Hotel's affidavit of permanent residents who were eligible to vote were discovered. It seemed that some unsportsmanlike citizen revealed that the names of Fio Rito and his wife had been added at the end of the permanent resident list, out of alphabetical order and a different typewriter had been used to add Fio Rito's name.<sup>80</sup> There was no way in which the machine could escape the publicity. The State's Attorney at that time was Daniel P. Ward, who knew something about vote fraud claims and election gimmicks himself. He was elected in questionable fashion in 1960. Since

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<sup>79</sup>op. cit., (Demaris), p. 157.

<sup>80</sup>"Reporter," p. 42.



Oglivie made his charge public, Ward had to act. Oglivie charged, "...there is no more flagrant example of crime syndicate interference with the free election processes than exists in the First Ward, and this goes for both parties."<sup>81</sup>

With this kind of heat and public pressure mounting, Ward began his investigation into the election of Fio Rito. Political insiders knew that the probe would be a whitewash, but the city held its breath as Ward announced his findings: 1) A different typewriter had indeed been used to add the names of Fio Rito and his wife to the affidavit which was filed with the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners on January 28 listing the permanent residents of the Hilton. 2) An election clerk admitted making a "human error" by signing the Fio Rito's registration records after the legal deadline. 3) Fio Rito had registered in the First Ward through an "irregularity". Ward concluded that he could not determine whether a crime had been committed and so the case was closed after one week, as far as he was concerned.<sup>82</sup>

The case was far from over as far as Oglivie was concerned, however. The Sheriff started a search for the missing typewriter and it was found in--the offices of the Election Board. The head of the Election Board claimed he was powerless to act against the clerk who admitted "human error" in the registration procedure because it was up to the City Council as a legislative body to decide

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<sup>81</sup>op. cit., (Demaris), p. 57, "Reporter," p. 42.

<sup>82</sup>"Reporter," p. 42, op. cit., (Demaris), 157-158, op. cit., (Fenton), p. 207.

whether Fio Rito should be seated. The "non-partisan" election board was in the hands of the machine, and any other judgment that they could have made would have been surprising indeed.<sup>83</sup>

The next development in this fascinating election came when Michael Fio Rito was sworn in as alderman on April 17. John Hoellen, a North Side Republican alderman, challenged Fio Rito's residence qualifications again. This time the Democratic majority led by Alderman Thomas Keane, shouted him down. It looked like Fio Rito was home free and he would have been except that United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy suddenly became interested in the election. This interest stems from the fact that Kennedy was then in the process of investigating the crime syndicate in Chicago. Kennedy decided that John D'Arco and the rest of the First Ward Regular Democratic Organization were somehow tied up with the mob. As a matter of fact, D'Arco has never bothered to deny this charge by Kennedy because, as Mike Rcyko states, "A denial would sound strained in light of his (D'Arco's) bad habit of being seen with Mafia bosses in public."<sup>84</sup>

The mounting pressure was finally too much for the mayor, so he acted. Wearing his hat as Chairman of the Cook County Regular Democratic Central Committee, he told John D'Arco, as committeeman from the First Ward, that Fio Rito would publically swear he met all the legal qualifications for the office or he would have to

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<sup>83</sup>"Reporter," p. 42.

<sup>84</sup>op. cit., (Royko), p. 65.

resign. Mayor Daley could do this because as party chairman he alone controlled all the patronage that went to the First Ward Organization. The Mayor also did not want any "heat" from Robert F. Kennedy, whose brother was President John F. Kennedy. Fio Rito resigned, and all the hard work of the "educators" in the First Ward went down the drain. The machine escaped just in time because many First Ward politicians, including John D'Arco and Pat Marcy, were in the process of being subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury investigating crime.<sup>85</sup>

The First Ward was now without an alderman, but the story has a typical Chicago ending. Donald Parrillo was selected to represent the First Ward in the City Council. In any other city, with any other political organization, a "reform" candidate would have been in order, but not Chicago. The story behind Parrillo is another political melodrama. His father, William Parrillo, had been the Republican committeeman from the Twenty-fifth Ward and a West Side blocater himself while in the State General Assembly. Donald Parrillo was a Democrat and a political unknown whose experiences had been in banking. When the aldermanic elections of 1967 rolled around, Parrillo was opposed by Dallas O. Littrell. This time the machine was not taking any chances on a repeat of 1963. Littrell's workers were threatened until he withdrew from the race, so Parrillo ran unopposed.<sup>86</sup> Parrillo did not stay in

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<sup>85</sup>op. cit., (Demaris), p. 160.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 160.

the City Council long, however; he resigned saying that being the First Ward's alderman "was ruining my reputation."<sup>87</sup>

When attempting to analyze the position taken by the mayor regarding the crime syndicate's existence in politics, one has to be very careful to remember that the mob had been involved in the political arena a long time before Daley ever thought of becoming mayor. It is very difficult for a political scientist to prove or discover facts concerning this relationship when the local and federal law enforcement agencies cannot. There is much conjecture around Chicago concerning this point. Yet, if it is taken for granted by the citizenry of Chicago that certain politicians are political appendages of the Mafia, why are these men still elected to office? the answer to that question is made up of several elements.

This writer believes that the crime syndicate is tolerated in politics to a limited extent (just as are the politicians) because it is concerned with the "status quo" regarding the majority of the people of Cook County. It appears that the crime syndicate chieftans are looked upon as just another interest group by the current leadership in Cook County. The syndicate provides many services that people want which are not provided by legal means. Gambling, prostitution, and money lending are all services which the crime syndicate provides the citizens. If the citizens do not want any of these services, they do not have to use them. If there was not a need by the general

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<sup>87</sup>op. cit., (Royko), p. 66.

public for these illegal services there would be no crime syndicate. It appears Mayor Daley recognizes this problem and allows the syndicate to have a few of its members, or fringe members, to represent them in the various governmental bodies in society. The question has often been raised about whether or not the mayor has political powers sufficient to politically disable the syndicate. There are times, such as in the 1963 aldermanic race in the First Ward, when he retreated back to the democratic position that the people have the constitutional right to elect their own leaders. It is hard to find fault with this logic, but the Chicago system of government does not always do this. The party leaders, like Mayor Daley, have a lot to say about who the people will select. This is true not only in Chicago but in other parts of the country as well. Daniel Walker's victory in the gubernatorial primary in 1972 was the first time in many, many years that the party leaders, both Democrat and Republican, did not hand-pick the primary winner. It is interesting to note, however, that Dan Walker, the "people's choice" will have to rely heavily on regular organization support for victory in November.

The election of Michael Fio Rito in the First Ward is not unique for Chicago, but it is safe to say that an election like that will never happen again as long as Daley remains in power. It caused too much embarrassment to himself and the party.

According to Ovid Demaris, a secret federal report lists the following politicians as mob-connected: 1) Frank Annunzio, Democratic congressman from the congressional district which includes the First



Ward; 2) Anthony Girolami, Twenty-eighth Ward Democratic committeeman; 3) Vito Marzullo, Twenty-fifth Ward Democratic alderman and committeeman; 4) Robert L. Massey, Thirty-sixth Ward Democratic committeeman, elected to the Circuit Court in 1964; 5) Bernard Neistein, Twenty-ninth Ward Democratic committeeman and state senator; 6) Anthony DeTolve, a former state senator and nephew-in-law of Sam Giancana; 7) Peter C. Granata, First Ward Republican committeeman and state legislator; 8) and Elmer Conti, a former mayor of Elmwood Park, Illinois.<sup>88</sup> It is not known how much influence the syndicate controls through these men, but the evidence tends to support the hypothesis that the Mafia has a place in the political arena in Cook County.

No one should have been surprised by the write-in election of Fio Rito. One of the main features of Cook County and Chicago politics is that elections are still won by precinct captains. There is no doubt that a certain amount of vote fraud took place, but Fio Rito would have won anyway. It would have been impossible, under the watchful eye of Sheriff Ogilvie and his army of poll watchers to steal over nine thousand votes. The citizens of the First Ward can be counted on to vote for the Democratic candidates by about a four to one majority no matter who is running or for what office. The First is one of the most "deliverable" wards of machine, on the state, county, or national levels. The voting statistics of 1960 lend credence to this hypothesis:

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<sup>88</sup> op. cit., (Demaris), p. 148.

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1960

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<u>For President</u>	<u>For Governor</u>	<u>For State's Attorney</u>
<u>Dem.</u> Kennedy 16984	<u>Dem.</u> Kerner 15916	<u>Dem.</u> Ward 16423
<u>Rep.</u> Nixon 4182	<u>Rep.</u> Stratton 3948	<u>Rep.</u> Adamowski 4260

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Source: Figures from Chicago Municipal Reference Library

Since 1960 was a presidential election year, the voter turnout was higher than in the 1963 aldermanic election or the 1959 race for mayor of Chicago.

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1959

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<u>For Mayor</u>	
<u>Dem.</u>	Daley 16227
<u>Rep.</u>	Sheenan 2450

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Source: Figures from Chicago Municipal Reference Library

The Democratic turnout was only slightly higher in the presidential year than in 1959. The figures show that the increase in voter turnout favors the Republican party, but only in presidential years in which voters interest is greater. In the 1960 election, Chicago had a remarkable voter turnout of 90%. In the 1963 aldermanic elections, however, the turnout was only 45% of the registered voters. The residents of the high-rise hotels vote in the presidential elections, and this explains part of the increase in the G.O.P. totals.

Mike Royko claims that the syndicate "owns" the First Ward and John D'Arco just "watches" it for Sam Giancana.<sup>89</sup> This relationship between D'Arco and Giancana became visible again when Giancana's son-in-law, Anthony Tisci, appeared on the congressional payroll of Congressman Roland Libonati and later on the congressional payroll of Libonati's successor in Congress, Frank Annunzio. Tisci was making \$19,000 per year for Congressman Annunzio until 1965 when the Justice Department hauled father-in-law Giancana before a federal grand jury investigating organized crime in Chicago. Anthony Tisci was also subpoenaed and took the fifth amendment on all of his appearances. After that show, the Better Government Association asked the Chicago Bar Association for Tisci's disbarment. Earlier, Annunzio said he would not fire Tisci but Tisci resigned because of a "heart ailment."<sup>90</sup> There is little doubt that Tisci's heart started going bad when Mayor Daley became furious over the publicity given Tisci's position on the staff of Frank Annunzio, who up until that time had a "clean" record, at least by Chicago standards.

Frank Annunzio got his start during the 1940's when he was secretary-treasurer of the state C.I.O.'s Political Action Committee and worked hard to elect Adlai Stevenson as governor in 1948. In 1949, Stevenson appointed Annunzio as director of the Illinois Department of Labor, a post he held until March of 1952 when he resigned under fire because of his post as First Ward Committeeman

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<sup>89</sup> op. cit., (Royko), p. 66.

<sup>90</sup> op. cit., (Demaris), p. 151.

which he had held since 1948. Annunzio went into hiding until 1964, when he became the Democratic candidate for Congress from the Seventh District and polled 82% of the vote against his Republican opponent.<sup>91</sup> In 1972, Annunzio will be running for Roman Pucinski's old congressional seat, and George Collins, black committeeman from the Twenty-fourth Ward will try to take his place in Congress, from the Seventh Congressional District. It appears as though the syndicate has one congressman to do its bidding in Washington.

This seemingly easy decision for Chairman Daley to make was not without its exciting moments. When the congressional districts were re-drawn, a power surplus resulted in Annunzio's district. George Collins, who was an incumbent congressman from another district, found himself thrown in with Annunzio. Collins is black, Annunzio is white and the district about evenly divided between the two races. To the unknowing, it looked like there might be a heated primary race for the party nod on March 21, 1972. It would pit black against white and revive old race issues. The blacks in Chicago deserved another black congressman, besides Ralph Metcalfe, because they make up a third of the city's population. This fact was brought before the Mayor by newspaper articles and black leaders. If Annunzio was allowed to hold onto his seat, Collins would have to be dumped. That would look bad for Daley, Chicago, and the Black community. Daley could not take the heat and decided to dump Frank Annunzio in favor of George Collins. The whites in the district howled,

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 142.

Vito Marzullo, committeeman and alderman from the Twenty-fifth Ward, which was in the district, threatened to resign if Annunzio was dumped. This became public. When the situation gets tough, the tough get going and Daley had a plan. Roman Pucinski would be given the nod for the United States Senate, Annunzio would move into that district and run for that seat. Everybody was happy, even Vito Marzullo. Pucinski, who had had some close calls in his recent congressional outings had earned a shot at the senate seat held by Charles Percy. Pucinski had been one of the leading liberals in the House under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, voting down the line on all civil rights bills and other Great Society programs. The late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. must have overlooked this fact when he decided to stage open housing marches within Pucinski's Northwest Side backlash district. The voters in this area were quite disturbed by this action which took place in the summer of 1966, right before the fall elections. Since they could not get at King too well, they decided against the advice of the precinct captains to vote Republican. Pucinski's opponent in that election was Republican Alderman John J. Hoellen, who ran a campaign slightly to the right of Barry Goldwater. This fact was not lost to the voters, and Pucinski barely made it back to Washington with a new outlook on liberal causes, such as busing. One indirect victim of open housing in marches staged by King was Senator Paul Douglas who was also running for re-election. Daley thought he had Dr. King all figured out when he said, "King came here to hurt Douglas because Rockefeller



gave him dough, that's why he came here, to try and get Douglas beaten."<sup>35</sup> As strange as it seems, that is just what happened. Douglas lost to Percy by a narrow margin. The proof of Daley's hypothesis is found in the vote returns for Cook County in 1966. The machine faltered and it was the liberals who lost their seats.

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<sup>92</sup>op. cit., (Royko), p. 147.

## CHAPTER XI

### CONCLUSION

From the evidence presented, it appears that the Chicago Democratic machine will remain in existence as long as the voters want it. There is no doubt that the machine is what is governing the city today. As long as it has patronage, it will have discipline; as long as there is discipline, there will be organization; and as long as there is organization, it will continue to win elections.

There are several general conclusions which can be drawn from the paper:

1. The machine is based on material rewards for its members.
2. The voters of Chicago are more inclined to consider themselves as Democrats in local elections, but show a definite trend toward the Republican party in national elections.
3. The examination of the machine shows that elections are won in Chicago by precinct captains, not issues.
4. There is evidence of collusion between members of the crime syndicate and various machine politicians.

This description of the machine is by no means complete. There is room for further research in several areas. The position of the Black machine leaders was not covered in this paper and their

role is increasingly important in Chicago politics. The relationship between the machine and state government is a prime area for a scholarly study. There is not enough data available on these two subjects to include them in this thesis.

#### POSTSCRIPT: THE FUTURE OF THE MACHINE

In the future, of course, the machine might fall apart, but nobody is going to deny that the machine can get the job done. The critics of its policies place moral value judgments on its methods, which I tried not to do. The machine has scored some of its greatest victories in the past four years. Daley has given it excellent leadership in the 1950's and 1960's. It remains to be seen what he can do in the 1970's.

Robert K. Merton has described the value of the machine as a social agent. It is possible that the future of urban centers will be found in "new style" political machines. Political machines have effectively governed large cities in the past, and maybe they will be needed to govern them in the future.

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