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# The Processes of Social and Political Power: The Case of the IERAC in Ecuador

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**THE PROCESSES OF SOCIAL  
AND POLITICAL POWER  
THE CASE OF THE IERAC  
IN ECUADOR**

PROCESSES OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER

THE CASE OF IERAC IN ECUADOR

(TITLE)

BY

ERNESTO ARROBA

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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING  
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SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  
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Ernesto Arroba  
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April 20, 1972

TO MY PARENTS

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Undoubtedly, there can be no excuse for possible faults in the study other than my own human imperfection, and nobody except myself can be held accountable for any deficiencies that could be found.

---

\* Gladys Crespo, Teolinda de Ortiz, Leonor Roldán de Tinoco, Julio Jaramillo, Kleber Chiriboga, Vicente Cordero, Melba i Lira Piedra, Fulton Rodriguez, José Pereira i Jorge Castro.

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## 1. RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY

### 1. SIGNIFICANCE

The study of political power in rural Ecuador is a neglected area. Occasionally there have been some studies of agricultural communities (Leonard, 1947; Beals, 1966), but generally they do not deal with the problems of political power and land redistribution. At the present, eight years after the establishment of the Ecuadorean Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization<sup>1</sup>, there is no scientific analysis of the impact of the IERAC in the agrarian structure of Ecuador. Besides, there is a tendency among some social analysts (Herrera: 1966; Dorselaer and Gregory: 1962) to think of Ecuador as made up of the urban centers, Quito and Guayaquil. This type of analysis disregards nearly 70% of the national population who live in the rural areas, who produce almost 95% of Ecuador's foreign exchange (Watkins: 1967). The conflicts and problems of rural Ecuador largely constitute the conflicts and problems of the country itself.

It is the responsibility of the social scientist to bring to the attention of the citizenry those areas of the social system that constitute an axis of conflict and a potential hindrance for effective functioning of society. It is also the responsibility of the social scientist to suggest

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<sup>1</sup>From here on, the letters IERAC will be used to refer to the Ecuadorean Institute of Agrarian Reform and Colonization.

alternative means that could enhance the overall welfare of the total community while producing the least harmful effects.

The manifest function of the IERAC is to redistribute land, while the latent function is to redress the demands of the rural workers, provide them with land ownership and thus prevent a violent revolution that could very well put an end to the indigenous forms of capitalist activities prevalent in Ecuador. It has been observed that during the years, the IERAC permitted coercive methods and the use of force to implement certain decisions. Through deliberate impediments to legal actions it has become an instrument of the government machinery in allowing the spread of violence in the countryside. This has resulted in widespread apathy towards social justice and in alienation amongst the rural workers. It seems paradoxical that the IERAC has not hesitated to the use of the same violent mechanisms that its very existence was supposed to prevent. The fact that the IERAC has in no meaningful sense contributed to the development of a rational approach to resolving the conflict in rural Ecuador, may be a measure of its own lack of effective organization. Nevertheless, it seems that such actions of the IERAC may heighten the possibility of a violent reaction on the part of the campesinos in general. However, for the time being, it seems that the IERAC acts as a palliative for the campe-

sinos' demands for land. The IERAC administrators generally offer their assistance and cooperation to turn the land over to the campesinos, but that fact almost never occurs, and if it does, it is still subject to legal appeal by the owner of the land.

## 2. THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE STUDY

A society that applies selective mechanisms of power to enforce decisions or that establishes differential punishment for similar violations to different groups, is a highly stratified society, in which a relatively modified "apartheid" system exists. In Ecuador, the existencia of selective enforcement processes could conceivable produce a society strongly separated between those who feel the use of violence persistently used against them, and those others who feel the use of non-violent mechanisms of authority consistently used towards them. To the extent that group differences are not only emphasized but used as a criteria for determining patterns of behavior, The possibility of reaching high scores of social disorganization becomes not only a threat but a reality.

The study of political power in rural Ecuador is an analysis of the operation of the redistribution of land by the IERAC. Such a study can yield information regarding the existing alienation and confidence that social groups have towards the political system and legal mechanisms which are introduced in order to bring change.

In as far as the degree of discontent may indicate, the government could eliminate the IERAC, replace it with a more flexible apparatus or reorganize it with more diversified personnel. The study can be of significant use for economic analyst and businessmen in as far as patterns of production and consumption are concerned. The greater the confidence a social group has in the society, the greater the levels of participation that can be expected regarding practices of consumption, savings, financing, agricultural production and transportation. With low confidence the possibility of low participation increases and low participation implies the decay of the prevailing order to the extent that there is an increase in the existence of anomic or alienated man. The political choices open to the members of society are (a) high confidence and (b) low confidence. The prevalence of one or the other must be evaluated in terms of the socio-economic political conditions in which such situations are found. It is interesting to note that various social research studies demonstrate (Coch, French, 1948: 512-532; Mann, Indik, Vroom: 20; Kahn, Kotz, 1960: 554-570 Rodriguez: 1961) that there is positive association between high confidence-participation and high productivity and satisfaction. The objective of this study is to test the applicability of such a theoretical framework in rural Ecuador in addition to analyzing the most

important feature of the rural social structure.

## II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

### 1. THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

The 1960's were marked by an effort of dramatic reforms in Latin America. The Kennedy Administration in the United States contributed to the nascence of this spirit with the introduction of the Alliance for Progress Program. The Cuban Revolution, according to some observers (Goldenberg: 1961; Carroll: 1961; Castro: 1960; Guevara: 1966; Barraclough: 1968), had set the mood for radical alterations in the structure of society throughout Latin America. Originally the main directions of change occurred at the purely political and military levels (Brana:1964). Castro's desire to export the revolution to the rest of Latin America, was a definitive objective of the Cuban Government.<sup>2</sup> The hemispheric nations deal with the Cuban issue at the diplomatic level by severing relations with Cuba and passing a variety of resolutions prohibiting

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<sup>2</sup> Although Richard Fagen and Theodore Draper have both presented positions suggesting the "uniqueness" of the Cuban Revolution (See Fagen's "Revolution for Internal Consumption Only" in Trans-Action, April 1969, Vol.6 No 6. pp.10-15, and Draper's Castroism: Theory and Practice, Praeger, 1966), there are obvious general similarities for underdeveloped nations, particularly those in Latin America. To this effect it is worthwhile to read Celsø Furtado, Obstacles to Development in Latin America, Doubleday Co 1970 and Andre G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Monthly Review Press, 1970, for an introduction.



commerce with, and travel to, Cuba.<sup>3</sup> There were, however, certain events at the local level that diplomatic actions could not necessarily curb, such as the beginning of relatively wide discussions on the causes and consequences of the Cuban Revolution, general political unrest manifested in acute political instability, mass demonstrations, industrial strikes and takeovers of land by the campesinos.<sup>4</sup>

## 2. THE ECUADOREAN CASE

Although the de-facto tactics used in demand for change generally received public rejection, the motives or forces that were behind the discontent of large social sectors were recognized as real problems that needed radical modifications (Velasco Ibarra: 1968). Many Latin American governments began an attempt to deal as effectively as perceived necessary with the issues at hand. The governments of some countries have been slow in producing changes, and some, such as Paraguay's, for example, have barely attempted at all to change their social structure. The government of Ecuador during

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<sup>3</sup> For a relatively factual narrative account of the events, see "Cuba, the U.S. and Russia: 1960-1963," Facts on File, Inc. 1964.

<sup>4</sup> For a discussion of the impact of the Revolution in Latin America, see Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolution and Latin America, Praeger, 1965, particularly the last chapter, Ernest Feder, The Rape of the Peasantry, Doubleday 1971, pp. 180-183 and Ernesto Arroba, Causes and Consequences of the Cuban Revolution, unpublished paper available on request.

the 60's moved forward, elaborating legislation that would provide the legal framework for social changes. Nevertheless, political instability during the decade of the 60's can help to explain why more adequate progress, in terms of consistency and adequacy of programs, had not been made. Six administrations were in control of the country during the decade with an average of twenty months for each one. However, the Junta Militar presided by Admiral Castro Jijón, stayed in office from 1963 to 1967, when massive antigovernment protest forced the Junta to turn over political control of Ecuador to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Junta Militar pursued a progressive policy, assisted by the U.S. Advisors, in running the country.<sup>5</sup> A significant attempt to change the social structure of the rural economy was the Ley de Reforma Agraria i Colonización.

### 3. THE LAW OF AGRARIAN REFORM

The Agrarian Reform law stated that "considering the importance of agriculture in the life of society, the vices of the agrarian structure have shaped the social institutions of the country" (IERAC: 3)

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<sup>5</sup> Better known in Spanish as "Desarrollista". See Agustín Cueva, "La Dominación Política en el Ecuador". Ed. Olmedo 1972 and Jaime Galarza El Festín del Petróleo. Editora El Sol 1972.

The law also made clear that the "holding of land is the basis of an institutional system that produces extreme inequalities in the distribution of income." (IERAC:9). The law incorporated in its text the motion that "property rights must be recognized only when the land is being economically exploited and serving a social function". (IERAC: 20). The law gave the government the right to expropriate land holdings that did not meet the two above mentioned requisities.<sup>6</sup> For the purposes of enforcing the law, the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria i Colonización (IERAC), was created on the 11th of July, 1964. Many amendments have been passed, none really altering the fundamental spirit of the law. During the administration of Velasco Ibarra, in November 1970, a new law was passed granting the Instituto de Reforma Agraria the right to redistribute the land so that the campesinos who work the land on a rented basis from its landlord, and who had been in possession of the land for the last three years, could become agricultural entrepreneurs in their own right.

#### 4. THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

The spirit of the law reflects a desire to change

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<sup>6</sup> For the full text of the law see Decreto No. 1480 published by the IERAC in book form with reforms made until 1967.



the mode of agricultural production that comes in sharp conflict with the existing means of agricultural production. In Ecuador, ten per cent of the population owned ninety per cent of the agricultural productive land. However, sixty-five per cent of the population live in rural areas and only thirty-five per cent in urban centers. Of all the economically active population, 58.4 per cent, 53.2 per cent are engaged in agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing. (Desal: 1967). The figure could be largely increased if we consider the many facets of underemployment in the rural region. Percentages can only give us the numerical dimension of the situation without suggesting the most serious aspect. The existing mode of agricultural production is the product of centuries of established tradition. It is beyond the scope of this study to survey the historical developments that have permitted this situation to develop (Weeks; 1947: 153-68; Mariu; 1969: 317-343). However, it is important to become familiar with four predominant forms of agricultural production. Thomas Carroll ( 1961: 161-170) has divided the agrarian structure of Latin America into (1) Latifundios, (2) Minifundios, (3) Comunidades and (4) Colonias. This classification is particularly descriptive of the Ecuadorean case.

#### 4.1 The Latifundio

The Latifundio category covers the large estates, usually divided in haciendas and plantations. A hacienda is a traditional agricultural enterprise where social relations are maintained at the personal level but with moral ties of domination between owner and worker. The plantation is a mechanized agricultural enterprise with impersonal social relations and with functional ties of domination between owner and worker. The relationship between manager (owner) and worker is one determined by some form of cash wage or payment to the worker in the case of the plantation or from payment in the form of crops, goods or services in the case of the hacienda. In Ecuador there are 705 units, which constitute 37 per cent of the farm land.

#### 4.2 The Minifundio

The minifundio category is made up of small farms, usually the result of holdings subdivided as a result of inheritance or population pressures (Lehmann, 1968, p.682). Some of these workers are migrants who have occupied the land and hold it without property title. Minifundios are at the margin of the market and lack institutional services, schools, roads, hospitals, etc. In Ecuador, 90 per cent of the farms are units of less than 20 hectares or minifundios.

### 4.3 The Community

The third category of community is primarily an Indian collective system of agricultural production. Comunidades are, for the most part, geographically and culturally isolated from the social and economic mainstream of the country. In Ecuador, with nearly 40 per cent of the population coming from Indian stock, considerable effort has been given to the goal of transforming them into modern cooperatives.

### 4.4 The Colono

The colono system applies to the small fraction of workers in agriculture that are paid on a cash basis. The most important characteristic of this type of tenure system is the transiency of the workers (Schulman, 1955, pp.34-40). This system is often combined with the latifundio and in Ecuador has the special name of huasipungo. The agrarian structure of Ecuador has usually rendered units of production that are either too large or too small, indiguenous forms of ownership and occupancy, communities that are tradition-bound and inflexible, farm labor conditions that are not many steps removed from serfdom, and land that is not freely exchanged but hoarded and unavailable to the small cultivator.

The agrarian structure of Ecuador is based upon

large states, which is an indicator of the degree to which the ownership and control of the land is concentrated in a few hands. The major features of a rural social system grounded on large estates have been summed up by T. Lynn Smith (1967: 16) (1) high degree of social stratification, (2) little vertical mobility, (3) caste is an important factor, (4) low average intelligence, (5) restricted development of personality, (6) "order-obey" personal relations, (7) routine all important, (8) manual labor is degrading, (9) low levels and standards of living, and (10) little incentive to work and save. Some of the characteristics suggested by Lynn Smith do not pertain directly to this study, but they are helpful in providing an overall description of the social relations in the rural areas. The nature of interpersonal relations, described by Smith as "order-obey" for the case of Ecuador, is the concern of this study. Authoritarian relationships produce a feeling of powerlessness and lack of control often referred to as alienation. The groups commonly alienated are those affected by the unilateral decisions made by those groups in power.<sup>7</sup> In a sense, the agricultural workers have no

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<sup>7</sup> The treatment of the concept of alienation in this context is found in S. Melman, Decision-Making and Productivity, Oxford 1958, p.18. Melman applies the concept to describe the separation between decision-making and implementation of decisions. He argues that

control over the IERAC's decisions.

##### 5. THE CATALYTIC ROLE OF THE IERAC IN THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE

The establishment of the IERAC was designed to change the structure of the rural social system in Ecuador as perscribed by law. The law was expected to eliminate certain features of (a) the organization of agricultural production, and (b) the condition of agricultural workers. The law was also expected to set in motion certain mechanisms for change over time. Table 1 (page 14) shows with relative accuracy the catalytic role of the IERAC. The IERAC would break up the feudal system still in existence for most of rural Ecuador and promote the development and growth of capitalist forms of agricultural production. The IERAC has used primarily two methods in its attempt to alter the agrarian structure. First, it has broken up latifundios and distributed the land to the workers. Second, it has selected land presently unused and given it to agricultural workers. An additional method was followed for a trial period and as a pilot project, trying

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the absence of participation in decision making produces alienation among the workers. For an extensive discussion of Melman's use of alienation, see "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological Review, December 1959, 24, pp. 783-791, M. Seeman and Arthur Neal "Organizations and Powerlessness: a test of the mediation analysis," American Sociological Review, April 1964, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 216-226. The notion of powerlessness and alienation can be dated back to Marx's Manuscripts (1968: 112) of 1844 where the worker appears "separated" from the means of production over which he has no control.



Table 1

Features of "Feudalism" and "Capitalism"

Feudalism

Capitalism

A. ORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Large size of landholdings<br>(latifundio)                              | 1. Landholdings smaller  |
| 2. Extensive agriculture   | 2. Intensive agriculture   |
| 3. Low and inefficient land<br>use   | 3. Greater, more efficient<br>land use   |
| 4. Migrant and slash-burn<br>agriculture                                   | 4. Crop rotation   |
| 5. Land-exhaustive and eroding<br>techniques                               | 5. Land conservation and<br>maintenance  |
| 6. Extensive livestock grazing   | 6. Intensive livestock<br>raising  |
| 7. Capital-poor agriculture;<br>no fertilizer, machinery,<br>or investment | 7. Capital-intensive agri-<br>culture; fertilizer,<br>machinery, investment.     |
| 8. Self-sufficiency sector;<br>subsistence                                 | 8. Specialization, outside<br>dependency, commercializa-<br>tion, no subsistence |
| 9. Non-rational mentality  | 9. Rational, capitalist<br>mentality   |

B. CONDITION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| 1. Serfdom   | 1. Proletarianization                          |
| 2. Tenancy, sharecropping,<br>unpaid labor: payment in<br>kind and in tokens | 2. Contract work with pay<br>in money wages    |
| 3. Unfree existence even behind<br>money-payment facade                      | 3. A certain liberty                           |
| 4. Low income  | 4. Labor more expensive;<br>workers less poor? |
| 5. Workers tied to farm  | 5. Expulsion of agricultural<br>workers        |

C. CHANGES OVER TIME

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. Continuous de-feudalization                  | 1. Continuous capitalization  |
| 2. Total disappearance of<br>feudal agriculture | 2. Total proletarianization<br>of agriculture; irre-<br>versibility of defeudaliza-<br>tion process |
| 3. Unresponsiveness to demand<br>changes        | 3. Responsiveness to changes<br>in market demand  |

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Source: from Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Under-  
development in Latin America. Monthly Review Press 1969  
p. 230.

to convert comunidades into full economic cooperatives. The IERAC has had severe difficulties in using all methods mentioned, and at present it has dropped the cooperative development in cases such as Tenguel, a coastal cooperative where the ideas of Palacios-Saenz were being implemented under the initiative of former IERAC's director, Juan Casals.<sup>8</sup> This study is particularly concerned with the first method. In the process of implementing the changes desired by the government, the IERAC has used a variety of mechanisms that range from the exercise of legitimate authority to the use of force. To the extent that the processes of power employed the use or the threat of violence to enforce decisions, implies that some party will be adversely affected.

#### 6. THE LAW TO ABOLISH FEUDAL WORK PATTERNS IN AGRICULTURE

The law to abolish feudal work patterns in rural Ecuador was used as a relevant criteria to determine the job of the IERAC as that of redistributing land. Prior to this law, land reform has been almost insignificant. The emphasis was placed in colonization of new land rather

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<sup>8</sup> Carlos Palacios Saenz has advanced the notion of "Agrarian Cities" which basically consists of communal arrangements run for profit by the workers themselves.

than in redistributing existing productive land.<sup>9</sup> To expropriate the land, the law established a legal process which became slow and complicated after the rules for expropriations were published. For a period of more than a year, in the office of Guayaquil, 23 cases had been studied, but only in two instances, decisions made were to the mutual convenience of both sides. For the remaining cases, no final solution was in perspective, particularly considering that they were subject to appeal to higher authority. For the purpose of this study, the Agrarian Reform has not been completed in these haciendas, since, with the exception of the two, they were all in legal process to review the expropriation. The legal process has produced an expensive waste of human resources in time and energy and no expropriation has come to the entire satisfaction of either of the parties.

This law was the preamble to a more important law that eliminated the legal process to expropriate land. According to the new law, decisions were made on a purely administrative criteria. This law was, however,

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<sup>9</sup> Colonization is a mechanism used by the government to retain large estate holding by the dominant groups and prevent full distribution of land to the campesinos. Therefore, the lack of alteration of property relations prevents any real change in the distribution of power.



applicable to only those lands that raised rice crops, that is, low areas close to rivers, channels or other water supplies.

### III. THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. The study assumes that "the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests" (Bottomore and Rabel, 1956, p. 223) and that "the state represents the interests of the propertied classes and serves as their coercive instrument" (Zeitlin, 1967: 106).

2. The study assumes that the IERAC as a government agency is controlled "through committees and associations" of the landowners, or through the provision of "candidates for the positions of authority" (Domhoff, 1959:107-110) or through the constant advise of businessmen prior to action, (Hunter, 1953:81). Intermediate and administrative positions are not subject to this control. Only the executive positions of the organization.

3. The study assumes that the most important axis of conflict in the rural social system of Ecuador is determined by the pattern of property ownership of the land prevailing at the time, (Clark, 1969:3-10; Smith, 1969:47-66). This study assumes that since every social system is an organization of power, (Hawley, 1963:422),

a "system cannot function effectively if it must devote too much of its resources to problems of integration and conflict management", (Gamson, 1969:13).

4. The study assumes that power, as an attribute of the system, (Parsons, 1960:220-221), is generated by a group's "perception of the efficiency of the political system in achieving collective goals and it is biased against a group in handling conflicts of interests". As a consequence, political alienation develops. Alienation means "exclusion from (political) participation", (Hajda, 1961:758).<sup>10</sup>

#### IV. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

##### 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENCE AND ALIENATION

Every political system established its own mechanisms to provide participation in the decision-making process on the part of its members. As pointed out earlier this choice constitutes a political decision that has to be made by the members of the system. The IERAC constitutes part of the mechanisms established in Ecuador to provide a feeling of participation in decision-

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<sup>10</sup> Although Hajda views alienation as some form of social inadjustment, Hajda's notion can be incorporated here to mean that there are social mechanisms that produce the exclusion from participation in the decisions which affect oneself. This exclusion from participation is what Seeman calls "Powerlessness". ( 1963:270 ; 1966:353-367 ).

making on the part of the campesinos and agricultural workers in General . The function of the IERAC is generally manifested through the amount of land it has redistributed. Consequently, the mechanics of redistribution constitute a focal point of concern of the study. Redistribution is accomplished through expropriation. The job of carrying out the Agrarian Reform actually means buying the land of the landowner and selling it to the campesinos. However, before buying the land, it is necessary to report on the physical existence of the land according to the description, the technical recommendation of the agronomer, the legal statement of the lawyer regarding the petition's legality, etc. Governments who have tried to give participation to the campesinos have backed the IERAC financially, those that did not care have reduced funds. Apparently, the governments have thought that through rapid land reform they could possibly gain the support of the campesinos (as in the fifth administration of Velasco Ibarra) or lose the support of the landowners (as in the administration of Otto Arosemena) and have guided their policy towards the IERAC accordingly.

On the other hand, those governments who have not backed the IERAC, have forgotten the dramatic need of a rapid Agrarian Reform in Ecuador and produce a feeling

of low confidence in the socio-political structure of Ecuador. When the political mechanisms established to manage grievances are not functioning to a minimum of the expectations of those in trouble, confidence in those mechanisms decays and alternate mechanisms to achieve their ends are sought in the light of this reasoning. Therefore, it seems coherent to argue that the IERAC does not meet the campesino's need for land. Hence, it appears that the IERAC functions to increase frustration and the possibility of promoting non-socially sanctioned socio-political behavior such as physical violence against (1) persons, and (2) non-persons. The basic question can be stated in terms of the feasibility of an Agrarian Reform, almost solely based on expropriation, to alleviate the social needs of the campesinos and thus prevent non-socially sanctioned behavior. Because we deal with expropriation as an independent variable in the research design, it is considered an operationalized criteria for the broader concept of Agrarian Reform. Subsequently we would consider expecting different degrees of confidence between campesinos benefited with expropriation. Although the study is not designed to impute causation between expropriation and confidence, the explanation of varia-

tions in confidence would lead us to explore alternate possible variables with clarifying power.

## 2. THE NOTION OF RURAL SOCIAL JUSTICE

If land redistribution has been sought as an expressive objective of the government, the assumption implicit in that objective is that it benefits either the productive capacity of the country or what is more important for this study, the growth and stability of social justice in the rural areas, (Barracclough 1970: 78). The notion of social justice is explicitly stated in the law that created the IERAC and assumes that the most appropriate means of establishing justice is giving the land to those who work on it. It also strengthens the idea that ownership rights do not constitute an omnimode power that allows the owner to do with the land as he wishes without regard for the conditions of the workers or the purposes for which the land is to be used.

## 3. UNIDIMENSIONALITY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

While the law recognizes the social function of private property in rural Ecuador, it also implies that private property is the answer to the problem of land distribution. The possibility of expropriating from some people to give property to others is accepted as the allpervasive feature of Agrarian Reform. Implicit

in this notion seems to be the idea that agricultural workers in Ecuador are anxious to gain property of the land where they work and that such gain is the objective and purpose of land reform. When the efficacy of the Agrarian Reform was questioned, the IERAC distributed the number of HTS <sup>11</sup> they had re-distributed from one owner to another in the lapse of one, two or X amount of years. Data regarding this material is divided by region, by provinces, or by parishes. To establish the criteria of efficiency in the IERAC, they have divided the process of redistribution in various levels and steps. According to this sequence the IERAC can say that so many thousand of cases are at point A, point B, point C, etc. But both concepts of efficiency and effectiveness are in relation with the basic idea of expropriation, which is the way the IERAC actually means and understand for Agrarian Reform when they refer to their job of land reform.

#### 4. THE MULTIDIMENSIONALITY OF CONFIDENCE

The concept of confidence is relatively abstract and needs of social indicators to be apprehended in a meaningful manner. The abstract idea can only be observed through tangible and measurable social facts that can be considered operational definitions of the concept of confidence. For the purpose of understanding confidence, a series of dimensions have been constructed. Confidence

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<sup>11</sup> HTS is a hectarea which is equal to one block.



is expressed through social behavior showing patterns of conduct which indicate a positive attitude towards the maintenance and approved change of the established socio-economic and political system. There are certain adscribed variables that do not reflect behavior, but that condition behavioral expectations. This is the case of four variables, age, land holding size, family size and educational level. Generally, as one reaches maturity, one develops confidence in the socio-political system, as well as when one increases the level of educational attainment. For the case of the campesinos in Ecuador, an important fixed dimension is the size of the land holding of the campesino. It can be reasonably expected that those perspective owners of relatively large areas will display considerably greater confidence in the legal mechanics for change. Family size is also important because the bigger the family is, the higher the confidence expected.

In addition to these four adscribed dimensions, four behavioral dimensions can be enumerated. The frequency of their ocurrence could be interpreted as a social indicator of confidence in the socio-political and economic system prevailing in Ecuador. Accordingly, those campesinos integrated in some organization or any type of association designed for political or social purposes will have higher confidence in the system than

one who remains relatively isolated. Secondly, the ownership of any means of transportation, as well as the most frequent and common means of transportation used, is another important indicator of high confidence level. The more mechanical the transportation, the greater the confidence and the greater the ownership of the means of transportation, the greater the confidence that will be displayed towards the existing apparatus for change. Thirdly, financial practices also reflect the confidence in the financial institutions that mobilize the monetary resources. This measurement of economic confidence is an integral part of the complete notion of confidence in the developing form of capitalism that Ecuador is undergoing. Fourthly, the use of fertilizers and machines reflect another dimension of confidence in the technical and scientific areas of the social system. Those campesinos with some technical knowledge can be expected to be more confident in the finding of a solution to their immediate or future problems. This technical confidence is part of the wider concept of confidence in the established mechanics of the prevailing system. ( See Table 2)



Table 2

DIMENSIONS OF CONFIDENCE

Adscribed	1. The older persons the more confident
	2. The more educated persons the more confident
	3. The larger the holding the higher confidence
	4. The bigger the family the higher confidence
Behavioral	1. Membership in organization more confidence
	2. Use of mechanical transportation (and ownership) more confidence
	3. The use of banking the more confidence
	4. The more technical the more confidence

5. THE MANAGERIAL ROLE OF THE IERAC

The role of the IERAC could be understood when it is assumed that expropriation is expected to increase the confidence of those benefited by the action in the legal and political apparatus sponsored by the government. [aston (1965:273) has suggested that trust (confidence) constitutes a "reservoir of good will that helps members (of a group) to accept or tolerate decisions to which they are opposed or see as damaging to their wants."<sup>12</sup> The function of the IERAC actually is that of palliative or sedative designed to provide a balance between conflicting forces in rural Ecuador. William Gamson (1969: 59) has suggested that "a well functioning political system is characterized by moderate confidence on the average" and that "the average trust(confidence)

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<sup>12</sup> Trust is defined by the American College Dictionary (1959:1302) as "confident expectation of something". It is accepted as a synonymous of confidence, and it is in the same context that it is used here.

can be regarded as a measure of the efficiency of the system". The problem to be studied can be satisfactorily stated in the form of a hypothesis exploring the nature of the relationship between expropriation and confidence. This actually means that those campesinos that have received land on the basis of the law of land redistribution, are expected to be more confident than those that have not. Confident campesinos mean that they are strong defendants of the system since they are beneficiaries of it. A graphic outline may clarify the various hypotheses suggested.

#### GRAPHIC OUTLINE OF PROPOSITION

1. 1 Campesinos benefited with expropriation are less likely than campesinos not benefited with expropriation to engage in non-socially sanctioned behavior (violence). Because

1.2 Those campesinos benefited with land expropriation tend to have higher scores for confidence in the established socio-political mechanisms for change than those campesinos not yet benefited with land expropriation. Whereas

1. 3 Those campesinos not benefited with expropriated land will tend to have lower scores for confidence in the socio-political mechanisms for change than the benefited group.

## V. METHODOLOGY

### 1. SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION IN THE IERAC

Systematic observation of field situations consists essentially of watching, but not participating in, the events under study. (Thomlinson 1969:45). The first three months of the data collection process were spent in the IERAC Branch Office of Guayaquil, which is one of the five branch offices that head the rural districts of Agrarian Reform. The purpose was to observe how events arise, how they are handled and how the job of land reform is conducted. The head of the branch office had given permission for conducting the study. He offered his personal cooperation and ordered that access to the files of the office be given to the author. The author was also allowed to be present at all times anywhere in the office. No situation or problem was to be concealed to the researcher and the cooperation of the rest of the personnel was authorized by the head of the branch office. He also allowed the author to join him and other administrators in many field trips for inspections of conflict areas. Generally, field trips would take a full day and in some cases part of the night. The author engaged in more than ten trips to various agricultural areas.

Field observation was divided in two main subject areas. Firstly, the internal structure of the IERAC ,

the management of the agency, relationships of authority, composition of the IERAC and procedural efficiency. An emphasis was placed in observing eventual differences on the part of the IERAC administrators when they were dealing with campesinos and landowners. Information was also collected regarding all requests for police or military assistance made by the IERAC, in terms of attempting to determine whose interests were protected. Secondly, the observation focused on the campesino situation itself, the problems and difficulties they encountered from the moment they came to the IERAC and on to their needs for agricultural, financial and social assistance. For transportation we often used mules, horses, canoes, cars and frequently covered long distances by foot. In many cases, a combination of all these means of transportation was present. The receptions the campesinos gave us were varied. On a certain occasion, we were invited for lunch where we were given a very hospitable attention. On another occasion, we were mistrusted to the extent that no one would accept even a coke from us. Most of the time, however, they acted angrily and showed concern and disgust about the delay in the processing of their applications for land appropriations. In spite of this, there always was a display of cordiality and social acceptance. The emphasis of observation was placed on their attitudes and in their customs and beliefs, with the intention of

formulating a questionnaire that would measure the required data.

## 2. SAMPLING TECHNIQUES

Within six months of the passing of the law to abolish feudal production patterns in rice in 1971, more than thirty haciendas have been expropriated. These haciendas are all located in the coastal area and particularly in the wide region known as the River Guayas basin. From this population, one hacienda was selected at random, picking one from a box where all names were placed. This hacienda is a sample of those areas where expropriation has been administered. The group of campesinos of this hacienda is expected to score high confidence. There are fourteen campesinos in the experimental group.

For control, a group of agricultural workers that had not received expropriated land was selected. Certainly those benefited with expropriation are an elite and constitute no more than five per cent of the total campesinos that have filled out forms requesting expropriation. From the large files of the IERAC, those belonging to province El Oro were again randomly selected. The size of the population of this group was equivalent to the size of the population of the experimental group. The sample obtained here had agricultural workers from

a radius of nearly eighty miles, living in almost un-accessible areas. The sample was selected from El Oro because this province has had very few conflicts for land redistribution. Almost all the land is intensively cultivated through capital-intensive techniques. El Oro produces bananas. El Oro provides a social setting where most campesinos are agricultural workers because they are paid in cash for their services in the handling of bananas. In this context, it nourishes the concept of an agricultural proletariat. The rural conflicts are produced, not precisely at the level of land redistribution, but at the level of workers employed, (Albuja:133; Hurtado: 142-146). The nature of agrarian conflict presented here follows the same pattern presented in rural areas with industrial or semi-industrial structures. However, the law is not designed to consider agrarian conflicts between contract workers and landowners. On this basis, the sample from El Oro is truly representative since it is an area where the idea of Agrarian Reform, in terms of expropriation, is considered unnecessary and actually illegal. Because the law provides for expropriation only when (1) feudal relations of production remain in agriculture, and (2) the land is not fully utilized. It does, therefore, permit private agricultural enterprises that hire labor to cultivate the land in the frame work of a capitalist venture.



### 3. INSTRUMENTS OF MEASUREMENT

The measurement of the dependent variable required the use of Srole's Alienation and Olsen's Normlessness scales. They were both translated to Spanish and three modifications were made to suit the needs. Based on pilot studies, changes were made throughout a one year period to make its context and meaning understandable to campesinos and agricultural workers who had almost no formal education and bare knowledge of reading and writing skills. The modified translation of the questionnaire was given to the IERAC administrators who worked as "promotores" of Agrarian Reform, directly with campesinos and agricultural workers. Their comments and suggestions served as a basis for a second translation and modification. The second translation was given to students in a sociology class three months later and their suggestions served as a basis for a third modification. Finally, the discussion with the interviewers and the explanation of terms and meanings determined further changes in the questionnaire. This was necessitated for easy comprehension. Considering that the instruments were originally developed to be administered under completely different circumstances, the changes made included localisms that make them useful only in Ecuador and specifically for the agricultural workers. (See Appendix A)

Besides the two scales, a modified Bogardus Social

Distance Scale was used. The question asked was "In the decisions taken by the IERAC, that have in one way violated your rights, what have you done?".

- 1 - Nothing
- 2 - Written to the governor or president
- 3 - Formed a group and written to the officials
- 4 - Try to verbally convince the IERAC of the inconvenience of the decision
- 5 - Offer a bribe to the IERAC administrators
- 6 - Block a road, cut-off water supply, some action displaying violence towards non-persons
- 7 - Fought against, fired upon or killed IERAC administrators or police or military forces or landowners.
- 8 - Other

The same question was also formulated in a hypothetical manner such as "what would you do if a decision taken by the IERAC violated your rights?". This question was designed to contrast with the previous one in an effort to predict future trends among the agricultural workers.

During the interview, additional data was gathered, expecting that it could have some yet unpredicted relationship between the variables which were being tested. Data on age, size of the family, education, extension of land cultivated, use of banking facilities, agricultural machinery and fertilizers, were determined, increasing the quantity of material available for further analysis.



#### 4. INTERVIEWING TECHNIQUES

The questionnaire was used for the first time in the offices of the IERAC. The author interviewed five campesinos present and administered the questionnaire, primarily for the purposes of further clarification. Those campesinos had none of them received land. After this pre-testing, a number of items were eliminated. Sex, religion and acquaintance with the IERAC were eliminated. All the sample units were males, a situation which rendered the question on sex, redundant. Race proved another ambiguous question. The campesinos were not aware of their race and this question seemed confusing. For all practical purposes, they could be considered mestizo. I had never found a black or a white campesino during the period of investigation. Almost all were mixed people. They are called mestizo, and more than half of Ecuador's population could be considered mestizo, for any practical purposes. In this case, race seemed an irrelevant item in the questionnaire. Religion was another unnecessary question. Almost all Ecuadorians are catholics in name. Asking them was almost disturbing. They are not practicing catholics. A male would rarely think of going to mass or been seen in mass. However, if he is pressured into a denomination, he would admit his catholicism because in his mind religion is associated with catholicism. In some agricultural areas, religion is

practiced through elementary forms such as superstitious beliefs in miracles, etc. The respondents felt ashamed of not living up to catholic expectations when answering this question. The question was dropped because of psychological reasons. They answered they were catholics even when they did not practice it. This answer was a hypocritical start whose impact on the rest of the questionnaire would have been seriously disturbing. It would have set a pattern. Finally, the question about the IERAC was dropped because the samples were taken out of the IERAC files - they obviously knew about the IERAC.

During the process of interviewing the author personally took to the members of the experimental groups. Their land belonged to a prominent businessman in Guayaquil. Once, on the way to the houses, the author accidentally met a seventy year old man who acted as a guide in the two sessions when the interviews were conducted. The houses of the campesinos are on the banks of the Guayas River. We visited their homes on two occasions; first, inspecting the area and asking general questions on how to get there. After half an hour of canoe traveling, we reached the area and during a full day of work on Sunday, the questionnaire was administered in its entirety. Being a rainy season, almost every part of land not cultivated was flooded. The campesinos knew of certain paths to walk through the mud and water up to their

chests. During the evening it began raining very heavily. Except for the questionnaires that were placed in a plastic bag by a kind and thoughtful campesino, we all were soaking wet.

The control group was interviewed almost completely by students of sociology at the University of Machala. They were given specific instructions on the techniques of interviewing and the reporting of the data. Ten students were divided into three groups. They worked as a team. Each group travelled almost one hundred miles. Some girl interviewers had to cross rivers, others had to drive through jungle areas, still others had to walk ten or fifteen miles to get to the house of a selected interviewee, only to find out that he was in town that day. Wives of campesinos thought that the female interviewers had or were having affairs with their husbands. Other campesinos thought that they were IERAC employees trying to see if the campesinos were an enemy of the government or not. The two cases personally interviewed were conducted without any serious incidences. The students selected were among the best in terms of their maturity and interest in sociology as displayed in classes, performance and writing of papers. This was a basis to trust the reliability of the data collected through them. Besides, the fact that they were working in groups was assurance of the

veracity of their task. From the accounts of the interviews, there seems to be considerable evidence to suggest that an informal situation was achieved, (Thomlinson 1969: 50), adapting individually to each respondent as the conversational interview lead him unexpectedly to a topic that normally appeared later in the interview.

## VI. RESEARCH OUTPUT

### 1. THE OBSERVATION OUTCOME

The IERAC is a rigidly structured organization. Administrative and political decision-making is centered at the highest level of the executive director in the head office in the capital. The IERAC is geographically divided into five districts that cover all the country. The power of the head of each district is limited by law and by the discretion of the executive director who had freedom to remove any of them at any time. With the exception of the executive director and his special assistant, no one else has any substantial power to effect decisions regarding the process of land reform. All positions are primarily bureaucratic, including that of the district head, which is usually awarded on the basis of political support in the area. Decisions made by the executive director can be appealed to the Secretary of Production who is generally appointed through political influences. He is often a prominent member of the chamber of commerce, industry or agriculture

or a reputed technician in the fields of banking, industry, commerce and agriculture. Since the Secretary of Production was created, no more than four men have held office and all of them were prominent large landowners, with the exception of one who was a lawyer. Finally, a decision can be appealed to the President, who with the exception of Velasco Ibarra and the Military Junta of 1963, have been two coastal financial bankers, Yerovi and Arosemena.

The management of the IERAC is achieved through the law that created the IERAC in 1964 with minor amendments made thereafter. In the Guayaquil office, the leading positions were filled with lawyers. So was the district head, a coordinator, the secretary, two assistants, one social promoter and the three members of the legal department. In the technical department, there were two men with the equivalent of a B.S. in Agronomy. The rest of the staff totalling thirty-seven in the payroll and about twelve more under the heading of services rendered, had no formal or informal training in college. Five had a high school diploma in Agronomy. There was nobody with an economics or sociology background. Not even the treasurer who was a third year law student in his late thirties. Those working at the IERAC, with the probable exception of two or three persons, seemed exclusively concerned with the bureaucratic regulations, and above

all, keeping their jobs. The concept of Agrarian Reform and an awareness of their role in the social structure was lacking. Some held very prejudicial conceptions of the campesinos. One leading administrator in Guayaquil said:

" The campesinos are uncivilized people. Sometimes I wonder if we will be able to pull them out of their situation. They are stubborn, never listen to what one tells them. They are not very intelligent. I don't know what we are going to do with them."

Others were primarily concerned with making an extra income. On certain occasions, when the author assisted some campesinos to overcome a bureaucratic barrier, they would hand out the equivalent of one or two dollars, some trying to conceal it, others openly. A high IERAC administrator from the executive director's staff confided to me that certain administrators had made millions in their positions. There is certainly a wide gap between the quantity of money a bureaucrat gets from poor campesinos and what an executive gets from landowners anxious to save their land or part of it. Bribery is not only expressed in monetary terms. In certain circumstances the campesinos or the landowners invite the IERAC administrators to dinner or to various other activities in which a relationship of obligation and debt between the landowners and the administrators is established. Offering a car for transportation on



the part of the landowner is a common gesture which puts the administrators in debt with the landowner.

The IERAC's real or actual power is extremely limited. The employees only have bureaucratic power, but no decision-making power. Because of centralization, decision-making power is held by a few persons at the top of the political machinery. The composition of the IERAC itself is primarily middle class. This allows for much sincerity on the part of the administrators towards the complaints of the campesinos. But, they have little power to do something significant about their grievances. In the district office at Guayaquil, of the thirty-seven employees, only two could be considered from the upper class. The criteria of education was used to determine the social class. These two were law students at the Catholic University which is a private institution for higher education and the composition of its student body is primarily from the upper class. Those others with college education or in college at the time were students at the state university which is free. These two law students had second level positions, with no decision-making power and they repeatedly expressed views about justice for the campesinos and the need to speed up Agrarian Reform. They could hardly be considered representative of the upper class's interests. The IERAC does not have a police force or any form of coercive implementation of its decisions. Decisions



generally have to be enforced by the police or the military. The usual procedure to assure this objective is an official written request from the district head to the chief of police. The communication informs the police of the decision taken and asks for their cooperation for enforcing it. During the year of 1970, the district office in Guayaquil sent out 2.800 official communications, of which 201 were addressed to the chief of police requesting cooperation.<sup>13</sup> The breakdown as observed in Table 6.1 shows that 81 per cent requested

Total- Protection for Campesinos-Protection for Landowner-Unclear

N= (201) 100%	(162) 81%	(29) 14%	(10) 5%
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Table 6.1

protection for campesinos, 14 per cent requested protection for landowners and 5 per cent were not clear. Apparently the IERAC was protecting the campesinos. This data substantiates the identity of the aggressor. For the most part, the landowners can produce violence by hiring professionals or using the local police through their influence with the local civilian authority -the teniente politico- that heads the police, (Hurtado 1969:144). It is when any of the above has taken place that the

<sup>13</sup> Data compiled by the author from the copy files of the IERAC

campesinos go to the IERAC and request police protection. They cannot fight back police ordered by the teniente político neither can they fight back successfully the organized violence of the landowner's workers or hired men. For the IERAC to act on a request by the campesinos for police protection indicates evidence that (1) violence has occurred, (2) the campesinos situation is guaranteed by the law, and (3) that the landowner had been absent after he had been subpoenaed to answer charges against him.

## 2. THE SROLE SCALE

The Srole Scale contains nine items (see Appendix B). The respondent has three alternatives to answer: A) agrees, B) disagrees, C) undecided. The validity of Srole's Scale in the measurement of alienation has been questioned. In a recent study, the proposition that the respondents display strong tendency to agree if they belong to the lower classes reflects the extent of acquiescence on the part of those interviewed, (Carr 1971: 287-293). The campesinos of both groups showed a strong tendency to agree with the statements which is congruent with Carr's findings that there is some type of association between the degree of acquiescence and the socioeconomic status of the respondent. Because the interviewers could be considered from a superior position to that of the respondents, because of education and

money, these findings could mean that norms governing interclass and intercaste relationships caused the respondents to agree with the items out of deference or acquiescence to the superior position of the interviewer, (Carr 1971:287). For the first item (Table 6.2),

Table 6.2

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	79% (11)	21% (3)
Cont	64% (9)	36% (5)

79 per cent of the experimental group and 64 per cent of the control group agreed with the statement. In response to the second statement ( Table 6.3),

Table 6.3

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	100% (14)	0% (0)
Cont	72% (10)	28% (4)

there was a 100 per cent agreement by those benefited with expropriations in contrast to 72 per cent of those not benefited with land reform. The explanation for this

variation could be due to the fact that those not benefited do not yet know if the future is going to be any better and have no reason to believe so. Nevertheless, 72 per cent thought it would be, a 28 per cent difference with the experimental group.

The third item states that the situation of the campesinos get worse and not better (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	79% (11)	21% (3)
Cont	100% (14)	0% (0)

For those benefited with expropriation who we would expect to disagree with this statement, we find 79 per cent agreeing with this pessimistic outlook. Among those not benefited with expropriation, the percentage of those agreeing was 100 per cent, by far considerably higher. The relationship in this item reflects the hypothesized relationship. Compared with non-expropriated campesinos, we are able to identify those who have received land, regardless of all their difficulties and problems as people who do not see their situation getting worse, but on the contrary, getting better, this shows evidence of some degree of confidence in the socio-

political structure of Ecuador. The 21 per cent marginal difference is not wide enough to overestimate the nature of the response.

Response to the fourth statement show a wide dispersion of the three categories (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5	AGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED
Exp	57% (8)	21% (3)	21% (3)
Cont	64% (9)	14% (2)	21% (3)

Among those benefited with expropriation, 57 per cent agreed that it is hardly fair to bring children into the world considering the way "things" are now. About 21 per cent were undecided in both experimental and control groups. In the control group, 64 per cent agreed with the statement. We may interpret these answers in two ways. First, having children is a good thing, for religious, social and psychological reasons. Having a child means therefore, expressing confidence in our social system's capacity for survival. In this sense, the experimental group should have scored lower as it did compared with the control group for the agreeing alternative and higher disagreement scores than the control group as it actually did. Both groups expressed lack of confidence. They

indicated by a majority that it is hardly fair to bring children into the world. Second, there are the new social values of planned parenthood. They have certainly been heard by the campesinos. They do not generally practice them, but probably expected that the interviewer supported some form of family control. If the respondent thought that the population explosion was bad, and a child therefore had, the conclusions suggested above would be the reverse, and the relationship between procreation and confidence the opposite of that explained. On the basis of observation, the first explanation seems more coherent than the second one. The remaining percentages, 21 per cent and 14 per cent for the experimental and control groups respectively, disagreed with the statement which actually could be taken to mean that they thought it was fair to bring children into the world. The degree of acquiescence was actually observed by the interviewer when an interviewee answered yes to the statement, agreeing, and a woman who was nearby could not restrain herself and loudly said, "but you keep pregnant your wife every year." The possibility of cases similar to this has not been specifically determined, but it must be taken into account in the analysis of the data.

The fifth statement says that one does know with what friends to count on in case of need ( Table 6.6).



Table 6.6

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	21% (3)	79% (11)
Cont	86% (12)	14% (2)

The experimental group, made up of those benefited with land expropriation disagreed with this item in a 79 per cent. They formed a cooperative before they began the process of expropriating the land where they live and work. The feeling of confidence in their friends, and specifically within themselves as a group, gives them a strong feeling of community. The group which has not received land agreed with the statement by 86 per cent. This group is made up of people who for the most part do not belong to a cooperative. They are relatively fashioned to the image of the one man entrepreneur. Three members of the group, however, reported belonging to a savings and loan cooperative. The relevant point brought out by this item is the strong relationship between forming part of their cooperative, hence a community, and the confidence placed on friends. The cooperative apparently provided the setting for fruitful social and human interaction which increased the degree of trust and confidence of its members on each other. The control group, probably due to the individuality and social isolation of its members



displayed high distrust on other people and little confidence on friends.

The sixth item states that most people don't care what happens to their neighbors (Table 6.7).

Table 6.7

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	64% (9)	36% (5)
Cont	72% (10)	28% (4)

Sixty-four per cent of those in the experimental group agreed as well as 72 per cent in the control group. The question, however, is not clear enough. It gives the impression in Ecuador, that it is good to say so, because people generally care too much about the private life of their neighbors, and, to a greater degree in a rural area where social control mechanisms are informal and personal. Almost every action of a neighbor is subject to comment and discussion by those living nearby. The statement could also be taken to mean that people don't care for the well being of their neighbors. Srole's item leaves these two alternatives open. Therefore, the respondent does not actually know on what subject is he really expressing his opinion. If they interpreted the item in a moral way, that is to say,

that the people should not care too much about their neighbors life, the measurement the scale provides is not one of confidence, but simply an attitude regarding a particular subject. The percentage of those disagreeing is relatively close for both groups. The discriminatory dimension for this question is almost minimal.

The seventh item does not lend itself to much explanations (Table 6.8).

Table 6.8

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	86% (12)	14% (2)
Cont	86% (12)	14% (2)

Both groups answered alike, agreeing by an overwhelming percentage -86 per cent- that money is the most important thing in life, after good health. In any society that has grown out of the barter system, money is an instrument of exchange and therefore, of survival. It is, therefore, only common sense to agree that securing the means for survival comes next to being sure that one has a fairly and good physiological disposition to survive. This item certainly adds an additional critique to Carr's criticisms on the use of Srole's items as a scale of alienation. This item is so obvious that it has no discriminatory power

among the campesinos in Ecuador. The eight item was widely misunderstood (Table 6.9).

Table 6.9

	AGREE	DISAGREE	UNDECIDED
Exp	64% (9)	28% (4)	8% (1)
Cont	43% (6)	14% (2)	43% (6)

It says that one cannot stop asking oneself if life is worth living. The campesinos thought the item stated that life is worth living or it is not. They had to be explained that the item referred to possible doubts about life's worthiness that they may have had. In the control group 43 per cent agreed, and 43 percent were undecided. In the experimental group 64 per cent agreed and 28 per cent disagreed. An explanation of the percentage distribution would probably emphasize the uncertainties and misunderstandings on the part of the respondent. These difficulties are very likely due to their little training in formal education, a handicap which severely impair them from effective communication through the use of sentences with double negatives and other ambiguously structured phrases. It should be mentioned that some of these specifications were carried from the English original, and that any major alteration would have hampered the meaning of an accurate

translation.

The last statement refers to the morality of various means to obtain money (Table 6.10).

Table 6.10

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	79% (11)	21% (3)
Cont	64% (9)	36% (5)

According to the responses collected, it would seem that the campesinos in Ecuador are "inmoral", if we impose our moral values in the analysis of the data, or at least "amoral" if we avoid the use of value judgement. Among those receiving expropriated land, 79 per cent of those answering agreed that there were no good or bad ways of getting or making money. Among those without land the percentage was smaller, 64 per cent but still relatively high. Since this was the last statement, the respondents usually had time for a final comment, and several indicated that it does not matter how you make it, the important point is making money. In one occasion, a respondent was pressed with an additional question right after he had answered the question in the scale, "even robbing?" to which he replied "yes, why not?". He was one of those campesinos benefited with expropriation. To understand these

answers would demand an analysis of the causes of poverty in Ecuador and of the reasons for malnutrition, lack of education, lack of sanitation, public utilities, etc., and other structural deficiencies which practically force people to consider survival as the end for which attainment by any means is good.

### 3. THE OLSEN SCALE

The scale developed by Olsen contains two parts, each one consisting of five statements. In the original responses are to be classified under five categories : A) strongly agree, B) agree, C) indicate undecided or uncertain attitude regarding the statement, D) disagree, and E) strongly disagree. The modified scale for use among agricultural workers in rural Ecuador was simplified to three alternatives: (Appendix C) A) agree, B) disagree, and C) undecided. The campesinos had extreme difficulty remembering five alternatives. They could remember three easily. In the second statement of the first section 72 per cent of those interviewed agreed and 28 per cent disagreed (Table 6.11).

Table 6.11

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	72% (10)	28% (4)
Cont	72% (10)	28% (4)

The campesino in both groups agreed that there is no alternative way for them to influence the actions of the government but through elections. This opinion markedly contrasts with the political reality that election results are often violated by civilian rulers backed by the military or outright by the military themselves. This occurred in 1972 when elections were called off because the possible winner was a candidate disliked by the economic elites of both the coast and the highland. More important, however, is the fact that American Oil Companies now in Ecuador will be able to work more effectively under military than civilian rule, as suggested by the Rockefeller Report on Latin America,(1969). Another electoral violation occurred in 1970 when the election results were not recognized by the government after Velasco Ibarra proclaimed himself dictator. In 1963, the military overthrew the government of C.J. Arosemena and in 1967 Yerovi Indaburu was appointed president without elections after a meeting of the military and most prominent political leaders. Therefore, the answers to this question reflect an ideal situation rather than the recognition of a real situation. However, it could possibly mean that precisely because the campesinos only have the vote to influence decisions, the elections are often not held or not respected, they have little confidence in the socio-political mechanisms for change.

In response to the second question of the second section ( Table 6.12).

Table 6.12

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	86% (12)	14% (2)
Cont	86% (12)	14% (2)

There was a 86 per cent of consensus in both groups and only 14 per cent disagreed. This result would seem to indicate that an overwhelming majority of the campesinos in general are aware that the government almost always serves the interests of the oligarchy and powerful dominant groups and, therefore, is not interested in the problems and needs of the campesinos. The high percentage agreeing with this statement can be explained in the light of two facts. First, politicians in their political speeches, lectures or conferences frequently blame the "oligarchy" for many of the social problems the country faces. The oligarchy in this context is a concept with apparent explanatory power for almost any major problem a social group may be facing. Second, there is the social reality that the government usually does not promote programs to serve the needs of the cam-



pesinos due to the nature of the economic power structure (Benalcazar, 1971:9). Furthermore, high government positions are generally awarded to the same people regardless of the political nature of the government. These facts are widely utilized by politicians to show how the oligarchy operates. This way they also attempt to show their grass root identifications. This mechanism also serves the purpose of labeling the opponents. Due to these reasons, these two statements would be extremely questionable if we should use them to measure some causal relationship between land reform and confidence. In other words, there are certain topics where confidence is absent regardless of whether Agrarian Reform is present or not.

For the remaining six questions the undecided category was so small, in certain circumstances only, one or two cases, that they were combined with the disagree category, for both groups for the purpose of this analysis. The first statement in the first section (Table 6.13) shows that 72 per cent of the campesinos benefited with expropriation agreed with the idea that public servants did not care for what they thought, while only 50 per cent of those in the non-expropriated category thought alike.

TABLE 6.13

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	64% (9)	36% (5)
Cont	50% (7)	50% (7)

The results yielded by this question are contrary to those hypothesized. This result suggests that as the campesinos get the land, their needs increase, in terms of financial and technical assistance and their needs are not met by the organized government structure. The reason behind the high response among the campesinos not benefited with expropriation lies in the attitudes of the IERAC administrators who throughout the process for expropriation display interest in solving the problem of the campesinos. Because they are not used to being generally listened to in their demands by the government agencies they see behind a word of encouragement, a world of hope. It is in this sense that the IERAC acts as a palliative to provide some form of pacification to the demands of the campesinos.

The third statement in the first section (Table 6.14) shows 64 per cent of those benefited with expropriation agreeing with the statement that it is difficult for them to understand what happens in national politics and at the government level, while 72 per cent of those not benefited agreed with the statement. The high response

Table 6.14

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	64% (9)	36% (5)
Cont	72% (10)	28% (4)

in both groups can be explained on educational grounds. Sixty-four per cent of the entire sample has less than three years of education. Many don't know how to read or write. The remaining 36 per cent has less than six years of education. Not one had any secondary education. This data reflects only numbers of years of formal education completed, but says nothing of the quality of education received. In general terms, lack of training impairs them to understand the complexities of political life. Finally, the 8 per cent difference reflects the hypothesized relationship. We could expect that those benefited with expropriation have been better able to understand the workings of the government, but such a small marginal percentage could not conceivably support our hypothesis, which if truth, should be reflected in a wider margin. Education is an intervening variable that prevents campesinos from reaching high confidence in the government in general, because they can't understand what happens.

The fourth statement in the first section (Table 6.15)

Table 6.15

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	79% (11)	21% (3)
Cont	72% (10)	28% (4)

indicates that 79 per cent of those who received land through expropriation believe that they neither have voice nor vote in what the government does. In the control group the percentage is very close: 72 per cent. This question reflects some degree of consistency among the respondents. In the second statement of the second section (Table 6.16) 86 per cent of both groups believed the government does

Table 6.16

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	86% (12)	14% (2)
Cont	86% (12)	14% (2)

not serve their interest. Tables 6.11, 6.13 and 6.16 reflect little participation in the decision-making process which suggests also low confidence. It seems reasonable to argue that the government does not meet their needs because they do not have voice or vote in the decision-making process. This logical explanation is relatively backed by the answers to this question which brings out high percentages in both groups stating that they are alienated from political participation, lacking the necessary structural joints to articulate their political demands. The reason that would help us explain why there are no substantial differences in the responses

of both groups, notwithstanding controlling for expropriation could be the generalizing power of the questions. The questions are broad generalizations that do not refer specifically to agrarian problems, and they show therefore, small differences within the campesinos as a social class.

In the second section, the statements pertain to the activities of the government. The first one refers to activities the government does not have a right to do (Table 6.17). Those without expropriations were equally

Table 6.17

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	64% (9)	36% (5)
Cont	43% (6)	57% (8)

divided agreeing and disagreeing with the statement, but among those benefited with expropriation the percentage of those agreeing was 64. Because the statement does not refer to anything in particular, we might assume that this reflects a degree of disgust and opposition to the government in general. The negative reaction is reflected in the fact that the government is spreading itself too much. This attitude on the part of those receiving land could possibly imply that now that they have acquired

property they are adopting a policy of less government intervention. This could be supported by the data showing that 57 per cent of those who have not received land yet disagree with this statement. It should be interesting to question the campesinos on this matter after they have received their expropriated land and compare the answers with the previous one, to notice if this trend indeed exists.

The third statement in the second section (Table 6.18) states that the government does not act as it should, even

Table 6.18

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	57% (8)	43% (6)
Cont	50% (7)	50% (7)

when it has government support. Responses to this question were evenly divided among those who did not have received expropriated land. Those who received land, agreed with the statement 57 per cent of them and 43 per cent disagreed. The fourth question (Table 6.19) yielded 72 per cent

Table 6.19

	AGREE	DISAGREE
Exp	72% (10)	28% (4)
Cont	64% (9)	36% (5)



of those benefited with expropriation agreeing with the position that the present government organization prevents it from dealing with the more important national problems, while only 64 per cent of the control group agreed. The group receiving land demonstrates a consistent degree of frustration with the government, which occasionally borders in the lines of verbal opposition. Their expectations seem to have been increased substantially after receiving the land, but only to find more frequent and numerous difficulties. Because the IERAC keeps the property tiles, the campesinos find themselves unable to mortgage the land to get bank loans to finance their agricultural production. The IERAC does not assist campesinos individually but requires them to be associated in cooperatives to receive the possible advantages of technical assistance in farming practices, covering a wide range of problems from seed selection to fertilizer utilization and deployment of machinery. Many campesinos have organized cooperatives. Cooperatives place the blame of their lack of coordination among the campesinos themselves, a fact which increases their internal conflict and thus reduces the effectiveness to act as a group towards the IERAC. The cooperative effort is extremely difficult for campesinos lacking education and knowledge, but a productive one when the earlier organization and coordination stages have been surpassed. The control group, as it has been

argued trusts the government more than the experimental group, as it was earlier suggested. Probably those in the control group feel they owe the government some loyalty for having IERAC administrators who listen, some very well, and offer sometimes to do everything they can to solve their problems. Expropriation statistics, however, show how difficult this is.

#### 4. THE SOCIAL DISTANCE SCALE

The results of the scale can be visualized in Tables 6.20 and 6.21. In responding to question eight and nine,

Table 6.20	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Exp	-	50%	50%	-	-	-	-	-
Cont	15%	20%	-	25%	25%	-	15%	-

Table 6.21	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Exp	-	-	-	-	-	100%	-	-
Cont	6%	6%	-	35%	12%	6%	29%	6%

CODE : See Appendix A Question 9

an individual could answer more than once. Since a letter closer to the end of the alphabet conveys higher disposition towards violence, those individuals in the

group without land could be expected to be prone to release their frustrations through non-socially sanctioned behavior, such as violence. In the control group, the results indicate a wide dispersion of behavioral alternatives for the sample. Since an individual could answer one, two or many actions he took or we would take (as in question No 9) the number of responses is greater than the number of individuals in the sample. Of all the alternative answer for each letter, the percentage for each category was obtained. In the control group, 15 per cent of the answer felt in the nothing category, which tells the percentage of those answering in reference to an apathetic attitude when faced with an IERAC decision that in one way violated their rights. Twenty per cent of the answers stated that campesinos had written to different government officials. Twenty-five per cent of the answers in the control group mentioned that they would try to verbally convince the IERAC administrators of the inconvenience of the decision taken. Twenty-five per cent of the answers point out the fact that those answering had offered a bribe to the IERAC administrators.

The percentage mentioned can be contrasted with the responses of those benefited with expropriation who had stated 50 per cent of them that they wrote to a government officer and the remaining 50 per cent that they had

gone as far as trying to verbally convince the IERAC administrators of the negative aspects of the decision taken. In their view, the alternate behavior to display discontent prevented them from engaging in forceful activities. Those benefited seem to have engaged in socially accepted patterns of behavior. In the control group we have a percentage of answers that indicate the use of violence. To the extent that violence can be considered the outcome of frustration due to exclusion from political participation or alienation -we expected the control group to score higher percentages as the letters of the questionnaire began to depart from the A. Generally, the results of question eight do tend to verify our hypothesis with regards to those benefited with expropriation, since they have apparently been given participation in conventional political mechanisms. This fact also substantiates the point that the experimental group have not engaged in non-socially sanctioned behavior on the grounds that the existing mechanisms for managing discontent served the purposes they were supposed to. On the other hand, in the campesinos of the control group, non-achievement of goals, in terms of securing land, produces frustration and alienation which tends to be expressed through violent behavior.

Question No 9 deals with future action in the eventual

case that the IERAC should take a decision violating their rights. The experimental group stated that they would try to block a road, cut the water supply, etc., reaching a point in which certain amounts of violence was displayed but directed towards non-persons. Nobody expressed the necessity of reaching the point of personal violence. To them there was no need to arrive at a situation where interpersonal violence would prevail. On the other hand, the group that had not received the benefits of land expropriation, stated that they would "fight until death" for their rights and that they had to be taken out of "their" land death if somebody wanted them out. Twenty-nine per cent of the answers given for the control group fell in the category referring to the use of personal violence. This category received the highest percentage besides letter D, which refers to attempts to verbally convince the IERAC of the inconvenience of the decision that received 35 per cent. The fact that almost a third of the answers expressed possible personal violence reflects a strong degree of frustration, produced by unfulfilled raising expectations on the part of the campesinos in the terms of obtaining land. The law to abolish feudal work patterns in agriculture, applicable practically in the coastal region, succeeds in slowing down the process of land distribution, retaining consequently the control of

the land in the hands of the powerful landowners while it brings hope and frustration to the campesinos. Hope because the law states the objective of redistributing land to those who work it. Frustration because in the process of land reform the campesinos are excluded and find themselves in the hands of lawyers and bureaucrats concerned with tasks not directly related with land redistribution. In this process, the campesino wastes time which he could be using cleaning up the land or planting his crops and loses his scarce financial resources paying lawyers to argue their cases and bureaucrats to speed up paperwork. The results of this law, at the end of March, 1972, after two years of existence is 23 haciendas expropriated out of more than 160 that applied for it in two coastal provinces of Guayas and Los Rios. Of the 23 cases, 21 have been contested to a higher legal authority through the normal channel of appeals. Only two cases have the decisions taken stood up. However, it should be pointed out that in these two haciendas, the landowners had made previous arrangements to sell their land to the campesinos who had formed cooperatives for that purpose. The law in these cases only served to legalize a situation previously agreed upon by the intervening parties.

## 5. THE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

### 1.

The variable age was considered important because



older people generally tend to be more confident in the socio-political mechanisms established by society. Younger people usually have less confidence, particularly when they become impatient in their demands for change. If our control group was made up of primarily older people and the experimental group of younger individuals, their alienation scores could be the product of age rather than of exprooriation. Although the argument cannot be entirely denied, the age structure of the sample population was studied (Table 6.22). In

Table 6.22

Age	1	2	3	4	5
Exp	2	3	3	2	4
Cont	0	4	5	4	1

CODE: See Appendix A Question 1

the control group 92 per cent of the sample was between the ages of 26 and 55. Practically all of them were middle aged individuals. In the experimental group, only 57 per cent of the sample fell in the same category with 14 per cent that were below 25 years of age and 28 per cent over 55 years old. Certainly, the proportion of old respondents is higher in the experimental group, but middle aged and old people are more consistently found in the control group. For this reason, the age variable could be disturbing the relationship

expected because there are more older people in the control group.

2. The level of education was discussed earlier. The importance of education is two-fold. First, it allows an effective degree of communication, as it was pointed out; if education is lacking, effective communication is severely reduced. Second, education has the ability to stimulate confidence in the established apparatus for change up to the twelfth year. Beyond that level and upon entering the university, the direction would be the opposite. University education is generally a thorough process of disenchantment with the socio-political system and even more so in Ecuador where university teaching centers around political indoctrination rather than professional learning or a liberal arts education. However, as it should have been expected, the campesinos in the sample had, for the most part, not even finished elementary school. Some of them were illiterates among the adult population in Ecuador. (Junta de Planificación, 1962: V.1). As Table 6.23 shows only 8 per cent of the experimental group had completed

Table 6.23 Education Level

	1	2	3	4	5	
Exp	13	1	-	-	-	
Cont	9	5	-	-	-	

CODE: See Appendix A, Question 2

up to the fourth grade, but 36 per cent of the control group had completed up to the sixth grade. The large majority of the experimental group was practically illiterate, but during the interview they explained that they were learning to write, to read, and some arithmetic. The teacher was the one who had the most education. They met on weekends for classes. In the control group, 64 per cent had less than three years of education. As the structure of the control group suggests, they were better educated than the experimental group, and this variable could have also produced distorting scores that contribute to show the control group with high or as high confidence as the experimental group.

3. Family size was another variable examined. The basic rationale for its inclusion was the relationship that it has with confidence in societal mechanisms for the management of conflicts. The larger the family, the higher the confidence. Procreation can be considered an indicator of confidence to the extent that people bring new children into the world when they have some reason to believe that they are going to be able to provide for them and that they will have a fairly acceptable chance for survival in a society that provides a minimum of reliability. However, consideration could also be given to the hazardous phenomena of unwanted or unprevented children, where the arrival was neither expected nor

desired. There is no clear way of determining this criteria. For this reason, the usefulness of this indicator could be questionable; notwithstanding, it was used in the questionnaire. The result shown in Table 6.24 indicates a relatively even distribution in family size for both experimental and control group. Fifty percent of the respondents in both groups indicated that there were somewhere between 6 to 10 persons living in the house of the

Table 6.24

Family Size

	1	2	3	4
Exp	4	7	3	-
Cont	5	7	2	-

CODE: See Appendix A, Question 3

family. The remaining 50 per cent was distributed in the experimental group with 28 per cent with 5 or less and 22 per cent from 11 to 15 members. Nobody reported more than 15 persons at home in any of the two groups. In the control group, 36% had 5 or less members and 14 per cent from 11 to 15. The differences can be considered significant to have altered or distorted the hypothesized relationship.

4. The size of the land holding was also recorded. The basic assumption behind the importance of this variable

was the confidence that large property owners are expected to have in the socio-political system. As a person increases his assets generally a greater concern with the survival and stability of the legal, conventional mechanisms for change appears. The most common assumption made is that those that own large property have a great deal also at stake with the present socio-political system. In the specific case of the campesinos if the control group had extremely large property holdings in perspective, their confidence in the system would be represented with high scores in the scales.<sup>14</sup> Had the large holdings been on the part of those in the experimental group, the high scores in confidence could possibly be attributed to their holdings' size and not necessarily to expropriation. Table 6.25 represents the size of the holdings in both

Table 6.25

Land Holding Size - Blocks

	1	2	3	4
Exp	7	7	-	-
Cont	4	6	1	3

CODE: See Appendix A, Question 4

groups. Those in the experimental group have have relatively small holdings with an average size of 5.2 blocks or Hectareas. In the control group, there are

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<sup>14</sup> The control group holds land that it has worked on for the last few years, but does not have a legal claim to it.

three camoesinos with an unusually large land holding such as 28, 30 and 60 blocks. These large land areas yield a group average of 13,8 blocks per individual. However, in the control group, there is one person with two blocks, while in the experimental, the smallest land holding is four blocks. It is important to observe that the size of the experimental group's holdings are more homogeneous than those of the control group. The campesinos demanding land in the control group, want larger quantities of land and are more inclined to violence, as it was pointed out before. The consequence of the larger holdings of the control group may be reflected in their scores for the scale's items and with the responses to other behavioral traits representing confidence in the socio-political system.

5. The use of transportation facilities is a behavioral variable of relative importance. The campesinos in the experimental group expressed their use of horses and canoes with relative frequency. As it was stated elsewhere, their rice production takes place on the banks of a major river - Daule, a major tributary to the Guayas River- and their houses face the river. Many camoesinos have a canoe at the river side, although none of those in the group indicated ownership of one. Three, however, mentioned the fact that they owned mules or horses. The



campesinos in this group shared many habits and practices, particularly because they live one next to the other. All the members of the group are neighbors of each other and they have frequent social or community gatherings that sponsor the permanence of relatively similar views and customs. They are only half-an-hour in car from the city of Guayaquil, once they get to the highway. To get to the highway they have to travel by canoe or on a mule or horse during the summer. Walking is possible in this time of the year. However, the landowners have closed their easiest exit to the highway putting up a wire fence. The landowner retained more than half the total extension of his estate, even after the campesinos had received more than seventy blocks. The distribution of the answers regarding means of transportation can be evaluated in Table 6.26. This table shows wide dispersion in the means of transportation used among the respondents in the control group.

Table 6.26

Transportation		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
Exp		6	-	-	6	6	-	-	-
Cont		6	3	1	10	-	1	1	-

CODE: See Appendix A, Question 6

Many of the campesinos in the control group, 42 per cent use horses, mules or donkeys, and a large number 71 per cent use mechanical means, as bus or car, 8 per cent reported using airplanes for transportation and 8 per cent trains. In the control group there was also an owner of a car, an economic criteria which practically pulls this case out of the typical poor campesino without land. Obviously, this case has other forms of income besides farming, and he is probably trying to increase his property by appealing to the law to abolish feudal work patterns. Although the law was not designed to benefit this type of person, it has enough flaws to permit that those renters of land from another landowner present their cases of the IERAC and, if possible, obtain a favorable decision. The renter usually subleases the land to poor farmers. They were supposed to be the beneficiaries of the law. The pattern of ownership of the means of transportation tells the existence of substantial income differences. In the experimental group, only 22 per cent had ownership of any means of transportation and those were mules, horses or donkeys. In the control group, 64 per cent of the respondents owned some means of transportation, 36 per cent owned horses, mules or donkeys, but 8 per cent owned bicycles, 8 per cent owned motorcycles, 8 per cent car and 8 per cent bicycle

and burden animals. The diversity of ownership of means of transportation and the higher incidence on mechanized transportation in the control group suggests that their degree of confidence in the socio-political system could be higher than on the experimental group where behavior patterns are very limited and more traditional. The important consideration lies in the fact that the group without land has patterns of behavior indicative of easy accommodation and confidence in the socio-political and economic systems.

6. The alternative of belonging or not to an organization could conceivably be the outcome of needed social contacts or the result of individual failure to manipulate social institutions to meet personal needs or a combination of both. Regardless of the reason for joining, an apparent consequence is to strengthen the internal cohesion of its members when they deal with common problems. It also provides a feeling of fulfillment for its members which produces a measure of satisfaction and subsequently of confidence. As it was said earlier, participation yields satisfaction which in turn yields confidence. Therefore, those campesinos part of associations for social or political or economic purposes could be reasonably expected to have higher confidence than those not members. Table 6.28 shows that all the members of the experimental group are members of a cooperative while only three

Table 6.28  
Membershio in Group

	Yes	No
Exp	14	0
Cont	3	11

members in the control are part of a savings and loan cooperative. The impact of membership was felt in Srole's scale when the answers for the fifth item (see Appendix B) was computed. The experimental group could consistently show that they could still trust a friend, while these in the control group found probably less people to count on. For them, the world basically demonstrated a hostile attitude where everyone has to look after his own lot, and where it is not usually possible to trust people. This expression of mistrust could be indicative of lack of confidence in the social system while the contrary reflects a positive attitude in the established network of social relationships.

7. The use of machines and fertilizer is reflective of trust in the technical and scientific means used by the prominent groups of the established socio-economic structure. The common reliance on mechanized instruments for agricultural production reflects an element of confidence. Consequently, if persistent use of these

mechanisms should be higher in the control group, it could be expected that this behavior does not precede expropriation and that its appearance is due to additional factors. It seems reasonable to suppose that those benefited with expropriation will have higher disposition to the use of fertilizers and machines. As Table 6.29 indicates, the experimental group expressed they believe that fertilizers and machinery will increase production. They do not only believe it, but they use

Table 6.29

Willingness to use Fertilizers and Machines

	Yes	No
Exp	14	0
Cont	11	3

a water bomb to pump the water from the river into production areas. The bomb is well protected under a specially built hut. They also pointed out that the cooperative was going to start using fertilizers in last March. At the present, they are probably making full use of technical and scientific advances available to them. In the control group, however, although we find 79 per cent believing that machinery and fertilizers will increase production, they also said that they do not use either one of the two. Among the reasons mentioned was lack of money. Forty-three per cent of the control

group specified their financial difficulties. Eight per cent said that the land was extremely fertile and that there was no need for machines or fertilizers to make it produce. Fourteen per cent pointed out that their crop were of short cycle. Probably they believe that mechanization and fertilizer usage is only applicable for long cycle production. The remaining 14 per cent used fertilizers and machinery. The 21 per cent that does not believe in the efficacy of technical agricultural methods did not specify the reason and only expressed their opinion.

8. Financing agricultural production is one of the most difficult tasks in the overall process of Agrarian Reform. The campesinos, for the most part lack the knowledge of financing procedures and find themselves in need of cash without knowing where to go. The problem is not only one of knowledge, because even if one knows, access to financing is almost impossible. Private commercial banks follow rigid credit policies and charge extremely high interest rates. The Banco Nacional de Fomento, a state owned bank supposedly finances agricultural production, but generally lends only with collateral to relatively known signatures. In spite of this, during 1971 and 1972, it became known that this bank was practically bankrupt. After following an easy credit policy it found itself with a high percentage of its lending resources in outstanding uncollectable loans or tied up resources in long term loans. The campesino,



therefore, finds himself in a dramatic situation after he receives the expropriated land. Either he resorts to the former landowners for money in which case he retains a dependent relationship with the landowner, or he goes to private lenders in the closest towns who charge illegal and exorbitant interest rates. The use of banking facilities does not only depend on the part of the campesinos, because the banks themselves practically close the door to potential customers. Notwithstanding, the use of banking facilities in the part of the campesinos suggests their confidence in an economic system that is reluctant to let them join it. As Table 6.30 shows, in the experimental group only 8 per cent of the campesinos go to banks. IT

Table 6.30  
Banking Facilities Usage

	Yes	No
Exp	1	13
Cont	5	9

should be added, however, that the cooperative has received a bank loan to finance the water pump and the fertilizer. Besides, of the one person in the group, who has a savings account, nobody else uses banking facilities. When they were asked where they save their money, campesinos in both groups said that there was no money to save, because there was too little. In the control group, however, those

not using banks save at home, keeping the money at odd places. Of those answering yes in the control group, 14 per cent had savings accounts, 14 per cent had loans and 8 per cent had a checking account. In the control group, 8 per cent of those not using banks used the cooperative for loans and 8 per cent the landowners. The rest kept their savings at home. Table 6.30 tells us that the campesinos do not use banking facilities, and that the wider use in the control group could be due to previous income differential not directly related with expropriations.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The study of two groups of campesinos in different stages in the process of Agrarian Reform has yielded substantial information regarding various dimensions that have been left out in the implementation of the Agrarian Reform law. Through the use of descriptive techniques an attempt has been made to show how both groups cope with their social needs. Certain features, such as financial assistance, which are absent, constitute the focus of a relationship of dependence between the campesino and the landowner. They generally find themselves in need of requesting the former landowner for finance. The lack of institutionalized technical assistance and education, restricts the campesinos from participating in the processes of the power structure. This

reduces their confidence in the forces of nature as well as in the mechanisms of social and political change. The existence of cooperatives show to some degree that it plays a positive role in giving some meaning to social life. It also seems to reduce the sense of powerlessness that has affected the life of the campesinos in the last centuries. Although no certain causation can be demonstrated in this study, the fact that those forming part of cooperatives had someone to count on, as opposed to non-members who did not have someone to count on, establishes a possible causal relationship. The campesinos' handling of the issues of procreation family planning and sexual education reveals some relevance in discussing them. This behavior can be explained due to (1) the prevalence of old traditional values, and (2) the restrictions the Church places on the subject.

Agrarian Reform has simply been considered as an act of legalizing the present holding of tenant workers in the rural areas through adjudication of land ownership. Maybe the high scores of alienation produced in the experimental group, precisely the one benefited with expropriation, could be explained on the grounds that Agrarian Reform has been considered an unidimensional concept. The problems faced by the campesinos who own their newly acquired land are relatively new for them.

To put it in an analogy, it is like asking a child to make the decisions of an adult without due training and preparation to accept this responsibility. The campesinos, it should be pointed out, have not made decisions on their own because they had retained a subservient relationship with the landowners who usually made the difficult decisions of financing, technical uses, etc. The inability of the campesinos to make decisions could be seen as the product of centuries of latifundismo -or large land holding estates- where they were used as cheap labor, domestic servants, kept uneducated and without skills, as well as almost entirely dependent on the landowner.<sup>15</sup>

The study also provides data regarding the disposition towards non-socially sanctioned mechanisms for social change. The control group shows higher motivation to engage in such behavior than the experimental group. Through the survey of attitudes in both groups, the latter

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<sup>15</sup> No specific study of the situation of the coastal campesinos in Ecuador has been scientifically conducted, although there is a vast amount of novels dealing with the subject. In the highlands, Pío Jaramillo-Alvarado, El Indio Ecuatoriano C.C.E. Quito, 1964, is one of the best early studies and for an overall analysis one of the most complete works was conducted by the Inter-American Center for Agricultural Development (CIDA). Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo Socio-Económico del Sector Agrícola: ECUADOR. Union Panamericana Washington 1965.

can conceive of violence as an alternate behavior to obtain their ends while the former did not suggest such possibility. Actually, those who have not received land have been forgotten by the dominant groups of the social structure, and their needs have not been recognized. This lack of acknowledgement is expressed in non-socially sanctioned behavior, in the hope of receiving the attention they believe they should receive. This outcome could be viewed as normal to the extent that the situation arises from a clash of aspirations and a breakdown of regulatory norms. (Merton, 1957:131-160). Such behavior implies a breakdown of social standards governing social conduct and also means little social cohesion. Above all, the possibility of such behavior implies the existence of a social order in which men cannot confidently put their trust, and which, therefore, is deprived of legitimacy.

Finally, the study does put forth the need for allowing the passage of time to test the causal relations between expropriation and confidence. The experimental group receiving land according to the law to abolish feudal work patterns do not have yet more than a year since they learned of the favorable decision. This situation does not give us the scope for measuring the impact of time in increasing or reducing confidence. The experimental group had not yet received the property titles six months

after they knew of the decision. Apparently, the IERAC plans to act as a trustee because the titles are non-negotiable, an additional factor which prevents campesinos from self-financing. Due to the short period of time that has elapsed between the moment of expropriation and the interviewing, the experimental group could not show the higher confidence that it was expected because their patterns of behavior ,may not yet be adjusted to their new social situation. More reliable conclusions regarding causation could be obtained after a considerable amount of time was passed from the moment the campesinos received the land. The period in between would have allowed them the opportunity to learn new behavior and actually be socialized in a different web of social interaction. The control group, on the other hand, coming from a relatively rich banana producing region seems to display greater confidence due to their income that has allowed some of them to engage in behavior here considered as an expression of confidence. Such is the case of 8 per cent of the sample that owns transportation, has bank accounts and uses technical innovations in agricultural production. This percentage may reflect the new agricultural entrepreneur that is the outcome of growing bananas and marks the appearance of an agricultural middle class in Ecuador. This new type of agricultural entrepreneur, which is the object of the Agrarian Reform law is a recent development in rural



Ecuador. The small 8 per cent in the control group suggests the conclusion that this development could be taking place without the direct action of the IERAC.

The interesting aspect that this trend shows is that land expropriation is not a prerequisite for the development of an agricultural middle class and that somehow, increases in production alone can contribute to an uprising of regional economic conditions. Such occurrence may strengthen confidence in the socio-political and economic mechanisms for change. Maybe the most relevant conclusion is that social justice in rural Ecuador, if understood in economic, social and political concepts, is not preceded by land redistribution. Although land expropriation could be considered apparently just, it serves no specific purpose beyond that of preventing violence as a possible alternative behavior, but in no way changes or modifies to any substantial degree, major patterns of social, economic or political behavior. There is a need to move away from a quasi technocratic obsession and enter into a real phase of reform that recognizes the immediate need to change the agrarian structure (Feder, 1971:VII-XI). But real reform can only include the various dimensions of the campesinos life. A reform that is limited to legalizing land holdings through purchases and selling of land is partial and incomplete. Such reform will be extremely unlikely to produce a

change in the social structure or in patterns of behavior and production.

The study suggests further research problems. There is much need to find out the reasons that induce campesinos to file applications for expropriation. What happens with the large figure that never applies for expropriation although they could be eligible. What reasons are behind not applying. How do the campesinos learn about the law regarding expropriation. Do the rest of the campesinos not involved with the IERAC have higher confidence than the groups studied in this case. Do they live in similar conditions. There are, without doubt, many new questions that arise from the study. An important inquiry is to determine if the trend observed here could be reverted, speeded up or slowed down, and what variables intervene in such outcome. These and more questions will probably be tentatively answered in future works.

APPENDIX A  
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Age
  - 1) 0-25      2) 26-35      3) 36-45      4) 46-55      5) 55-+
2. Educational Level -in years finished
  - 1) 0-3      2) 4-6      3) 7-9      4) 10-12      5) 13-15      6) 16 or more
3. Size of the family -those living at main home.
  - 1) 2-5      2) 6-10      3) 11-15      4) 16-25
4. Extension of the land -blocks or hectareas.
  - 1) 1-5      2) 6-10      3) 11-20      4) 20-+
5. Are you a member of a community group?
6. When you move from one place to another, indicate what means do you use.

a. horses, mules, donkeys	e. boat, canoe
b. bicycles	f. plane
c. motorcycles	g. train
d. bus, car	h. other

  - a) Do you own any of these ?
7. Do you go to banks to deposit or borrow money?
  - a. if yes, what: savings, checks, loans
  - b. if no, where do you save  
where do you borrow
8. Do you believe that machines and fertilizers will increase your agricultural production?

yes	no
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  - a. Do you use them ?
  - b. Why not ?

9. In the decisions taken by the IERAC, that have in anyway violated your rights, what have you done?
- a. nothing
  - b. wirten to the governor or president
  - c. formed a group and written to the officials
  - d. try to verbally convince the IERAC of the inconvenience of the decision
  - e. offer a bribe to the IERAC administrators
  - f. block a road, cut off water supply, some action displaying violence towards non-persons
  - g. fight against, fired upon or dilled IERAC administrators, police or military forces or landowners
  - h. other
10. The same as No 9, but hypothetically, asking what would you do, if the IERAC takes a decision violating your rights.

## APPENDIX A

### CUESTIONARIO DE DATOS GENERALES

1. EDAD  
1) 0-25      2) 26-35      3) 36-45      4) 46-55      5) 55-+
2. NIVEL EDUCACIONAL -en años completados:  
1) 3 o menos    2) de 4 a 6    3) de 7 a 9    4) de 10 a 12  
5) de 13 a 15    6) 16 o más
3. TAMAÑO DE LA FAMILIA CON QUE VIVE:  
1) 2-5      2) 6-10      3) 11-15      4) 16-25
4. EXTENSION DE LA TIERRA QUE POSEE, en cuadras o hecta-  
reas:  
1) 1-5      2) 6-10      3) 11-20      4) 20-+
5. EX UD MIEMBRO DE ALGUNA ASOCIACION CLASISTA?  

si                  no
6. CUANDO UD SE MUEVE DE UN LUGAR A OTRO, INDIQUE CUAL  
DE ESTOS MEDIOS USA:  

a) caballos, mulas o burro	e) bote, canoa, lancha
b) bicicleta	f) avion
c) motocicleta	g) tranvia
d) bus, carro	h) otro

a) es Ud. dueño de algún medio de transporte?
7. ACUDE UD A LOS BANCOS A DEPOSITAR O PRESTAR DINERO:  
a) Si es así, ahorros, cheques, préstamos?  
b) Si no es así, dónde guarda sus ahorros i a quién  
presta cuando necesita?.
8. UD CREE QUE LAS MAQUINAS I LOS FERTILIZANTES LE AUMEN-  
TARAN LA PRODUCCION DE SUS COSECHAS?  

si                  no

a) los usa Ud.?  
b) por qué no ?
9. CUANDO UD NO HA ESTADO SATISFECHO CON UNA DECISION  
DEL IERAC, QUE EN SU CRITERIO HAYA VIOLADO SUS DE-  
RECHOS, QUE ACCION HA TOMADO ?

- a) Ninguna
- b) Escrito una carta al gobernador, al ministro o al presidente ?
- c) Organizar un grupo de todos los afectados i escrito al gobernador, ministro o presidente?
- d) Tratar de demostrar la ilegalidad de la acción al funcionario del IERAC?
- e) Tratado de hacer regalos o algún favor al funcionario del IERAC para que cambie su decisión?
- f) Medidas inmediatas como bloquear el carretero, cortar el agua, etc?
- g) Tomado armas para resistir la decisión tomada?
- h) Otra

10. La misma No 9 pero hipotéticamente, preguntando qué haría Ud. si el IERAC tomara una decisión violando sus derechos.?



## APPENDIX B

### SROLE ANOMIA SCALE

1. There's little use writing to public officials because they often aren't really interested in the problems of the average man.  
Agree                      Disagree                      Undecided
2. Now a days a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.
3. In spite of what some people say, the average man is getting worse, not better.
4. It's hardly fair to bring children into the world with the way things look for the future.
5. These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on.
6. Most people really don't care what happens to the next fellow.
7. Next to health, money is the most important thing in life.
8. You sometimes can't help wondering whether anything is worthwhile.
9. To make money there are no right and wrong ways anymore, only easy and hard ways.

## APPENDIX B

### ESCALA MODIFICADA DE A.SROLE

#### PARA USO EN EL SISTEMA SOCIAL AGRARIO ECUATORIANO

1. No sirve de nada escribir o hablar con los empleados públicos porque no están interesados en los problemas del campesino.  
DE ACUERDO                      DESACUERDO                      INDECISO
2. Uno tiene que vivir para el presente i esperar que el mañana sea mejor.
3. La situación del campesino se hace peor i no mejor.
4. Como están las cosas es injusto traer niños al mundo.
5. Uno no sabe con qué amigos puede contar en un momento dado.
6. A la mayoría de la gente no le importa qué le pasa al vecino.
7. Después de la salud, el dinero es lo más importante en la vida.
8. A veces uno se tiene que preguntar si la vida vale la pena.
9. No hai modo bueno o malo de hacer dinero sino fácil o difícil.

APPENDIX C

POLITICAL ALIENATION

OLSEN

Political incapability/futility scale

1. I believe public officials don't care much what people like me think.

Agree                      Disagree                      Undecided

2. There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence actions of the government.
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can't really understand what's going on.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.

Discontentment or cynicism with politics

1. These days the government is trying to do too many things, including some activities that I don't think it has the right to do.

Agree                      Disagree                      Undecided

2. For the most part, the government serves the interests of a few organized groups, such as business or labor, and isn't very concerned about the needs of people like myself.
3. It seems to me that the government often fails to take necessary actions on important matters, even when most people favor such actions.
4. As the government is now organized and operated, I think it is hopelessly incapable of dealing with all the crucial problems facing the country today.

## APPENDIX C

### ESCALA MODIFICADA DE OLSEN

#### PARA USO EN EL SISTEMA SOCIAL AGRARIO ECUATORIANO

1. Yo creo que los empleados públicos no se interesan en lo que los campesinos creen.

DE ACUERDO

DESACUERDO

INDECISO

2. Al campesino no le queda otra forma que elecciones para influenciar las acciones del gobierno.

3. A veces la política i el gobierno parecen asuntos tan complicados que es difícil comprender qué es lo que está pasando.

4. Los campesinos no tienen voz ni voto en lo que el gobierno hace.

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1. El gobierno trata de hacer demasiadas cosas, incluso muchas que no tiene derecho a hacer.

DE ACUERDO

DESACUERDO

INDECISO

2. Casi siempre el gobierno sirve los intereses de los oligarcas i poderosos i no está interesado en las necesidades de los campesinos.

3. El gobierno no actúa como debe ni aun cuando tiene el respaldo popular.

4. Ea organización actual del gobierno le impide hacer frente a los más graves problemas nacionales.

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