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# Power, Decentralization and Urban Change: An Evaluation of Urban Renewal Decision Making

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POWER, DECENTRALIZATION AND URBAN CHANGE:

AN EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL DECISION MAKING

(TITLE)

BY

John Alessio  
=

**THESIS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIOLOGY

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,  
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1973

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING  
THIS PART OF THE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

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## CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

### The Development of a Problem and Hypothesis

Moving to Chicago from a predominantly non-urban and rural background made me very sensitive to the problems of our urban communities; perhaps more so than one who has gradually been exposed to the urban environment from birth and subsequently has grown accustomed to its problems. Doris B. Holleb in her book entitled Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning lists seven general common problems of our major cities. My awareness focused mainly on the first five.

1. Insufficient housing and public services as illustrated by existing slum areas.
2. A poverty cycle kept in motion by a decrepit educational system.
3. Pollution.
4. Transportation congestion.
5. Persistent racial discrimination.

My awareness of the last two problems mentioned by Holleb did not evolve until I sought answers to certain questions concerning the first five. The last two are:

6. Irrationalities in land use.
7. "The diffusion of governmental responsibility in urban areas, the fiscal inadequacies of local authorities, and the complexity of narrowly conceived, federal assistance programs which often work at cross purposes with localities."<sup>1</sup>

An awareness of the existing situation led to the question of what is being done about our urban problems. Seeking an answer to this question, I found through literary research<sup>2</sup> that the major impetus behind rehabilitating our cities is urban renewal and the more recent (1968) Model Cities Program. These programs are such that government funds are rewarded to communities that can develop a definite program that fits basic governmental requirements. This policy of filtering funds and decision-making from the federal level of government down

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<sup>1</sup>Doris B. Holleb, Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning. (Chicago, 1969), p. 20.

<sup>2</sup>(The bulk of which comes from government pamphlets received from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and United States Congressional Records)

to the citizens of local communities is a decentralized process. At this point I can state my research problem as, "What are the effects of a decentralized decision-making process on urban redevelopment?"

The next question I felt should be answered was whether or not the decentralized approach to urban problems was effective. Socio-economic studies of cities, such as New York, Boston, Atlanta, and Chicago, as well as smaller communities that have approached their problems through existing urban renewal or model cities programs, indicate that the system is not effective.

Having learned that the decentralization approach did not work positively, my next natural question was to learn why. The biggest problem has been that communities are unable to develop complete programs; and this inability is due largely to a lack of compromise among influentials within the community. In the cases where programs were produced, it was found that many of the most needed changes were compromised in order to prevent a loss of funds; or that those most affected by the changes remained passive or unapproached as a significant decision-making body.

My problem can now be narrowed down to the following guiding hypothesis: Local community interest groups inhibit the effectiveness of decentralized Federal policy in implementing programs of urban social change.

Isolated case studies do not, however, provide ample grounds for generalizations. Subsequently the next question to be answered was whether or not there was any systematic consistency between interacting community groups which could add justification to using the findings of the case studies herein as possible referents of the failure of decentralization. Many theorists who write of community power or conflict such as James Coleman, C. Wright Mills, Marvin Olsen and Pareto indicate that members of certain interest groups (as illustrated by Pareto's non-ruling elite) are very powerful people who exercise a great deal of influence over the political system and whose foremost loyalty is to their own particular interests. Our socio-political economic system is such that the most powerful interest groups are those with monetary wealth and those with monetary wealth are not those in the greatest need. Marvin Olsen makes this point quite clear with his strong emphasis on resources as the greatest determinents of social power.

A great deal of recent literature by social planners and urban sociologists is available that is complimentary to the well established theories on community power. This current literature also indicates that there is a systemic linkage between interacting community groups which serves to alienate the poor from community decision-

making -- thereby defeating the purpose of decentralization methods of urban rehabilitation. Many of the current prominent urban sociologists and social planners such as Edward C. Banfield go beyond community power theory by making the direct association between urban renewal failure and decentralization. It must be emphasized, however, that this study does not lend itself toward testing decentralization as an internally reliable policy for decision-making. What is being tested is whether or not decentralized decision-making as operationally defined herein has been implemented in urban renewal after several years of attempting to do so. If it has not been implemented, why hasn't it and what are the possibilities of it being implemented in the future?

It appears, therefore, from what has been discussed so far that the problem we have developed is a workable one and that the proposed hypothesis does have possible avenues of verifiability. Hence, two categories allow us to generalize from urban case studies: one is community power theory as represented most characteristically by Marvin Olsen, and the other is the works of social planners and sociologists who assume the nature of community power structure to be such that decentralization is ineffective. My intention is to support the



latter by reference to the former whereby rendering both as effective grounds for testing my guiding hypothesis.

### Operational Definitions of Terms

The terms below are defined in such a way so as to clarify their usage throughout the following pages of this manuscript.

Local Community Interest Groups: Interest groups that have influencing power over local politicians and/or a significant portion of public sentiment within a community.

Decentralized Federal Policy: Providing communities with funds to solve their own problems with their own plans, thereby having those most affected by decisions making them. In urban renewal the decision makers should be the bottom rung of the ladder, i.e., the urban poor, since it is they whom urban renewal is overtly geared toward.

Urban: ". . . a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals."<sup>3/</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," in Urbanism in World Perspective: A Reader, ed. Sylvia Fleis Fava, New York, 1963, p. 49.

Urban Social Change: Change that will benefit the poor most effectively, not exclusive of all other interrelating factors.

Metropolitan Area: Any central city and immediately surrounding areas that are either depended upon, or dependent upon an exchange of services with that central city.

Poverty: Federal standard of \$3,000 or less annually. (Recently changed to \$3,968 for a family of four).<sup>4/</sup> Annual income is a very general way of discriminating between the poor and non-poor and is useful in making concise statistical reference to poverty. It must be pointed out, however, that in a stratified society such as ours, poverty as defined by income is relative to the existence of people with higher incomes and the general standard of living. Hence, when "poverty elimination" is eluded to in this study, the author is not suggesting the ultimate form of classlessness but more realistically every urban individual having an equal opportunity to aspire to the maximum physical and mental health

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<sup>4/</sup>When the research for this study was completed, the poverty level income was still \$3,000 annually. Consequently, my reference to and statistical examples concerning poverty are all based on the \$3,000 level. Considering the recency of the change to \$3,968, finding replacement statistics based on published research would be an impossibility.



standards presently possible. Reaching this standard is not necessarily determined by equal income because one can have an income more than sufficient to afford him the just mentioned opportunity. On the other hand adequate social planning might afford an individual access to maximum physical and mental health without necessarily affording him the additional luxuries of a higher income person. One must keep in mind that low income is just one of many ways of identifying poverty.

Planned Change: Deliberate manipulation of resources so as to attain predetermined political, social, or economic goals.

Central City: The boundaries with which a city is legally and politically defined.

Migration: Movement of family residence from one area to another in the United States.

Immigration: Movement of family residence from another country to the United States.

Automation: "In the most general sense, the substitution of machine power for manpower; more specifically, the use of -- and the whole trend toward the use of -- automatically controlled mechanical and electronic devices . . ."<sup>5/</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Thomas Ford Hault, Dictionary of Modern Sociology, New Jersey, 1969, p. 24.

Substandard Housing: Living quarters that do not meet the American Public Health Association requirements for living as given below or otherwise indicated by authors referred to throughout this paper.

"Living quarters must provide adequate heat (and coolness), purity of air, illumination, and protection from excessive noise. There must be provision for individual privacy. A room of one's own is ideal; at most, it should be shared with another person of the same sex or with one's spouse. Adequate space is required. There must be proper facilities for homemaking and cleanliness, safe water, sanitation, and refrigeration. Protection must be afforded against accident, fire, and electric shock."<sup>6</sup>

Social Power: As generally defined by Marvin Olsen, social power is an energy like phenomenon which affords a social actor(s) the ability to affect social life.

"Social power", though very abstract in itself, can be and usually is the result of an imbalance of tangible resources which can empirically affect decision-making and future application of additionally available resources. A decentralized decision-making policy perpetuates tangible resources as the major determinants of social power because of its inability to accurately legitimize power, i.e., hold accountable one body of people for the overall balance and quality resulting from the decisions made. When intan-

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<sup>6</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 51.

gible resources, such as knowledge and objectivity, can be the determinants of social power, the chances are better of getting intangible results such as the just mentioned quality and balance. Hence, though the essence of social power does not necessarily change, its strength and the results of its application are very much affected by the ability of the decision-making policy to control the resources that determine the power.

#### Method, Data and Purpose

There has been much literature written on power theory as well as various subcategories of power theory such as those mentioned above, i.e., conflict theory and elitest theory. There have also been many community power studies done, most of which are based on either the decision-making technique or the reputational technique (as developed by Floyd Hunter) which either implemented a form of power theory or attempted to add credence to a particular theory or theorist. Surprisingly enough, we can also find numerous case studies of urban renewal. To this writer's knowledge, however, there has been very little application of power theory to urban renewal -- in theory or practice. One of the closest to filling this description is a quantitative study done by

Amos Hawley whereby he hypothesized an association between managerial and public official ratios and urban renewal success. Hawley's study, though a major contribution to the area of community power, does not cover the scope nor fulfill the purposes of the study herein.

A major purpose of this study is to show the relevance of power theory as a theoretical base for developing future urban planning trends and decision-making procedures. With this as an over-all goal, several sub-goals are brought into play in order to fill the gaps between levels of abstraction. By this is meant that unless a gradual incline is developed between the practical realities of everyday planning and the very high level of theory, one can only make suggestions that are purely philosophical in nature and which would most likely have little value in an area that is already well stocked with prominent theorists. From a purely step-by-step point of view, one can recognize the various levels just mentioned above from the chronological progression of the study itself. It begins with a somewhat theoretical and historical causal explanation for our urban problems, first focusing specifically on housing. Next is the planned reaction to housing as an urban problem and the subse-

quent additional programs. Following a brief survey of the programs is a look at the results of the programs through several case studies of urban renewal. To supplement the urban renewal case studies and to add an additional link between urban renewal and power theory, community power studies are also referred to. And finally, urban renewal is evaluated in terms of some of the most basic power theory concepts as they apply to the general findings of the case studies.

Though the above broad steps give the format of this study and demonstrate the progression of different levels toward its most general goals, they do not represent the method nor the more specific sub-goals that must be approached before broader generalizations can be provided.

The method used in this study is library research for the purpose of bringing together the quantitative and qualitative research of others who have done work in one of various interrelated areas. It should be pointed out that this is intended as a pilot study to be useful for researchers doing work toward interrelating empirically the various areas herein. The study itself is not intended to be empirical and therefore any conclusions that are made must be considered as highly tentative guidelines.



The value of this method is in the scope it allows the researcher to cover: the synchronization of, and credit given to, more specific, and quantitative works; and, the ability afforded the researcher to overlap and interrelate the empirical world as portrayed by quantitative methodologists and theoretical abstractions of the world as portrayed by various theorists. Any significant amount of verification attributable to this study can only be derived from the researcher's ability to interpret and synthesize the findings of others in a meaningful and perhaps useful way. Analogous to fitting a puzzle, the writer has put together various pieces which appear to create a total picture. Admittedly there are many pieces unaccounted for which when fit into their proper place might distort the entire image. It is the author's contention that the logic employed in interrelating the various sources of this study does purport sufficiently valid arguments toward a degree of verifiability of the proposed guiding hypothesis.

By establishing and overlapping the following six items or sub-goals, the author will attempt to develop a descriptive but nevertheless integrated chain of assumptions which when adequately demonstrated will add subsequent support to his hypothesis. The items and sources to be used for each are as follows:

1. Our major metropolitan areas have certain problems in common.

Substandard housing and avoidable illnesses are two of the major problems which will be illustrated by use of statistics from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and other interpretive secondary sources using these statistics such as Doris Holleb's Social and Economics Information for Urban Planning and Alvin Schorr's Slums & Social Insecurity.

2. These problems are directly related to poverty.

A great part of this material will come from a study done by Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan entitled New Homes and Poor People; and various other sources which show the relationship between poverty and substandard housing.<sup>6</sup>

3. Our present national policy toward dealing with urban problems is one of decentralization.

Congressional Records will be used along with information received from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and other works such as Scott Greer's Urban Renewal in American Cities, all of which will state the procedure that is followed before urban renewal programs are implemented.

4. Decentralization of funds and decision-making has not been an effective means for implementing programs of social change (as operationally defined for this study).

This is demonstrated by sources which point out present housing shortages and the amount of poverty that still exists as evidenced by

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<sup>6</sup>As pointed out quite generally in pages 23-25 and 35-40 there are numerous interrelating factors that are all symptomatic of poverty. The author has used substandard housing, however, as the main empirical referent of poverty because it is housing that our urban renewal programs have most directly focused on.

income and infant mortality rates. Also, an analysis of several follow-up studies on urban renewal will be made to determine what the programs set out to accomplish, how well the goals were attained, and just as important whether or not all the requirements were in actuality fulfilled--mainly active citizen participation, which is the major argument used in favor of a decentralized urban policy.

5. Decentralization is implemented by local decision-making authorities.

This will be illustrated (aside from by mere definition of decentralization) by a combination of references used in three and four above, i.e., specifications for program approval and special committees and political figures instrumental in making decisions in urban areas thus far. Additional reference will be made to the development of the more permanent local organizations such as the Chicago Housing Authority.

6. Local community power structures control local decision-making authority.

Power theory and community studies will be used to further verify and interpret the findings of the various urban renewal case studies.

7. The poor are the least powerful of all segments of the community.

References will be made to Olsen's power theory, i.e., the lack of resources on the part of the poor prevents them from being powerful and subsequently inhibits their mobility, i.e., perpetuates the poverty cycle.

One can readily see what this all leads to:

since decisions are affected greatly by local community power structures and the poor are the least powerful of all local structures, it logically follows that it is they who least determine their own fate through urban renewal.



The keystone to this entire study is item four above, which for the most part is represented by Chapter IV of the text. Clearly, since so few renewal case studies have had any significant active citizen participation in their decision-making processes, urban renewal as a means of helping the poor help themselves is held to serious question and the hypothesis proposed at the onset of this study is afforded a great deal of support: Local community interest groups inhibit the effectiveness of decentralized federal policy in implementing urban change.

The content of Chapter IV which is a survey of renewal case studies in twenty-four cities would be considered the most significant portion of the data used in this study; though in a qualitative study of this nature the entire manuscript is composed of various data from various sources.

The procedure involved surveying all sources for case studies on decision-making or citizen participation in urban redevelopment and objectively evaluating the decision-making process. For the purpose of conserving time and space and avoiding much repetitious reading, only twelve of the twenty-four cities surveyed will be discussed. For the convenience of the reader the author has devised an evaluative chart of the twelve cities not

discussed which can be found in Appendix A. The chart is divided into certain categories which were found to be prominent throughout the various case studies.

The author refers to essays and studies by urban planners and the findings of the controversial Bosselman Report to demonstrate the feasibility and need for a more centralized form of decision-making in urban planning. As with most studies of this type, the reader should be warned of various cautions to be taken before drawing any conclusions of his own or accepting any conclusions drawn by the author. First, the reader is reminded that, although objectivity has been a major goal throughout this study, there is no way of being certain that the findings of others are equally objective. Secondly, there is a great deal of material published that may contradict the findings of this research which are not dealt with individually at any significant length in this study. It might also be pointed out, however, that though the case studies in this report are taken from secondary sources, it is of some value that they are representative of a wide variety of authors whereby they are just as likely to be biased in favor of present renewal policies as against them. For obvious reasons, politicians are always anxious to have success stories published on their behalf.

It appeared, however, that sources that were seemingly intended to make certain urban renewal programs look good, were in effect self-defeating and very few in number.

Finally, the study covers too wide a scope to be accepted without a great deal of equivocation and further investigation through either quantitative research or other sources. It is the author's hope in having this investigation to initiate or perhaps in some small way add stimulation to a closer working association between what has been revealed through the works of power theorists, through the quantitative findings of community power studies, and through our past and present experiences in urban renewal so that an urban policy can be developed that will truly activate the resources available to us. Aware that such a wide area has been covered, the reader should realize no one particular portion of this area could be covered extensively within the time afforded the researcher to complete the study itself.

## CHAPTER II: COMMON METROPOLITAN PROBLEMS

Anyone who has ever spent a day in the inner city of one of our major metropolitan areas could very easily experience many of our major urban problems. Perhaps an example of a purely hypothetical but highly possible routine of events on a typical Chicago day will illustrate my point.

You've just moved to the far Northwest side of Chicago. You've been in the Loop (downtown business district) once, two days ago for a job interview; it was the middle of the afternoon and since you live just off the Kennedy Expressway the ride took only fifteen minutes. Today you are beginning your newly acquired nine-to-five job and you decide to leave at 8:30 to impress your boss by getting to work fifteen minutes early. As you enter the Kennedy you suddenly realize that the sixty miles per hour of two days ago has been reduced to a meager bumper-to-bumper five miles per hour and sometimes a dead standstill--it's rush hour and what's more there's a stalled car in one of the lanes. At 9:45 you pull into the underground parking trying to think of what you are going to say to your boss and consequently forget to mark the location of your car. After work you spend about an hour and a half trying to

locate your car unaware of the fact that you are not in the correct underground level let alone the proper section. In your frustration and confusion you decide to take the "L" home. Upon receiving only fifty cents change you ask the cashier if perhaps he has short-changed you and he assures you that he has not. Never having been on the "L" before, as is quite common for beginning commuters you get on going the wrong direction. Being very tired you fall asleep. Waking up a half hour later, you peer out your window at a small portion of the decrepitness of the south side. Whether or not you get mugged, whether or not you ever see the Cabrini homes just east of the Kennedy or go far enough south to really learn what pollution smells like, you've had a very educational day. You've experienced the time consuming struggle of rush hour traffic congestion and most likely a great deal of the exhaust that goes with it. You've experienced the exorbitant prices of public transportation upon which the poor depend a great deal for inner city mobility. You've seen at least a part of the south side, its poverty and perhaps even noticed a school building or two with their boarded up windows; and unless you are blind you certainly noticed that the



south side consists of black people only--a world apart from your northwest side middle class neighborhood where everyone is white.

What is the seriousness of these problems, and just how real and widespread are they? In 1965, in certain blighted areas of our cities, infant mortality ratios were over forty per thousand as compared to ten in many of our better neighborhoods and twenty-four and seven-tenths nationwide.<sup>7</sup> A great percentage of this infant mortality is black, not only because they cannot afford the proper care, but because there are still many cases of discrimination against them whereby services that should be granted everyone are denied them on the basis of so called "hospital policy" or "regulations".

As a child grows up he is cast into an educational system that badly lacks the facilities needed to adequately provide him with the educational stimulus that is vital for survival in our present fast moving complex society.

". . . educational expenditures of central cities are considerably below those in suburban towns, not only on a per capita basis but on a per pupil basis. Yet, the local tax burden in the central cities,

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<sup>7</sup>Doris B. Holleb, Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning, (Chicago, 1969), p. 20.

measured against income, is more than fifty percent greater than in the suburbs."<sup>8</sup>/

That our city is plagued with compounding problems is nothing new. Ernest Erber quotes J. L. Sert who wrote Can Our Cities Survive? twenty-eight years ago.

"... the city is breaking up. Such dispersion of great cities knows neither control nor planning. It is provoked by urban chaos itself, and is facilitated by modern means of transportation."<sup>9</sup>/

Today our complex expressway systems have de-emphasized the importance of public transportation. The expressway system has not, however, stifled the dispersion of the city. To the contrary, it has increased it and brought with it the additional problems of increased pollution, displaced people because of land usage, higher inner city transit fares, and with the continued migration of the middle class whites out of the city (made possible by expressway transportation), a lower inner city tax base. The author is not proposing transportation as our major source of urban problems. He is merely emphasizing the fact that though the problems of the city were recognized and written about by men such as Sert, nothing has been done in a comprehensive manner to solve these prob-

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid, p. 33.

<sup>9</sup>Ernest Erber, Introduction, Urban Planning in Transition, (New York, 1970), p. xiv.

lems. In the words of Doris Holleb:

"At the Metropolitan level, which is one 'Comprehensive' in a geographic sense, the range of planning activities is usually narrow. It has been largely confined to what is generally called 'functional' planning . . ."<sup>10</sup>

The following section will reaffirm the fact that our metropolitan areas have problems and will show the relationship of many of these problems to their most deeply rooted source--poverty.

Automation, Migration, and Poverty:  
Theoretical and Historical Background

Contrary to what many people may believe, inadequate housing is certainly not a twentieth century phenomena. Some authors trace housing problems back to the early settlements when people had no housing at all and had to build lean-tos for temporary protection from the weather. The major concern of this study, however, is urban housing, and again it must be stated that it is not a recent problem. Eighteenth century residents of major cities such as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston were already moving out of the city toward what we know today as the suburbs. Glenn Beyer in his book, Housing and Society, speculates that they were at that

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<sup>10</sup>Doris B. Holleb, Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning, (Chicago, 1969), p.10.



time beginning to move for many of the same reasons that people today flee from the central cities. Nineteenth century industrialization made migrating explanations more obvious. With the expanding and overcrowding of the cities, more and more people sought refuge in the suburbs to escape the rapidly growing deplorable conditions. The multi-directional flux of people beginning with the massive growth of Nineteenth century industrialism, made adequate housing facilities at that time an almost impossible reality. Foreigners were either being repelled by some adverse force in their own country or attracted by the promise of opportunity afforded them by industrialization's demand for labor in the large cities of the United States. Eventually rural people also began to migrate toward the large industrial areas in hope of finding work. Between 1910 and 1920, the United States passed the mid-point toward being more urban than rural.<sup>11/</sup> From 1820 to 1950, forty million immigrants found their way to the United States; the overwhelming majority of which settled in the larger industrial cities. As new generations of American born people were added to the population growth

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<sup>11</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 1965), p. 33.

and immigration began to taper off, the amount of foreign born people in the United States decreased. In 1920, one out of eight Americans were foreign born, in 1940 one out of eleven and in 1960, one out of every fifteen.<sup>12/</sup> These statistics might lead one to believe that the pressure was finally being taken off the incredible housing demands of our cities. Unfortunately, the statistics are somewhat deceptive in that respect, for though the amount of immigration began to decrease, the amount of American born people was increasing in number and rate. More important still was that the rapidly increasing automation of agricultural and mining areas stimulated a new wave of migratory trends toward the low income, already overcrowded, areas of the city. As Shannon and Shannon point out in their, The Assimilation of Migrants to Cities, the effects of rural to urban migration in this country are far from insignificant grounds for intensive observation and study of migratory trends.

"Quite apart from either real or perceived benefits, or added life burdens for individual migrants, the nature of contact and interaction between either new arrivals and members of the urban society, or between different ethnic and racial groups within

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<sup>12</sup>Lyle W. Shannon and Magdaline Shannon, The Assimilation of Migrants to Cities, ed. Schoore Fagin, vol. I, pp. 49-75, (California, 1967), pp. 49, 50.

urban society, indicates that far reaching public consequences of both earlier and latter-day population movements are continuing to generate."<sup>13/</sup>

The authors make more explicit their emphasis of the poor southern whites, blacks and Mexican-Americans movement to the urban areas when they state:

"Were one selecting a laboratory for the study of migration, and the process of acculturation and assimilation in individuals and groups that takes place as a consequence, there would be no better setting than Northern industrial cities, the way stations to which migrants first move, and the depressed areas from which they came."<sup>14/</sup>

The overemphasis on efficiency and capital gains by the large land and mine owners epitomized the need for controlled change through social planning--an area to be dealt with more specifically in a later chapter of this study. The additional burden of the rural migrant to the cities has had devastating effects on the migrant as well as the urban area to which he migrates.

"Modern agriculture is indeed a proud accomplishment, but it has left a social skeleton in the closet. In the United States the rapid growth of productivity per acre and per man since the 1930's has cut in half the number of farms, . . ."<sup>15/</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>15</sup>Kenneth R. Schneider, Destiny of Change, (Chicago, 1968), p. 29.

The above quote could just as well have been said in regard to mining automation. During the 1950's the deep coal miners of the Appalachian areas (such as parts of Pennsylvania and Virginia) were being either automated or replaced by strip mining. Thousands of people were forced to give up the only type of work they had known for the greatest part of their lives and search for industrial jobs in the city. Consequently, many of the mining towns were deserted and taken completely out of the housing cycle, creating a new demand on housing needs.

Kenneth Schneider in Destiny of Change takes a seemingly cold but most likely realistic point of view concerning the plight of the rural-urban migrant. Schneider believes that the decision of the farm worker to move to the city was one of choosing the worst of two evils. He terms the movement of the agricultural worker (similarly applicable to the miner) as one of "premature migration" and explains his choice of terminology as follows:

"If a rural person is underemployed but requires very little in paid 'services' he is not much of a burden on the resources applicable to development. But if he migrates to a city and is unemployed there, where he must be sustained by more complete

and sophisticated services, he becomes a heavier drain upon the small and struggling modern sector of the economy."<sup>16</sup>/

Schneider's assessment of the rural to urban migratory consequences may or may not be empirically accurate. It is not likely, however, that an individual would leave his familiar environment and the only life he knows without good reason. His existing situation must have been such that even a long move to an unfamiliar place seemed worth taking a chance. Hence, the value in Schneider's statement lies in his inadvertent criticism of the general lack of perception and control in regard to innovative and technological change.

Bernard Weissbourd openly criticizes our lack of foresight (possibly concern) when he states "The disproportionate amount of the federal budget allotted to agriculture has helped bring about the mechanization of the farm and speeded up the migration of both Negro and white farm labor to the city."<sup>17</sup>/

Another noteworthy result of technological change was the effect that it had on the upper class of the urban areas. With the influx of migrants and immigrants, the upper class city dweller who maintained his business

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 173.

<sup>17</sup>Bernard Weissbourd, "Segregation, Subsidies, and Megalopolis," in Urbanism in World Perspectives: A Reader, ed. Sylvia Fleis Fava (New York, 1968), p. 547.



affairs in the city was forced to either be a part of the overcrowded, rapidly degenerating city or move to the outer fringe. When migration first started toward the suburbs, only a select wealthy few were able to afford the expenses of transportation.

"Residence in the early suburbs was limited to those who could afford to live away from the city and were financially able to maintain some means of transportation between the city and their homes. As railroads or trolleys came to be provided, wealthy citizens built estates within driving or walking distances of them."<sup>18</sup>/

Technological advancements made migration to the suburbs available on a wider scale for the upper and upper middle class people. Innovation such as the septic tank to replace the cesspool made sanitation possible on a larger scale. More efficient house building played an important role in meeting the suburban housing demands. Construction companies found it most profitable and convenient to build several homes in a particular area at the same time. Techniques in building massive highway systems and the mass production of the automobile alleviated the expensive transportation problem. Though many people believe that the extensive use of the automobile for commuting purposes is currently more of a problem than the

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<sup>18</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York), p. 360.

problem it alleviated, there is little doubt that it was extremely instrumental in freeing the upper middle class whites from the central city. To quote Glenn Beyer: "The automobile was very likely, the one technological improvement that made living in suburbs feasible for large numbers of people."<sup>19/</sup>

Beyer quotes Martin Meyerson, Barbara Terreth, and William L. C. Wheaton's book, Housing, People, and Cities, to point out that though many people consider the move to the suburbs an additional luxury, it is believed by some that it was simply the result of choosing the lesser of the two evils, i.e., commuting everyday from the distant suburbs or living in the rapidly changing overcrowded city.<sup>20/</sup> Eventually, there was an additional incentive given to the middle class whites to leave the central city, which added additional ramifications to the plight of the poor.

"... federal housing subsidies, which, purported to be neutral, have in fact subsidized low-density middle income living in the suburbs and have thereby financed the flight of white populations from the city."<sup>21/</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 362.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Bernard Weissbourd, "Segregation, Subsidies, and Megalopolis," in Urbanism in World Perspectives: A Reader, ed. Sylvia Fleis Fava (New York, 1968), p. 540.

This phenomena added a fresh spin to the poverty cycle for with them, in their flight to the suburbs, the middle class whites took their tax revenues, thereby depleting considerably the inner city tax base. As the situation evolved the old song phrase "the rich get richer and the poor get poorer" became a living reality as exemplified by the following quote from Hans Blumenfeld: "A family with an annual income of \$3,000 is likely to pay 6 percent of it for real estate taxes, one with a \$30,000 income, about 2 percent of its income."<sup>22</sup>/ Though a greater portion of the lower income family's pay is taken (6%) as compared to the upper middle class family's (2%); the lower income family contributing much less to the services of his community--\$180 as compared to the \$600 contributed to the community in which the upper middle class individual lives. The true paradox of this entire phenomenon lies in the obvious fact that "Poor people can pay only little in taxes and need many services. Wealthy people pay higher taxes and need fewer services."<sup>23</sup>/ As was earlier pointed out by the quote from Doris Holleb, education is no exception to the consequences of the de-

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<sup>22</sup>Hans Blumenfeld, "The Rational Use of Urban Space as National Policy," in Urban Planning in Transaction, ed. Ernest Erber (New York, 1970), p. 96.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid.



manding inner city tax base. The importance of education in our society I am sure must be realized by all, especially those who have little of it. The less education one has today, the less are his chances of finding a job. One can easily see the cyclical consequences of this phenomenon. With little education and training upon entering the city the poor cannot obtain jobs. Without jobs they become dependent upon the welfare system and inner-city low income housing which subsequently immobilizes them. With the increasing amount of slums, the middle class escape to the suburbs causing the inner-city tax base to decrease considerably. The poor who for the most part are the only remaining source of revenue cannot adequately provide a revenue base sufficient for their needed services, foremost of which is education. As the educational system depreciates so do the chances of each succeeding generation of getting a good job and gaining the mobility that their parents lacked. Chester Hartman suggests there are twelve million United States families living below acceptable standards:

"It is absolutely clear to all but the most resistant that the vast majority of these twelve million families are not going to secure decent housing through the process of 'normal' mobility, and that existing

government programs to aid this sector of the population are hopelessly inadequate to the task, qualitatively as well as quantitatively."<sup>24</sup>/


In addition to the lower inner-city tax base, mobilization of the middle class caused massive rush hour transportation problems since the middle class continue to hold inner-city business and office jobs. While expressway transportation allowed for the escape of the middle class from the slums, it also allowed for their escape from pollution which, due to old and massive industrial techniques, is concentrated within or close to the inner-city. The expressway transportation not only left the poor to wallow in the already existing pollution but added an additional source of pollution. The following flow diagram roughly illustrates the above described cycle of which urban poverty is the base or independent variable with automation, industrialization and migration as antecedent conditions. The latter mentioned variables are antecedents simply because putting an end to them will not necessarily alter significantly the already existing cycle.

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<sup>24</sup>Chester W. Hartman, "The Politics of Housing," in Political Power and the Urban Crisis, ed. Alan Shank (Boston, 1969), p. 434.

(The programs loosely referred to in this section will be discussed in more detail in Chapter III.)

DIAGRAM A



Hence, we have briefly explored the various migratory trends that brought the poor to their still existing predicament in the inner-city. The important thing to remember from this section is that automation sent thousands of people scurrying to the cities in search of jobs where few jobs were to be had that fit the agricultural worker or miners' qualifications. Without an adequate income, these people could not afford to buy or rent a decent home and were forced into overcrowded sub-standard conditions.

As Clifford Jansen points out in his book, Readings in the Sociology of Migration, there are two major causes of geographical population movements:

1) a need to leave in spite of or beyond economic factors (e.g., political or religious reasons), 2) economic factors.<sup>25/</sup> The latter category is the dominating force behind the bulk of the internal migration of the United States. The southern farm worker or miner who is left without a job as a result of automation is being both pushed by the lack of economic opportunity at his present location and pulled by the possibility of higher welfare payments and/or finding industrial work in the city. Unfortunately, the latter possibility is not a very big one and with each additional migrant, it becomes noticeably smaller. For according to Dick Netzer in Economic and Urban Problems, since 1950 ninety percent of all employment opportunities in the United States has been in white-collar positions.<sup>26/</sup> Training programs such as the Job Corps have attempted to alleviate the problem of unskilled or limited skilled unemployed workers. Success, however, has been rather modest in comparison to the perpetual job demands that continue to arise.

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<sup>25</sup>Clifford Jansen, Readings in the Sociology of Migration, (New York, 1970), p. 39.

<sup>26</sup>Dick Netzer, Economic and Urban Problems, (New York, 1970), p. 116.

Another recent attempt to find a place for the poor has been in the form of mediators between professionals and their clients. This is an effort to provide communication between the highly professional and non-professional and at the same time provide an additional employment opportunity.<sup>27/</sup> Again, the results are far from being realized as a viable solution to hard core unemployment.

"Differences between the urban North and rural South and Southwest have been accentuated over a period of time. The transitional process from labor -- intensive production with skilled or unskilled labor, to mass production and assembly lines, and finally to automation, has had as its consequences for urban dwellers, a rather continuous upward movement in the occupational hierarchy. Traditionally this has left positions at the lowest level for new arrivals, but the lowest levels have also been moving up in terms of the years of formal education required for a regular place in the economic order. This also means that the proportion of workers that can be absorbed into the economy as completely unskilled laborers is decreasing."<sup>28/</sup>

While migration is a consequence of economic factors, overcrowded, substandard housing is a consequence of both economic factors and migration. There is somewhat of a parallel between housing and the above stated quote which will be illustrated in the forthcoming

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<sup>27</sup>Charles Grosser, William E. Henry, and James G. Kelly, Nonprofessionals in the Human Services, (San Francisco, 1969).

<sup>28</sup>Lyle W. Shannon and Magdaline Shannon, "The Assimilation of Migrants to Cities," ed. Schoore Fagin, vol. 1. pp. 49-75, (California, 1967), p. 35.



sections on housing sequences. Statistically, however, there is more than just a parallel between economic status and substandard housing; there is a direct correlation.

Substandard Housing: Limited Housing Sequences


The quote toward the end of the preceding section pointed out that in theory when economic opportunity has upward mobility those filling the new, top positions should be leaving vacancies for advancement on down the income scale. In reality, however, those at the bottom of the income scale are stagnating because of the constant influx of young, better educated men who by their own credentials raise the standards of the position they fill thus making it even more difficult for less educated, lower income people to advance to that position or one similar to it.

Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan in their book entitled New Homes and Poor People describe housing as a similar sequential phenomenon. One might logically rationalize since 70 per cent of all people who move, move into more expensive homes, that when a man with a \$20,000 annual income builds a new \$30,000 home he is leaving an indefinite chain of vacancies on down the income scale



each of which when filled will represent a move upward in the quality of housing. The following hypothetical flow diagram where each capital letter represents a home illustrates the thinking behind the above statement:

DIAGRAM B



As one can see, the new home owner of (A) caused a vacancy when he moved out of (B) and the person moving into (B) made (C) available and so on down the line with each less expensive house being available to a lower income person.

The chart below, followed by three general rules for buying a home, will be an aid in explaining the error involved in Diagram B. Chart A indicates the percentage distribution of homes among varied price ranges in each of six or more sequential positions.

Chart A

Sequence

|   |                    | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4      | 5      | 6 or more |
|---|--------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----------|
| F<br>C<br>O<br>S<br>I<br>N<br>G<br>U<br>S<br>I<br>O<br>N<br>S | Less than<br>5,000 | *      | 1      | 2      | 3      | 3      | *         |
|   | 5,000 -<br>9,999   | 1      | 5      | 10     | 6      | 15     | 14        |
|   | 10,000 -<br>14,999 | 9      | 22     | 21     | 30     | 12     | 7         |
|   | 15,000 -<br>19,999 | 24     | 30     | 27     | 28     | 32     | 57        |
|   | 20,000 -<br>24,999 | 20     | 19     | 18     | 14     | 15     | 9         |
|   | 25,000 -<br>34,999 | 28     | 15     | 12     | 13     | 25     | 11        |
|   | 35,000<br>and up   | 18     | 8      | 10     | 6      | *      | 2         |
| H<br>O<br>U<br>S<br>I<br>N<br>G                               |                    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100    | 100       |
|   | Median             | 23,000 | 17,800 | 17,200 | 16,000 | 17,500 | 16,900    |
|   | Mean               | 25,900 | 20,400 | 19,700 | 18,100 | 18,000 | 17,300    |

\* = Less than one per cent.

(Above chart taken from New Homes and Poor People by Lansing, Clifton, and Wade, p. 107).

Glenn Beyer, in his book entitled Housing and Society, suggests the following:

1. A home buyer should pay no more than two or two and one-half times his annual income.
2. One month's house expenses should not exceed one week's pay, or between twenty and twenty-five percent of his monthly income.
3. One week's pay should equal one percent of the price of the house; i.e., \$60 a week for a \$6,000 house, \$100 for a \$10,000 house.<sup>29/</sup>

According to these standards, a person making five thousand dollars annually or less would be in the market for a home worth approximately ten thousand dollars. As is evidenced by Chart A, there is a low percentage of housing available at that price range in any position in the sequence and the mean price for homes for the sequence positions below the fifth is \$17,300-- a considerable amount more than the ten thousand afforded. In most metropolitan areas (these statistics were taken from seventeen major United States metropolitan areas) not only are there few homes available in the ten thousand dollar bracket, but the quality of a home in that price range is extremely questionable in itself. According to

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<sup>29</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 1965), p. 67.

the 1960 census, eighteen percent of all occupied housing is substandard.

" . . . Based on a definition which would count almost any watertight building with indoor plumbing as standard. An additional 8 percent were described as 'deteriorating' and were for the most part barely livable; 12 percent had more than one person per room and were so overcrowded that their occupants were undeniably ill-housed."<sup>30</sup>/

It can also be seen from Chart A that very few new homes are built under a cost of \$15,000 (also note the mean cost of new homes is \$25,900). Consequently, people who have an income which affords them a home for less than \$15,000 are dependent on the lower sequence positions, i.e., the lower the income, the lower the sequence that one must depend on for a home. This phenomenon might not be so strikingly important if there indeed were a continuous number of positions made available by each new sequence. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It was found that out of a sample of 1,000 new home owners, 23.8 percent, i.e., 238 of the 1,000 left no vacancy behind when they moved into their new home. When the remaining 762 vacancies were filled, only 554 remained. The last of the (for the most part) short-lived sequences

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<sup>30</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 2.

(i.e., close to 70 percent ended at the fifth position) ended at the nineteenth position. Only 18.2 percent remained by the sixth position. The following chart illustrates the complete results of the sample.<sup>31/</sup>

Chart B

| Sequence<br>Position* | Houses<br>Available | Sequence<br>Position | Houses<br>Available |
|-----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| 1                     | 1,000               | 11                   | 30                  |
| 2                     | 762                 | 12                   | 21                  |
| 3                     | 554                 | 13                   | 15                  |
| 4                     | 372                 | 14                   | 10                  |
| 5                     | 260                 | 15                   | 7                   |
| 6                     | 182                 | 16                   | 5                   |
| 7                     | 127                 | 17                   | 3                   |
| 8                     | 89                  | 18                   | 2                   |
| 9                     | 62                  | 19                   | 1                   |
| 10                    | 43                  | 20                   | 0                   |

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<sup>31</sup>John B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, and James N. Morgan, New Homes and Poor People, (Michigan, 1969), p. 14.

\*Sequence position equals the group of houses made available by people moving into the next lowest group. For example, position 1 equals 1,000 new homes and position 2 equals 762 homes vacated by the people moving into the 1,000 new homes.



Chart A points out that the greatest percentage of houses in most sequences including the sixth and below are in the \$15,000 - \$20,000 bracket which according to Beyer's standards is equivalent to a \$7,000 - \$10,000 income. It was pointed out earlier that circumstances would be extremely difficult for a person making \$5,000 annually to find adequate housing within his range. According to the President's Committee on Urban Housing of 1969, "There are approximately 7.8 million households unable to afford decent housing, even after giving account to existing subsidized units."<sup>32</sup> Of the 7.8 million, about 50 percent make under \$3,000 annually, (which until recently was considered to be the federal poverty level; now it is \$3,968 for a family of four). If decent housing is difficult to find for someone with a \$5,000 income, consider the problem that the millions making under \$3,000 annually are faced with. Since poorer people have more difficulty in finding adequate housing, they invariably wind up living in a terribly decrepit or overcrowded home as indicated by the 7.8 million who are poorly housed or by going way beyond their means to afford a more adequate living unit. Consequently, it is not uncommon to find people who can least afford high housing costs paying

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<sup>32</sup>The President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 50.

well beyond 30 percent of their monthly income for housing as opposed to the recommended 20 to 25 percent. The just mentioned phenomenon in housing is described by Glenn Beyer when he refers to what is known as Schwabe's Law: ". . . expenditures for housing increase with increases in family income, but at a slower rate as income increases."<sup>33</sup>/ The key to this statement is "slower rate" as exemplified by Beyer in the following statistics from upstate New York between 1957 and 1962: the median price paid for a house for a family with an annual income of \$3,500 was \$10,320, which is about three times the income. On the other hand, the median price paid for families with an annual median income of \$15,000 was \$29,000 which is about 1.7 times the income.<sup>34</sup>/ Hence, one can see through this example of housing, a very common consequence of poverty, i.e., the smaller the total income the greater the percentage of that income that goes into a fixed cost which still typically yields substandard results. A very close parallel can be drawn between housing costs and the inner-city tax base. Although, as noted previously, the lower income inner-city individual pays a greater per-

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<sup>33</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 1965), p. 67.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 362

centage of his income for taxes than the suburbanite, he pays much less in actual tax dollars; thus, there is less money available for services despite the fact that his needs are greater than those of the suburbanite.

As indicated by Chart B, one of the major housing problems of the poor lies in the fact that too many housing sequences end before they are extended into the lower income person's price range. What are some of the causal factors that explain the shortness of most housing sequences? According to Lansing, Clifton, and Morgan, there are two main reasons for a sequence coming to an end: 1) the housing unit may be removed from the stock of housing, i.e., it may be destroyed, turned into a warehouse, summer cottage, etc.; 2) people moving into the last opening may not leave another opening (young people leaving home, etc.). A third category, not quite as significant as the just mentioned categories is that of people moving into housing from institutions or from outside the United States. An outline form breakdown of these three categories would be as follows:

- I. 20% removed from housing stock
  - a. 1% accidentally (fire or storm)
  - b. 8% deliberately for highways, parks, etc.
  - c. 4% remodeled to become part of a larger unit
  - d. 3% converted to non-residential purposes
  - e. 4% seasonal occupancy

- II. 63% no vacancy left behind
  - a. 47% newlyweds living previously with parents
  - b. 14% living with other relatives
  - c. 2% residents split up (e.g., college students or divorcees.)
- III. 17% came from institutions or outside of United States.<sup>35/</sup>

With so many families being displaced, and so many new families looking for homes, one can see why the moderate income quality home is seldom exposed to the buying power of the lower income people. The amount of housing destroyed alone has a striking effect on the extremely lower income family and his ability to find housing even of the quality that might be expected from his own conceivable price range.

Housing is simply not being produced rapidly enough to sufficiently meet the rapidly growing housing demands. A projected estimate of housing needs by 1978 taken from the President's Committee on Urban Housing is as follows:

- 13.4 million units for new young families
- 8.7 million units to replace or rehabilitate homes
- 3.0 million units to replace standard units destroyed for land use
- 1.6 million to allow for vacancies for mobility<sup>36/</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>John B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, and James N. Morgan, New Homes and Poor People, (Michigan, 1969), pp. 11-13.

<sup>36</sup>The President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 8.

The Housing Act of 1968 set a goal of six million subsidized units to be provided by 1978. According to Robert Taggart, author of Low Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, however, ". . . at present rates of production for subsidized units we will be lucky to reach half of this total."<sup>37</sup>/ If Taggart's estimation is accurate, then we will be subsidizing half of the goal of six million, which in the final analysis comes out to be less than 12 percent of the President's Committee's projected 26.7 million units needed by 1978. The remaining 88 percent is in the hands of private companies who without subsidies will naturally cater to the middle and upper class housing needs. Since there most likely will not be nearly enough homes built to fulfill even the new middle and upper class needs, the further sequence positions will continue to be filled with middle class income people, whereby the poor are forced to pay exorbitant portions of their income for subhuman living conditions. Fifty percent of all slum citizens and twenty-two percent of all other problem housing dwellers pay over thirty percent of their income in housing.<sup>38</sup>/

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
<sup>37</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 57.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 23.



Hence, the above information illustrates that there are many extraneous variables that interrupt the expected flow of housing sequences as presented in Diagram A. A revised and perhaps somewhat more accurate diagram of a housing sequence might be as follows:

DIAGRAM C




No vacancy  
college graduate leaves  
parents home.

"B" moves into "A" which is a new home.  
 "C" moves into "B" left vacant when the family moved into "A".  
 "C", however, is still occupied by the parents of the just married college graduate thereby leaving no further vacancies and stopping the sequence at position three.

The lack of a vacancy left by "C" is an example of many possible Z factors that could bring the sequence of vacancies to a halt. Another example might be:

DIAGRAM D



Highway—  
Clearance

In this particular example, demolition for highway clearance destroys the fourth position house and the sequence as well. Similar to highway clearance is urban renewal clearance where there is many times a several year lag between the clearance and the building of housing projects. Many times the housing units are never replaced.

This section thus far has illustrated the disadvantages of a poor person who is seeking a decent home. Perhaps an inquiry as to why a poor person needs to seek a better home is in order before continuing on to the next section, i.e., "What does it mean to live in a substandard home?"

There are many consequences to living in overcrowded substandard housing which probably can only be realized by those experiencing them. There remains, however, many effects which are undeniably obvious. Alvin Schorr in his book Slums and Social Insecurity discusses the housing problems that arise for the poor. He points out that it is difficult in some cases to evaluate overcrowded and substandard housing because of ethnic differences.<sup>39/</sup> Many use ethnic differences as an excuse, however, to justify what is in actuality substandard

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<sup>39</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963).

housing. For example it is believed that certain groups such as the Puerto Ricans enjoy closer living quarters more than most other groups. While this may be true to a certain extent because of previous conditions that they are accustomed to, it cannot be denied that they too suffer the same cultural deprivation as anyone else under the same conditions. When any group of people immigrates or migrates to another country or culture the dominant culture exerts a great deal of pressure upon the minority group to become assimilated. What usually takes place when a group moves to a more advanced culture is that the minority group usually becomes assimilated in aspirations long before it becomes assimilated in actual behavior. This is due in large part to the strong visual stimulus of such things as big cars and fancy homes which are the general results of a very complex and lengthy socialization process. When a minority child goes to school in the United States, he learns more about what he doesn't have (in relation to what is standard for most people) than how to go about attaining the things he doesn't have. Most likely people have some awareness of the fact that they could be living a healthier life or they would not move to begin with. However, to be surrounded by a higher standard of living with additional social pressures and to aspire to those standards without having the individual

means to do so can be much worse than having the same individual means within a culture of lower expectations.

One of the most fundamental results of inadequate housing is poor health conditions. Schorr points out that unsanitary conditions due to inadequate plumbing and garbage disposal are contributing factors toward high amounts of disease.<sup>40/</sup> Many times the diseases contracted due to unsanitary conditions result in death because of inadequate health facilities and an inability on the part of the poor to afford treatment. As mentioned in the previous section, infant mortality ratios in slums are clearly disproportionate to the other areas of our cities and the nation as a whole. Poorly insulated and poorly heated units represent additional health hazards in that occupants are unable to experience sufficient warmth during winter months. Mental health can also be affected by one's housing situation. Overcrowding can challenge one's sense of individuality. It is believed by many that one needs to have the opportunity to be alone if he so desires in order to better assert himself as a total and separate being. By so doing, one also is able to recognize and respect the individuality of

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid.

others. As Schorr puts it, a child's illusions about other people are challenged by overcrowding. Schorr also points out that clinical research has shown that overcrowded conditions present a challenge to any illusions a child may have about sex. By this is meant that sex is only understood on the physical level when overexposed to a child who cannot recognize the possible emotional and psychological aspects of it. It is also difficult for one with an extremely limited environment to develop an objective understanding of the world and its problems.<sup>41/</sup> It seems entirely possible that a person overcome by constant inadequacies and limitations in his own life would have little desire to even think about things that do not directly involve his personhood.

There are different interpretations that involve different standards for the term "overcrowded housing". In terms of space, Schorr presents three different means of determining overcrowdedness:

1. Count of persons per bed (used in Great Britain during the nineteenth century).
2. Four hundred square feet for one person, seven hundred and fifty for two, and one thousand for three, etc. (Public Health Association, years ago).

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid.



3. One and five-tenths or two persons per room or bedroom is another early standard.<sup>42/</sup>

Aside from crowding as it is measured in terms of space, there is also crowding in terms of usage, i.e., "use crowding". "Use crowding" refers to a situation where a room designated for a specific function or as a specific type such as a living room is out of necessity used for some other purpose. A common example of "use crowding" would be using a living room also as a bedroom. Whatever the type, overcrowdedness can lead to a general lack of rest whereby a person's health is not only endangered but also his interpersonal relationships with his family due to a resulting irritability.

As was previously suggested, though some residents may not consider themselves to be overcrowded they still may be experiencing without realizing it, detrimental effects of their living conditions. Studies of people who move into more spacious housing have indicated that noticeable changes occur within their families, i.e., changes in their needs and inter-relationships. "This material suggests that it is not only social interaction that is influenced by a family's location but the

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-18.

nature of family relationships flow together; change in one changes the other."<sup>43</sup>/ The author does not have the specific data which Schorr is eluding to in the just given quote. It should be pointed out, however, that the results of such studies are tenuous unless all possible intervening variables are controlled such as change in social circles and income.

Some people, however, are afraid to move even if given the opportunity to improve their conditions. For some there is a fear of being disoriented, out of place or unwelcome which in actuality are many times the results, particularly for black people. Old people have neighborhood ties that have carried over since childhood and are especially fearful of having their neighborhood torn down for highrise buildings. "Thus, a categorical choice between space familiarity may elude us. Yet it becomes clear that one cannot assume that all families wish or should wish to move. This is in fact the policy issue at which the argument is usually: Renewal and relocation policies need to take account of the families who do not wish to move."<sup>44</sup>/ Many old neighborhoods that appear to be slums are simply run down and could be rehabilitated.

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

By reviving a neighborhood rather than destroying it, the inhabitants can be spared the trauma of dislocation, disorientation and separation from friends and loved ones. If there is any way that adequate housing can be provided without changing the overall neighborhood, it should be given primary consideration. Schorr describes the situation as follows:

"There is considerable attachment to the place itself. Relationships are identified with locality and it is difficult to conceive them separately. . . It is evident that, if they are moved, many of these families would find it difficult to maintain their patterns of relationship. . As locality and the extended family are no longer possible to be neighborhood centered and extended family centered at once."<sup>45</sup>

No longer being neighborhood centered and family centered at the same time means that old people whose primary relationships were with their families all of which were a part of a specific neighborhood, when forced to relocate must create new primary ties. Old people are forced to mix more with other old people since their families can only visit them occasionally from other parts of the city.

The poor are who Schorr refers to as "Block Dwellers", and not really a part of the whole city. They do not feel comfortable anywhere but in their own small neighborhoods.

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<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-29.

"The block dweller doesn't cross the railroad tracks, let alone go up in the air, and never sees the model. Consequently, renewal brings to his neighborhood not only change, in itself upsetting, but a wholly offensive arrangement of space--towering structures, streets that become public pathways and resist efforts to possess them, but inside the houses privacy at any cost."<sup>46</sup>

In summary, adequate housing and the facilities and services that should go along with it are extremely important for the well-being of any individual in our society. We must also realize, however, the importance of neighborhood ties and an individual's right to choose where he wants to live. Most middle class white people are not threatened by the need to move because it is most likely that the place they are moving to is little different than the place left behind. This is not true of the poor, for they are in a unique neighborhood setting and any move out of that setting could mean having to change one's total life style.

"In a sense, one can distinguish between the poor and the middle class by describing their competence to manage change. Those who are poor are more often at the mercy of events: They do not have the money, the contacts, or the attitudes which make it possible to bend

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

events to their will. Poor people are most often affected by housing change and least often in a position to influence it."<sup>47</sup>/

Much has been done in the name of helping the poor, but the results clearly indicate that there have been ulterior motives involved whereby helping the poor has only been a guise for capital gains. The next section deals with the progression of legislative changes that have taken place since early recognition of the problem of housing the poor. What follows is not intended as an in depth study of housing legislation but as a general outline to indicate that though legislative changes have been heading basically in the right direction, they are still slow and ineffective in determining adequate planned change.

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 55.



CHAPTER III: PLANNED URBAN CHANGE  
TO THE PRESENT: AVOIDING THE POOR

Progress in the direction of housing the poor has been very slow. In fact, a socially conscious individual concerned with doing something for those who cannot help themselves today may find that his efforts are little more effective than they would have been one hundred years ago. The following two quotes illustrate my point:

" . . . the evils of the system, due to forgetfulness of the poor, and the absence of sanitary regulations and advice, were constantly increasing. Among such evils it enumerates filth, over-crowding, lack of privacy and domesticity, lack of ventilation and lighting, absence of supervision and of sanitary regulations, a growing tendency to build to greater height in stories, to build more rear houses, back to back with other buildings, to encroach further upon courts and alleys, narrowing them into unventilated, unlighted damp and well-like holes between the many storied front and rear tenements. The plans, construction and management of these houses had been left almost exclusively to the caprice and selfishness of men whose sole object had been to make small investments and a borrowed capital pay enormous advances, without regard to the tenants' welfare or the public safety."<sup>48</sup>/

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<sup>48</sup>Marcus T. Reynolds, The Housing of the Poor in American Cities, (College Park, Maryland, 1893).

"To destroy the homes and neighborhoods of thousands of poor families in order to replace them with so-called middle class housing is a crime little short of genocide. There is no secret about the motives for this crime. They are spelled out in many urban renewal reports. The purpose is to improve the finance of the city."<sup>49</sup>/

The first quote given above was taken from a book written in 1893 called The Housing of the Poor. It was a comment on the 1863 Council of Hygiene and Public Health report. The second quote written by Hans Blumenfeld in 1970 is indicative of the lingering lack of genuine commitment (on the part of those in effective positions) toward helping people in the greatest need of help. Most of the conditions described in the first quote above still exist today. Though legislation has provided some benefits for the poor, for the most part, it has merely provided new tools to be manipulated by politicians and private investors for the seeking of capital gains.

Most of what was done in the way of housing did not involve the Federal Government until World War I when housing units were needed for war-workers. In 1918 two agencies known as the United States Shipping Board and the United States Housing Corporation in the Department

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<sup>49</sup>Wentworth H. Eldridge, "Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment," in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber (New York, 1970), p. 4.

of Labor built 16,000 units to provide housing for people needed to work on war materials. Eventually, these units were bought by private owners and it wasn't until another major crisis that Federal attention was brought to housing needs. The Great Depression precipitated the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932 and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. The first provided housing through Federal loans to corporations and the latter initiated slum clearance and low-cost housing. At about the same time, the Public Works Administration of the Department of the Interior attempted to stimulate housing by subsidizing private builders. When this failed, however, it built some 20,000 units distributed among fifty projects in thirty different cities. "P.W.A. policies were sharply criticized by people who believed that, although it ought to be subsidized by the Federal Government, public housing should be controlled locally. Eventually most of the P.W.A. housing projects were deeded to local housing agencies."<sup>50</sup>/ This criticism of P.W.A. for taking too direct of an approach to the housing problem may have changed the course of all subsidized housing legislation. The influence of the change forced upon P.W.A. can still be seen

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<sup>50</sup>Martin Meyerson, Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (New York, 1955), p. 17.

today in legislators seemingly desperate attempts to maintain a politically decentralized approach to urban rehabilitation.

The National Housing Act of 1934, passed to stimulate construction and employment during the depression ". . . created the Federal Housing Administration to insure large-term, low downpayment mortgages to private individuals making home ownership possible for families of moderate income."<sup>51</sup>/ The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was also established under this Act along with the Federal National Mortgage Association which were to facilitate loaning institutions (the former), and private mortgages in areas without institutions (the latter). "All of these measures were intended to increase and more equally distribute the flow of private funds into housing and to extend the possibility of home ownership to moderate income families."<sup>52</sup>/

The Housing Act of 1937 is considered by many to be the first true subsidy program. One thing seemingly apparent is that it offered substantial evidence that the criticisms toward P.W.A. were having a lasting effect.

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<sup>51</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), pp. 11-12.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

It ". . . encouraged the creation by communities of independent, special purpose authorities chartered by the states and empowered to receive Federal grants and to build and manage housing."<sup>53/</sup> This Act marks the official beginning of a problem that is still very much a part of our Urban Renewal Policies of today, i.e., local politicians and interest groups fighting over Federal funds that are "supposed" to be for the benefit of the poor. The overall intentions behind this Act seemed to be geared primarily toward slum clearance. Unfortunately in its fury to clear slums, the Act allowed very little provisions for additional housing aside from what it attempted to replace. Eighty-nine percent of the activities resulting from this Act were on slum sites and only eleven percent on land already vacated.<sup>54/</sup> The Housing Act of 1937 subsidized public housing so that the tenants of housing built by local agencies could pay less rent. Such housing was so limited, however, in terms of the demands, that it was restricted to the "depression poor", i.e., those with temporary low incomes due to the extreme slowdown of the economy. The hard core poor or what Robert Taggart refers to as the "per-

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<sup>53</sup>Martin Meyerson, Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (New York, 1955), p. 18.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., p. 19.



manently disadvantaged" were in many cases only affected by being left homeless by slum clearance. "Equivalent elimination" as it was called was to provide a one-to-one replacement of all slum units. Between the time of clearance and rebuilding, however, many people were displaced.

The Veterans Administration also catered to the middle and upper income families when it introduced its long-term, no downpayment mortgage plan in 1944. But five years later the Housing Act of 1949 authorized 810,000 units to be built over a six-year period. This is considered by some authors to be the beginning of Urban Renewal. "Cities were given grants and loans for urban renewal, with stress on improving the total environment as well as building new housing."<sup>55</sup> Federal aid was given to local authorities to clear and redevelop entire areas. Unfortunately, with the bulk of the available energy being directed toward redevelopment, too little was done in the way of rehabilitating salvageable neighborhoods.<sup>56</sup> The success of the 1949 Housing Act

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<sup>55</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 13.

<sup>56</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 55-56.

Title I was also stifled by the opposition it met in many of the project site communities.

"Between the passage of the Act (1949) and February, 1954, in at least 70 communities (most of them small ones) opponents of public housing brought the issue before the electorate in referenda or similar measures. . . . Where referenda took place, public housing lost in five cities for every three in which it won."<sup>57</sup>/

Consequently, many local public authorities determined to assure their locality of the available federal funds, set out to devise ways of circumventing their opposition. In many cases the local public authorities combined with the politicians such as the mayor to develop plans intended to improve business or beautify the city. An example of this is the A.B.C.D. (Action for Boston Community Development). City planners and the mayor of Boston anticipating opposition to their proposals created their own opposition, i.e., the A.B.C.D., which they could indirectly manipulate to suit their own purposes.<sup>58</sup>/ Hence, the criticism of the centralized authority of the P.W.A., which initiated a decentralization of power to local authorities in subsequent legislative acts may have been instrumental in causing a major setback for housing

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<sup>57</sup>Martin Meyerson, Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (New York, 1955), p. 24.

<sup>58</sup>Stephen Thornstrom, Poverty, Planning, and Politics in the New Boston: The Origin of A.B.C.D., (New York, 1955), p. 166.

the poor. For now the actual goal of providing adequate housing was distorted and twisted by the various conflicting interests of the local communities and the local authorities. One of the oldest local public authorities, the Chicago Housing Authorities, started in 1937 is a good case in point.

"The Commissioners included a Jew, a Catholic, a Negro, a small businessman, a big businessman, a labor leader, and a social worker-intellectual. . . the Commissioners were in varying degrees self-conscious representatives of interest groups concerned with public housing."<sup>59/</sup>

In 1945 Miss Wood, one of the original C.H.A. Commissioners, made the following speech which began by pointing out that:

"Our principal goal should be to provide wholesome neighborhoods for the poor: You do not make plans that show the blighted area rebuilt for the purpose of restoring purchasing power to the central business districts. . . . You do not make plans for the purpose of restoring municipal income. You do not draw plans for the purpose of giving private enterprise new areas in which to operate its business. The plans cannot be directed or prejudiced by any single wish or objective, however respectable and right that wish may be. They must be related to the realities I have described."<sup>60/</sup>

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<sup>59</sup>Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, Politics, Planning and the Public Interest, (New York, 1955), pp. 49-50.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 156.

After many Urban Renewal failures, policy-makers began to recognize the problems that were preventing the needed urban changes. It was obvious that conflicting interests were causing either diffuse power to the point of little or no change, political power-plays whereby politicians, local authorities and/or influentials unite to overcome opposition, or trickery, tokenism and manipulation of the rules to get programs accepted for federal funds. But rather than going around the conflict, policy-makers and legislators continually tried various means of controlling it so as to preserve the decentralization of power to the local authorities. The Housing Act of 1949 brought the problem of conflicting interests into full light and subsequent acts made for the most part unsuccessful attempts to deal with it.

The Housing Act of 1954 introduced the highly ambiguous term "workable program". The requirement of a "workable program" was introduced to link public housing and urban renewal closer together. Under this Act, grants would only be given to communities or local public authorities that could produce evidence that they had developed a so-called "workable program".<sup>61/</sup> According to

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<sup>61</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 13.

Alvin Schorr, the "workable program" appears to have fallen short in two respects. In at least some cases, more likely in many, the "workable program" has provided paper assurances that have not been met. Second, with few exceptions, it remained a physical plan that did not succeed in fusing physical and social elements into a workable program.<sup>62/</sup> The Housing Act of 1954 also attempted to put more emphasis on rehabilitating housing rather than focusing solely on replacing housing as did the Act of 1949.

A step was made in the right direction when "In 1959 Congress provided for Federal assistance to localities to develop a 'community renewal program' -- a comprehensive study of a community to identify its renewal needs and resources, and to develop a long-range renewal program."<sup>63/</sup> The difficulty, as might be expected, was in defining the problem once there was a consensus that a problem did exist. The main reason it was so difficult to define the problem was because there were usually too many people involved in the planning who were from various specialized fields. Consequently, they could only see solutions that involved their specific training

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<sup>62</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 55-56.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.



(physical or social being the two most general categories of differences). The idea of comprehensive planning, however, was an important realization on the part of the policy-makers that more than just patchwork was needed. Unfortunately, there was no politically independent control, well trained group to implement the Act. The Housing Act of 1959 also was the first to submit recognition of the specific housing needs of the elderly. The assistance took the form of a direct loan program which provided funds to non-profit sponsors of rented housing for the elderly. This marked the first use of the below-market-interest rate technique.<sup>64/</sup>

In the 1960's subsidy programs became the center of federal housing efforts. Cooperative housing, begun in America in 1926, also became more widely used in the 60's due to amendments in '59, '61, and '62 geared toward subsidies and insured mortgages for management type housing projects, including occupancy limited to cooperative members. Glenn Beyer quotes Lewis M. Isaacs, Jr. for his comment on defining cooperative housing.

"The absence of a precise definition as to what is a cooperative apartment arises because it is not a creature of statute but an agglomeration of legal con-

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<sup>64</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970), p. 11.

cepts, some of which are in essence incompatible. It is a fiction which takes its existence partly from a corporation, which is another fiction. It is therefore at best an anomaly. The cooperative owner is something more than a tenant of his apartment and something less than an owner."<sup>65/</sup>

Between the years 1950 and 1960, there was a 29.3 percent urban increase in population.<sup>66/</sup> This rapid population increase may have been one of the major if not the major initiating factor behind the 1961 Housing Act. This particular Act established the B.M.I.R. (Below Market Interest Rate) program whereby profit-motivated private organizations could develop subsidized housing at special interest rates.<sup>67/</sup> The Housing Act of 1961 also authorized F.H.A. to insure mortgages on single family homes in amounts of up to \$25,000. Three percent of the first \$15,000 was required for a downpayment, ten percent of the next \$5,000 and twenty-five percent of anything beyond \$20,000.<sup>68/</sup> Hence, this program made it possible for a middle income person making between seven and ten thousand dollars annually to put \$2,000 down and build a \$25,000 home in the suburbs at a reduced

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<sup>65</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 1965), p. 266.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

<sup>67</sup>The President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 54.

<sup>68</sup>Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society, (New York, 1965), p. 67.

mortgage interest rate. At the same time, however, it stimulated the building of inner-city low income housing projects thereby forcing the lower income people to remain in the city where housing was available (as dehumanizing as it was and still is) at prices closest to what they could afford. For as pointed out in an earlier section of this paper and as most people are well aware, it is very unlikely that a person even in 1961 could build a new urban home for \$15,000. If it could be done on a wide scale, a person making \$3,000 a year could not afford it, nor could a person making \$5,000 who would be paying 33 percent of his annual income which at that level would leave him too little for other remaining living expenses. A person making \$3,000 a year of which there are presently over four million, could not even afford to pay \$10,000 for a home without paying over 35 percent of his income on housing. Consequently, the poor were bound to the inner-city projects and the white middle income people began more heavily than ever to migrate to the suburban areas. The effects of this Act and subsequent similar housing acts on the central city can be realized in part by the following statistics taken from The Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing:<sup>69/</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>The President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 40.

Chart C

(population in central cities in millions)

|           |      |      |      |      |                 |
|-----------|------|------|------|------|-----------------|
| White     | 45.5 | 47.5 | 46.6 | 45.1 | 44.9            |
| Non-white | 6.3  | 10.3 | 12.8 | 13.5 | 18.8            |
|           | 1959 | 1960 | 1966 | 1968 | 1978(Projected) |

As is evidenced by the above chart, up until 1960 there was a gradual increase of both whites and non-whites. Following 1960, however, there was a gradual decrease in the white population while the non-whites continued to increase. As the white middle and upper middle class people fled from the central cities, the inner-city tax base was decreased thereby putting more pressure on the poor to finance their own services. With a decrease in services such as education the poor's chances of overcoming their immobility and substandard conditions has lessened even more.

Eventually Below Market Interest Rate programs could not keep pace with the amount of borrowing, so in 1965 the Housing and Urban Development Act was passed. Originally the B.M.I.R. was set at whatever the average interest on the Federal debt was. By 1965, however, the

average interest on the Federal debt had risen to above four percent thereby forcing legislators to set the B.M.I.R. at three percent to sustain the program's attractiveness to builders. In an attempt to make up for the still slow rate at which low-income housing was being built, the 1965 Act initiated rent supplements whereby the Federal Government paid any additional rent over twenty-five percent of the tenant's income. This seemed to be a very viable means of assisting the poor but it met a great deal of opposition and consequently was not widely used. The 1965 Housing Act was also responsible for the cabinet-level Department of Housing and Urban Development which succeeded the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

As each new program met with disappointment, there grew a realization that planning was not taking enough variables into consideration. This was exemplified with the development of Urban Renewal in 1949 and again, with more emphasis, in 1966 with the Model Cities program. Through the Model Cities program the Government hoped to coordinate both the physical and social elements within certain neighborhoods.<sup>70/</sup> The program maintained, however,

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<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 3.



strong support of the decentralization policy of having local authorities develop their own programs. Stricter limitations and tighter deadlines were enforced for the local authorities to present the various stages of their so-called "workable program". Greater emphasis was placed on community participation to allow the people jurisdiction over the destiny of their own neighborhoods. The results of the program, though still not entirely known, for the most part seem to be an overall increase in trickery, deception and manipulation of the people and rules on the part of the local authorities and politicians. This rather harsh accusation is supported somewhat by Chapter IV of this study where the Model Cities proposals of Dayton, Seattle, and Atlanta are briefly discussed.

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 did initiate home subsidies to lower income families which was expanded by the 1968 Housing Act. Two major programs were expanded by the 1968 Housing Act: 1) Subsidizing loans to the sponsors of rental housing for lower income families, and 2) assisting low and moderate income home buyers. Though the intentions behind the Act were at long last directed toward helping the poor, there remains still a great deal to be desired.

The average family income of 235 recipients was roughly \$4,500 after deductions which in some cases is well over the \$5,000 gross income level.<sup>71/</sup> There is little question that people in this income bracket also need assistance, but there are still many people earning below five, four, and even three thousand dollars annually that are not being helped in any real way. We are heading in the right direction as further evidenced by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 which increased further "public housing subsidies so as to lower the rents of extremely low-income tenants."<sup>72/</sup> We are not, however, moving at a rapid enough pace. Change where it is most needed, on the macro level, is being bogged down by the local filtering process. Some success has been met through programs such as 235, but we must also recognize the need for planning ahead so the future generations will have no need for individual assistance other than in disability cases.

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<sup>71</sup>Robert Taggart, III, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid, (Baltimore, 1970).

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

CHAPTER IV: DECENTRALIZATION:  
A MULTI-PARTISAN APPROACH

Until 1968, our major attack on our urban problems had been the Urban Renewal Program, a continuation from the 1949 Housing Act. This program involved fulfillment of the following seven requirements (all of which are indispensable in order for the program to be a success) by the local public authority before its proposal qualifies for government assistance:

1. "Adequate codes and ordinances for structure and use, adequately enforced;
2. "A comprehensive community plan for land use and public capital development;
3. "Neighborhood analysis for the determination of blight;
4. "Administrative organizations adequate to an all-out attack on slums and blight;
5. "A responsible program for relocation of displaced families;
6. "Citizen participation in the entire program;
7. "Adequate financial resources for carrying out (1) thru (6)."<sup>73</sup>

The 1968 Model Cities program was supposed to be a fresh and more comprehensive approach to solving our urban problems. While urban renewal programs prior to the Model Cities program were based on decentralization (as

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<sup>73</sup>Scott Greer, Urban Renewal and American Cities, (New York, 1965), p. 10.

can be readily deduced from the seven steps listed above), the Model Cities program places even more emphasis on decentralized authority. Chester W. Hartman, in his essay "The Politics of Housing", describes the Model Cities program as simply a "rehash of old proposals". He goes even further and accuses the Model Cities program of being a "gild the ghetto approach to solving urban problems".<sup>74</sup> Though the intention of these programs is certainly not to act as a "gild the ghetto approach", in terms of actual accomplishment there is very little evidence to the contrary.

From the seven steps which constitute a successful proposal, we can recognize the logic used in formulating our present urban renewal programs. It is one of bringing the decisions as close as possible to the people being affected by them. Ideally the program probably could not be set up better to serve this purpose; but the purpose itself is too idealistic and overlooks too many possible extraneous variables that either directly or indirectly prevent the correct decisions from ever being made. Perhaps a brief inquiry into several case studies of some of the cities involved with urban renewal will clarify this point.

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<sup>74</sup>Chester W. Hartman, "The Politics of Housing", in Political Power and the Urban Crisis, ed. Alan Shank, (Boston, 1969).

New York

A case study of New York written by Clarence L. Davies, revealed some astonishing facts concerning our urban renewal programs. The entire study is filled with cross purposes and compromises that have very little, if anything, to do with helping the poor. The major interaction in New York's planning took place between the Chairman of the Slum Clearance Committee, Robert Moses and the middle class whites who did not want low-income housing in their neighborhoods. The poor did not want the low-income housing any more than the middle class did--most likely because of their awareness of misdealing in other renewal cases. Moses was determined, however, for reasons that for the most part revolved around economic and beautification purposes, to clean out the slums and consequently created new slums along with many displaced persons. In some areas he was forced into a compromise of building middle-income housing which created even more difficulties for the poor.

Davies' study covers three separate cases:

1) Seaside-Hammels, 2) West Village, 3) West Side Urban Renewal Area. All three were similar in that it was white middle class residents who forced any changes that occurred. The differences among the three cases were not



in actual decision-making results but in the procedure toward anticipating those results. In the first case, there was no plan or outward intention indicated to include the citizens who were most directly to be affected in the decision-making procedure. In the second, residents were informed of the program after the completed plans had been accepted. Shortly thereafter, it was found that some people in so-called slums liked where they were living, did not consider their neighborhood a slum, and did not particularly care for the idea of being torn away from their previous ties and life-long environment. Protests were made by the West Villagers but to no significant avail. Long standing ethnic groups were almost completely forced out of Washington Square and the middle class white element in the Greenwich Village area led by Mrs. Jane Jacobs managed to force a few changes to protect their interests. The third case (the West Side Area) involved an attempt to include residents in the decision-making which was later regretted by the local authorities. It did not take long before a great deal of conflict developed over who would be the most instrumental participants. As it turned out, the middle and upper-middle class residents took charge by assuming leadership positions to protect their own interests, such as Stanley Lowell, a retired Deputy Mayor and Dr. Thomas Matthew.

Both were residents of the area or at least the nearby area and both were eventually leaders of separate interest groups. Also involved in the decision-making activities was Jane Wahbery, a social worker who organized a Tenants Committee, and pastors of two of the Catholic churches in the area. Other groups later became involved such as the Puerto Ricans, under the Stryckers Bay leadership of Father Browne, a liberal priest. This tremendous multiplexity of interests presented much conflict and delay. After five years of struggle and attempted compromise there was a minimal amount of redevelopment with many of the people still needing relocation.

Davies speculates that the reason there was so much citizen resistance in the cases where the residents knew about the plans was because ". . . none of the three areas was a 'working-class' neighborhood. In each there was a significant proportion of middle-income residents, a fact that may have led to increased interest-group activity."<sup>75/</sup> This falls in line with many authors who stress the point of view that the lower income people are less able to activate and organize their own interests. As is quite noticeable throughout many of the Renewal Case studies, when the poorer groups are organized it is

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<sup>75</sup>J. Clarence Davies, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal, (New York, London, 1966), p. 4.

usually under the leadership of educated clergy, professionals in the area, or middle-class people from outside the area who possibly empathize for ethnic reasons. The point to be made in this particular case, however, is the fact that even in areas with a significant amount of middle class people only the best organized of the middle and the upper-middle class residents could create minimal changes.

The reason for this was simply that Moses was a very powerful man who knew how to maintain either the support of, or the control over, the most powerful people. As Jeanne Lowe points out when speaking of Moses, "No one else in American history produced so much for local public improvement and urban reconstruction--about \$5,000,000,000 worth by 1960. But no single person contributed more through his works and his methods to New York City's problems--the remote, factionalized local government; the unplanned private overgrowth; the traffic congestion; the inhumanity and citizen discontents; the real estate 'project' approach to community building; and the abduction of political and business leadership."<sup>76</sup>/

Moses was a manipulator of people and a builder of sometimes beautiful, but many times hopelessly useless

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<sup>76</sup>Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time, (New York, 1967), p. 48.

and expensive, structures. By controlling and stimulating New York's entire planning game, Moses created the nation's fastest moving Title I redevelopment program, whereby at the end of his reign in 1960 there were just as many slum dwellers (1,000,000) as at the beginning of Title I in 1949.<sup>77/</sup> When New York's antipoverty program was set up, the dominating forces were Robert Wagner, Mayor; Paul Serevane, President of the City Council; Adam Clayton Powell, Harlem U.S. Congressman who presided over the House Education and Labor Committee; and Governor Rockefeller. The "social welfare establishment" was the most powerful nonpolitical (in a technical sense) group, which consisted of ". . . a coalition of professionals and prestigious lay leaders who run multimillion dollar voluntary agencies."<sup>78/</sup> Professionals as it is used here does not refer to a group specifically trained for the purpose of adding expertise to the antipoverty program nor even a group necessarily with any planning knowledge at all. It refers to a nonspecific group of individuals, i.e., professionals in various areas as opposed to non-professionals.

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<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>78</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), p. 12.

Shortly after President Johnson's "War on Poverty" declaration, Mayor Wagner appointed his own Council Against Poverty and Poverty Operation Board, both of which were made up entirely of city officials. When they filed for Federal funds, they were heavily criticized by Congressman Powell and other interested groups for being solely government officials. So Mayor Wagner expanded membership on the Council Against Poverty so that it would include members of specific interest groups. When the Council was considered to be too governmental to be a nonprofit corporation, legislation was introduced to establish the Council as a public authority, hence finding a way of getting around the technicalities involved. Though the State legislature passed the bill, it was vetoed by the Governor. Mayor Wagner again tried to expand the Council to include more interest groups in order to get around the various blocs, but as the membership grew to include more than eighty members, it was unable to function as an effective Council. Subsequently much of the power had to be delegated to an executive committee.

Neighborhood groups were even more factionalized than the Mayor's appointed Council, with each applying separately for funds for their own programs. When Mayor Lindsay took office in 1966, there were more than sixty



agencies that reported directly to him. Mayor Lindsay put forth a massive effort to reorganize the city government but because of the competitiveness between the various interest groups much time and money was expired before city government was finally "centralized" into twelve major agencies, which, though a great deal more manageable than sixty, also presented many difficulties to be worked out before anything positive could ever be expected to be accomplished. One of the two major Federal grants to be won (6.9 million dollars) was purely the result of a self-selected board called the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation which worked together with eleven of the top business leaders of New York City.

Though some success in getting citizens involved in renewal efforts was finally attained through a form of neighborhood corporations, one need only read Hallman's report to realize that, with so many separate organizations and agencies pulling in separate directions, more time, money and energy is spent in trying to organize the interest groups into some feasible governmental framework than in actual redevelopment. Some of the more successful agencies such as the Y.I.A. (Youth In Action) did manage to get funds but many times the resulting programs were segmental and ineffective.<sup>79/</sup>

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-45.

Boston

Boston's story is very similar to that of New York's. The Mayor of Boston hired a city planner to develop programs for urban renewal. Anticipating opposition to many of these proposals, the Mayor and city planner formulated organizations to formally represent their opposition, to which they could yield minor compromises and maintain their position on the major issues. As James Wilson puts it in his essay, "Planning and Politics," "In Boston, for example, efforts have been made to stimulate the formation of neighborhood associations which will provide citizen participation (and citizen consent to) the plans of the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)."<sup>80</sup> One such organization was called Action for Boston Community Development and was manipulated for the most part by the city planner who technically was not even a member.

In referring to the North Harvard-Allston area, Wilson points out that ". . . no effort was made to obtain citizen participation and the plan was approved by the city council without the consent of the neighborhood."<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>James Q. Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," in Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, ed. James W. Wilson, (Cambridge, 1966), p. 416.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 417.

The big man behind Boston's many massive renewal movements was Edward Logue. Logue was invited into Boston's planning as a consultant. Having had much experience in the planning game, he refused to take charge of Boston's renewal unless he could be assured of having full control of the programs. From Logue's nine months as a consultant evolved a 90 million dollar redevelopment program which entailed extremely radical diversions from Boston's existing physical appearance. He also managed to restructure the Planning Board and the BRA by bringing them both together under the control of one agency which he eventually would head. "Only after a protracted battle in the fall and winter of 1960-1961 was Logue granted the enormous power he had demanded."<sup>82/</sup> Logue's power was the greatest ever granted one single person for renewal purposes. He ". . . built the BRA into the city's largest and most influential public agency through his political acumen, capacity to draw on Federal resources, and support from Mayor Collins and Boston's downtown interests--the financial, real estate, and newspaper communities."<sup>83/</sup>

Boston's South End: Logue believed in citizen participation as long as it did not disagree with his

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<sup>82</sup>Langley Carleton Keyes, Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning Game: A Study in the Diversity of Neighborhood, (Massachusetts, 1969), p. 23.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., pp. 28-29.

planning. His obvious ambition to get things done inhibited his ability to cater to the desires of the neighborhood residents. There was almost a total neglect of communication between Logue and the community. Good horizontal communication did exist among the various leaders, most of whom had known each other from several years of working with the South End planning council. Beyond filling in two questionnaires, the Urban Villagers, the old tenants, and the resident property owners who were not intimately involved with the Urban Renewal Council, either had not sought or had not been provided with much access to renewal negotiations. Most of the residents were totally ignorant of the fact that the rumors involving the destruction of their neighborhood were very quickly becoming a reality. One interviewee put it this way, "When they came down here with that plan we had no idea what was going on. It was only after the shock of that thing that we figured we had better find out what renewal was all about."<sup>84</sup>/

After several attempts of his own, Logue called in an expert on manipulating interest groups. Logue's appointee, Green, seemed to convince the local people that they were developing the plans but in the final analysis

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 62.

the plans were very little different from the original plan: "For all the fanfare attendant upon the scrapping of the first plan, the product that emerged from the U.R.C. in the spring of 1965 was not radically different from its predecessor."<sup>85</sup>/ Of all the techniques for getting around actual effective citizen participation in the decision-making process Green's appeared to be the smoothest. The same basic principles of deceptive tokenism are later found to be used in the development of some Model Cities programs.

Charleston Section of Boston: The Charleston area had had past experiences with redevelopment so the residents were on their guard at the first sign of renewal coming into their neighborhood. As it is in most neighborhoods that manage to go into the urban renewal game with some significant amount of organization, there emerged in Charleston an effective leader. Baldwin brought together the Self-Help Organization Charleston (SHOC) which was simply those residents in the area who were interested in having an active voice in any planning that involved their community. The inevitable conflict between SHOC and Logue went back and forth and nothing was accomplished for quite some time. Baldwin realized that SHOC lacked the type of organization needed to be effective in the renewal

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 82.



meetings so he initiated the bringing together of all the local organizations into a federation. "Almost one year to the day after Baldwin's proposal for a federation, the Charleston renewal game was blown to pieces by a public hearing on the night of January 7, 1963. At that time, 85 percent of the 1,000 people present were emphatically opposed to the proposals of the BRA supported by the Charleston Federation. Rather than facilitating the renewal planning game, the Federation brought about the very thing it had been instituted to prevent, the opposition of those with the capacity to make their presence felt at a public meeting."<sup>86</sup>/

The Federation had become dominated by clergymen and their chairman was an individual who was not recognized by some as a member of the community. Leaders of SHOC grew more and more dissatisfied with the Federation's actions and eventually the two organizations polarized into opposing interests. The Federation became identified as being close to the moderators of the community and SHOC became identified with those radically against Urban Renewal. The BRA made an all out effort to combine the moderates with the Federation to overpower the resistance of SHOC and eventually was successful. It is

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<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

important to note that throughout the entire planning ordeal in Charleston, SHOC remained the only genuine citizen's group represented solely by the residents' interests.

Boston's Washington Park: Washington Park is an area within a larger area known as Roxbury. Roxbury is divided into two major areas: Upper Roxbury which is the south side where the more well-to-do residents live and lower Roxbury on the north side which was the lower class poverty area. Washington Park was the south end of the north side or to put it in its most significant frame of reference, the poverty area bordering the well-to-do residents' neighborhood. "Of all the communities under study, Washington Park had the most articulate and sympathetic group of prerenewalites before the advent of the rehabilitation planning game."<sup>87</sup> The rationale behind this phenomenon is perhaps as typical as it is obvious: Upper Roxbury represented an elite group of Negroes who had nice homes and a clean, well-kept neighborhood. They didn't want the deteriorating slums close to their neighborhood with the ever present possibility of them spreading. Urban Renewal was recognized as having great value to them if it would be used to clear the area immediately adjacent to Upper Roxbury's north end. Keyes

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 158.

clearly emphasizes this point when he states:

"If blight could be rolled out of Middle Roxbury, the residential areas to the south would be preserved. The strategy of warring against physical decay dictated the terms defining the rehabilitation areas."<sup>88/</sup>

For the Washington Park residents, Urban Renewal could have meant almost anything. But one thing was certain, what they had was better than nothing, and nothing is what many were left with following Urban Renewal clearance. It would only seem logical that even the most deteriorated slum housing should not be destroyed unless the inhabitants have some place within their means to move to. But housing was not even a topic of discussion at the planning meetings; for every time relocation or housing were brought up they were suppressed or avoided.<sup>89/</sup>

"Considerations were never raised as to the socioeconomic capacity of the Washington Park area to endure the rigors of planning and executing a rehabilitation project."<sup>90/</sup>

Since the elite Negro population was strongly in favor of Urban Renewal for Washington Park, they were considered representative of the citizen participation even though

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<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

the clearance affected them only indirectly. The actual residents of the slum area were for the most part uninvolved and seemingly uninterested. Keyes offers a possible explanation for this rather common characteristic of the planning process which was mentioned in brief in the previous section of this Chapter:

"Whatever the actual breakdown numerically, it is safe to say that a large majority of the in-migrant Negroes earning less than \$3,000 annually are part of the culture of poverty, which combines alienation from social institutions, except perhaps a storefront church, with a day-to-day struggle for survival so time and energy consuming as to preclude concern for an involvement in the demands of the rehabilitation planning game."<sup>91</sup>/

In the immediately preceding section of this Chapter, Clarence Davies suggests that the reason New York did have involvement in the three areas he studied was because there was a middle-class group in each of these neighborhoods whereby had there not been, the power elements would have remained relatively passive. Again it must be pointed out that in the few cases where participation by the poor has taken place effectively it is usually because of the existence of extremely strong and unusual leadership many times from a middle or upper-middle class resident. In the Roxbury incident, the middle-class residents had interests diametrically opposed to any bargaining

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<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

power interests that existed for the hard core poverty residents of Washington Park. What is meant by this is simply that the only bargaining power that the Park residents had to assure themselves of adequate relocation housing was the fact that as a group they would in an organized protesting fashion refuse to let their neighborhood be torn down. Unfortunately, this is exactly what the middle-class element of Roxbury wanted in order to better protect their own section from deterioration. In this particular case the residents of Washington Park would most likely be forced to move north and increase the overcrowding and deterioration in the already blighted area. What takes place many times in renewal is that the displaced people are forced to filter into fairly well-kept neighborhoods which eventually become overcrowded and run-down themselves. Hence, in cases where there is no escape valve such as there was in Roxbury, it is not uncommon to find certain elements of the nearby middle-class residents supporting either relocation or rehabilitation if not both.

"The fact that there were only two neighborhood associations actually functioning in the Washington Park project area meant there was no systematic way whereby the Steering Committee could convey what they had learned to a wider audience. However, while there was a



definite lack of communication between the Steering Committee and the large majority of Washington Park residents, the absence of open criticism of the group reveals the extent to which those with the capacity to object were in accord with the direction that the renewal planning was taking."<sup>92</sup>/

There was a struggle between two of the middle-class groups who both had the same general motives which allowed the planning to remain virtually the same; it was simply a matter of who was going to be holding the wheel. Though the authorities made some changes of their own, the citizen participation remained in the hands of the Upper Roxbury elite and not in the hands of the Washington Park residents who were to be displaced.

Boston's West End: Not being extremely familiar with the geographical make-up of Boston it is quite possible that Gans' study of Boston's West End could overlap into one or more of the areas already discussed above without the writer realizing it. Nevertheless, Boston's West End as studied by the renowned Herbert Gans is much too important to be left out for the mere sake of preventing an overlap and will, therefore, be dealt with as a separate case study.

A rather lengthy, but conclusive, quote from an

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<sup>92</sup>Langly Carlton Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game: A Study in the Diversity of Neighborhood, (Massachusetts, 1969), pp. 172-173.

essay by Walter McQuade serves as a suggestive overview of Boston's West End:

"The West End, an entire neighborhood, thirty-eight blocks, forty-one acres, and 9,000 residents in the middle of the city, was wiped out--a low-rent, low-rise Italian tenement section. With Federal help, the land was condemned and bought for \$7.40 per square foot, revalued at \$1.40 per square foot, and leased for a yearly rental approximating 6 percent of the lower value to a syndicate headed by a political supporter of the Mayor. The area was ruthlessly cleared to make way for a cluster of high-rise, high-rent apartment houses, a banal grouping of blunt, balconied towers on a treeless, plain--and a bitter warning to all of the timeworn Boston neighborhoods of what renewal might mean to them too. Skirting this area was another of the typical urban scars of the 1950's in America, the John F. Fitzgerald Expressway, an eight-lane strand of concrete slashed through the ancient fabric of the city like a trail of lava on legs. This state-built road was the most expensive in the U.S., costing more than \$28,940,000 per mile."<sup>93</sup>

Here, then, is a good example of neighborhood residents not being able to organize fast enough to defend themselves against the ambitions of city politicians. The only opposition to the city's plan of tearing down the entire West End area to build luxury apartments was the "Save the West End Committee," which was organized under the leadership of an upper-class individual from outside of the neighborhood. Though he tried to mobilize the community, they were aware that he was an outsider and

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<sup>93</sup>Walter McQuade, "Urban Renewal in Boston", in Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, ed. James Q. Wilson, (Cambridge, 1966), pp. 263-264.

did not feel comfortable supporting him--nor he them. Also, the Committee failed to develop positive action to counter the city plans--it simply tried to get people to stay in the area and attend the meetings.

One can see how in order for decentralized planning to work, spontaneous action on the part of the citizens is necessary. This type of action very seldom comes about unless unusual leadership and organization happens to be immediately available in the neighborhood.

Gans points out that there were committee leaders from the West End neighborhood who also lacked the force and ability to organize resistance. He makes a point that could very well be applied to most residents of most neighborhoods:

"They were able to make speeches, and to share their anger with an audience, but other activities came less easily. Being a leader without any proof of results, spending time away from family and friends, or from second jobs and other individual pursuits was difficult."<sup>94</sup>

Not untypical of renewal planning, there was a gross information gap between redevelopment officials and the neighborhood committee leaders. The reason as described by Gans was quite simply the fact that the offi-

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<sup>94</sup>Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers, (New York, 1962), p. 297.

cials knew the neighborhood was not in favor of the clearance and felt the less they knew the better off redevelopment would be. As will be said time and time again concerning slum clearance, the residents did not consider their neighborhood a slum. They enjoyed their tight knit ethnic community and did not like the idea of having to move. As one individual stated, "It isn't right to scatter the community to all four winds. It pulls the heart out of a guy to lose all his friends."<sup>95</sup> Undoubtedly, this person expressed the feelings of many of the residents who were about to be displaced. At the same time, however, these people were experiencing other feelings--feelings of despair and helplessness. This particular neighborhood had additional possible peculiarities which this writer has taken the liberty to infer. Though Italians will not, as a rule, hesitate to fight when approached by equals, face to face, the persistent authoritarianism which is characteristic of the traditional Italian family has seemingly compelled them to look upon authority, especially national authority, with awesome respect--not necessarily favorably but, more accurately, as a natural phenomenon which cannot be dealt with. If there is a direct correlation between authoritarianism and income, the above

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<sup>95</sup>Ibid., p. 289.

speculation may be generalizable to other so-called slum neighborhoods. If so, it may add to the various explanations offered for the passiveness of so many neighborhoods that have been cleared for renewal. Regardless of any socio-psychological variables that may be entertained there are certain concrete realities that cannot be denied.

As Gans puts it,

"The truth was, that saving the West End was an overwhelming, and perhaps impossible task. Indeed, there was relatively little the committee could do. The decision to redevelop the West End had been made early in the decade, and it had received the blessings of the city's decisive business leaders and politicians."<sup>96</sup>

The planning in Boston's West End did involve a great deal of purpose even if it did not help the immediate poor. Boston, like many other cities, was becoming poorer as the middle class residents and industry continually migrated to the suburbs. By replacing low-income and tax-exempt residents and institutions with high-income housing it was hoped that the city tax base could be lifted. There were motives of sheer beautification along with the desire of central businesses to attract people with more money to spend in their stores. Last and most likely, not least as a determining factor, ". . . Massa-

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<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 298.



chusetts' General Hospital was expanding rapidly, and it's trustees had long been unhappy about being surrounded by low-income neighbors."<sup>97</sup>/ By the summer of 1960, a 9,000 resident community had been totally wiped out and the citizens had nothing to do with it.

### Newark

Newark was one of the few cities that did organize neighborhood participation rather effectively. Consequently, they required and used more Federal funds than most other cities and when the Office of Economic Opportunity funds were cut, Newark suffered more than most other cities.

Blacks and whites were forced to polarize in Newark so that both might better protect their interests. Many of the redevelopment disputes added to the black-white polarization such as the planning of a 185 acre medical school right in the middle of a black residential ghetto. Hallman suggests that disputes such as this were key variables in the setting off of the explosive five days of civil disorder beginning July 13, 1967. There is little question that the medical school dispute, along with others such as the appointment of a white councilman with-

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 286.

out a college degree over a black councilman with a masters degree, had added to the tension and distrust already existing between blacks and whites just prior to the July break-outs.<sup>98/</sup> Though Newark in the late sixties may be considered somewhat of a success story as far as citizen participation is concerned, there is a possible underlying variable which should be considered. Hallman made the claim that certain disputes were the cause of certain outbursts of violence. It seems perfectly suggestable, however, that the general atmosphere in Newark during that time was one of much tension and emotional involvement due to the overall nationwide condition of the black man. The true facts about the black populous in this country were just at that time being brought out into the open under the national influence of Martin Luther King. Other cities with a large and rapidly growing black central city population were having similar outbursts. It is entirely possible that the ill-timed planning disputes that arose in Newark simply gave ammunition to an already cocked gun. The unusual high pitch involvement in this case was not simply economic or political but also racial which when

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<sup>98</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970).

effectively actuated as a cause, demands cohesive involvement from all of the group members being discriminated against. The question then arises: Had there not been racial tension could there have been the massive resistance in Newark that gave the residents a voice in the decision-making of renewal? If the majority of the case studies surveyed by this researcher is a sufficient basis for answering that question, one would be inclined to say no; it is rare that extreme poverty neighborhoods rally in a massive effort to resist clearance. In fact, prior to the late sixties movement,

"The role of grass roots opposition in Newark's redevelopment program has been insignificant. Not once between 1949 and 1960 did a neighborhood committee succeed in altering or delaying NHA's plans for an area."<sup>99</sup>

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"Newark's urban redevelopment policies are products of the interaction of two elements: the goals of NHA's professional staff and the demands of certain nonlocal participants, like the Urban Renewal Administration, the Federal Housing Administration, and the private redevelopers.... NHA's clearance policies have not been the result of open conflict among local interest groups. Such conflict over slum clearance has

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<sup>99</sup>Harold Kaplan, Urban Renewal Politics: Slum Clearance in Newark, (New York, 1963), p. 135.

been rare and has not effected the substance of NHA's decisions. NHA has provided the initiative for all clearance projects."<sup>100</sup>/

There are, of course, sources that are biased for obvious reasons. One such source is a book written by Leo Adde, a member of the Urban Land Institute which played active roles in the planning discussed within Adde's book. Adde emphasizes the importance of citizen participation and yet fails to mention any actual incidents of citizen participation in the planning the ULI was involved in.

#### Philadelphia

Philadelphia appears to have been a very unusual case in terms of redevelopment. The city itself was allowed to degenerate by a massive wave of political corruption and neglect.

"Its payroll was loaded with employees too lazy to clean even the grimy grandiose City Hall. City budgets were thrown together year by year to meet the requirements of the Republican City Committee, as expressed through the Mayor and City Council. Municipal appointments and positions depended on a nod from ward chairmen. Political leaders often sold city jobs. But the ruling class tolerated all this. They did not live in

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<sup>100</sup>Harold Kaplan, "Urban Renewal in Newark," in Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy, ed. James Q. Wilson, (Cambridge, 1966), p. 235.

the city, and did not have to drink its water. They just wanted to maintain the status quo. . . Industry, too, fled because (it was said) of the crushing city tax burden."<sup>101</sup>/

What eventually took place was that Philadelphia became so decrepit that the people who wanted to remain in the city had no choice but to organize to get things done. The question in this case is: Can this be considered a poverty level participation success story?

"The new direction was not imposed from the top; it emerged from many sources, and progress has been infused with the critical viewpoints and talents of middle-class civic leaders, university professors, urban designers, political administrators, as well as the dynamic leadership of City Hall and top business."<sup>102</sup>/

The coalition started with young intellectuals organizing and planning because of their discontent with the way in which the city was being run. It would appear, therefore, that what took place in Philadelphia was not the poor creating plans to redevelop their neighborhoods by implementing urban renewal, nor the politicians trying to beautify their city or revive the central city business district. It was, rather, a massive effort on the part of the most able Philadelphia residents to clean up their town. The first coalition didn't consist of the dire poor

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<sup>101</sup>Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time, (New York, 1967), pp. 319-320.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 314.



who had nothing to loose and who saw little possibility of anything to gain; but was made up of the middle and upper-middle class residents who had a great deal to loose unless something positive happened in Philadelphia's planning game.

The City Policy Committee was the first organization that began steps toward reform. They presented a proposal to Mayor Samuels for a planning commission, but Samuels

" . . . worried about the opposition of special interests in the city to the proposed reorganization of the planning commission, sat on the necessary ordinance for a year."<sup>103</sup>/

The City Policy Committee then collected more forces from the community and eventually had the ordinance passed. The coalition, not taking any chances, hired one of the best planners in the country to be the Commission's director of planning. Other measures were also taken to assure the success of their reform programs. This all took place in the early 1940's and did not maintain a great deal of momentum. In September of 1947, a \$400,000 display was put together, "to dramatize city planning--to gain the confidence of a public made cynical by utopian futuramas and the inertia of local politicians."<sup>104</sup>/ Philadelphia

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<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 322.

<sup>104</sup>Ibid., p. 323.

became one of the leading cities in the area of redevelopment, housing rehabilitation and neighborhood conservation. Long range planning was practiced to a certain extent by trying to attract the rich back into the central city area. The Washington Square project; 1,000 acres southwest of Independence Hall, an area which formed about one-fourth of the entire central city was suggested to be certified for urban renewal. Mayor Dilworth liked the idea and began with the Society Hill area, also known as "Washington Square East". There is no mention of citizen participation or resistance to clearance but it appears that the period following the reform movement of the forties was one of redevelopment minded, but nonetheless centralized power. "Mayor Dilworth was enthusiastic about the ambitious proposal. His first public act in office was to issue a directive to the city planning department to proceed with detailed plans for the renewal of the Society Hill area. . ."<sup>105</sup>/ From this, and previous comments, one can readily deduce that the poor are pretty much out of the picture in Philadelphia. The reader should be reminded that in order for decentralized decision-making to be successful, in terms of offering a systematic way of solving urban problems, it must reach the bottom rung of the

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<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. 343.

ladder where the greatest need is. Philadelphia's activities involved first mobilization by middle and upper middle class citizens and intellectuals to reform the city's planning followed by perhaps more trustworthy, but also very powerful political leadership. Regardless of how straight-forward a city mayor might be, his foremost obligation, as he realizes it, is to the city as a whole and the people who put him in office. He is the mayor of the majority, not the minority, and usually acts accordingly. Even though Philadelphia, more than any other city, emphasized low-rent housing in renewal areas, it apparently did not do it as effectively as it should have. By the mid 1960's a great deal of dissatisfaction was building among the poor and those concerned about them.

"University critics charged that the local 'renaissance' was a facade which hid the city's teeming, neglected slums. It was asserted that the welfare mandate of the 1949 National Housing Policy--'a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family'--had lost out to economic development; that physical planning had been overemphasized and human needs ignored; that urban renewal had done too little in creating jobs and better housing for the poor."<sup>106</sup>

Indeed the coalition did get a great deal done to save the city as a whole from further degeneration as did the

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<sup>106</sup>Ibid., p. 397.

Pittsburgh coalition which will be discussed later in this chapter. But as the city began to move, the hard core poor were left behind and many began to realize that the slum dwellers were just being shoved around for renewal purposes. When dissatisfaction began to be expressed, it became apparent that the greatest renewal attempt made to that time was not a success in terms of providing for the poor or involving the poor in the decision-making process. An inner-city slum covering eleven square miles of the city housed 377,000 families. Eighty percent of these families were nonwhite and the density of the area was 34,300 to a square mile. Only fifty-eight percent lived in housing that contained all necessary facilities and was what could generally be evaluated as "sound".

"Of the labor force there in 1960, 13 percent were unemployed (the number was no doubt much higher, since the statistics only classify those seeking work), 84 percent were unskilled or semiskilled. Fifty-four percent of the families had incomes below \$4,000."<sup>107</sup>/

It was pointed out that at the time this particular case study was being published, city officials were considering the possibility of adopting a planning program that would include the professional expertise of sociologists, an-

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<sup>107</sup>Ibid., p. 393.

thropologists, psychologists, educators, economists, as well as welfare, physical planning, and redevelopment experts.

"But these sophisticated new techniques and approaches must earn acceptance in the local political market place, and success depends ultimately on the ability and willingness of the elected political leaders to forward and use the planners' ideas."<sup>108</sup>

Not unlike most cities, Philadelphia would have a great deal of difficulty in attaining adequate cooperation from its elected leaders. This proved to be especially true of Mayor Tate who was noted for his slowing down of already existing programs.

Leo Adde also did a study of Philadelphia and his research, though quite unintentionally, verifies what has been stated above, i.e., citizen participation did not involve the poor but the most able Philadelphia residents. Adde mentions the major local organizations and quotes brief descriptions of them. One such quote is,

"Later, the West Philadelphia Corporation, also made up of our best citizens, prepared a planned program for the redevelopment of West Philadelphia around the University area."<sup>109</sup>

It might also be pointed out that Adde's evaluation of urban renewal in terms of success and failure is some-

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. 400.

<sup>109</sup>Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 23.



what divergent from the stated aims and goals of the Urban Renewal program as it has continually been restated throughout the years. His evaluation of local participation, as indicated from his selected quote above, appears to be based on how many of the well respected so-called important people can be drawn into the planning game and not how effective the poorest residents have been in determining their own fate. Also, rather than evaluating the overall success in terms of how adequately the poor have been housed and cared for, Adde makes the following evaluative statement:

"Renewal projects have taken about \$100 million in assessed valuation off the tax rolls. The measure of renewal's success is gauged by the fact that some \$350 million in tax ratable has gone back into the tax rolls as a direct result of renewal. The indirect benefits are not precisely calculable, but they are massive. Land at the south end of the Triangle, which was valued at \$10 a square foot in the early 1950's, now goes for \$50 a square foot."<sup>110</sup>

Housing the poor is not even mentioned as an indirect possibility. Instead, the fact that land has increased in value from \$10 a square foot to \$50 a square foot is given special attention even though it took place over a 19 year span in which case inflation and the usual city land value increases could be credited with a great percentage of the 10 to 50 dollar difference.

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<sup>110</sup>Ibid., p. 41.

Howard Hallman in his book, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, cites various attempts at neighborhood involvement which failed. He also gives credit to a few instances of actual neighborhood resident involvement, e.g., Germantown where a substantial amount of participation did take place. Hallman demonstrates, however, that for the most part neighborhood resident participation is dealt with as an obstacle and not an instrument as it was intended. In the mid 50's, citizen participation was the topic of concern at the area planning conference. After a year of discussing the matter, it was decided that private organizations should be responsible for involving the neighborhood residents in the Urban Renewal planning. In regards to the result of this decision, Hallman makes the following statement:

"In a study of educational efforts related to urban renewal, I took a look at the resident involvement process and found that two years after the Area Planning Conference had recommended independent community organization, scarcely none was being performed in connection with the urban renewal program. In a city of 2 million, there were less than 30 privately paid community organizers working with neighborhoods to do a combination of community organization and community relations, the latter being more a matter of selling residents on the agency's program rather than informing citizens about what they could do."<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), p. 166.

Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh's story on redevelopment is almost identical to Philadelphia's, mainly because Pittsburgh was used as a success model by Philadelphia as well as other dying cities. Prior to the late 1940's, Pittsburgh was rapidly decaying. Businesses could no longer attract top managerial employees because of the undesirable physical and financial conditions of the city. Industries began moving out and those intending to stay considered providing accommodations for their top managerial personnel in a more attractive city. The city had reached a point where it was in danger of massive outward migration when many of the people who had too much to lose decided to do something about it. Hence, the late 1940's marked the beginning of what became known as "Pittsburgh's Action Formula". Certain people who had too much to lose took it upon themselves to act.

"The Pittsburgh formula seemed simple enough: first, bring together the top industrial-business leaders of the community in an organization to support a general program for overall community improvement; second, establish a cooperative working relationship between them and the political and government leaders to advance specific projects."<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>112</sup>Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time, (New York, 1967), p. 115.

The "quasimunicipal organizations" that the businessmen

" . . . sponsored were generally not designed to forward programs and projects benefiting the community as a whole or its residents. Indeed, these groups helped promote the city to outside industry or protect local business interests and to turn public spending to the 'efficient' minimum. Some businessmen backed regional planning organizations, but these private bodies wanted power. Up to now, the businessmen had lacked a device or even a desire for constructive civic development action."<sup>113/</sup>

Pittsburgh, similar to modern day Chicago, is a good example of how effective power can be when it is centralized. It is also a good example, however, of how ineffective power is, in any form as a means of bringing about adequate social change when social and human factors are disregarded to attain physical and economic change. Pittsburgh was considered one of the most miraculously saved cities in the country. Yet when examining the statistics one might wonder if the city had been saved at all.

"By 1960, there were 70,000 fewer young adults, the base of the working population, in Allegheny County than in 1950--a 29 percent drop. The city's total population fell by 9 percent, from 676,000 to some 604,000. This was the fourth highest central city decline during that decade in the nation, and this in spite of its Renaissance. And at the same time, sixty-five plants and 35,000 jobs were lost, while almost no new industry came in. Those which remained sharply reduced employment by adopting automated production processes; steel was far below capacity.

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<sup>113</sup>Ibid., p. 115.



Meanwhile, the inventory of deteriorated housing was changed only slightly."<sup>114</sup>/

Credit must not be taken away from Pittsburgh's coalition for at least rebuilding many of the physical deteriorations of the city. The ability to mobilize power and produce constructive change of any type may certainly be considered a form of success as long as it is kept in its proper perspective. Physical and business improvements do not necessarily mean the poor are being housed and provided with jobs. The same must be kept in mind when evaluating the planning process itself. The fact that neighborhood and resident groups have mobilized to initiate action or stop action does not necessarily mean that grass roots democracy is working at its lowest level of participation. In Pittsburgh, as in many other cities, the poor were only dealt with to the extent necessary to create other changes. Housing became a major issue only after it became a threat to the industrial-businessman.

"During the 1930's, government surveys had found that one-quarter of the city's dwelling units were substandard and required clearance; but little had been done about them since."<sup>115</sup>/

During a luncheon it was brought to Mayor Richard Mellon's attention ". . . that 18,000 families would have to move

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<sup>114</sup>Ibid., pp. 116-117.

<sup>115</sup>Ibid., p. 153.



for industrial redevelopment."<sup>116</sup>/ Their moving into already crowded areas could create more slums and deterioration at a quicker than ever pace. "Mellon was shocked. He recognized that these facts would scare off the companies he and others were endeavoring to attract to the Pittsburgh area."<sup>117</sup>/ A conference was put together which was closely associated with the citizen's interests. It was intended to be in charge of the housing program. Mellon did not like the idea of the conference handling the housing program. He felt that the businessmen should be the decisive element in the housing proposals. There were objections that "the people" would be totally alienated from the source of change of which they were the primary target. The objections produced no avail and a new group was formed called ACTION-Housing, Inc. and was headed by Mellon's assistant. Certain steps were taken to provide housing for lower-middle income groups but success was extremely limited because of ACTION's inability to deal with overriding social issues:

" . . . among them housing integration, changing neighborhoods and the city's growing number of low-income, unskilled and unemployable Negroes--that would

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<sup>116</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

<sup>117</sup>Ibid., p. 153.

not be resolved or treated as rapidly as putting up some new buildings downtown."<sup>118</sup>/

San Francisco

William Taylor, in his book Hanging Together: Equality in an Urban Nation, blames federal legislators for the failure of federal programs, claiming that it is they who cater to the special interest groups. Though Taylor's accusation may be legitimate, he does not adequately support his argument. He cites as examples cases of local decision-making negligence:

"Not untypical, for example, was the testimony of Jack Tuggle, deputy director of the San Francisco office of the Federal Housing Administration and the official responsible for carrying out in the Bay Area the provisions of President Kennedy's executive order requiring nondiscrimination in federally assisted housing. Replying to questions designed to ascertain why almost five years after the issuance of the order very few Negroes lived in new subdivisions insured by FHA, Tuggle revealed a very narrow conception of his responsibilities. He said that when builders apply for mortgage insurance with the FHA, he 'calls their attention' to the fact that they have signed a nondiscrimination agreement. But he did not require them to seek to reach the Negro market, or to advertise the equal opportunity policy, or even to make known to potential buyers that they were bound by the executive order."<sup>119</sup>/

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<sup>118</sup>Ibid., p. 155.

<sup>119</sup>William L. Taylor, Hanging Together: Equality in an Urban Nation, (New York, 1971), p. 142.

Taylor goes on to explain that Tuggle felt that builders should not have to be required to pursue equal opportunity just because they were under an FHA program since they still had to compete with other builders.

Since the program states the necessity for a non-discrimination agreement, this cannot be identified as a Federal legislative error as clearly as it can a local executive error. It is the responsibility of the local authorities to see to it that the Federal program agreements are enforced. Granted, existing Federal programs leave a great deal to be desired, but it is the local authorities' inability to adequately implement the programs we do have that accounts for the abuse of allocated resources.

To discredit his point even further, Taylor goes on:

"It may be a measure of relative influence that, although top officials of FHA and HUD made special efforts after the San Francisco hearings to inform regional staff that they expected the executive order to be enforced vigorously, Tuggle nevertheless felt free months later to restate to the press the views he had expressed at the hearing."<sup>120/</sup>

Hence, we have a clear case of federal forces trying to assure the enforcement of equal opportunity while local

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<sup>120</sup>Ibid., p. 148.

authorities buckle to the pressures of the more powerful local interest groups. Taylor cites even more evidence toward proving the inadequacy of local officials when he states that very few of the local officials he encountered were able to elaborate on the long-term goals of the programs they were involved in. They knew the laws and regulations of the program inside and out many times but could not state its overall purpose as a social plan.

Reference to another case study source points out the slowness of San Francisco's planning--particularly for the elderly. Most activity for the aged in San Francisco was undertaken by the Social Planning Department of the United Community Fund. The Social Planning Department is divided into various councils, committees, and several subcommittees which are dominated by members of wealthy, conservative, old line families. In 1959 several of the committees pushed for uniting the various committees into one organization with its own professional staff. From this came the Ford sponsored "San Francisco Program for the Aging" which had one full time social worker and one full time secretary for a professional staff.

"The project was directed in the traditional style of social planning in San Francisco, with heavy reliance upon volunteer committees. The SPA generated more than twenty-five special committees

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during the course of the Ford demonstration. . . Out of each of these, in turn, came a variety of subcommittees."<sup>121</sup>/

Though interest in unifying the committees initiated an overall program, it did not suffice to bring about any notable amount of cohesiveness. What is more, out of the 240 members involved in the project, very few represented the hard core needs of the elderly. Most of the members were leading churchmen and recognized members of the community such as doctors and attorneys. These people all had various private interests which succeeded in stimulating a great deal of wasted energy and inaction.

"For example, one of the projects' proposals, involving an expenditure of only \$40,000 over a two-year period, was subjected to the scrutiny of ten separate committees--six committees of SPA and four committees of the American Red Cross, the agency which would administer the service in question. And the proposal was still subject to review by the board of the United Fund even though the money was to be provided by some source other than the Fund."<sup>122</sup>/

The application for the Ford grant started out by setting three general goals which were later broken down into several more specific goals throughout the planning procedure for the project. The goals that evolved from

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<sup>121</sup>Robert Morris and Robert H. Binstock, Feasible Planning for Social Change, (New York, 1966), p. 39.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., p. 40.



the Ford application efforts in San Francisco are listed in Appendix B along with the goals from a Ford Foundation project in Denver, Worcester, and West Contra Costa, all of which are taken from Morris and Binstock's Feasible Planning for Social Change. One might question the purpose of listing these goals within the confines of this study since they have no intrinsic value toward contributing to the decision-making process involved. The value of these goals for the reader does not lie specifically in what is said but in the mere fact that there is so much said. The questions that confront the reader at this point are: "How realistic are these goals in terms of being attained within the limitation of the Ford project and allocated resources?" and "Why, if the goals are not realistic, were not fewer, more attainable goals set for the project?" as pointed out by Morris and Binstock, though the goals ". . . seem to follow a logical course of systematic development, in fact, they developed erratically, in response to various pressures, interests, and events."<sup>123</sup>/ The main reason for so many goals being produced was the existence of so many committees and subcommittees, all of which developed their own set of planning objectives. Each subcommittee was usually made up

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<sup>123</sup>Ibid., p. 40.

of people from one specific area which they were affiliated with in some way during the course of their everyday lives. As might be expected, each subcommittee and each member of each subcommittee wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to better their area of interest for themselves or the group they represented. A good example of this point can be taken from the manner in which recreation was handled.

"As the Ford project began, the SPA formed a special committee of representatives from several senior citizens' centers and recreation groups serving the aged, which were primarily interested in providing limited recreational programs for their own members and in building up their respective memberships."<sup>124</sup>

Since only 3 percent of the elderly in downtown San Francisco came in contact with the existing senior citizens' centers, the SPA proposed expansion in the volume, clientele, and service areas in an attempt to reach more elderly people in need of such facilities. The SPA's recreation committee was against this idea because of the possibility of detracting patronage from their own already existing facilities. The recreation committee claimed that elderly people prefer to travel to centers that they find attractive to them personally rather than simply attend the center most conveniently located. Available

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<sup>124</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

evidence on the matter, however, indicated that those facilities that were being used were only used by people in the nearby community and not by people who would have to travel a significant distance.

Many of the people who did have access to centers did not have a regular family physician. It is for this reason that a health screening proposal was made that would provide the elderly with the proper medical attention.

"The chairman and the other members of the medical society who eventually dominated committee activity proved to be unrelentingly opposed to the original health proposal, fearing that it would detract from the accustomed responsibility of the private physician."<sup>125</sup>

It appeared that the medical society was not receptive to any proposal that was not profitable to the medical profession and its members.

The only real example of citizen participation that had any significant results came about when the State cut the reimbursement rates to nursing homes. Again one must question whether or not this can be considered a case of successful citizen participation since it occurred at a much higher level than that of the hard core poor. When the reimbursement rates were cut, it was not the pa-

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<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 46.

tients who brought about a reconsideration of the act, but the nursing home owners and influential relatives of the patients. Had the patients themselves been the only victims of the cut rate, there most likely would not have been anything done about it. It was the owners and paying relatives of the patients, however, who had to make up the cost difference, and their protests were sufficient to reestablish higher rates ninety days after they were cut.<sup>126/</sup>

#### San Francisco's Hunters Point

"Mr. Justin Herman, executive director of the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, refers to the process that occurred in Hunters Point-Bayview as 'collaborative planning'. In his view, the most important feature of the relationship is an attitude of trust on both sides. Some local critics say that he has the Joint Housing Committee 'in his pocket', but individuals who have provided civic leadership in the project area over many years are generally satisfied with the relationship and believe that they have had an honest and important role in shaping the plan. It happened that the goals of the citizen leaders were similar, so details could be worked out within a mutual framework."<sup>127/</sup>

The above rather lengthy quote by Howard Hallman presents some interesting possibilities when evaluating the planning game. Justin Herman points out the impor-

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<sup>126</sup>Ibid., pp. 40-48.

<sup>127</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), pp. 172-173.

tance of trust on both sides of the bargaining table. One must ask whether the "trust" being referred to is what led to the successful collaboration or perhaps the result of mutual interests at the onset of the planning, as Hallman points out, whereby agreements were easily made without fear of compromising ones own interests. Throughout the writer's research, other similar cases of collaborative planning were found and in each instance the success was attributable to nonconflicting interests among all concerned participants in the program. This type of planning does not come about very often because of the rare balance that is needed between the various interest groups. What sometimes sets the stage for this type of situation, as appeared to be the case in Hunters Point, is that the poor in their attempt to obtain a decisive voice over city hall, put their trust and resources behind existing neighborhood organizations that though significantly respected by city hall and local authorities offer very conservative demands in terms of change for the poor. Also to be pointed out is that even if neighborhood organizations are able to attain a position whereby they have a voice in choosing neighborhood staff members, many times (as in Hunters Point) the neighborhood staff members



are under the central payroll of the local authority.<sup>128/</sup> Hence, Hunters Point was a success in terms of activating federal funds but leaves room for question in terms of active citizen participation by the poor residents. Granted, they took the power from city hall but the significant question to be answered was, "Did they maintain that power in such a way so as to actively and directly serve their needs?"

A perhaps more common type of planning used in San Francisco at the same time is what Hallman refers to as "advocacy planning". This type of planning involved simply each interest group having its own planning advocate to represent a program that fits that particular group's interests in the decision-making process. This type of planning can be effective and has been on rare occasions when residents happen upon a leader who can forcefully and earnestly represent them. While the Joint Housing Committee was supposedly representing the residents in the major Urban Renewal program, Marshall Kaplan was a planning advocate who refused to be a part of the overall collaborative effort. When rejected as the prime consultant to the Redevelopment Agency, he dropped out of the formal planning proceedings. Instead, Kaplan submitted a report calling for immediate construction of new

housing on ten acres of mostly vacant land that would be split off from the 127 acre urban renewal project. The plan went through, but Kaplan was suppressed from further activity when he became ". . . a public spokesman for the residents, not merely their professional advisor."<sup>129/</sup>

Though Kaplan's organization eventually became very weak, it was respected by the members of the Joint Housing Committee.

" . . . they felt that at least it belonged to the community and that with its own funds for consultants it had a kind of independence which they lacked. They did not want a professional advocate, but they could see the advantage of having funds of their own to hire staff and consultants and thereby enhance their role in collaborative planning."<sup>130/</sup>

In evaluating the collaborative planning efforts, Hallman states that the residents did not have the technical capacity necessary to initiate their own proposals or perhaps play a more aggressive role in the planning procedures.

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<sup>129</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

<sup>130</sup>Ibid., p. 176.

Washington, D.C.

Southwest: In 1953, one of the Nation's worst slums was Washington, D.C.'s 550 acre Southwest side. For some time there was a great deal of conflict between authorities over whether the area should be redeveloped for the residents already living there or rebuilt for ". . . higher-income groups who would bring a greater tax return to the District . . . "131/

From Lowe's report it appears that there was virtually no conflict between citizens and the redevelopment authorities nor any citizen decision-making participation. Any conflict that existed was between the authorities themselves and since the area was so close to the Capitol, it was decided that it would be totally rebuilt and upgraded. The people were moved out and middle and upper-middle income housing was built.

"By the end of 1965, the redeveloped site was emerging as an attractive, racially integrated community of 5,700 residents, among them Congressmen and Senators, living in new private high-rise apartments and townhouses. . . ."132/

Southwest Washington did involve a more planned approach to relocating the residents of the condemned area than have most city projects and was subsequently more

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<sup>131</sup>Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time, (New York, 1967), p. 173.

<sup>132</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

successful than most. One need only look at D.C. today, however, to realize that its relocation and redevelopment planning was far from a total success. Between 1949 and 1966, Title I projects have displaced 194,000 families and the District of Columbia has without question had its share.<sup>133/</sup>

D.C. Planning in General: The overall planning game in Washington is not as smooth as a quick look at the Southwest might lead one to believe. The poor, lacking the organization and resources to act independently were manipulated and abused by the various organizations seeking power. In 1962 four private organizations came together to form the United Planning Organization (UPO). Later, in 1964, it also absorbed the Washington Action for Youth (WAY); originally initiated by Robert Kennedy. OEO required UPO to add representatives of the poor to its board of directors. UPO formed a Metropolitan Citizens Advisory Council which consisted of four representatives from each neighborhood committee who were to choose the representatives for the central board. What understandably resulted was the wide range of representatives allowed for too diversified a group to come to a consensus about any specific issue. Representatives with

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<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p. 172.

common interests acted as a bloc for the total board on proposals that were not geared toward benefiting them. UPO then tried to focus citizen action on specific issues by forming city-wide, issue-oriented committees. These committees seemingly had very little, if any, formal decision-making power. Their primary means of making their separate demands was to use various types of communication and media pressure (e.g., picketing Senator Robert Byrd's home) thereby initiating counterpressures from District officials and OEO onto UPO.<sup>134/</sup>

In late 1965 the Community Improvement Corporation (CIC) was formed and a year later contracted with UPO.

"However, the citizens advisory committee first organized by UPO stayed in existence, separate from CIC's board of directors, and since it was larger, it had more poor people participating than the 40-man corporation board. So there continued to be division and lack of community cohesiveness. A survey made for the Senate Subcommittee on Employment, Manpower and Poverty in the spring of 1967 found the following: 'Factions have formed to vie for power within the corporation. These have formed around personalities. And one of the issues they fight over is whether to bring in more hard core poor. As poor are brought in leaders of factions compete to win them to their side.'"<sup>135/</sup>

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<sup>134</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), pp. 45-56.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid., p. 49.



United Factions: A more specific and perhaps rather successful example of planning in Washington, D.C. involved an old Junior High School. This particular case was a situation similar to that of Hunters Point in San Francisco, i.e., both D.C. City School officials and neighborhood residents had a common goal and united to attain it. The just mentioned goal was to replace the old school with new developments. Proceedings involved in the planning for this area bear more evidence toward illustrating the importance of centralized power in decision-making than decentralized power. If it had not been for the unity of factions to centralize legitimate authority and the existence of a strong leadership figure (Reverend Fauntroy) there would have most likely not been any significant action taken toward redeveloping this area. Reverend Fauntroy had access to several professionals and businessmen who could provide the neighborhood with significant resources for power, e.g., know-how and influence. Under the title of "Model Inner City Community Organization", Fauntroy and his people held 25 meetings with residents and a hearing which involved about 700 citizens. MICCO then developed a program and won the endorsements of 150 local organizations to demonstrate its acceptance. One hundred and fifty organizations, however, proved to be too few to steer clear of opposition. Consequently, MICCO

had to enlarge its membership to provide seats for an additional 37 representatives of various interest groups. Since most of the opposition was against the fact that MICCO dominated the program and not against the program itself, this strategy of token membership proved effective. One can easily see the potentialities for a stalemate had not all of the participating organizations maintained unilateral agreement on the needs for their neighborhood. Hence, the physical planning and approval was a success in large part due to the unity and know-how behind it. The same could not be said, however, of the social planning--of which there was little or none. An emphasis on social planning through the Model Cities program showed how little local organizations were capable of doing in terms of solving problems that pure physical planning completely overlooked. Even in the just mentioned area above, where a great amount of unity was attained, social planning brought to surface enough new interests and factions to cause subsequent planning efforts to fail.

From what this writer has read concerning Washington, D.C., there does not appear to be anything definite or exciting that can be said about the city's renewal planning. The main purpose behind including D.C. in this Chapter is to suggest with the first and last planning examples cited above, two very significant points that will be hinted at time and time again throughout this study.

First, when massive change was desired, the residents had little, if anything, to do with it. Second, in the situation that did not involve social change, and where there was unilateral agreement on the issues, citizen participation was successfully utilized through representative organizations, but not without a great deal of politicking and compromise as to who maintains the power. So we have two examples of success in terms of utilizing allocated Federal funds and creating change; but in the first where social factors were definitely involved, citizens were avoided; and in the second which was not massive and which did not involve social issues, representative citizen organizations were extensively used. Success was not attained, however, without great difficulty even with the aid of strong leadership and unilateral agreement on the proposal.

The middle section of this very brief report on Washington, D.C.'s renewal planning adds additional insight to how the poor are many times exploited when they cannot be avoided.

Chicago's Hyde Park

Depending on what point a particular author is trying to emphasize, one might find sources using Hyde Park as a plus for decentralized decision-making or sources using Hyde Park as a minus for decentralized decision-making. This rather classic example of Urban Renewal seems to be a favorite referent of many sociologists and political scientists. The inherent contradiction within Hyde Park's planning game which gives it a seemingly paradoxical elasticity is not dissimilar to renewal projects in other cities. The neighborhood under consideration for redevelopment did succeed in having effective resident participation. The irregular nature of the neighborhood itself, however, leads one to ask which residents in particular participated and which did not; and whether those who did participate were truly representative of the overall neighborhood. North West Hyde Park is an area one-fourth of a square mile near the University of Chicago with about 17,000 people--mostly black.

"In the center of the neighborhood are clustered large, well maintained brick and frame single-family homes, similar in quality to those in Kenwood. These

have always been occupied by whites, many employed at the University of Chicago and George Williams College."<sup>136</sup>/

As one might expect from other similar cases of renewal, the well-to-do minority of white upper-middle class residents in the center of the community took an extremely active role in the redevelopment effort of that area. They maintained control of both resident and mediating conference representation. A contrast can be made with South West Hyde Park where the community conference, intended to mediate between the officials and residents, gave very little if any consideration to the wants of the citizens. Eventually the conference was cut off completely from the residents. In North West Hyde Park, the upper-middle class residents controlled both resident and conference positions, rendering the two as virtually synonymous.

"In February, 1954, Maynard Kreuger--Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, charter member of the Conference, and a North West resident for more than twenty years--presented a proposal for creation of the North West Hyde Park Neighborhood Redevelopment Corporation to a committee of neighborhood leaders assembled for this purpose."<sup>137</sup>/

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<sup>136</sup>Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal: The Chicago Findings, (New York, 1961), p. 192.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., p. 196.



Hence, technically North West Hyde Park did maintain a high level of citizen participation. It appears safe to infer, however, that the black poor were not part of the citizen initiative and that the proposals made by the corporation did not involve the well-being of the black population.

As already mentioned, the South West Hyde Park project was different. There was no successful citizen participation at all; the entire plan was developed by the University of Chicago and appeared to be strictly for the University's benefit even though it involved the neighboring community area. The community protested the project on two major accounts:

"(1) The entire area to be cleared will be used for University utilization--with nothing for the community. (2) Since the area is predominantly Negro, the operation is seen as antiNegro clearance."<sup>138</sup>

A Neighborhood Association was developed by the residents and worked rigorously against the program, but it was passed anyway, in spite of its obvious popular defeat within the overall community.

North West and South West Hyde Park are two more examples of success in terms of attaining and using Federal funds for renewal purposes but failure in terms of at-

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<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

taining genuine citizen participation, i.e., participation by those most directly affected by the renewal. Though not necessarily as a result of the lack of participation, there was very little done to help the poor residents of Hyde Park.

Since the main purpose of this Chapter is to learn whether or not citizen participation is genuinely attained in urban renewal, a great deal concerning these case studies is left unsaid. There are numerous closely related suggestable generalizations distinguished by the literature in this area which are not clearly inferable from this study. The reader is encouraged by this writer to delve into the case studies mentioned in this manuscript as a check to any conclusion he might be inclined to make from the interpretations given within this work. For the purpose of this study, however, the author must ask the reader to be aware of the following possible propositions that are not dealt with significantly in this study, but which add a great deal to cases such as Chicago's Hyde Park: 1) That genuine citizen participation occurs, does not necessarily mean that the residents have made the proper decisions to best utilize the program toward serving their needs. (Since there appears to be very few cases of genuine citizen participation in urban renewal this would be very difficult to prove.) 2) From number

one above it logically follows that: Urban renewal that does not help the directly affected residents is not necessarily a result of lack of citizen participation.

Citizen participation in Chicago's Hyde Park was not genuine, in the way that "genuine" has been used throughout this work; so one cannot claim that this was a case of genuine citizen participation failing to produce the most desirable changes. This is not what was intended to be inferred from statement number one above. Statement number one above was made simply to point out the possibility of statement number two which does apply to Hyde Park and many other studies covered by this research. Change very definitely took place through the urban renewal process which was not geared toward helping the poor residents of Hyde Park. Genuine citizen participation did not take place as it does not in many similar cases; and yet, there is not necessarily a direct association between the two. A great many public officials, political scientists and sociologists continue to make the mistake of assuming that more citizen participation means more of the best possible decisions made for helping the poor when in actuality, there is very little positive evidence with which to base this assumption.

So as not to detract from the major purpose of the Chapter, i.e., determining whether or not citizen participation has been significantly attained in urban renewal, let us continue with the remaining case studies.

### St. Louis

St. Louis's largest urban renewal project covered 460 acres of blighted, apparently residential area called "Mill Creek Valley".

"... 99 percent of the 2,100 structures needed major repairs; 80 percent of the dwelling units had no bath or toilet, and more than two-thirds lacked even running water.

"The City had plans for redevelopment. At the late 1964 stage of this planning, the area was parceled out among a variety of uses: residential, commercial, industrial, expressway rights-of-way, and a 22-acre expansion area for St. Louis University."<sup>139/</sup>

Plans were made, the area was cleared, and Adde, the author of the above does not mention what part the residents played or even what became of the residents once the land was cleared. Some indication is given later in the case study when Adde states: "St. Louis's present-day problems concern minority groups and poverty . . ."<sup>140/</sup> "About

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<sup>139</sup>Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 208.

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., p. 214.

25 percent of the residential sections of St. Louis are rated as slums . . . "<sup>141</sup> If the earlier planning in St. Louis had involved at least adequate relocation procedures, there may not have been such an overwhelming problem of slums in later years.

As in other cities, the Mayor ordered the organization of a citizen's committee called "Civic Progress, Inc." which was ". . . a loosely knit coalition of the business community's elite."<sup>142</sup> As might be expected, its main function was to pull businessmen together to attack the possibility of revitalizing the central business district. When the real problem of poverty hit home, Civic Progress, Inc. was still "representing" the people. Though it tried various means of approaching the problem, as one of its members, Harry Wilson, put it, the committee had no competence in that field.

Another curious example of resident neglect can be found in the not-too-distant history of East St. Louis--the effects of which still remain. Proposal after proposal was presented by professional planners who apparently were under the illusion that they would eventually be given the go-ahead. Public agencies and the legitimate governmental powers were not working together and therefore in-

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<sup>141</sup>Ibid., p. 215.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., p. 212.



action was the inevitable result regardless of the hopeless condition of the East St. Louis Waterfront.

"St. Louis development has meant little to East St. Louis except that the view of the St. Louis skyline has become magnificent from the Illinois side of the river. East St. Louis has also received more plans for its riverfront--no operating programs, but plenty of discussion and meetings. New proposals and riverfront improvement committees have kindled temporary fires of excitement, and planners and development consultants have come and gone. Nothing has happened. While the St. Louis riverfront acquired a \$37 million memorial and a spin-off in additional development, the East St. Louis riverfront became the home of a writhing, spaghetti shaped interstate highway system which displaced hundreds of families and which became a high-speed raceway through desirable riverfront property and through the city as a whole."<sup>143</sup>/

### Model Cities

Concerning the organization, Action for Boston Community Development, Stephen Thornstrom, author of a case study in Boston's redevelopment notes:

"The A.B.C.D. experience does indeed suggest that the community-action model, in which national sponsors lay down only broad program guidelines to insure that local creativity can find full expression, is difficult to realize in practice."<sup>144</sup>/

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<sup>143</sup>Robert C. Mendelson, East St. Louis: The Riverfront Charade, (Edwardsville, 1970), p. 3.

<sup>144</sup>Stephen Thornstrom, Poverty, Planning, and Politics in the New Boston: The Origin of A.B.C.D., (New York, 1969), p. 106.

The amount of restrictions placed upon local public authorities eventually becomes recognized as the major reason for failure of the urban renewal programs. Unfortunately, Thornstrom and anyone else who drew the same conclusion was slightly off in his assessment of the procedural deficiencies. Thornstrom was correct in deducing that the broad guideline approach was ineffective but was wrong if he intended to infer that a more restricted procedure would suffice.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development did draw the conclusion that the answer to achieving success in urban renewal programs was in tighter restrictions and a more rigid enforcement of the decentralized procedure. They incorporated their conclusion into the supposedly more comprehensive program of Model Cities. Though this program is relatively new (1968) and the physical results cannot actually be evaluated, the proposal procedures for three of the major cities have been studied and published in a book by Marshall Kaplan called The Model Cities Program. The reports in these cities seem to be objective but avoid detail as to what actual compromises were made in order to reach agreements. The reports mostly emphasize the struggle of the cities to meet the deadlines and regulations put forth by H.U.D., and seems to measure the success of the proposals in terms of the ability of the

city to meet the one year deadline and not the intrinsic value of the proposals themselves. The importance of meeting the restrictions can be emphasized by the following quote taken from a Model Cities question and answer pamphlet: "What happens if citizens and the city cannot agree on the ways residents will participate in the program?" The answer was, "If residents and the city cannot agree to a way that will permit the city to meet the citizen participation performance standards of the program, the city cannot participate."<sup>145</sup> One might be led to believe that the one year deadline and additional restrictions would call for an even greater necessity to short change the citizen. It would seem that more cover-up activities would have to be developed similar to the A.B.C.D. in Boston to give the records an appearance of citizen participation where no actual citizen participation took place. One could be right in making these assumptions because it appears that this is actually what has taken place.

St. Louis, now halfway through its five-year program has been exposed as a prime example of H.U.D.'s failure to control local authorities through Model Cities.

"The multimillion-dollar federal program that began with the promise of improving the quality of life for the urban poor has funneled contract awards totaling at

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<sup>145</sup>Model Cities Program, Questions and Answers, (December, 1968).

least \$991,000 in the last two and a half years for architectural, engineering, accounting and consultant services, a Post-Dispatch study shows."<sup>146</sup>

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"Neighborhood resident evaluation workers, who are paid less than a third of the professional fees, were angered to discover that their efforts were being duplicated. ." <sup>147</sup>

Aside from needlessly contracting consultants at ridiculous prices, St. Louis officials have been guilty of reckless record-keeping and possibly the displacement of \$800,000.

Atlanta, Dayton and Seattle

Atlanta, Dayton and Seattle are dealt with as one case in this study because they had only completed the planning stage of the program when Kaplan did his studies of them. Even at the present time no significant conclusion can be drawn as to whether the final product of these three programs will be a success or failure. For the purpose of this study, however, enough information is available to make brief but decisive statements concerning the decision-making in these cities.

Dayton: Howard Hallman cites Dayton as an example of a city that has succeeded in attaining citizen partici-

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<sup>146</sup>Louis J. Rose and Connie Rosenbaum, "Model City Consulting Cost \$991,000 Here," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, (May 14, 1972), p. 1.

<sup>147</sup>Ibid., p. 28.



pation through the Model Cities program.<sup>148/</sup> As described by Kaplan and as evidenced indirectly by much of what Hallman states in his study, the citizens were "involved" in the planning of the model neighborhood but they were working virtually outside of the Model City program. The residents seemingly were used as a voting group which had little choice but to give approval; for if they didn't they would be without a program entirely.

"The Planning Council functioned well as a policy review and approval group. It and the seven functional committees were not able, however, to effectively participate in final drafting of Parts I, II, and III. This task was completed by the city technicians and the Antioch team."<sup>149/</sup>

Kaplan suggests that the reason residents were not instrumental in planning the model program is because of the seemingly typical inability of neighborhood citizens to solidify toward common goals. Each subgroup tends to think that its goals are most important and deserve top priority.

"Accordingly, the citizen participation process followed the time-honored tradition of individualized and largely unrelated priorities. This had little relevance to the rational approach posited by HUD."<sup>150/</sup>

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<sup>148</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970).

<sup>149</sup>Kaplan, Marshall, Gans and Kohn, The Model Cities Program, (New York, 1970), pp. 96-97.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid., p. 97.



Seattle: Seattle's citizen involvement was similar to Dayton's. The residents were seemingly kept busy with token assignments to more or less keep them satisfied while the real planning was done by technicians. As Kaplan put it, "Though citizens played a rather small part in the preparation of Seattle's plan, they were given a strong role in the planning process."<sup>151</sup>/ As in Dayton, the citizens had approval power over proposals prior to their being presented to the Mayor which apparently was more of a gesture type of formality than a means of putting a check on the program.

It seems that the Model City program introduced a new strategy for handling the residents--keep them busy--make them feel like part of the program so they can't be against it and yet work around them. The proof of this lies in the mere fact that in Seattle, as in Dayton, "The task of drafting the final submittals was assumed by technicians."<sup>152</sup>/

Atlanta: Atlanta's planning even more clearly than the other two cities just mentioned, neglected the genuine participation of citizens. Perhaps the main difference lies in the fact that Atlanta didn't try to hide

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<sup>151</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>152</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

the fact that it avoided the citizens as did Seattle and Dayton. The following quote quite accurately sums up the attitude existing at that time toward citizen participation and how it was dealt with by the authorities.

"Direct sustained citizen involvement in Atlanta's planning program was minimal. Whatever meaningful continuous involvement did exist resulted from the review and sign-off powers granted the Executive Board and its six Model Neighborhood resident members. Neighborhood meetings were used by staff to present their reports and to elucidate a response to these reports. In effect they were sensitivity sessions. The limited degree of citizen participation was the result of a conscious decision on the part of the CDA, a decision apparently acquiesced in by the community. This decision was, according to the CDA staff, dictated by (1) the need to meet 'tough' one-year planning requirements; (2) the need to carry out reasonably difficult analytical processes; (3) the need to choose between often competing HUD planning objectives; (4) Atlanta's traditional way of planning."<sup>153/</sup>

The Model City program, supposedly intended as a get tough on local authorities policy, apparently left citizen involvement "open-ended", as Kaplan put it, as a safety valve for the additional limited time pressure. HUD requirements state that, ". . . means must be developed permitting residents of the Model Neighborhood to be fully involved in planning and execution. . ."<sup>154/</sup> but never

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<sup>153</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>154</sup>Ibid., p. 35.

state how or to what extent. Hence, though some degree of citizen involvement may be found in the "planning process", i.e., busy work such as ". . . initiating and developing problem statements and program approaches. ."155/ there might not be any citizen participation in the actual program planning. Kaplan makes the following conclusive statement in regards to the application of Seattle, Dayton, and Atlanta:

"To a very real extent, the application was the product of a small group of 'insiders'. . . Primarily responsibility for the context of the application grant rested variously with professionals, officials, and community leaders."156/

When evaluating the implications of the above given results, one must keep in mind that the entire decentralized approach to solving urban problems revolves around the intention to have the poor creating their own program. If the program fails to be a direct product of the people, then the primary function of decentralization has failed and though change may take place, needed urban change as defined at the outset of this paper is denied.

The A.C.I.R. (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations) has to a great extent occupied itself

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155Ibid., p. 63.

156Ibid., p. 99.

with the problem of decentralized government and its continued failures in dealing with urban problems. The Commission's conclusions show a great deal of inconsistency varying from publication to publication. In realization that the more recent restriction-oriented approach to making decentralization work is not effective, the Commission advised as follows:

"The Federal Government has been too specific and too detailed in many of its standards and requirements. Federal categorical and program requirements seem all too often to imply that officials at other levels of government cannot or should not be trusted to exercise good judgment."<sup>157</sup>

The naivete and oversimplification of this statement seems hardly excusable coming from a commission dedicated to solving intergovernmental problems. The fact that sixteen of the twenty-eight members on the Committee are Governors, Mayors, Members of State legislative bodies and elected county officials may, however, bear some explanation of the Commission's conclusions at that time.

By now it must be realized that the failure of decentralization to produce effective results does not lie in the degree of enforcement of the rules but within the nature of the local community. Numerous studies of cities, including those discussed above, have shown that in reality

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<sup>157</sup>State Aid to Local Government, A.C.I.R., Report A-34, (April, 1969), p. 17.

the local public authorities are not in a position to cater to the wants and needs of the poor. The local public authorities are for the most part professional politicians who wish to remain as such. They realize their need for the support of the influentials--the people with money, the people who will get them reelected.

". . . elected officials serve the interests of certain groups rather than some hypothetical overall public interest. . . In practice, in a democracy, the needs and preferences of unpopular, and powerless groups are neglected."<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>158</sup>Martin Rein, "Social Planning: The Search for Legitimacy", in Toward a National Urban Policy, ed. Daniel P. Moynihan, (New York, 1970), pp. 209-210.



CHAPTER V: POWER: A THEORETICAL  
INTERPRETATION OF URBAN RENEWAL FAILURE

Two of the major theories of community power structures are represented by the opposing views of C. W. Mills and David Riesman. Mills saw community power as a three layer pyramid: the top layer represents the power elite, the middle level represents the influential interest groups and the bottom layer represents the masses of society. Riesman saw the top layer as essentially diffused into the middle layer and referred to this layer as the "veto groups". Essentially little difference can be detected in the bottom layer, i.e., Mills saw the masses as being controlled by those above them and Riesman saw the masses as an unorganized public sought after by the interest groups as an ally.<sup>159/</sup> To say that one is right and the other is wrong would be to admit that all communities are the same. There are various degrees of both of these types of community structures. Two extreme examples are probably New York City during the time of Lindsay's election as mayor and Chicago, Illinois. New York City had so many interest groups pulling in different directions toward their own private interests that very little was ever accomplished in terms of change.

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<sup>159</sup>William Dornhauser, "Power Elite" or "Veto Groups?" in C. Wright Mills and the Power Elite, ed. G. William Domhoff and Hoyt B. Ballard, (Boston, 1969), pp. 35-59.

"The city was regarded as a collection of separate disparate interest groups, each of which had nothing to do with the others. The goal was to keep the city afloat by ministering first to one group, satisfying it, and then turning to the next group whose dissatisfaction was at a crisis stage."<sup>160</sup>/

Chicago adds a point to Mill's pyramid in Mayor Daley, Chicago also has its interest groups and Daley, being the shrewd politician that he is, knows that it is downtown businessmen that are the paying customers and it is to them that he must cater.

The important point to be made is that both feel the weight of the interest groups; whether it be diffusion to the point of a standstill or whether it be the more powerful interest groups implemented through a strong central authority such as Daley.<sup>161</sup>/

C. W. Mills points out in his book, The Power Elite, a balance of power implies equality of power. In reality this seldom, if ever, takes place. The more powerful condemn the less powerful as disturbers. The theory of balance depends on the idea of rational harmony of interests which does not exist. Mills goes on to say that "pressure groups" especially those of rural and urban businesses have

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<sup>160</sup>John V. Lindsay, The City, (New York, 1969), p. 75.

<sup>161</sup>Mike Royko, Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago, (Chicago, 1971).

". . . become the instruments of small and powerful cliques, which sometimes include their nominal leaders but often do not."<sup>162</sup>/

Marvin Olsen purports the elitist theory to be a reaction to Marxism, i.e., the elitist theory of the major figures. Marx, given credit by Olsen as the principal intellectual of contemporary political sociology, argued that power is a result of economic production. Economic production maintains social stratification whereby the government is forced to serve the dominant class.

"Marx thus expanded the concept of power from a specifically political phenomenon to a ubiquitous social process and offered a theory of societal development based on the exercise of power."<sup>163</sup>/

Elitist theorists maintained that a concentration of a powerful few was both necessary and inevitable for a society to be socially organized. This is in direct opposition to Marx's belief that the social process of change was evolutionary in nature whereby society moved closer to classlessness and an equal power distribution.<sup>164</sup>/

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<sup>162</sup>Wright Mills, The Power Elite, (New York, 1956), p. 247.

<sup>163</sup>Marvin E. Olsen, "Marx as a Power Theorist", in Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E. Olsen, (New York, 1970), p. 70.

<sup>164</sup>Marvin E. Olsen, "Elitist Theory as a Response to Marx", in Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E. Olsen, (New York, 1970), p. 106.

Pareto and other elitist theorists were convinced that social change is a cyclical process with no foreseeable deviation from the existing pattern. Marx saw a pattern in social change, but it was more of a spiral type of effect rather than cyclical, i.e., society goes through three phases: thesis, antithesis and synthesis of which the end product (or narrowest possible point of the spiral) is the above mentioned state of classlessness.

There are of course many theorists who reject both Marxism and Elitist theory such as the social pluralists who uphold political democracy or decentralization as the ultimate distribution of social power. Decentralization might, quite loosely, be described as the inverse of elitist theory whereby the power flows in the opposite direction, i.e., from the masses to a few selected "representatives" of the masses. A. de Tocqueville warned of the possible dangers of the pluralistic societal model which, in spite of the fact that Tocqueville's suggested alternative is being attempted, have become serious realities of our time.

"Tocqueville saw mass equality, created by the breakdown or absence of traditional bureaucracies of feudal authority, as providing fertile ground for the emergence of a 'tyranny of the majority' that would be totally destructive of individual freedom."<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>Marvin E. Olson, "Social Pluralism as a Basis for Democracy", in Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E. Olsen, (New York, 1970), p. 183.

As an antidote to this possibility, Tocqueville proposed that intermediate levels of organization in the form of autonomous, private, voluntary and special-interest associations be developed thereby providing a more personal link between the individual and the national level of government. Today such a level of organization has become a significant political and social reality in countries such as the United States where decentralized power is fervently cherished.<sup>166/</sup> Though various special interest organizations do exist, they do not maintain equal amounts of power; for poorer, lower status organizations can not enjoy the same overall representation or decision-making voice as the wealthy upper class organizations. Hence, Tocqueville's proposed alternative, though beneficial to many, does not prevent what he so adequately labeled as the "tyranny of the majority".

Theodore Lowi, in The Politics of Disorder, offers a very enlightening understanding of some of the shortcomings of a decentralized power distribution as a means of attaining needed social change. The following significant quote by Lowi is extremely relevant to the Urban Crisis:

"Decentralization has become a fashionable mode of response. Yet there is little assessment of the methods and consequences

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<sup>166</sup>Ibid.



of decentralization. If there were, there might be less propensity to favor it. Though it is understandable that Americans find the notion of decentralization attractive, there are strong reasons for being skittish about it. The most important of these is that decentralization tends to plug government into the interest-group system. Thus, during a time of great change like the present, decentralization, in effect, commits government to system maintenance just when it is trying to be, or at least trying to appear to be, on the side of change. To the many movement leaders who were educated to favor decentralization, the outcome of decentralized policies ultimately begins to look like a gigantic stab in the back."<sup>167</sup>

Edward C. Banfield, appointed to the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations during the summer of 1971, recognizes not only that interest groups are a significant determinant of the decisions made by local public authorities, but also that as long as the community is comprised of various influential interest groups, decentralization will never be an honest representative of participatory democracy when it comes to aiding those in the greatest need.

"The presence of the influential on the American civic scene is to be accounted for on several grounds. The most important of these, perhaps, is the decentralization of authority that is a characteristic of the American political system. Accordingly, the businessman (or anyone else) finds it easy to 'get in on the act'.

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<sup>167</sup>Theodore J. Lowi, The Politics of Disorder, (New York, 1971), p. 65.

Because he can check the public official, he can also bargain with him; as it is usually expressed, the official 'needs his cooperation'.<sup>168/</sup>

Wentworth Eldridge strongly emphasizes that there are many obstacles to participatory democracy on the urban redevelopment level:

"... We fail to recognize in our pluralistic society that not only do the three tiered governments govern, but also that in addition government corporations, government bureaus, private foundations, quasi-private corporations, quasi-public corporations, foundations, universities, labor unions, private cooperatives, free associations including even S.D.S.--all play a part in government."<sup>169/</sup>

As pointed out by Frederic Cleveland, even if an interest group sincerely wants to do what is best for the city its perspectives will be from a very limited point of view. The best example of this (and most pertinent to our discussion) is the city planner. The city planner is usually a bricks and mortar specialist without the slightest inclination toward social or comprehensive planning. His lack of awareness of the socio-psychological needs of man limit his planning to physical and functional programs.

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<sup>168</sup>Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, "Power Structure and Civic Leadership", in Metropolis in Crisis, ed. Jeffrey K. Hadden, Louis H. Masotta, Calvin J. Larsen, (Itasca, Illinois, 1967), p. 419.

<sup>169</sup>Wentworth H. Eldridge, "Toward a National Policy for Planning" in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 5.

There has been an overwhelming amount of empirical studies done on community power. An excellent bibliography of the major studies done since Floyd Hunter's "Regional City" can be found in a study by John Walton entitled "A Systematic Survey of Community Power Research". An essay on the particular study is available in a book edited by Aiken and Mott--The Structure of Community Power.

Walton's findings are very significant for our purposes. In his comparison of the various power studies, Walton found two basic types--reputational and decisional. Depending on which of these two methods is used, one's findings will systematically vary accordingly, i.e., if one employs the reputational method he is more likely to come up with certain findings than if he employs the decisional method and vice versa. One such finding of variance according to the method used was that the reputational showed a more elitist type of power structure, and the decisional, a more pluralistic type of power structure.<sup>170</sup> This phenomenon adds to the already difficult task of making comprehensive generalizations from the various empirical power studies that have been done. As Walton points out,

"Since the type of power structure identified by studies which rely on a single method may

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<sup>170</sup>John Walton, "A Systematic Survey of Community Power Research", in The Structure of Community Power, ed. Michael Aiken, Paul E. Mott, (New York, 1970), pp. 443-464.

well be an artifact of that method, future research should simultaneously employ several techniques and continue to compare the characteristics of each with the other."<sup>171</sup>/

Our main concern here is not developing a new instrument for future power studies but in the credibility of those already made. As pointed out earlier when referring to Mills and Riesman, whether an elitist power or an amorphous power exists in a particular city or community is not significant in terms of evaluating whether or not the most knowledgeable people in the area of planning were instrumental in the decision-making or whether or not the citizens actually participated, which is a central issue of this study. In referring to his own findings and perhaps the findings of other authors such as Walton, Michael Aiken concludes the following:

"It seems clear from these findings that the nature of community power structure is by no means the most important or only factor affecting community mobilization and, therefore, is probably not the most effective or appropriate theoretical framework for trying to understand these phenomena . . . perhaps a framework that considers all communities to be decentralized, that is made up of diverse and competing centers of power, would be more productive."<sup>172</sup>/

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<sup>171</sup>Ibid., p. 453.

<sup>172</sup>Michael Aiken, "The Distribution of Community Power: Structural Bases and Social Consequences", in The Structure of Community Power, ed. Michael Aiken and Paul E. Mott, (New York, 1970), pp. 487-525.



The point that Aiken seems to be making here and the significant finding of nearly all community power studies regardless of methodology used or label given to the power structure studied, is that interest groups do exist. While this statement does not overflow with profundity in itself, it adds a very significant link between the study at hand and empirical community power studies.

Floyd Hunter's study of Bennington demonstrated, through the use of tables, who the town leaders were and the amounts of cohesian among these leaders concerning different issues. The results indicated that the leaders were those who represented the most interest groups and their greatest cohesian was on small issues where compromise and tokenism could be afforded.<sup>173/</sup> One might infer from these results that decisions are made in conjunction with various interest groups and that interest groups maintain certain checks on each other which inhibit changes (let alone adequate change) from taking place. In communities where there exists what James Coleman refers to, in Community Conflict, as an "interlocking of memberships" whereby a community has its important members in more than one organization or interest group, change is quite passively slowed down. The reason for

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<sup>173</sup>Morris Janowitz, Community Political Systems, (Illinois, 1961), pp. 117-123.



this phenomenon is simply that if community leaders have their hands in various interests, it is very difficult for them to cater to their right hand without risking cutting off their left--except perhaps on minor issues. Subsequently, the safest road to take is down the middle to inaction. If a community has isolated interest groups, however, it will be factionalized and the members will be in constant conflict.<sup>174/</sup> This is exemplified in a case study by Warner E. Mills and Harry R. Davis called "The Case of the Crowded Corral". In this particular example, a restaurant owner wanted to have a zone changed so that he could build a parking lot in a residential area. The people with decision-making authority were not influenced by whether or not a parking lot should be built in that particular area or whether or not it would be right to change the zoning for one isolated resident, but were influenced in main by whether or not they or their influential friends lived in that particular area. Those who lived in that area were against the changing of the zoning restriction and those who did not live in that area were in favor of it because the restaurant in question was one of the biggest in town, the owner was very influential and the parking lot would allow for more street parking space

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<sup>174</sup>James S. Coleman, Community Conflict, (New York, 1957).

which would improve business and parking facilities for the downtown area. How the case turned out is, of course, not important because either way, the final decision was based on who could use his influence and the power of his interest group to the best of his advantage rather than on what was best for the people of the community. In cases such as this, people are sometimes forced to clearly define their position since they are going to be directly affected by a decision not in their favor. Subsequent to forced activism, conflicts sometimes develop into stalemates which go many times for years before they are resolved.

Herbert Gans' study of Levittown is an excellent illustration of the ineffectiveness of the pluralistic model, i.e., interest group decision-making procedure in terms of serving the needs of the less powerful minority groups. The just mentioned study is an analysis of the political and decision-making process in Levittown, Pennsylvania (also Levittown, New Jersey) where Gans lived as a participant observer for two years. Gans found the decision-making process ruled by four criteria;

"First, government is normally passive; it waits for issues to come to its attention. . .

"Second, government avoids or postpones decisions that cannot be resolved without conflict or that expose the gap between the actual and the performing government. . .

"Third, government gravitates toward decisions with immediate payoffs, avoiding those which produce mainly long-run effects. . .

"Fourth, the decision-making process is structured so that, whenever possible, every elected official is free--or feels he is free--to reach the decision dictated by his conscience and by his desire to benefit the community. Whether or not he is ever really free is debatable, but the feeling of being so allows him to claim that he is not required to pay attention to citizen pressure, to include his own values in his decisions, and to identify these as the public interest. Feeling free to vote 'according to his conscience' allows him to make decisions that will please his reference groups and the constituents from whom he gets the most votes."<sup>175/</sup>

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"The application of these criteria resulted in decisions which: (1) maintained Levittown's governmental bureaucracy and municipal service up to voter expectations; (2) aided the party in power; (3) benefited large or otherwise influential voter blocs and satisfied interest groups that were either in constant contact with the government, could apply pressure on it, or had campaign funds to contribute (or withhold); (4) represented pet projects or vested interests of individual decision-makers."<sup>176/</sup>

The two major interest groups were the Levitt organization (Mr. Levitt himself) and a group of businessmen who bought land in the downtown section to build stores and shopping areas. The municipal government was eager to

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<sup>175</sup>Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners, (New York, 1967), pp. 333-334.

<sup>176</sup>Ibid., pp. 334-335.

please the businessmen but would not make decisions without consulting Levitt. Within whatever means afforded them, the politicians served each other's private interests, most of which were geared toward reelection tactics. "Even when beset by internal strife, the decision-making bodies always united to defend members against attack from citizens."<sup>177</sup>/

Of particular significance was the effect that Levittown's just described network of interests had on minorities such as the blacks. Gans points out that minorities could only effect change by resorting to "political schemes" or appealing to forces outside of the city itself such as in the case of Levittown's racial desegregation. William Levitt owned the building company in Levittown and made it a practice not to sell homes to blacks. When approached by the press, Levitt openly admitted that he had no intention of desegregating the town. Shortly after, two black people brought suit against him in the State courts. Levitt stalled for as long as he could so that most of the homes would be bought by white people but eventually the State and Federal courts forced enforcement of the desegregation laws and Levittown was integrated.

Why didn't local officials and administrators see to it that desegregation laws were being enforced without

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<sup>177</sup>Ibid., p. 336.

blacks having to resort to lawsuits? The answer appears to be all too clear--any politician who acted against the interests of the larger blocs and/or Levitt himself would not have been a politician very long.

There are many community power studies among which there are many types of power structures found to be in existence. As has previously been indicated, however, the significance of these studies does not lie in what particular type of power structure predominates among communities but the fact that interest groups always exist. Whether there are only a few powerful interest groups which are representative of an elite or several powerful interest groups representative of a more amorphous power structure, makes little difference to interest groups that have no power at all. The power that is distributed within a community varies in terms of being centralized or decentralized, but each community's power structure is only a small part of an overall decentralized national structure. The effects of a more centralized community power structure cannot be generalized from since its power is part of an overall decentralized system. Only the effectiveness can be generalized from. "Effectiveness" is used here in reference to ability to initiate change and "effects" is used in reference to the characteristics of the change made. Hence, effects are the result of the particular



interests of the group maintaining the most power and effectiveness is the result of the balance of power itself, i.e., if one or a small number of groups have a disproportionate amount of power they will be more effective in bringing about change. This says nothing about what the effects of the changes will be except that they will most likely be to win support of a majority bloc or benefit the particular group or groups initiating the change.

From the example of Levittown one can see the effectiveness of a power structure that has only a couple of very powerful interest groups and be reasonably assured that the same effectiveness will exist in similar power settings. Many of the Urban Renewal case studies discussed in Chapter IV bore evidence to this fact, e.g., New York under Moses and Boston under Logue. Olsen purports what is being referred to here as "effectiveness" to be the balance between the resources committed toward a goal and the resistance met by these committed resources. Essentially this appears to be a rough formula which can be applied with relative consistency.<sup>178/</sup> The question then arises, "Given a certain amount of effectiveness, can the effects of a particular community power structure be

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<sup>178</sup>Marvin E. Olsen, "Power as a Social Process," in Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E. Olsen, (New York, 1970), pp. 2-10.

predetermined?" The answer must be "No, they cannot." At the community level of the total decentralized structure, the level where people's private lives, property, and desires are immersed into almost every decision they make, the effects of change depend on what the more powerful groups have to gain or lose in each specific case. Hence there can be no systematic means of assuring social justice unless it is composed from forces beyond the local power structure. Again Levittown serves as a case in point. This is not to say that there are no powerful local decision makers who will adhere to altruistic values and work toward social justice; for our survey of the renewal case studies bore out the fact that there are. It is to say, however, that where more tangible rewards are at stake, it seems reasonable to assume that altruism will seldom provide sufficient stimulus toward determining action.

As Marvin Olsen suggests, social power is dependent upon resources, i.e., money, land, material possessions, organizational members or intangibles such as knowledge, skills, legitimacy, and organizational unity.<sup>179/</sup> If an individual's power is dependent upon tangible resources, (either directly or indirectly) he must use his power to defend those resources; for if the resources are

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<sup>179</sup>Ibid.

threatened in any way so is his power. Hence we have effectiveness for the purpose of maintaining effectiveness rather than bringing about socially desirable effects. If an individual's power is dependent upon intangible resources such as knowledge and/or skill and once established not indirectly dependent upon tangible resources; he must use his power to bring about desirable effects. Desirable effects are the only means of asserting the knowledge or skill representing the resources upon which the power is based. Without desirable effects there is no recognizable evidence of knowledge or skill and subsequently nothing from which the individual can maintain his power.

What does all of this mean in terms of the urban renewal case studies that were discussed in Chapter IV? It is apparent from these studies that the urban poor, who are extremely lacking in both tangible and intangible resources, have very little power. They don't have the power to assure their own active participation, nor effectiveness if participation is by some means granted. Our decentralized national policy dictates that legitimate authority should be granted all the way down to the bottom rung of the social ladder so that the poor can determine their own destiny. What many fail to realize is that the poor lack the necessary resources to overcome the

"Force" and "Dominance"<sup>180/</sup> exerted by groups that do have resources. Hence, legitimate power afforded the poor is never actualized. As Alvin Schorr quite accurately describes the situation:

"The terms 'citizen participation' or, more recently, 'indigenous leadership', are used variously. One meaning of these terms is simple--that poor people who are touched by a public decision (a housing decision, in particular) have techniques and a measure of power which they exercise to influence the decision in what they regard as their own interests. It is peculiarly difficult to discuss the matter at this particular moment. Everyone approves of indigenous leadership, but never has more respect been paid to so little reality. Citizen participation has never been a conspicuous success in housing programs, even though it is a legal requirement. Accounts of genuine, lasting success by indigenous leaders are hard to come by."<sup>181/</sup>

What is needed is people with effectiveness (decision-making power) who are reinforced only in accordance with their ability to bring about socially desirable effects. The poor obviously do not have the resources and subsequent power to bring about needed social effects and the people presently assuming this responsibility are for the most part using their effectiveness for the sole purpose of reinforcing their own effectiveness. At times this process may involve a compromise that will in some small way bene-

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<sup>180</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>181</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Exploration in Social Policy, (New York, 1968), p. 231.

fit the poor but by no means does this process come close to systematically bringing about needed changes. Emphasizing the importance of desired social effects as an integral part of the overall reinforcement schedule does not necessitate implementing a total "one for all" philosophy. As Marvin Olsen suggests:

". . . autonomy and responsibility do not confront mankind with a dilemma to be resolved through compromise, as is commonly assumed. On the contrary, we should speak of them as a paradox. Personal autonomy and social responsibility can be mutually reinforcing, so that an increase in one condition may also produce an increase in the other."<sup>182</sup>

Our present urban renewal and model cities programs are such that local public authorities are induced to use trickery and deceit to attain government funds. We dangle the money before the eyes of the local public authorities and dare them to devise ways of obtaining it. This process forces public authorities to act in a socially irresponsible manner because their self-maintenance is dependent upon their ability to please dominant interest groups while at the same time fulfilling Federal obligations.

By realizing the results of the renewal studies in Chapter IV and by applying these results to general power

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
<sup>182</sup>Marvin E. Olsen, "The Mature Society: Personal Autonomy and Social Responsibility", in Vital Problems for American Society, ed. Winter, Robow, and Chesler, (New York, 1968), pp. 418-419.



theory discussed in this chapter, one can see how decentralization, though appealing in its ideal form, cannot be realistically implemented on the empirical level, i.e., in attaining needed urban change.

The following flow diagram offers a pictorial illustration of the relationship between the major areas covered in this study.

DIAGRAM E



Hence: Local community interest groups inhibit the effectiveness of decentralized federal policy in implementing programs of urban social change.

A quote from Malcolm Rivkin clearly leads us onto the next chapter:

"The game of grantmanship which communities must play with the federal establishment are a national disgrace. So are the fragmented patterns of metropolitan government. . ."<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>Malcolm D. Rivkin, "Structural Change Needs National Committment", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 87.

CHAPTER VI: COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING FOR A  
COMPREHENSIVE PROBLEM: A NATIONAL CONCERN

"The urban condition has steadily worsened, and the once proud municipalities can no longer cope with their grave and incredibly complex difficulties, which for a number of reasons lie beyond the impact of any one city to control."<sup>134</sup>/

Most social planners today realize the importance of a more centralized approach to attacking the many ills of our metropolitan areas. The main discrepancies seem to lie in just how centralized our planning system should be and subsequently what major changes should be focused upon. First, let us start at the question of how centralized should our planning be? The three most common possibilities are presented and rationalized by Dick Netzer in the following quote:

"Voters in a community are unlikely to be willing to tax themselves heavily to provide services whose benefits are largely realized by others. If the decisions were made at a regional, state, or national level, voters in those larger areas might be entirely willing to do so, since the area in which the taxes are collected would coincide. But when the decisions on services with heavy spillovers are made by small units of government, this is not the case."<sup>135</sup>/

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<sup>134</sup>Rita D. Kaunitz, "The Emergence of the States in Urban Affairs", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 103.

<sup>135</sup>Dick Netzer, Economics and Urban Problems, (New York, 1970), p. 116.

Many social planners are advocates of the regional government whereby cities come together under one massive metropolis. The regional government approach would most likely be a very effective means of solving many of our service problems such as education and sanitation. It is questionable, however, as to the effectiveness of a regional government in achieving comprehensive long-range planning. Though revenue would be more evenly distributed throughout the metropolitan areas, there is little reason to believe that the regional government would employ a planning system that would be able to give priorities to the areas of the region most in need. The planners, coming from and being employed by the regional government, would be subjected to the power distribution of that region and, though there could no longer be formal boundaries, interests (which would now include the interest groups of the entire regional area) would be more diffuse than ever. When it came time for appropriating funds for redevelopment programs this diffusion would express itself in a fury of cross purposes. The major setback in putting high hopes into the regional government, however, is that it is becoming less and less likely that the regional government could ever come into existence. Oliver Williams, in his book Metropolitan Political Analysis, indicates that rather than regional areas becoming more unified, they are becoming

more complex every year. When cities began to realize that they were losing people to the surrounding areas, most began an intensive program of annexation. Through annexation, the city was continually extending its boundaries to encompass the urban spiral. With transportation systems rapidly improving, however, the city could not keep pace with the rate of expansion and eventually separate municipalities were formed. "(Between 1963 and 1968 the number of S.M.S.A.'s increased from 212 to 233.)"<sup>186</sup>/ Williams' argument is simply that with each additional Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, the average of which contains an additional eighty-seven local governments, there is a tremendous decrease in the chances of any type of union between them. The reasoning is that no community or city once it has established its independence is going to want to relinquish that independence by submitting its authority to a more powerful body. Hence, the greater the number of separate areas that come into existence, the greater the number of local political systems the regionalists have to negotiate with.

". . . there is probably no metropolitan area in the country in which there have not been several efforts to start metropolitan consolidation. . . Thus, after four

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<sup>186</sup>Oliver P. Williams, Metropolitan Political Analysis, (New York, 1971), p. 83.

decades of self-conscious promotion of the metropolitan idea, five or six metropolitan areas have achieved some kind of general governmental centralization through consolidation."<sup>137/</sup>

It appears that regional government, though having numerous advantages over our present more diversified system of many small municipalities, is still dependent upon a somewhat decentralized authority structure. The authority structure of a regional area would most likely not be much different than that of our present cities. The power of the public authority such as the mayor or mayors may even be more diffuse because of the cumulation of interests to be simultaneously satisfied.

"The perennial hope that new metropolitan agencies; most recently the councils of government, will become the instruments for urban change and metropolitan governance, falls short of the political reality."<sup>138/</sup>

To cling to the regional government approach to solving our urban problems is extremely optimistic, somewhat utopian and most likely futile. Lewis Mumford is such an optimist. Mumford sees hope for community life in the development of regional governments. By his conception of community, however, community life is difficult to realize

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<sup>137</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>138</sup>Rita D. Kaunitz, "The Emergence of the States in Urban Affairs", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 103.



within the realm of regional politics. For "Mumford holds that a community is formed when moral law takes precedence over private desires or individual whims."<sup>189/</sup> What he is calling for here is practically a total reordering of the social system. To think that anything close to this could come about in time to save our rapidly degenerating urban areas and in the process help those that need help now is unrealistic to say the least.

This writer is inclined to agree with Williams when he says, "It is evident that if the metropolitan 'settlement' is to be abridged by society, intervention must come from some jurisdiction larger than that controlled by the actors in a specific urban complex."<sup>190/</sup> There are cases where the "rugged individualism", that this country prides itself of simply will not work and urban poverty and the problems that go with it is clearly one of these exceptions. Since "rugged individualism" and competitiveness are deeply engrained into the American system, a force outside of the area of concern is needed in order to achieve

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<sup>189</sup>Marvin D. Kownegzsberg, "Urban Development: An Introduction to the Theories of Lewis Mumford", in Urbanism in World Perspective: A Reader, ed. Sylvia Fleis Fava, (New York, 1971), p. 94.

<sup>190</sup>Oliver P. Williams, Metropolitan Political Analysis, (New York, 1971), p. 94.

in that area some sense of balance. For as rapidly as we have progressed and continue to progress, anyone who is starting out at the bottom of our socioeconomic system without education or training simply does not have a chance to improve himself let alone catch up with those that have a family history of education and success.

Clearly, most social planners of today recognize the urgency of a national planning policy; a policy that will be able to deal with the problems of today and plan for the prevention of future urban chaos. Eldridge writes in his essay, "Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment",

"No one disputes that immediate remedial action is needed, but it should be obvious to even the most 'gung-ho' administrator that imposing with visible illls on an ad hoc basis is not remotely connected with the planning ethics of strategic as well as tactical schemes for clearly delineated goals, based on the careful selection of options and a recognition of realistic, actual, and potential resource allocation possibilities."<sup>191</sup>

What Eldridge is saying, just as many of the social planners are saying, is that our national government must take the responsibility of our urban crisis upon itself if the neglected situations are to be corrected. We must deal with the problems of today, not in the piecemeal, handout

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<sup>191</sup>Wentworth H. Eldridge, "Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 4.

patchwork manner that is presently going on but in a manner that will encompass all the problems simultaneously-- a manner that will not create new problems while solving another. Our policy toward urban redevelopment should not only include correcting our present problems but should also have a definite concern for the future, taking into consideration as many variables as possible, for it is better to be prepared for something that may never occur than to overlook consequences that are not only damaging to groups of certain individuals but in the long run to society as a whole. In the words of Daniel P. Moynihan:

"Hence the issue occurs as to whether the demands of the time are not to be met in terms of policy, as well as program. It has been said of urban planners that they have been traumatized by the realization that everything relates to everything. But this is so, and the perception of it can provide a powerful analytic tool."<sup>192</sup>


Martin Rein, in his essay "Social Planning", places great emphasis on the fact that planners should have the right to implement change. He believes that it can be accomplished within the realm of our present political system by making planners an active part of the bureaucratic structure. Others believe that planners should be a fourth independent power in themselves. Whatever precise form our

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<sup>192</sup>Daniel P. Moynihan, "Toward a National Urban Policy", in Toward a National Urban Policy, ed. Daniel P. Moynihan, (New York, 1970), p. 5.

future planning policies take, they must be centralized in all of their phases except physical construction and most definitely must be the product of highly trained professional planners.

DIAGRAM F



A national policy of professional planners will bypass the network of cross interests that are an inevitable barrier to the decentralized approach, and will be placing the responsibility of comprehensive planning upon the most qualified people available. Eldridge points out that even if decentralization had succeeded in reaching the people of the slums, there is a good possibility that they would not have known what was necessary to correct their own situation in a preventive fashion. Again this phenomena relates back to Olsen's theory of power whereby the resource of legitimacy is not only overshadowed by dominance and force as stated earlier but also rendered ineffective by



a lack of such power resources as skill and knowledge.

As Eldridge puts it:

"Can alienated little people in a world they never made and do not really understand, play a meaningful part in running a society which is seemingly becoming daily less understandable in its chaotic complexity--even to the so-called experts."<sup>193</sup>/

In order for a national policy to be a dynamic force in creating needed urban change, our present national budget must experience a massive shift in priorities. This does not mean necessarily a total restructuring of our present social system as Mumford suggests, which would take an unimaginable amount of time (though I agree that our present system of social organization does need to be changed). It means that our leaders and representatives must be responsible enough to realize the urgency in reappportioning our present budget in a fashion suitable to current needs. Many social planners realize the futility behind any type of national policy unless sufficient funds are provided for appropriation. Chester Hartman points out the disproportionate amount of money spent in defense when he says, ". . . as a nation we just don't seem to want to spend big money these days for anything but killing Vietnamese."<sup>194</sup>/

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<sup>193</sup>Wentworth H. Eldridge, "Toward a National Policy for Planning the Environment", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 5.

<sup>194</sup>Chester W. Hartman, "The Politics of Housing", in Political Power and the Urban Crisis, ed. Alan Shank, (Boston, 1969), p. 434.



Rivkin suggests that 50 percent of our Vietnam budget be spent in dealing directly with social problems at home.<sup>195/</sup> Little needs to be said about the wastefulness of our present military system. Regardless of one's ideological belief concerning the Vietnam War, candid films and documents of military procedures demonstrate excessive waste in nearly all dimensions of military procedures. Yet, the gap between Federal aid authorizations and appropriations continues to grow annually. Statistical records tend to suggest that perhaps politicians are using their power to authorize funds to gain public esteem. For when it comes to appropriating programs, proposals are repeatedly turned down, with appropriation funds many times never coming close to the annual amount authorized. The increasing gap between authorization and appropriation made to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare illustrates my point:

|       |       |       |       |       |       |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Year: | 1966  | 1967  | 1968  | 1969  | 1970  |
| Gap:  | 19.1% | 22.3% | 36.7% | 50.8% | 49.5% |

"The 1970 appropriation figures for H.E.W. are passed by Congress but vetoed by President Nixon."<sup>196/</sup>

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<sup>195</sup>Malcolm D. Rivkin, "Structural Change Needs National Commitment", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), pp. 33-37.

<sup>196</sup>The Gap Between Federal Aid Authorization and Appropriations, Fiscal Years 1966 - 1970, A.C.I.R. Report M-52, (June, 1970), p. 10.

Hans Blumenfeld states that,

"No other single measures of national policy could do more for the rational use of urban space than the replacement of this tax (property tax) by allocation of a share of centrally collected revenue, such as a per capita share of the federal income tax."<sup>197</sup>

Blumenfeld's dream is close to coming true in the form of Revenue Sharing. Revenue Sharing is simply putting portions of the federal income tax revenue under the jurisdiction of state and local authorities on a no-strings-attached basis. As the A.C.I.R. stated, Revenue Sharing is ". . . essential to the cause of decentralized government."<sup>198</sup> Revenue Sharing may fulfill Blumenfeld's request as stated above but I do not believe it will fulfill his overall intentions. If the Revenue Sharing Act is passed, the results could not only fail to be beneficial in creating needed urban change but could be detrimental to our national interests by giving the influentials already in control of local affairs a free hand in the pot, hence factionalizing even more our ability to appropriate governmental aids.

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<sup>197</sup>Hans Blumenfeld, "The Rational Use of Urban Space as National Policy", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. Ernest Erber, (New York, 1970), p. 190.

<sup>198</sup>Revenue Sharing - An Idea Whose Time Has Come, A.C.I.R. Report M-54, (December, 1970), p. iii.

If the money is there to be given (and apparently President Nixon, who is the prime advocator of Revenue Sharing, thinks that it is) then it seems logical to channel it in the direction where it will do the most good for those in the greatest need, i.e., urban planning. Just as planning without funds is useless, the converse is also true; funds without planning are useless. By the time the funds are filtered through the bureaucratic structure, little if anything will be left to direct toward the poor. It is significant to include, at this point, the following quote taken from an Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations report on Revenue Sharing:

"Chairman Robert E. Merriam recently summed up the need for early enactment of the revenue sharing principle when he stated before a Congressional Committee: 'The greatest value of revenue sharing, however, may be psychological. The enactment of revenue sharing, after all, would provide the most persuasive evidence that national policymakers have confidence in our system of federalism, in general, and in state and local government, in particular. . .'"<sup>199</sup>/

Chairman Merriam went on to say that he hoped a national urban policy could eventually be established but that Revenue Sharing was essential at this time. It appears that the logical sequence of events has been reversed. The more reasonable approach in terms of positive productive change

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<sup>199</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

would be to first develop a national urban policy and then provide the necessary funds in that specific direction.

It is significant to note, however, that the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations does recognize the importance of a national urban policy. The following statement was taken from an A.C.I.R. Report:

"Finally, and most central of the statutory responsibilities of the commission, we believe that a national policy dealing with urban growth is necessary and desirable in preserving and strengthening the American federal system. The problems arising from and surrounding the drift of urbanization and economic growth are among the most critical and difficult domestic problems of our time. If the federal system does not move to meet them, its very usefulness is brought to question."<sup>200</sup>

Though the A.C.I.R. reports tend, at times to be contradictory it is encouraging that a commission of the nature of A.C.I.R. would openly admit to the need for a national urban policy--a policy that deviates somewhat from the traditional American pattern of governing. It is also encouraging to know that the A.C.I.R. has recently added to its commission Edward C. Banfield, a strong advocate of social planning. What is discouraging, however, is the nature of Merriam's address to the Congressional Committee on Revenue Sharing. He speaks of local public authority as

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<sup>200</sup>Urban and Rural America: Policies for Future Growth, ACIR Report A-32, (April, 1968), p. 129.



a parent would speak of a child. Merriam is advocating something similar to what is known as reverse psychology, i.e., by giving the local authorities unconditional funds and showing complete trust in them, they will suddenly cast off all personal interests and direct the given funds toward the greatest need. To even suggest this as a possibility is outrageous when considering all the revenue that is going to be misdirected if revenue sharing in its present form becomes a reality.

The greatest strides in centralizing planning today are being made at the state level in controlling land use. Though land use control does not involve urban problems, per se, a more centralized control of land use can definitely affect the general urbanization patterns of the future, e.g., migration and suburbanization. More importantly, however, is the fact that the efforts made in this direction have been relatively successful and might adequately serve as models for more centralized planning in other areas such as the urban environment itself. It is not entirely inconceivable that the centralized procedures adopted by some states today in controlling land use could be useful in the development of a national urban policy or perhaps the initiation of state urban policies.



"In the twentieth century we are so accustomed to thinking of the national government as the focus of centralized power in society that it may require more than a moments reflection to realize that this need not always be so."<sup>201/</sup>

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". . . each type of activity in the society might be coordinated by a separate agency that dealt only with a limited sphere of events, thus permitting numerous foci of power."<sup>202.</sup>

What Olsen is saying here is rather significant toward realizing the value of the Bosselman Report which we will shortly be discussing and toward realizing the positive possibilities involved in a national urban policy. The main reason for centralizing power is not to give one or a few people some ominous type of absolute control but to coordinate planning from a jurisdiction outside the specific areas of concern. In discussing two of the biggest obstacles for city planners Dennis Poplin states:

"First the city planner must constantly deal with vested interest groups. In most cities there are at least a few individuals who stand to lose if the master plan is implemented fully."<sup>203/</sup>

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<sup>201</sup>Marvin E. Olsen, "Power Centralization as a Social Process", in Power in Societies, ed. Marvin E. Olsen, (New York, 1970), p. 229.

<sup>202</sup>Ibid., p. 232.

<sup>203</sup>Dennis E. Poplin, Communities: A survey of Theories and Methods of Research, (New York, 1972), p. 228.

"An even greater problem lies in the fact that the area over which the city planner has authority is frequently smaller than the area which requires unified planning. In short, the city planner's authority usually ends at the city limits, whereas the city as a physical entity does not."<sup>204</sup>

Some city governments have had partial success in dealing with cross boundary problems by initiating such things as commuter taxes. Though this type of approach helps keep up with the problems to a certain extent financially, it does not help solve the problems in a future oriented manner. For example, obtaining a few extra tax dollars to put toward fixing a few more broken school house windows is quite distant from long-range urban planning that is geared toward equalizing educational opportunity. Problems that involve coordination of various interacting parts can only best be dealt with at a macro level from outside of the "whole". To use an analogy, if one chooses to make a pottery vase, one must constantly be turning that vase to assure total symmetry on all sides. If one individual has a personal investment in only one side of the vase and other individuals with less ability (skill as a form of power) have investments in other areas of the vase, what are the chances of having an end product that is even functional let alone attractive? This is not to

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<sup>204</sup>Ibid., p. 229.

infer that one person should shape the entire urban complex as if it were a ball of clay--not at all. The intention is to emphasize the need for a coordination of parts. Taking the same analogy of the vase--supposing a committee of people who had nothing invested in any one part of that vase, but were reinforced only in accordance with the quality of the end product, were chosen to see to it that no one aspect became disproportionate with the other aspects of the total object: With no authority to touch the vase themselves the committee could see to it that each individual was afforded every possible opportunity to perfect his particular design or contribution as long as it did not interfere with the overall coordination of the product.

Perhaps a brief inquiry into the findings of the Bosselman Report followed by a concluding chapter will clarify the significance of the above analysis.

The Bosselman Report: The Quiet  
Revolution in Land Use Control

Fred Bosselman and David Callies were commissioned by the Council on Environmental Quality to report on the recent innovations of several states in controlling their land use. The report includes nine case studies:

- 1) Hawaiian Land Use Law
- 2) Vermont Environmental Control Law
- 3) San Francisco Bay Conservation and  
Development Commission
- 4) Twin Cities Metropolitan Council
- 5) Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law
- 6) Main Cite Location Law
- 7) Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Program
- 8) Wisconsin Shoreland Protection Program
- 9) New England River Basins Commission

For the purposes of this study only two of the nine will be discussed: Hawaiian Land Use Law, because it was the first and Twin Cities Metropolitan Council because it was initiated to solve urban problems.

" . . . efforts are underway in widely separated areas of the country to broaden the community making decisions with respect to certain land use issues. Undoubtedly, matters of purely local interest-- for example, where to allow a gas station--

should remain under local control. Probably the great majority of land use decisions made by government are properly local in effect.

"However, as our society has become more complex it has become clear that some land use determinations of one locality often have very important consequences for citizens in other areas."<sup>205</sup>/

Hawaii: The first Statewide Land Use Law was passed in 1961 in Hawaii. Hawaii is a small state with a very limited amount of agricultural land (approximately 400,000 acres). When Hawaii became a state, Honolulu began to expand very rapidly. It was soon realized that in order to prevent over-urban expansion into prime agricultural areas some regulation would have to be made. To expect officials of Honolulu to restrict their own boundaries would be like asking Mayor Daley to exclude Bridgeport as part of Chicago. The restriction had to come from an exclusive jurisdiction which meant the state level of government. Prior to being made a state, Hawaii had a history of centralized control. Hence, it was less difficult for Hawaiians to accept the Land Use Law than it would have been for most mainland Americans.

The Land Use Commission consists of seven private

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<sup>205</sup>Fred Bosselman and David Callies, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control, prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality, (Washington, D.C., 1971), p. 11.



citizens, the Director of the Department of Land and Natural Resources and the Director of the Department of Planning and Economic Development. The State has been divided into four major categories: urban, rural, agricultural, and conservation. Each category serves as a regulatory basis for maintaining a balance of land use throughout the State. Urban districts are existing high density areas and specified land for the sole use of urban expansion--supposedly to accommodate ten years of growth.

Rural districts are low density residential areas. New zoning of this type is rare in agricultural areas. Agricultural districts are crop and graze lands based on the quality of land, rainfall, etc.

Prior to the Land Use Law the State owned a certain amount of land for water and forest conservation. Since the law the Commission has been given the right to zone private land for conservation purposes so that as of 1969 one-third of the land in conservation districts is privately owned.

Zoning changes are made by application to the Commission. Though there is a great deal of argument between vested interest groups, over whose interests the Commission is catering to, after ten years of decision-making it appears the following three policies are used to best interpret the Land Use Law:

- "(1) Prime agricultural land should be preserved for agricultural use.
- "(2) Tourist-attracting development should be encouraged without disturbing the attractions of the natural landscape.
- "(3) Compact and efficient urban areas should be provided where people can live at reasonable cost."<sup>206/</sup>

The decisions made so far by the Commission seem to be as objective as possible considering the constant pressure from the various public sectors. Of the 100,000 acres requested for rezoning to urban use only 30,000 have been approved of which only 3,500 acres was prime agricultural land. Much of the 3,500 acres was already within a highly urbanized district.

". . . There is also evidence that as a result of the state's strong land use law, its plantation management has been given incentive and assurance to plan for long-term stability and growth in agriculture operations."<sup>207/</sup>

Though the prime motive behind organizing the Commission was to protect agricultural lands, this does not mean that all land owners want this protection. In fact, a great percentage of the land in Hawaii belongs to a few very powerful land owners who realize quite clearly the profits to be made in development.

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<sup>206</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>207</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

"Each of the large landowners looks enviously at the tempting profits made by those who are able to sell or lease their land for hotels or condominiums."<sup>208</sup>/

Hence, it seems that the Commission has managed to escape existing pressure groups and has made its decisions on a nonpartisan basis.

Nonpartisanship and jurisdiction over overlapping areas represent the core value of centralized decision-making. Without nonpartisanship, however, an overlapping jurisdiction cannot genuinely come about because one area will be given more decision-making power than the other areas. Though any group that is made up of human individuals can fall prey to pressure tactics in one form or another, even if they have no personal investment toward their power involved; it is much more feasible to assure nonpartisanship by selecting choice representatives than by letting all the people with various amounts of power and vested interests fend for themselves. The effectiveness of the Land Use Commission can only be measured in terms of their ability to maintain a healthy balance between the four designated districts. Whatever legitimate power is afforded them is maintained by their ability to resist temptation by any one particular part and favor only the whole environmental balance.

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<sup>208</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

Minnesota: In 1967, the State of Minnesota responded to the rapidly growing problems of its Twin Cities area by creating a Metropolitan Council. Rapid population increases in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region brought about problems such as inadequate sewage disposal and transportation which the local government could not handle. The purpose of the council was to initiate a comprehensive plan for the entire region and implement this plan by steering local agencies into making the proper decisions that would lead toward fulfillment of the overall comprehensive plan. The Council consisted of fifteen members, all appointed by the Governor. Even though the Council ". . . proved itself by formulating a plan for alleviating the sewage and water crisis which were the catalyst that brought it into being. . ." <sup>209</sup> there still arose a great deal of conflict between the Council and local authorities over just how much power the Council should have.

A result of the existing conflicts is a more than equal share of failures to successes in terms of getting legislation passed. The legislation that has passed has been successful, i.e., it has helped solve some problems that otherwise may not have been solved. The conflict arises when defining the power potential for the Council

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<sup>209</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

itself. There are a great many areas which the Council, and only the Council (with its comprehensive framework), could be of even a greater service than it has by initiating sewage planning, e.g.: "health and criminal justics." Unfortunately the Council has yet to be able to pursue these areas because of the tough resistance of local authorities who are fearful of loosing their own power. It is being realized by more and more State and Federal politicians that the various powers of local authorities are self-defeating in terms of initiating long-range comprehensive plans. Seemingly the Twin Cities Council is overcoming its difficulties by more accurately defining its duties. There is the question, however, of why there was as much successful resistance as there was while other States with similar programs have had comparatively little. A possible suggestion might be the regional nature of the Council itself. It was stated that fourteen of the fifteen members of the Council had to be from the Twin Cities Region which could affect the ability of the members to remain objective. It could also affect the ability of the local agencies to look upon the Council as an objective group; especially if an agency identifies one or more of the Council members with a faction to which he is opposed. There is also the possibility that the regional agencies might feel they are being picked on since the Council is



specific to their area and not Statewide. Though the Regional Council as a more centralized form of decision-making and planning has been more successful than the local agencies, there is also a great deal of evidence to support Owen Williams' argument against regional governments. Had the State not appointed the Regional Council, it is very unlikely that the Council would have come into existence. For various possible reasons, some of which were just mentioned above, the Council was met with a great deal of active partisanship that does not take place as readily when decisions are enforced from the State or Federal level.

The Bosselman Report has clearly demonstrated that notwithstanding certain inevitable difficulties a great deal more can be accomplished toward solving overlapping problems in a comprehensive manner through centralized planning and decision-making than could ever be hoped for through piecemeal local partisanship.

Precedence has been set by a few States that have put the welfare of their State before tradition and have succeeded in bringing about constructive changes. Hopefully an increasing number of people will realize the significance of these breakthroughs and encourage their own States to adopt similar programs. One possible form of a national urban policy might be to simply enforce the init-

iation of Statewide programs for regulating land use and urban growth. This enforcement could be in such a way so as to maintain basic requirements in areas of common concern and yet allow for each State to handle its own peculiar problems as well. Local authorities would then go about their more specific services without diverting their skills and energy toward the macro problems which they have little or no ability to solve.

## CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

### Summary

By showing that decentralized decision-making has failed to eliminate housing problems this study has also demonstrated that the decentralized process has failed to eliminate poverty. The reasoning behind this is that housing is primarily a problem relative to people not being able to afford a "decent" home. Urban renewal case studies show that community power structures in the form of interest groups are the intervening variable preventing decentralization from being an effective policy toward eliminating poverty. Also, empirical community power studies point out that there are interest groups involved in nearly all major community decisions. Reference to the Bosselman report provided a means of controlling the intervening variable, i.e., bypassing the local interest groups by developing more centralized controls over comprehensive decision-making. It follows, therefore, that any time decentralized decision-making is applied to poverty elimination community interest groups are going to be a necessary intervening variable preventing the decisions from being in favor of the poor. The reason this is most pertinent to the poor is explained in Olsen's power theory in that poor people, having

the fewest resources, also have the least amount of power and, therefore, the least chance of having decisions made in their favor when competing with other more powerful interest groups. This has been demonstrated in several of the case histories where urban renewal programs, basically intended to help the poor, were controlled by middle and upper middle class organizations and interest groups. The results of these more powerful interest groups controlling the urban renewal decision-making have been that the poor, the citizens most effected by the programs, have had little if any voice in the decisions and are many times harmed rather than helped by them. Two very good examples of this are Chicago's Northwest Hyde Park and St. Louis' "Mill Creek Valley".

Northwest Hyde Park had a small elite community living in the center of a large run down neighborhood. The elite members who were predominantly University of Chicago professors certainly were not representatives of the majority population. However, because they represented greater resources; money, knowledge, influence, etc. and had definite vested interests at stake, the changes that took place were in fact non-beneficial to the majority of the residence of that community, i.e., the poor.

St. Louis represents another excellent case in point where a 460 acre residential area was cleared. The

area was badly blighted with the greatest percentage of housing having no baths, toilet or even running water. The citizen's committee was made up of a coalition of elite businessmen who were naturally in favor of the cities plan to divide a once residential area into a variety of uses. Some residential building took place, but the bulk of the area was used for the following purposes: commercial, industrial, expressway right-of-way, and a 22 acre St. Louis University expansion area. The overall result was that the thousands of poor people displaced by the redevelopment had no decisive power over its taking place. Quite clearly the area seems to have been parceled out among the most powerful interest groups, those with the most resources initially. The displacement of people into already overcrowded areas and the lack of emphasis on social planning became apparent when it was realized that twenty-five percent of the residential sections of St. Louis were rated slums.

Hence, it appears that as long as there are poor people at the base of the decentralized system who have less power (resources) than other existing groups which are interested in attaining federal funds for their own purposes, the decentralized federal policy cannot be implemented effectively in terms of creating change geared toward urban social problems, i.e., deliberate and adequate attack on the poverty cycle. The fact that poverty is the



core of many interrelating factors of which none can be dealt with separately allows for reference to a concept more inclusive than just poverty. An analogy might be that the circulatory system is useless without the heart and yet we still need the term "circulatory system" to describe the entire interdependent process between blood, arteries, and the various other parts as well as the heart. It is within this context that the term "urban social change" is referred to as the dependent variable of the guiding hypothesis of this study. Urban social change refers not only to poverty elimination but to all factors directly or indirectly related to poverty elimination as well. Hence, we have a situation where adequate urban social change cannot take place without dealing with poverty and at the same time poverty cannot be dealt with apart from consideration of all the other completely interrelated social and environmental factors.

It appears, therefore, that our guiding hypothesis: "Local community interest groups inhibit the effectiveness of decentralized federal policy in implementing programs of urban social change" has been supported by the data presented herein. The nature of this study, however, makes it very difficult to determine to what degree the guiding hypothesis has been substantiated. When considering the extent of substantiation one must bear in mind that this

is not a quantitative study and therefore cannot render empirical validity. Though the case studies herein were not purposely selected, but selected on the basis of availability within time and monetary limits, the study does not involve statistical coding nor scientifically recorded longitudinal data. There is longitudinal information within many of the case histories in that "before urban renewal" and "after urban renewal" conditions are compared but these do not render scientific validity to the study itself. Substantiation at this point is not scientifically induced but merely logically inferred by the author through an effort to ascertain whether or not information exists which supports certain sociological assumptions.

Within this context, it can be said that the greatest amount of substantiation attributable to this study is derived from the fact that out of the many urban renewal case studies covered by the author none indicated adequate change for helping the poor as a result of citizen participation by the poor. Though a couple poor communities came close to controlling the decision-making in their area it was mainly in the form of bloc tactics and not productive reconstruction. One partial success story involving Newark was the result of racial tensions whereby at the time renewal proposals were being made black emotional solidarity was at its peak. Power resulting from this type of collective activism was very rare throughout the case

studies that were encountered and in none did there exist anything close to the intensity level of Newark in terms of urban renewal control. The power that resulted in Newark was to a great extent a result of the great potential for violence that the black community displayed as a group.

There were a few other partial success stories where the poor were led by people from the middle or upper middle class groups hence giving suggestable credance to Marxian conflict theory, i.e., the masses must be led by members of the middle class. Such cases were few, however, and dependent upon spurious situations rather than a systematic policy where high predictability of results is inferred. The findings of this study can best be discredited or substantiated further through additional research. The author suggests that more empirical techniques be employed to deal with the various interrelationships herein, thereby affording one more exact interpretation of results in terms of substantiation of findings.

Conclusion: Planning Our Urban Environment

"No city in the country makes a long-range estimate of all its housing needs in order to plan to meet them in some reasonable period--10, 15, or 20 years."<sup>216/</sup>

One of the most significant statistics in the book New Homes and Poor People is the fact that there is an inverse relationship between the sequence position of a home and its distance from the central city: i.e., as a sequence gets longer, those furthest in the sequence are the homes closest to the center of the city. The mean distance from the center of the city to new dwelling units was found to be 18.2 miles (also the median). The mean distance for the last dwelling units was found to be 12.7 miles (median 10.9); nearly half were under ten miles.<sup>211/</sup> One can also see a correlation between these statistics and the figures given in Chart C where it was illustrated that during the 1960's when moderate income subsidies were provided, there was a gradual decrease in the number of whites in the central cities. In comparison to the entire urban population, twenty-six percent of the whites are in the central city as compared to fifty-five percent of the

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<sup>210</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 60.

<sup>211</sup>John B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, James N. Morgan, New Homes and Poor People, (Michigan, 1969), pp. 19-20.

non-whites.<sup>212/</sup> From this one can deduce that most of the non-white population are in the lower income brackets since it was the middle income people that were subsidized to the suburbs. Hence minority groups such as the blacks are discriminated against not only because they are black (which is evidenced by the fact that thirty percent fewer blacks can find homes in their perspective income bracket than whites) but also quite obviously because they are poor.<sup>213/</sup> As Bayard Rustin points out:

"The black slum proletariat has been growing in numbers and density. . . . As agricultural mechanization and other factors continue pushing Negroes out of the south, the urban ghettos expand each year by half a million; only 40,000 Negroes annually find their way into the suburbs."<sup>214/</sup>

Poor people are forced to stay in the inner city because it is the only place they can find housing close to their income. Black people are forced to remain in the inner cities because they are discriminated against for being black as well as for being poor. Just as the poor cannot supply themselves with adequate jobs and ade-

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<sup>212</sup>The President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 40.

<sup>213</sup>John B. Lansing, Charles Wade Clifton, James N. Morgan, New Homes and Poor People, (Michigan, 1969), p. 43.

<sup>214</sup>Bayard Rustin, "Away Out of the Exploding Ghetto", in Cities in Trouble, ed. Nathan Glazer, (Chicago, 1970), p. 203.



quate housing, they cannot supply themselves with the needed services such as education to break the poverty cycle for succeeding generations.

Many urbanologists today believe that the only feasible way of dealing with poverty is by planning an urban policy that will balance the suburbs and central city both racially and economically. Since most blue collar jobs have moved to the suburban areas, it seems logical that low income housing should be provided in the same areas. As Herbert Gans suggested several years ago,

"The solution, then, is not to repeal urban renewal, but to transform it from a program of slums clearance and rehabilitation into a program of urban rehousing. This means, first, building low- and moderate-cost housing on vacant land in cities, suburbs, and new towns beyond the suburbs and also helping slum dwellers to move into existing housing outside the slums; and then, after a portion of the urban low-income population has left the slums, clearing and rehabilitating them through urban renewal."<sup>215</sup>

This writer is of the opinion that the best long-term results would be attained if a similar movement to that of the 1960's was induced whereby this time it would be the poor who were subsidized to the suburbs. To make the program effective; the loans would have to be geared specifically toward meeting the demands of the bottom economic

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<sup>215</sup>Herbert Gans, People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions, (New York, 1968), p. 267.

sector of the urban population. It would also be wise to have research teams assess the job capacity for all of the suburban areas until the job capacity is filled. This would have to take into account the changing dimensions of the community, i.e., its natural rate of growth and the additional increase in jobs due to the migration itself. The long-term benefits of such a program would be that the lower income people could have adequate homes that they could be proud of, the educational benefits and other community services of the middle and upper middle class families and an overall better chance of breaking the poverty cycle. At the same time, our economy would be stimulated by having the poor working as productive forces in the economic system.

Following still the suggestions of Gans; to upgrade the city tax base and community services, it would also be necessary to induce an influx of white middle class suburbanites back into the central city. This point can be supported by a quote from Robert C. Weaver:

"Regardless of any social, political, or moral consideration, the economics of the situation require concern for retention of white middle-class families in central cities because their numbers far exceed those among non-whites. In any given locality the problem has three manifestations: creation of new areas in which middle-class families will establish stable communities, rehabilita-

tion or partial renewal of areas which will attract and hold middle-class families, and the arresting or preventing the desertion of middle-class families from existing areas of residence."<sup>216</sup>

One of the most overlooked but important consequences of a policy based on balancing all metropolitan areas would be that a greater percentage of people would be closer to their jobs whereby public transit systems could be the major means of transportation for all. A great deal of money could be saved by de-emphasizing the massive expansion of expressway systems that is presently occurring. There could also be a considerable decrease in pollution as a result of less rush hour traffic and the accompanying exhausts. As pointed out by Alvin Schorr, many poor people do not want to move. These people would benefit by the presence of the middle class whites who would demand quality education and community services. The middle class whites would benefit by being closer to their jobs and the many entertainment activities of the central city such as museums and theaters.

There is little question that these policies would demand a budget many times more than what most politicians would consider feasible. If we are, however, making a transition from a war to peace time economy as some of

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<sup>216</sup>Robert C. Weaver, "Class, Race, and Urban Renewal", in Urban Sociology, ed. Faud Baali, Joseph S. Vandiver, (New York, 1970), pp. 383-403.

our leading politicians have suggested, there should be a considerable amount of funds that could be shifted from the military budget to the domestic urban problem of making significant strategic subsidies for the poor and creating jobs geared toward improving the quality of life. By jobs that improve the quality of life is meant a wider expansion of our educational system by way of construction and maintenance on the blue collar level and better trained, better equipped instructors with a lower student-instructor ratio on the white collar level. Other examples might be jobs that result from an extensive expansion of recreation and health services of which many people are presently deprived. It has been said that in times of "need" regardless of the magnitude, Americans have somehow always managed without hesitation, to finance it. With World Wars I and II the United States has developed one of the largest, most expensive military systems in the history of the world. Korea and Vietnam cost and are still costing the United States hoards of money. When the Russians were the first to put a satellite into space, the American people could not spend their money fast enough to see to it that we were adequately competing in the space race. The realization that the funds behind one rocket to the moon could comfortably house thousands of poor people is revolting. Gemini 3 alone involved: two years of



preparation, the top talents of more than five thousand American corporations, cooperation of 3,196 subcontracting companies which supplied \$343,837,143.88 worth of parts and services for the capsule alone, a trip of 75,000 miles that took less than five hours.<sup>217/</sup> It appears that many American people and their leaders have a warped interpretation of the word "need". This writer is of the opinion, and I'm sure that most of the 7.8 poorly housed people in our metropolitan areas would agree, that adequate social planning is a tremendous need in our society and if it were recognized as such by the right amount of the right people, i.e., influentials and politicians, one would be amazed at the amount of funds that would suddenly be available to meet the task. Alvin Schorr states the following in regard to the expenses involved in adequately providing subsidies for the poor:

"Such a program need not appear to be favoritism. On the contrary, aids that have so far been devised (income tax advantages, mortgage insurance) reach middle and upper income families with special effect. Resources and techniques are available to right the balance."<sup>218/</sup>

As Schorr also points out, social workers, architects, bankers, politicians, builders, and anyone else that is in-

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<sup>217/</sup>Edward Higbee, A Question of Priorities, (New York, 1970), pp. 23-29.

<sup>218</sup>Alvin L. Schorr, Slums and Social Insecurity, (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 137.



volved in a particular phase of planning, must unite to combine knowledge and resources into an effective, dynamic form of planned change. Again, I refer to an appropriate quote from Schorr's book Slums and Social Insecurity:

"Emphasis on social planning appears to be intended to encompass three distinct ideas: First, that the needs of individuals--especially those who live in an affected area--should not be overloaded in a preoccupation with blueprints of officialdom. Second, that human attitudes, prejudices, preferences, sentiments, and notions should be fed assumptions into the thinking machine that eventually produces a city or neighborhood plan. Otherwise these intangibles turn up late on the scene to interfere with perfectly good physical plans. Third, that some sense of unifying community purpose should pervade a city's planning to represent a countervailing, if not overriding force to commercial and financial considerations."<sup>219</sup>

The idea of planned social change raises not only political and economic questions, but also a moral one: Is it right to manipulate the lives of people? Planned social change as this writer perceives it should, if effectively implemented, be a perpetual chain of additional choices whereby old choices eventually become extinct with the constant rise of new, more attractive ones that are created in juxtaposition with a predetermined social pattern. This writer believes it is wrong to control individual behavior by limiting one's ability to make certain

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<sup>219</sup>Ibid., p. 57.

choices e.g., programming specific individual behavior patterns through the educational system. The idea behind social planning is to eliminate, on an as totally conscious level as possible, any desire or need to make a choice detrimental to oneself or anyone else. The major difference as I see it between the two approaches is that in one the individual's scope of choices is constantly being broadened whereas in the other, the individual's scope of choices is being thwarted or restricted even to the possible extent that a choice does not exist at all. An illustrative example will further clarify my point: many poor people today are totally immobilized in the central cities. By presenting an attractive opportunity such as owning their own homes and holding a stable job their scope of choices has been broadened somewhat. Doubtless many would not choose to take advantage of such an opportunity in which case if a straining social imbalance persisted new avenues of choice would have to be created. An individual's scope of choices should be broadened as much as possible on the secondary educational level and should be realistically generalizable to his adult life. That is, following secondary education, one should be able to choose an area of interest, train for, and pursue it as his life's work and still maintain the ability to cultivate the remaining interests in the form of hobbies, recreation, or

alternative occupations. On the other hand, to control one's behavior pattern (assuming that it is possible) to the extent that he is conditioned into a specific occupation is to deny him the ability to become self-actualized which Abraham Maslow purports as a basic need of man. Though not yet proven, it is the author's contention that men do have subtle genetic differences which in various ways, be it neurologically or physiologically or some other means, allow for different adaptational capabilities to environmental stimuli. The only way to afford one the capacity to assert his particular capabilities is to expose him to as wide a variety of stimuli as possible while at the same time controlling the environment from aversive stimuli that could inhibit one from fulfilling all of his needs. Though a pseudo-randomized stimulus approach to human behavior in no way allows one a pure form of choice or anything close to it, it does allow one to adopt a life style most compatible with his particular personality peculiarities, however significant these peculiarities might be. Hence, man could presumably be afforded acceptable choices through effective social planning that does not involve strict behavioral controls. Herbert C. Kelman expresses this writer's view on planned change when he states:

"Complete freedom of choice is, of course, a meaningless concept. But the purpose of education and of the arrangement of the social order, as I see it, is to enable men to live in society while at the same time enhancing their freedom to choose and widening their areas of choice."<sup>220</sup>

As an urban nation, we cannot afford to cling to the laissez-faire traditions of our early, rural, American heritage. The social organization of our urban areas is an overlapping interdependent fabric of parts--not a group of total, independent, self-sufficient families or clans which at one time made up the bulk of this nation. Our modern metropolitan problems are becoming so complexly interwoven that piecemeal planning and decision-making only add to the already existing frustrations of concerned and/or involved individuals.

The content and progression of this study demonstrates that there is a great deal of evidence pointing to the contention that in order to attain effective planned change we must be committed to more comprehensive approaches which can only be initiated effectively from a more centralized sociopolitical viewpoint.

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<sup>220</sup>Herbert C. Kelman, "Manipulation of Human Behavior: An Ethical Dilemma for the Social Scientist", in The Planning of Change, ed. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, Robert Chin, pp. 582-612, (Chicago, 1961), p. 585.



# APPENDIX A

|  | New Haven | Oakland | Syracuse | Contra Costa County | Denver | Dallas | Peoria | Midland | Pittsfield | Columbus | Worcester | Detroit |
|--|-----------|---------|----------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|---------|------------|----------|-----------|---------|
| 1) Little or no significant citizen participation at lower class level             | X         | X       | X        | X                   | X      | X 229  | X      | X       | X          | X        | X         | X       |
| 2) Existing citizen participation was at middle class level*                       |           |         |          | X 225               |        |        | X 230  | X 231   | X 232      |          | X 235     |         |
| 3) "Representative" citizen participation appointed by authorities or officials**  | X 221     |         | X 223    |                     | X 228  |        |        |         |            |          |           | X 236   |
| 4) Near complete diffusion of interests by effective groups                        |           |         |          | X 224               | X 227  |        |        |         |            |          | X 234     |         |
| 5) Citizen activism with little or no productive results in terms of renewal       |           | X 222   |          |                     | X 226  |        |        |         |            | X 233    |           |         |
| 6) Citizen participation in work activities but not in planning or decision-making |           |         |          |                     |        |        |        |         |            |          |           |         |
| 7) Effective citizen participation for lower class (effected) citizens***          |           |         |          |                     |        |        |        |         |            |          |           |         |

\* Usually through middle class organizations or business circles.

\*\* Usually "yes men" who are appointed for formality and expediency purposes.


\*\*\* Though none of the twelve cases charted above fit into categories 6 and 7 there are examples of both of these



in other cases covered in Chapter IV. The best examples of category 6 are found in the later Model Cities Programs such as in Dayton. Examples of 7, though very few, were also demonstrated in Chapter IV, e.g., Newark.

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Though there are cases of category 2 charted, one of the best examples is Philadelphia where the entire flow of the decentralized process could be recognized except for in the lower class level.



As demonstrated by the above rather crude design, the circulation of power went from officials and authorities to the middle class people who in turn reinforced the officials and authorities who have some legitimate authority above them and so on. The flow of decision-making power very seldom reaches the lowest level where the effects of decisions are felt the most.

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<sup>221</sup>Jeanne R. Lowe, Cities in a Race With Time, (New York, 1967), pp. 42, 165 and 168.

<sup>222</sup>Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), pp. 199-202.

<sup>223</sup>Linton C. Freeman, Patterns of Local Community Leadership, (New York, 1968), pp. 20-21.

<sup>224</sup>Robert Morris and Robert H. Binstock, Feasible Planning for Social Change, (New York, 1966), pp. 98 and 53.

<sup>225</sup>Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>226</sup>Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 183.

227 Robert Morris and Robert H. Binstock, Feasible Planning for Social Change, (New York, 1966), pp. 66-67.

228 Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 183.

229 Ibid., pp. 73-74.

230 Ibid., p. 111.

231 Ibid., p. 138.

232 Ibid., p. 157.

233 Howard W. Hallman, Neighborhood Control of Public Programs, (New York, 1970), p. 72.

234 Robert Morris and Robert H. Binstock, Feasible Planning for Social Change, (New York, 1966), pp. 101 and 72.

235 Ibid., p. 100.

236 Leo Adde, Nine Cities: The Anatomy of Downtown Renewal, (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 229.

## APPENDIX B: PLANNING GOALS FOR FOUR FORD FOUNDATION PROGRAMS

### San Francisco:

1. Improvement of public and private programs
2. Arousal of interest in the community to move it into action for improved services for the aged
3. Creation of machinery for coordinating services for the elderly

More specific goals emerged in the course of the project. While these seem to follow a logical course of systematic development, in fact, they developed erratically, in response to various pressures, interests, and events:

- A. Casework and Personal Counseling Services
  1. Additional caseworkers to be employed or reassigned for work with the elderly, especially by the department of public welfare, but also by hospitals, the Family Service Association, and the Jewish Family Service
  2. The department of welfare to organize a special training program for its staff; a school of social work to organize a training program on the needs of the aged for all agency staffs
  3. Discontinuance of joint case services provided by the voluntary family agencies to public assistance recipients, in order to encourage staff increases within the department of welfare
  4. The public welfare department to expend all funds annually appropriated to it through an increase in allocation for professional services to clients
  5. The local chapter of the American Red Cross to sponsor a program of friendly visiting to supplement professional casework services, to be financed by a local foundation

B. Health, Medical Care, and Rehabilitation

1. Initiate a system of health examinations and referrals for the elderly without family
  - a) To be located in several public health centers
  - b) To be administered by the local medical society
  - c) To be financed from a grant by the Public Health Service
2. Persuade the city health department to increase all of its public health services and to include auxiliary services, such as homemaking and home nursing for the aged
3. Support adequate payment for public assistance recipients in nursing homes

C. Adult Education and Recreation

1. Bring leisure-time services within reach of residents in all parts of the city by:
  - a) Inducing agencies operating leisure-time programs under sectarian auspices to extend their services to all nearby residents
  - b) Increasing the scope of responsibility of the nonsectarian senior citizens' center
  - c) Reallocating service-area responsibilities among all existing agencies
2. Launch a training program about leisure-time needs of the aging, conducted by a school of social work and directed both to sectarian and to nonsectarian agencies
3. Persuade the municipal recreation department to begin a program of in-service training for its own staff
4. Influence the municipal library to adopt more favorable policies in handling indigent older persons who use its facilities
5. Induce the Canon Kip Community House to organize a special center for the socially isolated aged
6. Arrange for agencies working in the North Market area to cooperate in case referrals and to establish better liaison with the Hotel Association whose constituent members in this area house a large number of older persons

D. Retirement Policies

1. Encourage the state employment service to assign special vocational counselors to advise older unemployed persons and to help them locate employment.



2. Organize, with the cooperation of the California department of employment and the U. S. Office of Manpower, Automation, and Training, a special retaining program for older unemployed workers
3. Stimulate adult education organizations to offer classes in retirement preparation

E. Housing

1. Persuade the redevelopment authority to arrange for the construction of 800 units to house older persons soon to be displaced by downtown urban renewal projects
2. Persuade the housing authority to incorporate a social services and facilities in its low-cost public housing projects
3. Organize a housing information service

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Contra Costa County:

A. Organization of Planning

1. Establish the extent to which effective planning can be centralized on a county basis or decentralized to regional or local communities
2. Develop and test both county-wide and local coordinating committees, requiring recruitment of leadership from other organizations and the uncovering of latent leadership not yet involved in community activity
3. Merge the one strong council in the west and the relatively weaker councils in the central and eastern parts of the county
4. Engage the major county governmental agencies (health, welfare, housing, and recreation) in the work of the new county council and smooth out relationships with the voluntary agency members
5. Strengthen the decision-making responsibilities of the Community Council's board of directors for county-wide action

B. Private and Public Agency Programs for Older People

1. Increase the volume of public low-cost housing through action of the relevant public housing authorities:
  - a) In Richmond
  - b) In Martinez
  - c) Throughout the county



2. Improve the quality of public housing by persuading public housing authorities to introduce drop-in recreation centers in newly constructed public housing projects
  - a) Persuade recreation departments of cities and voluntary agencies to help staff these centers
3. Establish a new county-wide service to provide homemaking and home nursing services to out-of-hospital patients
  - a) Secure participation of several agencies (county health department, county hospital, visiting nurses' agencies, heart and cancer associations, and the medical society) to launch such a service
  - b) Secure a demonstration grant for initial financing from the U. S. Public Health Service or the state health department
  - c) Incorporate a new independent agency to provide this service, with approval from the above agencies and from the board of the County Council of Community Services
4. Consolidate various friendly-visiting programs into one strong county service, to be administered by the local chapter of the American Red Cross
5. Enlarge recreation opportunities for the aged throughout the county
  - a) Stimulate town recreation departments and voluntary groups, such as churches and women's clubs, to open drop-in centers for the elderly

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Worcester:

- A. Organization of Multiservice Center for the Elderly
  1. Persuade the Golden Rule (United) Fund and the Community Services of Greater Worcester to support and sponsor such a center--later converted into an effort to establish an independent corporation without ties to the Fund
  2. Persuade any of several agencies (YWCA, housing authority, department of parks) to provide space for the center
  3. Secure initial financing from any of the following: United Fund; department of public health, private donors; or, in the last resort, as the contribution of volunteer staff time

B. Medical Care

1. Introduce a recreational therapy, as a first step in rehabilitation, into several proprietary nursing homes
2. Secure a sponsoring agency to administer recreational therapy--either the Community Services of Greater Worcester, the YMCA, or the Bay State Rehabilitation Society
3. Secure the cooperation of five nursing home owners
4. Secure initial financing from the public health service or from the nursing home operators themselves
5. Increase the state welfare department's reimbursements to nursing homes for patients on public welfare

C. Casework and Personal Counseling

1. Persuade the Family Service Association to assign casework staff to work with older clients and train the rest of the staff to recognize the needs of such clients
2. Continue the volunteer work of the Information Service for the Aging by securing new volunteers
3. Incorporate the information service in the proposed multi-purpose center
4. Train volunteers for a friendly visiting service

D. Housing

1. Persuade the housing authority to construct low-cost housing in a downtown location suitable for the most needy aged persons
2. Induce the housing authority to include a center for recreation for the aged in a new, low-rent apartment house project

\* \* \*

Denver:

A. Arrangements for Central Planning for the Aged in Denver

1. Improve the relationship between the MCCC and the SCC
  - a) Appoint the president of the SCC as vice-chairman of the MPPOP
  - b) Coordinate the activities of the SCC and the MPPOP
  - c) Merge the SCC and the MPPOP
  - d) Secure the appointment of the president of the SCC as the next chairman of the merged planning unit

- e) Secure an MCCA commitment to provide full-time staff service for the aging after the termination of the demonstration
  - 2. Improve relationships between the United Fund and the MCCA
- B. Relationships among Direct-Service Agencies
- 1. Organize a conference of nonprofit homes for the elderly
  - 2. Organize a conference group of agencies servicing the chronically ill aged
  - 3. Establish a friendly working relationship between the Denver housing authority and the MCCA
  - 4. Encourage closer cooperation among Jewish-sponsored social agencies
- C. Quality of Existing Programs for the Elderly
- 1. Enrich the programs of nonprofit housing corporations serving the aged
    - a) Secure participation of housing managers in training institutes, stressing the social needs of residents
    - b) Provide various technical aides to enhance occupancy of such homes by needy aged persons
  - 2. Persuade the Denver housing authority to build more units of low-cost public housing and to introduce social services in their management
  - 3. Induce selected agencies to initiate an organized home medical care program
  - 4. Induce certain health agencies to initiate a program of preventive services
  - 5. Persuade similar agencies to introduce comprehensive rehabilitation programs into commercial nursing homes
  - 6. Expand preretirement educational programs through selected industries and the Adult Education Association
  - 7. Persuade the family service agencies to increase their allocation of caseworkers for counseling the aged
  - 8. Persuade the Denver recreation department to serve a federation of senior citizen clubs
  - 9. Persuade the Allied Jewish Council to support family counseling for older clients

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