

1973

The Military in Political Leadership in Ghana

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THE MILITARY IN POLITICAL

LEADERSHIP IN GHANA

(TITLE)

BY

Kenneth Koroma

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1973
YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Military intervention in the political affairs of a nation has become a phenomenon in today's world. It is worth noting, however, that political philosophers have usually considered it unnatural. Due to the fact that social scientists have refused to accept this as a natural occurrence, studies on this topic have been few and limited. The major works done in this area have been in the form of articles. As early as the 1930's military intervention into politics was considered as an aberration.

Samuel P. Huntington, Morris Janowitz and other authors on military institutions in developing areas, have identified several factors which tend to retard scholarly research in this field. These include: a) personal values of social scientists; b) the intellectual postures which tend to discourage such research; c) the inherent secrecy of military institutions; d) the political sensitivity of this type of research with regards to the leaders of these nations; e) the pervasiveness of liberal ideology which tends to either ignore the military or to treat it as an aberration.

However this topic has come into sharper focus lately due to the repeated occurrence of military take-overs in the developing nations. The latest coup happened in September of 1973 in Chile when the military took over the government of Allende.

As the governmental agencies of these countries are being replaced by military personnel, a large amount of the national budget is allocated to military expendi-

tures. In Africa alone with a population of 270,000,000 the military expenditure² in 1966 was eight billion dollars. With a figure like this, one is tempted to criticize such military expenditures when the people of these nations remain uneducated, hungry and sick. With regards to the defense budget as a percent of the Gross National Product, Zaire comes first with an expenditure amounting to 5.9%. Somalia comes second with a 5.0% followed by Congo Brazzaville with a 4.7%. Mali and Sudan come fourth with a 3.5% while Ghana takes the eighteenth position with³ 2.3%.

METHODOLOGY

I intend to use Ghanaian military experience as a case study and to compare empirical data of the civilian regime of Kwame Nkrumah (1960-1966) with that of the military regime that overthrew him (1966-1969). In so doing, one should be able to make a realistic judgement as to which of these governments is the more modernizing agent. By modernization, I mean the degree to which the military and the civilian governments brought development in Ghana in terms of adequate social welfare programs, more schools, more health facilities and better housing.

My data come from two primary sources. One will be economic statistics from the Ghanaian Embassy in Washington. Material from this source includes reports of the various commissions of inquiry set up by the military National Liberation Council just after the coup; their inquiries were designed to find out Nkrumah's expenditures as well as his corruptions. The second source comes from periodicals and other publications such as the United Nations Statistical Year Book.

Although I will rely heavily on the primary sources, it is worth noting that they may be inaccurate and insufficient. Some governments have the tendency of either reporting false figures to protect the integrity of their regime or refusing to give out certain economic, social or political data if they feel that the revelation of such data could be against their interest. One may therefore find discrepancies in statistical figures between those provided by the government concerned and those

made by other organizations like the World Bank and international organizations collecting statistical data in that country.

I chose to do my research on Ghana for many reasons. Ghana has been the 'model' nation in Africa for both African countries and students of African affairs. The greatest African Ancient Kingdom in the 16th century flourished in Ghana. It is believed that commerce and nationalistic political activities in Africa began in this Empire.

In the 20th century, Ghana continues to be the leading modern nation in Africa. It was the first black African country that achieved independence from Britain, under Kwami Nkrumah the leader of the Pan African movement. It was Nkrumah who called for independence for all of African nations and an eventual formation of the United States of Africa under one government.⁴ Kwami Nkrumah supported guerrilla movements in the Portuguese African territories and South Africa in their fight for independence.

According to European standards, at the time of its independence, Ghana was an 'advanced' country. It had a large middle class of civil servants and a professional class as well as merchants. It also had the highest standard of education in all of Africa south of the Sahara and a high literacy rate. About 25% of the people over 14 years of age are literate. Approximately 13.3% of the population is in primary school and secondary school compared to 11.5% in the Congo and 1.4% in Ethiopia.⁵

I also chose to do a national rather than a cross-national study because I think that cross-national research in this field is not only too extensive for time available but is unnecessary. What seems to be most important is to test, using empirical data, certain claims about military institutions by Western scholars. These claims argue that the military is the most modernizing institution in developing areas. My research will attempt to evaluate this claim with regard to Ghana.

PROPOSALS

My proposals are based upon certain theories or assumptions about military government in developing areas made by Western writers. For the sake of clarity I shall divide the proposals into two groups: 1) Defense Expenditures and 2) Economic Developmental Policies.

Defense Expenditure

One of the major reasons why military institutions exist in Africa is to protect the national interest and the military's own professionalism. In some countries where the military is independent of the civilian government, as was the case of Sierra Leone before the coup of 1967, military expenditures in the national budget were very small. The army was ill-equipped in terms of uniforms and military equipment. This low military profile was sustained by the belief among the political leaders that the army, given more attention and better standards of living, would become involved in the political process in the sense of increasing their demands. Therefore the leaders tried to keep the army apolitical by keeping expenditures small. The military in some countries, like Ghana during Nkrumah's regime, are ill-equipped and inferior in comparison to their counterparts in other countries. Therefore after a military take-over one could expect a substantial increase in expenditures in defense.

Economic Developmental Policies

The economic aspect of modernization has been a major cause of instability in developing areas. The major problem area is the phenomenon of rising expectations. In an effort to mobilize the people against the colonial power, the elites of these nations had promised a better standard of living for all. They had blamed the under development of the nation on the presence of the colonial power. In most countries these elites were able to attain the independence of their individual countries. However, after independence they soon found

out that economic development was not as easy as getting rid of the colonial power. They realised that they could not fulfill the promises they made to the people. This resulted in frustration within the masses. These frustrations are channeled to activities which tend to erode the legitimacy of the government's authority. The instability that usually occurs causes the army to intervene in the political process. However taking over the civilian government does not ensure a ready-made legitimacy for the military regime. The military regime, like its civilian counterpart, has to acquire its legitimacy by insuring economic benefits for the people and relative political stability.

Western writers of military institutions in the developing areas have theorized that the military governments are the most modernizing agent in these areas. They support such theories by referring to the training abroad of the officer corps, the Western model of military organization which their nations acquired after independence and the demand for efficiency which they say is natural in all military institutions.

If such assumptions hold true one could hypothesize the following on economic policies: a) substantial military involvement in the political process will be followed by a relative increase in economic development/infra-structure expenditures, (agricultural, industrial, and trade expenditures); b) a substantial military involvement in the political process will not be followed by an increase in social expenditures.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION

Scholarly literature in this area can be divided into three groups; 1) literature that deals with the history of military institutions in Africa; 2) literature that tries to explain why the military intervenes into the political process. The authors of this type of literature tend to look at the economic

and social instability of the nations as the cause of the military coup.

3) Literature that shows the soldier as a political administrator. Such writings are usually case studies in which authors try to evaluate the leadership of the military government in a particular country.

In all three areas, social scientists have been more preoccupied with research dealing with the explanation of the social and economic conditions that cause the military to intervene. Therefore the major literature on military institutions in developing areas is of this kind.

There are three major writers on this topic. All of these writers agree to what seems to be the major points. These authors are Pierre Van den Berghe, James S. Coleman, and Belmont Brice Jr. There are, of course, others like Claude E. Welch, Samuel Huntington, Henry Bienen, Morris Janowitz who have made contributions to the study of military institutions in developing areas.

Van den Berghe in his article, "The Military and Political Change in Africa," identifies seven types of armies in the evolution of African military institutions. The first one he calls the Raiding-Citizens Army. This type of army is found during the stateless society in Africa before the coming of European into the continent. The army itself is mono-ethnic in the sense that it is made up of able-bodied men from a single tribe. It is formed spontaneously when there is a threat of war from another tribe. Age grade determines the military divisions to which an individual is assigned. For this reason, each division is made up of men or boys of the same age.

The second type of army is the Palace Army. The development of centralized monarchies during the period of the great empires of Ghana, Mali and Ashanti, transformed the Raiding Army to the Palace Army. During this period some kind of organization in the affairs of the state was in its embryonic stage. The Palace Army as the name literally implies, constitutes the major instruments of

power of the establishment--the king, the nobility and the clergy of the official religion. It is a well organized army and recruitment to it is permanent. The officer corps is made up of men of aristocratic families while the ordinary soldier is of peasant or lower class background. It is apolitical and is directly under the control of the king. The major African tribes that had Palace Armies were the Fulani of northern Nigeria, the Ashanti and Benin people of Southern Ghana, the Zulu, the Swazi and Ndebele tribes of East Africa. One still finds Palace Armies today in areas of Morocco, Libya and Ethiopia.

The third type of army is the Putch Army. The introduction of modern technology in the means of war and the recruitment of the people of lower class status to the officer corps changed the Palace Army to the Putch Army. It is a very highly professional and politicised army. Due to its power, this type of army is quite independent of political officers. Its internal organization is typified by military dictatorship. Van den Berghe claims that this is the type of army that is found in many African countries today.

The fourth is the Herrenvolk Army. This type of army is typical of the military institution in South Africa and Rhodesia. It's ideology is one of white supremacy. Officers are all whites. Non-whites are recruited as auxiliary unarmed and non-combatant troops. In addition to the regular military units, other units are designed for the sole purpose of intimidating the African population. The army is apolitical and is under the stern control of the government.

The fifth type of army is the Colonial Army. This is the type of army that was found in the periods of colonial domination. The purpose of this army was to suppress internal African uprisings. The colonial powers often aimed to foster ethnic rivalry among the tribes. Recruitment into the army was therefore from illiterate tribes that have a strong military tradition and are noted for their fierceness. As a means to maximize the reliability of colonial soldiers,

troops were often stationed away from home among traditional enemies. The colonial army was therefore regarded by the African with hate and fear.

Due to the high illiteracy rate in the army, the military profession is still linked with lower status personnel. In the eyes of many it is a symbol of past colonial shame. Van den Berghe noted that in order for such military institutions to be more effective they would have to change this image. In other words they would have to create a good relationship between themselves and the rest of the population. He suggested two ways by which this can be done. The first thing is to transform the army into what he called a literate citizens' army which is to be propagandized fully into the national ideology. Making the soldier literate would remove the reputation of "uncivilized and savage" which the soldier acquired during the colonial period, and making them nationalistic would erase the old image of the army as a tool "for foreign oppression." The second solution he suggested is to use the army in such constructive purposes as sanitation, rescue crews, transportation and in public work. Building bridges and roads, and administering medical aid would be most effective in changing the image of the African Army. However he noted that the transformation of the Colonial Army into a National Army would not take place overnight. Indeed, as Van den Berghe himself concluded, "One should not expect a National Army to arise before the national itself has become a reality."⁷

The National Army is the seventh type of army. To Van den Berghe, this is the ideal type. This type of army would be modern but apolitical and under the control of the civilian government. Van den Berghe claimed none of the African military institutions have reached this stage. Most of the military institutions today in Africa not only lack a set of political ideologies, but are relatively independent of the power of the political leader. In fact, the political leader needs the strong backing of the military in order to stay in power and rule effectively. The heterogenous composition of the army makes the

institution of the National Army impossible. National in this sense means that each soldier views himself as a part of the whole nation, rather than in terms of tribalism. In the Ghanaian army, the officer corps is occupied by the well educated southerners, while the ordinary soldiers mostly come from the less educated and Muslim North. One could therefore expect an intense problem of tribalism in the army.

In their article "The Role of the Military in Sub-Saharan Africa," James S. Coleman and Belmont Brice Jr. try to point out the legacies of the colonial rule on the military establishment of Africa. He looks at the British, French, Belgian and Portuguese African territories. For my paper, the emphasis will be on the British and French West African territories. In West Africa, Coleman and Brice stated that the British did not concentrate on building a strong and effective military establishment. They also noted the imbalance of tribal group representation in the army that Van den Berghe mentioned. The British had a policy of recruiting the officer corps from the dominant group or tribe. This is one of the causes of the present day tribalism of the army in Africa today. The French, on the other hand, view their colonial armies as part of the French army. Therefore the French did not develop any territorial army in the colonies. Coleman and Brice noted that these colonies, even after independence, were very dependent on their former colonial powers for military aid. However they concluded that there is a growing tendency among these nations to diversify their dependency to other nations.

The second part of my literature review deals with the literature on the causes of military intervention into the political process. In this section, I will include literature that deals with the military as a modernizing agent. Writers in this area include Claude E. Welch, Martin C. Needler, Samuel P. Huntington, Lucien Pye, Guy Parker, Martin J. Levy, John P. Lovel and I. Eugene

Kim, Morris Janowitz, Lerner and Turner.

Apart from Janowitz, Lerner, and Turner, most of these writers claim that the military is the only hope for substantial development in the third world. They use the organizational model of the military institution as basis for their argument in making such claims. They argue that by virtue of the professionalism of all military institutions and the training of their officers it should stand to reason that the military is the most modernizing agent in these nations. In 1960 Lucian Pye claimed that one of the great forces of today is the dynamic and self sacrificing military leaders of the developing areas who are committed to progress and the task of modernizing their societies that have been sub-
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verted by the corrupt practices of politicians.

Guy Parker, who has written on the military in South East Asia and specifically dealing with the problem of combating the spread of Communism into that area, stated that the politicians in that area would not be able to cope with the instability caused by Communist infiltration because they have neither the prestige of the traditional aristocrats nor the prestige of the first generation of leaders. He said that those best equipped to become an effective counter-balance to the spread of Communism and instability are the members of the national officer corps as individuals and as national armies in their organizational structures. He noted that the soldiers' personal qualities of leadership, patriotism and commitment to moral values are products of modernization and should be the only non-Communist group equipped to modernize these
11
countries.

Martin J. Levy stated that the armed forces organization is the most efficient type of organization for the combining of maximum rates of moderniza-
12
tion with a maximum level of stability and control.

The major point of John P. Lowel and I. Eugene Kim is that the military plays an important part in the socialization and communication functions of the

new states, because its own requirement demands that it be rational, universalistic and industrial oriented. Its recruitment of civilian personnel into the army and its contact with the rest of the population, help in the socialization of the civilian into modern western society. Because of these reasons these authors believe that the military is a vehicle for national integration¹³ and economic and political stability.

The major theoretical work on military intervention into the political process is done by Lucian Pye, Claude E. Welch and Robert D. Putman. Even though they seem to be saying the same thing, I think it is worth reviewing some of their major works.

Lucian Pye in his work "The Armies in the Process of Political Modernization", claimed that most of the military establishment in developing areas acquired their institutional model from the West. In so doing he said these armies have undertaken to create a form of organization typical and peculiar to the most highly industrialized civilization yet known. In order to achieve the high industrial skill characteristic of Western military institutions, he said that most of the military officers had to be sent abroad for military training. In an attempt to compare the soldier with his civilian counter-part in the process of modernization, Pye stated that the soldier is more determined to modernize the society than the politicians. He gave two reasons for this: 1) due to the fact that all military establishments are by nature rival institutions, the soldier is often called upon to compare his standards with other armies of the world. On the other hand the politician does not have a similar institution to compare himself. Because the military uses an international yardstick to measure the degree of its own development, it is therefore more sensitive to the backwardness of his country and is more committed to develop it. 2) Due to their professionalism and training abroad, the military is divorced from the realities of their traditional society and is more socialized with the industrial Western

culture. Pye noted that in the developing areas the soldier should not only be a good soldier but a good soldier must also be a modernized man. ¹⁴

Robert D. Putman's work is on the military intervention in Latin American countries. Even though the conditions for military intervention in Latin American countries may be somewhat different from those in Africa, I think his conclusion is worth mentioning in this paper. Before looking at Putman's work, it is important to bear in mind that there are great differences between military institutions in Africa and in Latin America. In talking about these differences, Jose Nun, one of the prominent authors of military institutions in Latin America, stated that the major difference lies in the fact that there is a greater degree of expansion of industrialization in Latin America than in Africa. He also noted that the military profession is more respected in Latin America because the armed forces are well integrated into the society. This makes the military more institutionalized in Latin American than their counter-part in Africa. Finally, he claimed that military intervention does not threaten the middle class nor is it a substitute for its absence but that the military tends to represent that class. ¹⁵ Because of this Nun believes that the military in Latin America inhibits change.

In Africa the military officers do not represent any traditional landowning aristocratic or an urban bourgeoisie. These classes are very weak and even non-existent. Africanization of the officer corps began after independence in many countries.

Mr. Putman investigated five areas in his research: 1) The political development of the country; 2) Its socio-economic development; 3) Its military establishment; 4) Foreign influence on the military; 5) The military trend and influence on the society. He arrived at the following conclusion with regards to the probability of military intervention in Latin American politics; a) that there is very little evidence linking political development to military abstention in politics; b) that widespread participation in elections, strong

parties and pressure groups and freedom from political violence are neither necessary
16
nor sufficient for military abstention from politics.

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLITICS

The major explanation of military intervention into the political process in Africa is made by Claude E. Welch. Welch begins his article by identifying three types of military involvement into the political process.

In the immediate post-independence period the army was for the most part an advocate of non-involvement. The reason for this is that during this period the army was still under the control of expatriate officers who were committed to maintain the government in power.

The second type of military involvement came in the form of mutinies. The aim of these mutinies was not to overthrow the civilian government but rather to force the government to increase salary scale of soldiers, to institute pension benefits and to Africanize the officer corps. It is worth noting the Africanization of the officer corps of the army was very slow in the post-independence period. For example in 1959 in Ghana, the officer corps was only made up of ten percent of the native Ghanaians. The majority of the officer corps were expatriates. It must be noted here that Ghana at that time occupied the highest level of education in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the Belgian Force Republique there were no African officers in 1960. The reason for this late Africanization of the officer corps has been cited as the unavailability of Africans with the required education. However, three years later in 1960 in Ghana, the Africanization of the officer corps increased from ten percent to forty percent. This increase was no doubt a result of the intense demand of the African soldiers to enter the officer corps.

The third type of involvement is the coup d'etat. This type of involvement

is directly aimed at replacing politicians and civil servants in the administration of government. The first coup d'etat in Africa was in the Sudan in November of 1958 when General Ibrahim Abboud and some officers took over that government. There has been a succession of coup d'etats since that time to the present.

Welch pointed out seven factors that cause the military to intervene into the government. These are: 1) decline in the prestige of the major political parties; 2) schism among prominent politicians which weaken the solidarity of the broadly based Nationalist movement or party of the colonial period; 3) the likelihood of external intervention in the event of a military coup; 4) "contagion" from seizures of control by the military in other African countries; 5) domestic social antagonisms, most obviously manifested in countries where a minority group exercised control e.g. the Arabs in Tanzania, the Mende in Sierra Leone and the Watuse in Burundi; 6) the economic instability in the country, which in turn leads to the implementation of austerity economic policies affecting the articulate, urbanized sector of the population such as trade union members, the army and civil servants; 7) corruption and inefficiency of government and party officials especially during a period of economic decline; 8) a heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.

Decline in Party Prestige

Welch deals with some of these points in detail, one of which is decline in party prestige. Welch claimed that there is usually a single party in the post-independent African countries that is most powerful and respected by all. An example of such a party is the Convention Peoples Party of Ghana and the Sierra Leone Peoples Party. These parties acquired such power and prestige because they had mobilized the population against their colonial powers and had successfully won the independence of their countries. The leader of such a party

like Kwami Nkrumah of Ghana or Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone are respected even to the point of being worshipped. Nkrumah was called by such names as Osajifo, the father of the nation, the redeemed and even the messiah by his people. The nation was united as one under this leader. Welch called this unity a heterogenous monolith. The leader maintained such a unity by blaming the poverty and backwardness of the country on the exploitation of the colonial power, and by promising them a better standard of living after independence had been achieved. However, after independence the people remained poor, hungry and uneducated. The political leaders have not lived up to their promises of a better standard of living for all. Soon there began to appear cracks on this heterogenous mono-ethic. Primordial attachment became stronger than national sentiment. Participation in politics intensified. However such participation took the form of an obsessive concern with the relation of one's tribe, religion or sect to the center of power. Opposition to the leader and his legitimacy to govern became intense. At this point the leader or party resorted to ways and means to get rid of the opposition and limited freedom of speech and movement. The opposition in the government is removed in the following ways: 1) by creating civil actions against politicians through legal restrictions on their activities; 2) by manipulating the electoral machinery against opposition candidates; 3) by increasing the rewards for "carpet crossing"; 4) by removing the spokesman of the major opposition groups through political house arrest.¹⁷

The leader or party continues to rely increasingly on the use of force to achieve its goal. As it has always been the case, increasing the use of force by the government increases the significance and power of the army. On the other hand the power and prestige of the leader or the party continues to decline. In Ghana for example, the use of force by Nkrumah and the Convention

People's Party against opposition resulted in the loss of his power and prestige he had at the time of independence.

Political Schism

This is usually a political split among top party officials. Welch proposed that in a state where political rivalry cannot be contained within the framework of a single party, the likelihood of a military intervention is increased. He gave some examples of such occurrences. In Sudan General Ibrahim Abboud was invited to take over the government due to a constitutional deadlock in the government. In the Congo, the military and General Mobutu took over the government when the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu found themselves in a constitutional impasse. Patrice Lumumba had ruled unconstitutional his dismissal from the position of Prime Minister by the President. In both of these cases the army sees itself as the only hope to restore the country to normalcy. General Soglo, the head of the Dahomean coup d'etat, summarized the military rationale for a coup:

"The trouble with our country, as you know, is separatism and regionalism with all their threats of division. The political leaders are not bad, they are men with great qualities who have rendered considerable service to their country, but they have proved that they cannot rise above their personal quarrels...Our objective is to introduce into this country a new style of politics in which the people will rally around a program and not around personalities." 16

Possibility of External Intervention

Welch proposed that a threat of an external intervention to stop a coup d'etat would significantly effect the possibilities of the army intervention into the political process. There are four conditions that may cause a particular foreign country to intervene to stop a coup. 1) If that nation has a good investment in that country, the fear that such an investment might be confiscated by the military government could cause that country to intervene and try to stop the coup d'etat. 2) If that nation has a good number of its people

residing in that country, it may intervene if it feels that the new military government may cause some political troubles for that population. 3) The cold war rivalry may also cause a particular foreign country to intervene and stop a coup d'etat if it feels that the new military government may pursue policies that would be detrimental or at least unfavourable in terms of the cold war strategies. 4) The presence of a good number of expatriate military officers in the national army may prevent African officers and soldiers from embarking on a coup d'etat. The reason for this is that the expatriate officers are committed to maintain the African government concerned. The African political leaders do realize the importance of expatriates in the officer corps. After independence some have tried to maintain a good number of expatriates in their armies. During Nkrumah's regime, the highest military officer in Ghana was an expatriate. The political leaders have also tried to maintain foreign military personnel in the armies by signing military agreements with their former colonial powers. Most of the French colonies signed bilateral treaties with France shortly after Independence. The agreements of the treaties permit an extensive "interconnection between France and the colonial armies, to a point of allowing France both to intervene directly and to establish bases and military installations." ¹⁹ The agreements also provide that the African leaders appeal for French assistance in maintaining the organization of their own armies. This means that the African leader may call for French military assistance to crush down an attempted coup d'etat. In addition to French declarations to aid the government at a time of an attempted coup or political unrest, the treaties provide for a regional military organization to co-ordinate military assistance and activities among member countries. This regional organization is named the Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense (U.A.M.C.) The members of this organization which include all former French colonies except Guinea, Mali and Upper Volta, agreed to come to the defense of any member state threatened by a coup or political unrest. Britain has an

agreement with some of its colonial territories. However the agreements are exclusively bilateral and do not have a regional military organization like the Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense of the French colonies. However in both agreements, there are provisions for mutual defense, for military equipment and the training of the officer corps. France has a troop of 16,000 soldiers stationed in Africa, Britain has at the present 2,000 and the United States has between 5,500 and 6,000 troops stationed in Ethiopia and Libya.

These treaties that the African leaders make with their former colonial powers and other foreign countries are designed mainly to safeguard them from military coup. It is worth noting here also that the signing of these treaties give the former colonial power or foreign country greater influence in the country and on the leader as a whole because the extent to which the leader remains in power is dependant upon his relationship with the foreign power. If the relationship is unfavourable the foreign power may either abandon its commitment to protect the leader or it may support or even instigate a coup with the collaboration of the members of the army.

Contagion Effects

This is more like a chain reaction of coups. A successful coup d'etat in one state may cause a chain reaction of coups into other states. For example it is believed the coups that occurred in Central African Republic, Dahomey, Togo and Upper Volta are manifestations of this Contagion Effect. The chain reaction of coups is made possible by two factors: 1) the personal links among African military officers in different countries; 2) an increasing extent of inter-African state ties.

Most of the military officers in today's African army attended the same school. For example, the school where most of the officers from the British colonies have been educated in Sandhurst in England. This is where soldiers from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda meet and become acquainted with

the same technique of military organization and ideology. It is believed that a successful coup instigated by one may prompt others to do likewise in their own country.

The increasing inter-African relations at the United Nations, at the Organization of African Unity and in other economic and political alliances may cause a country to intervene or instigate a coup d'etat in a neighboring country.

Unstable Social Conditions as a Course for Military Intervention

Such intervention usually occurs when a tribe or tribes' faction in the army see the government as dominated by a single tribe and pursuing policies that are hostile to its interest. An example of this type of intervention is the Nigerian coup d'etat of January 1966. The Ibo tribal group in the army perceived the federal government to be pursuing policies that were antagonistic to the Ibo population. This was why the Ibos instigated the coup. The same thing happened in Zanzibar where a revolutionary military force overthrew a minority government dominated by Arabs and Shirazis.

Stagnating Economic Conditions

Welch points out that the extravagant expenditures and inefficient management in the government may result into poor economic conditions which may invite the military to intervene.

Before proceeding to the main body, it is important at this point to make some general introductory notes on Ghana, its geographical location and economy.

Ghana is situated on the west coast of Africa, it covers an area of 91,943 square miles. This area is just about the size of Oregon. It has a population of 3.4 million. Seventy percent of these people live in the southern part of the country which is much more developed than other areas. The capital of Ghana is Accra with an area of 618 square miles and a population of 337.6 thousand people. Other major towns include Sekondi-Takoradi with 367 square miles and Kumasi with 3,169 square miles.

Ghana's economy is based on agriculture. Cocoa production accounts for about 70% of Ghana's export earnings. However the decline in cocoa price in the world market has resulted in a continuous balance of payment deficit. Other agricultural products include rice, corn, millet, groundnuts, cassava, yam and plantain. Mining is carried on extensively with the major minerals of diamond and gold and bixite.

The per capita income in Ghana averages \$214 per year. This is one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana has the highest literacy rate in Africa. There are three major tribes and over 50 different dialects spoken in Ghana. The major tribes are the Ashanti, Ewe, and Fanti. Ghana's armed forces number 17,000 and the National Police Service has 18,000 men.

Ghana achieved its independence on March 6, 1957 from Britain under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, who became the country's first Prime Minister and later President. He reigned from 1957 to 1966 when the military overthrew the government.

CHAPTER IV

WHY DID THE MILITARY INTERVENE IN GHANA?

In his article "Military Officers and Leadership," Robert Price identifies two types of motivations for military coup in developing areas. These are societal interest and military professional interest. With regards to societal interest, Price says that this involves the military intervention into the political process to prevent some change in the total society or one of its sub-systems. Corruption and mismanagement in the civilian government is usually motivation for the military to stage a coup d'etat. The rationale for the coup is usually given as to stabilize the economy through the institution of new social and economic programs such as land reforms. A coup d'etat of professional interest is usually staged to protect military autonomy and prerogative.

The Ghana coup was staged not only on the grounds of societal and professional interest but to safeguard individual freedom and liberty. There are three reasons why the military intervenes: 1) military professional interest--to prevent Kwame Nkrumah's control and manipulation of the military institution; 2) to protect individual freedom and liberty; 3) societal interest. The military intervened to bring back economic stability. It is worth pursuing these reasons in detail.

The Military and Nkrumah

Africanization of the Ghanaian army took place very slowly during the colonial period. At the time of Ghana's independence the Ghanaian army officer corps was made up of only 10% Ghanaians, the majority was occupied by expatriates. This was a very small number for a country that had the highest standard of education in Sub-Saharan Africa. When Nkrumah became Prime Minister, his first goal was to update the Ghanaian army. The reason for this was encapsulated in Nkrumah's political goals. Because Nkrumah was the first black African to have successfully won the independence of the first black African country, he saw himself and Ghana as the leader and the centre for African political and economic spheres. He saw the West as the most exploitive nations in Africa and he called for unity of Africa against Western imperialism. He proposed the future formation of a United States of Africa after colonialism had been driven out of the continent.²⁴

Due to these goals, Nkrumah saw the armed forces of Ghana as a symbol of national integration, a necessary bulwark against a serious threat to internal security and a tangible earnest of his right to military leadership in Africa. He increased the army from 4,000 in 1959 to 7,000 between 1960-61. By 1966 it doubled to 14,000. In 1960 he established the Ghana Military Academy. The number of African officers increased to over 200 in 1961; by 1966 there were as many as 1,200 African officers in the three branches of the armed forces.

To make the military profession attractive he increased the army's salary and fringe benefits. Statistics show that in 1961 a newly commissioned 2nd lieutenant received a salary of \$663 per year, a college graduate received \$680. At the same time the salary of private soldiers was increased to twice that of the national minimum wage.²⁵

There was also an increase in the African officer corps in the navy and air force. Between the time of independence in March 1957 to April 1961 the African corps increased from 25 to 150 respectively.

There was a considerable increase in the government military expenditure. Between 1954-55 military expenditure increased from 1.5 percent of the total national budget to 5 percent in 1957 and 1960. Between 1962 and 1963 the expenditure rose to 7.5% and in 1965 it increased to 8.4% of the national budget.

The police force was increased from 6,000 to 7,500 from 1957 to 1961. By early 1966 it was 12,500. The number of foreign trained African police officers was forty-seven.²⁶

Nkrumah's Control of the Army

The tension between the army and Nkrumah began from 1961 through 1963. During this period, Ghana's economy was on the verge of disaster. There was the problem of rising costs of living because the Ghanaian cocoa production was drastically reduced due to the attack of swelling shoot disease on the crops. Nkrumah exhausted Ghana's foreign reserve to finance his extravagant development projects. There was a lot of discontentment with the regime and its economic policies. There were strikes all over the country.

In an effort to curb opposition Nkrumah resorted to control of all spheres of governmental as well as private activities throughout Ghana. He instituted the Preventive Detention Act to reduce political opposition. This act provided for the arrest and detention of persons known to be dangerous to the state. The

'state' was Kwami Nkrumah. He later ammended this act to detain political prisoners for a period of ten years without trial. With the help of his Convention Peoples Party, Nkrumah took deliberate measures to control the armed forces, especially the military. These steps included: 1) the formation of a separate military regiment to counterweight the regular military. This regiment was called the Presidents Own Guard Regiment (P.O.G.R.). In 1966 this regiment had 1,142 men and 50 officers. It was made up of about a dozen smaller security units.²⁷ This became the legitimate armed force of Ghana as far as Nkrumah was concerned. He neglected the rest of the armed forces. The national military budget was devoted mainly for the upkeep of this President's Own Guard Regiment. It was equipped with the best military weapons and was given preference in terms of military material and benefits. Major Ocran, one of the participants in the coup, described the condition of the army during this period vividly:

"Since the approved type of officers uniform material could not be obtained, officers started acquiring and wearing all sorts of khaki drill from Japan, America, Canada, and even the USSR...it was no surprise, therefore, that the morale should suffer, and the pride of the regular was hurt..by 1965 the situation had become critical..the effective administration of units became impossible and the operational efficiency of the armed forces dropped considerably." 28

The formation of the President's Own Guard Regiment was opposed very strongly by many of the officers. Nkrumah fired Major Ankra from his command of the Ghanaian military force for openly opposing the institution of the President's Regiment. In an effort to infiltrate the regular army, Nkrumah established an intelligence agency called the Armed Force Bureau. In 1964 he ordered that the military enlist all personnel in the Convention Peoples Party. He also demanded a periodic affirmation of the army's fidelity to him.

In 1964 an attempt was made to assassinate Nkrumah by a member of the police force. For this reason Nkrumah disarmed the entire police force, detained

eight of its most senior officers and transferred the police special branch to the President's Own Guard Regiment.

Between 1960 and 1963 the fear of a military coup instigated by a Western government, especially the United States, caused Nkrumah to increasingly rely on the Soviet Union and East European countries for military aid. In July-August of 1961 he made an extensive tour of the USSR, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Red China. He entered into military agreements with each of these countries. As soon as he returned to Ghana, he ordered that 400 cadets from the Ghanaian army be sent to the Soviet Union for officer training. This move was objected to by the majority of the officer corps. One of the officers who objected to this was a British officer in the Ghanaian army, General Alexander who was the chief of defence. In a letter to the deposed General Akra, General Alexander wrote:

"The President proposes to send 400 potential officers to the Soviet Union for training. I have done all I can to persuade him that such action is neither necessary nor prudent..It is unwise for several reasons. Firstly, it splits the training and outlook of the officer corps into two camps, and can breed neither contentment nor efficiency. Secondly, I considered that such action may in the long-term prove dangerous to the President himself."29

Before this time all the military training of the Ghanaian officer corps had been in Sanhurst, England. Beginning in 1962 Nkrumah began to recruit Russians as agents to supervise the armed forces.

This withering away of the army's autonomy, professionalism and prerogative led the officer corps and the police force to take over the government while Nkrumah was flying from Rangcon to Peking in February of 1966, on a mission to bring peace in Viet Nam.

When the military took over power one of the first things it had to do was to update itself. There was a great need for equipment and uniforms. Because of this need, there was a substantial increase in the defense budget

during the era of the military regime. There was an average annual increase of 22% over Nkrumah's 1966 defense budget. This was increased to 41.4% over the 1966 budget in 1968 and 1969. There was also an increase in foreign relation expenditures in 1967-68.³⁰

TABLE I

PERCENTAGE OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES*

SECTOR	1966-67 Nkrumah	1967-8 Military Govt.	1968-9	Average
Defense	+4.0	+20.0	41.4	22.0

*West Africa, July 27, 1968. p. 868.

When asked to explain the increase in the military expenditure Brigadier Afrifra replied that the increase was due to "the neglect suffered by our Armed Forces in the past, it has become imperative to re-equip the entire army to justify its existence."³¹

My proposal on defence expenditure in this case seems to hold true, I stated that military involvement in political processes will be followed by an increase in defence and foreign expenditures.

Economic Conditions

The second reason for the coup of 1966 comes from the economic conditions in Ghana at the time of Nkrumah's regime. Nkrumah's goal for Ghana was to make it a model for Africa in terms of modernization and technology, as well as the centre of the Pan African movement. His economic policies were therefore geared toward the attainment of these goals. In an effort to compare Nkrumah's economic policies to the economic policies of the military government, I will try to pursue the economic condition under the heading of agriculture, foreign trade, industry and foreign debt.

Agriculture

This occupies the mainstay of the economy in Ghana. Statistics show that

seventy percent of the population is actively engaged in this sector. It is thought to contribute one-half of the gross national product. Cocoa is the major crop grown. In fact Ghana has been characterized as a one-crop economy country. With concession to fluctuation of cocoa prices in the international market, cocoa alone accounts for 65% of the export earnings and it's a major source of government revenue and development expenditure. Other crops include maize, millet, rice, groundnuts, cassava, yams and plantain.

Nkrumah's economic policies were based on his political philosophy. The economy was strongly controlled by the state. This policy was derived from two sources; first of all Nkrumah saw the Western democratic nations as the most exploitive nations in Africa. On the other hand, he saw the Soviet Union as an ally for the destruction of Western imperialism in Africa. He was attracted to Marx-Lenin theories of capitalism, especially Lenin's theory of imperialism. Because of this attitude toward the West, Nkrumah increasingly relied upon the Soviet Union for economic advice. Russians supervised many governmental agencies in Ghana. The result of this was a highly centralized economy. Secondly, opposition and discontent with Nkrumah's repressive measures was so heightened that Nkrumah had to fill governmental positions with his party loyalities. Thus, like the Soviet Union, Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party became the state. The members of the Convention Peoples Party became the state officials. The members of the Convention Peoples Party became the New Class in Djilas terminology. Describing this new class, Colonel Afrifra of the Ghana National Liberation Council said: "This new class began to assert itself in our society, men to whom concepts like honesty, truth and integrity mean nothing. This essentially, however, was part of the pseudo-communist system Nkrumah was building."³²

Nkrumah devoted most of his efforts in the cultivation of cocoa. This emphasis on cocoa as the only agricultural product was the major problem of

Ghana's economy. The revenue from cocoa is dependant upon its price in the world market. There has been a decline in its price since 1957. In 1956 the price fell from \$985 a metric ton during that year to a low of \$138 a metric ton in 1965. The countrys foreign exchange which stood at \$700 million at that time of independence fell to \$126 million in 1961.³³

The other major cause of economic problems, apart from the emphasis on cocoa, was Nkrumah's control of the economy, especially the agricultural sector. Beginning in 1958 he began to restructure the agricultural as well as the industrial sectors to facilitate his control. He replaced administrative personnel in governmental agencies with his party loyalists. In 1959 he replaced the Ghana Marketing Board, of the Ministry of Agriculture, with an agency called the Ghana Cooperative Council (U.G.F.C.C.). The Ghana Marketing Board was responsible for buying and selling of government cocoa. It was also responsible for the issuing of cooperative licenses to farmers as well as providing machinery, fertilizers and insecticides to independent farms and government-owned farms. Records of this Board show that it had been efficient in it's responsibility with regards to the farmers and the government.

The responsibility of the Marketing Board was turned over to the U.G.F.C.C. The members of this agency were all members of the Convention Peoples Party and were very loyal to Nkrumah. This facilitated Nkrumah's control over their activities. The National Liberation Council Committee on Agriculture found that all but one of the officers of the U.G.F.C.C. had the required qualifications. Under the U.G.F.C.C. nearly all independent farmers and cooperatives were put under its control. Those that existed independently had to do so under very difficult conditions.³⁴

By 1961 about 15,000 independent cooperatives with an asset of over \$16 million had been brought under the control of the U.G.F.C.C. Nepotism and

corruption was rampant. Inquiring on the malpractices of the U.G.F.C.C., the National Liberation Council Committee on the purchase of cocoa states:

"The U.G.F.C.C. brought in paid treasurers who were illiterate. There was evidence of rigging the cocoa machines, of delays in weighing and in being absent from the buying stations. Some of the officers required tributes from junior officers when they visited the agricultural stations. It is believed that senior officers of the U.G.F.C.C. demanded between L50 to L100 as a bribe to allow the opening of a cooperative society in the villages." 35

By 1966 it was estimated that of the 1500 cooperatives put under the U.G.F.C.C.'s control in 1961, only 870 remained with an asset that dropped 36 down from \$16 million in 1961 to \$2.5 million in 1966.

Another area of mismanagement by the U.G.F.C.C. was the buying of agricultural machinery from the Soviet Union. Most of this machinery turned out to be unsuitable for farming conditions in Ghana. In 1965 the U.G.F.C.C. had the following machinery: 919 tractors, 1,087 tillers and cultivators, 32 combines, 20 corn huskers and 95 tillers. By 1966 it was estimated that 15% of this machinery was unserviceable in Ghana because the government had not 37 ordered spare parts with the machinery.

The agricultural firms under the U.G.F.C.C. were divided into five groups: 1) cooperative farms, 2) state farms, 3) workers brigade, 4) young farmers league, 5) others in joint ownership with the university of Ghana. The U.G.F.C.C. had 1,114,315 acres of land.

TABLE II

THE UTILIZATION OF LAND BY STATE AND PRIVATE FARMS*

Types of Holdings	Number	Area Acquired	Area Cleared	Area Planted	Acquired Land %	Land Planted %
Coop Farms	870	339,610	23,705	18,413	5	0.23
State Farms	123	345,060	90,645	64,246	19	0.80
Workers Brigade	47	280,877	25,490	19,140	7	0.24
Young Fmr. League	37	60,362	1,999	1,950	3	0.02
Others	123	88,386	18,238	10,369	12	0.13
Total State Farms	1,205	1,114,315	160,077	14,136	10	1.42
Peasant Farms	640,000		7,937,305	7,937,305		98.53

*Statistics of Farming and Service Stations. The Republic of Ghana. (Accra 1965) p. 7.

Even though they had the largest amount of land and better farming equipment the utilization of the land by the state farms was very small. For example, state farms acquired 345,000 acres of land with an average labour force of 20,000 people and good machinery. However only 19% of this land was utilized. The total percentage of the land planted was less than two percent. On the other hand, peasants who acquired less land, poor machinery and problems of insecticides and fungicides utilized more land for planting. In 1965 they produced 98% of Ghana's food stuff.

TABLE III
REVENUE OF STATE FARMS*
1965-67

Year	Outside Finance\$	Annual Labor Force	Revenue\$
1965-66	8,000,000	20,800	1,400,000
1966-67	4,000,000	13,500	1,300,000

*Statistics of Farming and Service Stations. The Republic of Ghana. (Accra 1965) p. 8.

The reason for this low production and loss of revenue was given by the report of the National Liberation Council's Committee on Agriculture:

"Thousands of workers were dumped on these farms through political pressures. Consequently the number of workers employed on the projects was economically unrelated to the actual returns. In fact as the farms were directed from the head office, no proper account was kept of expenditures and returns from these farms. Farm managers who lacked the managerial experience and initiative required for work were entrusted for obviously political reasons." 38

Between 1957 and 1959 agricultural production in Ghana increased only 4.8%. During this same period Ivory Coast had an increase of 66%. Ghana's agricultural output per capita increased during the same period only by 16%.
39
On the other hand, agricultural output in the Ivory Coast increased 35%.

Production of other crops also decreased in proportion to the land utilized.

The only crops that were produced substantially were cocoa, yam and cassava which are the chief staple foods in Ghana. It is worth noting here also that the greatest producers of this food stuffs were independent cooperatives and peasant farmers. Production of crops was as follows:

TABLE IV
FOOD CROP PRODUCTION*
1964-66

1964 Crop	Area Planted (1000 acres)	Production in 1,000 Metric Tons
Maise	500	170
Corn	411	434
Millet	255	---
Rice	105	42
Groundnuts	159	---
Cassava	402	---
Cocoyam	603	301
1966		
Maise	602	353
Corn	434	107
Millet	333	66
Rice	65	29
Groundnuts	80	20
Cassava	364	1152
Cocoyam	431	1170

*Economic Survey, Ghana (Accra, 1969) p.4.

Industry

Nkrumah turned to industrialization when he found that his agricultural policies were a failure. The industries included a major production industry, Fibre Bag Manufacturing Industry, vegetable and oil industries and textile mills industries. In 1966 these industries were producing less than 50% of their capacities. Therefore a good number of these industries were operating at a tremendous loss. The major causes of this were lack of effective planning, bureaucratic inefficiency and malpractices. In its inquiry on government industrial activities, the National Liberation Council Committee on Agriculture made the following conclusion: "The successful operation of these in-

dustries was hindered by lack of qualified technicians, competent managers, nepotism, over-staffing and inadequate supply of raw materials coupled with inavailability of foreign exchange for the importation of other items needed⁴⁰ in the production and manufacturing process."

Some of the factories were established where no provisions had been made for the availability of the raw material required to run them. One reason for this was the desire of the regime to satisfy certain political interest demands. Consequently the supply of raw materials was of secondary importance. In other cases poor feasibility studies for the execution of the projects and lack of effective coordination at the planning stage among the various agencies concerned with the establishment of the enterprise contributed to the inefficiency of the⁴¹ industries.

Eighty-five percent of Ghana's manufacturing was in the agro-industrial area. Nkrumah constructed the Volta Hydro-Electric Dam for the processing of Brixite. The cost of this dam was \$196 million. The utilization of this dam in the food processing industry was under 25% and its utilization for the entire⁴² manufacturing business was under 50%.

By 1965 Ghana's foreign exchange was completely exhausted. In order to finance many of his economic projects Nkrumah turned to East European countries and to some countries in the West for loans. The major part of Nkrumah's loans were through what is called 'suppliers credits'. The term 'suppliers credit' relates to a particular form of financing equipment and material imports. The supplier does not necessarily provide the loan directly, this usually comes from a separate financing institution, but arranged by the supplier. This loan is made, and payable, in foreign exchange. Supplier credits may be regarded as a short-term loan. They are payable before the project for which they have been negotiated can be expected to generate income to allow repayment on a self liquidating basis. Suppliers credit are short-term not on a financial but on

an economic criterion. ⁴³

Nkrumah obtained supplier credit from both the West and East European countries. In terms of interest on the supplier credit loans, the West European countries had interest rates of 5-6% with a principle payable in 5 to 8 years. Loans from East European countries had interest rates of 2-3% on a principle payable in 12 years. ⁴⁴ The low interest from East European countries was due to the very close relationship which Nkrumah had developed with these countries.

Ghana's foreign exchange liabilities with regards to supplier credit loans is as follows:

TABLE V
FOREIGN EXCHANGE LIABILITIES*

Note: n.c. - New Cedi, approximately One Dollar

End of Year	Total Liabilities	Liability of Suppliers Credit	% of Total
1963	38,372 n.c.	-----	82.4
1964	346,786 n.c.	286,276 n.c.	82.4
1965	386,363 n.c.	301,010 n.c.	79.5
1966	375,457 n.c.	283,583 n.c.	71.9

*Ghana Economic Survey, The Central Bureau of Statistics (Accra, 1969).

By 1966 Ghana's debt service had risen to 50% of its export earnings. It is estimated that Nkrumah signed sixty-nine financial agreements with foreign agencies. Of these sixty-nine, forty-seven were made with Western firms, eight with the Soviet Union and fourteen with East European countries. ⁴⁵ By 1965, because of worsening economic conditions, many Western financial institutions refused to accept financial agreements with Nkrumah's regime. The government was even unable to pay for imports, freight insurance and dividends on foreign investments. Due to this there was a continuous delay in the shipment of equipment. The estimate of Nkrumah's debt has varied widely. However in 1966 it seems to have reached 20 million dollars. This debt included a medium-term debt

at an interest of 60% in five years and 71.7% on a long-term debt with an interest of 5% in 19 years. Three-fourths of this debt is accounted for by suppliers creditors in the United Kingdom. Five hundred thousand dollars was owed to financial agencies in the United States and \$150,000 was owed to financial agencies in the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

Ghana had a substantial trade relation with the Soviet Union and East European countries. In 1965 Ghana's exports to the Communist block reached 35%. Foreign investment was very small because of the fear that Nkrumah might nationalize the industries. Britain was the major West European country that had a substantial investment in Ghana. The others were owned by Africans from other countries.

Ghana's foreign reserve had dropped down from the \$750 million it had inherited from the British administration at independence to \$300 million. There was an unfavourable balance of payments due to the high rate of government expenditure on capital equipment which was unproductive. The cost of imported goods was very high, this was due to the government's deliberate policy of the allowing of imports of consumer goods to counteract price raises on internal markets. The import restrictions instituted by Nkrumah were not only erratic but subject to removal by negotiation.⁴⁷

There were strikes all over Ghana. By the time the military took over the government, there was a great shortage of Ghana's staple foods. This was mainly due to strikes that extended to the agricultural department. Due to these strikes in this department, most of the farmers were not supplied with the necessary seeds and fertilizers.

Military in Political Leadership

The major goal of the military regime was to stabilize Ghana's economy. In order to do this they needed financial aid as well as technical personnel. Because of this condition the military pursued a policy of economic diversi-

fication with regards to obtaining aid from abroad. They acquired aid from both East and West. However, the fear of a Soviet Union sponsored counter-coup in 1967 led the military government to terminate their relationship with the Soviet Union, Cuba and some East European countries. In 1967 over one-thousand Russians, Chinese and East European technicians in Ghana were promptly expelled. This number included 665 Russians, 52 Chinese technicians. ⁴⁸ The policies of the military government were therefore pro-Western. These pro-Western policies incurred certain advantages to the military regime with regards to external assistance. Many countries in the West that had been antagonized by Nkrumah's brand of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonial sentiments were quick to respond to the needs of Ghana during the military regime.

In 1966, the military government asked the International Monetary Fund to study the economic condition of Ghana. Other nations volunteered to be members of the group that was formed by the IMF. These countries were Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. ⁴⁹ At the end of these studies the IMF made an agreement with the military officers whereby Ghana was allowed to draw \$36,400,000 in various currencies within a twelve month period. ⁵⁰

To help relieve food shortage in Ghana the military government made agreements with the United States and other countries for the supply of food. In late 1966 the U.S. supplied 2,500,000 pounds of rice, maize, flour, vegetable oil, tobacco, and cotton through the P.L. 480 Program. The Canadian government supplied 17,500 tons of flour and the United Kingdom offered an export credit guarantee of \$600,000 in low payments for Ghana's immediate importation of the commodities from the United States and Canada. ⁵¹

The U.S. also showed its approval of the military pro-Western policies by increasing its financial assistance to Ghana. During Nkrumah's regime the U.S.' total assistance was \$100,000. For three years during the Nkrumah regime

the United States did not give any aid to Ghana. However, during the military regime, the U.S. gave about \$75 million in aid, \$13.2 million in grants and \$61.8 million in loans. Since 1966, the U.S. provided training for 41 Ghanaian⁵² military officers and 25 police officers here in the U.S. It is estimated that under the military, Ghana received about two-thirds of United States aid to Africa. Other countries which provided financial assistance to Ghana were Canada, Japan, and Australia. The total amount of aid from these countries was⁵³ 2.5 million dollars.

The second policy of the military regime was to reduce governmental expenditures. It sold some of the state farms to individual enterprises and decentralized the rest to local agencies who carried the financial burden of their operations. There were a total of 125 state farms at the time of the coup. The National Liberation Council (NLC) assigned the state farms to the following organizations: 1) the oil palm cooperation was given 4 oil projects; 2) the fibre corporation took over the production and processing of 10 fibre projects; 3) the rubber corporation was given nine rubber projects; 4) the extension service of the ministry of agriculture took over the management of three rice projects. In addition, 78 farms projects were sold to independent farmers and the ministry of agriculture was given the authority to reallocate 37 farm projects for the use of extension bases, seed multiplication centres, shortage depots and workshops for agricultural institutes.⁵⁴

The farmers whose land was confiscated by Nkrumah for his state farm projects were given 20 farm projects as compensation. The rest of the state rubber farms were turned over to the Firestone Corporation which made an agreement with⁵⁵ the military government to manufacture tires in Ghana.

Direct governmental agricultural and economic activities were limited only to enterprises that had a substantial operational advantage over peasant farmers. The cultivation of cotton and sugar was intensified to supply the raw material needed to operate the cotton and sugar industries that Nkrumah had built which

were not in operation in 1966. To facilitate more production and at the same time reduce the cost of production, factories were relocated to areas where the raw material was available. Experienced technical as well as administrative personnel were provided by the United Nations to help design and supervise the projects. The number of farm workers was drastically cut down. The result of these policies was an increase in the revenue from the state farms.

TABLE VI
REVENUE OF STATE FARMS *
1967-70

Year	Outside Finance	Annual Labour Force	Revenue
1967-68	2,600,000 n.c.	9,000	1,850,000
1968-69	1,800,000 n.c.	5,300	2,800,000
1969-70	700,000 n.c.	4,650	1,850,000

* Economic Survey. Republic of Ghana, Central Bureau of Statistics (Accra 1969 and 1970).

The production of most of Ghana's principle food crop during the military regime increased over the production during Nkrumah's regime. This was partly due to the full utilization of the land and good planning and efficient management.

TABLE VII
LAND UTILIZATION *
1968-69

1968 Crop	Area Planted in 1000 Acres	Production in 1000 metric tons
Maize	517	253
Corn	298	72
Millet	271	57
Rice	88	42
Groundnuts		
1969 Crop		
Maize	680	300
Corn	359	96
Millet	400	90
Rice	100	60
Groundnuts	400	1350

* Ghana Economy and Aid Requirement. Jan-June 1969; Republic of Ghana (1970) p.6.

Due to the conditions of decline of cocoa prices in the world market, the military regime made efforts to diversify Ghana's agricultural production. These efforts to diversify included encouraging the growth of such crops as oil palm, sugar cane, cotton and rubber. It also extended its agricultural activities by creating educational centres for the training of youths in farming practices. In 1968 the government embarked on a Feeders Roads Development Program. The main objective of this program was to improve the movement of produce from the rural centres to the town. In order to minimize fluctuation in farmers' incomes, farmers were guaranteed minimum prices for rice and maize at which price the food marketing corporation would purchase any quantities of these products. The increase in guaranteed minimum prices was from \$6.20 to \$7.50 for rice and from \$4.50 to \$7.00 for maize. The price of cocoa was increased to 14% in producers prices.⁵⁷

The government's industrial policy with regards to private sectors was to encourage Ghanaian control of certain parts of the economy. During Nkrumah's regime, major parts of the business in the private sectors were owned by expatriates. The reason for this was the fact that only expatriates could afford to pay the bribes for licenses to governmental officers needed to open up a business in Ghana.⁵⁸

The nations that had business interests in Ghana during Nkrumah's period were Britain, Lebanese and Syrian merchants, Italians, Germans, French and a very high number of Africans from neighbouring countries. In 1962 Europeans owned more than 5,000 of the country's 103,000 industrial establishments while Africans from neighbouring countries owned 3,000 industries.⁵⁹ Because of foreign dominance in the industrial sector of Ghana's economy, the military government embarked on a series of measures in 1968 to reduce such dominance and to allow Ghanaians to play a major part in the ownership of petty businesses and industries.

In December of 1968 it introduced a decree which prohibited foreign ownership of firms and industries with an annual gross national retail sales of under \$490,000; wholesale firms of \$980,000 or less; industries and firms having fewer than 30 employees; and firms and industries in extractive, processing, manufacturing or transportation businesses with a capital of \$98,000 or less. 60

In November of 1969 the government instituted the Residence Permit Compliance Order. This order was to restrict other Africans, Lebanese and Syrian merchants from petty businesses. 61 In the same year the government introduced the Ghanaian Business Promotion Act. This act provided for government assistance in the promotion of Ghanaian business enterprises. The act also charged foreign business enterprises to maintain programs to train Ghanaians to acquire the skills necessary for the operation of businesses. The act further listed business enterprises that would be reserved exclusively for Ghanaian ownership. These included overseas businesses operating in Ghana, commercial transportation by land, bakeries, printing, beauty shops, commodity brokerages, advertising and publicity and manufacturing of cement blocks. 62

These decrees were mainly aimed at other Africans, Lebanese and Syrian businessmen. The result of these decrees was the confiscation of some 600 firms by the government. 63 The majority of these firms were owned by Africans from neighbouring West African countries. This act of the military government was opposed by Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. In Sierra Leone, the government reacted to this act by expelling all Ghanaian fishermen doing business in Freetown. Western European firms were not very much affected by these decrees. In fact the government introduced the Capital Investment Act to induce European investments in Ghana. These inducements included guaranteed transfer of profits, interest and principle, income tax holiday, and exemption from tariff and duties. 64

The effect of these economic policies with regards to economic develop-

ment was good. In the industrial area, there was an increase in private business and a drop in government-owned businesses. There was an increase in government revenue from the industrial activities of foreign companies.

TABLE VIII
NUMBER AND REVENUE OF INDUSTRIES *
1966-68

1966 Nkrumah Industries	Number of Establishments	Revenue
Total	267	142,143 n.c.
State-Owned	74	31,557 n.c.
Joint-State-Owned	7	11,266 n.c.
Co-operatives	3	88 n.c.
Private	183	99,232 n.c.
1968 Military Industries		
Total	383	176,658 n.c.
State-Owned	68	43,615 n.c.
Joint-State-Owned	12	20,599 n.c.
Co-operatives	1	16 n.c.
Private	302	112,440 n.c.

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68. (Accra, 1970)p. 86.

Revenue from export agricultural commodities was also increased due to the increase in production.

TABLE IX
EXPORT EARNINGS *

	1965-69
	Export Earnings
Nkrumah 1965	226,382 n.c.
Nkrumah 1966	191,393 n.c.
Military 1968	245,122 n.c.
Military 1969	338,782 n.c.

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68. (Accra, 1970) p. 203.

The value of exports as a whole was increased by 12%. The balance of trade from a deficit in 1966 to an estimated surplus of over \$30 million in 1968. The total government receipt in 1969 including committed aid minus payments was \$480 million. This was an increase of 13.5%, from the 1968 level. Because

of the high price of cocoa in the world market during the military regime, receipts from cocoa were \$250.4 million. This was an increase of 19.1%.

In 1967 the military devalued the Ghanaian currency to thirty percent. This devaluation helped to redress some imbalance in external payments. There was a steep rise in cocoa prices in 1967-68. The increase in the cocoa price helped to offset the value of Ghana's exports.

In March of 1968 the military regime introduced the international two-tier gold prices. This effort improved Ghana's earnings from the sales of gold bullion. By the time the military relinquished power to civilian rule in 1969, Ghana's balance of payment stood at \$687.2 million. This was considered a very favourable balance of payment.

Therefore with regards to the economic conditions in Ghana, my proposal which states that "a substantial military involvement in the political process will be followed by increase in economic development" seems to hold true.

My research tends to show that the military regime substantially improved the economic conditions in Ghana.

Human Resources: Education

My research indicated that more schools were constructed during the military regime than during the civilian government of Nkrumah. There were more students enrolled in school during the Nkrumah period than in the military regime. In 1965, 75% of the primary age children were in school. The high enrollment during this period was due to the free education which Nkrumah instituted in 1961.

However in 1966 due to the economic problem, the military had to abolish free schools temporarily. The charge for text books was \$3.00 for primary and middle schools and \$10.00 for secondary schools. This action caused a reduction of students enrollment in school to 40%. However, the overall expenditures of the government on education was much higher during the military regime.

TABLE X

NUMBER AND TYPE OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS*

Type of School	Nkrumah 1964-65	1965-66
Total number of schools	10,325	10,561
Primary schools	7,900	7,961
Middle schools	2,112	2,267
Secondary schools	136	150
Technical schools	44	45
Teachers' Training Colleges	48	83
Higher educational institutions	3	3
Type of School	Military 1966-67	1967-68
Total Number of schools	10,660	10,946
Primary schools	7,913	7,480
Middle schools	2,365	3,036
Secondary schools	163	167
Technical schools	61	63
Teachers' Training Colleges	83	82
Higher educational institutions	3	3

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68 (Accra, 1970) p. 191.

TABLE XI

EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES *

Type of School	Nkrumah 1965	Nkrumah 1966
Administration	3,280.6 n.c.	1,051.3 n.c.
Primary school	23,921.5 n.c.	11,867.4 n.c.
Secondary school	7,902.9 n.c.	3,893.4 n.c.
Colleges and Universities	28,261.8 n.c.	13,616.4 n.c.
Technical Training Schools	1,393.0 n.c.	2,006.0 n.c.
Adult ed., libraries, museums	1,082.3 n.c.	376.1 n.c.
Total-----	66,003.0 n.c.	33,491.8 n.c.
Type of School	Military 1966-67	Military 1967-69
Administration	2,551.7 n.c.	2,481.4 n.c.
Primary school	27,143.8 n.c.	27,223.4 n.c.
Secondary school	8,567.3 n.c.	10,377.4 n.c.
Colleges and Universities	26,924.2 n.c.	28,240.7 n.c.
Technical Training Schools	1,864.4 n.c.	1,814.5 n.c.
Adult ed., libraries, museums	1,866.9 n.c.	1,318.6 n.c.
Others	212.5 n.c.	611.0 n.c.
Total-----	68,460.1 n.c.	172,066.9 n.c.

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68 (Accra, 1970) p. 70-71.

TABLE XII

NUMBER OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL *

	Nkrumah 1965	1966	Military 1967	1968
Government Hospitals	125	127	129	129
Doctors	576	573	497	539
Dentists	35	39	35	37
Nurses	2,660	3,078	3,173	5,095
Midwives	1,601	1,894	1,981	2,334
Medical Field Units	217	224	224	139
Qualified Pharmacists	355	342	357	357

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68 (Accra, 1970) p. 193.

The medical personnel and items tabulated above are all employed in government agencies. There were other medical hospitals that belonged to foreign mining companies and Christian missionaries. These hospitals and their personnel are not included in this table.

As the figures show the military government instituted more medical facilities in Ghana than during Nkrumah's period. There were continuous shortages of medical supplies due to uneven distribution during Nkrumah's regime. The largest amount of medical supplies and facilities were heavily concentrated in the urban areas, the rural or villages benefitted very little from the medical improvement.

To solve this problem, the military government introduced medical mobile unit centres. Apart from distributing medicine to villages, these mobile units were also used in health education helping villages become aware of modern medicine.

TABLE XIII

GOVERNMENT MEDICAL EXPENDITURE *

(per thousand cidi)

Item	Nkrumah 1965	1966	Military 1966-7	1967-9
Administration	4,449.2 n.c.	2,416.9 n.c.	4,518.5 n.c.	4,839.3 n.c.
Research	4.1 n.c.	59.5 n.c.	442.2 n.c.	145.8 n.c.
Hospitals	13,815.2 n.c.	4,125.9 n.c.	10,284.2 n.c.	15,201.9 n.c.
Medical and Dental	472.6 n.c.	178.9 n.c.	168.1 n.c.	54.7 n.c.
Special Health Services	916.9 n.c.	693.8 n.c.	1,089.2 n.c.	1,213.9 n.c.
Total-----	19,660.0 n.c.	7,475.2 n.c.	16,565.5 n.c.	21,455.6 n.c.

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68. (Accra, 1970) p. 196.

TABLE XIV

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON SPECIAL SECURITY AND SPECIAL WELFARE SOURCES *

Type of Welfare	Nkrumah 1965	1966	Military 1967	1967-69
Social Security	5,431.3 n.c.	3,455.7 n.c.	8,421.9 n.c.	22,761.1 n.c.
War Veterans	264.9 n.c.	55.8 n.c.	131.8 n.c.	116.1 n.c.
Child Care	31.0 n.c.	8.5 n.c.	14.4 n.c.	46.9 n.c.
Care of Aged, Disabled	100.0 n.c.	36.6 n.c.	86.1 n.c.	92.6 n.c.
Housing	4,649.2 n.c.	639.7 n.c.	2,772.6 n.c.	7,150.7 n.c.
Other Welfare	332.9 n.c.	29.8 n.c.	221.6 n.c.	194.1 n.c.
Total	10,810.2 n.c.	4,239.1 n.c.	11,650.6 n.c.	23,410.1 n.c.

* Statistical Year Book, The Republic of Ghana, 1967-68. (Accra, 1970) p. 134.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study showed that the military has proved itself more useful in terms of providing economic benefits, better health aid and education for the people of Ghana than the civilian government of Kwami Nkrumah. The reason for this success was their pro-Western policies. These policies attracted foreign business as well as aid to Ghana. On the other hand Nkrumah's anti-West and anti-colonial attitude caused many Western countries to withdraw most business and aid programs from Ghana. This meant that Nkrumah had to pursue his economic development programs with the scarce resources of Ghana and the little aid it got from the Communist block.

It is not assumed here that a pro-Western policy is the best policy, for a military regime or even a civilian government. What one may suggest is that in the case of Ghana, the pro-Western policies of the military government contributed heavily to the degree of economic recovery during the military regime. On the other hand, it is worth noting here that the anti-Western policies of Ghana during Nkrumah's regime not only reduced the amount of aid coming to Ghana but impeded foreign investments in Ghana especially from countries of the West. Although one cannot make an academic citation here, a foreign student from Ghana,

John Okipi informed this researcher that the C.I.A. was involved in the overthrow of Nkrumah.

The pro-Western policies of the military government provided the financial aid the military needed for its programs. And also as the table on foreign investment shows there was an increase in foreign investment in Ghana. It is true that there was exploitation and black-mailing by foreign companies. What seemed to be important however, was the military regime needed the financial aid necessary to implement some of their programs.

There was good reason for the army government to pursue a pro-Western policy. Nkrumah's relations with the Soviet Union and Communist countries were very strong. There were advisors from the Soviet Union in almost all governmental agencies in Ghana during Nkrumah's regime. After the coup the fear of a counter-coup instigated by the Soviet Union, caused the military to deport a good number of Russian and Chinese advisors. The pro-Western policy of the military may have been used by the army to counteract any effort of the Soviet Union and the other Communist block countries to undermine the military regime.

Nkrumah's misuse of power created many enemies for him. His Preventive Detention Act empowered him to arrest and imprison anyone who opposed his authority. In an effort to maintain control over Ghana, he appointed members of his political party to head many of the governmental agencies. Most of these appointees were not only illiterate but were completely ignorant about the agencies to which they were assigned. This resulted in mismanagement, corruption and inefficiency in most of the governmental agencies.

The first thing the military officers did was to remove all of Nkrumah's political appointees and fill the vacancies with efficient Ghanaians and expatriates as the case may be. They also set free about 600 people that Nkrumah had imprisoned because of their opposition to his policies. These actions

by the military officers quickly legitimized their authority.

The major problem the military had to face was unemployment. This resulted from the closing down of many state projects and industries. In 1968 it was estimated that 64,000 workers were fired. During that same year, about 25% of the labour force was employed. This caused some problems between the government and the union leaders. This problem was accentuated when the military in an austerity measure announced a cut of one percent in salary of some state farm workers. Apart from this unemployment problem, the economic policies of the army were successful. Ghana's trade deficit on current accounts was dropped from \$1200 million in 1965 to \$20 million in 1967. By 1968 the government achieved a surplus of \$29 million⁶⁶. The gross national product was increased from 0.6% in 1966 to 2.4% in 1967.

This success was due to a great extent to a very strong determination by the military to legitimize itself as a respectable institution that was above the quarrel and corruption of politicians. A poll conducted in February of 1968 showed that 91% of the Ghanaian people wanted the military government to continue to rule.⁶⁷

The significance of this success is the new image it created for military institutions in most of Africa. For most Africans, the military is no longer seen as 'savage' and a vestige of the tool of colonial oppression. The new image is one of respect and a better substitute for civilian government.

There has not been any major critique of the military government with regard to its performance. The major reason for this was due to the fact that there was no commission of inquiry for the activities of the military government as was found at the end of Nkrumah's regime. The military relinquished their authority to civilian government through a peaceful general election in which the party of Dr. Busia won an overwhelming majority of the seats in Parliament.

Due to this peaceful and legal way in which the military relinquished its authority, the military regime was considered by most Ghanaians as efficient and non-corrupt. Commissions of inquiry were therefore unnecessary.

One major thing that happened that may have resulted in disrespect for the army was when it was found that General Ankra, a high official in the government was found guilty of bribery and corruption. In an effort to vindicate itself from corruption the military government quickly removed General Ankra from his position in the National Liberation Council.

In conclusion therefore this research tends to support my proposals that military involvement in politics will result in: 1) an increase in defense expenditures; 2) an increase in public health expenditures; 3) an increase in economic development/infra-structure expenditures (agriculture, industry and trade); and 4) an increase of expenditure on education.

In the case of Ghana, one could say that the claims of Western experts that the military is a modernizing agent holds true. It is a different thing however to say that what happened in Ghana can happen in other countries. One could easily make reference to Dahomey, in which the military has proven itself inefficient and corrupt.

It is worth noting here that almost twenty-seven months after the military government relinquished its power, the government of Dr. Bussia was overthrown by another military coup. The reasons for the coup were similar to those of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah. These reasons included: 1) problems of inflation; 2) decrease in cocoa production; 3) a decrease in cocoa prices from an average of \$825 per ton in 1970 to \$437.5 in 1972. Included in the causes of the coup was the abuse of military autonomy and prerogatives. A summary of this was given by Achepong, Leader of the coup in a radio broadcast:

"The first people which Bussia put his eyes on were the armed forces and police. Some army and police officers were dismissed under the pretext of retirement. Some officers were put in certain positions to suit the whims of Bussia and his colleagues. Then he started taking from us the few amenities and facilities which we in the armed forces and the police enjoyed even under the Nkrumah regime.

Having lowered morale in the armed forces and the police to the extent that officers could not exert any meaningful influence over their men, so that by this strategy coming together to overthrow his government was to him impossible he turned his eyes on the civilians" 67

Military coup d'etats will continue being a dominant phenomena in developing areas as long as the quest for order prevails. This quest for order takes the form of mobilizing the masses towards a sense of national identity to replace tribalism, better health and education and to some degree an even distribution of the nations wealth. As long as there remains a group that does feel left out or discriminated against in terms of the distribution of wealth, one could expect political unrest and thus military take-overs.

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