1973

The China Factor in Arms Control and Disarmament

Yung-Laung Fang

Eastern Illinois University

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THE CHINA FACTOR IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

BY

Fang, Yung-Laung

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Arts

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1973

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This study is an inquiry into the People's Republic of China's nuclear policy and its strategy in the nuclear age. In spite of the arms control agreements which have been achieved in recent years, the problem of China's role in arms control has remained relatively untouched. This project is an attempt to see if a study of China's policy and strategy could increase the understanding of this problem.

There are basically two reasons for doing this research. The first is the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United States. In the author's opinion, China's emergence as a nuclear power means that armament or disarmament, speculation, and verification, are problems for which no effective solution will have meaning unless China is a full participant. China is already seen by many as a great power and as such will not be content to be represented by the Soviet Union acting as broker in disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, China's admission to the United Nations in 1971 made the viewpoint more prevalent that any multilateral measure in the United Nations is not likely to come about unless the superpowers, including China, share a common interest in arms control efforts. Therefore, arms control in the 1970s is not only concerned with the strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet Union but also with the task of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts.

The second reason for doing this research concerns the recent
agreements achieved by the United States and the Soviet Union in the SALT negotiations. On May 26, 1972, President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed a Treaty on ABMs and an Interim Agreement in Moscow. It remains to be seen whether the agreements of May 26 will prove to be more of a success than a failure in the attempt of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts. In fact, these agreements not only had tremendous effects on the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, but they also challenged all the preconceptions of those who advocated a Chinese-oriented ABM system. In view of these two developments, the seating of the People's Republic of China and American-Soviet arms control agreements, there is a need to examine Chinese nuclear policy and its impact on the world system of international relations.

In analyzing Chinese nuclear policy, one basic point must be kept in mind. Although China's military strength seems to be incomparably stronger than most nations, China has little in the way of nuclear weaponry by comparison with the superpowers. As a consequence, there are certainly grounds for such a view that China's basic attitude toward arms control is of necessity defensive. It is a fact that ever since 1949 China has felt very vulnerable to a nuclear attack by the United States or even the Soviet Union. In Southeast Asia, China's support of local Communist revolutions has brought it close to confrontation with the United States. In Africa it is competing for the loyalties of the emerging nations with both the Soviet Union and the
West. Within the Communist camp it has challenged the Soviet Union's right to be the leader of the world revolution. All those actions, leading to an increased risk of nuclear attack by the superpowers, have made the task of defending China's national security more difficult. One of China's aims has been, and still is, to increase its national defense capability to oppose the superpower's nuclear threat. More basic is the fact that China's hope is to increase its influence in Asia and to deter nuclear attack against China.

To date, the Chinese government has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. But, in fact, the Chinese government has consistently opposed all American-Soviet steps toward arms control and refused to accept any limitation on its own freedom of action. In 1963, the Chinese bitterly attacked the partial test-ban treaty signed by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in Moscow and regarded it as a "big fraud to fool the peoples of the world." In 1964, when China successfully exploded its first nuclear bomb, Peking made a strong "no-first use" pledge and formally proposed to the governments of the world that a universal summit conference be convened to discuss the question of a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. This proposal was primarily for purpose of propaganda, and it was dismissed by the West because the terms used by the Chinese in their proposal did not allow for practical negotiations leading to specific agreements.
Although China's attitude toward all arms control measures sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union has so far been hostile, this does not mean that it is unchangeable. It should be remembered that China's policy in regard to arms control took shape at a time when the Sino-Soviet split was developing. At that time, China found that its national security and major power status needed to be sustained by strength at home. The Chinese strategy was therefore based on intense hostility towards the Soviet Union and the need for Chinese self-reliance.

Before the Sino-Soviet split, China's national security came primarily from the Sino-Soviet alliance. Soviet official assurance was reflected in Khruschev's statement in September 1958, that "an attack on the People's Republic of China, which is a great friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the Soviet Union... and the Soviet Union would do everything to defend, jointly with People's China, the security of both countries." In the years immediately following the Sino-Soviet split, China was actually forced to change its attitude toward nuclear weapons and to see the need of its own nuclear capability under the circumstance of increasing tensions with the Soviet government. Consequently, there was certainly considerable debate in China during 1957 and 1958 on the question of nuclear armament.

The great debate arose from the theoretical contradiction between manpower and nuclear power. Traditionally, Communist China's leaders have from time to time stressed the superiority of man to weapon. For example, in the article published in November 1950, after China had intervened in the Korean War, the Chinese argued that "the atomic bomb itself cannot be the decisive factor in a war...the more extensive the opponent's population is, the less effective will the atom bomb be." If the manpower was superior to nuclear weaponry, why undertake a nuclear program which is very expensive but as useless as a paper tiger? Debates on this question were very popular in much of the public discussion at that time and revealed to the world China's interest in the development of nuclear weapons.

To date, the establishment of China's nuclear capability has fundamentally altered the balance of power in Asia and created many problems for all of those Asian countries which are most concerned either about their own national security or about the prevention of Chinese aggression. In analyzing these problems and the new balance of power in Asia, it should be remembered that one of the most important goals of Chinese strategy is the removal of American influence from Asia. Efforts to achieve this goal have been promoted by China in the Korean War, Vietnam War and many other revolutionary struggles in this area. In spite of these efforts, however, China has suffered serious setbacks.

In brief, frustration brought about by American intervention against China is fundamentally a result of American military superiority in Asia and China's unwillingness to run the risk of a nuclear war with the United States. In viewing of this situation, one may imagine that the most important Chinese objective would be the reduction of American military strength in Asia and the prevention of an American nuclear attack against China.

At present, for a number of reasons, there is no possibility of a nuclear war between the United States and China. The Chinese understand that the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not, by itself, grant them complete freedom of action and, as long as American nuclear power remains superior, it would be unwise for China to run the risk of nuclear war. For this reason, it can be assumed that China's nuclear policy is, and will continue to be, primarily based on the future development of its nuclear capability.

But how strong is China and how does it intend to employ its nuclear strength? Until one can assess accurately the weight of China's nuclear capability, one can hardly determine the intentions of its nuclear policy. Obviously, evaluation of China's nuclear capability is difficult. Indeed, there is no agreement among the world intelligence community as to when China will possess both hydrogen bombs and ICBMs with which to deliver them. In 1967 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara predicted
in a speech before the United Press International Editors and Publishers that China will have an initial ICBM capability in the early 1970s. Based on this prediction, as the United States continues to explore the possibilities of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts, it can be assumed that the Chinese-oriented ABM system will be one of the key issues of American arms control policy. The more frequent questions which arise in this area of concern are: first, is there any possibility that by the end of 1970's China might become so incautious as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States? and second, of the answer to this question is "yes," what should the American position be in regard to the Chinese-oriented ABM system? Although it would be insane for China to attempt a nuclear attack on the United States, one can still conceive of certain conditions under which China might miscalculate. A Chinese-oriented ABM system is thus designed to prevent the possible irrational behavior of China. Contrary to this, there are strong arguments in favor of trying to reach American agreement with the Soviet Union so that neither will build anti-Chinese ABM systems.

The purpose of this study is to describe and explain China's policy towards arms control and disarmament. After the background chapter describing China's nuclear policy, the study deals primarily with some problems related to China's emergence as a nuclear power. Chapter I analyzes the political and military background of China's nuclear policy and then analyzes the role of political and military
factors in the formation of nuclear policy. Chapter II enumerates the technological ingredients of China's nuclear capability and briefly relates the history of its nuclear development. Chapter III evaluates China's policy alternatives in relation to strategic goals--removal of American influence from Asia and dissuasion of superpowers from nuclear attack against China. Chapter IV describes China's attitude towards the partial test-ban treaty and nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In addition to these two American-Soviet sponsored treaties, China's proposals for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are considered. Finally, Chapter V turns to the evaluation of the Chinese-oriented ABM system in light of the recent policy trends in the United States.

The principal focus of this study is on China itself, but evidence is also drawn from reports and information of other countries in regard to China's real role in the field of nuclear arms. Materials contained in the footnotes support and amplify the analysis in the text, primarily by quotations from public and official statements. Furthermore, there are several points concerning methodology which need to be elaborated. First, the author has purposely tried to avoid using any secondary sources relating to the study of China's nuclear policy and strategy in order to reduce the possibility of making mistakes in the translation of language. However, collection of Chinese original sources in the United States is extremely difficult because of security reasons. Therefore, the sources used in this study are not only of Chinese
origin. Second, despite the fact that both the Nationalist government and the Communist regime claim to be the legitimate government of all of the Chinese, throughout the study the author has used the term "China" to mean that part of China which is currently under the control of the Communist regime. Third, the author has long been of the opinion that the basic impetus to China's arms control policy seems to have been the compelling nature of domestic developments, even though these were made more acute by the impact of external developments. For this reason, the author has adopted a research method to suggest interpretations for China's arms control policy equally based on the analysis of domestic developments as well as specific external developments. Lastly, the author has no intention of predicting some of the limitations imposed on the future development of China's nuclear capability because the author believes, in a rapidly changing international system, it is a mistake to try to draw conclusions without adequate knowledge and information.
Any discussion about the Chinese policy and strategy in nuclear age must begin with the fact that, for more than two decades, the Chinese policy can be understood as an outgrowth of her domestic affairs and a combination of her national interest and long-range goals expressed through the ideology of Mao Tse-tung thought. Despite obstacles, the author suggests it is possible to make sense of the Chinese nuclear policy provided we take her political and military into account.

In brief, the formation of the Chinese nuclear policy can be divided into two periods: 1949-1957 and 1957 to the present. After 1949, when the Chinese Communist were consolidating their power, they followed a moderate policy modeled to a great extent on the Soviet Union. During this period, friendly relations with the Soviet Union were a matter of importance for the Chinese Communist regime. assuring nuclear protection for the newly established regime in exchange for partnership in world affairs. The policy of "leaning to one side" was reflected in Mao's article "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" issued in 1949:

Externally, unit in a common struggle with those nations of the world which treat us equal and unit with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies, and with the proletariat and the broad masses of the peoples in all other countries, and form an international united front...
In the light of the experiences accumulated in these forty years and these twenty-eight years, all Chinese without exception must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road.

Liu Shao-chi, a top leader of Communist China before the Cultural revolution, reiterated this position in the article "Internationalism and Nationalism." He wrote: "If one is not in the imperialist camp...then one must be in the anti-imperialist camp...so-called neutrality...is nothing but deception, intentional or otherwise." Perhaps the real basis for the Chinese policy in this period was its faith in the deterrent effect of the atomic strength of the Soviet Union. American monopoly of nuclear weapons was eliminated in August of 1949 with the successful detonation of a Russian A-bomb test. Furthermore, despite Communist China's program of industrialization, China's modern technology was limited and its industries were vulnerable in the 1950s. The fact that the first two atomic bombs were dropped at Hiroshima and Nagasaki make the Chinese leaders particularly worried about an American nuclear attack. Therefore, though one may find many interpretations to this "leaning to one side" policy, there is every reason to believe that Communist China's dependence upon the Soviet Union was greater in respect to military security than in any other field.


This policy lasted until 1957. After that several factors seemed to propel China toward an increasingly autonomous role. In general, "this new course in China's policy was an outgrowth of external experiences that convinced the Chinese of the feasibility of pursuing a radically independent course of action." Between 1952 and 1957 China went through a transitional phase of testing out her strength, attempting to forge alliances with neutralist countries of the third world within the framework of economic aid diplomacy. At the Geneva Conference in 1954 and at the Bandung Conference in 1955, China offered to negotiate problems that were sources of conflict and hostility, provided China's interests and security were taken into full account. Externally, the Chinese continued to show an interest in establishing themselves in Asia, Africa, and South America. China agreed in 1956 to fund a $16 U.S. million trade deficit with Indonesia. Among the other early recipients of Chinese aid were Nepal, Egypt, Cuba, Somalia, and Algeria.

Indeed, the formation of the new Chinese policy was based on the consideration of several factors. The first was the increasing border dispute between China and the Soviet Union and its consequent threat to China's security. In 1963 China publicly declared that the treaties which established the present Sino-Soviet

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borders were unequal, typical of the settlements imposed on China by imperialists. The Soviet Union refused to accept this accusation and would not agree that such an admission should accompany a re-examination of the whole border. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union stated in November 1963 that:

Naturally, we will not defend the Russian Tsars who permitted arbitrariness in laying down the states boundaries with neighboring countries. We are convinced that you, too, do not intend to defend the Chinese emperors who by force of arms seized not a few treaty territories belonging to others. But while condemning the reactionary actions of the top-strata exploiters who held power in Russia and in China at that time, we cannot disregard the fact that historically-formed boundaries between the states now exist. Any attempt to ignore this can become the sources of misunderstanding and conflicts.7

Undoubtedly, the persisting tensions along the Sino-Soviet border and Moscow’s increasing attempts to set up a political structure in Asia have induced the Chinese leaders to re-examine the advantages and necessity of developing nuclear weapons. In fact, the Sino-Soviet dispute can be considered as one of the motive forces behind the Chinese nuclear policy.

Second, the interrelations of Chinese nuclear policy and the international situation are obviously complex. No single or simple explanation can suffice. However, an analysis of China's nuclear policy suggests the fact that China's policy responds to

the international situation: as long as her vital interests and major power status are threatened, her policy tends to be violent and aggressive. The development of American defense system in Asia, the establishment of SEATO and the increasing military strength of the United States in Southeast Asia were all early indications to the Chinese of a shift in American global strategy throughout the 1950's. In the 1960's American strategy appeared to take an even more ominous turn as Asia increasingly displaced Europe as the center of American concern. Washington's former Europe-first strategy during this period was upset and abandoned because of the rising revolutionary movements led by Communist China in Southeast Asia. The heart of American policy towards China at this time was that:

There is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-à-vis Red China in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown...a cold war waged under the leadership of the United States with constant threat of attack against Red China led by Formosa and other Far Eastern groups of military forces supported by the United States.9

American policy was thus regarded, in the eyes of Communist China, as set on a path of escalation which was particularly dangerous for China. According to the Chinese, "confrontation with China, instead of the Soviet Union, is the military strategy


Washington now subscribes to. Thus, the shift in American global strategy, together with the fact that since the Quemoy crisis of 1958 the Soviet Union failed to support China militarily in pursuit of a Chinese interest, forced China to consider the importance of nuclear weapons. In fact, China's national security now depended on her own nuclear capability.

The third factor which affected China's nuclear policy was the decline of the role of the Sino-Soviet alliance in defense of China's security. By the late 1950's the strategic value of the alliance had been brought into question principally for the following reasons:

(1). By seeking a limited detente with the United States, the Soviet Union in effect pursued a policy that prejudiced China's prospects of obtaining her foreign goals which involved changing the status quo in Far Eastern and probably South-eastern Asia.

(2). The Soviet Union wished to have a measure of control over its giant neighbor and this obviously prejudiced China's independence. As Chen Yi remarked in late 1963, presumably with reference to the Soviet offer of joint military command in the spring of 1958, "Soviet protection is worth nothing to us... No outsiders can give us protection, in fact because they always attach conditions and wish to control us."

It is impossible to estimate exactly what weight should be given to each of the various factors which have contributed to the shift in China's nuclear policy, but there can be no doubt

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that the Soviet Union's refusal to assist China to become a nuclear power further increased China's suspension of the Sino-Soviet alliance. According to the Chinese account of the matter, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture, apparently as part of an agreement on "new technology for national defense" concluded in October 1957, but unilaterally abrogated this agreement several years later and suddenly withdrew all the Russian technicians from China's industry in 1960. The crucial issue of the Soviet Union's assistance to the Chinese nuclear development probably concerned the question of control and command. As a price for nuclear aid, the Soviet Union may have insisted on one or more of the following: (1) retention of Soviet control of warheads or other weapons supplies; (2) some measures of joint planning and/or command in the Far East; (3) Chinese assurance that independent military initiatives would not be undertaken, e.g. over Taiwan.

In reality, the Soviet Union sought to bring China under military control, and China regarded such an aim as infringing on her national sovereignty. Since soviet desires were inconsistent with the Chinese policy of freedom of action and Chinese determination to go it alone, China decided to pursue her nuclear program without Soviet assistance.

During recent years the Chinese have been keenly aware of the importance of nuclear weapons and the problems they pose for their revolutionary struggle. Priority has naturally been given to the avoidance of nuclear war with the United States or the Soviet Union, together with the enhancing of China's own military strength. Therefore, the major purpose of China's nuclear program is to neutralize the nuclear advantage of the superpowers, leaving her mass army free to accomplish its goals. In strategic terms, China's goal have been the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent against the superpowers and a second-strike capability in case of confrontation with the United States or the Soviet Union. In so far as Chinese nuclear policy has been a mixture of verbal violence and practical caution, this policy has probably been due to the experience of being threatened with nuclear weapons in several instances by the United States. In the Korean War, President Eisenhower made it clear that nuclear weapons might be used against China if China refused to accept the armistice agreement. In the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1954-1955 and in the Quemoy crisis of 1958, President Eisenhower and Secretary of States Dulles again threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China in the event of open aggression in this area. It is true that, in these crises and other military conflicts

between the United States and Communist China, no nuclear weapons were actually used by the United States, but China had to cope with the American nuclear threat and consequently to adjust her policy accordingly.

In addition to being guided by pure military considerations, the Chinese nuclear policy also derives strong support from political ideology. Although a political ideology may not alone provide a thesis strong enough to explain the foundation of the Chinese nuclear policy, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of political ideology in the formation of the Chinese policy.

The aspects of the Chinese political ideology that are relevant to the question of arms control can be summarized as follows:

1. In war, men are more important than weapons, and political-ideological factors more decisive than technology;
2. As an aspirant to great-power status in the world, China, nevertheless, will not be denied the technological appurtenance of such states—including nuclear weapons and missiles;
3. Except as a temporary tactical expedient in a "protracted struggle," accommodation with the "enemy" is tantamount to surrender;
4. Any tactical or strategic advantage must be followed up aggressively either politically or militarily.14

The Chinese Communist leaders have long been of the opinion

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that military considerations must be subordinate to ideological and political considerations. The Chinese recognize constantly the fact that, in socialist countries, political and psychological factors play a far greater role in military policy than they do in the capitalist countries. In general, however, analysis of such factors as well as Mao Tse-tung's military writings contained in his Selected Works enables one to reach conclusions as follows:

**Men versus Machines**

According to the Chinese, the decisive factor in war is not machines or weapons, but men. This principle has its historical origin in the military history of the Chinese Communists. As early as 1938, in the first year of the Sino-Japanese, Mao Tse-tung attacked those who argued that ultimately it was armament that determined the outcome of a war:

This is the so-called theory that 'weapons decide everything,' which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and moral.15

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In the nuclear age, "the atom bomb is a paper tiger which the U.S. reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons." Moreover, in nuclear war, quantity and not quality will be the main consideration. During the initial period of a war, deficiencies in quantity or quality of armaments can be compensated for by the enthusiasm of the masses, and subsequently by their industry. Experiences of past wars in which the Chinese Communist have engaged would appear to confirm Mao Tse-tung's view on the subject:

On the contrary, we must exert all our efforts to make up the lost ground and carry through a comprehensive political mobilization in order to overcome the enemy. Much depends on this. Our inferiority to the enemy in armaments and other equipment is of secondary importance. Political mobilization is the really primary concern. If the entire people is mobilized, the enemy will suffer; he will be plunged into the depths of disaster; then conditions will be right for making up our deficiencies in the fields of armaments, etc.; we shall create the prerequisites for overcoming all the deficiencies of war.

More specifically, the Chinese argue that the "spirit atom bomb"—the political consciousness of the people, the courage


and spirit of sacrifice—will prove to be the most important weapons in war.

However highly developed modern weapons and technical equipment may be and however complicated the methods of modern warfare, in the final analysis the outcome of a war will be decided by sustained fighting of the ground forces, by the fighting at close quarters on battlefields...The spirit atom bomb which the revolutionary people possess is a far more powerful and useful weapon than the physical atom bomb.18

Mao Tse-tung’s "paper tiger" doctrine is not just an exercise in theory, for Mao is the supreme leader of military thought in practices. This "paper tiger" doctrine, as Cohen says, has been put to good use: (a) to infuse courage into the Chinese masses by deliberately underplaying the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy; and (b) for use as a psychological sub-structure on which to build a revolutionary attitude among the emergent and newly emergened peoples. Such a doctrine, which is very similar in meaning and political purpose to Lenin’s earlier characterization of imperialism as a 'colossus with feet of clay;' is founded basically on Marxism which regards men as the ultimate force in overcoming all human and material obstacles. Knowing the terrifying destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, however, the Chinese do not credit nuclear weapons in their revolutionary struggles with imperialist countries.


The Morality of War

In the Chinese view, imperialism is the source of international war, and the threat of war will exist as long as imperialism remains. "War, this monster of mutual slaughter among men, will be finally eliminated by the progress of human society," Mao has said, "but there is only one way to eliminate it and that is to oppose war with war." All wars are seen by the Chinese to be either just or unjust. The first category includes defensive wars, wars of national liberation, and civil wars of the oppressed against the oppressors. In his "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Mao Tse-tung wrote, "We support just wars and oppose unjust wars. All counter-revolutionary wars are unjust, all revolutionary wars are just."

The image of military and political conflicts between the socialist countries and capitalist countries has given a completely different meaning to the Chinese notion of war. To the Chinese, war appears as a form of armed struggle, an indispensable instrument in the struggle for national liberation and independence. However different the Chinese notion of war, it refers mainly to Lenin's works on the question of war and peace.


(21). Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writing, P.79.
"Until the final issue is decided," said Lenin, "the state of awful war will continue...Sentimentality is no less a crime than cowardice in war." Following the same line of reasoning, Mao said, "We...have no use for stupid scruples about benevolence, righteousness and morality in war. In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf."

The Nature of Nuclear War

Indeed, the Chinese appear to some extent to share with the Soviet Union an emphasis on the relations between war and imperialism. Leaders in Peking, however, hold a view quite different from that of the Soviet Union about the nature of nuclear war.

The ideological dispute between the Soviet and Communist China centers mainly on the impact of nuclear weapons on the validity of Marxism-Leninism. To the Soviet Union, "the atomic bomb did not respect class laws," and "violent revolution was a dangerous path because it might trigger a nuclear holocaust which would wipe out all the gains of the revolution and destroy the economic and social base for further seizure of power by the Marxist-Leninist

Moscow holds that violent revolution must be abandoned and that nuclear war would be catastrophic for all countries. Contrary to the Soviet Union's view, the Chinese bravely contend that there is no direct relations between revolutionary war and nuclear war. Moreover, if nuclear war broke out, a new civilization would rise from the debris of imperialism.

The Chinese spoke in detail their statement of September 1, 1963, about the meaning of their position on the nature of nuclear war:

(1) China wants peace, and not war;
(2) It is the imperialists, and not we, who want to fight a war;
(3) A world war can be prevented;
(4) Even in the eventuality that imperialism should impose a war on the peoples of the world and inflict tragic losses on them, it is the imperialist system, and not mankind, that would perish, and the future of mankind would still be bright.25

Though the Chinese continue to voice the line that exaggeration of the destructiveness of nuclear war demoralizes the people of the socialist camp, they have been very cautious in their estimation of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and take into

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full account the impact of nuclear weapons in decision-making relating to military policy.

**Disarmament as Tactic and Strategy**

Theoretically, the Chinese constantly cite Lenin's warnings that disarmament is a dangerous slogan in world revolution, because it can spread the illusion that peace and disarmament may come without the triumph of Communism. In replying to a reader's inquiry about the way to achieve a warless world, the editor of China Youth, February 16, 1960, declared:

The so-called 'warless world'--if it is not a childish fantasy--can only be a world where there is no imperialism...where there is no class. To realize this ideal, the human race must necessarily undergo a long-term, sinuous, complicated and violent struggle so as to eliminate imperialism and class. At a time when the imperialists not only still exist but are even armed to the teeth, any thought that there is a short cut to realizing a 'warless world' will only disarm the people's vigilance against the imperialist.

In practice, the Chinese have consistently called for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons through international consultations. Over the years, after each nuclear test, China, as a rule, has issued one or more policy statements related to the test. In these policy statements the Chinese have

constantly stressed certain importance points. Some of these are:

First, China calls for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In the statement on her 1964 nuclear test, the Chinese stated:

In developing nuclear weapons, China's aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government also formally proposed to the world's governments that a summit conference of all countries be convened to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. 27

Second, China declares that she will never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons. After her hydrogen test in 1968, the Chinese stated:

The Chinese Communist Government reiterates once again that the conducting of necessary and limited nuclear tests and the development of nuclear weapons by China are entirely for the purpose of defense and for breaking the nuclear monopoly, with the ultimate aim of abolishing nuclear weapons. We solemnly declare once again that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. 28

Third, China claims that she is developing her nuclear weapons for the purpose of defense only. For example, after her 1964 test, China declared that "to defend oneself is the inalienable right of every sovereign state... China is forced to conduct nuclear


tests and develop nuclear weapons... The development of nuclear weapons by China is for defense and for protecting the Chinese people."

The contradiction between China's theory and practice over the question of disarmament and nuclear weapons can be only explained in terms of propaganda. Each of China's nuclear tests held until 1968 was portrayed as a triumph for the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" and "a great encouragement to the revolutionary people of the world." Most of these tests, furthermore, seem to have been timed to dramatize Chinese reaction to some external events. The test of October 16, 1964, was clearly timed to dramatize the fall of Khrushchev; the test of October 27, 1966, was held at the time of U.S. President Johnson's visit to Asia (South Vietnam and Thailand); and the test of June 17, 1967, was held at the time of the Soviet Union's Premier Kosygin's visit to the United States. Undoubtedly, the Chinese nuclear test statements and her proposals for disarmament, with such a low chance of acceptance, must be viewed primarily as propaganda and tactic in her nuclear policy.


Chapter Two

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Although the Chinese have been keenly impressed by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, no evidence of China's intention to develop her nuclear capability could be found before 1957. The Chinese appear to have launched their nuclear weapons program only in 1957. The establishment of the Institute of Atomic Energy and the achievement of technical agreement with the Soviet Union in 1957 marked the turning point in China's industrial development. The first official statement by a Chinese official of China's intention to develop nuclear weapons came in 1958, when Liu Ya-lou, the Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Air Force, wrote:

China's working class and scientists will certainly be able to make the most up-to-date aircraft and atomic bombs in the not distant future... By that time... we can use atomic weapons and guided missiles... in coping with the enemies who dare to invade our country.31

In October, 1961, Lord Montgomery reported Chou En-lai as saying "that the government had decided to proceed with plans for developing nuclear weapons for the armed forces." 32

With regard to China's nuclear weapons development and testing


program, from 16 October, 1964, to the end of September, 1969, a period of five years, the Chinese detonated 10 nuclear devices. Six were air-dropped, two were detonated on a tower, and one was delivered by a missile. The first nuclear test was successfully conducted on October 16, 1964, on the test ground at Lop Nor in Sinkiang. Significantly it was a fission device built of enriched uranium (U-235), which produced a yield equivalent to 20 kilotons of T.N.T. This test had two implications. First, China was capable of extracting fissionable U-235 in substantial quantities on a large scale through its gaseous diffusion plant. Second, since enriched uranium (U-235) could increase a country’s capability to produce tritium, a basic component of thermonuclear bombs, the result of this test suggested that China might have intended to develop hydrogen bombs. On May 14, 1965, China conducted her second nuclear test; a bomb dropped from a plane was exploded over the same site as the previous one. The U.S. sources estimated the force of the detonation as equivalent to that produced by the explosion of perhaps a little more than 20 kilotons of T.N.T. The third test took place on May 9, 1966, at the same test site near Lop Nor. This was the first Chinese claim of the use of "thermonuclear material" in a test. The presence of the thermonuclear material (lithium-6)

in the test indicated that a thermonuclear reaction had occurred, because a yield of more than 200 kilotons was greater than that obtained from just a fission bomb. Therefore, this test was probably accomplished by a combination of a fission and a fusion.

Despite the fact that two factors may have affected the rate of development of China's nuclear program (the deterioration in China's economic situation since the Great Leap Forward Movement and the withdrawal of Soviet technicians in mid-1960), the Cultural revolution did not seriously slow China's nuclear program. Indeed, the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests during the period when China was reported to be in the chaos of Cultural revolution.

On October 27, 1966, China conducted her fourth test, using a nuclear warhead on a guided missile. This missile involved a Soviet-type SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile and carried a warhead made of uranium (U-235) a distance of approximately 400 miles. The fifth test was a bomb detonation on December 28, 1966. It was reported that a triple stage (or fission-fusion-fission) nuclear device was used along with some fissionable uranium-235 in this test. The sixth test, which consisted of a hydrogen bomb,

came on June 17, 1967. Its blast produced a powerful yield equivalent to three-seven megatons of T.N.T. The U.S. Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy commented on this test as follows:

The sixth Chinese nuclear test has confirmed the conclusion reached from the analysis of the fifth Chinese nuclear test that they are making excellent progress in the thermonuclear design.35

In December 1967 China conducted another thermonuclear test that Western analysts judged an abortive test. It produced a yield equalvalent to 20,000 tone of T.N.T. After this test, there was no nuclear test until December 27, 1968, when a hydrogen bomb was detonated. It produced a yield equavalent to three megatons of T.N.T. The U.S. Atomic Energy Committee confirmed it to be a thermonuclear test. Finally, in September, 1969, two tests were conducted in rapid succession. The first one was an underground nuclear detonation conducted on September 22, which produced an explosion equavalent to 200-250 kilotons of T.N.T. The second one was a hydrogen bomb explosion equavalent to three megatons of T.N.T.

Despite the lack of information on the underground test, the fact that China chose to conduct an underground nuclear test

raises questions which need to be elaborated. The two most plausible reasons for a Chinese underground nuclear test in 1969 appear to be, first, that the Chinese are interested in setting up controlled experiments whereby they can more effectively analyze nuclear-design information, as well as the physical effects of a detonation and, secondly, that the Chinese seek to deny to both Western and Soviet analysts debris and other technical intelligence material, since they are beginning to test tactical nuclear weapons designed for battlefield use.

To date, the Chinese have tested a number of relatively small nuclear weapons ranging from 10 kilotons to 30 kilotons each that can be delivered by a tactical fighter-bomber of Chinese design, known in the West as the F-9. The Chinese nuclear test in November 1971 and the test in January 1972 were also reported to be under 20 kilotons of Y.N.T.

Following the 1969 test, obviously, a major shift in the nuclear program has been adopted by the Chinese due to the increasing threat of the Soviet Union. In the author's opinion, development of ICBM capability is the next step in the Chinese nuclear program. On the other hand, the high priority of the nuclear


program has been changed by the Chinese from long-range missiles to small tactical missiles which can attack some military targets in the Soviet Union's Far East territory. More plausible is the possibility that the Chinese may be experimenting not only in the size of the nuclear device but also with the amount of fissionable material it contains. This fact can be supported on the following grounds. First, with the increasing tension along the Sino-Soviet border, the Chinese have to demonstrate their nuclear potential in sufficiently clear terms for the Soviet Union to keep the border dispute strictly under control. The possession of small tactical nuclear weapons might well be regarded by the Chinese as an important attack weapon against the Soviet Union's troop concentration and land operations in the event of a border conflict. Second, since the tactical nuclear weapons can be regarded as an effective weapon against troop concentration and land operation in a local or limited nuclear war, the Chinese might believe that the possession of small tactical nuclear weapons could act either as a direct deterrent against the use of such weapon by the United States or as an indirect deterrent by forcing the non-Communist bloc countries to put pressure on the United States to prevent the use of such weapons.

Of course, while no one in the West can calculate with certainty, it is conservatively estimated that China has at least 50-100 tactical nuclear weapons in her arsenal. She is also mass-producing
the F-9 fighter-bomber at the rate of about 15 a month, and of the 300 produced in 1970-1972, at least 200 have already been placed in operational squadrons.

TABLE I
Chinese Nuclear Test, 1964-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 16, 1964</td>
<td>20(kilotons)</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Tower-mounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 1965</td>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1966</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 27, 1966</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Missile-delivered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 28, 1966</td>
<td>300-500</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Tower-mounted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 17, 1967</td>
<td>3,000-7,000</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 24, 1967</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 27, 1968</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Air-dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 22, 1969</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 29, 1969</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Air-fropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 14, 1970</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>TN</td>
<td>Air-fropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 18, 1971</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan --, 1972</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: F--fission; TN--thermonuclear(fusion)

The production of nuclear weapons requires sophisticated industrial technology and the expenditure of large sum of money. In his "Scientific and Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963," Chu-yuan Cheng estimates that some 400 senior scientists were engaged in a top level nuclear program in the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy and several universities centers by 1964. And by the end of 1965 at least five of the eight ministries of machine-building industries were devoted to defense purposes.

The elite group of Chinese nuclear scientists includes Chien Hsueh-shen (who holds a Ph.D. from California Institute of Technology), who was director of the US Scientific Commission of National Defense during the World War II years and a former professor of Jet Propulsion at the California Institute of Technology, Tsien San-tsiang (Director of the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy), Wang Kan-chang (who was educated in Germany before the World War II and was a research associate at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1947-1948), Chien We-chang (who had been at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of the California Institute of Technology), and Wei Chung-hua (who had been at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Many Chinese scientists

had also been trained in the Dubna Institute for nuclear research in the Soviet Union before the open Sino-Soviet split occurred.

With these first-rate nuclear scientists and so many research and technical personnel, the Chinese should not have any difficulty in developing nuclear weapons in the coming years. Therefore, the only remaining implication of China's nuclear program in the next decade would be the economic situation. In agreement with the hypothesis that "there exists an exact correlation between the nations with the highest military budget and the nations that have achieved the use of nuclear arms," then, an examination of the economic feasibility of China's nuclear program appear to be necessary and useful in evaluating China's potential for further nuclear development. Since a country's GNP is probably the most significant indicator of its overall economic capability, the growth rate of China's GNP must be considered as one of the factors which can affect her nuclear development.

Basically, there are two routes that China can follow in developing her nuclear weapons. The first involves the construction of atomic reactors that use natural uranium to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The second is to build a gaseous diffusion

plant to separate uranium and yield weapons-grade 238. A nuclear reactor capable of producing enough fissionable material for one weapon per year would cost about $50 million, and a gaseous diffusion plant is estimated to cost approximately one billion dollars.

This is indeed a high cost, but it is unlikely that the Chinese, in developing their nuclear weapons, have found their rate of economic growth to have been affected seriously by their nuclear program. On the contrary, the slowness of economic growth may be considered as one of the reasons for the stagnation of China's nuclear program during the year 1968-1969. Since nuclear capability is largely determined by economic capability, and a country's GNP is probably the most significant indicator of its overall economic capability, therefore, a study of China's GNP from 1957-197- would provide us a more practical basis of judging China's nuclear potential.

In terms of GNP, China has been ranked fifth ($46,256,000,000), after the United States ($443,270,000,000), the Soviet Union ($121,920,000,000), the United Kingdom ($61,379,000,000), and West Germany ($49,906,000,000) in 1957. Using 1960 data, China

(40). Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb, P.73.
has been ranked eighth with a GNP of $50,000,000,000. In 1961, China's GNP was estimated to be about $57,844,000,000. These figures indicated a slow but steady rate of economic growth.

Although the Chinese conducted three nuclear tests and scientists were to be treated gently during the Cultural revolution years, the Cultural revolution was apparently an obstacle to China's economic development. In the author's opinion, there seems to be indirect relations between the absence of China's nuclear testing from December, 1967 to December, 1968 and her political chaos and economic depression. In a speech to a rally on October, 1967, Chou En-lai admitted that the Cultural revolution had at least complicated the tasks of economic and nuclear development. He said:

> It is already clear that there will be another bumper harvest in agriculture this year. Within the space of less than one year, we have conducted three nuclear tests, including a guided missile nuclear weapon test and a hydrogen bomb. Such a world-shaking revolutionary movement of course exacts a certain price in production in certain places and in certain departments. We took this into account in advance. Production is affected to a certain extent, especially in places where disturbance occur. But this is only a transient thing. As soon as disorder is turned into order, production can quickly pick up and rise.  

However, after the Cultural revolution, China's economic growth has been maintained at a normal level. Using extensive material

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from published sources, the World Economic Survey observes that in 1971 "China maintained the high rates of economic growth of recent years."

TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (Billion of Dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>82.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>89.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>97.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>104.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>101.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>99.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>109.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>121.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>128.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the analysis of the Chinese GNP allows us to relate easily China's economic and military strength, the real function of GNP, in calculating China's nuclear potential, depends on the percentage of military expenditures in the total GNP. According to U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency statistics, China ranked seventh in military expenditures among all countries during the year 1967. The military expenditures for China's nuclear weapons program have been estimated as 3.5 billion yuan a year in 1966-68, and they have been held within a range of 3 to 4 billion annually from 1969 on. Based on the fact that the capital costs for research and development need a large sum of money, it is possible that the additional military expenditures required in China's future nuclear development may substantially exceed this level if some new weapons program are initiated by Communist China in the coming years. But, in evaluating the cost of Chinese weapons program, the American experience of rising research and development need not apply to the Chinese case. Two reasons may account for the difference. First, the large and rising labor costs in American weapons research and development will not exist in China because of the absence of competitive market there. Second, Chinese labor costs are low relative to material costs in comparison with the United States.

(46) A ratio of 3 or 4 yuan to the US dollar may be used in this case.


(48) Ibid., p.61.
Analysis of China's GNP and her military expenditures allows us to see the fact that China's nuclear weapons program has costed her the equivalent of approximately two percent of her GNP. On the basis on this conclusion, it is clear that certain factor, both economic and noneconomic, any affect the actual rate of growth of the Chinese economy and may therefore affect China's nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the annual expenditure on the nuclear weapons program is such a small portion of the GNP that the Chinese may not concerned with the economic costs involved. In the coming years, Communist China's economy will be able to sustain and support her nuclear weapons program without too much strain. Since these conclusions are based on the assumptions that Communist China will continue to maintain a high rate of economic growth and that there will be no massive expansion of nuclear program in the future, these conclusions may be altered as these two assumptions change. Even with a very high rate of GNP growth the Chinese nuclear capability, as a whole, would still be far from fully developed by 1976 in comparison with the United States and the Soviet Union.
Chapter Three

CHINA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Granted that no one factor or constellation of factors will always determine China's nuclear policy, it seems clear that military and strategic considerations effectively account for many of the important decisions in China's policy, particularly in arms control and related matters. In the previous chapter several factors which can affect China's nuclear capability have been analyzed. In the foreseeable future, a nuclear weapons program will be fully developed by Communist China so that she possesses a minimum nuclear "deterrent" against the United States and the Soviet Union. But, how will the Chinese use their nuclear weapons in their struggles against the imperialist countries? What, then, are the principles which guide China's strategy and her science of revolution in the nuclear age? To obtain a deeper insight into the dynamics of Communist China's policy, we now turn to the examination of the positions taken by Peking on matters of war, peace, and disarmament; also to the problems and prospects for the future emerging from this interaction of military and strategic considerations.

In fact, China's strategic policy has been closely related to certain domestic and international issues over the years. The following analysis concentrates on some of these issues and their implications. In comparison with the strategic thought of the
Soviet Union, Chinese policy may be divided into three periods reflecting the shifts in outlook:

A.) 1949 to 1956: Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and Emphasis on Manpower in War.


C.) October, 1964 to Present: Balance of "Nuclear Deterrence" and Negotiation with the United States.

On matters such as arms control and nuclear weapons, both the Soviet Union and Communist China agree that "Leninism" should guide Communist policy, but they disagree radically over interpretation. The doctrinal controversies preceding and following the open schism between the Soviet Union and China in 1963 provide an essential if only partial source of information concerning the general nature of the Chinese nuclear strategy. Discussion in this chapter of necessity includes some material on the Sino-Soviet nuclear dialogue and its consequent impact on the Chinese leader's strategic thought. But, what is more important is the impact of domestic and international events on China's nuclear strategy.

A. 1949 to 1956: Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons and Emphasis on Manpower in War.

Mention in the Chinese Communist documents and press of the implications of nuclear weapons was rare in this period. In fact, when they are discussed, one notices a depreciation of their
importance and effectiveness. For example, in the Korean War period, when the Chinese were afraid of American nuclear attack, Communist China's leaders tried to minimize nuclear weapon's battlefield usefulness in order to maintain troops moral.

The atomic bomb itself cannot be a decisive factor in a war... Moreover, the atomic bomb has many drawbacks as a military weapon; i.e., in the first place, the length of time for manufacture and the high cost which prohibits large-scale production... Secondly, because of its highly destructive power, it cannot be employed on the battlefield to destroy directly the fighting power of the opposing army, in order not to annihilate the users themselves. Thirdly, it can only be used against a big and concentrated objective like a big armament industry center or huge concentrations of troops. Therefore, the more extensive the opponent's territory is and the more scattered the opponent's population is, the less effective will the atomic bomb be.

It is difficult to get a precise impression as to the kind of nuclear attack the Chinese considered likely, and it is even more difficult to understand the real reasons why the Chinese depreciated nuclear weapons before 1957. However, two factors may explain the Chinese attitude: first, one which still has a great effect, is that Mao Tse-tung's political ideology inhibited him from discussing implications of a situation in which weapons might be decisive over men; secondly, and probably the more important factor, here, is that the Soviet Union had not formulated its strategic doctrine at this time.


In this period, the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons was carefully estimated by the Chinese. Copies of the 1961 issues of the Chinese classified military publication *Work Correspondence* released by the United States Government in 1963 reveal that the Chinese believed that the United States would have to invade China's territory even after a nuclear attack. Consequently, they admitted the great destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Lewis has written:

> The documents suggest no Soviet assistance in case of war. The Chinese Communist do not appear to expect an immediate conflict with the United States but neither do they rule out the possibility of a surprise attack by American military forces. The fear of sudden moves by the United States presumably prompted a tightening of confidential and security work in 1961, for example. The *Work Correspondence* series highlights the Chinese Communist dread of nuclear and bacterial warfare on the one hand and the hope of attaining advanced weapons and technical expertise on the other. In several documents a shift in military training programs to prepare for scientific and technological advances in coming few years is noted, but in the meantime the Chinese Communist have adopted a passive strategy of dispersal in order to survive nuclear attack and hence to wage "close combat" with invading group forces. Maintenance of of internal communication after nuclear attack has become a primary mission of radio and signal personnel.

Several factors in this period indicated a coming shift related to a change in the Chinese strategy and a re-evaluation of the

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nuclear weapons.

1. Strategic Balance and Soviet Union's ICBM Test: The East Wind Prevails over the West Wind.

The period of China's greatest fear of the nuclear imbalance between the capitalist countries and the Communist countries came to an end in 1957 with the launching of the Soviet Union's Sputnik and with the Soviet Union's first ICBM test. The Chinese concluded that a fundamental change had taken place in the nuclear balance: The East wind was now prevailing over the West wind. In his famous speech of November 18, 1957, Mao Tse-tung declared:

It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East wind and the West wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East wind prevails over the West wind or the West wind prevails over the East wind." It is characteristic of the situation today, I believe, that the East wind is prevailing over the West wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.

In the Chinese view, the Soviet Union's ICBM had two positive implications: (a) it provided a nuclear deterrent adequate to cover Chinese territory, and (b) it allowed Peking greater political and military flexibility behind the Soviet shield.

(52) John Gitting, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, P.82.
The Chinese became more vocally militant than the Soviet Union in their support of revolutionary movement. In fact they tried to take advantages of the changing strategic balance by adopting an offensive minded strategy. On the one hand, the Chinese felt that the United States was largely deterred by the Soviet Union from a total war. On the other hand, the Chinese wanted to create the impression of a United States with a propensity towards local war wars, even if it couldn't win. They cited the new U.S. reliance on "brinkmanship" and "limited war" strategy advocated by Dulles and Kissinger, as evidence of U.S. preparations for limited nuclear war and a shift in global strategy. The Chinese thus expanded their military progress and did not hesitate, as shown by her attack on Quemoy in 1958 and her attack on India in 1962, to deviate from peaceful coexistence in order to make sure that the East wind would continue to prevail over the West wind.

2. Domestic Debate over Defense Modernization: Military Modernization or Industrial Development.

While the Soviet Union's ICBM test was an important event related to the fundamental shift in Chiba's strategy, it was not, however, the only explanation of the growing awareness by Peking of the implications of nuclear weapons.

The Domestic debate between professional military leaders and party leaders over the question of priorities in China's national
policy, together with the hints appearing in the early period of 1960's of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute, reflected the growing awareness by China's policy-makers of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their implications for strategy. Some Chinese military leaders, having a normal desire to be self-reliant and prepared for national defense, indicated their awareness of the possible consequences of a sudden nuclear attack and, thus, emphasized military modernization: a trained and well-equipped army, as well as an advanced weapons program. In line with this evaluation of the strategic context and nuclear weapons, Liu Po-cheug noted:

With the emergence of atomic weapons and jet weapons, military science has registered a new development. It is anticipated that war in the future will be a combined operation by the land forces, naval forces, parachutes, and air defense units carried out on land, and sea, and in the air. Only with the industrialization of the state will there be the physical foundation of national defense will there be protection for the industrialization of the state.54

On the contrary, party and political leaders, who obviously had a different evaluation of Soviet nuclear deterrent capability and who maintained that priority should be given to economic and scientific development as the basis for China's long-term national defense position, disagreed. They believed that military expenditures and manpower should be saved in order to lay down a

(54) Ibid., p.44.
strong technical and economic foundation for the national defense. People's Daily said on February 15, 1955 that:

Our socialist construction work calls for enormous sources of funds and large numbers of talents. Those funds and talents cannot be obtained from others and must be...fostered by ourselves...It is not necessary in peacetime for our country to maintain a large standing army because a country with powerful reserves can rapidly call them up to resist the enemy at the time of invasion...It is possible for our country to reduce the standing army gradually to the necessary size in order to save enormous resources and manpower for use in socialist and peaceful construction work.55

Of course, the difference in interests between the professional military leaders and party men had other aspects, and the debate was related to the issues of the atomic bomb and nuclear war. A study of the domestic debate between Peking's leaders clearly reveal the fact that, in the late 1950's, some Chinese military leaders were quite dissatisfied with their role in policy-making, and, consequently, they tried to gain control within the framework of national defense by emphasizing the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and their implications for China's nuclear strategy.

C. October, 1964 to Present: Balance of Nuclear Deterrent and Negotiation with the United States.

In the second half of 1960s, three major events emerged that seemed to affect China's strategy: the American escalation of war in Indochina, the growing Sino-Soviet rift, and the Chinese

nuclear detonations.

From Peking's perspective, American strategic doctrine went through three distinct phases in the 1960's. The first phase the Chinese refer to as that of "flexible response." Under this strategy, the American government sought to prevent Communist China's expansion and Communist revolution in Southeast Asia by building up its military power in this area. With the failure of this effort in the eyes of the Chinese, American strategy turned to the second innovation, that of "counter-insurgency," and finally evolved into the third stage—the stage of "escalation." The rapid, sharp reaction of the United States in July 1964 to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the bombing of North Vietnam had shown that the United States could be probably provoked into reprisals. In any event, uncertainty about American intentions thus played an important role in the Chinese new strategic thought.

At the same time, the escalation of war in Indochina, especially in South Vietnam, paralleled the rapid deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations to the point where the Chinese could no longer rely on Soviet nuclear deterrent and protection. Following the armed conflict which broke out on the Ussuri River at Chenpao

island (Damansky island in Russian Press) on March 2, 1969, the Chinese began to fear that either the United States or, more likely, the Soviet Union might decide to destroy the embryonic Chinese nuclear capability. This apprehension led the Chinese to act very cautiously in the period following their nuclear detonation and to accompany the development of nuclear capability with a series of statements stressing China's reasonableness: that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that China strongly support the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Fear of a pre-emptive nuclear attack not only forced the Chinese leaders to consider new options and strategies, to reduce China's isolation and vulnerability, to explore new opportunities for improvement of mutual relations with the United States, but also increased the Chinese need of a nuclear deterrent against the superpowers.

In evaluating the evolution of China's nuclear strategy and her attitude toward nuclear weapons, one may find China's strategy and her predispositions to "calculate"—how one is to advance or retreat depending on the objective conditions. Yet, there are some military principles affecting the formation and evolution of China's strategy in her leader's view of war and revolution.

Basically, the Chinese principles of war are found mainly in Mao Tse-tung's military thought. Its specific contribution to the
Chinese strategic doctrine are widely known, because the top military leaders of present-day China have been trained in Mao's thought and are experienced in its successful application.

Alice Langley Hsieh summarizes Mao Tse-tung's major military principles as follows:

1). Rejection of the conception of quick decisive wars, based on purely military considerations, in favor of a view as the totality of political, economic, psychological, and military factors.

2). Emphasis on the conception of strategic withdrawal, avoidance of decisive battles, and even temporary abandonment of territory in the early stages of the war, in the interest of eventual victory.

3). Belief in the initiation of the strategic offensive only when the balance of total strength is in the Communist's favor and their victory certain.

4). Subordination of the strictly military viewpoint of the professional soldier to the political-military objective of the revolution, of the army to the Party, of weapons to men, of short-term success to long-term.57

In short, we may conclude China's military doctrine as follows:

The Emphasis on Flexibility

The development of Communist China's strategy has been characterized by tactical opportunism and adaptability. Mao Tse-tung evolved

a strategy of maximum ambiguity which originally applied to guerrilla warfare but also reflects his strategic thought in general. He expresses the principle of this strategy in a sixteenth basic formula: "Enemy advance, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." On his essays "Protracted War" and "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War" written in the 1930s, Mao summarized the correct military line in three propositions which he considered the prerequisites for victory:

1) To fight resolutely a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle when victory is certain.

2) To avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign when victory is uncertain.

3) To avoid absolutely a strategic decisive engagement which stakes the destiny of the nation.

Practically, Mao was aware of the inferiority and vulnerability of the Chinese nuclear capability and the importance of pursuing only limited objectives in relation to capability. In Mao's viewpoint, "people who direct a war cannot strive for victories beyond the limit they can and must strive for victories through their conscious activities."

Realizing this, then, in the field of arms control, the Chinese are likely to accept an international agreement in order to

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(a) to prevent disadvantageous escalation; (b) to seek formal recognition of gains already achieved; (c) to mobilize public opinion; and (d) to win support for the future.

The emphasis on flexibility suggests two important assumptions about the Chinese behavior in international politics. First, Communist China's leaders can be induced to compromise if they can be convinced that the existing balance of political and military forces make this necessary or desirable. Second, any compromise Peking accepts must generally be regarded as tactical movement rather than as the abandonment of any of its long-term aims.

**War is a Continuation of Politics**

What is permanent in the Chinese theory is the insistence upon the subordination of purely military considerations to ideological and political considerations. In Mao's view, war is not simply "the continuance of politics by other means," but is itself a form of politics. Mao's theory of war is derived from that of Lenin on the relative importance of political factors. To Lenin, "War is part of the whole. The whole is politics...Appearances

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are not reality. Wars are most political when they seem most military."

While by no means minimizing the importance of military force -- "political power grows out of the gun," Mao notes that the decisive factor in war can only be of a political nature, and that the Communist party should command the gun.

Mao's concern with winning a war through emphasis on political forces enforces one to identify two additional Chinese approaches to victory. First, the quantity and quality of military forces depend directly on the political morale of the people. Thus, in his famous article -- "Long Live the Victory of People's War" -- Lin Piao wrote:

The essence of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of army building is that in building a people's army prominence must be given to politics, i.e., the army must first and foremost be built on a political basis. Politics is the commander, politics is the soul of everything. Political work is the lifeline of our army. True, a people's army must pay attention to the constant improvement of its weapons and equipment and its military technique, but it relies mainly on politics, on the proletariat revolutionary consciousness and courage of the commanders and fighters, on the support and backing of the masses.63


Second, political mobilization is the reality primary concern in war against imperialist countries having military superiority. If the entire people is mobilized the enemy will suffer, then conditions will be right for making up the deficiencies in the field of armament.

Fighting War by Proxy

While emphasizing the importance of ideology and political forces in Peking's military strategy, it would be a mistake to underestimate the role of nuclear deterrence in China's nuclear strategy.

At present, Peking's desire for a nuclear deterrent or a second-striking capability is based on the reality that any war involving China might bring unacceptable destruction to the Chinese mainland. But, according to the Chinese, this risk can be reduced if:

1). the Chinese can fight war by proxy—which is being done in Indochina—in contrast to the use of Chinese troops, as in the Korean War.

2). the prospective enemy (the United States or the Soviet Union) can be prevented from resorting to forms of warfare in which he enjoys a distinct superiority.

3). the prospective enemy can be precluded from adopting other forms of warfare against China that are more effective.
4). the world opinion can be mobilized against American "war mongering" and in favor of an international agreement on total destruction of nuclear weapons "no-first use" of these weapons.

5). the Chinese can acquire the power of retaliation as a deterrent to the United States or the Soviet Union.64

Further, Mao's theory of People's war--the establishment of rural revolutionary base areas and the encirclement of the cities from the countryside--is of outstanding importance to the Chinese military strategy.

Taking the entire globe, if North American and Western Europe can be called "the cities of the world," then Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute "the rural areas of the world."...In a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of cities by the rural areas.65

Theoretically, the Chinese have adopted what seems to be a contradictory position on the question of people's war. On the one hand, they argue that it is not actually necessary for China to help fight or even give material aid to foreign revolutionary struggles, because revolution in each oppressed country is made by the people of that country, not by Chinese. When Lin Piao specified the main elements of the people's war, he particularly included a commitment to self-reliance as a major factor:

In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of

(64) Yuan-Li Wu, "Peking and the United States," Modern Age Volume 12, No.4, 1968, Published under the auspices of the foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.

self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off.\(^{66}\)

On the other hand, however, the Chinese argue that the socialist countries should regard it as their international duty to support the revolutionary struggles in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In fact, it has not been Peking's policy to commit Chinese troops to support wars outside China's border, unless China's national security and integrity are drastically threatened. In Mao's mind, Chinese present nuclear strategy is just one of the applications of people's war theory. Under no circumstance should the Chinese conduct wars in such a way as to risk direct confrontation with the United States or the Soviet Union.

\textit{Despite the Enemy Strategically; Take Full Account of Him Tactically}

At the heart of the Chinese military strategy is the principle, --"despite the enemy strategically, take full account of him tactically":

To despite the enemy strategically means to perceive that the class enemy, viewed in its essence and in the long run, is bound to perish in the end, no matter how powerful he may be for a time.

...To take full account of the enemy tactically

\(^{(66)}\)Ibid., P.483.
means that with regard to any given part of the
whole, and in each specific struggle, it is nece­
ssary to take the enemy seriously, to be prudent,
to pay careful attention to the art of struggle
and to adopt forms of struggle suited to different
times, places, and conditions in order to isolate
and wipe out the enemy step by step.67

It is in this light that we should examine such statements
as "The United States is a paper tiger" or "Man will triumph
over weapons." The statement that the United States is paper
tiger—a doctrine which is probably the most graphic example of
the Chinese principle of despising the enemy strategically but
taking full account of him tactically—means that in the long
run the United States can be defeated by proper strategy; it
does not mean that nuclear weapons cannot destroy China. In the
same way, the statement that man will triumph over weapons means
that in the long run what will determine the political orien­
tation of countries is the view of men and not the nature of the
weapons system; it does not mean that if a nuclear weapon and
a man are in the same place, the nuclear weapon cannot explode
and kill the man.68

As mentioned earlier, many factors in the international system
and issues in Chinese domestic affairs have contributed to the
formation of the Chinese nuclear strategy. Turning more specifically

(67). Shao T'ieh-ch'en, "Revolutionary Dialectics and How to Appraise

(68). Morton H. Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy (Toronto:
to strategically issues, the military presence of the United States in Southeast Asia and the Sino-Soviet border conflict to the north present the specters of encirclement and war on the Chinese multiple fronts. Peking's leaders appear to realize that as long as the United States and the Soviet Union virtually possess nuclear superiority, Chinese strategic goals and foreign policy objectives will be very difficult, if not impossible, to realize. At present, it seems that Communist China may adopt certain different strategies to enhance Chinese security. One can divide these strategies into three categories:

1) Improving China's security by calling for arms control or disarmament proposals, such as complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and "no-first use" of nuclear weapons.

From the point of view of Peking, Soviet invasion or American nuclear attack is theoretically diminished by the fact that "the Chinese claim they will never launch war of expansion or wars as a substitute for revolutionary struggle by the peoples of other countries." Such proposals for arms control or disarmament seek to convince the superpowers of China's peaceful intention so that they will not consider taking any action against the development of nuclear weapons by the Chinese, such as a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Chinese nuclear facilities.

2) **Continued development of China's nuclear weapons.**

The purpose would be to attain a second-strike capability to inflict politically unacceptable damage on the United States. The same purpose would apply vis-a-vis the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union.

3) **Negotiation with the United States and improvement of diplomatic relations with non-Communist countries.**

The purpose is to attempt an U.S.-Soviet-China triangle in world affairs. The point is that if the Soviet Union can be isolated from the mass revolutionary peoples of the world, effective Soviet nuclear pressure on China will lessen.
As discussed in chapter three, Communist China could enhance her national security by adopting arms control and disarmament proposals. At present, China's position on arms control and disarmament is one of the most complicated issues in the international system. The basic difficulty of inducing China to participate in arms control efforts comes from the character of arms control arrangements. In the Chinese strategic view, an actual formal arms control and disarmament arrangement, as distinct from a more initiative, must promote not only the security of the world, but also their military power and political influence.

This chapter deals with primarily with the development of attitudes and policies in China concerning the nuclear test and the spread of nuclear weapons. Discussion and analysis in this chapter is divided into two parts: (1) China's position on nuclear proliferation and; (2) China's attitude toward arms control.

**China's Position on Nuclear Proliferation**

In recent years the Chinese have made several declaratory statements, which at fact value have major implications for the Chinese stand
on the question of nuclear proliferation. In constructing the Chinese view on this question, it is of considerable importance to distinguish between their attitudes in their period following their nuclear detonation on October 16, 1964, and those elaborated in the predetonation period.

During the early postwar period, prior to their first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, the Chinese did not have anything much to say on the question of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear proliferation meant to them initially Soviet development of nuclear weapons, and later their development by China, and possibly other socialist countries in order to break the nuclear monopoly of the United States. This basic view was made in the statement in the People's Daily in 1951 which declared that:

Only the fact that other countries, in the first place the Soviet Union, possess the atomic weapon can bring America to believe that there is not the slightest advantage in atomic militarism, thereby bringing about the possibility of prohibiting the atomic weapon.\(^{70}\)

Beginning in 1956-57, the Soviet Union became gradually concerned with the possibility that West Germany would ultimately acquire a nuclear capability. The Soviet Union therefore apparently withdrew its aid to the Chinese nuclear program in 1959 and urged

\(^{70}\) People's Daily, October 7, 1951, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate), No. 190, p.2.
China not to become a nuclear power. At that time the Chinese in general continued to support the Soviet stand on the question of nuclear proliferation, but apparently began to see the non-proliferation more as reflecting an attempt by the Soviet Union and the United States to prevent China from getting nuclear weapons. What the Chinese believed and what in fact happened during this period were explicitly expressed in the Chinese public statement of August 15, 1963:

> It is not only at present that the Soviet leaders have begun to collude with U.S. imperialism and attempt to manacle China. As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the Soviet Government on September 3, 1962, October 20, 1962, and June 6, 1963, stating that it was a matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but that the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons... The whole course of events amounts to this: first the Soviet Government tried to subdue China and curry favor with U.S. imperialism by discontinuing assistance in an attempt to induce China to abandon its solemn stand. Failing in all this, it has brazenly ganged up with the imperialist bandits in exerting pressure on China. 71

During this period, many high-ranking Chinese leaders began to indicate that they considered nuclear proliferation to be desirable. For example, in 1958 General Liu Ya-lou, Commander-in-chief of the Chinese Communist Air Forces, and in 1961 Chen Yi, Vice-premier and Foreign Minister, both said that the spread of nuclear weapons to as many countries as possible was desirable, for it would increase the prospects of complete disarmament.

In 1963 China moved into open opposition to the Soviet position on the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly on the partial test ban treaty. The Chinese maintained that the more socialist countries which have nuclear weapons, the better.

With regard to preventing nuclear proliferation, the Chinese Government has always maintained the arguments of the U.S. imperialists must not echoed, but that a class analysis must be made. Whether or not nuclear weapons help peace depends on who possesses them. It is detrimental to peace if they are in the hands of imperialist countries; it helps peace if they are in the socialist countries. It must not be said indiscriminately that the danger of nuclear war increase along with the increase in the number of nuclear powers.

A second Chinese argument concerned the correlation between the statistics of nuclear spread and the danger of nuclear war. In the Chinese view, the danger of nuclear war becomes less when

the number of nuclear powers increases from one to two. In 1963, Communist China claimed: "Did the danger of nuclear war become greater or less when the number of nuclear powers increased from one to two? We say it becomes less, not greater." Hence the Chinese have never shown any indication of being worried by the statistical argument about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, which is extremely common in the West. If one examines the Chinese behavior, one finds that Albert Wohlstetter's proposition that each nuclear power will be opposed to the development of nuclear weapons by the next Nth power does not characterize the Chinese position at all.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, should therefore be, in the point of view of Communist China, rejected because it was designed to "bind all socialist countries except the Soviet Union and all countries subject to aggression, without hindering the United States from proliferation its nuclear weapons among its allies and countries under its control."

In 1964, immediately after their first nuclear test on October 16, "the Chinese entered a period in which their politics tended to be extremely cautious in an effort to present a picture of

(74). Ibid., P.347.


(76). Ibid., P.343.
China as a reasonable country which could be trusted with
nuclear weapons."

In fact, there were two notable changes
in China's policy toward nuclear proliferation after the 1964
test. First, China stopped explicitly advocating nuclear pro-
liferation. But it still, in general, reasserted that the po-
session of nuclear weapons by socialist countries was desirable.
Second, China started to denounce a total nuclear test ban.

Before their first nuclear test, the Chinese, although they
opposed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, still advocated a total
nuclear test ban. After their first nuclear test, the Chinese
argued that because the United States had already conducted
hundreds of nuclear test and possessed a huge stockpile of
nuclear weapons, a total nuclear test ban would not affect the
balance of nuclear capability between the socialist countries
and the imperialist countries, but, on the contrary, would make
Chinese further development of nuclear weapons impossible.

Therefore, the Chinese began to regard a total nuclear test ban
as a means of preventing China's nuclear development.

As for the important question of whether China itself might
transfer actual nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to other
socialist countries, the Chinese position has been very ambiguous.


When Chen Yi was questioned on this point, in September 1965, he said:

There are two aspects to the question of nuclear proliferation. As for the peaceful use of atomic energy and the building of atomic reactors, China has already been approached by several countries, and China is ready to render them assistance; as for the request for China's help in the manufacture of atom bombs, this question is not realistic.

Actually this statement may not be strictly true; there are some indications that in 1964 or in 1965 China may have made some promises of nuclear assistance to Indonesia. In fact, it seems fair to conclude that China has sought to give the impression that she will not transfer nuclear weapons to other states but has attempted to avoid giving a pledge to this effect that could be interpreted as anti-socialist.

Some recent trends in nuclear proliferation has pushed China into a position of pivotal importance. In the foreseeable future, China's growing capability will increase the problems for some Asian countries, particularly for India and Japan, in maintaining their own nuclear security. Even if the United States and the Soviet Union play down China's nuclear power or assure military assistance in case of a Chinese nuclear attack, this would not


resolve the difficulties of those non-nuclear countries which feel menaced by China. In the case of India, for example, any superpower's guarantee to defend India against Chinese nuclear threat would probably be undatisfactory to India. Under what conditions would India trust a superpower's assurance and forgo nuclear program? Masson Willrich has summarized India's position:

Would a guarantee against nuclear blackmail help India decide to forgo the chance of developing a nuclear capability? Since Communist China began sitting off nuclear blasts, India has raised its price for making an unequivocal renunciation; it indicates that it wants considerably more than a simple guarantee. An undertaking "through the United Nations" to safeguard the security of nonnuclear nations is only part of its demand. Also included are an agreement by the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to other powers, a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a freeze on further production of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, coupled with substantial reductions in existing inventories.82

On the other hand, the Chinese in fact may see very real advantages in an Indian or Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons. At least, the development by India of an independent nuclear capability would produce pressures driving both of the United States and the Soviet Union out of India and making their cooperation in India more difficult. Similarly, a Japanese decision


to develop nuclear weapons would serve to accelerate the deterioration of Japanese-American relations.

Besides these implications, China's consistent support of nuclear proliferation also has some impacts on the superpowers relations and their strategic thought. According to S.C. Yuter's analysis, both the United States and the Soviet Union are currently faced with three similar and difficult alternatives: (1) accepting a nuclear-proliferating world, in which a confrontation with the Soviet Union (or the United States) over a nuclear West Germany could easily lead to general nuclear war; (2) attempting, with at least the tacit support of the Soviet Union (or the United States), to prevent further nuclear proliferation by freezing or destroying the Chinese nuclear program, which might lead to a nuclear exchange in the Far East; or (3) withdrawing in isolation behind a heavy anti-ballistic missile system, leaving the rest of the world to be dominated by the Soviet Union (or the United States) and China.

If Yuter's analysis is correct, how far the United States and the Soviet Union will go in actually preventing nuclear proliferation depends upon how quickly China's nuclear capability increases in size and also on whether or not the Chinese continue with their policy of advocating nuclear proliferation.

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(83) S.C. Yuter, "Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Through the Legal Control of China's Bomb," Orbit, Volume XII, No.4, 1969, P.1020.
China's Attitude toward Arms Control

Prior to the 1963 Moscow negotiation on the nuclear test ban, the Chinese had generally supported Soviet proposals and positions on arms control and disarmament. On August 31, 1958, a Chinese statement declared that the United States and the Great Britain should suspend all nuclear tests because "the experts at Geneva have found detection possible." The Chinese added that an "agreement must be negotiated for a permanent ban on the testing of all atomic and hydrogen weapons by all powers." The Chinese also supported Khruschev's assertion that an atom-free zone must be created in the Far East and the entire Pacific basin area. On April 18, 1959, the Chinese explicitly advocated an atom-free zone throughout the whole of East Asia and the Pacific region. Throughout 1958 there were some indicators regarding the Chinese view toward a nuclear-free zone in Asia. The president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences stated that he would welcome a conference to (a) establish de-atomized zones; (b) stop flights with nuclear bomb loads; (c) stop nuclear testing; and (d) ban the manufacture, stockpiling, and use of such weapons.


(85) Walter C. Clemens, Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, P.258.
In any event, the year 1959 was a turning point in Sino-
Soviet relations. Following Soviet refusal to give China a
sample of an atomic bomb in 1959 and Soviet withdrawal of
technicians from China in 1960, the Chinese began to criti-
cize the Soviet Union’s pursuit of arms control and disarm-
ament. In January, 1960, the Chinese declared that “any inter-
national agreement concerning disarmament, without formal
participation of the People’s Republic of China and the sig-
nature of its delegate, cannot have any binding force on her.”

This view was expressed at a time when the Soviet Union began
to negotiate with the United States on the nuclear test ban.

In February, 1960, the Chinese observer at Warsaw Pact Conference
stated that “the struggles for general disarmament is a long-
term complicated struggle between us (the Communist countries)
and imperialism.” In 1961, an editorial in Hung-ch’i, the
theoretical fortnight of the Central Committee of the Chinese
Communist Party, insisted that “to safeguard peace, it is nece-
ssary to wage an active struggle against imperialism, the creator
of war.”

In September and October, 1962, and again in June, 1963, the
Chinese sent three notes to the Soviet Union expressing the hope

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(87) SCMP, 2194, February 11, 1960, P.44.
that the Soviet Union would not accede to any agreement that would infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. The Chinese also argued that only complete and total nuclear disarmament is realistic and a nuclear test ban treaty can only be dangerous to world peace. Thus the first Chinese reaction to the nuclear test ban treaty was a statement advocating the complete and total prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. In its statement of July 31, 1963, the Chinese Government made clear its position:

(1) All countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely.

(2) All countries shall dismantle all military bases, including nuclear bases, on foreign soil, and withdraw from abroad all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

(3) Establishing a nuclear-free zone of the Asian and Pacific region, including the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Central Europe; a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Africa; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone of Latin America.

(4) An international conference of the government heads of all the countries of the world shall be convened to discuss the question of the complete and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.89

These proposals were rejected by the West. From the Western viewpoint, "nuclear weapons were as much a part of the security

system in the Far East as they were in Europe." Therefore, "the establishment of a nuclear free zone would upset the military balance in the Far East in the same manner as it would in Europe."
The strategic consideration, and past Chinese behavior of supporting Communist revolution, made it highly unlikely that the Western countries would accept any zonal program for arms control. The Chinese proposals undoubtedly were designed for propaganda purposes—to counteract the adverse effects of their rejection of the nuclear test ban treaty—and were not designed for practical operation.

In 1964, after her first nuclear test, Communist China withdrew her long standing support for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone. In addition to reiterating her appeal for a summit conference and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, Communist China made a unilateral commitment never to use nuclear weapons unless subjected to nuclear attack. She was no longer interested in any proposal which might increase resistance to continuing nuclear test and thereby adversely affect her nuclear development. Instead, emphasis was shifted from nuclear-free zone to the no-first-use principle:

Many countries are at present keenly interested in the establishment of nuclear-free zones. However, to really free the nuclear-free zones from the

threat of nuclear war it is necessary in the first place for the nuclear powers to undertake not to use nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the establishment of nuclear-free zones would be impossible.91

In the Chinese viewpoint, a no-first-use agreement would serve as the first step to the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons:

This concrete proposal by the Chinese government that an agreement be reached first on not using nuclear weapons is practical, fair and reasonable, easily feasible and involves no question of control. If all the countries concerned are willing to make this commitment, then the danger of nuclear war will be immediately reduced. An this would mean a big initial step towards the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. After that, it would be possible to discuss the question of the halting of all kinds of nuclear tests, the prohibition of the export, import, proliferation, manufacture, stockpile and destruction of nuclear weapons.92

In a second letter to all heads of government in 1964, Chou En-lai also maintained that, as the first step, "the summit conference should reach an agreement to the effect that the nuclear powers and those countries which may soon become nuclear powers undertake not to use nuclear weapons." Following their first nuclear test, the Chinese consistently called for such a

no-first-use agreement on may occasions. For example, following the third nuclear test, Chou En-lai revealed that earlier he had proposed at Warsaw to negotiate with the United States about a no-first-use agreement. The United States, however, rejected the Chinese proposal by arguing that it did not represent "a constructive step toward the paramount problem of controlled disarmament."

In the foreseeable future, there are reasons to believe that Communist China's no-first-use proposal will never be accepted by the United States. First, the Chinese are fully aware of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, but they also have a realistic appreciation of the limitations of nuclear weapons. Weapons of such mass destruction as hydrogen bombs make nonsense of the traditional limited aims of most conventional wars between nations. Since the Chinese possess a huge conventional armed forces, a U.S. commitment not to use nuclear weapons would increase the effectiveness of Chinese conventional armed forces in the event of local conflicts. Secondly, the United States currently has many treaty obligations and commitments in Asia. A U.S. no-first-use pledge would seriously reduce their credibility to American allies and thus affect the defense system of those countries. Those Asian countries may become less confident

(94). Arms Control Arrangements for the Far East (California: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, 1967), p.48,
of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in their defense and less willing to accept the use of nuclear weapons in a situation in which a nuclear war may be reciprocal.

So far, Communist China's position on arms control and disarmament remains unchanged, though many tangible and intangible factors may affect China's attitudes toward various arms control measures in the next decade. One still can summarize China's current position on arms control as follows:

1) Communist China regards arms control essentially as one of the means which can enhance her national security and her political influence in world affairs.

2) Communist China regards "no-first-use" principle as the first step toward the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. In the coming years, as her nuclear capability grows, Communist China will not be willing to accept a nuclear-free zone proposal.

3) Communist China regards current arms control and disarmament measures as an American-Soviet collaboration aimed at the prevention of Chinese nuclear development. Therefore, actions must be taken by the Chinese to break such collaborations as the Nuclear Partial Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

4) Communist China regards nuclear weapons as the center of arms control efforts and gives no explicit consideration to control of conventional armed forces, such as limitation of the number of conventional armed forces.

5) In the coming years, if the United States or the Soviet Union fails to make a no-first-use agreement, Communist China may regard prohibition of an ABM system and removal of troops from foreign countries as additional requirements for a complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.
A View of Attitude of Communist China Toward Western-sponsored and Possible Chinese-initiated Arms Control Measures (1973).

The following table represents what would be the actual attitudes of the People's Republic of China under three major nuclear balance arrangements for specific arms control and disarmament measures. The judgments are comparatively hypothetical in the cases of the Type B and Type C nuclear balance, which have never existed in post-1949 Communist China.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms Control Measures</th>
<th>Types of Nuclear Balance</th>
<th>Type A</th>
<th>Type B</th>
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<td>U.S. and USSR First Strike Capability Against China</td>
<td>Chinese Second Strike Capability Against U.S. and USSR</td>
<td>Chinese First Strike Capability Against U.S. and USSR</td>
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<td>2. Nuclear Total Test Ban</td>
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<td>3. Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nonsissemination of Nuclear Technology</td>
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<th>Types of Nuclear Balance</th>
<th>Type A</th>
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<td>Arms Control Proposals</td>
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<td>Establishment of Nuclear-free Zone</td>
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<td>Prohibition of or Restriction on ABM System</td>
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<td>No-first-use Agreement</td>
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<td>Removal of Troops and Nuclear Weapons from Foreign Countries</td>
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<td>Complete Prohibition and Total Destruction of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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In the foreseeable future, as Chinese nuclear capability grows, a new type of nuclear balance will appear in Asia which may have some complicated impacts on American nuclear strategy. On the strategic level, the United States will be confronted with the realization that in any Asian military conflict it will be up against a nuclear power capable of wrecking great nuclear destruction in Asia and at least politically unacceptable damage in the United States. This fact would appear to provide some pressure against greater American intervention in Asian military crises and cause some major shifts within the framework of American nuclear strategy. There has been much debate whether a Chinese-oriented ABM system would change this situation.

There is not doubt that uncertainty is a characteristic fact of the present weapons systems that are incorporated into military forces. The accurate evaluation of a Chinese-oriented ABM system is beset by many doubts and uncertainties, for the entire question of the American ABM system against China rests on assumptions regarding the nuclear development and the aggressiveness of China. Although these uncertainties and assumptions make it difficult to predict with confidence the effectiveness of the ABM system, they also mean that discussion and analysis of the possible effects of ABM deployment are of particularly value.
The Impact of Chinese ICBMs on American Nuclear Strategy

Over the last twenty-five years, the nuclear strategic postures of the United States have been developed almost entirely with a view to deterring the Soviet Union. When Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced in 1967 the American decision to deploy a thin Chinese-oriented ABM system, he introduced an entirely new element into the dialogue of American defense and deterrence. For the first time, he cited China's emerging nuclear capability as a potential threat to the United States. In looking at the question of a Chinese-oriented ABM system, it is relevant to consider, among other things, what kind of ICBM capability is China likely to have, and what are the impacts of China's ICBM capability on the United States defense system.

On the question of China's nuclear capability, Secretary McNamara estimated in 1967 that there can be an operational Chinese ICBM as early as 1973. On March 20, 1969, however, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard downgraded McNamara's prospect by saying that "the Chinese threat is not much further along today than it was three years ago." In 1970 the Chinese nuclear capability continued to be limited to airplanes with a limited range. They are working on ICBMs but, according to the United States estimation,

they will not have a significant capability until the 1980's.

Current estimates suggest that the Chinese will probably have accumulated ten to twenty-five operational ICBMs by the middle or late 1970's. The U.S. Department of Defense believes that in the event of a full-scale clash, a Chinese force of twenty-five ICBMs could inflict up to eleven million deaths upon the United States, and a Chinese force of seventy-five could kill up to twenty-five million.

The Chinese recognize that American "assured destruction" forces can inflict immense damage on China and therefore act as a potent instrument of deterrence and persuasion. However, it also seems to the Chinese that the United States is unlikely to escalate to the use of these "assured destruction" forces. Conversely, once the Chinese possess ICBMs, the ability of the United States to continue to deter the Soviet Union will depend upon an assured destruction force that can survive a nuclear exchange with China as well as a first strike by the Soviet Union. From the point of view of China, this reverse effect may compel the United States to take avoiding action to prevent a nuclear clash with China. Consequently, there is every reason to believe that the Chinese


seeking only for a moderate ICBM capability which would deter the United States from launching a pre-emptive attack against China.

Given this background, the Chinese could theoretically hope for three kinds of damage-inflicting capability against the United States. The first would be the ability to destroy or use up enough American weaponry, including ICBMs, to leave the United States with too few deliverable warheads to maintain assured destruction force against the Soviet Union. The second possibility would be a Chinese nuclear capability which can threaten the destruction of vital parts of the American command and control machinery. Besides these two kinds of capability, the third kind could be the most crucial: that of casualties and the associated intangible of morale.

If it is accepted that the United States cannot seek a solution of this problem through inaction, five alternatives are available to cope with the nuclear threat from China:

1) Alternative A--A search for the improvement of mutual relations and a general political understanding with China.

2) Alternative B--The announcement of a U.S. first-strike strategy designed to convince the Chinese that China would be unable to launch an ICBM attack on the United States before her ICBMs were hit by a pre-emptive attack.

3) Alternative C--Achievement of a bilateral agreement designed to drastically reduce strategic forces and military budgets

(99) Ibid., pp. 411-412.
4) Alternative D--A combination of a drastic increase in strategic offensive forces and a development of an ABM system.

5) Alternative E--A full deployment of an Chinese-oriented ABM system in order to secure a drastic reduction in China's nuclear threat. This would add enough defense to U.S. strategic offensive forces to protect the American people from China's ICBMs attack.

For the long term, alternative A would be the only policy capable of solving the basic difficulty and attacing support within the United States. However, Communist China's hostility toward the United States is confirmed by a number of other matters, ranging from U.S. support for the Nationalist regime (Republic of China) on Taiwan to the American-Soviet collaboration in the field of arms control. An improvement of mutual relations can be reached only through a mutual accomodation of differences; both powers must face up to decisions that will bring fundamental changes in their policies. Although Communist China's hostility toward the United States may soften in the future, genuine progress toward the improvement of mutual relations between China and the United States will certainly take a long time.

From the point of view of China, an American first-strike strategy will extend in time the American ability to threaten China with sufficient nuclear weapons. Therefore, alternative B may tend to reconfirm Chinese assumptions about incompatible hostility and, hence, slow down China's reconciliation with the United States.
Alternative C, mutual force reduction, would protect the United States against the ultimate threat of China. But this alternative can be carried out only by an agreement that includes a nuclear test ban, which the Chinese have rejected.

Alternative D, if adopted by the United States, would also protect the United States against an irrational Chinese ICBM attack, but would not save money. Suppose for discussion purposes that halting the introduction of new offensive weapons and multiple warheads would release at least between $5\text{ billion} and 10\text{ billion} a year for American strategic defense. Conversely, such a sum will buy a Chinese-oriented ABM system capable of intercepting China's incoming ICBMs and cutting American civilian deaths.

There remains the possibility of alternative E. Most importantly, this should mean an ABM system designed to hold damage and casualties from a Chinese attack to a very low figure. Proposals for such a system, called Sentinel, were advanced by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1967. That system has been modified by the Nixon Administration in 1969. According to the U.S. government, the new ABM system, named Safeguard, would give the same degree of area cover against a Chinese threat through the 1970's as Sentinel would have done.

The Development of an American ABM System
A missile system is designed to protect a target system from ICBM attack by intercepting the reentry vehicles of an incoming enemy ICBM or a short range SLBM (Submarine-launched ballistic missile).

Serious concern in the United States about anti-ballistic missiles stretched back over the last decade and half to 1954. In that year the United States began to shift the emphasis in its strategic weapons program from manned bombers to ballistic missiles. The first research work for a defense against missiles began in 1956 with the Nike-Zeus ballistic missile defense system. By 1962, the Nike-Zeus system had successfully intercepted its first ICBM on a test firing from the Pacific test range at Kwajalein Atoll. Further tests conducted on ICBMs fired from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California demonstrated the feasibility of the technique of interception. But President Eisenhower vetoed the deployment of the system in 1959, and this decision was reaffirmed by President Kennedy in 1962.

One of the principal objections to the Nike-Zeus system came from the strategic argument of the United States Air Force. Certainly, emphasis on offensive capability has been the dominant theme of the United States Air Force in the post-world War II period. From the point of view of the U.S. Air Force, the heart of American nuclear deterrent strategy has been the ability to
destroy an aggressor's cities and population. Therefore, if the only purpose of the American nuclear forces is to deter wars, then any change by the Soviet Union in the deterrent equation can be met by increasing the American offensive deterrent forces. An ABM system, then, is viewed as a waste of money which could be spent on offensive forces to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

The second difficulty of the Nike-Zeus system was its great cost. For fiscal 1960, beginning in July 1, 1959, the U.S. Army recommended $1.3 billion for the Nike-Zeus program. This figure included $300 million for research and development and $700 million for tooling and some Nike-Zeus bases. In the end, this figure was reduced by U.S. Congress to $300 million. Since the Army had no additional funds, the Eisenhower Administration would have to raise the defense budget. Since this would upset the budget, the Eisenhower Administration decided not to deploy the Nike-Zeus system.

Moreover, the most significant limitation with regard to the Nike-Zeus system was that its radar system was too slow (about one-fourth the speed of an ICBM warhead) to cope with the problem of missile attack. In his 1963 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Secretary of Defense McNamara explained the reasons for not producing the Nike-Zeus system:

We still have a great deal to learn about re-entry phenomena and techniques for discriminating between warheads and decoys. We also have a great deal to
learn about the effects of a nuclear detonation from one of our intercepting missiles on other elements of the decisive system. On balance, therefore, we believe that it is premature at this time to commit ourselves to the production of any system and certainly not to an interim system with admittedly limited capabilities. Instead, we propose to proceed with the greatest urgency in the development of the Nike-X system, retaining the option to move ahead with actual production and deployment of such system, if the capabilities of the system and the circumstances should warrant such a decision at some later time. 100

McNamara's pronounciation marked the birth of the Nike-X system. This system involved an improved radar system and a mix of missiles designed to overcome the insufficiencies of the Nike-Zeus system. The mechanically steerable radars used in Nike-Zeus system were replaced by several types of phased-array radars in Nike-Z system. In addition, the Nike-X system also included an "area defense" concept by incorporating the Spartan missile.

The Nike-X system was not, however, approved for deployment. Daniel J. Fink, former Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering for Strategic and Space system, has noted that:

The reasons were severalfold, but at least included the following: It was a very expensive terminal defense system which for a given amount of money could provide protection to some number of cities, but leaving many totally unprotected, and it suffered the flaw of any terminal defense system--namely, that every piece contributes to the cost but the enemy

can choose where to attack and only a small part of the system can be brought to bear to counter another attack.101.

Despite the fact that the Nike-X system was not approved for deployment, research and development work continued. In 1964, China conducted her first nuclear test, and the United States saw a threat that might be neutralized with greater confidence than the nuclear threat from the Soviet Union. Not long thereafter, the range of the American ABM system was greatly expanded. On September 18, 1967, the Johnson Administration announced the U.S. decision to deploy a thin Chinese-oriented system designed primarily to defend the United States population against a potential Chinese nuclear attack in the mid-1970s.

Because the Sentinel system was a Chinese-oriented ABM system, it was obviously vulnerable to the nuclear attack. In 1969, the Nixon Administration took account of the rapid rate of Soviet ICBM deployment and then proposed the Safeguard system. The purpose of the Safeguard system was defined by President Nixon as (1) protection of American land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; (2) defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount with in the decade; (3) protection

against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.
The primary mission of the Safeguard system is different from
the original Sentinel mission. It was designed primarily to
protect U.S. Minuteman ICBMs and Strategic Air Command bases.

The discussion of the Chinese-oriented ABM system reached to
a new stage in 1972. On May 26, 1972, President Nixon and Leonid
Brezhenev signed what will prove to be the most important arms
control agreements negotiated between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The Moscow ABM and arms limitation agreements pro­
vided for (1) a proposed treaty limiting the development of de­
fense against ballistic missiles, called the Treaty on ABMs,
and 2) a proposed "Interim Agreement" limiting certain kinds
of strategic offensive weapons, namely ICBMs and SLBMs.

The basic provisions of the Moscow ABM treaty were as follows:
first, the United States and the Soviet Union undertake not to
deploy ABM systems for a defense of their territories and not
to provide a base for such a defense. Second, the United States
and the Soviet Union undertake not to develop, test or deploy
ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space­
based or mobile-based.

From the viewpoint of military consideration, nothing in either
Moscow agreement provided a substitute means for satisfying the

(102). Charles M. Herzfeld, "Missile Defense: Can It Work?" in
John J. Holst & William Schneider, Jr., eds., Why ABM?
Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy, (New York:
threelfold objectives of the Safeguard system. But these two agreements actually were great steps toward the stability of international system and contributed to the halting of nuclear arms race. They didn’t introduce an essential change is the defense system of the United States and the Soviet Union. They merely recognized political realities. The United States had to make a choice if it indeed tried to prevent the possibility of nuclear attack from any source without spending a minimum of an additional $100 billion for defense in 1972-1976. Furthermore, the United States had to sign these two agreements if it sought to avoid building any ABM system which can be viewed by China as an anti-Chinese posture.
TABLE IV

Summary of Arguments For and Against the Deployment of a Chinese-oriented ABM System

Many political, military and technical arguments have been advanced both for and against the development of a Chinese-oriented ABM system in the United States. To examine the current state of the ABM issue, and appraise its effectiveness, it is necessary to simplify those arguments in terms of political and technical viewpoints. Based on the statements of protagonists and antagonists of the ABM system, the following table represents a summary of arguments for and against the deployment of a Chinese-oriented system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-ABM</th>
<th>Anti-ABM</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It discourages nuclear proliferation by sidening the gap between the superpowers.</td>
<td>There is no way to test it except under actual enemy attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It can maintain the credibility of the American deterrent.</td>
<td>It will intensify rather than restrain the arms race, worsening instead of improving U.S.-Soviet relationships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It should be deployed because the Soviet Union has developed one.</td>
<td>It cost too much.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It reduce the possibility of smaller powers using nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear countries</td>
<td>It threaten arms control and disarmament measures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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(Cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pro-ABM</th>
<th>Anti-ABM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It might produce a &quot;Winning&quot; position.</td>
<td>It would actually decrease American security and capacity to conduct an intelligent and rational foreign policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would reduce greatly the damage which the Chinese could do with ICBMs attack.</td>
<td>It would force the Soviet Union to react by increasing the size of its strategic offensive forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will enables the United States to add as a concurrent benefit further defense of U.S. Minuteman sites against Soviet attack.</td>
<td>It will provoke the Soviet Union into finding a counter to it or launching a pre-emptive attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It will provide economic benefits in terms of employment, large investment, etc.</td>
<td>It is destabilizing, since it upset the deterrent balance and does not allow for a stabilization of strategic weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Its radars are vulnerable to attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It would prevent China from participating in arms control negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

What can be said in summary about the complex problems of China's emergence as a nuclear power? First of all, the military danger from China should not be overlooked. At present, the Chinese do not have the resources or, apparently, the inclination to undertake major military actions beyond their borders—particularly in the face of American nuclear power and the presence on their northern continental borders of a Russian nuclear threat. On the contrary, the great danger results from the weakness and misunderstanding of the superpower's policy toward China. It is essential to deter possible Chinese nuclear attack and check the expansion of Chinese influence, but the superpowers cannot rely solely on a policy of military retaliation to cope with the Chinese problem.

A possible solution of the problems posed by the Chinese nuclear forces can be achieved through some sort of political arrangement. China is a vast political entity forced unwillingly in the last century to participate in a world of colonialism and imperialism, with which she had no fundamental sympathy. The admission of China to the United Nations, the beginning of a détente with the United States, and the fact of being a nuclear power should have gone some way towards eradicating the feeling of frustration which, from the beginning, has been the main dynamic of Chinese
international behavior. The United States and the Soviet Union must attempt to draw China into more active and responsible participation in world affairs, rather than trying to exclude it from the international community.

Looking to the future, it is certainly possible that China's nuclear strategy, and her specific foreign policies, could undergo significant changes. As President Kennedy felt that "the passage of time, the change of leadership isolation from world contacts, internal requirements and failure of aggression would all persuade the Chinese on the mainland to amend their attitude," it can be assumed that new leadership and new policies will emerge in China's positions regarding many international issues.

However, fundamental changes in China's attitudes toward nuclear weapons and arms control issues will not be easy for China to make because of China's weakness in relation to the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese will aspire to an equal and, if possible, superior status to the superpowers in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons. This stand, which is characteristic of Communist China's past nuclear policy and strategy, will preclude any acquiescence by China in control of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, even if China can be induced to participate in arms control efforts, there will be doubts raised as to the reliability

of some of the promises which China undertakes to perform via international agreements. Communist China does not subscribe so much to the sanctity of treaties but rather is inclined to examine the power relationships of the signatories in determining if the agreement should be kept. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, Communist China will not accede to an international agreement that would permit her actual and potential enemies to retain their nuclear superiority while inhibiting her from improving nuclear capability. However, if in the future China ever concludes that particular arms control arrangements will better serve her vital interests, the Chinese will be as willing to accept such arrangements as would any other nation that has reached the same conclusion.
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