

1973

Political Domination by the Military in the People's Republic of China Since 1965

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POLITICAL DOMINATION BY THE MILITARY IN THE

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA SINCE 1965

(TITLE)

BY

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THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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INTRODUCTION

The Thesis

For many years, political systems of Communist countries have been looked upon and regarded as party-dominated systems. In the case of the People's Republic of China, it is generally believed that only the wish and policy of the Party (Chinese Communist Party) counts in the political system; all other organs of state are merely tools to be used to pursue the policy of the Party and to implement it. In spite of this general recognition by students of Communist China's political system, this author is convinced that there is another organization which competes with the Chinese Communist Party for political domination. This organization is the Chinese Armed Forces. Furthermore, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (also called the cultural revolution) and its aftermath indicates that the military has reduced the political domination of the Party a great deal and has lifted itself above the Party in power politics.

It is the author's argument, as implied in the title of this thesis, that the military will continue to play an increasingly influential role in the Chinese politics. Much of its political domination has already been recognized and more will be recognized in the near future.

The author has chosen this period (1965 to the present) because this time span has revealed a great deal of political and ideological struggles between the military and the Party. But, as will be noticed, some pertinent political phenomena in the past, i.e., the Great Leap Forward which dated back to 1958 is also discussed in order to shed more light on the understanding of the present political atmosphere.

This study has the following broad purposes: (1) to clarify the relationship between the military and the Party, the two political rivals, which have been competing for the control of power in the Chinese political system; (2) to show that in fact the Party has become an advocate of revisionism (communism, in communist countries, is the only legitimate base for one to lead and rule the people); (3) to indicate the domineering position of the military over the Party, and the emergence of the military as a super power within Chinese politics; and (4) to demonstrate that Mao's maxim: "The Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party" is not a valid maxim after all. In fact the real maxim is the correct communist ideology. Whosoever advocates or professes to advocate the correct line dominates the Chinese political system.

Importance of the Study

This study attempts to establish, or at least substantiate, the proposition that in communist countries a non-party (i.e., the military as in Communist China) can dominate the political system. The communist political system does not necessarily mean party

politics; there will always be a clash between the "reds" and the "experts" unless the strict rule of ideology is relaxed and material incentiveness is tolerated by the political system.

Definitions of Terms Used

China and Communist China--the People's Republic of China;

Military--all military establishments, especially the PLA (People's Liberation Army);

Economism and revisionism--a separation of economics from politics and a primacy of economic and technological solutions over communist ideology; and

Party--the Chinese Communist Party.

PART I. PRELUDE TO MILITARY DOMINATION

CHAPTER I

THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD

The Great Leap Forward phenomenon provides the essential element for a better understanding of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt of Mao Tse-tung to concretize two Maoist concepts: the supremacy of the Communist ideology over experts and their expertise, and human labor over machinery. The impact of the Great Leap Forward on Chinese society was eminent as revealed in the following discussion.

In June, 1966, the volcanic eruption of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China created turmoil in Chinese society in general and Chinese political leadership in particular. Her internal politics were viewed with special attention by nations of the world.

Mao Tse-tung, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party who had been in retreat for some time, reappeared in the limelight at the center of Chinese politics again. Mao's reappearance and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to wild speculation in the world as to what was going on in the People's Republic of China and why there had to be a revolution.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was designed by Mao to achieve a totally revolutionized form of Chinese culture. This culture included, "ideology, social thought, world outlook, customs and habits, political points of view as expressed through art, films, theatre, dance, fine arts, education, literature and other departments which compose the superstructure of society."¹ Thus, this revolution was a complete overhaul of Chinese life and society.

Origin of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution can be traced back and understood more clearly when looking at the Great Leap Forward and the "People's Commune Movement" which spanned from 1958 to 1960 under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.

Basically, the Great Leap Forward was a master plan designed to increase production of the country "on all economic fronts at an unprecedented high rate."² The People's Commune Movement was designed to create throughout China an individual "self-sufficient organization" that combined all aspects of people's lives in one single commune-unit. Within the commune-unit there would be a collective way of life, a division of labor, and the superstructure that would fulfill the needs of the commune. In short, it was a state within a state. That is "the commune adopts a partial supply system providing members with a suitable amount of free supplies which, to a limited extent, embodies

¹Gerald Tannenbaum, "China's Cultural Revolution: Why It Had to Happen," in Richard Buam and Louise B. Bennett (eds.), China in Ferment: Perspectives On the Cultural Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.; 1971), p. 60.

²Kang Chao, "Economic Aftermath of the Great Leap in Communist China," Asian Survey, No. 4 (May, 1964), p. 851.

(ideologically) the principle of 'to each according to his needs' of the Communist society."³

In order to make the program a success, a great deal of capital investment and labor were needed. Capital investments involved big industries and machinery requiring expenditures which China lacked. The Communist leadership, therefore, used cheap and crude methods instead of modern technology. They created backyard industries in place of a modern industrial system. The most famous of them all was the backyard-furnace system. These backyard furnaces were used to produce steel. But these backyard industries did not go anywhere and proved to be a failure later.

The backyard industries also manifested a severe shortage of capital and lack of reserves in Communist China. There was not enough help from outside. Aid and assistance from the Soviet Union had not been adequate enough. Furthermore, because of the disagreement between the two countries concerning China's overemphasis on ideology and underemphasis on technical standards, the Soviet Union terminated aid, assistance and experts to China in August of 1960.⁴ The termination of Soviet aid and assistance damaged China's economic progress gravely, "but the psychological lesson which the Soviets' draconian measures were meant

³Yung Ping Chen, Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 65.

⁴Jan S. Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China (Pennsylvania: International Textbook Co., 1970), p. 318.

to convey to the Chinese romantics apparently did not sink in."⁵ It only proved to the Chinese that "the foreigner, fraternal or not, could not be trusted."⁶

Thus the only thing the Communist leaders could do was to "substitute human labor for capital investment."⁷ For example, instead of building up steel industries, they substituted for it with backyard furnaces which forced people to use their strength and most of their time compensating for the lack of machinery. Furthermore, in other factories that were already functioning, Communist leaders "exerted tremendous pressure on local party members, directors of communes and managers of local enterprises to expand production at a pace practically impossible to achieve."⁸ The following description by Mende well illustrates the heavy mobilization and uses of human beings in the Great Leap Forward period:

The countryside was in convulsion. Marching in columns and working in dense crowds, immense peasant masses were spending their over-spilling energy... Enormous crowds were carrying sand to swell embankments along rivers. Marchers...were...on their way to replace teams laying rail tracks..., they recalled the rhythmic breathing of some mythological colossus, suddenly awakened and flexing its milliard muscles in a supreme effort to change the face of the earth.⁹

⁵Ibid., p. 317.

⁶Ibid.

⁷George P. Jan, "Mass Education in the Chinese Communes," Asian Survey, No. (October, 1964), p.

⁸Ta-Chung Liu, "Economic Development of the Chinese Mainland, 1949-1965," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, Vol. I, Book 2 (University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 631.

⁹Tibor Mende, China and Her Shadow (New York: Coward-McCan, 1962), p. 70.

Unfortunately for the Chinese, labor alone is not enough to industrialize a country; industrialization also requires money and material. But instead of giving money and material, Communist leadership gave the masses only inspirational slogans: "Give your heart to the Party"¹⁰ was to spiritually lift and encourage the masses to trust the Party and not to fear hard work; "Every rural township with its inventions, every cooperative with its improvements"¹¹ was aimed to tell the masses that, rightly or wrongly, "technological innovation was to spring from the practical experience and the inventive genius of the masses rather than from laboratories, academics, universities and other centers of research and learning."¹²

To make things more difficult, Mao, who was the henchman of the program, made very little use of experts and their specializations in all fields. For instance, he sent economic experts to work in villages and factories and ordered them not to interfere with the way the regime was running things and keep their mouths tightly shut.¹³ Moreover, Mao's overemphasis on indigenous production methods was a costly mistake for it overlooked the necessity of the need for experts, managerial personnel and technicians in order to have well-run industries. As it turned out, the Great Leap Forward and the People's

¹⁰Prybyla, op. cit., p. 258.

¹¹Yang Min, "Revolution in Farm Tools," Peking Review (May 13, 1958), p. 10.

¹²Prybyla, op. cit., p. 269.

¹³Kang Chao, op. cit., p. 857.

Commune were catastrophic failures causing famine and economic disaster in China.¹⁴

By the end of 1960, the Great Leap Forward and the People's Commune were "...for all practical purposes dead--only the symbols and the semantics remained. The radicals (Mao and his followers) were in retreat..., disgruntled, bitter, shifting position, and waiting for the next opportunity to stage a comeback."¹⁵ Finally, after six years of retreat, Mao and his followers did stage a comeback during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution..

Economic Impact

The Great Leap Forward had a very profound impact on Chinese society. It not only deeply affected the Chinese economy, but it also provided, for the first time, a rationale for the anti-Maoist faction to challenge Mao's authority and his political status as well. The Great Leap Forward will demonstrate that economic failure could very well lead to a change in political power, even in a totalitarian country like Communist China.

Kang Chao describes the economy of the Great Leap Forward:

China ...had been afflicted by a prolonged and serious agrarian crisis. The economic situation made continued industrial expansion impossible. The most obvious consequence of the Great Leap was the enormous waste involved. Indigenous production methods often proved either too costly in comparison with their counterparts in the modern sector or capable of producing only low quality goods. A large number of backyard furnaces hastily built in 1958 dissolved into piles of mud and brick after a few rains....

¹⁴Franz Michael, "The Struggle for Power," Problems of Communism, No. 3 (May-June, 1967), p. 12.

¹⁵Prybyla, op. cit., p. 293.

Another serious form of waste was created as a result of inter-industry imbalance. Because the Great Leap movement was improvised rather than well-planned in terms of inter-industry coordination, and because bottlenecks came sooner in some industries than in others as the movement proceeded, the economy was completely off-balance.... Stocks piled up in those industries which had overproduced, while production capacities could not be fully utilized in other fields due to material shortages.¹⁶

Thus, one can see that economic policy such as the Great Leap Forward, as Professor Prybyla has pointed out,

...is for those who like excitement, but the excitement wears off and apathy sets in. It is fairly obvious, yet it can stand repetition that one cannot ask for night and day toil from even the most ideological fired up masses without at some point meeting the payroll. The Great Leap did not meet the payroll, and the predictable result was the widespread resentment and passive resistance. In some instances passive resistance turned into open rebellion by the masses.¹⁷

Mao's failure to carry the Great Leap Forward to the intended goal has not only damaged China's economy as a whole, it has also discouraged and disgusted the technicians and managerial personnel.

...Under the slogans "politics take command" and "reliance on the mass line," the administrative system within the enterprise underwent considerable disruption. Technicians and engineers were humiliated by the existence of a situation under which experts had to listen to non-experts in technical matters, scientific laws were replaced by political demands, and production fell into the hands of a group of "fanatics."¹⁸

¹⁶Kang Chao, op. cit., pp. 853-54.

¹⁷Prybyla, op. cit., p. 333.

¹⁸Kang Chao, op. cit., p. 858.

This humiliation of the intellectuals, among others, created the controversy of "Red" versus "Expert" which is one of the factors that contributes to military domination in China (see CHAPTER VII).

Political Impact

The failure of the Great Leap Forward and Commune system was very harmful to Mao, who was the architect of the plans. The Chinese people began to doubt his judgment. He was losing face and authority. Mao's delicate position can be understood when we look at the living and working conditions of the Chinese peasantry (most of the Chinese are peasants) during the period when the Great Leap Forward and the Commune system were in full swing. Because of these plans, the people had to suffer extreme hardships. Elaborating on this point, Club observes:

The utilizing of labor had brought truly onerous working conditions. In the past the Chinese peasants ...had enjoyed certain unengaged periods during the working years....Under the conditions of the Great Leap, however, the peasants were not even given enough time for sleep. There was...a spread of illness...

...peasants (were forced to) eat in common mess halls, where they got both inadequate food and faulty service, ...(and in order) to find metals to feed the furnaces, the peasant was forced to give up his kitchen utensils, the hinges of his doors,¹⁹ and any other bits and pieces (that could be found)...

While the disaster of the Great Leap Forward was being realized, Mao's opponents stepped forward and spoke out against Mao's policy. One of the chief opponents was Marshall P'eng Teh-huai, then the

¹⁹0. Edmund Club, 20th Century China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 361.

Minister of National Defense, who openly attacked Mao's policy at the famous Lushan meeting of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party (July-August, 1959). Peng opposed Mao's Great Leap, the People's Commune Movement, and Mao's emphasis on China's self-sufficiency, free from outside help, especially from Russia. Instead Peng was an arch proponent of Russian assistance and advocated professionalism and heavy reliance upon the advice of experts rather than Mao's puritanic ideological approach.

For "...the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist movement since 1935, Mao's personal leadership and programs had come under attack by a long time, trusted "comrade-in-arms" who, moreover, had managed to muster support within the top leadership."²⁰ For this act, Peng "...has transformed himself from a mere henchman of Mao Tse-tung into a spokesman of the Chinese peasants and a maker of Chinese history."²¹

Liu Shao-chi, then vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and also vice-chairman of the People's Republic of China, positions second only to those of Mao's dual chairmanship, was Peng's supporter though not overtly at the time.

When Mao stepped down from the position of chief of state and governmental hierarchy by resigning from the chairmanship of the People's Republic of China in December, 1958, it was understood that he did so because he had been asked by his opponents, and also because

²⁰Philip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origin and Development," China Quarterly, No. 29 (January-March, 1967), p. 2.

²¹Kung Chu, an introduction in The Case of P'eng Teh-huai 1959-1968 (Hongkong: Union Research Bureau, 1968), p. iii.

the political situation compelled him to do so.²² In April, 1959, Liu Shao-chi, a prime target of the Red Guard's attack in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, was named chairman of the People's Republic of China.

Liu, "...a reluctant dragon, who never directly attacked Mao's prestige or claim to leadership, but,...led the retreat from Mao's extreme programs through a series of practical measures..."²³ For instance, in January, 1961, Liu issued a "12-point emergency directive regarding rural work," which restored the peasants' right to cultivate private plots and to sell their produce in 'free' markets, and which stipulated that labor should be given more rest than they had been allowed under the frenzied mobilization of the Great Leap Forward."²⁴ Concurrently, the Central Committee of the Communist Party which formerly supported Mao's policy, this time endorsed a so-called "8-character charter" designed to correct the economy of the Great Leap Forward.²⁵

Liu Shao-chi was a pragmatist, not a dogmatist. He knew the usefulness of experts and specialists in industrialization. Therefore, he re-established practical procedures in industry.²⁶ In other words, like Peng, he accentuated scientific practices and enterprise in industrialization over ideological preference.

²²Michael, op. cit., p. 15.

²³Ibid., p. 16.

²⁴Ibid., p. 17 (an interview with Ting Wang by Franz Michael).

²⁵Peking Review, January 27, 1961, pp. 3-5.

²⁶Michael, op. cit., p. 17.

To Mao, the dismantling of his programs was much more than a disagreement in policy or opinion. It was like being slapped in the face. His feelings were badly hurt. In addition, his ultimate ambition as a theoretician "...to claim the supreme leadership of the Marxist-Leninist world movement..."²⁷ was destroyed because his communization of the Great Leap had failed. Therefore, Mao always looked at Liu Shao-chi and Peng Teh-huai and their supporters in the Party (not his impractical plans) as "persons" who failed him.

As suggested above, Mao's political power and leadership were not as firm as they used to be. He had been attacked and his opposition continued to grow steadily, though silently. Thus the political impact of the Great Leap Forward was a downgrading of Mao's authority in Chinese politics. Politically, his control over power politics proved to be slipping away, but it was not completely out of his hand. Ideologically, his Maoism also confirmed, as we have seen in the Great Leap policy, that ideology alone cannot substitute for the technical know-how and intelligent advice of experts in the fields of economics and engineering.

²⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a successor to the Great Leap Forward. It was to complete what the Great Leap had started and failed, that is, an emphasis on the supremacy of ideology and human beings. Furthermore, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was also a significant factor for political change in Chinese politics. It provided a way for the military to intervene in politics, which later led to political domination of the military. In order to understand the origin, consequences, and purposes of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the following ideological principles and political facts should be understood.

Revisionism versus Maoism

The failure of the Great Leap Forward and People's Commune movement, in part returned China to a policy of economism. The term "economism" means a separation of economics from politics, and a primacy of economic solutions over communist ideology and moral values. This principle of economism was strongly advocated by Liu Shao-chi and his followers in the Party.

Later on, the progress of industrialization and modernization helped push China into an even deeper stage of economism, as evidenced

by the strong commitment to economic development rather than ideological commitment. In Communist China, Professor Schram observes:

...the process of industrialization and modernization ...led to the emergence of the same tendencies which have been engendered by economic development in other countries: increasing functional differentiation and the birth of new forms of social stratification, the subordination of moral values to technical rationality, the primacy of economic incentive.²⁸

To Mao, this is "revisionism," or a step of taking the road back to capitalism. He was very much dissatisfied with these prevailing tendencies, and he surely had reason to be so. "... (T)he domination of a bureaucratic and technocratic elite in the Soviet Union appeared to him to be linked to the development of such 'capitalist' tendencies..."²⁹

A practice of revisionism is one of the most dangerous things one can do to communism, for it encourages people to look for materialistic incentives and private gains rather than ideological commitment and public interest. To Mao, therefore, revisionism was intolerable and must be destroyed. He, in the cultural revolution, at least in part, subdued its growth.

Mao's Distrust of the Party and Its Leadership

When Mao stepped down from the Presidency in 1958, he was already being treated increasingly as irrelevant for the day-to-day

²⁸Stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," China Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), p. 26.

²⁹Ibid.

operations of government. As the Red Guards declared later, Chairman Mao resented the fact that Liu Shao-chi, who succeeded him as President of the Republic, began to treat Mao as "...one treats a parent at his funeral..."--that is, revering him but not asking his advice.³⁰

It was also apparent to Mao that Liu and his supporters were drifting away from Maoism, which strongly advocated ideological commitment. Mao's deep dissatisfaction with the bourgeois and bureaucratic tendencies of the policies was obvious. He wanted to correct this situation. In the past, he had always relied upon the Party to fight back these tendencies, but this time he could not do so because the Party and its leadership led by Liu Shao-chi were, according to Mao, renegades who themselves degenerated toward revisionism.³¹

Revolutionary Zeal

In addition to his distrust of the Party and its leadership, Mao was also concerned about the lack of revolutionary experiences of the Chinese youth. These included enduring hardship, and developing both a fighting spirit and strong will power which only revolution can provide. In this sense Mao applied his experience as well as experiences of others who were his contemporaries. His generation had experienced hardship, had lived for the revolution, had fought for it, and many had died for it.

³⁰Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1968), p. 199.

³¹C. T. Frederick, "Leadership Purges in Communist China," China Quarterly, No. 41 (January-March, 1970), p. 122.

To Mao's generation, communist revolution created will, power and strength, and to him those things cannot be obtained outside the realm of revolution. It meant that people must physically and psychologically experience and live in a revolution. Mao once pointed out to the late Edgar Snow, well-known Sinologist and a personal friend of Mao, that "...those in China now under the age of twenty have never fought the war and never seen an imperialist or known capitalism in power."³² In saying that, Mao implied that his generation had suffered under the imperialism of the United States, Germany, Japan, etc., and the bourgeois politics of Chiang Kai-shek in the period immediately before and right after World War II. This suffering made his generation well-motivated to fight for the Communist cause. In the same statement he indicated that the now-youth are too soft,³³ and are not motivated enough for the Communist cause. Therefore, they might not be able to carry out "...the world view that created the revolution."³⁴ To Mao, the Communist revolution is a worldwide phenomenon and must be carried out not only in China but also abroad. This interpretation is manifested by the fact that Communist China is now supporting, financing, and arming Communist insurgencies throughout, to say the least, South-east Asia. For example,

...A Chinese labor force of several thousand, possibly including PLA soldiers in civilian clothes, has been engaged in ...strategic road-building program (in Laos, without the consent of the government of Laos). ...The

³² Robert J. Lifton, The Revolutionary Immortality (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 19.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

road-building crews are guarded by at least two Chinese army battalions, including mobile anti-aircraft batteries.³⁵

...The Chinese consulate...is believed to act as a contact point between the Pathet Lao and Peking.³⁶

Thus, Mao felt that in order to have experience and revolutionary spirit, the young must live in the old society. But the old society is now long gone. Then what can he do about getting the young to live in that society? To turn the clock back is impossible, which Mao recognized very well. To give up the idea was also impossible for him. Therefore, a theoretician like him must find the solution for the problem.

Finally, he found the solution. He made the young believe that the Party leadership led by Liu Shao-chi was a revisionist with a capitalistic element, and he transformed the young into the "Red Guard" and let them make a revolution--the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution--for themselves to experience.

The Struggle for Power

Mao's political control over Chinese politics was collective and not absolute, although he may be the first among equals. He had lost some of his political control to Liu Shao-chi during and after the Great Leap Forward period; Mao wanted to have absolute control

³⁵ Martin Ebon, Lin Piao: The Life and Writings of China's New Ruler (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), p. 136.

³⁶ Ibid.

over political affairs. Therefore, it can be stated that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was, among other things, also a struggle for power. This was a struggle by which Mao Tse-tung, who claimed to represent the proletarian class and ideology, wanted to seize total power from his political opponents who advocated revisionism within the Party.³⁷ It was Mao who went all the way to seize power even when it meant the destruction of the party which he painfully helped create and it was the party in the past that had been a foundation of his political power.³⁸

³⁷ Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1969: The Struggle to Seize Power," China Quarterly, No. 34 (April-June, 1968), pp. 6-37.

³⁸ Kikuro Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 58.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Revolution and Reaction

In Mao's thought, the increasing of his power, the revitalization of the zeal of revolution and the destruction of revisionism could be achieved only by eliminating his opposition, led by Liu Shao-chi in the party hierarchy, and by producing a totally new power structure.³⁹ The only means open to him was to use the masses as instruments to discredit and destroy his opponents. Mao, for political expediency as well as political necessity, used fear and disruption as his weapons. He made people suspect the motives of the Party hierarchy and be uncertain about the political situation. He created turmoil in the nation which eventually created anarchy in China.

This tactic of Mao's is known as "positive anarchism." It is to appeal to the masses, make them aware that his opponents were wrong and the Party under their direction was taking the road back to capitalism, which is a deadly sin in Communism. Mao was very sure that in time of trouble the masses under this uncertain situation, particularly the young, would come to him. He was right, for his

³⁹Kikuro Ito and Minoru Shibata, "The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 58.

charisma worked exceptionally well with the masses. He had become a master in manipulating them according to his wishes. Thus anarchical conditions were created by Mao for this purpose.⁴⁰

Mao's masses, especially the Red Guards who were high school and college students, in their frenzied drive to seize power rampaged through the nation, disrupting political, social, and economic order. They destroyed everything they thought was bourgeois in nature. For example, Christian churches were closed and destroyed, biblical pictures were mutilated,⁴¹ the Red Guards took over the Roman Catholic convents in Peking,⁴² and invaded Peking's largest Islamic mosque.⁴³ They also destroyed and burned art objects dragged out of Peking Central Art Academy.⁴⁴

In the daily work life of the Chinese, Red Guards intervened and interfered in many factories and rice fields. They told experts in the factories that they had to run the factories according to Mao's thought. Many factories were taken over by the Red Guards and workers in factories were prevented from doing their work. Peasants were forced to study the little Red Book, and were beaten up if they refused to do so. As a reaction to the Red Guards' activities, workers and peasants, in order to be able to do their jobs, finally fought the Red Guards in

⁴⁰Chen, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴¹New York Times, August 23, 1966.

⁴²New York Times, August 25, 1966.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴New York Times, August 26, 1966.

many areas.⁴⁵ "Serious, large-scale clashes were soon reported not only in the provinces but in Peking as well."⁴⁶

Red Guards were more than successful in creating turmoil in Chinese society. This anarchy was far more than anyone expected it would be, perhaps even Mao himself, because the Red Guards not only discredited and undermined the existing power structure, they often murdered their opponents, burned down buildings and factories indiscriminately, which destroyed not only their opponents but also seriously damaged the country's economy. The Chinese people suffered a great deal from the Red Guards' activities.

The Military as a Peace Promoter

This anarchy eventually hurt Mao's image in the eyes of the public. Therefore, Mao called upon the Red Guards to stop interfering with the people's work and stop destroying things indiscriminately. But the Red Guards were out of control by then and they continued their activities, regardless of Mao's pleas. This situation was made worse when fighting broke out all over the country. Mao, in order to stop this upheaval, had to turn to the military and his comrade-in-arms, Marshall Lin Piao who was then the Defense Minister. Lin Piao later became Mao's heir-apparent until his mysterious death in 1971. Mao's call for the military's help permitted the intervention of the military which in turn provided a key for the military to unlock the door to political power in Communist China.

⁴⁵New York Times, December 9, 1966.

⁴⁶Bridgham, op. cit., p. 28.

The disruption of the country by the Red Guards added more hardship to the livelihood of the Chinese people. People were confused and uncertain of what was going on. Therefore, when the military was called in to put a stop to this commotion, it was welcomed and appreciated by the public; law and order was established by the military. To the Chinese people the military was a "hero on a white horse" who just performed a noble act for society. This noble act gave the military the reputation of a peace promoter and enhanced the military's position.

PART II. MILITARY DOMINATION

CHAPTER IV

MILITARY PROPAGANDA AND INDOCTRINATION

Political propaganda and indoctrination have been used as effective weapons, especially in totalitarian regimes, to maintain the existing political values and behavior or inject new ones that would satisfy the purposes of the rulers. As a matter of strategy, new myths are created for the justification of changes and scapegoats are found for the past failures. For example, when Hitler needed support from the German people for his war plans, he created scapegoats, encouraged the public and the army by putting the blame on other elements as having caused Germany's defeat in World War I.

As Brown observes:

...he (Hitler) reassured the nation that the War had not been lost by the army but by a stab in the back from Jews and Communists thus giving back a measure of self-respect and reassurance; he played on the theme that everybody had been unfair to Germany. The British had continued the hunger blockade for months after the armistice, the Versailles Treaty was grossly unjust and a breach of American promises, the German colonies had been stolen, and Germany was encircled by enemies.⁴⁷

Since the German people believed in him, Hitler's success was largely due to his extensive and massive propaganda campaign.

⁴⁷ J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 115.

The People's Republic of China underwent a similar process of propaganda, particularly during the cultural revolution. This propaganda was in line with Mao's thought and political indoctrination, which emphasized the virtues of good military leadership as opposed to the Party. During this period, military indoctrination as a major propaganda program was injected into the mainstream of the masses. The military signified Maoist ideology and Mao Tse-tung himself, but at the same time it emphasized military aspect and its important role in the revolution.

No one would deny the fact that the military was the chief propagandist in the cultural revolution. Actually its role as a propagandist went back to earlier years, In 1960, Marshall Lin Piao whose role was identified with the military, not the Party, launched a proletarian campaign against the un-proletarian activities of the Party. His "four first" directive:

...provided clearcut directives in handling the relations between man and weapons (man comes first); between political work and other work (politics come first); between ideological and routine work (ideological work comes first); and between ideas in books and living ideas currently in people's minds (living ideology comes first).⁴⁸

The "four first" clearly set out the ideological priorities of non-material incentives as opposed to the material incentives of the Party. The so-called "Socialist Education Campaign" of the military was yet another propaganda device designed to suppress the growth of economism of the Party. These campaigns grew more and more each

⁴⁸Bridgham, op. cit., p. 6.

year and finally merged with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, in which, undoubtedly, the military played an even stronger role than ever. Thus, the military was able to sell much of its preferences to the public through the educational system and the public's emulation of heroic soldiers.

The Military and Education

"...As is well known, education in Communist China is not aimed primarily at developing the individual, but at serving the interest of the state."⁴⁹ Thus, the purpose of education is to instill the official ideology and policy. In school, students are taught certain concepts and values which will make students accept and follow them.⁵⁰ Through this type of education, students were trained to behave in accordance with the state policy and ideology.

Emphasis on political education in school can be seen in their curricula and the time students have to spend on it.. Normally there are six periods of classes, forty-five minutes in length, plus one period of individual study of the "Works of Mao Tse-tung." On every school day, two periods are devoted to the study of politics. Therefore, including Mao's works, three out of seven (over 40 %) of the periods are devoted to political study.⁵¹ Courses in politics and Mao's works are extremely important in a student's academic achievement. "A bad attitude toward participation at the class or

⁴⁹George P. Jan, "Mass Education in Chinese Communes," Asian Survey, No. 10 (October, 1964), p. 1103.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto, Red Guard (New York:Doubleday, 1972), pp. 20-21.

small-group level was certain to bring trouble."⁵² A study of Mao's writings is a "must" for at least one period each day for teachers and students alike, even when they are on vacation or working in the field. Chairman Mao's little "Red Book" is to the Chinese what the Bible is to devout Christians. Mao himself has been deified; his works and words are held in reverence and followed dutifully. Mao has always emphasized an important role in politics and greatness of the military as a true believer of Communism, as we shall see later in this chapter. Therefore, it is not an overstatement to say that students also look upon the military with admiration. However, the military itself has penetrated into the lives and hearts of students and teachers. In schools there are military courses and training.

Bennett and Montaperto have noted:

...All students and teachers received military training. The PLA would send instructors to each school...and give basic instruction in the firing of rifles, machine guns, and small mortars... and conduct bayonet drills as well as some elementary maneuvers.⁵³

Teachers and students not only learned to appreciate the military training: they seemed to enjoy it as well. Moreover, they exchange ideas and visits with military men, and they participate together in joint sports and recreation activities. Thus, students and teachers get to know military men very well and have great respect for them and even want to emulate them.⁵⁴

⁵²Ibid., p. 21.

⁵³Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁴Ibid. p. 24.

Thus school, as an agent of political indoctrination, has been very successful in conditioning students and teachers to regard the military man as a hero and leader. Their political norms and values have also been geared toward those of the military. They are willing to accept the leading role of the military in politics.

Furthermore, the military has not limited its propaganda to students and teachers in schools. Its virtue has also made the military a worthy model for the people of China to emulate. The reasons for its high status appear to be its heroic deeds and virtuous character, as will be seen in the following discussion.

The Emulation of Military Heroes

The military man has been a heroic fighter in the eyes of the Chinese Communists. He defeated the Japanese aggressor in World War II, drove bourgeois Chiang Kai-shek off mainland China in 1949, won the war with India in 1962 during the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, and recently brought peace to the people in the cultural revolution. The military man is not only a heroic fighter; he has also been a forceful and convincing force in enhancing the political behavior and political ideology in China. He is a true representative of the socialist moral order and of proletarian discipline.⁵⁵ His organization has been regarded as a classless organization which is to be emulated by the nation at large. The nation must learn from the example of the

⁵⁵Jan S. Prybyla, The Political Economy of Communist China (Scranton, Pennsylvania: International Textbook Company, 1970), p. 429.

People's Liberation Army and make itself a true socialist like the military.⁵⁶

Various groups and mass organizations such as the All-China Students' Federation, Peasants' Association, etc., were also directed to learn from sections of the military. They would imitate the Good Eight Company of the PLA for its counter bourgeois thought, strengthened collectivism, and the like. The story of the Eight Company went as follows:

...The company's men were honest. ...they returned 1,390 lost articles to the rightful owners, including 87 fountain pens. They were frugal, saving 80 per cent of their pay. They were concerned about public property, protecting it and fixing it up without charge.⁵⁷

The people as individuals have been programmed to emulate the behavior of individual soldiers. The "Learn from Lei Feng," the "Learn from Wang Chieh," and other similar campaigns represented the "need" and the "must" for the individuals to value military men and behave like them.

Hero Lei Feng came from a poor peasant family. His family had been deprived and exploited by the rich. His twelve year old brother "toiled like a beast of burden" in a factory and later died of tuberculosis. His mother, a servant, was raped by the landlord. She hanged herself. His father was buried alive by Kuomintang troops. Lei Feng himself "was stabbed three times in the left hand because he had beaten

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 431.

the landlord's dog." When the Communists took over in 1949, Lei Feng was liberated. After the liberation, he joined the PLA. To become a good soldier, he studied Mao's thought, learned by heart, and worked very hard as a soldier. Lei Feng's "...devotion to duty, zeal for hard work, uncomplaining endurance to hardships, hatred of the enemy, love for the people, selflessness, Red expertise, ...and devotion to Mao Tse-tung..." were to be emulated by the people. He was killed while performing his duty as a soldier for the country on the Indian battlefield. Lei Feng was the most famous hero of them all.⁵⁸

Wang Chieh was born into a middle class peasant family. He enlisted in the PLA. He, like Lei Feng, also studied Mao's thought and worked hard to become a good soldier. Although he had never been oppressed (he was a middle class peasant), Wang Chieh was very much in favor of the class struggle of the proletariat; he had overcome his own incorrect class background. He was a true Communist revolutionary who sacrificed his life; he threw himself over a package of explosives to save many more lives of his comrades, so others could live and carry on the revolution. This heroic act earned him the coveted honor of being the true revolutionary-proletarian. The Maoist propaganda urged the people that Wang Chieh's ideas and acts must be emulated.⁵⁹

This emulation of the military and Mao's cultural revolution is the most extensive effort in history to transform a nation into a near-communist state by attempting to change the character of its

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 431-433.

⁵⁹Peking Review, November 12, 1965, pp. 3-4.

people as well as correcting the wrongs of its system. Thus, it was a "moralistic and inner-directed" as well as an "outer-directed" revolution. "Good men and good deeds" are what people have to be and do, and selfishness is the principal enemy.⁶⁰ The military as the exemplar of the "good men and good deeds," has been chosen for the nation-wide emulation campaign.

This campaign was expected to encourage the Chinese people to accept the values and leadership role of the military which stands for true Communist values and practices and also serves as a representative and advocate of the correct approaches of Maoist priority of ideological commitment as opposed to the material incentive of economism which the Party under Liu Shao-chi had been identified with.⁶¹ At the same time the prestige of the Party, since its economism stood for selfishness, was being undermined.

The Chinese people, exposed to military propaganda, have been indoctrinated to love, to respect, and to follow the military for years. Moreover, since the cultural revolution the military has been in control of all the propaganda machinery and the communications network;⁶² this enables the military to propagate and indoctrinate even more of the military's virtue and the vice of the Party leadership and policy.

⁶⁰Mary Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes," China Quarterly, No. 33 (January-March, 1968), p. 47.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 48.

⁶²Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 116.

One can appreciate and understand the depth of military propaganda in China more when one compares it with the aspirin commercial in America. It is well-known that "aspirin is aspirin," and the government has been informing the public so. But, unfortunately, the drug companies have done a much better job in telling the public something else: one's aspirin is better than others' aspirin. The one company that does the best job in advertising its product by letting it appear on television and/or radio broadcasts, etc. most often will be able to sell the greatest amount of aspirin. This is in agreement with propaganda theory: when one "repeats a statement often enough, it will in time come to be accepted by his audience,"⁶³ especially when one "makes bold assertions in favour" of his statement.⁶⁴

In America, different companies are able to voice and assert the quality of their products against one another and let the best product win. But in China, propaganda is done by the military alone with very little competition. Thus, the public is exposed to one view only, by which they are led to believe that the view is good and correct. In the way just stated, the military propaganda in China is more effective than the aspirin commercials in America.

Another example of the effectiveness of political propaganda follows: in Nazi Germany, where propaganda was not as sophisticated and thoroughgoing as those of the communist countries, it still proved to be highly successful.⁶⁵ In China, propaganda and indoctrination

⁶³Brown, op. cit., p. 27.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 28.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 121.

have been a vital part of the Communist ideology, policy, and Chinese way of life. Nazi propaganda emphasized the negative side (i.e., anti-semitism) more than the positive side.⁶⁶ But Chinese propaganda has emphasized both negative and positive sides, i.e., anti-revisionism (negative) and the military as a representative of true Communism (positive). Therefore, it may be assumed that the Chinese propaganda is more effective than others.

In conclusion it may be stated that the political propaganda in Communist China has been accomplished in a way that the public is overwhelmingly drawn into the process through schools, massive propaganda, and widespread emulation of heroic soldiers. Messages and viewpoints of propaganda point to one direction. Only affirmative informations are allowed; opposing viewpoints and informations are banned. Consequently, as directed, it has made people regard and accept the military as their leaders, both ideologically and politically. This acceptance, in turn, provides legitimacy for the military to play a leading role in Chinese politics if it so desires.

⁶⁶Ibid.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL DOMINATION BY THE MILITARY

Before the cultural revolution, the Chinese Communist Party was a dictator of the proletariat. Its political power and authority were prominent among other state organs. After the cultural revolution, its political hegemony was reduced drastically and its prestige was badly marred. The military has emerged as a de facto ruler of China. The fall of the Party and the rise of the military are integrally related and this relationship is the subject of this chapter.

The Instability of the Party

The Chinese Communist Party enjoyed a stable unity until about the time of the Great Leap Forward. The disaster of the Great Leap provided the firm base for Party organization men like Liu Shao-chi and Peng Teh-huai to discredit Mao Tse-tung and his authority in the Party. Since that time the Party has been divided into two camps, to so-called "revisionists" and the "Maoists." The former was represented by the organization men of the Party: Liu Shao-chi, Peng Teh-huai, and their followers; the latter group included Mao and his followers. The organization men had more members and were more popular within the Party than the Maoists.

The rift in the Party was a disadvantage to Mao. He was losing authority and face; his Party chairmanship was merely symbolic. The Party went astray, and Mao could not rally enough followers, more particularly ranking members, to gain control over the Party.

The organization men were professionals who cared a lot about how to run things (Party, industries, etc.) as effectively as possible, even when it meant a deviation from the Communist ideology as defined by the Maoists. The organization men were pragmatic leaders. However, Maoists did not take them that way, especially Mao who regarded this deviation as an unforgivable sin.

Chinese Communist politics means party-politics--a party domination in politics. Undoubtedly, Liu Shao-chi saw it that was too. Liu was sure that within the Party, since he had firm control over the Party hierarchy, Mao could not harm him. Liu was absolutely right, for Mao was unable to get rid of Liu via Party struggle, because at the time the Party was stable, organized, and under Liu's hand.

As a Party man, Liu believed in Party supremacy and its superiority over other organs of state in the republic. Since Mao was then and still is chairman of the Party, he also appeared to be a vehement advocate of Party supremacy: therefore, Liu was convinced that Mao would think the same way. Thus, Liu was confident that Mao would not bring the outsiders in for help. Liu was wrong. Mao, since he could not fight within the Party, created the Red Guards and turned to the military as was manifested by the cultural revolution.

Mao has been a fountain of Communist ideology in China. His thought has been regarded as correct, pure, and as important as Marxism and Leninism. Even the Party under Liu always regarded Mao's thought as an official one to look upon and follow. Therefore, when Mao charged that the Party had been advocating an uncommunist practice--economism--and at the same time underlined the outstanding role of the military as the true ideologist, the prestige of the Party as the leader in ideology began to suffer greatly. Especially during the cultural revolution, when the Party was attacked and condemned for its sin of taking the road back to capitalism, the military was enjoying its glory as a true ideologist. This created an ideological rift within the Party and caused it to become internally unstable.

The Withering Away of Party Domination

Since the beginning of the Communist revolution in China, the Party and the military have been in virtual competition with one another for the control of Chinese politics. In many ways the Party had a domineering attitude toward the military and shared some authority⁶⁷ that should exclusively belong to the military. For example, commanders of military regions had to share their authority⁶⁸ and take advice from

⁶⁷Chester Cheng, ed., The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966), p. 544.

⁶⁸Harvey Nelson, "Military Forces in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 51 (July-September, 1972), p. 447.

the provincial Party committee.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Party men often doubled as provincial Party secretaries and political commissars in many provincial military districts.⁷⁰ A provincial commissar is responsible for political affairs of the military district. A commissary post is very important since it is in charge of all political propaganda and indoctrination as well as supervising the ideological training of the troops.⁷¹

The presence of Party men as political commissars demonstrated the existence of Party domination in the military establishment. But this did not mean that the military had not tried to pull above or at least to the same level as the Party. The military was quite successful because there were many military commanders who also were political commissars of their units after 1954.⁷²

The increasing power of the military and leadership of Lin Piao after he had replaced Peng Teh-huai as Defense Minister in 1958, alarmed the Party leadership which in turn reasserted control over the military by appointing more Party men to the post of political commissars.⁷³ This clearly suggests that there has been a series of political-

⁶⁹ A. Doak Barnett, Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 245.

⁷⁰ Donald W. Klein, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist Leaders," China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), p. 60.

⁷¹ Dereck J. Waller, The Government and Politics of Communist China (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971), p. 110.

⁷² John Gittings, "Army-Party Relations in the Light of the Cultural Revolution," in Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in China, ed. by John Wilson Lewis (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 389.

⁷³ Ibid.

assertion campaigns for hegemony between the military and the Party. However, whenever it felt it necessary, the Party was able to control the military. It was not until the time of the cultural revolution that the military was able to exert its influence over the Party and to be really independent of the Party. During the cultural revolution the great majority of political commissars who were Party men were unseated by military men.⁷⁴

The fight for commissary posts between the military and the Party was not only because the commissarship is an important position politically, but also because this was a symbolic fight involving political principle. To the military, it was the struggle to gain its rightful prerogative. To the Party, it was the struggle to maintain the supremacy of the Party over other state organs, including the military establishment. Therefore, when the Party lost the fight for commissarship, it meant that the domination of the Party over the military was withering away.

The Fall of the Party

During the cultural revolution, the Party as a whole was publicly degraded. Its leadership came under heavy fire by the Maoists. Liu Shao-chi, who was the head of state until he was ousted in 1968, was denounced by the Red Guards for being a revisionist. The Party as an institution was also labelled as a fountain of revisionism, since Liu and his colleagues who were running the Party always identified themselves with the Party and the Party with them. On the contrary,

⁷⁴Ibid.

Mao himself, who was and still is chairman of the Party, did not identify with the Party. At the time, Mao virtually had no control over the Party and its organization; figuratively speaking, he was a dead parent who had been left out of the Party. It could also be observed that Mao was above the Party and politics.

Ironically, Mao as the Party Chairman, who should have been responsible for the Party's wrong doing (economism), was able to rid himself of the burden because of his failure--he could not control the Party and its organization men. Moreover, it was not only that he did not have to be responsible for the wrong doing of the Party; rather Mao, as Party head, wanted to destroy the Party which in a high degree was his own creation and once a foundation of his own power and status.⁷⁵

Up until just before the cultural revolution in mid-1966, the Chinese Communist Party was the most powerful organization in the country. Professor Barnett writes:

...All government organizations in Communist China .
...function under very close Party direction...The
Party acts as the primary policy-making body, while
government units...are responsible for implementing
Party-defined policies.⁷⁶

But in the cultural revolution, many high ranking Party officials were purged as a result of the attacks of the Red Guards. The Party's highest administrative body, the Central Committee Secretariat,

⁷⁵ Benjamin I. Schwartz, "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad Perspectives on Leader and Party in the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 1.

⁷⁶ Barnett, op. cit., p. 18.

was virtually destroyed, since its Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping and his staff on the committee were purged.⁷⁷ It was not a Peking phenomenon that the Party's organizations were brought down; the regional and provincial Party officials were also purged and the organizations were dysfunctional throughout the country.⁷⁸

As a result of the cultural revolution, the structure of the Communist Party was shattered by attacks from non-Party organizations --Red Guards, revolutionary rebels, and the military. The downfall of the Party meant that the revisionists and anti-Maoists in the Party were suppressed and put under control. The Party's functions were paralyzed. Its power and authority were taken away. Last but not least, its prestige, leadership, and superiority over other organs of state were also gone. While the prestige of the Party was collapsing, the prestige of the military man as a true communist and leader of the revolution rose,⁷⁹ and the authority of the military became unquestionable.⁸⁰

There can be little doubt that the Chinese Communist Party has lost its integrity and that its structure has been shattered. The Party losses, realistically, would be worse if one examined the political gain of the military, which emerged as the real winner at the great expense of the Party.

⁷⁷Parris H. Chang, "Mao's Great Purge: A Political Balance Sheet," Problems of Communism, Vol. XVIII (March-April, 1969), p. 6.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 7.

⁷⁹Bennett and Montaperto, op. cit., p. 163.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 165.

The Military as a Party-Builder

Later on the shattered Party was to be reorganized in the Maoist mold. This reorganization was accomplished by yet other non-Party organizations called "Revolutionary Committees." These committees were established on the "three-in-one combination" principle. The three were as follows: (1) revolutionary "Party and government" cadres, (2) revolutionary masses--young people, former Red Guards etc., and (3) the military.⁸¹

Of the three, the military was the only organized group and was respected by the other two, who were disorganized. Professor Prybyla describes the relationship of these two groups:

...(they) were only factions ready at the drop of a hat to fly at each other's throats, compete with each other for the distinction of being the most revolutionary, and accuse each other of revolutionary deficiencies.⁸²

Thus, one should not be surprised at all that, in fact, the military alone dominated the revolutionary committees that had set up at all levels of China's provinces. That the military was overrepresented in the committees⁸³ is clear when one looks at the composition of these committees. Of all 29 chairmen of these committees, 20 (70%) of them were active military men.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Prybyla, op. cit., p. 529.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Wang Yun, "Maoist 'Revolutionary Committees': Organization and Prospects," Issues and Studies (December, 1968), p. 3.

⁸⁴ Richard M. Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 52. (October-December, 1972), p. 650.

The duty of the revolutionary committees was to rebuild the Party. Thus the domination of the military in these committees provided the military with the most powerful authority in administering Party rectification and rebuilding it.⁸⁵ As a Party-builder, the military also had control over Party organization and structure. Before the cultural revolution, the Party was running the country; but now the country was like a broken skeleton awaiting the military to redesign and rebuild it.

Military Personnel in the Party Organization

In April 1968, 1,512 delegates of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party elected the Ninth Central Committee of the Party.⁸⁶ This Central Committee, consisting of 170 regular members and 109 alternates,⁸⁷ is the "...highest leading body of the Party" when the National Party Congress is not in session.⁸⁸ The Congress will only be convened once every five years or longer if it is necessary.⁸⁹ Therefore, practically, the Central Committee, compared to the National Party Congress, is where the power resides. It is then proper to say that the more the numbers of a group membership are represented in the Central Committee, the greater the domination that particular group has over the Central Committee.

⁸⁵ Ralph L. Powell, "The Party, the Government and the Gun," Asian Survey, No. 6 (June 1970), p. 444.

⁸⁶ Peking Review, April 14, 1969, pp. 7-9.

⁸⁷ Peking Review, April 30, 1969, pp. 45-48.

⁸⁸ Chinese Communist Party, 1969 Constitution, Art. VI.

⁸⁹ Ibid., Art. VIII.

In the present Central Committee, the military is the largest group (about 50%) within the total membership of this group.⁹⁰ This is four times larger than it used to be.⁹¹ The great number of the military personnel on the Central Committee indicates that the military is in control of the Central Committee.

Furthermore, the political strength of the military can be seen even more clearly when one looks at the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Ninth Central Committee. This Politburo is a higher organ than the Central Committee (see heirarchical chart of the Chinese Communist Party at the end of this chapter). Out of twenty-one voting members of the Politburo, eleven are military men: before ranks were abolished in China, three were marshalls and eight were generals.⁹² There have never been as many military men in the Central Committee or Politburo before. The large numbers of military men indicate that the military had control over the Party because it was able to put military men into such powerful Party-organs.

In the light of the discussion in this chapter, it is evident that the Party has lost its power and authoeity to the military. The losses of the Party were not limited to Party members in the Party organization alone. Party members who were in other state organs were also purged. For example, a study of the State Council, which is an

⁹⁰Chang Ching-wen, "Analysis of the Newly Elected Ninth Central Committee," Issues and Studies (July, 1969), pp. 33-34.


⁹¹Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee," China Quarterly, No. 45 (January-March, 1971), p. 52.

⁹²Powell, op. cit., p. 462.

administrative organ of the state, shows that many Party members who were holding the posts of ministers and vice ministers were also purged, while the non-Party ministers and vice ministers were almost untouched.⁹³ This shows that the military who did the purging was concentrating its efforts on destroying the Party, both its organization and its members. The reason for this effort of the military was the fact that the military viewed the Party as the chief holder of political power; therefore, in order to take away the Party's political power and authority the Party must be destroyed. As the literature indicates, the Party was destroyed.


⁹³ Donald W. Klein, "The State of Council and the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968), p. 87.

ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
NATIONAL LEVEL NO. 1




ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

NATIONAL LEVEL NO.2



ORGANIZATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY LOCAL LEVEL



↓ ■ CONTROLS

CHAPTER VI

INEVITABLE CLASH OF CLASSES

There has been a firm belief in Communist China, especially among the Maoists, that there is a constant struggle of classes. The Maoists' orientation toward the nature of classes is ideological as well as political. To them, the struggle of classes must be controlled in such a way that Communist ideology will be the sole beacon of the proletariat and for the proletariat. To make this possible, military domination seems to be the only logical and practical solution to the problem of class struggle, as the following discussion will reveal.

The Continuity of Class Struggle in the Society

The superstructure, which includes ideas, religion, arts, law, and political power, has been created for the purpose of maintaining and preserving the commanding class in society. Of these components of the superstructure, political power is the most important, for it exists at the very center of the superstructure.⁹⁴ In China, political power is regarded as the power to suppress.⁹⁵ Power to suppress

⁹⁴Lin Piao, "Informal Address at the Politburo Meeting," in Lin Piao, Martin Ebon (New York: Stein and Day, 1970), p. 253.

⁹⁵Ibid.

means both its existence and usability, that is, this power must be real and strong enough to suppress any opponent force. This political power is also used as an oppressive instrument by which one class with the power chooses to oppress the other without the power.⁹⁶

In a capitalistic society, political power is in the hands of the capitalist class, which in turn uses it to oppress and exploit the proletarian class. Therefore, if the proletarians do not wish to be oppressed and exploited, they must obtain that political power by any means necessary. In China, the proletariat is no longer oppressed and exploited by the capitalist, since they have overthrown the exploiting class and took away political power from that class by force of arms.⁹⁷ As long as the proletarians have this power, they will not have to suffer from the capitalist exploitation again.

But class antagonism still persists in Chinese society. Although the exploiting classes have been overthrown and political power has been taken away from them, they have not been exterminated. Their properties were confiscated but not their reactionary thought, since the revolutionary proletarians could only imprison them but not their thought.⁹⁸ According to the Communist line, these capitalists will become reactionaries who will try to restore capitalism and struggle for their "lost paradise."⁹⁹ Therefore the struggle between the proletariat and the

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Lin Piao, "Betrayal of the October Revolution," in Ebon, op. cit., p. 229.

⁹⁸ Lin Piao, "Informal Address at the Politburo Meeting," op. cit., p. 261.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

bourgeoisie is by no means over after the proletariat has seized political power. As Mao indicates, there will be a class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie until there is a classless society,¹⁰⁰ which may take a long time to come, if ever. Thus the class struggle is permanent.

In Communist China the proletarian class already has political power; therefore, instead of trying to seize political power, the revolutionary (toward Communism) force of the proletariat must suppress the counter-revolutionary force of the bourgeoisie from taking political power from them. As in the cultural revolution, the revolutionary force led by the military was very successful in suppressing the counter-revolutionary revisionists led by Liu Shao-chi.

The Power of the Gun

The continuity of class struggle indicates the need to possess and maintain political power by the proletariat to insure victory in the struggle. Therefore, the proletariat needs political power to suppress the revisionists; and to have political power, the proletariat must know the source of political power. To them, as Mao points out, "...political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."¹⁰¹ This much quoted statement of Mao suggests that political power is obtainable only by raw force; it belongs to the strongest. This means that the military, which has the gun, will be the strongest political element

¹⁰⁰ Lin Piao, "Sweep Away All Ghosts and Monsters," in Ebon, op. cit., p. 229.

¹⁰¹ Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," Selected Works, II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 224.

in a country. Therefore, the military will control political power in a society.

Furthermore, Chinese Communists not only believe that "...political power grows out of the barrel of the gun," they also believe that, as Mao says: "...All things grow out of the barrel of the gun."¹⁰² Therefore, with the gun they can obtain and create everything, i.e., schools, organizations, culture, and the proletarian country--in the past the military with its gun barrels overthrew the bourgeoisie government of Chiang Kai-shek, and established the proletarian government.

Based on this discussion of the Chinese concept of the "permanent nature of class struggle," it is obvious that the proletariat definitely needs and must rely upon the military for its survival as the dominant class in the permanent class struggle. It is a fact that other state organs, i.e., the Party does not have nor can it provide a real "political power," although it may exercise political power provided for and permitted by the military. Thus, political power belongs to and is always available to the military.

The Guardian of the Proletariat

The military has been a powerful instrument for political struggle in China. It fought and won the wars against both external (Japan) and internal (Chinag Kai-shek) enemies. It restored order and

¹⁰²Ibid.

brought peace to the Chinese people. It provides security for the people. The military was also an economic force, at least for its men, which produced plenty of food and clothing.¹⁰³ Most of all, the military controls political power due to its possession of the raw power of the state. In fact, the Chinese people owe much of what they have to the military; as Mao has pointed out, without the military, the people would have nothing.¹⁰⁴

As the guardian of the proletariat, the military always sides with the proletariat and "...fights not for private interests of a few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the broad masses and the whole nation."¹⁰⁵ The recent role of the military in the cultural revolution has shown that actually it has performed the role and assumed the responsibility just described. It also shows that to have a socialist state of the proletariat, China needs the military. Its existence and contributions, according to the Marxist point of view, have made the military the "...chief component of the state power..."¹⁰⁶ without the military the state would have no power.

The military is not only a controller of the gun barrel, it has also established itself as a true believer of Communism as represented by Mao Tse-tung Thought (a written form of Maoism which implies

¹⁰³ Mao Tse-tung, "We Must Learn to Do Economic Work," Selected Works, III (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 243.

¹⁰⁴ Mao Tse-tung, Quotation from Chairman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966), p. 99.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," op. cit., p. 224.

the equality of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought).¹⁰⁷ It is obvious that the two most important factors (correct ideology and political power) of a Communist nation are vested on the military. It is then very appropriate to state that the military is indeed "...the mighty pillar of the dictatorship of the proletariat..." not the Party.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the increasing importance of the military in this light has no limit in Chinese politics. When the military speaks, its voice will be heard and heeded too in Chinese politics.

For its quality, the military is indispensable, especially as opposed to the Party, which in the cultural revolution has been proved very dispensable and has been placed under military control. Also the "cultural revolution" manifested Mao's famous statement; "...The Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party"¹⁰⁹ was also null and void. The reason for Mao's saying was that he projected the Party as the Party which is armed with correct ideology in comparison with the military the gun as just a gun without correct ideology. Even so, the Party is a subordinate of the "author of correct ideology,"¹¹⁰ in this case, Mao, since he is considered to be above the Party and politics. Mao is

¹⁰⁷M. Rejai, Mao Tse-tung on Revolution and War (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970), p. 426.

¹⁰⁸Lin Piao, "Revolutionary Vigilance," in Ebon, op. cit., p. 328.

¹⁰⁹Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," op. cit., p. 224.

¹¹⁰Stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," China Quarterly, No. 38 (April-June, 1969), p. 3.

very serious about the supremacy of the author of correct ideology; he himself openly admitted that he was a subordinate of Stalin who was then the chief proponent of Communism (Marx, Engels, and Lenin were already dead),¹¹¹ as Mao is now.

It is the "correct ideology" that commands the gun; it is not the Party or the military that are allowed to take command. Since the military now is equipped with the correct ideology of Mao Tse-tung, there should not be anything to deter the military from taking political command. If there is anything to prevent the military from taking over power in China, it certainly is not Mao's motto, "...the gun must never be allowed to command the Party," especially when the Party is ideologically wrong. The cultural revolution was a very good example, by which the gun, in fact, did command the Party.

¹¹¹Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (rev. ed.; Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969), pp. 425-28.

CHAPTER VII

THE PROTECTOR OF COMMUNISM

In Chapter VI, the ideological aspect of the readiness of the military to be a guardian of the proletariat was discussed. This chapter will discuss the "expert" who is regarded as a vicious factor most likely to endanger the purity of Communism. Therefore, the "expert" has to be suppressed and kept away from damaging the ideology and the country of the proletariat. In order to preserve the purity of the ideology and save the country for the proletariat the military will have to be the protector of Communism and Communist China.

Experts are those individuals who are college graduates, or the equivalent.¹¹² These people are proud of themselves and their expertise. They would seek a technocratic approach to problems and planning in opposition to the "reds" who are inclined toward ideological purity and stress the anti-intellectual approach to problems and plannings.¹¹³ For example, Chinese economic experts, as Dr. Goldman observes, would want:

¹¹²Barnett, op. cit., p. 46.

¹¹³Pye, op. cit., p. 278.

...a pragmatic, rather than an ideological, approach to economic problems. ...efficiency, instead of political expediency, be made the basis of investments and that the market-place, instead of administrative decisions, determine prices.¹¹⁴

This intellectual tendency has existed and persisted in Chinese Communist society for some time. Mao's "Hundred Flowers and the Hundred School of Thought" campaign in 1957 indicated that there was a time when the regime would need intellectual advice and criticism from the professionals in the fields. The campaign allowed experts to voice their disagreement with the policy or practice of the regime. They accused the regime of deterring the progress of the country by paying too much attention to ideological factors and little attention to scientific factors concerning the technical know-how. Indeed, some of them even suggested the (democratic) multi-party system as opposed to the monocratic political system of Communist China.¹¹⁵ They claimed that China belongs to every Chinese including the counter-revolutionaries and the bourgeoisie.¹¹⁶ Finally, Mao had to put a stop to the campaign, since the criticism by the experts was too damaging to the Communist ideology. These flowers were allowed to bloom for only six weeks.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴Merle Goldman, "Party Policies Toward the Intellectuals," in (ed.) Lewis, op. cit., p. 278.

¹¹⁵Prybyla, op. cit., p. 246.

¹¹⁶Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 57.

¹¹⁷Prybyla, op. cit., p. 242.

Then the regime resumed its strict control over the intellectuals, and criticized them of being "non-red"; this campaign was Mao's idea. The time of the campaign (1957) was before the Great Leap Forward (1958) when Mao occupied a dominant position in the Party. This suggests that at that time the Party was "red." But after the Great Leap Forward started, with Peng Teh-huai's attack on Mao and his policy, the Party became an advocate of intellectual approach in problems and plannings. Goldman points out that in 1961 the Party under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi:

...sought to enhance the prestige of the intellectuals at the expense of the cadres. It reversed its previous policy of downgrading intellectual achievement and stressed the crucial role of the intellectuals and the professionals in the development of China. The cadres and masses were told that ideological orthodoxy, administrative abilities and labour could not alone build a modernized society; the techniques and professional skills of the intellectuals must also be used. In contrast to the proceeding period of repression, the leadership decreed that intellectual endeavor and professional proficiency, rather than ideological orthodoxy, should be the standard of achievement.¹¹⁸

It is obvious that the Party was de-emphasizing ideology and was encouraging experts to use the scientific approach in regard to both problems and planning. The Party then was in agreement with the "expert," who had regarded the modernization of the country and economic development as the highest priority of them all, even if it meant taking the road back to capitalism and a confrontation between capitalism and socialism in the Chinese society. While the Party was

¹¹⁸ Goldman, op. cit., pp. 270-71.

making use of the experts regardless of their non-communist methods (end justifies the means) to develop the country, the military was campaigning for the absolute domination of ideology.¹¹⁹ It is also in this light that one can identify the military with the "red" label, and the Party with the label of revisionism. With the "experts" having their ways of solving problems or planning in their jobs, comes the threat to the political domination of the "red" since the decision of the "experts" will be based on professionalism and expertise as opposed to the ideology of the "red."

The alleged revisionism of the Party in the cultural revolution was in fact a continuation of expertise instead of "redness" of the Party since 1961. The failure of the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the purges of the cultural revolution had proved that the "red" would not tolerate the "experts" and their professionalism. At the same time, it was clear that the "experts" would consistently try to mobilize themselves to gain access to the inner core of political power which was now in the hands of the anti-intellectual class ("red") for the "experts" believed that power politics rightfully belonged to the most educated class.¹²⁰ The belief that the educated class should be the rightful ruler has had a strong root also in other Asian countries.¹²¹ Thus this would appear to be a regional belief.

¹¹⁹ See Chapter IV above.

¹²⁰ Pye, op. cit., p. 199.

¹²¹ Abdul Lateef, a suggestion to this author (June, 1973).

Undoubtedly, the "experts" are capable enough to govern China. This capability plus the ambition of the "experts" constitutes a threat to the "reds" who are now in power. Therefore, the "reds" will try every way possible to keep the "experts" from becoming a power holder.

As in the cultural revolution, institutions of higher learning were deprived of their right to be operated academically and professionally. For example, the use of examinations and objective measurement of academic capabilities was eliminated in favor of the new system of ideological commitment and political feelings of candidates for admission.¹²² In important fields such as economics, economic experts who were in control of the Chinese economy before the cultural revolution, were replaced by far more inferior men from peasant and worker background and by military men. The inferior students and men were strongly committed to the Maoist ideology. The "reds" believe that their (the inferiors') ideological commitment will not change. It is acceptable that the new experts will conform more to the idea of the "reds," but there is no reason to assume that the new experts, at least in the long run when the fashionable revolutionary-fervor is gone, will carry out their responsibilities any differently from the previous experts.¹²³ Furthermore, the new experts, after they have mastered their trades and technical know-how of their new jobs and professions, will become just

¹²² Pye, op. cit., p. 47.

¹²³ Richard Diao, "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's Economic Elite," China Quarterly, No. 42 (April-June, 1970), p. 86.

the "experts," which will make them or condition them toward professionalism and expertise rather than ideology. As Professor Schurmann points out, these professional intellectuals are strongly committed to their professionalism, expertise, and technical knowledge. He says that in China, these experts:

...are admiring of advanced countries, Russia as well as the United States. They are firmly convinced that only expertise, not political direction will modernize the country.¹²⁴

China is a developing country, and, naturally, communist leadership wants to see her developed. But development, since it involves rational planning and an intellectual approach to problems and needs requires experts and their specialization.

It is a good thing for a country to be industrialized and modernized. But at the same time it is bad for Communist ideology, particularly Maoism, because its strict and strong commitment to the purity of ideology will be destroyed by the commitment to specialization of experts. That is, these experts will look at things professionally not ideologically (i.e., using economic and material incentives rather than coercion or ideological fanaticism in asking men to work or perform their duty). By this inclination these experts will form a new class and have new values. David Truman states that the need for specialization is:

¹²⁴Franz Schurmann, "China's Economic Policy: Transition or Beginning," in (ed.) Choh-ming Li, Industrial Development in Communist China (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 85.

...to meet the challenges and opportunities of the physical environment, and they specializations are allocated to individuals roughly on the basis of differences in skills. Men are preoccupied by their skills, and these preoccupations in large measure define what the members of such groups know and perceive about the world in which they live...(and groups will be formed) among those who share this 'knowledge' and the attitudes it fosters.¹²⁵

Therefore, the interest of the "experts" will be in conflict with those of the "reds" because of differences in their values, attitudes, and the choice of means to develop the country.

Thus, to a high degree, the "experts" class is taking the road "forward" toward capitalism (the author uses the term forward, rather than the normally used "backward" because its emphasis is on professionalism and progress rather than just going back to the bourgeoisie system of old China). Furthermore, they like to be rewarded for the job they do. Since they are the ones who contribute more to the development of China, they should be rewarded in terms of material incentives more than men who lack knowledge. This privilege will have to be increased for them even more in the future when the need for experts in developing the country increases. As Schram indicates:

...the process of industrialization and modernization under way in China leads to the emergence of the same tendencies which have been engendered by economic development in other countries: increasing functional differentiation and the birth of a new form of social stratification, the subordination of (Communist) values to technical rationality, the primacy of economic incentive.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), p. 54.

¹²⁶ Schram, "Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," op. cit., p. 26.

The domination and privilege of a bureaucratic and technocratic elite in the Soviet Union represents a manifestation of this view.¹²⁷

But at the same time, the "reds" will not tolerate this economism as we have seen in the cultural revolution. As long as the conviction that "redness" is better and more important than "expertise" still prevails in the eyes of the Chinese Communist leadership, and particularly the military leadership who are in power now, the "experts" will be put into the provided frame and play the assigned role which is not a ruling role. At the same time the "experts" because of their conviction that they are the best educated class, and are therefore better fit to play a ruling role than any of the other classes; hence they will always try to break out of that "provided frame" and climb over any political barrier to become the ruler, or one of the rulers.

But the "reds" who believe in ideological purity will not let them do so, and the military which is the leader of the "reds" will use force if necessary to protect and preserve the domination of the proletarian class. In the cultural revolution the military did help the other reds (i.e., Red Guards) attacking the Party because it wanted ideology over professionalism--"redness" over "expertise." As long as the military wants the supremacy of ideology, since it controls the political power of the gun, the military will always have it.

Therefore, as long as there exists a contradiction (by their very nature there will always be) between "expertise" and "redness"

¹²⁷Ibid.

in Communist China, the "experts" will try to gain power and the "reds" will try to suppress the "experts." The military which is also red will always suppress the "experts," and thus will continue to dominate the Chinese political arena.

CONCLUSION

As an organization, the Chinese Communist Party which used to be the most influential organ of state suffered a great setback during the cultural revolution. Politically, it has lost its authority and power to the military. This makes it most unlikely for the Party to recuperate and make a comeback as a leader in political leadership again, especially when it has been controlled and rebuilt by its rival, the military.

By its own merit, the military is quite popular with the public, and also its propaganda and indoctrination seems to have convinced the Chinese people that the military is better and more truthful to Communism than the Party. Thus, the military leadership belongs to and stands for the betterment of the proletariat. One must also bear in mind that the place of the military in China, as in most of the developing countries, is completely different from the one prevailing in the western countries or, for that matter, in the Soviet Union. In the West and in the Soviet Union, the military has always known where their place is. But in China things are different. The public has been conditioned to view the military's political role as an essential part of the Chinese political system. The military itself has always tried to make itself at least one of

the rulers if not the only ruler. But, in the West, it would be extremely hard, if not impossible, for the military to do so, because of constitutional tradition and regard for representative institutions.

The clear indication that the military wished to take over power in Communist China can be seen in the case of Lin Piao, who was a potential successor of Mao Tse-tung before Lin's death in an airplane crash. Lin attempted to take over the power from Mao. This shows that in fact the military did want the power. The reason for this might be simply that the military wanted the power or that the military regarded itself as a better vanguard than the Party since the Party was guilty of revisionism in the past, when at the same time the military has been a true representative of Communism.

The failure of Lin Piao's coup d'etat against Mao was because he picked the wrong time and, most of all, the wrong person. His mistake was that he was challenging Mao at the time that Mao's status was very high. This loss of Lin's was a personal loss in a personal fight with Mao; it was not a loss of the military and a gain of the Party. The military will try this again especially since its leadership has tasted glory during the cultural revolution. In the future there may be no Mao, but the thirst for power of the military will always be there.

It is also true that there will be a continuation of a struggle between the "experts" and the "reds." The "experts" means the rise of

non-communist (economism) practice and ideology. This development will make it necessary for the military, which regards itself as the strong "reds" to play the role of the protector of communism by putting down the "experts." It is most probable that the military, which is replacing the Party, will eventually rule Communist China in the name of Communism.

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