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## Lawrence Yates Sherman: United States Senator from Illinois, 1913-1921

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*Eastern Illinois University*

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LAWRENCE YATES SHERMAN: UNITED STATES

SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS, 1913-1921

(TITLE)

BY

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B. S. in Ed., 1970, Eastern Illinois University

M. S. in Ed., 1972, Eastern Illinois University

**THESIS**

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1974

YEAR

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## FOREWORD

The purpose of this thesis is to consider the political career of Lawrence Yates Sherman. Sherman, who served as United States Senator from Illinois, 1913-1921, was a colorful individual in Congress during one of the Republic's more turbulent periods. As a United States Senator, Sherman dealt with many vital issues. However, Senator Sherman is best-known for his "irreconcilable" position on the question of ratification of the Treaty of the League of Nations.

Actually, Sherman's political career was much more extensive than merely opposition to the League of Nations. Sherman was the "favorite-son" candidate of Illinois for the nomination of the Republican Party for President in the 1916 elections. Also, Sherman actively sought a governmental policy of a higher tariff, and stressed military preparedness in nearly all of his speeches prior to United States entry into World War I.

By analyzing Sherman's speeches, his voting patterns, and letters a more accurate picture of the Senator may be gained. Through tracing his career and interpreting it in the light of all available data, this work will add to the understanding of the man, the period, and one phase of Illinois and United States History.

Credit for assistance is due several persons: my wife, Marsha, who made many suggestions; my parents, for providing encouragement; and my advisor, Dr. Koch, for providing direction.



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## CHAPTER I

### THE BACKGROUND OF THE FUTURE SENATOR

Lawrence Yates Sherman was born near Piqua, in Brown Township, Miami County, Ohio, on November 8, 1858. His father was a backwoodsman and farmer, and his mother was a housewife. When Sherman was one year old, the family moved to McDonough County, Illinois, where they rented land near Industry Township. In 1867 the family packed their possessions in a covered wagon and moved again, this time to Grove Township, Jasper County, Illinois.<sup>1</sup>

Sherman spent most of his childhood years on the Illinois prairie learning the skills of farming. As a boy he worked with his father on the farm. However, the family was not well off financially, so beginning at age twelve, Sherman worked summers for farmers in the area. Between the ages of twelve and twenty-one he contributed \$434 in cash to help provide for the family.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Illinois State Journal (Springfield, Illinois), June 4, 1916, p. 1; John M. Palmer (ed.), The Bench and Bar of Illinois: Historical and Reminiscent (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1899), p. 740; General Committee of Businessmen and Old Settlers, History of McDonough County, Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Continental Historical Company, 1885), p. 15.

<sup>2</sup>Illinois State Journal (Springfield, Illinois), June 4, 1916, p. 1.

In the winters young Sherman attended district schools. During his early years, Sherman was only an average student, but he began to excel as he grew older. After progressing as far as the district schools could assist him, Sherman spent one term at Lee's Academy in Coles County, near Charleston, Illinois. During his leisure time he often borrowed and read what books he could find. He also enjoyed attending the court proceedings of the local justice of the peace.<sup>3</sup>

At the age of seventeen Sherman accepted a teaching position in a country school. He took the certification examination from one of his former teachers, and passed it easily. Sherman's wages improved, so that by the spring of 1879 he had saved enough money to begin college. Sherman attended McKendree College in Lebanon, Illinois, for four months. He subsequently taught at Emerald Mound School, north of Lebanon, for three years, pursuing his law studies in his spare time.<sup>4</sup>

The law course at McKendree greatly interested Sherman, and was in fact the only course of studies he completed. In 1880 he began reading Blackstone under Judge Henry Horner of Lebanon, Illinois, and was encouraged to proceed by Professor Samuel H. Deneen. Finally, in May, 1882, he went to Springfield, Illinois, passed an examination

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<sup>3</sup>Letter to Mr. G. Douglas Wardrop, December 15, 1914. Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers.; John M. Palmer (ed.), The Bench and Bar of Illinois: Historical and Reminiscent (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1899), p. 740.; "Lawrence Yates Sherman," The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography: Being the History of the United States, Vol. XV, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1967), p. 101.

<sup>4</sup>Illinois State Journal, June 4, 1916, p. 1; Joseph Guandolo (ed.), Centennial History of McKendree College: with St. Clair County History (Lebanon, Illinois: Publicity Committee, 1928), p. 15.

before the Illinois Supreme Court, and was admitted to the bar.<sup>5</sup>

Sherman moved to Macomb, Illinois, where he hauled freight and drove a team, in order to subsist. In exchange for janitorial and clerk services, Sherman read law in a local attorney's office.<sup>6</sup> In October of 1882, with the money Sherman had saved, plus \$100 borrowed from a college classmate, Sherman and a local acquaintance, Lyman B. Vose, formed the law firm of Vose and Sherman.<sup>7</sup>

For the next four years Sherman engaged in a general law practice. Sherman also became active in local civic affairs and politics. In May, 1885, he was elected City Attorney of Macomb, Illinois, and in November, 1886, at the age of 28, he was elected judge of McDonough County. Sherman served four years as county judge, and declined re-nomination in 1890, whereupon he returned to the practice of law.<sup>8</sup>

In 1890, Sherman formed a partnership with George D. Tunnicliffe and D. G. Tunnicliffe (ex-Justice of the Supreme Court), and went into general practice.<sup>9</sup> Sherman continued to be politically active, though, and was elected in 1896 to the Illinois General Assembly, on the Republican ticket.<sup>10</sup> In 1899 Sherman was elected Speaker of the House of

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<sup>5</sup>Illinois State Journal (Springfield, Illinois), June 4, 1916, p. 1.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>7</sup>Palmer, The Bench and Bar of Illinois, p. 741.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Newton Bateman and Paul Selby (eds.), Historical Encyclopedia of Illinois and History of Sangamon County (Chicago: Marshall Publishing Company, 1912), p. 608.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

Representatives, a position which he held until January of 1903.<sup>11</sup>

As Speaker of the House, Sherman presided in 1899 over a Republican majority of 81 Republicans to 71 Democrats and one Prohibitionist. In 1901, Sherman was re-elected as Speaker, with the Republicans again having 81 seats, to 72 seats for the Democrats.<sup>12</sup>

While in the House, Sherman began exhibiting those qualities which would later make him one of the United States Senate's more colorful members. He was disliked by some for his occasionally sour temperament, his caustic comments, and his reputation for obstinacy.<sup>13</sup> However, reporters enjoyed interviewing him, as his sharp sense of humor made good copy. Sherman was talented at political slang, and named the Illinois and Michigan Canal "the tadpole ditch", the political game wardens "the rabbit shepherds", and the members of the Governor's staff in their elegant uniforms "the sunburst colonels".<sup>14</sup>

Sherman's thoughts on legislation also became clear at this time. He opposed much legislation on the basis that "the government which governs least governs best". In that respect, he remained true to his conservative prairie upbringing. Legislation, to Sherman, meant a

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<sup>11</sup>"Lawrence Yates Sherman", The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, p. 101.

<sup>12</sup>Charles A. Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois 1854-1912: With a Review of the Aggression of the Slave-Power (Rockford, Illinois: Wilson Brothers Company, 1912), p. 190.

<sup>13</sup>Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (State Cooperative Scholarly Publishing Agency: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 187.

<sup>14</sup>"Lawrence Yates Sherman", The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, p. 101.

restriction on individual freedom. Hence, keeping legislation to a minimum meant a greater opportunity for individual freedom.

In regard to certain reforms, though, Sherman made exceptions. In 1901, and again in 1902, Sherman pushed for an Illinois Constitutional Convention to update the 1870 Constitution.<sup>15</sup> Sherman believed that the state had grown so rapidly that changes in the charter were needed. He especially thought that Chicago should be granted more political freedom to deal with its unique metropolitan problems. However, a Constitutional Convention was not destined to be held, and despite Sherman's advocacy of the convention resolution, it was defeated in 1902 in the Illinois House of Representatives by a vote of 76 to 52.<sup>16</sup>

During this period Sherman began to develop political allies and enemies that would remain with him the rest of his career. In 1902, Sherman, the Speaker of the Illinois House, joined Shelby Cullom (United States Senator from Illinois), Charles Deneen, and Fred Busse of Chicago in opposing William Lorimer's bid for the United States Senate. Lorimer was seen by these men as a political "boss", and a "malevolent influence within the party." Lorimer, a strongman in Chicago politics, proved too strong for the coalition of opposition forces, and in January of 1903 the Illinois Congress sent him to Washington as the United States Senator from Illinois.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Ernest L. Bogart and John M. Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth 1893-1918, Vol. V: The Centennial History of Illinois (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1920), p. 193; Editorial, Call Board Bulletin (Chicago: Chicago Real Estate Board, 1901), p. 2.

<sup>16</sup>Editorial, Call Board Bulletin, p. 2; Bogart and Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth, p. 193.

<sup>17</sup>William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 104.

As a result of the January, 1903 loss in the William Lorimer-Charles Gates Dawes struggle for the senatorship, Sherman temporarily lost ground. Later in January when the Republicans of the Illinois House of Representatives caucused, Sherman lost the Speakership of the Illinois House, by a vote of 49 to 30, to John H. Miller, who was picked for the job by William Lorimer.<sup>18</sup>

After his ouster as Speaker, Sherman set out to consolidate his position. He no longer held the prestigious Speakership, but he still was a member of the House of Representatives, and still possessed considerable prestige. Sherman soon decided on his next goal: he wanted to become Governor of Illinois. Richard Yates, a fellow Republican, currently was Governor, but he was not a forceful leader, and he controlled only one wing of the Republican Party. Although Yates hoped to be renominated, several of the factions in the party wished to remove him from the Executive Mansion in Springfield.<sup>19</sup>

Sherman began his campaign more than a year before the elections: he actually started working toward his goal in the spring of 1903. As a result, in May, 1903, thirty-nine members of the legislature called Sherman their candidate for Governor.<sup>20</sup> This commitment began what Sherman hoped would become a "bandwagon" movement.

Sensing the weakness in Governor Yates attempt for the renomination, there were also several others who made it known that they were available

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<sup>18</sup>Ray Ginger, Altgeld's America: The Lincoln Ideal versus Changing Realities (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1958), p. 271.

<sup>19</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 110.

<sup>20</sup>Chicago Chronicle, May 17, 1903, p. 1.

for the nomination. Among them was Charles S. Deneen, the States' Attorney for Cook County, who believed that Chicago should supply the next Republican Governor. With Yates, Sherman, Deneen, and others all hoping to be the Republican nominee, the gubernatorial campaign was well underway in the summer of 1903.<sup>21</sup>

Another candidate in the race was Frank O. Lowden, another politician from northern Illinois. In 1903, Lowden denied that he was a candidate, but quietly moved about northern Illinois, gathering strength. Lowden entertained many influential Republicans in his home: Governor Yates, Attorney-General Hamlin, Lawrence Yates Sherman, Congressman Lorimer, Alderman William Hale Thompson, "Boss" T. N. Jamieson, and others came to confer with him.<sup>22</sup>

On January 26, 1904, two thousand Republican politicians assembled in the new Springfield, Illinois, Armory to discuss details of the upcoming nominating convention. They decided upon May 12 as the date for it, and then listened to a number of "party unity" speeches. The harmony note was broken by Lawrence Y. Sherman, who in his speech attacked Governor Yates and his "payroll brigade".<sup>23</sup> This was an advance warning that all might not go smoothly at the nominating convention.

On Thursday, May 12, the nominating convention got underway. Its sessions convened in the new Springfield Armory, where each contestant had an office. However, much activity centered on the Leland Hotel, where the rivals had conference rooms, campaign literature, and free

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<sup>21</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, pp. 110-114.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., pp. 107-112.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 120.



cigars to offer. Each of the candidates attempted to entertain and discuss politics with as many of the 1502 delegates as possible.<sup>24</sup>

This convention was of greater than ordinary importance because of the persons assembled there. Such persons as Joe Cannon, Frank Lowden, Shelby Cullom, Len Small, and Lawrence Sherman were in attendance. In addition, it would prove to be the longest state political convention in history, and would draw nation-wide attention.<sup>25</sup>

During this first week of the convention, each of the contenders attempted to sweep the delegates by mounting large demonstrations. The vote totals seesawed, but after the first half-dozen ballots, no candidate received over 500 votes. After the 58th ballot on May 20th, a motion to recess until May 31 was passed by the weary delegates by a vote of 1,414 to 88.<sup>27</sup>

When the convention resumed activity, the Lowden forces seemed to be on the brink of victory. At this point Deneen, Yates, Sherman, and Hamlin conferred in the Executive Mansion, and made some agreements. Governor Yates decided to throw his support to Deneen, and Lawrence Yates Sherman made the same choice. Sherman admitted that he could not draw votes from Yate's followers, and concluded that ". . . the logic of the situation suggests that Mr. Deneen is the only

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<sup>24</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 123.

<sup>25</sup>Herman Kogan and Lloyd Wendt, Big Bill of Chicago (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Incorporated, 1953), pp. 64-65.

<sup>26</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 124.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 127.

candidate among us whom we can nominate. Governor Yates can deliver to him and so can the rest of us."<sup>28</sup>

When the convention re-convened on the afternoon of June 3, Governor Yates formally withdrew his candidacy in favor of Deneen, as did Hamlin and Sherman in succession.<sup>29</sup> The results of the next ballot, the 79th, were as follows: 957½ for Deneen; 522½ for Lowden; 21 for Warner; 1 for Yates.<sup>30</sup> The rest of the slate was then decided as follows: Lawrence Yates Sherman, Lieutenant Governor; James A. Rose, Secretary of State; James S. McCullough, Auditor; Len Small, Treasurer; and William H. Stead, Attorney-General.<sup>31</sup>

The Convention had lasted 22 days, with 79 ballots having been taken. National interest in this convention had been such that newspapers across the country had followed its progress. In Illinois, public interest was so great that hourly convention bulletins appeared outside newspaper offices in many towns, and visitors went to Springfield to see "the greatest political battle of the young century."<sup>32</sup>

However, the convention also had a far deeper importance. By denying Lowden the nomination, the coalition forces had dealt political "boss" William Lorimer a blow. The Lorimer-Thompson forces had backed

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<sup>28</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 127.

<sup>29</sup>Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois, p. 200.

<sup>30</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 127.

<sup>31</sup>Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois, p. 200.

<sup>32</sup>Kogan and Wendt, Big Bill of Chicago, pp. 64-65; William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 126.

Lowden, and they were unaccustomed to losing. Particularly, it had been a heavy blow to Lorimer, and as a result the Illinois Republican Party split into two factions, with the split lasting the rest of Big Bill Thompson's political career.<sup>33</sup>

The coalition forces sought at all costs to defeat Lowden. In the conference on June 2, Deneen had asked Yates if he could deliver, to which Yates replied, "I can deliver. I'll go before the convention tomorrow to announce my withdrawal. Then we'll be finished once and for all with that bastard (Lorimer) from Washington."<sup>34</sup> Sherman, Yates, and Hamlin were interested in party reform, and the removal of party "bosses".

In September, 1904, the Republicans began campaigning, and continued on until election day. The forces of unity had brought the party together, and Lowden, Yates, Dawes, Cullom, Mason, Sherman, and Hanecy all campaigned together by train, making speeches from the rear platform of the train at its many station stops.<sup>35</sup>

The result in the November 8, 1904 elections was a landslide victory for the Illinois Republicans. Charles S. Deneen won the Governorship over the Democratic candidate, Lawrence B. Stringer, by a vote of 634,029 to 334,880. Also, Lawrence Yates Sherman won the Lieutenant-Governorship over his Democratic opponent, Thomas F. Ferns, by a vote of 628,774 to 332,134. The huge margin of victory may be attributed in part to the popularity of President Theodore Roosevelt, who helped the

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<sup>33</sup>Kogan and Wendt, Big Bill of Chicago, pp. 64-65.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid.

<sup>35</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 99.

state ticket considerably. The Republicans in Illinois carried not only the normally Republican downstate, but also Chicago itself, which usually voted heavily Democratic.<sup>36</sup>

During the next four years, 1905-1909, Lawrence Y. Sherman was Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois. In 1907, he was appointed a member of the United States Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, but declined, in order that he could devote full time to his work as President of the Illinois Senate. Then, in 1908, he decided to run for the office of Mayor of Springfield, Illinois, in order to help consolidate the Republican control of the state. He ran on a law and order platform after the Springfield Riots of August, 1908, but was defeated in the election.<sup>37</sup>

After losing the mayoral election, he was appointed by Governor Deneen as President of the Illinois State Board for Charities, which controlled the seventeen state public charities.<sup>38</sup> As President of the Board, Sherman was responsible for the smooth and efficient functioning of this large institution. The duties included personal inspection

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<sup>36</sup>James A. Rose (Secretary of State of Illinois), Blue Book of Illinois, 1905 (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Journal Company, State Printer, 1906), pp. 590-593; Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 133.

<sup>37</sup>"Lawrence Y. Sherman", Who's Who in America, 1914-1915 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis Company, 1915), p. 2124; "Lawrence Y. Sherman", The National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, p. 101.

<sup>38</sup>Centennial History of McKendree College, p. 15; The following institutions comprised the state charitable institutions: Elgin State Hospital, Elgin; Kankakee State Hospital, Kankakee; Jacksonville State Hospital, Jacksonville; Anna State Hospital, Anna; Watertown State Hospital, Watertown; Peoria State Hospital, Peoria; Chester State Hospital Menard; Lincoln State School and Colony, Lincoln; The Illinois School for the Blind, Jacksonville; The Illinois Industrial Home for the Blind, Chicago; The Illinois Soldiers' and Sailors' Home, Quincy; The Soldiers' Widows' Home of Illinois, Wilmington; The Illinois Soldiers' Orphans' Home, Normal; The Illinois Charitable Eye and Ear Infirmary, Chicago; The State Training School for Girls, Geneva; The St. Charles School for Boys, St. Charles; and the Illinois State Colony for Epileptics.

visits for the institutions concerned, speeches to civic groups about the needs of the institutionalized, and dealing with the legislature in an attempt to get adequate operating funds. The supervision was a large task, inasmuch as there were approximately 2,500 employees, who cared for 16,960 inmates. The budget, which Sherman was most directly concerned with, amounted to about four and one-half million dollars per year.<sup>39</sup>

In keeping with his moderately conservative political philosophy, Sherman thought that there was "no good reason . . . why any adult person of average mind and health should be supported by public charity."<sup>40</sup> He believed that each person was basically responsible for his own well-being, and that to ask the taxpayers to support an individual capable of caring for himself was not justifiable.

Basically, Sherman subscribed to the philosophy of "rugged individualism." He believed that each person had only himself to praise or castigate for his own success or failure. In keeping with this, he believed that each person should have as much freedom as possible in order that he might more easily reach his goal. For those who were able, Sherman believed in the frontier philosophy of "pulling oneself up by the bootstraps."

However, the question of the care of those not able to care for themselves was an entirely different matter in Sherman's mind. He made

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<sup>39</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman, "State Charities," Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1911 (Danville, Illinois: Illinois Printing Company, 1911), p. 324; Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech by Sherman at Champaign, Illinois, October 23, 1911.

<sup>40</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman speech at Champaign, Illinois, October 23, 1911. Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 42.

a distinction between those two "categories", and felt that those who could not care for themselves as a result of events beyond their control should be the responsibility of the state, and should be given such care as would enable them to become self-sufficient, if that were possible. Sherman delivered a number of speeches concerning the necessity of improving the quantity and quality of the homes for orphans.<sup>41</sup> Also, during his term as President of the Board, he succeeded in getting an additional appropriation of approximately one million dollars per year.

While serving as President of the Illinois State Board for Charities, Sherman remained active in politics, and cultivated old friends and political allies. He thought that from his position, he was in an admirable situation to aspire to some higher office. In 1912 and 1913, this ambition came within his grasp.

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<sup>41</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman speech at Champaign, Illinois, October 23, 1911. Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 42.

## CHAPTER II

### THE SENATORIAL ELECTION OF 1913 AND RE-ELECTION IN 1914

After the 1904 elections, in which Charles S. Deneen became Governor of Illinois, and Lawrence Yates Sherman gained the position of Lieutenant-Governor, the next election of importance was that of the Senatorship from Illinois. On March 3, 1907, the United States Senate term of Republican Senator Shelby Cullom expired, and several persons wanted this prize. Senator Cullom at this time was seventy-six years old, in poor health, and had been in the Senate for twenty-four years. Many thought that even if Cullom gained re-election, he would not live out his term.<sup>1</sup>

Cullom's main Republican opponent, former Governor Yates, announced his candidacy for the Senatorship in 1905, and declared that he would campaign vigorously. Yates' candidacy put a strain on the 1904 Deneen-Yates-Hamlin-Sherman coalition, since any backing of Yates by Governor Deneen would incur the wrath of the Cullom organization, as well as Sherman and Hamlin, who wished to be Senator. However, Yates decided to collect all the political debts owed him, and decided to run.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Henry A. Converse, "The Life and Services of Shelby Moore Cullom," Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Historical Society), Vol. XX, p. 63.

<sup>2</sup>William Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 135-136.

One factor in the 1906 senatorial battle was a new law, passed in 1905 by the Illinois Legislature, which provided for an advisory vote by the public for United States Senator. Consequently, Senator Cullom was forced to campaign for the public favor, seeking the preferential vote of his party, for the first time in nearly three decades. Cullom, ill as well as aged, did not campaign actively, but had his friends campaign for him. The preferential primary election was August 4, 1906, and when the votes were tallied, Cullom had trounced Yates by a 45,000 vote margin. As a result of this lop-sided victory, Cullom was the unanimous choice of the Illinois Republican legislative caucus, received every Republican vote in an official Illinois House-Senate vote, and easily gained re-election for another six year term.<sup>3</sup>

Illinois' other Senatorship, held by Republican Albert J. Hopkins, expired March 3, 1909.<sup>4</sup> Senator Hopkins received a plurality in the Republican preferential primary, and it was supposed that the members of the Illinois legislature would carry out the voters' wishes, as they had with Cullom two years earlier. However, when the legislature met, Hopkins' opponents Mr. Foss and Mr. Mason continued to be candidates. Also, many members of the legislature thought they should follow the vote in their district and not the overall Hopkins victory in the state. The result was a deadlock, which lasted from January to May 1909. This

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<sup>3</sup>Converse, Shelby Moore Cullom, pp. 63-64; Charles A. Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois 1854-1912: With a Review of the Aggression of the Slave-Power (Rockford, Illinois: Wilson Brothers Publishing Company, 1912), p. 210. The state legislatures at this time elected United States Senators, not the popular vote in the primary election.

<sup>4</sup>Converse, Shelby Moore Cullom, p. 65.



meant that from March 3, 1909, to May 26, 1909, Illinois was represented by only one Senator, Shelby Cullom. Finally, on May 26, 1909, fifty-five Republicans and fifty-three Democrats suddenly voted for William Lorimer, who heretofore had not been a candidate. Mr. Lorimer was declared elected, and took his place in the United States Senate as the junior Senator from Illinois.<sup>5</sup>

Lorimer since 1895 had represented a Chicago district in the United States House of Representatives. In 1893, Lorimer had gained control of patronage in several Chicago wards, and used this as his power base. His tactics for extending his control included using allies and friends in both political parties, a practice that was frowned on by party regulars.<sup>6</sup> For the help received by Lorimer, he dispensed favors in the form of jobs, labor contracts, or other rewards.<sup>7</sup>

Lorimer's bipartisan politics were fruitful for him in his fight for the senatorship, inasmuch as on May 26, 1909, on the 95th ballot, Lorimer was elected United States Senator by the following margin: Lorimer, 108; Hopkins, 70; and Stringer, 24. Of Lorimer's 108 votes, 55 were Republican and 53 were Democratic.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Converse, Shelby Moore Cullom, p. 65.

<sup>6</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 82. Among the Democrats Lorimer's chief ally was Roger Sullivan, a Democrat from Chicago, who would oppose Sherman in a race for the United States Senate in 1914.

<sup>7</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 81.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 186; Charles A. Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois 1854-1912: With a Review of the Aggression of the Slave-Power (Rockford, Illinois: Wilson Brothers Company), p. 214. Political "deals" such as this were discouraged by regular party leaders, as they were thought to be a corrupting influence and a subversion of competition between the two major political parties.

On April 30, 1910, a little less than a year after Lorimer had taken his Senate seat, an event of importance took place. On that date the Chicago Tribune published a confession of Charles A. White, a Democratic State Representative, that he had been bribed to vote for Lorimer for Senator the year before.<sup>9</sup> White alleged that he had received \$1,000 from Lee O'Neil Browne for his vote for Lorimer. A few days later, three other Democrats admitted to having taken bribes. These charges resulted in an investigation by the United States Senate, which alone has the authority to determine the rights of claimants to their seats. A committee began its inquiry in Chicago, on September 20, 1910. On December 12, 1910, a sub-committee submitted a report which stated that Lorimer was entitled to his seat on the grounds that while there was bribery, there was not enough bribery to destroy Lorimer's majority of fourteen votes. However, there was a minority report by the committee, which reported on January 9, 1911, that Mr. Lorimer was not legally elected.<sup>10</sup>

During the investigation Lorimer declared that he had not bribed anyone, and that no one in his employ had done so, either. Further, Lorimer charged that the confessions were "fairy stories concocted by, or at the instigation of, the editor of the Chicago Tribune, who paid them generously for their perjury."<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Chicago Tribune, April 30, 1910, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois, pp. 214-215.

<sup>11</sup>Dillingham Committee Hearings, Senate Reports, 62 Congress, 2nd Session, Number 769, Part One, pp. 87-91; Congressional Record II, 1155; VIII, 7391, 7578-82, 7804, 7931.

On March 1, 1911, the United States Senate, by a vote of 46 to 40, declared that Lorimer was entitled to his seat in the Senate. On the vote Senator Cullom of Illinois voted in favor of allowing Lorimer to keep his seat. However, the public had been following the Senate deliberations with keen interest, and the Senate decision outraged many Illinois citizens. In Illinois, on May 18, 1911, the Illinois Senate voted 39 to 10 in a declaration that it believed Lorimer had been elected by corruption.<sup>12</sup>

The pressure to reopen the case finally became too great, and on June 1, 1911, the United States Senate reopened the investigation. There was a committee formed, with Senator Dillingham as chairman, which took lengthy testimony. The committee began its hearings on June 20, 1911, and finished on February 9, 1912. Two reports were presented, the majority favoring Lorimer, the minority report in favor of ousting Lorimer.<sup>13</sup> On July 13, 1912, the issue came to a vote in the United States Senate, and by a vote of 55 to 28 Lorimer was unseated.<sup>14</sup> In this vote, Senator Cullom voted to unseat his colleague.<sup>15</sup>

With the election of Lorimer declared null and void, the senatorial situation in Illinois was rather unsettled. The last three years of Lorimer's term remained, and someone was needed to fill it. In addition, Cullom's term was drawing to a close. Interested candidates were

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<sup>12</sup>Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois, p. 216.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 216-217.

<sup>14</sup>Senate Reports, 62nd Congress, 2nd Series, # 769, part 1, pp. 87-91. Note: William Lorimer was at that time the only man ever expelled from the United States Senate because of corruption.

<sup>15</sup>Converse, "Shelby Moore Cullom", p. 67.

required to submit their name for a primary vote in the spring of 1912.

The effects of the Lorimer investigation were manifold. It had brought about the demise of Lorimer on the national level, of course, but beyond that there were implications of far greater importance. The public notoriety which attended the Lorimer hearings did not go unnoticed by the voters, and the Chicago Tribune did not let them forget it. Also, the various committee hearings exposed to the public the antics which their state representatives went through in electing United States Senators to represent them.<sup>16</sup> These events helped develop public demand for the direct election of United States Senators.

In 1912, though, it was still up to the Illinois legislature to appoint United States Senators. For the two terms available (Cullom's and the remainder of Lorimer's) a number of candidates appeared. In the Republican Party, four candidates emerged: Senator Shelby M. Cullom, Lawrence Yates Sherman, Hugh S. Magill, and William Grant Webster.<sup>17</sup>

Shelby Moore Cullom, the incumbent Republican Senator, was eighty-two years old and in poor health at this time. In 1911 he had decided not to run for re-election, but in 1912 he was concerned with holding

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<sup>16</sup>In testimony in the Dillingham Committee Hearings, former Illinois Governor Richard Yates described the setting of the 1909 joint Illinois Legislative session which selected Lorimer: "The legislators, (he said) were absolutely tired out (by late May). It had gotten to be an absolute joke. Everybody voted for everybody. I think that there were 150 of us that got one vote apiece at a time. It got to the point where the papers had cartoons representing senators as saying 'I vote for that bald-headed man up in the gallery. I vote for that messenger boy coming down the hall.' It was all a good argument for election (of Senators) by the people." William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 188.

<sup>17</sup>Church, History of the Republican Party in Illinois, p. 223.

the Republican Party of Illinois together. He finally decided to run for Senator again in the interests of party harmony.<sup>18</sup> He stayed in Washington, D. C., on doctor's advice, and again let his friends run his campaign. However, Cullom possessed certain liabilities in 1912. Besides his age and poor health, Cullom had lost many thousands of votes because of his vote in favor of allowing Lorimer to remain in the Senate.<sup>19</sup> Since he had gone to Washington, the world had changed greatly, and suddenly Cullom was placed in an era he did not fully understand.<sup>20</sup> Cullom had served his country well, but his time was past.

On April 9, 1912, the Illinois Preferential Primary election was held.<sup>21</sup> In that election, Lawrence Yates Sherman received 178,063 votes, to 129,375 for Shelby Cullom, 78,344 for Hugh Magill, and 24,567 for William Grant Webster. Sherman carried sixty-four counties, with thirty-two going to Shelby Cullom, and six going to Hugh Magill.<sup>22</sup> The groups which gave Roosevelt strong support also supported Sherman, and Deneen was endorsed for another term as Governor.<sup>23</sup> On the Democratic side,

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<sup>18</sup>Richard F. Wells, "Illinois Agrarianism and Shelby Moore Cullom." Unpublished Master's thesis, History, Eastern Illinois University, 1969, p. 102.

<sup>19</sup>Converse, "Shelby Moore Cullom", p. 66.

<sup>20</sup>Wells, "Shelby Moore Cullom", p. 102.

<sup>21</sup>Edward F. Dunne, volume II, Illinois: The Heart of the Nation . (Five volumes, Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1933), p. 366.

<sup>22</sup>Harry Woods, (Secretary of State of the State of Illinois), Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1913-1914 (Danville, Illinois: Illinois Printing Company, 1914), pp. 460-461, pp. 66-467.

<sup>23</sup>"The Progress of the World," American Review of Reviews, volume 45, May 1912, p. 519.

Edward F. Dunne had been nominated for Governor, and James Hamilton Lewis for United States Senator.<sup>24</sup>

Lawrence Yates Sherman had campaigned hard in Illinois.<sup>25</sup> He had attempted to maintain his old alliances, and forge new ones. During the campaign an alliance of long duration developed between Sherman and Edward J. Brundage of Chicago. Brundage controlled a part of the Republican machine in Chicago, and proved very helpful in the 1912 and 1914 Senatorial votes, and in Sherman's 1916 try for the Presidential nomination.

In 1913, the state legislatures still elected United States Senators.<sup>26</sup> In Illinois, that meant that the party which proved victorious in the fall elections in 1912 would be in excellent position to claim the two available senatorships. The Republican Party split in 1912, and a part of it formed the Progressive Party, under the overall leadership of Theodore Roosevelt. The result of this in the Illinois General Assembly elections of November, 1912, was that 97 Democrats, 76 Republicans, 27 Progressives, and 4 Socialists were elected.<sup>27</sup> These

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<sup>24</sup>Lewis G. Stevenson, (Secretary of State of the State of Illinois), Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915-1916 (Danville, Illinois: Illinois Printing Company, 1916), p. 531.

<sup>25</sup>Lawrence Y. Sherman filed a statement, in accordance with the Act of Congress passed August 19, 1911, revealing his campaign expenditures. Sherman stated that he spent \$7,999.25 in campaigning for the April 9, 1912 primary election. He reported receipts of \$8,800.00.

<sup>26</sup>The Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides for direct election of senators, went into effect on May 31, 1913. On April 8, 1913, the legislature of Connecticut ratified the Amendment, which meant that it had been ratified by 35 states, or the required 3/4. American Review of Reviews, May 1913, volume 47, p. 532.

<sup>27</sup>Edward F. Dunne, vol. II, Illinois, p. 366.

men would vote to determine who would be the next two United States Senators from Illinois.

At this point the situation was clearly rather fluid. There were two United States Senate seats at stake, and no political party with a majority. Accordingly, during the ten months between the preferential primary and the voting by the state representatives and senators, a number of persons besides Sherman and Lewis considered entering the fray. One such person was Medill McCormick, who had to make up his mind whether or not to become the Progressive Party candidate for the United States Senatorship, or to remain in the Illinois General Assembly.<sup>28</sup> McCormick consulted with Theodore Roosevelt on the matter, and Roosevelt suggested that McCormick remain a state representative. Roosevelt decided this in spite of the fact that the Progressives were in a position to make a deal with either the Democrats or Republicans.<sup>29</sup> Roosevelt reasoned that "It would be very hard to get a Progressive Senator from Illinois without making some deal that would lay us open to attack".<sup>30</sup>

Another person who considered making a try for a senatorship was Albert J. Hopkins. His rationale for making the attempt was based on the events of 1909. He reasoned that since Lorimer had corruptly beaten him

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<sup>28</sup>Elting E. Morison, John M. Blum, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Sylvia Rice, (eds.), volume VII, The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1914; The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (VIII volumes, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 661-662.

<sup>29</sup>The Progressives had 27 votes, and a merger by them with either of the two major parties would produce a large majority, even providing for a few defections.

<sup>30</sup>Morison and others, (eds.), The Days of Armageddon, 1909-1914; The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 661-662. Letter to Ruth Hanna McCormick, December 4, 1912.

out of a Senate seat, and that since Lorimer had been expelled from that seat, then the seat morally belonged to him.<sup>31</sup> He garnered some support, but not enough.

As the first day of balloting approached, early in February 1913, each of the parties seemed intent on electing their candidate, though none seemed willing to compromise. The Republicans, their party torn asunder in the fall campaign, were in rather desperate straits. The Democrats had the largest number of legislators in the Illinois Assembly, a position the Republicans had held seemingly from time immemorial. From the Democrat's perspective, they badly needed a senatorship in order to regain some of their lost prestige. The preferred solution to the apparently paradoxical situation was a scenario such as this: Sherman is elected to the long term and Lewis to the short term as a result of a tri-partisan coalition.<sup>32</sup> It could be reasoned that the voters had mandated this by their vote in the preferential primary. Indeed, voter groups such as the Sherman-Lewis Club of Chicago were demanding that the legislators follow their constituents' vote.

The Republicans were not wholly unrealistic about their chances, though. It was believed that Sherman should receive the Republican's nomination for both the long and the short terms. This was because it was thought that only one Republican could be elected, and that if Sherman could not win one of the places, then no other party member could hope

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<sup>31</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Edward Brundage, February 4, 1913. Box 46.

<sup>32</sup>New York Times, February 2, 1913, II, p. 3.



to be successful.<sup>33</sup> Sherman himself stated, in his private correspondence, that "If a Republican is elected to the short term that is all we have coming to us."<sup>34</sup> Of course, Sherman also thought that every effort should be made to make a combination which would give him the long term.-

Logically, for Sherman to get the long term, the coalition which would seem most promising would have been a Republican-Progressive merger. This would have gotten Sherman the long term, and the Progressive candidate the short term. In theory this would seem feasible, inasmuch as the Progressive Party was largely an offshoot of the Republican Party. However, the reform-minded Progressives seemed to prefer moralistic purity to pragmatic success in terms of getting a senator elected from their ranks. Sherman observed that "Few of them have manifested any friendly feelings toward Republicans. . . Prospects are that very few of the bull moose members will vote for me. I may have two or three but I do not at this time expect any more."<sup>35</sup>

Another possible solution to the deadlock would have been a Republican-Democratic combination. However, both parties wanted the long term. Also, it was suggested that coalition . . . . would be suicidal for both the Republican and Democratic Parties . . . ." <sup>36</sup> The reasoning here was that such a deal would be viewed by the voters as another "Lorimer-type" finangle, and would produce a Progressive victory in the

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<sup>33</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), February 5, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>34</sup>Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers, letter to Edward Brundage, February 4, 1913. Box 46.

<sup>35</sup>Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers, letter to Elmer T. Walker, February 8, 1913. Box 47.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, February 2, 1913, II, p. 3.

1914 elections.<sup>37</sup>

Yet another alternative for Sherman was to attempt to draw fragments from both of the other parties. Sherman could draw some of the Progressive votes, and might have been able to persuade many of the former Lorimer Democrats to vote for him. One newspaper columnist commented that "Those in touch with the legislative situation in its relationship to the senatorship believe that it would be possible to elect Sherman and defeat Lewis, but they also hold the view that such an election would discredit every Republican leader who had anything to do with it."<sup>38</sup>

On the eve before the beginning of the voting, each of the political parties caucused and re-affirmed their choices. The Democrats selected Lewis for the long term, and Charles Boeschenstein of Edwardsville, Illinois, for the short term. The Republicans selected Lawrence Yates Sherman, and the Progressives chose Frank Funk over Walter Jones and Medill McCormick.<sup>39</sup>

The first day of balloting, Tuesday, February 11, showed the following results:<sup>40</sup>

LONG TERM

	HOUSE	SENATE	TOTAL
Lewis	70	24	94
Sherman	50	24	74
Funk	25	2	27

SHORT TERM

Boeschenstein	52	12	64
Sherman	43	11	54
Hopkins	2	11	13
Funk	25	2	27

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<sup>37</sup>New York Times, February 2, 1913, II, p. 3.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), February 5, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., February 12, 1913, p. 1.

At this point the situation looked quite favorable for the Democrats. They had 94 votes for the pink-bearded Lewis, and needed only nine more votes, or 103, to carry the day. Lewis' nearest challenger, Sherman, had only 74 votes. However, after this vote Lewis lost some of his strength. On the third ballot for the long term, the results were: Lewis, 87; Sherman, 76; and Funk, 19.<sup>41</sup> On the fifth ballot, the vote on the long term was Lewis, 85; Sherman 73; and Frank Funk, 5.<sup>42</sup>

A stalemate then occurred, with the vote tallies varying only slightly on the ensuing ballots. Now other politicians saw an opportunity to be a "kingmaker". In late February and early March, William Jennings Bryan attempted to influence the outcome. In a letter dated February 13, 1913, written from Miami, Florida, Bryan stated that Illinois Democrats should not consent to any agreements which would give the long term to anyone other than Lewis.<sup>43</sup> To help Lewis further, Bryan made a personal visit to Illinois, and was a guest of the Illinois General Assembly on March 18, 1913.<sup>44</sup> It is also suggested that Bryan proposed that the Democrats and Progressives divide the senatorial seats and the state patronage. When consulted, Theodore Roosevelt advised the Progressives against this type of collusion, again apparently seeking to maintain his party's moral purity.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), February 19, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., February 21, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>J. Hamilton Lewis' vote total declined during Bryan's visit from a high of 91 to 85. Daily Pantagraph, March 19, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>Morison and others (eds.), Letters of T. Roosevelt, vol. VII, p. 662.

As the days went by, each of the groups became increasingly frustrated. On February 27, Democratic Speaker McKinley attempted to end it all with a parliamentary maneuver. Most of the members of the Assembly were absent, but a majority of those present were Democrats. He called for a vote, and of the 77 votes cast, a majority were for Lewis.<sup>46</sup> There ensued a prolonged fight over the technicality of whether a constitutional majority is a majority of members (103) or a majority of those present. The Democrats finally gave in on this point.

Again, attempts at forming coalitions were made. On the evening of March 12, 1913, with 71 Republican members of the Illinois Assembly present, the group unanimously agreed to vote for Frank Funk for the short term, provided the Progressives agreed to vote for Sherman for the long term.<sup>47</sup> This tactic, which was favored by Sherman, required all 27 Progressive votes, as the 76 Republican and 27 Progressive votes were all needed to reach the magic 103 vote total. The Progressives, however, could not deliver all their votes, and so this plan was aborted.<sup>48</sup>

In late March the deadlock was finally broken. Democratic Governor Dunne suggested that Lewis get the long term, and Sherman the short term. Sherman and Lewis visited the Governor's Office, and signed a pledge which called for the support of all of Sherman's supporters for Lewis for the long term, and all of Lewis' supporters for Sherman for the short term.<sup>49</sup> Through Representative Homer Tice, Sherman made his decision

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<sup>46</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), February 28, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., March 13, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>48</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Oliver W. Gogin, April 1, 1913. Box 47.

<sup>49</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), March 26, 1913, p. 1.

be known on March 25, 1913. A pledge petition was then passed. On March 26, on the fourteenth ballot, the results were:<sup>50</sup>

LONG TERM

	HOUSE	SENATE	TOTAL
Lewis	118	46	164
Sherman	9	0	9
Funk	20	2	22

SHORT TERM

Sherman	106	37	143
Boeschenstein	26	8	34
Funk	22	3	25
Fitzpatrick	1	0	1
McDonald	1	0	1
Hopkins	1	0	1

Thus, on March 26, 1913, at 1:46 P. M., J. Hamilton Lewis was elected, and at 2:55 P. M., Speaker McKinley declared Lawrence Yates Sherman elected to succeed William Lorimer for the two years remaining of Lorimer's term.<sup>51</sup> The forty-three day stalemate was broken. Sherman and Lewis became United States Senators, the last Senators elected by a state legislature.<sup>52</sup>

The election of Sherman and Lewis filled all of the vacancies in the Senate. Their addition resulted in a balance of 51 Democrats, 43 Republicans, and 2 Progressives.<sup>53</sup> Lewis and Sherman, upon presenting their credentials, were accepted into the Senate as a matter of routine. As a senator with no seniority, and a member of the minority party,

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<sup>50</sup>Daily Pantagraph (Bloomington, Illinois), March 27, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Edward F. Dunne, vol. II, Illinois, p. 365.

<sup>53</sup>New York Times, March 27, 1913, p. 8.

Sherman's committee assignments were not choice ones. Sherman received the following assignments: District of Columbia; Canadian relations; Privileges and elections; Disposition of useless papers in executive departments; expenditures in the Post Office Department; Transportation routes to the seaboard; and Forest reservations and protection.<sup>54</sup>

Sherman began expounding and explaining his position on the issues, once his entry into the Senate was settled. There were no great changes of position. On the question of free trade, Sherman continued to fight for his protectionist position. During his campaign he had made his position on this question perfectly clear when he stated "I am a protectionist and believe in such reasonable duties as will safeguard the wages of our own people and permit the employer adequate return for his money invested . . . ." <sup>55</sup> He thought that importing goods from abroad was not in the interests of strengthening American industry.

Sherman also sided with the moneyed interests on the Glass-Owen Bill. Since the bill called for some regulation of the banking system, Sherman believed that the measures proposed were an over-reaction to imagined problems. Before 1,500 bankers at the annual convention of the Illinois Banker's Association, Sherman stated that the currency bill was "unwarranted and unwise interference with the private funds of the stockholders and depositors of national banks."<sup>56</sup> Sherman called "dangerous" such provisions of the bill as "creating credit by the fiat

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<sup>54</sup>Congressional Record, April 17, 1913, p. 199.

<sup>55</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Aurora Mantle and Lamp Company, January 24, 1913. Box 46.

<sup>56</sup>New York Times, September 26, 1913, p. 4.

of a board whose membership depends on the rise and fall of candidates in a political campaign."<sup>57</sup> Sherman suggested that "For myself I would support a law to wind a watch with a crowbar as cheerfully as I will support any such bill."<sup>58</sup>

While Sherman's positions no doubt won him favor with the industrialists and money men, his positions were really quite consistent with his philosophy. Sherman, raised on the prairie in the post-civil war period, had "pulled himself up by the bootstraps", and believed that this way was possible for all who really wanted to improve their lot. A believer in rugged individualism, he thought that laws and regulations tended to restrict the ways a person could improve his position. To Sherman, the least possible number of laws was the best way to run the country.

During 1913, Sherman diligently attended to his senatorial duties, and missed few Senate sessions. One reason was that the tariff bill was under consideration, and Sherman strongly opposed it. Also, Sherman was interested in building a good attendance record to show the folks back home, as " . . . my absence might affect me . . . so many are ready to criticize . . . ."<sup>59</sup>

Sherman did not, however, neglect the opportunity to engage in partisan politics. He had been noted in Illinois for his ability to conjure up sarcastic phrases, and this ability had not left him. In the

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<sup>57</sup>"Senator Sherman of Illinois Criticizes the Glass-Owen Bill," Banker's Magazine, vol. 87, November, 1913, pp. 519-523.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

<sup>59</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Edward Brundage, August 26, 1913. Box 49.

fall of 1913, Sherman attacked Secretary of State Bryan, deriding him for his frequent absences from the Capitol. Sherman pointed out in one speech that:

. . . the Secretary of State spends more time on the Chautauqua circuit than he does in the Capitol . . . but the commercialized Chautauqua circuit must go on forever. A minimum of 250 man-made dollars is the price to hear the God-made man make a speech, with half the gate money in excess of \$500. Postmasters all over the United States are being beheaded because they were ten minutes late in arriving at the Post Office in the morning.

At another point in his attack on Bryan, which made the front page of the New York Times, Sherman said:

I have a suggestion: let Bryan cancel all his Chautauqua dates, proceed to Mexico in person, and there on the platform assemble the belligerents and deliver to them nightly and daily his celebrated lecture on 'The Prince of Peace.' If it costs the audience as much as it does in the United States, it may end the war by financial exhaustion.<sup>60</sup>

Sherman also clearly aired his views on foreign policy during his first year in office. As a product of the Midwest, he was far more concerned with internal problems than world-wide policy. He backed Woodrow Wilson's strict neutrality and detachment from the problems of the European world. Sherman voted with the Democrats on some foreign policy questions, and this angered many Illinois Republicans.<sup>61</sup>

The Senator's main issue in foreign policy at this time pertained to Mexico. He believed that the Mexican civil war's effects on the United States were intolerable, and that the United States should invoke the Monroe Doctrine, and intervene in Mexico. In one speech, he suggested that it would be a long time before Mexico would be a republic in any-

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<sup>60</sup> New York Times, September 20, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>61</sup> Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, pp. 255-256.



thing but name. He stated, "It was a military government in the past, and it will continue to be one for a long time. It is a republic in name only. It needs a healthy protectorate . . . ."<sup>62</sup>

In defending his position on Mexico, and in attack on Administration policy, he stated that over 1,000 Americans in Mexico had been killed, and that nearly \$20,000,000 worth of American property had been destroyed, confiscated, or stolen. He stated that this had occurred over a period of years, and that no end was in sight. He went on to suggest that no American with property or money was safe, given the state of internal disruption.<sup>63</sup> The chaos which existed in Mexico seemed a good enough reason to Sherman for the United States to step in and establish order.

The nation's liberal political forces wasted no time in counter-attacking Sherman. On the next day an editorial in the New York Times replied that Sherman was an "alarmist" and was exaggerating the number of Americans who had been injured in Mexico. The editorial concluded that Sherman " . . . seems unwittingly to have made himself a mouthpiece of the small body of irresponsible interventionists." Another reaction took place in Mexico, where Foreign Secretary Gamboa in a speech attempted to minimize the effect of the war on Americans, and suggested that Wilson's policy was the correct one.<sup>64</sup>

Sherman was also active in the Senate in introducing bills, as well as in debating on the tariff question. In 1913, Sherman's pet project

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<sup>62</sup>New York Times, September 20, 1913, p. 1.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.

<sup>64</sup>New York Times, September 21, 1913, II, p. 14.

was the passage of legislation for a new Presidential primary system. His bill provided for a nation-wide Presidential preference primary. It allowed for one delegate for every 15,000 votes cast at the last election, two delegates for each Senator and Representative from states which cast 25,000 votes or more; and one delegate for each Senator and Representative from states casting less than 25,000 votes.<sup>65</sup> He suggested that this reform, or some similar type of reform, was needed to " . . . remedy party abuses."<sup>66</sup> Sherman thought that a law of this type was needed to prevent another fiasco such as the 1912 Republican Convention in Chicago.<sup>67</sup>

With the lengthy debates over the tariff bill, the currency bill, and other legislation, Sherman's two-year term rapidly drew to a close. Sherman never displayed in word or deed any intention other than to run again for a full six year term. This election would be different, with the voters directly choosing the United States Senators. However, with the Democratic plurality in the Illinois General Assembly, this was actually in Sherman's best interests.

As the date for the primary election, September 9, 1914, began to draw near, Sherman attempted to assess what challenges he would have to face from within the Republican Party. In June, the situation was such that a "big primary fight" seemed likely.<sup>68</sup> However, Sherman's allies smoothed over the difficulties, and by August major opposition had

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<sup>65</sup>New York Times, May 23, 1913, p. 2.

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., March 6, 1914, p. 10.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Lawrence Yates Sherman from Edward Brundage, June 10, 1914. Box 48.

withdrawn. Sherman was gratified, and in near disbelief. He commented that "It would be so unlike anything that has ever happened to me that I would not believe it was real."<sup>69</sup> However, it was real, and Sherman defeated his nearest Republican rival by a 3-to-1 margin.<sup>70</sup>

The Democratic primary race for Senator was an entirely different story. Here two powerful factions were locked in combat. One candidate, Lawrence B. Stringer, received the backing of the powerful organization of Mayor Carter Harrison of Chicago, Governor Dunne, and United States Senator J. Hamilton Lewis. In addition, United States Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan made it known that he favored Stringer.<sup>71</sup>

The other candidate was Roger Sullivan, who controlled one faction of the Democratic machine in Chicago. Lacking such impressive endorsements, Sullivan worked diligently, and campaigned in every county in the state, every county seat, every ward of Chicago, and in the majority of the public halls of Chicago.<sup>72</sup> Sullivan won the nomination in the primary election by a comfortable margin. The votes in the primary election were as follows:

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<sup>69</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Edward J. Brundage, August 26, 1913. Box 48.

<sup>70</sup>Lewis G. Stevenson, (Secretary of State of the State of Illinois), Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915-1916 (Danville, Illinois: Illinois Printing Company, 1916. There were several other candidates, but none of them posed a serious challenge to Sherman, as Sherman had the support of the regular Republican Party organization.

<sup>71</sup>Lawrence B. Stringer Papers, letter from G. E. Hixson to Judge Stringer, July 22, 1914.

<sup>72</sup>Samuel Alvin Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan." Unpublished Master's thesis, History, Eastern Illinois University, 1964, p. 49.

DEMOCRAT

Roger Sullivan	141,008
Lawrence Stringer	109,928
Harry Woods	24,947
Barratt O'Hara	14,160
James Traynor	7,294

REPUBLICAN

Lawrence Y. Sherman	141,186
William E. Mason	51,937
Myer J. Stein	11,633
Frank Hall Childs	11,321

PROGRESSIVE

Raymond Robins	24,953
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SOCIALIST

Adolph Germer	4,220 <sup>73</sup>
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After the primaries, the Republican Party was united in its support of Sherman, as little blood had been shed in a primary battle. However, there was not complete unity in the Democratic ranks. While Governor Dunne on October 13 came out for Sullivan, Mayor Carter Harrison of Chicago refused to support Sullivan in any way.<sup>74</sup> Sullivan's problems in Chicago were further compounded by the fact that the Chicago Federation of Labor had Sullivan's name on the list of those unfair to organized labor.<sup>75</sup>

With the primary election over, each camp began formulating campaign strategy. With the race essentially a three-cornered one (Sherman, Sullivan, and Robins), it promised to be a hard-fought campaign, with no easy winner. Adding to the complexity of the campaign was the fact that the senatorial balance was so delicate that the seat was of more than ordinary importance, which drew persons to the state of national stature.

The Progressive candidate, Raymond Robins, benefitted most from endorsements. Robins persuaded Theodore Roosevelt to come to Illinois

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<sup>73</sup>Stevenson, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915-1916, pp. 648-649.

<sup>74</sup>Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan", p. 55.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.

and campaign for him, which Roosevelt personally did for two days.<sup>76</sup> During Roosevelt's trip, huge crowds turned out to hear Roosevelt praise the qualifications of Robins and label Sherman and Sullivan as bipartisan reactionaries.<sup>77</sup> Roosevelt considered Sherman so reactionary that he placed him in the same class as Joe Cannon, former Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Roosevelt gave speeches in Rock Island, Galesburg, Peoria, and Springfield, and hammered away on the theme of the machine politics of the Democratic and Republican candidates. Roosevelt went on to comment that "If any voter can square it with his conscience to vote for either Sherman or Sullivan, let him take out his conscience and look at it."<sup>78</sup> Later in the campaign, in October, Roosevelt pointed out that in February of 1913 Sherman had offered the Progressives a deal, whereby the Progressives would get the short term and Sherman the long term. Roosevelt suggested that the Illinois Progressives turned down the deal at his behest, in order to avoid "deals" and machine politics.<sup>79</sup>

Robins attempted to identify himself during the campaign with the charismatic Roosevelt, and draw strength from him. Robins also benefitted from the fact that organized labor favored him. The labor organizations had Sullivan and Sherman on their list of persons unfair to labor. Robins spoke against both Sullivan and Sherman, but criticized Sullivan most.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> New York Times, September 25, 1914, p. 6.

<sup>77</sup> Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan," p. 52.

<sup>78</sup> New York Times, September 25, 1914, p. 6.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid., October 20, 1914, p. 8.

<sup>80</sup> For example, in the Robins' campaign pamphlet, "For the Honor of Illinois," there is twenty pages of invective against Sullivan, and only one page of castigation of Sherman.

Sherman chose not to react strongly to the charges made by Roosevelt, as he recognized Roosevelt's popularity. He chose to speak later in the campaign at places Roosevelt had spoken, and quietly refute the charges. Sherman recognized the boost Roosevelt had given Robins was a substantial one, but thought the advantage would fade away as time passed.<sup>81</sup> Also, Sherman reasoned that " . . . Roosevelt's abusive language in East Saint Louis, especially, hurt him rather than me . . . ."<sup>82</sup> Sherman decided to take a temperate course, and not dignify the charges by answering them.

Sherman campaigned diligently, with the support of his Party. His allies, especially Illinois Representative Homer Tice, assisted him in building a small campaign fund.<sup>83</sup> Sherman also received a token amount of monetary assistance from the Republican Party's war chest, that money coming mainly from contributions from Chicago businessmen.<sup>84</sup>

In October, Sherman began attacking his opponents more forcefully. He pointed out to the rural areas that Robins had espoused the single tax, a tax which placed a heavy burden on land ownership. Naturally, this diminished whatever favor Robins had in this area.<sup>85</sup> Also, Sherman campaigned downstate on the issue that the downstate area needed a person from that region to represent their interests in the United States

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<sup>81</sup>Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers, letter to V. A. Wilson, September 28, 1914. Box 52.

<sup>82</sup>Ibid., letter to S. J. Drew, October 3, 1914.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., letter from Homer Tice, April 8, 1914.

<sup>84</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 94.

<sup>85</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to James Blazer, October 3, 1914. Box 53.

Senate. J. Hamilton Lewis, who resided in Chicago, was already in the Senate, and Sullivan and Robins were also from there.<sup>86</sup>

Roger C. Sullivan, the Democratic candidate, campaigned on the argument that he was the only candidate who would support the President.<sup>87</sup> Sullivan, at the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore in 1912, had been instrumental in helping Wilson get the Presidential nomination. In fact, Wilson conceded privately that if it had not been for Sullivan's efforts he would have lost the nomination.<sup>88</sup> In the senatorial campaign, Woodrow Wilson did attempt to repay Sullivan by assisting him. On October 12, 1914, President Wilson wrote a letter to Congressman Henry T. Rainey of Illinois, in which Wilson endorsed Sullivan. However, Sullivan refused the gesture, replying that it would hurt Wilson more than do good for himself (Sullivan).<sup>89</sup>

Sullivan had a number of problems. His opponents repeatedly referred to the Ogden Gas Company Scandal, in which he was involved.<sup>90</sup> Also, Sullivan was of the Roman Catholic faith, which did nothing for his campaign. In addition, labor had blacklisted him, and the Prohibitionists berated him for his anti-Prohibitionist stance.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Walter A. Townsend, Illinois Democracy: A History of the Party and Its Representative Members-Past and Present, ed. Charles Boeschenstein, vol. I (II vols., Springfield, Illinois: Democratic Historical Association, Incorporated, 1935), p. 318.

<sup>87</sup> Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan," p. 54.

<sup>88</sup> Chicago Daily Tribune, October 30, 1914, clipping in Sherman Papers.

<sup>89</sup> Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan," pp. 54-55.

<sup>90</sup> Walter S. Rogers, "The Embarrassing Mr. Sullivan," Harper's Weekly, October 24, 1914, pp. 394-395.

<sup>91</sup> Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan," p. 60.

A more serious problem for Sullivan was that he was not on good terms with William Jennings Bryan. Sullivan had defied Bryan in 1906,<sup>92</sup> when Bryan had demanded Sullivan's resignation as Democratic national committeeman.<sup>93</sup> The self-righteous Bryan, who had backed Stringer over Sullivan in the primary, had not forgiven Sullivan for his 1906 opposition, and so did nothing to assist Sullivan's campaign.

The results of the November 3, 1914, vote for United States Senator were as follows:<sup>94</sup>

<u>CANDIDATE</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>DOWNSTATE</u>	<u>COOK CO.</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Lawrence Sherman	Republican	286,853	103,808	390,661
Roger C. Sullivan	Democrat	214,031	159,372	373,403
Raymond Robins	Progressive	114,540	88,487	203,027
Adolph Germer	Socialist	17,720	22,169	39,889
George W. Wolsey	Prohibition	5,642	1,108	6,750
John M. Frances	Socialist-Labor	1,290	788	2,078

Sherman carried eighty counties, with eighteen going to Sullivan, and three for Robins.<sup>95</sup>

In analyzing the vote, it is interesting to note that the counties in the southwestern part of the state, where Bryan had been strong in 1896 and 1900, had voted for Sherman.<sup>96</sup> However, Sherman's plurality of 17,258 votes does not really show the extent of his victory, as Sherman carried almost five times as many counties as Sullivan.

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<sup>92</sup>Chicago Chronicle, August 1, 1906, clipping in Sherman Papers.

<sup>93</sup>Chicago Examiner, August 1, 1906, clipping in Sherman Papers.

<sup>94</sup>Stevenson, Blue Book of the State of Illinois, 1915-1916, pp. 694-696.

<sup>95</sup>Ibid.

<sup>96</sup>Lilly, "The Political Career of Roger C. Sullivan," pp. 60-61.



## CHAPTER III

### LAWRENCE YATES SHERMAN IN THE

#### SENATE: THE EARLY YEARS

After his election in November of 1914, Sherman directed his energies toward his work in the Senate. Sherman's committee assignments for the 1915-1917 Senate session were among the least powerful of committees.<sup>1</sup> Beyond the details of his committee and subcommittee work, Sherman began to display more interest in foreign affairs. Heretofore he had restricted his main efforts toward domestic affairs. Secure in his six year term, Sherman decided to expand into other areas.

During the year of 1915 Sherman tended to support the President's neutrality policy in regard to the European conflict.<sup>2</sup> Sherman saw America as still in the nineteenth century role of innocent bystander, isolated and aloof from world difficulties. Washington's Farewell Address, in which he admonished America to "avoid foreign entanglements", seemed to Sherman to still be valid advice. Also, the substantial German-

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<sup>1</sup>Canadian Relations; District of Columbia; Disposition of Useless Papers in the Executive Department; Transportation Routes to the Seaboard; Commerce; Forest Reservations and the Protection of Game; Pensions; Expenditures in the Post Office Department; and Privileges and Elections. Congressional Record, December 13, 1915, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup>In speeches made on May 15, 1915; June 8, 1915; and September 3, 1915, Sherman praised Wilson's position in foreign affairs with regard to the European conflict. New York Times, May 16, 1915, II, p. 2; June 9, 1915, p. 5; September 3, 1915, p. 18.

American community made its attitude known to Sherman through letters to the Senator. The majority of those writing to the Senator thought that the United States should at least remain neutral in the European war.<sup>3</sup>

The extent to which Sherman hoped for the continuation of the United States policy of non-involvement may be seen by his attitude toward the resignation of William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, who had opposed Sherman's election and had campaigned in Illinois for the opposition, was seen by Sherman as a force that tended to keep America neutral. Sherman believed that it was "peculiarly unfortunate that Mr. Bryan should withdraw from President Wilson's cabinet . . . ."<sup>4</sup>

At the time of the sinking of the Lusitania, Sherman refused to comment.<sup>5</sup> After this incident, he reacted with disfavor to what he viewed as Wilson's increasing partiality to the English cause. Sherman pointed out that the President was moving in the direction of American involvement in the war against Germany, and thought there was no real basis for this.<sup>6</sup>

Concerning the question of American neutrals on passenger ships of belligerent powers, Sherman believed that Congress should pass a resolution warning Americans not to travel aboard ships of countries at war. He reasoned that the sentiment against such a resolution "emanated from a group of editors in the East who were guided by the business profits from exporting munitions of war."<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Research in the Sherman Papers indicated that the overwhelming majority of letters from the German-American community favored neutrality.

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, June 9, 1915, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., May 11, 1915, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup>Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers, letter to G. Earle, March 5, 1916.

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, March 4, 1916, p. 2.

In the spring of 1916 Sherman became more vehement in his reaction to administration policy. He frankly stated that the United States had no reason whatever to get into the war.<sup>8</sup> Sherman believed that the President could exercise his right to sever diplomatic relations, but that anything beyond that was the jurisdiction of Congress. Regarding a United States declaration of war against Germany, Sherman stated flatly that he would vote against it.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, a gradual change developed in Lawrence Yates Sherman's attitude toward the President. At first Sherman praised and supported Wilson; later he was unsure, and finally we shall see that Sherman came to castigate Wilson in the strongest language, vote against the Versailles Treaty, and suggest that the President should be impeached.

Sherman took quite a conservative view of domestic legislation. It was his belief that there should be little or no government regulation of business, and that there should be a higher tariff.<sup>10</sup> To Sherman, a vital issue of the 1916 elections would be the reinstatement of a high protective tariff.<sup>11</sup> Sherman contended that the lowered tariff would result in a severe recession, a great loss of jobs, and general economic chaos. In addition, Sherman believed that Wilson was "basically hostile"

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<sup>8</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to William Heutschel, April 12, 1916. Box 81.

<sup>9</sup> New York Times, April 20, 1916, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech, n. d. g., "Results of the 1914 Campaign"; Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, Speech at Indianapolis, Indiana, January 29, 1915; Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, Labor Day Speech at Riverview Park, Chicago, Illinois, September 6, 1915. Box 61.

<sup>11</sup> The Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, resulted in a greatly lowered tariff.

to the railroads and business in general."<sup>12</sup>

Sherman also demonstrated his conservative position on the Ship Purchase Bill, which was debated in January and February of 1915. It would authorize the government to purchase and operate merchant vessels for the duration of the war. After the war, the ships would be sold and the government would cease operations in the shipping business.

A bipartisan coalition opposed the Ship Purchase Bill. Sherman, one of those against the bill, argued that the government had no legitimate reason for entering the shipping business. Sherman pointed out that the government was already engaged in competition with private enterprise in the banking business, in armor plate production, in nitrate production, in railroads, and in the freight and express business.<sup>13</sup> For the free enterprise system to exist and thrive, Sherman believed that a laissez-faire policy toward business was essential.

However, by the second week of February, 1915, the supporters of the Ship Purchase Act were close to acquiring the needed votes for passage in the Senate. To block the bill, the opposition organized a filibuster. One of those taking part was Lawrence Sherman. On February 11, 1915, Mr. Sherman began speaking at 1:00 A.M., and held the floor until 9:10 A.M., when he yielded to Senator Townsend, another Republican senator opposed to the bill. The filibuster lasted fifty-five hours and eleven minutes, the longest continuous Senate session in history.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> St. Louis Globe-Democrat, January 30, 1915, speech by Sherman in Indianapolis, Indiana. Clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers.

<sup>13</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech by Sherman, n. d. g.

<sup>14</sup> New York Times, February 11, 1915, p. 1, p. 4. The prior record was thirty-eight hours and forty-five minutes. It was concerning the 1893 debate over repeal of the Sherman Law.

In his speech opposing the measure, Sherman discussed the evils of government ownership of business. His arguments were essentially a repetition of his January twenty-ninth speech on the same subject, in which he inquired as to why, with high prices, the government did not also go into the milling business and the sheep ranching business. Senator Sherman remarked that:

Food and clothing are infinitely more important to the people than transportation over the sea . . . . The only effect of additional ocean transportation will be to take more flour and meat away from this country and send up the prices of these articles. Why not do something to reduce the cost of living?"<sup>15</sup>

Of course, the vital issue in this debate really was whether or not aid should be given to the British and French. Aid, once given, would tend to multiply, and Sherman thought that this would inevitably lead to direct American entry into the war, as indeed it later did.

While Sherman adamantly opposed military involvement in Europe, it is interesting to note his attitude toward Mexico. As early as January of 1915 Sherman was calling attention to the dangers which the unsettled conditions in Mexico were causing. Sherman stated that if the Republicans were put in office in 1916, they would formulate a Mexican policy which would protect United States citizens and their possessions in Mexico. Furthermore, Sherman charged that the current civil strife (January 1915) was directly the result of President Wilson's administration. Sherman stated that ". . . he (Wilson) undertook to decide on the moral title of various military dictators struggling for supremacy." Sherman believed that this was a mistake, because, as he put it, "What choice

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<sup>15</sup>New York Times, January 29, 1915, p. 6.

is there between Villa and Huerta? If Jesse James were alive, he could be substituted as a great moral improvement on both."<sup>16</sup>

The demand for American intervention in Mexico grew. On January 15, 1916, there occurred the murder of several Americans in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. This brought an open call by several members of the United States Senate for armed intervention in Mexico, or war with that country if General Carranza could not keep order. Senator Sherman presented a resolution calling for a Pan-American policing of Mexico. Also, Senator Borah of Idaho stated that " . . . the time has come to abandon the policy of watchful waiting and resort to force, if General Carranza cannot keep his promise of protection for Americans."<sup>17</sup>

The senatorial demands for action against Mexico were heightened greatly by the March 9, 1916, raid by Francisco Villa and his men on Columbus, New Mexico. Shortly before dawn on that day Villa and fifteen hundred men attacked Columbus, killing seventeen people. The raiders looted and burned several buildings, and then returned to Mexico.<sup>18</sup>

Senator Sherman quickly gave his solution to the problem. "Armed intervention in Mexico is the solution of present difficulties there," Sherman remarked in a statement released to the press. Sherman stated that we should send an army into Mexico to make the Mexican people respect us. Also, Sherman thought that this was necessary for the security of the Southwest. Sherman went on to say that "We may expect occurrences

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<sup>16</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech in Indianapolis, Indiana, January 29, 1915. Box 59.

<sup>17</sup>New York Times, January 13, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup>New York Times, March 10, 1916, p. 1. Of the seventeen Americans killed, eight were soldiers. The bandits suffered twenty-seven dead, and an unknown number wounded.

of that kind while we continue our indecisive policy . . . ."19

Two weeks later, Senator Sherman offered a more concrete plan of action. On March 23, 1916, Sherman delivered a speech on the floor of the Senate in which he outlined his ideas. He introduced a resolution to authorize the President to issue a call for 50,000 volunteers to be used in the service in Mexico. The resolution was tabled, to be dealt with later.<sup>20</sup>

Senator Sherman became rather angry at this point and delivered a discourse on his evaluation of the situation. He declared that Congress did not fully understand what was currently going on at the border and in Mexico. He pointed out that the United States had only a few thousand soldiers in Mexico, under General Pershing. He stated that they were several hundred miles from the border inside Mexico, with communication lines in poor shape. In addition, he said that the railways and bridges were indispensable for rapid movement, and Villa's forces could destroy these at any time.<sup>21</sup>

Sherman believed strongly that the 50,000 volunteers were needed, to be used as a reserve in case of trouble. He suggested that ". . . the best method of redeeming ourselves from disaster is to be prepared before the disaster strikes."<sup>22</sup> Sherman also observed that "we are

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<sup>19</sup>New York Times, March 10, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., March 23, 1916, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

thrusting our men into unknown danger without safeguarding them by prompt preparation."<sup>23</sup>

The desire by Sherman for 50,000 volunteers reflected more than a quick response to a current situation. It was Sherman's belief that the United States should be prepared to deal with any eventuality. This line of thinking may be traced back to the year 1914 when, in a speech by Sherman, he pointed out that the United States ought to be more concerned about preparedness. At that time it was his contention that the regular army should have been increased by voluntary enlistments, with those men serving a short term of service, and then forming a reserve.<sup>24</sup> Also, Sherman stated at that time that the United States Navy should be upgraded in number of ships and total firepower. He said, "If necessary, four battleships a year ought to be provided . . . as will bring out naval strength (up) to meet the needs to public defense . . . ."<sup>25</sup> In a 1915 speech Sherman stated that the regular army should be increased to 200,000 men, with a reserve of 300,000 more. Also, he thought that submarine and aircraft defenses ought to be properly developed, with an increase needed also in the number of battleships, a total of forty-eight being needed.<sup>26</sup>

Sherman's urgent pleas for preparedness did finally bear fruit. On March 16, 1916, by a unanimous vote of 69-0, the United States Senate

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<sup>23</sup>New York Times, March 24, 1916, p. 3.

<sup>24</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech, "Results of the 1914 Campaign", n. d. g., place of speech not mentioned. Box 58.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>New York Times, July 25, 1915, II, p. 4.



voted to adopt the resolution passed by the House of Representatives. The House Resolution called for increasing the regular army to nearly 120,000 men.<sup>27</sup>

Lawrence Yates Sherman, we have seen, believed in thorough military preparedness. However, it is vital to point out that he was interested solely in defense. Sherman stated his philosophy as ". . . simply the desire of this country to take care of itself in any time of danger and did not include any thought of expansion of territory and possessions."<sup>28</sup> Sherman plainly did not believe that it was America's role to have anything at all to do with the European war. However, a larger army was needed to deal with minor irritants, such as Villa, and to cope with such problems as might develop after the European war. Sherman stated:

I believe in military preparedness, which does not mean a policy to conquer peoples or add more territory, but a preparedness limited to our use for defensive purposes. No one knows what the future holds for us after the world emerges from this present maelstrom of war. Possibly some of the smaller nations should be protected and allowed to work out their own destiny in the way which seems best to them. The smaller countries of the world have made vast contributions toward human liberty during the past one hundred years.<sup>29</sup>

Besides preparedness, Sherman also was a proponent of several other concepts. For example, Sherman was an advocate of the cause of

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<sup>27</sup>New York Times, March 16, 1916, p. 2. In addition to the resolution that was passed, Senator Sherman introduced another resolution that had been passed by the House, which called for the withdrawal of the United States Army from the Philippine Islands, in order to add to the available troops in the United States. Senator Sherman's resolution would have had the effect of bringing home the 12,000 United States Army officers and troops in the Philippines.

<sup>28</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech at the Illinois Women's College, October 16, 1915. Sherman was a trustee of the college. Box 62.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

Prohibition. Sherman believed that to make the production and consumption of liquor illegal would contribute to family stability and to the moral health of the country. Accordingly, Sherman later voted to pass the Volstead Act.<sup>30</sup>

Another problem, as Sherman saw it, was the large number of immigrants coming to America. He pointed out that making good citizens of the immigrants was a necessity, and vital to the security of the country.<sup>31</sup> Particularly in time of national danger, he pointed out, it was essential to ensure the loyalty of all citizens. Therefore, Sherman spoke in favor of special education classes in citizenship for immigrants, to aid in the assimilation of immigrants into the American culture.

Women's suffrage was also an issue during the World War I era. Sherman, a conservative, might have been expected to oppose the measure. However, he supported the women's suffrage movement, and voted in favor of the constitutional amendment. Sherman reasoned that women had played an important role on the frontier and in the development of the country, and accordingly had earned the right to vote.<sup>32</sup>

Sherman, we have seen, was quite industrious and vociferous in these Senate years. Coming from a midwestern state, critics might fault him for being weak in the area of foreign affairs. To meet this possibility, Sherman tried to develop an image of himself as identified with

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<sup>30</sup> Congressional Record, August 1, 1917, p. 5663. In return for Sherman's support of the Prohibition movement, various Temperance Societies gave him their support in his 1914 campaign. Sherman later gave credit to his pro-Prohibition stand for helping him win election. Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers, letter to H. D. Cheney, January 5, 1915.

<sup>31</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech by Sherman at the Illinois Women's College, October 16, 1915. Box 61.

<sup>32</sup> Lawrence Sherman Papers, letter to H. Cheney, January 7, 1915. Box 58.

neutrality, military preparedness, a high tariff, and emphasis on prosperity at home through a laissez-faire policy toward business. Also, Sherman identified himself with reform in the sense that he supported both Women's Suffrage and the Prohibition movements. These policies, Sherman hoped, would result in a better America.

## CHAPTER IV

### SHERMAN'S TRY FOR THE 1916 REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION

The election year of 1916 seemed a propitious one for Lawrence Yates Sherman. He was now fifty-eight years old, and had been serving the public in one capacity or another since 1885. Ever aspiring to greater heights, Sherman determined to bid for the Republican Presidential nomination. Among Republicans, presidential politics in 1916 was a bit confused. The Democrats suffered no such uncertainty, as there was little doubt that they would renominate President Woodrow Wilson. Wilson had successfully kept the United States out of the European war, and promised to continue to do so. Also, he had called for several pieces of reform legislation. Wilson was thus seemingly in excellent position to run for a second term.

The Republican Party had no such clear choice for their candidate for the presidency in 1916. Four years earlier the G. O. P. had split into two factions, the Republicans and the Progressives, with President Taft and Theodore Roosevelt as the candidates. As a result of the split, the party fared poorly at the polls, and the wounds were just now beginning to heal. It was certain the Republicans would need a strong candidate to defeat the President. Preferably, the person would be one who had not taken sides in the 1912 rift, and who could unify it once more. Since the party lacked a single, dominant individual at this

time, numerous Republicans sought the nomination.

The Progressive Party also found itself in a difficult situation. The party was dependent on one man, Theodore Roosevelt. The dynamic personality and tremendous popularity of the former President had created the party, and without him it might perhaps fade into oblivion. At this time Roosevelt was considering returning to the Republican Party, and perhaps hoping to be its candidate in 1916. Therefore, the role of the Progressives in the 1916 election was unclear.

Given the wide-open situation for the Republican Presidential nomination, the time seemed opportune to Lawrence Sherman to make an attempt for it. His background in public service was adequate, with over thirty years of experience. Also, he was considered to be of a proper age for running for the Presidency. Sherman fully anticipated two major difficulties he would encounter in his quest: his lack of national status, and his position on foreign policy. During his early years in the Senate he had made an effort to acquaint himself with American foreign relations. He had espoused a policy of neutrality in regards to European concerns, while demanding an active role for the United States in the Mexican border problems. Indeed, Sherman had received front-page coverage of his statements on the Mexican situation in such a prestigious newspaper as the New York Times. Therefore, Sherman thought he could honestly present himself as knowledgeable in the realm of foreign diplomacy.

However, meeting the criteria of being known as a national politician was somewhat more difficult. True, Sherman had worked diligently in the Senate, and occasionally enjoyed front-page coverage in the national newspapers. He knew, though, that much more than this would be needed.

Accordingly, Sherman began to develop an organization of allies to assist him.

Sherman had early prepared the groundwork for his 1916 campaign. In 1913 Sherman's main Cook County ally, Edward J. Brundage, had founded the "1916 Club" with a magazine entitled The Reflector to serve as its voice. The 1916 Club and The Reflector were joined in 1915 by the "Original Sherman Club." These organizations raised funds and produced and distributed literature to promote Sherman's candidacy.<sup>1</sup>

To gain grassroots political support, Sherman stepped up his public appearances. One of these, made at Chicago's Riverview Park on Labor Day, 1915, received favorable comments in several newspapers, and was published in its entirety in a magazine.<sup>2</sup> His speech, entitled "A Broader Americanism", stressed the themes of military preparedness, a higher tariff, neutrality, thrift, and the dignity of labor. One result of this speech was that the Chicago Tribune in September of 1915 came out in support of Sherman for President. The Chicago Tribune in its editorials stated that Sherman had developed into a definite possibility for President, and that Sherman was aware of the issues. The Chicago Tribune continued to remain loyal to Sherman through the Republican National Convention.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, pp. 253-254; Peoria Herald-Transcript, November 6, 1913, clipping in Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers; The Reflector: A Chronicle of Politics, vol. 1, November, 1913, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup>The magazine was Banker's Magazine, October, 1915, pp. 481-485.

<sup>3</sup>Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1915, editorial column, clipping in Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. The 1916 Republican National Convention was held in Chicago from June 7th through June 10th.

Sherman also spent considerable time during 1915 touring the country and making speeches. Sherman hoped to make his name familiar to the voters, and to gain friends in influential places. Sherman especially concentrated on the Midwest and Western states, but also traveled up and down the East Coast. To illustrate the intensity of Sherman's speechmaking, here is a partial schedule of Sherman's fall itinerary:

October 29	St. Louis, Missouri. Millers' Club.
November 1	Topeka, Kansas. Political speech.
November 2	Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Political speech.
November 6	Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Speech to Life Insurance Underwriters.
November 10	Chicago, Illinois. Speech to Association of Commerce.
November 11	Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Political speech.
November 12	Benton Harbor, Michigan. Political speech.
November 13	Chicago, Illinois. Speech to Irish Fellowship Club.
November 15	Chicago, Illinois. Speech to Masonic Lodge.
November 16	Minneapolis, Minnesota. Political speech, sponsored by the <u>St. Paul Dispatch</u> .
November 17	Billings, Montana. Political speech.
November 18	Great Falls, Montana. Political speech.
November 19	Butte, Montana. Political speech. <sup>4</sup>

This pace had been maintained by Sherman since the preceding March, as he strove to make his name familiar around the country. Also, Sherman thought his appearances might in part help reunify the party, which had been in a shambles only four years earlier.<sup>5</sup>

In his speeches around the country, Sherman continued to emphasize the issues of military preparedness, a higher tariff, neutrality, and prosperity, all of which the Republicans would support when victorious in 1916.<sup>6</sup> Also, Sherman upheld the virtues of thrift, economy, and hard work in his speeches.

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<sup>4</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Richard Yates, Springfield, Illinois, October 25, 1915; letter to O. F. Berry, Carthage, Illinois, October 29, 1915. Box 62.

<sup>5</sup>Lawrence Sherman Papers, letter to John Eversman, October 18, 1915.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., letter to D. J. Donovan, September 8, 1915.

The first order of preparation for the June Convention was to make sure that Sherman's political base in Illinois was secure. This was achieved in a series of meetings with other top Illinois Republicans in the spring of 1916. On February 5, 1916, the Illinois Republican State Central Committee endorsed Sherman. Also, the committee selected Peoria as the site for the April 21 Republican state convention.<sup>7</sup>

At the state convention a major political shift occurred. Control of the party was wrested from the forces of ex-Governor Deneen by a coalition of the supporters of Sherman, Frank O. Lowden, who aspired to be Governor of Illinois, and Chicago Mayor William H. Thompson.<sup>8</sup> In effect, the basis for the coalition was a three-cornered political deal. Each of the men needed the other's support. Frank Lowden hoped to be the Republican candidate for Governor of Illinois, and he needed Sherman and Thompson's support. Sherman had to have total commitment from his own state in order to have any chance at all of getting the Presidential nomination. Also, since the national convention would be held in Chicago, Mayor Thompson's backing could prove most beneficial. Mayor Thompson wished to be a national committeeman, and elicited a pledge of support for this in return for his backing of Lowden and Sherman.<sup>9</sup>

Additionally, at the April meeting Sherman's close supporter, Edward J. Brundage of Chicago, gained support for his goal. Brundage wanted to run for Attorney-General of Illinois in 1916. Of course, he counted on Sherman for support. Also Lowden may have given a

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<sup>7</sup>New York Times, February 6, 1916, section I, p. 8.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., April 22, 1916, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, pp. 277-278.



promise to back Brundage at this time.<sup>10</sup>

After the political maneuvering was over, the convention formally endorsed Sherman for President. Sherman then addressed the convention, and in his speech he attacked President Wilson's administration. He charged that Wilson had been "playing politics in the present submarine controversy," and said that if diplomatic relations with Germany were to be broken off it should have been done when the Lusitania was sunk.<sup>11</sup>

In May of 1916, Sherman declared his formal candidacy for President. Edward Brundage and Charles Gates Dawes officially launched Sherman's campaign, with Lowden's blessings. Mayor Thompson, irritated that his arch-rival Brundage would be the candidate for Attorney-General of Illinois, refused to comment in mid-May, but later came out in full support of Sherman.<sup>12</sup>

The only serious Illinois opposition to Sherman came from James R. Mann, the Republican leader in the United States House of Representatives. After finding that few persons wanted him as the candidate from Illinois, Mann withdrew. However, Mann did sound a note of discord when he then came out for Elihu Root for President. In an address before the Hamilton Club of Chicago, Mr. Mann scoffed at the Sherman candidacy, saying that it would reduce the Illinois influence in the National Convention to a "round zero."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>St. Louis Globe-Democrat, April 22, 1916, clipping in Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 84.

<sup>11</sup>New York Times, April 22, 1916, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 265.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, November 5, 1915, p. 6.

From other indicators, though, Sherman seemed to be doing quite well. In its December 18, 1915 issue, The Literary Digest polled over seven hundred Republican newspaper editors. The results were that two hundred and forty-nine of the editors favored Elihu Root, one hundred and fifty-two were for Justice Charles Evans Hughes, one hundred forty-four chose Lawrence Yates Sherman, one hundred and eight preferred Senator Borah of Idaho, and the rest of the selections were scattered among the other candidates. Root and Hughes were the candidates receiving support on a more national basis, with Sherman strong in the midwest, and Borah favored in the Rocky Mountain area. The Literary Digest poll also found that five of fifty-eight Republican members of Congress heard from were for the Sherman candidacy.<sup>14</sup>

One of Sherman's strongest sources of support in his campaign came from the newspaper editors. The Illinois editors overwhelmingly supported him, with the Chicago Tribune being the leader. Also, the Chicago Evening Post in April 1916 came out strongly for Sherman. The Literary Digest commented that " . . . the favorite son of Illinois, who basks in wider favor than the favorite son in any other State, is its Republican Senator, Lawrence Yates Sherman."<sup>15</sup>

Sherman also received support from newspaper editors in other states. The Philadelphia Inquirer stated that "The end of April, according to present indications, is likely to see Sherman the actual leader . . . ." The Philadelphia Inquirer also commented that "He

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<sup>14</sup>"Republican Forecast of the Presidential Campaign," The Literary Digest, December 18, 1915, pp. 1403-1405.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 1433.

(Sherman) will have in all probability a considerable following among the uninstructed delegates from the middle and far west." The Philadelphia Public Ledger stated that "By the end of April . . . Senator Sherman is likely to lead on paper, with the solid delegation of fifty-eight votes from his own state . . . ." The Philadelphia Public Ledger also stated that Sherman had some support outside his state, as he had " . . . the known good will of several uninstructed delegates, as well as a considerable second choice following."<sup>16</sup>

Some other Eastern newspapers also looked with optimism on Sherman's candidacy. The New York Sun had Sherman scheduled to lead from the start. The Baltimore American "picks Senator Sherman to lead on the first ballot, gather strength from unpledged delegations as the roll calls proceed, with the possibility of greater additions when delegations from other states begin naming their second choice."<sup>17</sup>

Sherman also received support from Illinois farmers. In a letter of support, T. N. Abbott, member of the executive committee of the Illinois Farmers' Institute stated that " . . . it is the general opinion that Root is too old . . . ." He further commented that:

You will have the Illinois delegation without question. The only objections against you are that you are a comparatively new man in national affairs and it is feared that you do not have the acquaintance over the country which will insure (sic) you the nomination. The poll of the Republican editors went a long way to dispel that idea.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Illinois State Journal (Springfield, Illinois), April 1, 1916. Clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 84.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter from T. N. Abbott, January 2, 1916. Box 82.

During the spring of 1916, Sherman received many letters of support from Illinois residents and out-of-state persons. Most were letters of encouragement, but some were from delegates. In these letters Sherman received promises of support from individual delegates, and predictions of the support of entire delegations.<sup>19</sup>

The Republican presidential primaries in April and May were viewed with interest and hope by the candidates. Sherman's supporters sent out posters and leaflets to remind Republican voters to come out and vote even though Sherman had no opposition in the Illinois primary. Hopefully, a strong turnout would produce a solid block of delegates instructed for Sherman. As it turned out, the concern was not necessary. The Chicago vote in the April 11, 1916, presidential preferential primary was: Wilson, (Democrat) 79,398; Sherman, (Republican) 63,823; Roosevelt, 11,620; Hughes, 950; and William H. Thompson, 2.<sup>20</sup> Similar results were later tabulated in the rest of the state, and Sherman now had 58 delegate votes for the convention.

Soon after the primary, rumors began circulating that Sherman wanted to have Theodore Roosevelt for President if he could not receive the nomination himself. Sherman quickly put an end to these rumors,

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<sup>19</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter from W. R. Conklin, April 25, 1916; letter from J. L. Greene, November 29, 1915. Also vaguely mentioned in Sherman's correspondence is a "feeler" from a state delegation as to "railroad fare and expense money." A Georgia citizen wrote Brundage, and indirectly stated that in return for money some assistance for Sherman might be obtained. Of course, Brundage refused the deal.. Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter from Edward Brundage, October 26, 1915. Box 62.

<sup>20</sup>New York Times, April 12, 1916, p. 1.

stating that "The alleged interview or interviews claiming I am for Roosevelt as second choice are pure falsification."<sup>21</sup>

After the Illinois primary, the out-of-state prospects began to look less favorable. On April 16, 1916, the Chicago Tribune published the results of a canvass of Republican editors across the nation. Justice Hughes placed first, with Theodore Roosevelt in second place, and Sherman far down the list.<sup>22</sup>

On the East coast, the situation began to look worse for Sherman. In a poll by the Boston Transcript of Republican members of the Massachusetts legislators, it was found that Justice Hughes was the overwhelming favorite. As it turned out, Massachusetts voters in their Republican presidential preference primary decided to send unpledged delegates instead of delegates for Hughes, Root, or Roosevelt.<sup>23</sup>

Rather than risk defeat, Sherman sometimes chose to withdraw. For example, Sherman chose to withdraw from the Montana primary for President, stating that this area was quite far from his base of power, and was uncertain territory.<sup>24</sup> On the delegate situation in general, Sherman made the following analysis:

The prospects outside of Illinois are as encouraging as I could expect. I have not made a contest in any (other) state because in the main the delegates are coming un-instructed. I believe contests would have served no useful purpose either to us or to the party welfare hereafter. It seems like a wide open convention up to this time.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>New York Times, April 16, 1916, p. 16.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid. It should be noted, though, that Illinois Republican editors voted as follows: Sherman 204, Roosevelt 82, and Hughes 36.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., March 30, 1916, p. 6; Christian Science Monitor, April 27, 1916, p. 1.

<sup>24</sup>New York Times, March 30, 1916, p. 6.

<sup>25</sup>... ..

As the June seventh convention approached, two promising actions did occur. One was that a Sherman man, Thomas Williamson, was appointed assistant Secretary of the convention.<sup>26</sup> This was not exactly control of the convention, but it was significant.

Of more importance was the fact that as the convention drew closer, Mayor Thompson became more and more friendly. Thompson entertained many of the senator's friends, together with the Illinois delegates and their alternates to the nominating convention, at the La Salle Hotel in Chicago on May 20. Frank Lowden, the Republican candidate for Governor, placed himself at the right hand of Thompson, and next to former Governor Deneen. Thompson was quite congenial and vowed " . . . to do everything in my power to further Sherman's (presidential) candidacy."<sup>27</sup>

On Wednesday, June 7, 1916, the Republican National Convention began. The first few days of the assemblage were consumed with political speeches, meetings, and attempts to sway votes of delegates. Finally, on Friday, June 9, the nominations were made. Chosen to place Sherman's name in nomination for the Presidency was William J. Calhoun. Mr. Calhoun, a Chicago businessman and an ex-Minister to China, had served as President of the Original Sherman Club. He had been an ardent supporter of Sherman's, and had spent considerable time and money in support of Sherman's candidacy. In placing Lawrence Yates Sherman's name in nomination, Calhoun made the following speech:

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<sup>26</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter from Charles D. Haller, Chairman, Republican National Committee, May 10, 1916. Box 86.

<sup>27</sup> William T. Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois: The Life of Frank O. Lowden (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 281.

The possibility of danger to this country now, or in the near future, are present as never before since the Civil War, and, strange to say, our opponents seem oblivious to these world-wide conditions, and apparently are more intent on the size of the pork barrel than they are on the size of our army and navy for defense purposes.

The personality of the candidates we nominate may have much to do with the result. I am authorized by the delegation from Illinois, and it, in turn, is instructed by the Republicans of the State, to present for your consideration the name of a candidate for the high office of President of the United States.

The story of his life, as I know it, is for the most part a very simple one, and yet it has in it many elements of the heroic which elevated it far above the commonplace. He has been twice elected to the United States Senate, once by the State Legislature and once by a direct vote of the people; in each instance, his election was preceded by a primary vote for the nomination.

This is the outline of the life story of the man whose name I am instructed to submit for your consideration. In behalf of the State of Illinois, I nominate Lawrence Yates Sherman as your candidate for President of the United States.<sup>28</sup>

The speech, however, was not made under the best of conditions.

The convention hall was somewhat noisy and chaotic at the time; and not everyone heard his speech. As Sherman stated in his letter of thanks:

Your address placing me in nomination was made in most unfavorable surroundings. The coliseum is a vast building in which hardly any human voice can carry even to a majority of the audience. The substance of the address, however, is what counts, and in that I am entirely content.<sup>29</sup>

After the speech, a demonstration for Sherman for President took place. The twenty-five minute long demonstration was orchestrated by Mayor Thompson, who marched several hundred Sherman supporters into the hall and

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<sup>28</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 4. Mr. Calhoun was also a member of the Committee on National Defense, an organization which called for military preparedness and a larger defense budget.

<sup>29</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to William J. Calhoun, June 14, 1916. Box 87.

placed them at vantage points, where they could do the most good. The Sherman supporters, some of whom marched up and down the aisles, were led by a man costumed to look like "Uncle Sam." Also, several behind him were attired in the manner of the picture "Spirit of '76." In addition, a flashily dressed child riding on a baby elephant followed the "'76'ers."<sup>30</sup>

For about fifteen minutes the hundreds of Sherman supporters cheered and did their best to create an enthusiasm for the Sherman candidacy. After the whistles, cheers, and yells of the first quarter hour, the demonstration died out, and conversation took place the last ten minutes. Following the latter ten minutes of inaction, the mood of the crowd indicated that it was time for the official demonstration to end, and for other speeches to be made.<sup>31</sup>

Actually, the demonstration had been rather cleverly organized. The several hundred Sherman supporters had taken the seats of delegates who were out of the hall at the time. This was possible since Mayor Thompson had control of the police, and the police would permit no one to return at this time. What this meant was that bona fide ticket holders, newspaper reporters, and invited guests of the convention were not allowed back inside. In fact, not even the Sergeant-at-Arms could get in! Ordinarily, at least a select few who had exited would have been allowed to return. However, "Big Bill" Thompson's men, added to

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<sup>30</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid. When the Sherman demonstration began tapering down, the Indiana delegation began preparing for its demonstration for its candidate, Fairbanks. The crowd hissed and shouted for the convention to get on. Most of this was due, though, to the delegates' displeasure with the Thompson tactics of taking over the hall rather than anything else.



those already in the hall, filled it considerably beyond the number permitted by law and the fire department. Had the genuine ticket-holders been allowed back in, there would have been little or no space for the Sherman-Thompson forces.<sup>32</sup>

Theodore Roosevelt's name was among those placed in nomination. The ex-President had declined the nomination of the Progressives, perhaps in hope that the Republican Party would nominate him. However, while Roosevelt's name drew prolonged applause from the crowd, it did not draw many votes. Roosevelt did make his feeling known, though, that if he were not nominated himself, he hoped that the convention would award Henry Cabot Lodge the honor.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, Friday evening, June 9, the balloting began. On the first ballot Charles Evans Hughes, the dignified Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, led in the balloting. The results were as follows:<sup>34</sup>

CANDIDATE	VOTE
Justice Charles Evans Hughes (New York)	253 $\frac{1}{2}$
Senator John W. Weeks (Massachusetts)	105
Elihu Root (New York)	103
Senator Albert B. Cummins (Iowa)	85
ex-Senator Theodore E. Burton (Ohio)	77 $\frac{1}{2}$
ex-Vice-President Charles Fairbanks (Indiana)	74 $\frac{1}{2}$
Senator Lawrence Yates Sherman (Illinois)	66
ex-President Theodore Roosevelt (New York)	65
Senator La Follette (Wisconsin)	25
others	118

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<sup>32</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 281.

<sup>34</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 1. Also, for a discussion of Sherman and his role in the convention see Official Report of the Sixteenth Republican National Convention Held in Chicago, Illinois, June 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1916 (New York, 1916), pp. 181, 184, 196.

On the first ballot, Sherman received sixty-six votes, and was in seventh place in total votes. Sherman's vote support by state was as follows: Illinois, 56; Arkansas, 2; California, 2; Kansas, 2; Alabama, 1; Louisiana, 1; Oklahoma, 1; Texas, 1. Two of the Illinois delegates had deserted Sherman, but the others would remain steadfast through the second vote.<sup>35</sup>

Sherman must have been dismayed that he received so few votes from only seven other states. He had spent nearly two years traveling and making speeches, and had spent a great deal of time, effort, and money in the process. To this point, all available indicators such as the newspapers, editor polls, correspondence, and conversations seemed to suggest that considerably greater support would be forthcoming. This, however, failed to materialize on June ninth. Sherman's dream was fading at this point.

The second ballot was also taken Friday evening. The results were as follows:<sup>36</sup>

CANDIDATE	VOTE	GAIN OR LOSS
Charles Evans Hughes	328 $\frac{1}{2}$	+75
Elihu Root	98 $\frac{1}{2}$	-4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Charles Fairbanks	88 $\frac{1}{2}$	+14
Albert Cummins	85	--
Theodore Roosevelt	81	+16
John Weeks	79	-26
Lawrence Sherman	65	-1
La Follette	25	--
others	123	-7

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<sup>35</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 1; Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 281.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 1.

On this ballot Sherman's vote had decreased by only one, not a serious loss. His vote breakdown by state was: Illinois, 56; Arkansas, 2; Kansas, 2; Texas, 2; California, 1; Louisiana, 1; Oklahoma, 1. On this ballot Sherman had lost one vote from California and Alabama, but had gained one additional vote from Texas.<sup>37</sup>

After two ballots, it looked as if Justice Charles Evans Hughes would be nominated. He had gained seventy-five votes on the second ballot, and his supporters were confident. The required number of votes for nomination was 484 (of 987 possible), and Hughes already had over two-thirds of the required number, far more than his nearest competitor.<sup>38</sup> After the second ballot the convention adjourned for the evening, to vote again on Saturday. Following the second ballot Friday evening, representatives of the Hughes movement in the New York delegation predicted that Hughes would be nominated on Saturday, on the fourth ballot. They further stated that they thought the additional votes would come from the forces of Cummins, Sherman, and La Follette, and give Hughes a winning total of over five hundred votes.<sup>39</sup>

What actually occurred on Saturday, June 10, was more favorable for Hughes than even his supporters had hoped. On Saturday on the third vote for the Republican nomination for President, Charles Evans Hughes won an overwhelming victory. The results of the third ballot were:

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<sup>37</sup>New York Times, June 10, 1916, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., June 11, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., June 10, 1916, p. 1.

Charles Evans Hughes	949 $\frac{1}{2}$
Theodore Roosevelt	18 $\frac{1}{2}$
others	<u>19</u>
	987 possible votes. <sup>40</sup>

During the night several of the candidates had withdrawn from the race, concluding that Hughes would be the eventual winner. The New York Times stated that "One of the real causes for the flop to Hughes was the withdrawal of Senator Lawrence Yates Sherman of Illinois from the contest for the nomination."<sup>41</sup>

Sherman had talked on the telephone at about 2:30 A.M. on Saturday morning with his managers, and they had given him a gloomy forecast. They stated that if he decided to release the delegation, they would vote for Hughes. Sherman then decided not to postpone the inevitable. When word of Sherman's decision reached other delegations, they concluded that further struggle would be futile. Several other candidates then withdrew, and Hughes won a near-unanimous triumph on the third ballot.<sup>42</sup>

Early Saturday morning, after having talked with his managers and having released his delegation, Sherman made this statement to the press:

I joined in the belief of the fitness of Mr. Hughes and asked my friends of the Illinois delegation and others to give their united vote to him . . . .

I wish to express my profound gratitude for the support of the Illinois Republicans and those elsewhere who have so significantly honored me with their confidence.

Let us now turn to the coming duty of the campaign to redeem the country from Democratic misrule and restore the wholesome administration of a people's government by a sweeping Republican victory.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>New York Times, June 11, 1916, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., June 11, 1916, p. 4.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

Although the nomination for the Presidency had been lost, there still remained the possibility that Sherman might be asked to serve as the Vice-Presidential nominee. It seemed logical to balance the ticket with someone from the midwest. In Sherman's favor was the fact that he initiated the move to Hughes by withdrawing. Sherman's hopes were quickly dashed, though, when Charles Fairbanks of Indiana received the nod for the Vice-Presidential slot.

Official notification of candidates by a committee of dignitaries was still the custom in 1916. Originally, Senator Borah of Idaho was selected to head the notification committee for Mr. Fairbanks. However, Borah declined the role. The Republican campaign committee then chose Senator Sherman to head the notification committee. Senator Sherman accepted this honor, and was the principal orator at the official ceremonies on August 31.<sup>44</sup> Sherman gave to Fairbanks the official notification letter which stated:

Pursuant to instructions of the Republican National Convention of 1916 and in behalf of the Committee of Notification, you are formally advised of your nomination as the candidate of the Republican Party for Vice-President.<sup>45</sup>

After the convention was over, Sherman concluded that he had acted properly in his decision to release the Illinois delegates. He stated:

All things considered I believe we adopted the wise course. Eventually I believe Hughes would have won. A long contest might have engendered some feeling. As it was the Illinois delegates, fifty-eight in number, ended the matter by our decisive action . . . .<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>New York Times, August 13, 1916, p. 10.

<sup>45</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Charles W. Fairbanks, August 31, 1916. Box 87.

<sup>46</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to William J. Calhoun, June 14, 1916. Box 85.

During the 1916 campaign, Sherman made many speeches and supported the Hughes-Fairbanks ticket wholeheartedly. He did so despite the fact that some Republican leaders in Illinois stated the the dignified Hughes "was a drag on the state ticket."<sup>47</sup> Still, Sherman campaigned diligently for the national leaders of the party. In his speeches, Sherman sharply criticized the proposed income tax increases, which he believed were unfair and inequitable. He also condemned the tariff which, for most Republicans, was too low.<sup>48</sup>

Another task for Sherman after the convention was to try and repay his political debts. Edward J. Brundage, who controlled one faction of the Cook County Republican Party, moved rapidly to collect. Brundage, who had been the prime mover behind the Original Sherman Club, and who had steadfastly supported Sherman for President, now wanted to run for the position of Attorney-General of Illinois. This caused Sherman a problem, as one of his other friends also wished to run for Attorney-General. Sherman was therefore reluctant to enter into the dilemma of choosing between friends to support. At this point Brundage wrote a series of letters to Sherman, reminding him of the services he had given. Sherman acknowledged this, and decided to support Brundage.<sup>49</sup>

One of Sherman's favorite targets for invective during the fall campaign was organized labor. On the Senate floor on August 14, 1916, Sherman characterized Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation

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<sup>47</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 289.

<sup>48</sup>New York Times, August 25, 1916, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Edward J. Brundage, June 27, 1916. Brundage was elected Attorney-General of Illinois. Box 86.

of Labor, as a "public nuisance." Sherman went on to say that "There is no more tyrannical outrageous injustice than that of leaders who live on the sweat of other people's brows." Sherman had been opposed by organized labor in Chicago in his 1914 campaign, and stated that "I have been owing this to Mr. Gompers for some time . . . ." <sup>50</sup> In a series of speeches, Sherman attacked Gompers in the harshest of terms. Sherman employed many adjectives in his descriptions of Gompers, and thought that restraint, in this case, was not warranted.

Gompers responded to Sherman's attack in a series of speeches, in which he stated that the attacks on him were not justified. Gompers made the dubious statement that "I never have attempted, and do not now attempt, as I do not have the power, to deliver the vote of any man or group of men." Gompers mentioned that Senator Sherman had called him "poison ivy," a "skunk," and a "parasite." He suggested that the only inference which could be drawn from Senator Sherman's attack was that Sherman was not against him personally, but rather opposed to the principles and activities of the American Federation of Labor. <sup>51</sup>

While Sherman did personally dislike Gompers, Gompers was correct in his assessment of Sherman's thoughts about organized labor in general. For example, in September of 1916 it was proposed to give the Interstate Commerce Commission control over wages and hours. This was in response to a threatened strike by railroad employees. Senator Sherman deeply believed that this was wrong, that it interfered with the free enterprise system, and was in essence meekly submitting to the threats of the labor

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<sup>50</sup>New York Times, August 15, 1916, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., August 16, 1916, p. 4; August 18, 1916, p. 4.

leaders. He said he would oppose the bill, on the grounds that it was setting a dangerous precedent. "It will turn Congress into an arbitration board for all time to come," he warned. Sherman so vehemently opposed the strike settlement bill that he stated he was going to make speeches directly to railroad workers, as soon as Congress adjourned, to inform them that they were being "buncoed" by the eight-hour day. He was anxious to have his vote on the bill known, as he regarded the bill as a "humiliation to the country."<sup>52</sup> Sherman also thought that by direct communication with the workers he could get them to oppose the bill.

Sherman also spoke on many other issues during his many speeches of the fall 1916 campaign. He still had strong feelings about staying prepared but aloof from the European conflict, and the next few years would find him becoming one of the more vocal critics of the Wilson administration. Particularly, Sherman would play a key role in the fight over the Treaty of the League of Nations.

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<sup>52</sup>New York Times, September 2, 1916, p. 2; September 3, 1916, p. 2; September 7, 1916, p. 6.



## CHAPTER V

### SENATOR SHERMAN AND THE WAR YEARS

During the 1917-1919 Congressional session, Lawrence Yates Sherman served on several of the standing committees of the Senate. His assignments were the committees of Appropriations, Canadian Relations, Commerce, District of Columbia, Forest Reservations and Protection of Game, and Privileges and Elections.<sup>1</sup> During this period of time Sherman became a very vocal critic of the Wilson administration. Sherman opposed all measures the President suggested which gave the appearance of ending American neutrality.

In February of 1917, Congress considered legislation to arm American merchant ships. This measure had been requested by President Wilson as a protection against the ever increasing dangers at sea. Germany had announced unrestricted submarine warfare in a wide zone around Great Britain effective February 1, 1917, whereupon Wilson severed diplomatic relations with Germany. Subsequently the "Zimmerman Note" was disclosed to the public. This message from the German Foreign Office, relayed through the German ambassador at Washington, D. C., suggested that in the event of war between the United States and Germany, Mexico should form an alliance with Germany. In return for diverting the United States, Mexico would receive assistance in taking control of the states of Texas,

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<sup>1</sup>Congressional Record, March 12, 1917, p. 50. Senator Sherman and Senator Warren G. Harding of Ohio served together on the Commerce committee.

New Mexico, and Arizona. Also, the "Zimmerman Note" asked the Mexican government to urge Japan to join the war against the United States.<sup>2</sup> As a result of the "Zimmerman Note" a considerable amount of public support developed for such war measures as the arming of American ships. Several Senate Republicans decided to block action on this and other bills by means of a filibuster. At this time there was no procedure for ending a filibuster, so a small group of senators could hold the floor for as long as they could continue speaking. Actually, different groups of senators wanted the filibuster for different reasons. The isolationist group believed that such a law as the Armed Neutrality Act would lead the United States into war. Others desired to block the Armed Neutrality measure and several key appropriations bills in order to force the President to call a special session of Congress. This would embarrass the President, and maintain Congressional power in what appeared to be a critical period in United States history. The filibuster began on February 23, 1917, and extended to March 4, 1917. During that period, Republican orators repeatedly delayed proceedings with extraordinarily long speeches.<sup>3</sup>

Lawrence Sherman of Illinois participated in the early stages of the filibuster, delivering a two and one-half hour speech on February 24. Also, Warren G. Harding of Ohio took the Senate floor on February 26 and continued the filibuster for portions of two days. Other senators kept the filibuster going. As the session ground to an end, the Democrats

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<sup>2</sup>Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940), pp. 117-118.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 115, pp. 117-118.

and some Republicans became quite frustrated by the legislative inactivity. On March 4, the last day of the session, Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas read a manifesto signed by seventy-five senators declaring that if a vote could be had they would pass the Armed Neutrality bill. They were not given this opportunity, though, and Congress adjourned on March 4 with much vital legislation not considered.<sup>4</sup>

President Wilson reacted quickly to the lack of action by the Senate. Wilson, whose second inauguration had just taken place, determined that the best way to vent his anger and gain public support was by making an appeal to the country. In a speech made a few hours after Congress adjourned, the President stated: .

The termination of the last session of the Sixty-fourth Congress by constitutional limitation disclosed a situation unparalleled in the history of the country, perhaps unparalleled in the history of any modern government. In the immediate presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle and far-reaching possibilities of national danger than any the government has known within the whole history of its international relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard the country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens. More than 500 of the 531 members of the two houses were ready and anxious to act; the House of Representatives had acted, by an overwhelming majority; but the Senate was unable to act because a little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not.

The Senate has no rules by which debate can be limited or brought to an end, no rules by which dilatory tactics of any kind can be prevented. A single member can stand in the way of action, if he have but the physical endurance. The result in this case is a complete paralysis alike of the legislative and of the executive branches of the government.

. . . a little group of willful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United States helpless and contemptible. The remedy? There is but one remedy. The only remedy is that

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<sup>4</sup>Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate, pp. 116-117, pp. 119-121.

the rules of the Senate be so altered that it can act. The country can be relied upon to draw the moral. I believe that the Senate can be relied on to supply the means of action and save the country from disaster.<sup>5</sup>

After this speech a great wave of protest swept the country. In some states the legislatures passed resolutions denouncing the filibustering Senators and pledging support to the President. Mass meetings were held in several cities, and telegrams of protest were sent to the Senate. In addition, at some places the filibustering Senators were hung in effigy. In response to this wave of public protest, the Senate, convened in extra session after the inauguration of the President, decided to give in. The Republican and Democratic caucuses agreed on an amendment to the Senate rules to provide for "closure" of debate. On March 8, 1917, after two days of discussion, the amendment was adopted by a vote of 76 to 3. The three negative votes were cast by Senators Sherman, La Follette, and Gronna.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>"President Wilson's Appeal to the Country," New York Times Current History, Vol. VI, April 1917, pp. 51-53. Wilson tried to stimulate public anger against these eleven Senators: Clapp of Minnesota; Cummins of Iowa; Gronna of North Dakota; Kirby of Arkansas; La Follette of Wisconsin; Lane of Oregon; Norris of Nebraska; O' Gorman of New York; Stone of Missouri; Vardaman of Mississippi; and Works of California. Many of these senators would later become "irreconcilables" in the fight over ratification of the Treaty of the League of Nations. Lawrence Sherman had participated early in the filibuster, but had not taken part in the final stages. Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940), p. 122.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid. The rule specifically provided that a two-thirds vote of the Senators present may bring a measure to a vote, and thereafter each Senator may debate the measure only one hour, when it is to be put upon its passage without any delaying actions or further debate. This new rule represented a great change in the United States Senate's procedure. See Lindsay Rogers, The American Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926), p. 126.

As a result of these actions, the Presidency gained in prestige. The Senate had been humbled, and the President now proceeded to arm American ships under an old eighteenth century law. As the opponents of arming ships had feared, the United States was on the road to entry into World War I. The United States Congress, on April 6, 1917, voted by an overwhelming margin to declare war on Germany.<sup>7</sup>

Sherman did not initially support American intervention. On February 7, 1917, Sherman said on the Senate floor that he reluctantly agreed with the President's decision to sever diplomatic relations with Germany. This, he reasoned, was necessary inasmuch as the German blockade would eventually bring an end to all neutral trade. Still, Sherman had qualms about hostilities with Germany. He stated that he had voted in the Senate to warn American citizens to "refrain from traveling upon the armed ships of belligerent nations." His logic was this:

I considered that if I traveled upon the merchant ship of a belligerent nation armed for defensive purposes sufficiently to destroy a submarine I voluntarily put myself on the high seas at a point of danger wherever a naval battle occurred, and that the Government therefore owed me no duty of protection.<sup>8</sup>

During the first stages of the war, Sherman was only lukewarm in his enthusiasm for American involvement in the war. In fact, on August 10, 1917, Senator Sherman introduced a resolution which called on the President to confer with representatives of the Allies for the purpose of determining criteria for ending the war. These objectives were to be made public, so that Americans could plainly see what they were fighting

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<sup>7</sup>George H. Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 348.

<sup>8</sup>Congressional Record, 64th Congress, second session, vol. 54, number 51, (February 7, 1917), pp. 3-5.

for. Also, Sherman included in his speech some suggestions. He thought that restoration of all invaded territory, no indemnity, limitation of armaments, and freedom of the seas were items which should be included.<sup>9</sup>

As the war progressed, Sherman became more firm in his support of the American war effort. In October of 1918, he stated:

Germany must lay down its arms, must surrender unconditionally, before I, as a Senator of the United States, can give any ear to pleas for peace. The time has not come when peace can be considered . . . .<sup>10</sup>

In the same vein, Sherman also stated that removal of the Kaiser was desirable. In a magazine article he authored, Sherman said:

I do not wish to hear any peace talk or any intimidation of peace while Germany occupies Belgium or flies her colors above a single foot of French soil . . . .

There can be no permanent peace in the world as long as Germany is dominated by the Kaiser or the militaristic party . . . .<sup>11</sup>

Sherman had also stated that:

. . . there is but one way to talk peace, and that is through the agency of our Army and Navy to continue pressing back the line that is now north of the Marne until the colors representing the enemy that began this war four years ago shall be thrust back beyond the Rhine . . . . Let them then ask for peace . . . .<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>New York Times, August 16, 1917, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup>New York Times, October 9, 1918, p. 2. Sherman also stated on October 6, 1918, in Chicago that as a United States Senator he would vote against an armistice on any basis other than unconditional surrender. New York Times, October 7, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman, "Germany Must be Vanquished," New York Times Current History Magazine, VIII, Part II, September 1918, pp. 527-529.

<sup>12</sup>"A Conclusive and Overwhelming Victory over Our Enemies," July 25, 1918, United States Senate Speech by Sherman, Banker's Magazine, September 1918, vol. 97, pp. 322-323.

While Sherman eventually became enthusiastic for the fighting of the war, he continued to resist in the strongest terms the Administration's methods of handling the domestic phase of the conflict. To provide troops, the President asked for a Selective Service system. This Sherman opposed, on the basis that it should not be necessary. In its place, he suggested a resolution authorizing the President to call for one million volunteers. With popular support for the war, he thought that this was not unrealistic. He further stated that "England for a thousand years had got along and fought her wars successfully without resort to conscription." What really nettled Sherman was that he thought the metropolitan newspapers were responsible for bringing on the war. He wanted to point out that they were not as successful in bringing in recruits.<sup>13</sup>

Sherman also opposed passage of the Overman bill. This legislation, debated in April of 1918, gave the President the authority to consolidate war activities. In effect, the President was granted the power of a dictator. He was also to be given authority to acquire supplies for the army at a price he was to determine; he was given the power to take over mines, factories, packing houses, railways, steamships, and communications; and he was to license the importing, manufacture, storage, and distribution of all necessities.<sup>14</sup> In debate on the Overman bill, Sherman referred to the cabinet officers as "Socialists and economic freaks."<sup>15</sup> The

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<sup>13</sup>New York Times, April 12, 1917, p. 2; April 26, 1917, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup>Leon Canfield and Howard Wilder, The Making of Modern America, Eds. Anderson, Coulter, Hicks, and Mead (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 668-669.

<sup>15</sup>New York Times, April 24, 1918, p. 13. Sherman specifically attacked Postmaster General Burleson, Secretary Baker, and Secretary Wilson.

President's position on the bill was that he wanted the legislation passed, and that there was to be "no compromise." Sherman characterized the bill as unwise legislation which would prove to be a "positive menace to orderly administration even in war times."<sup>16</sup>

Sherman believed that power was being concentrated in the executive branch of government. This trend he recognized and feared, as he thought a "presidential dictatorship" of a socialist trend under "executive whip and spur" was developing.<sup>17</sup> Sherman had summed up his feelings a year earlier in a speech on the draft in which he stated that he "would not abdicate his power for any Chief Magistrate, Cabinet, or War College." The President was, in Sherman's view, a power-greedy man whom he called "the Great American jester."<sup>18</sup>

For Sherman to speak out against the Administration in time of war, he had to pay the political price. In Illinois, the newspapers blasted what they thought to be an unpatriotic, foolish, and disloyal act. The Chicago Tribune, always friendly to Sherman, stated that he was in error on this issue. Downstate, the small-town newspapers roundly condemned Sherman.<sup>19</sup>

Sherman did not permit his critics to halt his remarks. He saw the development of what he referred to with disdain as " . . . unofficial

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<sup>16</sup>New York Times, April 23, 1918, p. 6.

<sup>17</sup>Ernest Bogart and John Mathews, The Modern Commonwealth 1893-1918 (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Centennial Commission, 1920), p. 474.

<sup>18</sup>New York Times, April 26, 1917, p. 3; September 10, 1916, p. 7.

<sup>19</sup>Oregon Journal (Oregon, Illinois), May 11, 1918, editorial, clipping in the Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers; Lincoln Herald-Courier (Lincoln, Illinois), April 25, 1918, editorial, clipping in the Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers; editorial, Chicago Tribune, concerning debate on the Overman bill, clipping in the Lawrence Y. Sherman Papers. Box 123.



and personal government." Sherman contended that under the guise of wartime necessity the President was attempting to establish a "civilian autocracy." Sherman saw it as his duty to oppose this trend, regardless of his critics.<sup>20</sup>

One piece of legislation which Sherman opposed was the Sedition bill. This provided for the limiting of the freedom of speech, and the extending of the mail censorship power of the Postmaster-General. Senator Sherman led the opposition to the measure, charging that the law was unnecessary. He argued that Attorney-General Gregory did not prosecute under the existing laws, so further legislation was not needed. What Sherman really feared was the increasing amount of control by the government of news, communications, and free speech. Sherman looked askance at such propaganda activities as provided by the Committee on Public Information. Sherman referred to Mr. Creel's writings as "a reprehensible type of journalism," that ". . . aimed at shock rather than sense."<sup>21</sup>

Senator Sherman also disliked the Administration's actions with regard to the press. He asked at one point whether government control of printing paper was really necessary. Also, Sherman later called upon the Committee on Printing to investigate the various publications issued by the government, to determine if they were actually serving any purpose.<sup>22</sup>

Another branch of the Administration which Sherman attacked was the Council of National Defense, which directed that certain products had preferential shipment by the railroads. While he did not question the

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<sup>20</sup>New York Times, September 4, 1918, p. 10.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., May 4, 1918, p. 8; July 13, 1918, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., January 10, 1918, p. 13; January 21, 1919, p. 15.

motives of the Council, he thought it interfered needlessly with the efficient market system in many cases. He pointed out that many domestic industries were suffering as a result of the Council's arbitrary priorities, especially the cement business. Also, Sherman charged that the high price of wheat was due to the Council's decision on the use of railroad cars.<sup>23</sup>

In the realm of government price-fixing, Sherman saw this as an unwise intrusion into the free enterprise system. For example, Sherman thought the regulations on the price of wheat were "incomparable folly," which might lead to shortages. It would have been much wiser, Sherman contended, to let the forces of supply and demand determine prices.<sup>24</sup>

Sherman viewed government price-fixing, control of the railroads, and control of the economy as integral components of a master plan to impose socialism on the United States. He stated that Wilson, and especially advisors Colonel House and George Creel, had a "masked purpose" of eventually controlling all means of production and distribution.<sup>25</sup> Socialism, or even government control of railroads, led inevitably to a "certain diminution in effectiveness and service."<sup>26</sup>

Another area of concern to Sherman was that of the influence of labor on the government. He charged that labor had obtained control of the government, and was using the war effort as a means to strengthen

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<sup>23</sup>New York Times, May 30, 1917, p. 7; May 26, 1917, p. 4.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., March 21, 1918, p. 24.

<sup>25</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd session (September 3, 1918), p. 9873.

<sup>26</sup>New York Times, February 21, 1918, p. 6.

its position.<sup>27</sup> After the war, Sherman's view of the situation is seen in his position on the railroads. Sherman favored the immediate return of the railroads to their private owners. Also, he opposed allowing railway workers to strike, and asserted that a law should be passed preventing a strike. Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, testified before a Senate committee that his union would disregard any law passed by Congress prohibiting such strikes. This, in Sherman's estimation, was a statement that "anticipated revolution."<sup>28</sup>

Generally, Sherman opposed the vast powers that Congress gave to the President during World War I, and thought that a "Presidential dictatorship" was being established.<sup>29</sup> Sherman charged that:

. . . the President has not been happy in the use of the executive powers which he now possesses: that he had surrounded himself with Socialists and pacifists and (Sherman) demanded that he (Wilson) should 'scatter the bunch of economic fakirs and howling dervishes' now in office before asking Congress for further autocratic powers.<sup>30</sup>

Sherman also detested the establishment of a huge government bureaucracy. This to Sherman was wasteful. He pointed this out in one speech: "We don't need all this ponderous machinery. We don't need to be creating a lot of fat jobs . . . ."<sup>31</sup> Sherman's dislike for President

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<sup>27</sup>Ralph Allen Stone, "Two Illinois Senators Among the Irreconcilables," (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Illinois, 1959), p. 7.

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, October 1, 1919, p. 2.

<sup>29</sup>New York Times, June 11, 1917, p. 10.

<sup>30</sup>Los Angeles Times-Mirror, April 25, 1918, II, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers.

<sup>31</sup>New York Times, June 22, 1917, p. 3.

Wilson and his Administration, we shall see, was carried over into his thinking about Wilson's proposed League of Nations.

## CHAPTER VI

### SENATOR SHERMAN AND THE FIGHT OVER THE TREATY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

On January 22, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed the Senate, and made a speech of great significance. In his address he called for American participation in a league for peace. Immediately a great debate began throughout the country, one which would last for over three years.

About the President's speech, Sherman initially reacted by stating that the President's proposals were "humanitarian in purpose but impracticable for operation. . . . They were a future Hague Convention up in a balloon . . . they will make Don Quixote wish he had not died so soon." Later, Sherman referred to Wilson's January 22 address as a "stump speech from the throne."<sup>1</sup>

Sherman also doubted the President's motives. He thought that the December peace note, the Hitchcock resolution, and the "Peace without Victory" speech were part of a scheme "to forestall and foreclose independent action on the part of the Senate." Sherman deduced that Wilson was appealing to public opinion in advance of Senate action in hopes of generating enough public support to force the Senate to go along. Sherman continued:

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<sup>1</sup>New York Times, January 23, 1917, p. 2; January 25, 1917, p. 2.

Was it not Wilson's purpose . . . to appeal to public opinion in advance of Senate action so that the League idea might sink unanswered into the minds of the general public . . . ? Was it not for the purpose of preventing dispassionate action by the Senate, making us accept whatever treaty shall be hereafter transmitted to us, and compelling us to ratify it by the coercion of the public opinion sought to be created?<sup>2</sup>

Soon after Wilson's address, the United States entered the World War. Wilson urged wholehearted cooperation in winning the war, and in May, 1918, stated that "politics is adjourned" until after the war. Yet, as the fall 1918 elections approached, both political parties recognized their significance. The results of these elections would determine which party would control the Congress, and decide on the Peace treaty. Realizing the importance of the Congressional elections, Wilson on October 25, 1918, issued a statement asking the public to return a Democratic Congress. Wilson asked that the electorate, if it approved of his leadership, to respond by sending Democrats to Washington.<sup>3</sup> The President was at this point reversing his earlier solemn statement that politics had no place in a country at war. Sherman and others were quick to respond to this action by the President. Sherman asserted that:

The President has taken off his mask. He now stands revealed and known to the public as a grossly partisan Democrat caught in an attempt to use the war to rule the American people in their internal and domestic affairs.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Congressional Record, 64th Congress, 2nd session (January 24, 1917), p. 1884.

<sup>3</sup>Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations (State Cooperative Scholarly Publishing Agency: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 27-28.

<sup>4</sup>Chicago Tribune, October 28, 1918, p. 1.

When the votes were counted the Republicans had gained control of the Senate by a slim margin. In Illinois, Democratic Senator J. Hamilton Lewis lost his seat to a Republican, Joseph Medill McCormick of Chicago. This was of more than passing interest. J. Hamilton Lewis was a "Democratic friend of the League," and was often referred to by his Senatorial colleagues as "the President's unofficial spokesman." McCormick thus replaced one of the few active speakers for the League at the beginning of the debate.<sup>5</sup>

President Wilson again surprised the nation when he announced late in November that he planned to attend the Peace Conference. On December 2, 1918, Wilson addressed the opening of the 3rd session of the 65th Congress, and gave his reasons for attending in person. He stated that the allied and enemy governments had agreed on the Fourteen Points as a basis of discussion, and that he was needed to interpret and clarify them. Wilson further stated that it was his duty "to make the world safe for democracy."<sup>6</sup>

Sherman reacted quickly to Wilson's announcement. On December 3, 1918, Senator Sherman introduced a resolution to strip the President of his constitutional powers as soon as he left the United States. It said:

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<sup>5</sup>Ralph Allen Stone, "Two Illinois Senators Among the Irreconcilables" (unpublished Master's thesis, University of Illinois, 1959), p. 14. There were at this time ninety-six United States Senators plus the Vice-President of the United States, who presided over the Senate and voted to break ties. The Republicans, as a result of the fall 1918 elections, controlled forty-nine seats. Had Lewis defeated McCormick, the situation would obviously have been quite different. Ralph Stone, The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations, p. 31.

<sup>6</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session (December 2, 1918), pp. 12-15.

Resolved, by the Senate, the House of Representatives concurring therein, that the departure of the President and his absence from the territory of the United States and the seat of government so fixed and declared by law be and the same is hereby declared to constitute an inability to discharge the powers and duties of the President of the United States, and is hereby declared to constitute a vacancy in said office of President, and that the powers and duties thereof shall immediately on such departure and absence by the President from the territorial limits of the United States and the seat of government thereof devolve and be exercised by the Vice-President of the United States, who shall qualify and assume the powers and duties of the President of the United States until a President shall be duly elected: and all official acts of the Vice-President while such powers and duties are so devolved upon him shall be and hereby are declared to be valid for all intents and purposes, and shall be accepted as the act of the President of the United States.<sup>7</sup>

In the same speech Sherman stated that an Act of 1790 had fixed Washington, D. C., as the seat of government, and tradition held that the President was not to leave the United States.<sup>8</sup> He went on to say that it was the intention of our forefathers:

. . . to guard the President against the insidious influences and flattery incident to the servile adulation and absurd pomp of the kings and council chambers of the Old World . . . A courtier's smile and the bending knee of a sycophant have often in history entangled a nation in fatal alliances. A kiss of a sensuous woman has changed the course of empire. We ought not put him in temptation.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 23-28. Also, refer to the New York Times, December 3, 1918, p. 1, and to Denna Frank Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1932), p. 65.

<sup>8</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session (December 3, 1918), pp. 23-25. Mississippi Senator John Sharp Williams pointed out that Theodore Roosevelt had visited the Canal Zone, William Howard Taft had crossed the Mexican border, and George Washington had sometimes left the territorial boundaries of the United States. Stone, "Two Illinois Senators Among the Irreconcilables," p. 16.

<sup>9</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session, (December 3, 1918), pp. 23-28.



Other senators also chose to attack the President at this time. Senator Johnson of California complained that Wilson had withheld information about United States troops in Russia. Senator Borah made a speaking tour of bar associations, and was checking the reaction to his isolationist views.<sup>10</sup>

As a result of Sherman's actions, he received much criticism. On December 5, 1918, Sherman revealed that the true motive of his had been to embarrass the President. After all, "We would have said the same things if he had stayed here."<sup>11</sup>

However, it was true that such a trip as Wilson took was highly unorthodox. Stranger yet was the fact that Wilson did not choose to take even one United States Senator to the Peace talks. Wilson's reason for not taking any senators along was that after "looking into the precedents" he thought that it would be unethical to have a senator vote on a treaty that he had helped to write.<sup>12</sup> At this point even the pro-Wilson New York Times recognized the displeasure of many members of the United States Senate, stating that the senators " . . . displayed unmistakable signs of determination to have a hand in winding up the war."<sup>13</sup>

On December 4, 1918, the steamship George Washington left the United States bound for Brest, France, with the President and his entourage

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<sup>10</sup>George H. Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 355.

<sup>11</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session (December 5, 1918), p. 132.

<sup>12</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 36.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, December 4, 1918, p. 1.

aboard.<sup>14</sup> In the negotiations on the treaty, Wilson had to accept several compromises. These, and Wilson's failure to include any Republican Senators in his entourage, assured a hearty fight over the treaty.

During Wilson's absence several senators were vocal in their criticism of Wilson. Sherman commented that the negotiations for the peace treaty ought to be open, not secret. He stated that:

The American people ought to have all of the available information that would be of value in determining whether the treaty that is to be ratified by the Senate is the character of treaty that they want their government to make. To force secrecy at this time is a distinct blow to the President's idea of a League of Nations.<sup>15</sup>

Of Wilson's motives in personally going abroad, Sherman commented,

Nothing but the grossest egotism took him to the Peace Conference, where no Executive of any other civilized power sits. He cannot resist the lure of the lime-light.<sup>16</sup>

Sherman also questioned Wilson's sagacity in the peace talks. Sherman's analysis of Wilson was that:

Don Quixote is abroad now, the knight-errant of the world, largely fighting windmills. It is a toss-up of a coin which one is Sancho Panza, whether it is Colonel House or the other fellow.<sup>17</sup>

On February 24, 1919, the President would return to the United States, landing in Boston, Massachusetts. While in Boston, Wilson would speak on the subject of the League of Nations. Senator Sherman thought

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., January 17, 1919, p. 2.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., February 5, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., January 24, 1919, p. 1.

that this constituted a further insult to the United States Senate. The President, Sherman believed, should first report to the Senate. Accordingly, on February 21, 1919, Sherman introduced a resolution on the floor of the Senate which ordered that the President should make no public address until he had conferred with the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees. For Wilson to speak in Boston would be "unwise, undiplomatic, and calculated to promote discord and misunderstanding" between the executive and legislative branches of government. The President, Sherman asserted, should not forget the Senate's "equal rank and dignity in treaty-making." Sherman's resolution also wryly asked that in the meantime Wilson should "preserve an unbiased and impartial mind."<sup>18</sup>

Aware of possible difficulties with the Senate, Wilson had cabled dinner invitations for February 26, 1919, to members of the Foreign Relations Committees of both houses of Congress. He also requested that his guests not mention the League until he reached the United States.<sup>19</sup> On the evening of February 26, Wilson discussed the League with his guests until almost midnight. Wilson explained the Covenant in detail, and stated his hope that it would be accepted without major changes.<sup>20</sup>

Apparently, Woodrow Wilson did not win over very many Congressional converts that evening. Lawrence Sherman, for one, had been against the League, and he remained against it. Sherman's thoughts about the League

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<sup>18</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session (February 21, 1919), p. 3909; Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 57; New York Times, February 22, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>19</sup>Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964, pp. 355-356.

<sup>20</sup>Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1944), p. 198.

of Nations were that:

It seems to me that we are heading toward grave problems for the future in this League project . . . . We must look into all possible entanglements that may come up before we go into this thing. It may be that the League may prove itself to be an advantageous thing for this country. But as I read it, I have my doubts.

The League, as proposed, I believe, will sacrifice not only the Monroe Doctrine-a sacrifice the American people cannot tolerate-but it would mean that European nations would mix in all our affairs.

It is all very well to say that European nations favor it . . . . I have no doubt they do. They seem to have much to gain from mixing in our affairs. But what about America? I judge from the letters and telegrams I have received that the American people are not going to swallow this League of Nations too easily.<sup>21</sup>

Soon after the February 26, 1919, evening dinner the partisan warfare began in earnest. On March 1, 1919, the Senate Republicans caucused to consider whether or not to filibuster the remaining four days of the 65th Congress. The reasoning supporting a filibuster was that the 65th Congress would expire on March 4, 1919, and the 66th Congress was not scheduled to begin until December of 1919. The President, then, could use the interim to complete the peace treaty and to gather support. In the meanwhile, the Senators would not have a forum, and would be weak, disunited, and thus ineffectual in opposing the President.<sup>22</sup> Also of importance was the fact that the Republicans would control the upper chamber when the 66th Congress began, by virtue of their success in the fall 1918 elections. If the Republicans could filibuster and force a special session of Congress, it would be to their advantage. During the

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<sup>21</sup>New York Times, February 18, 1919, p. 3. The letters in the Sherman Papers indicate that Sherman's mail ran about three-to-one against the League during the entire debate.

<sup>22</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 32-33.

caucus, Sherman was one of the main supporters of a filibuster. He argued that the Democrats had not proceeded rapidly enough in reporting the various bills, and now were trying to push them through too quickly. When the Senate Republican caucus voted on the issue, the result was a fifteen to fourteen decision with the majority against a filibuster. Sherman was sincerely outraged by this vote, and declared to reporters that his colleagues had no "backbone." Furthermore, he stated that if they did not "call the President's bluff," there was no reason for him to return to Washington in December. Sherman said in a thinly veiled threat directed at Lodge, "You fellows might need a vote later, when you won't get it."<sup>23</sup> The Republicans had a one vote majority in the 66th Congress including Sherman: without him the upper house would be deadlocked.

Senator LaFollette of Wisconsin had foreseen this decision by the caucus, and was prepared for it. On February 23 he telephoned Sherman to ask him if he would join La Follette in a filibuster. Sherman agreed, as did two other senators.<sup>24</sup> Henry Cabot Lodge, the Senate Republican leader, was publicly against the filibuster; later he would say that he tried to stop the filibuster but that Sherman and La Follette were "beyond control." However, Lodge secretly did in fact want a filibuster. In early February Lodge stated to La Follette that "There must be an extra session." He also mentioned to La Follette that he would " . . . welcome anything that took up the time."<sup>25</sup> Sherman was also

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<sup>23</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 37.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 65.

aware of Lodge's desire, as he wrote to a friend, "There were more Senators than really appeared on the surface . . ." trying to force an extra session.<sup>26</sup>

On March 1, 1919, the filibuster began. Sherman and La Follette turned out to be the only two filibusterers, though Senator Reed of Missouri spoke a few hours to keep the filibuster alive. Finally, after twenty hours of continuous debate, Sherman and La Follette gave up. At 6:40 A.M. on March 2, the filibuster ended, and the Senate passed the Victory Loan bill, which was a loan issue of seven billion dollars. After the vote on the bond bill, the Senate adjourned until the morning of March 3.<sup>27</sup>

On March 3, there were still several major pieces of legislation to be acted upon. The most important item was a general deficiency bill, which appropriated \$840 million for expenses already incurred by the government, of which a large amount was for the financing of government operation of the railroads.<sup>28</sup> After having rested, Sherman and La Follette were ready to filibuster again. At 10 A.M. on March 3, the last twenty-six hours of the session began. Sherman started speaking at 1 A.M. on March 4, and was spelled by La Follette. Sherman proudly stated at this time that the general deficiency bill would not pass

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<sup>26</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter from Sherman to C. E. Chipfield, March 10, 1919. Box 101.

<sup>27</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 68; New York Times, March 2, 1919, p. 1; New York Times, March 3, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, March 3, 1919, p. 1.

"unless I drop dead."<sup>29</sup> As word of what was occurring spread, a large crowd of spectators gathered in the corridors near the Senate. Sherman resumed speaking at 8 A.M., and rebuffed efforts by Lodge, Knox, and Democratic leaders to stop him. Sherman stated later that he had seen no "grave questions considered" in the bills he was delaying, and therefore the senators should have relaxed and enjoyed the filibuster. After three and one-half hours, Sherman concluded his speech. This left only thirty minutes before adjournment at noon, insufficient time to get anything done.<sup>30</sup>

The President was furious at the obstructionist senators. In a speech to members of the Democratic National Committee on February 28, Wilson stated that he was opposed by "blind and little, provincial people," who reminded him " . . . of a man with a head that is not a head but is just a knot providentially put there to keep him from ravelling out." Those men who opposed him were not in tune with modern ideas. "They are going to have the most conspicuously contemptible names in history. The gibbets that they are going to be executed on by future historians will scrape the heavens, they will be so high. They won't be turned in the direction of heaven at all."<sup>31</sup> Wilson also stated that:

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<sup>29</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 68; New York Times, March 5, 1919, p. 1; Franklin L. Burdette, Filibustering in the Senate (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940) pp. 130-131.

<sup>30</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 69-70.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 63. Also, see Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Knew Him (Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1921), p. 377.

I take it for granted that the men who have obstructed and prevented the passage of necessary legislation have taken all of this into consideration and are willing to assume the responsibility of the impaired efficiency of the government and the embarrassed finances of the country during the time of my enforced absence.<sup>32</sup>

Sherman reacted quickly:

We are willing to take that responsibility. If the constitution of the League of Nations is the result of his attendance at the Paris conference and his administration of the railroads is the result of his constant attendance upon Congress, both Paris and Congress can do better without him. He is a superfluous luxury anyway.<sup>33</sup>

During the extended speeches he made in the process of filibustering, Sherman also made several quite vivid descriptions of his view of the League of Nations. He pictured it as "a Pandora's box of evil to empty upon the American people the aggregate calamities of the world." It would "embargo our commerce, close our exchanges, destroy our credits, leave our merchandise rotting on our piers, shut the Isthmian Canal, order Congress to declare war, levy taxes, appropriate money, raise and support armies and navies . . . ." It was " . . . the death knell of the American Republic . . . a fantastic idealism, a polyglot philanthropy as vain in the realms of world philosophy and morals as it is impossible in peaceable execution." It would cause us "to defend Great Britain's colonial dependencies any place in the world."<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Chicago Tribune, March 5, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid.

<sup>34</sup>Denna Frank Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1930), p. 135; Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, p. 148.



Sherman also commented on Wilson's speechmaking. Sherman stated that it was regrettable that a President of the United States who had written a history of American political institutions chose to degrade himself by descending into the "raw vernacular" when talking about senators. Sherman also responded to Wilson's charge that those who opposed the League "had pygmy minds" and "were against the stream of history." Sherman asserted that this reminded him "of visiting a mental institution in which all the patients swore that they were sane and everyone outside was demented."<sup>35</sup> Clearly, the President had erred in engaging in verbal combat. Sherman was an absolute master of speechmaking and debate. Vice-President Marshall, who himself was skilled in "words that would wound" stated that he was "a mere kindergarten pupil" compared to Sherman.<sup>36</sup>

Senator Sherman also demonstrated his opposition to the League by signing the "Round Robin Resolution."<sup>37</sup> This was a document signed on March 4, 1919, by thirty-nine senators and senators-elect, in which they indicated that they would vote against the existing version of the Covenant when it came to a vote. This document, read into the record by Henry Cabot Lodge, showed that he controlled more than one-third of the votes in the Senate, the amount needed to defeat the League.<sup>38</sup> The Round Robin also stated a desire by the senators to consider the question of a League of Nations separately from the Peace Treaty.

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<sup>35</sup> Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 63-64; Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 3rd session (March 4, 1919), pp. 4797-4980.

<sup>36</sup> Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 70; Thomas R. Marshall, Recollections (Indianapolis, Indiana: 1925), p. 290.

<sup>37</sup> New York Times, March 4, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>38</sup> Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964, pp. 356-357.

In the face of this opposition, Woodrow Wilson worked on getting a revised Covenant accepted by the other allies. To gain the changes, Wilson was forced to agree to such things as the French demand for a military occupation of the Rhineland. After the bargaining concluded, there was an agreement on April 28, 1919, on a revised Covenant. The changes included:

. . . a clause permitting a nation to withdraw from the League after giving two years notice, provided it had fulfilled its obligations . . .; exclusion of domestic matters from League supervision; modification of Article 21 to read that 'treaties of arbitration or regional understanding like the Monroe Doctrine' were inviolable; and making acceptance of mandates dependent on a nation's explicit willingness to accept them. Articles X and XVI, two of the most controversial, were left intact.<sup>39</sup>

Sherman's reaction to the revisions was negative. He thought the League still resembled a superstate. Also, he thought that the mandate system needed further clarification, and perhaps some extension. For example, Sherman stated that France and England should accept the mandate "to put the Turk out of Europe." Also, he said that the United States should be given a mandate to "clean up Mexico."<sup>40</sup> Privately, Sherman wrote:

It is in keeping with the whole structure of the League of Nations that its capital should be in Europe. It is in fact the creation of a supergovernment, a new power . . . . It will not be five years until it will be issuing orders on how much we shall appropriate for world purposes, how to manage our army and navy, and when to declare war.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 87-88.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid.; New York Tribune, April 29, 1919, p. 1, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers; Chicago Tribune, April 29, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>41</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to J. H. Bacon, May 8, 1919. Box 95.

Sherman on May 23, 1919, submitted a resolution in the Senate. It suggested that the Treaty and the Covenant should be considered separately.<sup>42</sup> This would lead one to believe that Sherman was unalterably opposed to the League. Yet a survey taken by the New York Times on June 8, 1919, suggested that Sherman would approve the treaty with reservations.<sup>43</sup> In his personal correspondence, Sherman commented:

The League of Nations plan as revised must be further improved before I can support it. It still has certain radical defects. I am for a League of Nations and have always so announced myself, but I am not for the form presented last February or the amended one now before the country.<sup>44</sup>

Sherman stated that the course of action most desirable was that:

Peace should first be made; then the United States could safely enter into a League that will continue the present defensive alliance between our associated nations in Europe and ourselves, with such other friendly nations as desire to join.<sup>45</sup>

Precisely what revisions would enable him to approve the League, Sherman never stated. Probably what Sherman really wanted was the separation of the Treaty from the Covenant, and quick ratification by the Senate of the Treaty. Then, the Senate could rewrite the Covenant to its own liking. Besides the personality clash between Sherman and Wilson, and their differences over the nature of American participation in the League, Sherman also believed that in this matter the Executive branch of government had infringed on the powers of the Legislative branch.

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<sup>42</sup> New York Times, May 24, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., July 9, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>44</sup> Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to William Henry Smith, May 5, 1919. Box 89.

<sup>45</sup> Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 48.

Sherman's hesitance to accept the Covenant with revisions, and his demand for further changes was interpreted by some observers as xenophobia.<sup>46</sup> While this is doubtless an exaggeration, Sherman did think that American interests should be put first. On August 22, 1919, Sherman commented that Americans had sacrificed enough. He stated that:

Let us continue to be Americans. We will continue to keep the world safe for democracy by keeping the United States safe for our own people. My patriotism is greater than my altruism. My allegiance is to my own country. My duty is first to our own flag. I decline to accept any substitute for it.<sup>47</sup>

Nor did Sherman approve of aid to other countries. Sherman stated that "I shall attend first to the relief of our own country. I think that is enough to occupy our time for a while."<sup>48</sup> On the subject of foreign aid, Sherman asserted that nothing required us "to scatter our strength over earth's seven seas and dissipate our energies and resources in crusading in the affairs of every warring people . . . ." For Sherman, the mentality that wanted United States involvement in the world was one of " . . . an impossible idealism, drunk with phrase-making and cajoled by European diplomacy into spending our national strength to underwrite the war risks of Europe, Asia, and Africa."<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup>Charles P. Howland, "Anti-League Arguments Had Parallel in 1789," New York Evening Post, January 3, 1920, p. 2, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 84.

<sup>47</sup>Speech by Lawrence Y. Sherman at Macomb, Illinois, August 22, 1919, Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 96.

<sup>48</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Frank Hoskin, February 3, 1920. Box 105.

<sup>49</sup>Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, p. 377.

What Sherman espoused was basically an isolationist philosophy.

Sherman's isolationist thoughts are summed up in this speech:

Our domain is compact, sufficient in itself to supply all our wants and furnish every necessary instrument of self-defense. Providence never before so abundantly endowed a nation with the facilities to be and continue great and powerful by remaining at home and attending to its own business.<sup>50</sup>

Sherman believed that isolationism was necessary inasmuch as America possessed moral superiority and should not let itself become corrupted by the Europeans. Sherman's analysis of Europe was that:

Europeans were colonizers; the United States was not, Europe had a history of endless wars; our history was one of peace. Europe had already frittered away its time in petty quarrels; we had tilled the soil and built our industries. If we were to join this League of Nations, we would be thrust into their heritage and inherit all of their malevolent institutions.<sup>51</sup>

All summer long debate raged in the Senate and in public forums over the Covenant. In Illinois, the sentiment was generally anti-League. Senator McCormick's letters ran about ten to one against the League.<sup>52</sup> Sherman commented that "If the President thinks there is an overwhelming sentiment for the League of Nations, he ought to take a look at my mail."<sup>53</sup> Sherman's mail ran about three letters to one against the League.<sup>54</sup> Small-town newspapers in Illinois also usually reflected the isolationism of

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<sup>50</sup> Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session, (September 16, 1919), p. 5492. For further isolationist sentiment, see "What Patriotic Americans say about the League of Nations," (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: True American Publishing Company, 1919), pamphlet 2, in Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers.

<sup>51</sup> Stone, "Two Illinois Senators Among the Irreconcilables," p. 28.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 47.

<sup>53</sup> New York Times, March 6, 1919, p. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Lawrence Sherman Papers. Generally, this ratio held true.

the state.<sup>55</sup> One bastion of support in Illinois for the President was the faculty and students of the University of Illinois. On May 31, 1919, H. W. Ballantine, Dean of the University of Illinois Law School wrote to Sherman, stating that:

. . . the sentiment of the faculty and students of the University is practically unanimous in demanding the ratification of this Covenant . . . .<sup>56</sup>

This outraged Sherman, who in the past had been a staunch advocate of increased spending for education. He angrily retorted that:

What your University needs . . . is a touch of practical common sense . . . the conduct of certain of the faculty and of the heedless, half-baked views of students in your institution, has been a matter of profound regret to me. If the State of Illinois cannot produce better results, the taxpayers have carried the burden in vain and learning has but demonstrated its uselessness in the affairs of men.<sup>57</sup>

In fact, Sherman had little use for intellectuals in practical matters. He thought that professors and theoreticians were "good enough in their place, but a country run by professors (is) ultimately destined to Bolshevism and an explosion."<sup>58</sup> At a later date, Sherman asserted that "there is nobody but university professors, international bankers, and appointive office holders for the League."<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>55</sup>Omaha Sunday Bee (Omaha, Illinois), editorial, "The Versailles Treaty", July 27, 1919, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. This is one example of small-town, agrarian isolationism. Box 89.

<sup>56</sup>Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1919, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 88.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Congressional Record, 65th Congress, 2nd session, (September 3, 1918), p. 9873.

<sup>59</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to John Smoot, September 5, 1919. Box 88.

Though public opinion in Illinois apparently was anti-League, this was not the case throughout the country. To defeat the League, its opponents determined that whatever means necessary were acceptable. Accordingly, a series of anti-League appeals based on prejudice were used. Senator Reed of Missouri suggested that the kings of the world would dominate the League. Another senator suggested that Great Britain would dominate the League, as it would have six votes. Senator McCormick of Illinois fostered the Irish prejudice. Democratic Senator Reed mentioned in the South that the League would be dominated by Negroes. The appeals to prejudice were many and varied as Senator Borah brought in the prejudice against the Wall Street interests, and Senator Johnson emphasized the Japanese menace.<sup>60</sup> An example of the logic employed is demonstrated in a statement by McCormick that the League would result in:

. . . efficient and economical Japanese operating our street railways . . . Hindoo (sic) janitors in our offices and apartments . . . Chinese craftsmen driving rivets, joining timbers, laying bricks in the construction of our buildings.<sup>61</sup>

However, one of the most effective appeals to prejudice was made by Senator Sherman when he introduced the Catholic menace.<sup>62</sup>

On June 20, 1919, Sherman made a sensational speech on the floor of the Senate which injected the religious issue into the League question. Sherman pointed out that twenty-four of the forty Christian nations in

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<sup>60</sup>Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (June 20, 1919), pp. 1435-1445; Chicago Evening Post, "In Behalf of Republicanism," October 30, 1919, p. 2, clipping in Lawrence Sherman Papers; Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate, p. 142.

<sup>61</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 83-84.

<sup>62</sup>Fleming, The Treaty Veto of the American Senate, p. 142.

the League were "spiritually dominated by the Vatican." The danger implicit in this, Sherman said, was that the Papacy had never abandoned its claim to temporal power, and might some day reassert its claim. Therefore, Sherman reasoned that the League "bears within its folds a reactionary power more fatal and insidious than a Prussian helmet, more dangerous than future war."<sup>63</sup>

The reaction to Sherman's speech was immediate and varied. The Literary Digest viewed Sherman as an alarmist, and stated that the League might as logically be captured by the "Seventh-day Adventists, by the Anti-Tobacco League, by the Pan-Zambesian Foundation . . . ." <sup>64</sup> Catholic journals took the charge more seriously, and attempted to logically refute it. <sup>65</sup> The reaction in the United States Senate was also negative. Senator Borah of Idaho stated that he regretted the speech, and that many of Sherman's friends had tried to persuade him not to make it. Senators Ashurst and Thomas, among others, were quick to castigate Sherman. <sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (June 20, 1919), pp. 1435-1438, 1508; W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), p. 291.

<sup>64</sup> "A Papal Bugaboo in the League," Literary Digest, July 5, 1919, p. 46.

<sup>65</sup> J. Harding Fisher, "Senator Sherman and the Vatican," America, July 12, 1919, pp. 350-352; J. Harding Fisher, "Senator Sherman's Pope-Baiting," America, July 19, 1919, pp. 374-376. The reactions of Catholic newspapers are printed in "Catholics Deny a Catholic Peril in the League," Literary Digest, July 19, 1919, pp. 32-33.

<sup>66</sup> Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 104-105; J. Harding Fisher, "Senator Sherman and the Vatican," America, July 12, 1919, p. 350. Until Sherman's speech, the only mention of religion with reference to the Covenant had been made by Borah, who stated that he would oppose the League even if Jesus Christ should appear on Earth to advocate it.



In Illinois, the reaction to Sherman's speech was mixed, but generally favorable. Sherman's correspondence showed that he received over twice as many favorable as unfavorable letters. Sherman also received many favorable letters from out-of-state, most notably from many Protestant ministers in the southern United States. To further publicize his speech, Sherman had twenty-seven thousand copies of his speech printed and distributed.<sup>67</sup>

Sherman's decision to inject the Catholic issue had not been a hasty one. The Senator was preparing to bring the religious issue into the debate "through a long period, beginning last winter."<sup>68</sup> His motives were undoubtedly to raise fears and doubts about the League.

To deal with the arguments, doubts, and fears being raised by the anti-League forces, President Wilson decided to appeal directly to the people. On September 3, 1919, the President began a speechmaking tour of the country, and was greeted by large crowds. Wilson chose not to stop in Illinois, though, as Chicago was rapidly becoming the center of American isolationism.<sup>69</sup>

The anti-League forces combatted the President by "trailing" him. Wilson's opponents came into the same towns a few days after the President,

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<sup>67</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 104-105.

<sup>68</sup>Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, p. 225. Sherman claimed that he had no prejudice against Catholicism, and would as quickly denounce any Protestant group which threatened civil government. Sherman noted that Protestant as well as Catholic nations had been guilty of intolerance in the past. Sherman frequently attacked Protestant ministers who differed with him on the League. Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 104-105.

<sup>69</sup>Fleming, The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, p. 337.

and often followed the same parade route and spoke from the same platform. Generally, the speeches followed the same arguments as those made in the Senate. Supposedly, the League would destroy American sovereignty; control American immigration, armaments, and army and navy; and end the Monroe Doctrine.<sup>70</sup>

Debate on the League extended into October. By that time, many amendments were being offered for addition to the Covenant. On this subject, Sherman commented that:

I'll vote for any amendment that comes along, consistent or inconsistent. If anybody will write out any amendment that has anything to do with the treaty at all, I'll vote for it. And when they're all in I'll vote to throw the whole thing into the alley.<sup>71</sup>

Sherman personally introduced one proposed amendment. He suggested that the phrase to "invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and gracious favor of Almighty God," should be inserted into the Preamble. In discussing his amendment, Sherman asserted that "Voltaire would have been glad to see the collection of godless men who gathered at Versailles." Senator Lodge opposed the amendment, saying it would be a travesty to invoke divine blessings on such a document as the League. The amendment was tabled by a vote of fifty-seven to twenty-seven.<sup>72</sup>

Debate and discussion on the League was ended on November 13, 1919, when Senator Hitchcock moved to invoke closure. Hitchcock presented a

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<sup>70</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 82, 132.

<sup>71</sup>New York Times, October 17, 1919, p. 2; Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (October 16, 1919), p. 7000; St. Louis Globe-Democrat, October 16, 1919, p. 2, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 89.

<sup>72</sup>New York Times, October 30, 1919, pp. 1-2; Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (October 29, 1919), pp. 7680-7683.

petition with twenty-three signatures (sixteen needed), and on the seventeenth of November, closure was adopted by a vote of seventy-eight to sixteen. The vote on the Covenant was set for November 19, 1919. .

Sherman made a speech on the Senate floor the day of the Treaty vote. He referred to this speech as "a funeral oration over the defunct remains" of the Treaty. He stated that the Treaty "bristles with the selfish philosophy of Abe Potash, sharpened with the cruel avarice of Shylock, and interwoven with the crude commercialism of David Harum."<sup>73</sup>

In the actual voting on the Treaty, it was rejected with and without amendments. With reservations it was rejected by a vote of thirty-nine in favor to fifty-five against. Without reservations it was rejected by a vote of thirty-eight in favor to fifty-three against.<sup>74</sup> Senator Sherman voted against ratification of the Covenant with or without reservations, one of thirteen Republicans who refused to vote along with the party majority. Senator Sherman also cast the sole negative Republican vote on Reservation number thirteen, concerned with International Labor.<sup>75</sup>

After the defeat of the treaty, there were several attempts to effect a compromise. In January of 1920, a bipartisan group of senators were working on Article Ten, the main point of contention. Article Ten, which Wilson called the "heart of the Covenant," required members to preserve the territorial boundaries of fellow nations, and specified how the nations would respond in case of aggression. On January 23, 1920,

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<sup>73</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 144; Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (November 19, 1919), pp. 8769-8776.

<sup>74</sup>Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, p. 294.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid.; Chicago Herald and Examiner, November 28, 1919, p. 2, clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 91.

Senator Lodge took part in a bipartisan conference on the Treaty in Senator Simmons' office. Senators Sherman, McCormick, Knox, Borah, Brandegee, Poindexter, Moses, and Johnson scheduled a protest meeting for the same time in Senator Johnson's office. They called Senator Lodge away from the bipartisan conference, and a confrontation then occurred. The irreconcilable senators bluntly informed Lodge of their displeasure with him, and made it clear that there should be no compromise on the Lodge reservations.<sup>76</sup>

Senator Sherman, one of the conferees, was outspoken at the meeting in his opposition to a settlement. In a "vigorous" speech, Sherman charged that Wall Street bankers had gained control of certain key Republican leaders, preventing them from taking a strong stand against the League. In his speech Sherman also stated that if the Senate Republicans compromised at all on the Lodge reservations, he would bolt the party. Outside the conference room, Sherman commented:

If the Republican Party at the Chicago Convention wants to stand on the Lodge reservations I would accept the decisions and would support the platform. But if there is the slightest yielding on the Lodge reservations, I am through with the party.

Let there be no misunderstanding as to my position. I will not support the Republican organization in the Senate or in the country if it compromises on the Lodge reservations. In plain language, I'll bolt even to the point of supporting a third ticket.<sup>77</sup>

This action by the "battalion of death" senators effectively ended the hopes of a compromise. In March of 1920 a second vote on the League took

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<sup>76</sup>New York Times, January 24, 1920, p. 1; Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964, p. 361; Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 156.

<sup>77</sup>New York Times, January 24, 1920, p. 2; Chicago Tribune, January 24, 1920, p. 1.

place. The Covenant failed by a vote of forty-nine in favor to thirty-five against the League with reservations.<sup>78</sup>

Sherman's reasons for his actions on the question of the League were many and varied. First of all, it should be realized that Sherman, along with most of the people involved, believed that the League was one of the greatest issues in the history of the United States. Sherman stated that "Not since the Civil War has there been anything so fundamental, and now is the time for every red-blooded American citizen to act and to vote."<sup>79</sup> Sherman's extreme statements and actions are explained by the observation that given the heated arguments of the time, many persons on both sides had gone to excess. Those favoring the League had also gone to extremes, as they charged that the League should be supported because "Jesus Christ had dreamed of it," or that "George Washington, if alive, would summon a stenographer and dictate an urgent recommendation for its approval." Even President Wilson had stated that his opponents were "blind and contemptible little men who gave aid and comfort to the Bolsheviks and the Germans."<sup>80</sup> The questions of the period lent themselves to extremes, and both sides had responded in that fashion.

In addition, it should be noted that another reason for Sherman's opposition to the President on the League was the question of legislative versus executive power. Sherman noted this in a speech, in which he

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<sup>78</sup>Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, p. 295.

<sup>79</sup>New York Times, March 7, 1919, p. 4.

<sup>80</sup>Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964, p. 357; Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 181.

stated that:

The universal tendency following all war periods is over-centralization, and to substitute a rule of unbridled official discretion for the wholesale rule of written law. The invariable result is a vast concentration of power and a corresponding absorption of local rights in the process.<sup>81</sup>

Furthermore, the period following wars may also be seen as a period of struggle between the legislative and executive branches as the Congress attempts to expand its powers and reduce the President's. Conflict between the President and Congress in this situation is nearly inevitable.

Also, partisan politics entered the fray. Wilson the Democrat was attempting to guide his League through a Republican Senate. He had virtually ignored the Senate in negotiating the Treaty, and had failed to take a single Republican Senator with him to Paris. However, Sherman denied that partisan politics entered the dispute:

There is no partisan motive in the opposition to this document. The senators, both those who favor ratifying it with the Lodge reservations and those who oppose it altogether, including some Democrats, are not prompted by political reasons. It is the profound belief by these men that the League as presented to us from the Paris conference is a menace to the safety of the United States, the integrity of our government, and the welfare of our people.<sup>82</sup>

Perhaps one of the more important reasons for Sherman's stand on the Treaty may be explained by Sherman's intense personal dislike of Woodrow

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<sup>81</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, Lawrence Yates Sherman speech on February 25, 1920, to the Illinois Constitutional Convention, Springfield, Illinois. Box 102.

<sup>82</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to E. Paget, February 5, 1920. Box 104.

Wilson. Sherman was not alone in this, as in the post-war period "the country had been swept by a gust of anti-Wilson feeling."<sup>83</sup> During the President's stay in Europe, Sherman had made a personal attack on the President, charging that the President and Mrs. Wilson had accepted gifts in Europe worth half a million dollars. This charge was later shown to be untrue.<sup>84</sup>

Sherman also stated that Wilson's tour of the country to generate support for the League was the beginning of Wilson's campaign for a third term as President. Many ridiculed this charge at the time, but it was later shown that Wilson actually considered running for a third term.<sup>85</sup> One hint of this had been that the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee had stated on May 28, 1919, that if the League was rejected "it might force a third candidacy on President Wilson." At that time Sherman observed that the Democrats "were intent on making the League a party issue in 1920."<sup>86</sup> In an earlier speech Sherman had attacked "the attitude of President Wilson," and asserted that Wilson was making an issue of universal peace for 1920 just as he had made an issue out of war for the 1916 campaign.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>83</sup>Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1964, p. 357.

<sup>84</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, pp. 133-134; Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st session (September 16, 1919), pp. 5500-5501.

<sup>85</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 134; Wesley M. Bagby, The Road to Normalcy; The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920 (Baltimore, Maryland: 1962), pp. 51-68.

<sup>86</sup>New York Times, May 30, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>87</sup>Ibid., March 4, 1919, p. 3.

Sherman had earlier detected less than honorable reasons for the President's bill for food relief in Europe. Sherman, in opposing the measure, believed that the President wanted it for other than humanitarian reasons. He charged that the \$100,000,000 appropriation was "not a relief fund for starving nations but a campaign fund for the President as a candidate for Chairman of the Peace League of the World."<sup>88</sup>

After the President had suffered his stroke, Sherman also made an indirect attempt to have Wilson removed from office. Sherman drafted a bill to set procedures for investing the Vice-President of the United States with Presidential power in case of the disability of the President. Sherman took this action after Wilson had dismissed Secretary of State Lansing for merely calling a Cabinet meeting during Wilson's incapacitation.<sup>89</sup>

However, aside from Sherman's personal dislike of Wilson, and his desire to restore legislative authority, Sherman opposed the League because it very clearly was antithetical to all the values that Sherman held dear. Along with others, Sherman honestly believed that the League was too radical a break with the past. Noninvolvement in European affairs had been a good, long-standing policy, and Sherman saw no reason to terminate it.<sup>90</sup> Also, Sherman thought that the League would set up a super-government. He stated that:

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<sup>88</sup> New York Times, January 24, 1919, p. 1.

<sup>89</sup> Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 162.

<sup>90</sup> Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1944), p. 200.



. . . I am convinced that there was an excellent plan of government prepared by the fathers of the Constitution, and I don't think anyone has been born since who is capable of writing a new document for our national government that will improve upon it.<sup>91</sup>

Sherman thus had a variety of reasons for opposing the Covenant.

These reasons explain Sherman's intransigence, and the intensity of his fight. Sherman sincerely believed that American participation in the League would do more harm than good, and that the interests of world peace could best be served by the nation focusing on strengthening itself and solving its own problems, rather than taking on the world's. Sherman had traditional American views, and believed that the American tradition of "no entangling alliances" was best.

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<sup>91</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman, "Aims of the Republican Congress," The Forum, vol. 60, December 1918, pp. 738-740.

## CHAPTER VII

### RETIREMENT AND BUSINESS

After the fight over the Treaty of Versailles, Sherman spoke out less frequently. One issue to which he did address himself was that of the proposed soldier relief bill, which was considered in the early summer of 1920. In response to an inquiry by an American Legion Post, Sherman put his opinion on the record. He stated that for two decades he had not allowed the American Federation of Labor to dictate to him, and that he did not intend to allow the American Legion to do so. Sherman referred to the proposed soldier relief bill as a "disgraceful deterioration of the patriotism of a great country." If the goal of the American Legion was to "loot the Federal Treasury, it is a disgraceful organization."<sup>1</sup>

Sherman also continued his feud of long standing with Henry Ford. In early 1919 Sherman had asserted that Henry Ford's grasp of public affairs could be measured by Ford's "peace ark to command peace by the mere majesty of his presence . . . and the exemption of his son, Edsel, from military service."<sup>2</sup> In a later speech in the Senate, Sherman stated that Edsel Ford was "a Presidential pet" and had been excused from military service by misuse of executive power.<sup>3</sup> Much of what was said at this time

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<sup>1</sup>New York Times, May 26, 1920, p. 11.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., February 5, 1919, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., July 16, 1919, p. 2.

may be dismissed as partisan debate. Henry Ford was running for the United States Senate on the Democratic ticket, and was thus a choice target for Sherman's barbs. However, even after Ford was defeated at the polls, Sherman continued to attack him. The defense that Henry Ford's supporters used was that Edsel Ford had served his country best by supervising the Ford Company's war construction. This argument Sherman scoffed at.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, Sherman in early 1920 introduced a resolution which called for an end to all government work in the widening and improvement of Michigan's Rouge River "pending an investigation by the Senate Appropriations Committee of the activities of Henry Ford in connection with the work and the feasibility of the project." Sherman asked that the committee inquire "in particular to the interest and influence of Henry Ford and his agents and the use of the name of the United States and powers of the Secretary of War in condemnation proceedings" for land by the river.<sup>5</sup>

Sherman's last actual legislative effort took place in late January of 1921. Sherman introduced a bill to increase the salary of members of Congress from \$7,500 to \$12,000, and that of Cabinet members from \$12,000 to \$18,000 per year. The bill was referred to the Appropriations Committee.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>New York Times, February 18, 1919, p. 10; Ibid., February 20, 1920, p. 17.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., January 14, 1920, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., January 27, 1921, p. 17.

During his second Senate term, Sherman made the decision not to run for re-election in 1920, and to retire from an active life in politics at the end of his term. His decision was based on several factors, one of which was his failing health. In 1920 Sherman was sixty-two years old, and his sight and hearing were failing. That year eye specialists declared that Sherman's eyes were almost worn out from overwork, and that he faced the alternatives of either a year's complete rest from work, or blindness.<sup>7</sup> Sherman's sense of hearing was also declining. In 1915, Sherman had become totally deaf in one ear. A hearing aid helped for a while, but by 1920 he could barely hear the speeches in the Senate.<sup>8</sup>

Another factor which influenced Sherman's decision to retire was finances. In 1920, the salary for and United States Senator was \$7,500.<sup>9</sup> Of this sum, Sherman commented:

Unless a man lives very economically here he cannot keep inside of his salary as a Senator. I have some experience now for two years. I can scarcely keep even. Congress is in almost continual session. I have been compelled to abandon my profession. I have had no time to attend to personal business during the . . . years spent here.<sup>10</sup>

On the same subject, Sherman stated that:

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<sup>7</sup>New York Times, September 14, 1920, p. 9.

<sup>8</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Will Colvin, February 16, 1915; Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 67; conversation with Mrs. Walter Johnson, of Urbana, Illinois, who is a niece of Lawrence Yates Sherman.

<sup>9</sup>Illinois Voters' Handbook, Abbot, Grace, et al, editors (Chicago, Illinois: Hildman Printing Company, 1920), p. 91.

<sup>10</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to C. H. Canby, March 1, 1915. C. H. Canby was the President of the Chicago Board of Trade. Box 59.

My expenses are very heavy. I have had sickness in my family ever since I have been in Washington, and have had a trained nurse in my house since last December and do not know how long I must continue her services as the member of my family who is ill shows no signs of any permanent improvement. It is about all I can do to keep even.<sup>11</sup>

The member of Sherman's family to which he was referring was his younger sister, Sarah Jane (Jennie) Sherman. She had tuberculosis, and Sherman had supported her for twenty-five years.<sup>12</sup>

On being a senator, Sherman stated that:

. . . if a man is not of independent means I do not see how he can long make such a sacrifice for the public.

He noted that "the honor is certainly an expensive luxury."<sup>13</sup> Though Sherman was not a personally wealthy man, he refused to compromise himself by accepting money for speechmaking. On this subject he said:

I have never received a dollar whether in Chautauqua or elsewhere while I was in public life and that has been the most of the time for the last twenty years. No one has ever paid me money when I was so situated except for my service . . . in the courtroom. Somehow it has always seemed improper to me to charge people for the privilege of hearing one who has been chosen to public office by the same people who pay to hear him.<sup>14</sup>

Nor would Sherman accept money for articles which he wrote for magazines. In 1919, Sherman wrote the article "Why I Opposed the League"

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<sup>11</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to David Shipp, May 16, 1914. Box 53.

<sup>12</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Mrs. Dispensa, February 16, 1926. Box 201.

<sup>13</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to C. H. Canby, March 1, 1915. Box 60.

<sup>14</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Reverend John W. Holland, December 4, 1914. Box 57.

for Leslie's Weekly magazine. They sent him a check, which he sent back. In returning the check, Sherman stated:

I have made it a uniform rule for twenty-five years that while I held public office I would not accept pay for either an address or an article on any public question. As long as I have lived to sixty years of age without varying from this course I believe I will finish up what few years I have left the same way. Let me suggest if you do not wish to return this check to your company that you give it to whatever most deserving charity you know of, say something like a fresh air fund for an out of town farm for children or something of that kind.<sup>15</sup>

When Sherman had first entered the United States Senate, he had voiced his philosophy of one's life vocation with regard to salary. He stated in 1914 that if an office does not pay salary enough to support its occupant or satisfy him then "he ought to get out of it and go into private life where he can so lecture and receive money without incurring . . . criticism . . . ." <sup>16</sup> Sherman decided at this point to heed his own advice.

Actually, Sherman had been considering retirement for some time. In June of 1916, Sherman had stated to Edward Brundage that he intended to retire after his term expired.<sup>17</sup> He reaffirmed this in 1918, in a private letter saying that he had made his decision not to attempt re-election in June, 1916.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to John A. Sleicher, June 19, 1919. Mr. Sleicher was the editor of Leslie's Weekly. Box 131.

<sup>16</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Reverend John Holland, December 4, 1914. Box 57.

<sup>17</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Edward J. Brundage, June 27, 1916. Box 85.

<sup>18</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Noah C. Bainum, December 9, 1918. Box 127.

In Illinois, the political climate was still favorable for Sherman. Sherman had aligned himself with that faction of the Illinois Republican Party controlled by Governor Frank O. Lowden, and opposed to "Big Bill" Thompson. In 1919, Sherman had served as Vice-Chairman of a committee to promote Lowden's candidacy for President of the United States.<sup>19</sup> This candidacy ran counter to the wishes of Mayor Thompson, who wished the Illinois candidate to be himself, or Senator Borah of Idaho.<sup>20</sup> The April 13, 1920, Illinois presidential primary effectively ended Lowden's hopes, as he was defeated by General Leonard Wood by 30,000 votes in Chicago.<sup>21</sup>

While the Lowden-Deneen-Sherman forces had suffered a setback, on June 7, 1920, they gained revenge. On that date Lawrence Sherman replaced Mayor Thompson as a member of the Republican National Committee. Senator Sherman garnered thirty-seven votes, while nineteen supporters of Mayor Thompson did not vote, and two voted "no."<sup>22</sup> Senators Sherman and McCormick were also chosen as delegates at large to the Republican National Convention.<sup>23</sup>

The result of the November 1920, general election was a near landslide for the Republican Party in Illinois. Warren Harding, the Republican candidate for President, carried the state by over 800,000 votes. In Illinois, Len Small of Kankakee won the Governorship over Democrat

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<sup>19</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 408.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 399.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 443-444.

<sup>22</sup>New York Times, June 8, 1920, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., May 11, 1920, pp. 1, 3.

J. Hamilton Lewis by more than one-half million votes. The Republicans also won Sherman's senate seat as William B. McKinley, a Champaign, Illinois, public utility magnate, won election over Democrat Peter A. Waller by a plurality nearly as large as Harding's.<sup>24</sup>

Actually, Sherman did not completely retire from politics. He served as a delegate to the 1924 Republican National Convention at Cleveland, Ohio, as a delegate-at-large. In 1928 Sherman also was a delegate to the Republican National Convention, this time representing the State of Florida.<sup>25</sup>

In September of 1921, six months after the end of his senate term, Sherman was appointed by President Harding as Special Advisor to Charles Gates Dawes in the development and installation of the Federal Bureau of the Budget. This appointment, which lasted until February, 1922, was one in which Sherman served without compensation. Sherman's assistance in creating the budget system of federal finance may fairly be evaluated as one of his outstanding activities.<sup>26</sup>

In the latter part of 1924, Sherman moved to Daytona Beach, Florida. Besides engaging in a law practice, Sherman became a banker. In 1924 he helped organize the First National Bank of Daytona Beach. Sherman served

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<sup>24</sup>Hutchinson, Lowden of Illinois, p. 481; Edward F. Dunne, Illinois: The Heart of the Nation, 5 vols., (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1933), vol. 2, p. 404; Theodore Pease, The Story of Illinois (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 241. In the 67th Congress (1921-1923), the Illinois delegation consisted of twenty-four Republicans and three Democrats.

<sup>25</sup>Illinois State Historical Society Journal, vol. 45, (Springfield, Illinois: The Illinois State Historical Society, 1952), p. 74; New York Times, September 16, 1939, p. 17.

<sup>26</sup>Illinois State Historical Society Journal, vol. 57, (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Historical Society, 1964), pp. 329-330; New York Times, September 16, 1939, p. 17.



as its President in 1925, and was Chairman of the Board from 1925 to 1927. In 1930 the bank merged with the Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, and Sherman served as a director of the merged bank until 1933. At that time he retired from all business, political, and legal activity.<sup>27</sup>

On September 15, 1939, Sherman died in Daytona Beach, at the age of eighty. His body was returned to Illinois, and last rites were held in Springfield, Illinois, on September 21. He was interred in Faunce Cemetery, near Montrose, Illinois.<sup>28</sup>

In analyzing the life of Senator Sherman, it is obvious that he was a complex man, a man of contradictions. As an example, Sherman held various viewpoints about the value of education. Though he denounced its practical value at one point, he also gave assistance in the creation of the Normal College at Macomb, Illinois, which became Western Illinois University.<sup>29</sup> He was an avid student of the lessons of history, and valued the lessons of history, yet said at one point that "all school histories ought to be burned."<sup>30</sup> Sherman was also trustee of the Illinois Women's College at Jacksonville.<sup>31</sup> In addition, Sherman was affiliated with the Illinois State Historical Society for many years. He served on

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<sup>27</sup>New York Times, September 16, 1939, p. 17.

<sup>28</sup>Illinois State Historical Society Journal, vol. 33, (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois State Historical Society, 1940), March-December 1940, pp. 104-105; New York Times, September 16, 1939, p. 17.

<sup>29</sup>"School Days of Senator Lawrence Yates Sherman," p. 1, Clipping in the Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers. Box 117.

<sup>30</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman, "History has a Word for Us," Banker's Magazine, August 1919, pp. 183-184; New York Times, June 8, 1922, p. 17. This was part of Sherman's address to the graduates of Lincoln College at Lincoln, Illinois, on June 7, 1922.

<sup>31</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, letter to Dr. Joseph R. Harker, January 6, 1916. Box 118.

the board of directors from 1905-1908, and as a Vice-President of the organization from 1912 through 1934.<sup>32</sup>

Another contradiction lay in Sherman's thoughts about changes in government. On most issues he opposed change, yet in Illinois he continually championed the cause of constitutional revision. He realized that "it is an act of radical character," but was convinced that it was necessary.<sup>33</sup>

Also, Sherman took various positions on the question of free speech. In the Senate, he used filibustering methods in fighting the Ship Purchase Act, the Victory Bond Bill, and the League of Nations. Yet he fiercely attacked the censorship laws and government control of the telegraph lines during World War I.

On the issue of the League of Nations, Sherman was considerably less ambivalent. He was against it, period. Yet it is open to question what amount of his fierce opposition was due to actual dislike of the provisions, and what portion stemmed from his intense personal dislike of Woodrow Wilson. Also, it is necessary to consider the influence of the congressional-executive power struggle which often takes place after wars, as well as poor tactics on Wilson's part. Although Sherman has been portrayed as being irrevocably against the League of Nations, it should be noted that in early 1921 he mentioned that President-elect Harding had in mind a plan to establish an association of nations,

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<sup>32</sup>Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, (Springfield, Illinois: The Illinois State Historical Society, 1905-1934), vols. for 1905-1934.

<sup>33</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman, "A New Constitution is Necessary for the Welfare of the State," (Chicago: Public Policy Publishing House, 1901), pp. 75-77. This was a speech Sherman made on October 12, 1901, before the Chicago Real Estate Board.

independent of the plan of Versailles. Sherman's reaction to such a plan was:

Senator Harding is proceeding along the right lines, and there is an excellent prospect that he will work out the program to which he is now devoting himself.<sup>34</sup>

Sherman's actions also indicate some contradictions in his ideas about military intervention by the United States in other countries. In a speech at Macomb, Illinois, on May 30, 1900, he stated what eventually became the basis for his stand against the League of Nations. He said:

We . . . resolve that America shall remain isolated from other continents . . . (in order that) our political independence from them will be preserved.<sup>35</sup>

Yet Sherman also favored intervention in Mexico in many instances, and definitely favored military preparedness. Sherman also supported our participation in World War I, though he had doubts about the manner in which the Administration conducted it.

Sherman's position on the League and his criticism of the conduct of the war gained him many enemies. Eastern newspapers, especially the powerful New York Times, presented an unfavorable opinion of Sherman in their editorials. Since he opposed Wilson (and had earlier opposed Theodore Roosevelt) whom they idolized, Sherman was obviously the devil incarnate. Accordingly, the editorial section of the New York Times pictured Sherman as an unpatriotic man, and a fool.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>New York Times, January 7, 1921, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup>Lawrence Yates Sherman Papers, speech by Sherman at Macomb, Illinois, on May 30, 1900. Box 23.

<sup>36</sup>New York Times, September 5, 1919, p. 10; New York Times, December 7, 1918, p. 14. These are but two examples of the negative opinion of the New York Times regarding Lawrence Yates Sherman.

In fact, Sherman's various positions on policy questions had gained him a great many detractors over the years. Those who followed Theodore Roosevelt attacked Sherman after he and their idol crossed verbal swords. Also, Sherman had made additional enemies such as Henry Ford and Woodrow Wilson. Collectively, Sherman's antagonists comprise an impressive list. However, this did not bother Sherman, as he reasoned that "a man's character was often determined by the enemies he made."<sup>37</sup>

Sherman also earned a reputation for being obstinate. He admitted that:

Most of my experience has been devoted to killing bills rather than promoting them, even when I have been with the majority in control of legislative bodies.

He further stated that a senator could get more done by "whaling the life out of everything" than by trying to pass a large quantity of legislation.<sup>38</sup> This was in line with Sherman's conservative philosophy that the best government was the one that governed least. That is, by eliminating all non-essential bills, what remained would be the most important legislation, that which was worthy of passage.

A final evaluation of Sherman must note that Sherman's enemies tended to bias the contemporary opinion of him. As a colorful senator during a very turbulent era, Sherman developed many detractors. Though at times he seemed to have cultivated antagonists, they did tend to damage him in national newspapers and magazines. The demagogic buffoon, as the New York Times portrayed Sherman, was far from an accurate portrayal. Yet in that period of heated issues, many, perhaps including Sherman,

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<sup>37</sup>Stone, The Irreconcilables, p. 104.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. 187-188.

carried their views and their rhetoric further than convention allowed. In his political dealings, Sherman did maintain his personal integrity, and stood bravely for what he believed in. Thus, an accurate analysis of Sherman must fall somewhere between the villain portrayed by his foes and the moral purist Sherman's supporters claimed him to be. Sherman was in fact an extremely complex and multi-faceted individual. His contributions to the American political arena are worthy of note, and his role in the debate over the Treaty of the League of Nations has ensured him a place in history.

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Box 1-33	1885-1908
Box 34-42	1908-1911
Box 40-45	1912
Box 46-50	1913
Box 51-57	1914
Box 58-63	1915
Box 79-108	League of Nations correspondence
Box 109-213	Various topics.

The filing boxes are labelled to 1921, and are in roughly chronological order. The post-1921 material is contained in gray cardboard boxes, and consists of miscellaneous materials. The numbered boxes end at number 213, which is for the year 1921.

The Papers are extremely valuable to this thesis inasmuch as they provide otherwise unavailable source material. The Senator kept the letters he received, as well as carbon copies of the letters he wrote. His position on many issues is therein explained.

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VOTE FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR IN ILLINOIS, NOVEMBER 3, 1914

Counties	Pluralities		Republican	Democratic	Progressive	Socialist	Prohibition	Socialist Labor Party
			Lawrence Y. Sherman	Roger C. Sullivan	Raymond Robins	Adolph Germer	George Woolsey	John M. Frances
Adams	D	1,489	4,008	5,497	1,667	165	77	18
Alexander	R	719	2,497	1,778	236	67	23	3
Bond	R	1,029	1,883	854	564	43	54	5
Boone	R	1,383	1,987	521	604	63	13	3
Brown	D	456	548	1,004	506	11	12	2
Bureau	R	1,073	2,918	1,845	1,400	198	109	14
Calhoun	D	287	614	901	36	13	18	0
Carroll	R	1,215	1,806	591	427	53	60	6
Cass	D	174	1,242	1,416	846	67	54	3
Champaign	R	2,265	5,282	3,017	2,479	105	89	18
Christian	R	62	2,958	2,896	1,003	245	89	13
Clark	R	230	2,314	2,084	625	30	55	7
Clay	R	563	2,174	1,611	255	59	67	5
Clinton	D	857	1,336	2,193	431	243	27	3
Coles	R	455	3,174	2,719	1,478	62	42	8
Cook (see below)								
Crawford	D	165	1,840	2,005	943	37	52	3
Cumberland	R	128	1,411	1,283	309	27	23	5
DeKalb	R	151	2,659	1,013	2,508	127	39	14
DeWitt	R	600	2,061	1,461	855	62	34	7
Douglas	R	816	2,010	1,194	991	24	46	0

Counties	Pluralities	Socialist Labor Party					
		Republican	Democrats	Progressive	Socialist	Prohibition	Socialist Labor Party
		Lawrence Y. Sherman	Roger C. Sullivan	Raymond Robins	Adolph Germer	George Woolsey	John M. Frances
DuPage	P 1,118	2,131	1,620	3,249	93	69	10
Edgar	D 948	2,273	3,221	1,241	70	41	4
Edwards	R 896	1,447	551	194	6	29	0
Effingham	D 563	1,517	2,080	387	31	18	5
Fayette	R 484	2,641	2,157	900	74	83	7
Ford	R 230	1,276	803	1,046	27	40	4
Franklin	R 793	2,904	2,111	621	334	55	26
Fulton	R 812	3,867	3,055	1,614	853	117	44
Gallatin	D 412	923	1,335	170	31	10	9
Greene	D 562	1,009	1,571	360	68	20	1
Grundy	R 1,138	2,079	737	941	129	44	7
Hamilton	D 36	1,473	1,509	597	40	15	9
Hancock	R 479	2,798	2,319	1,218	93	87	9
Hardin	R 240	875	635	80	22	13	4
Henderson	R 453	1,087	595	643	21	22	1
Henry	P 150	2,861	1,640	3,011	219	52	13
Iroquois	R 1,578	3,350	1,772	1,328	44	71	3
Jackson	R 783	3,420	2,637	1,173	150	43	20
Jasper	R 83	1,623	1,540	353	25	43	2
Jefferson	R 307	2,826	2,519	713	86	38	10
Jersey	R 85	1,546	1,461	137	7	22	4
JoDavies	R 401	2,094	1,693	804	52	44	5
Johnson	R 892	1,527	635	423	47	30	4
Kane	P 1,735	4,854	3,744	6,589	317	109	24
Kankakee	R 1,937	4,344	2,407	1,818	60	39	6

Counties		Pluralities	Republican	Democrats	Progressive	Socialist	Prohibition	Socialist Labor Party
			Lawrence Y. Sherman	Roger C. Sullivan	Raymond Robins	Adolph Germer	George Woolsey	John M. Frances
Kendall	R	521	1,176	250	655	15	6	2
Knox	R	1,915	3,980	1,972	2,065	199	64	20
Lake	R	1,253	3,225	1,972	1,770	251	58	45
LaSalle	D	413	7,104	7,517	3,183	340	91	29
Lawrence	R	473	2,500	2,027	322	98	94	7
Lee	R	1,371	2,944	1,573	1,237	79	35	5
Livingston	R	1,536	4,298	2,762	1,565	55	37	5
Logan	R	157	2,332	2,175	1,336	131	43	8
Macon	R	2,593	5,668	3,075	1,892	234	92	32
Macoupin	R	812	4,411	3,599	1,057	631	84	28
Madison	R	2,354	8,068	5,714	1,491	1,237	95	51
Marion	R	238	2,375	1,964	2,137	257	71	12
Marshall	R	115	1,578	1,463	446	92	21	7
Mason	D	300	1,546	1,846	399	27	46	10
Massac	R	1,142	1,509	367	270	31	19	4
McDonough	R	1,576	3,646	2,070	748	81	90	2
McHenry	R	1,895	3,254	1,359	1,135	23	20	0
McLean	R	1,852	6,114	4,262	1,906	234	217	15
Menard	R	109	1,360	1,251	317	34	31	3
Mercer	R	903	2,274	1,371	878	106	46	8
Monroe	R	403	1,763	1,360	188	15	5	3
Montgomery	R	923	3,593	2,670	853	464	104	20
Morgan	R	895	3,503	2,608	1,057	96	44	16
Moultrie	R	115	1,307	1,192	570	22	26	4
Ogle	R	1,601	2,846	927	1,245	63	74	4



Counties		Pluralities	Republican	Democrats	Progressive	Socialist	Prohibition	Socialist Labor Party
			Lawrence Y. Sherman	Roger C. Sullivan	Raymond Robins	Adolph Germer	George Woolsey	John M. Frances
Peoria	R	385	7,478	7,093	2,788	546	73	45
Perry	R	122	1,939	1,817	475	136	47	18
Platt	D	795	1,739	2,570	944	23	16	2
Pike	R	240	2,810	2,570	456	134	60	9
Pope	R	894	1,344	450	314	16	18	1
Pulaski	R	1,015	1,742	727	181	23	17	2
Putnam	R	69	467	398	379	25	6	4
Randolph	D	24	2,254	2,278	820	151	57	19
Richland	R	109	1,295	1,186	585	51	68	2
Rock Island	R	2,425	6,480	4,055	2,495	1,317	76	88
Saline	R	941	2,951	2,010	775	598	44	26
Sangamon	R	4,573	10,793	6,220	2,008	871	104	33
Schuyler	D	143	1,291	1,434	345	22	65	3
Scott	R	464	1,340	876	246	11	10	1
Shelby	R	448	2,399	1,942	1,337	73	101	10
Stark	R	494	1,087	593	383	8	13	3
St. Clair	R	1,276	9,704	8,428	2,794	1,522	108	62
Stephenson	R	286	3,062	2,776	2,214	104	44	18
Tazewell	D	92	2,647	2,739	941	154	78	26
Union	D	455	1,275	1,730	354	15	13	2
Vermilion	R	2,395	7,783	5,388	2,723	425	436	55
Wabash	R	238	1,462	1,224	292	54	69	5
Warren	R	61	1,833	1,772	1,572	101	52	13
Washington	R	866	2,198	1,332	367	78	29	4
Wayne	R	835	2,822	1,987	237	28	66	5
White			2,143	2,143	267	112	44	8

Counties	Pluralities	Republicans	Democrats	Progresssives	Socialist	Prohibition	Socialist Labor Party	
		Lawrence Y. Sherman	Roger C. Sullivan	Raymond Robins	Adolph Germer	George Woolscy	John M. Frances	
Whiteside	R	914	2,976	1,226	2,062	35	73	4
Will	R	1,937	6,805	4,868	4,819	208	30	18
Williamson	R	1,233	4,081	2,848	1,232	419	75	40
Winnebago	R	1,253	4,371	1,575	3,118	1,065	93	49
Woodford	R	174	2,000	1,826	634	61	7	3
Down State	R	72,822	286,853	214,031	114,540	17,720	5,642	1,290
Cook	D	55,564	103,808	159,372	88,487	22,169	1,108	788
Total	R	17,258	390,661	373,403	203,027	39,889	6,750	2,078

Counties carried: Sherman, 80; Sullivan, 18; Robins, 3.  
Sullivan and Sherman received the same number of votes in White County.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Lewis G. Stevenson, (Ed.), Blue Book of the State of Illinois: 1915-1916 (Springfield, Illinois: Illinois Printing Company, 1916), pp. 695-696.

## APPENDIX II



The grave of Lawrence Yates Sherman is in Faunce Cemetery, which is located in Cumberland County, near Montrose, Illinois.