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Tanzania: The Politics of Socialism and Rural Development in an Emerging Country

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Eastern Illinois University

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TANZANIA: THE POLITICS OF SOCIALISM AND

RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AN EMERGING COUNTRY

(TITLE)

BY

YASMIN DELPHA SCHARSCHMIDT

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
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CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1977

YEAR

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PREFACE

This study deals with the political and economic development of Tanzania since its independence in December 1961. It covers the major problems which have been encountered in the struggle towards the realization of a socialist society in an agriculturally backward economy.

In the course of writing this paper, I have incurred debts to many people who cannot all be mentioned by name but without their help it is inconceivable that this thesis would have been completed. However, I would like to offer my sincere thanks to my advisor, Dr. Soderberg, whose contribution, by way of guidance and helpful criticism gave me priceless insight into the problems at hand. To Ms. Mattie Lewis and Ms. Tokunbo Lafinham I would like to express great appreciation for the encouragement which they gave. To the library staff, whose efficiency ensured that I obtained all the necessary research materials, I give my thanks. Last but not least, I would like to mention my parents, whose constant efforts both financial and spiritual made all of this both probable and possible.

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CHAPTER I

BASIC PURPOSES OF THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Tanzania, a young African country practicing socialist principles in many important areas of development, has been chosen as the major topic for discussion in this study. It is still at that stage of building the foundations for subsequent economic, social and political growth, however, it has made considerable progress towards the achievement of its socialist objectives since independence in 1961. Its ideology, policies and style of political leadership and organization have been of interest not only to students of development, but to political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and other social scientists. It has adopted an approach to development which attempts to transform society in terms of the society's own goals and values. This particular study is an attempt to analyze the major political, economic and social changes in Tanzania that have been brought about as a result of that country's policy pronouncements.

Tanzania was singled out for further research not simply because it was a developing country, but rather for its attempts at modernization via a socialist path. Although it can be debated whether or not there is any novelty in such an idea, that fact remains that Tanzania's brand of socialism has withstood, at any event has not desintegrated from, the pressures of development and modernization. This study does not delve deeply into the definitions which abound concerning the nature of socialism -- African or otherwise. It is obvious that the varieties

of socialism are many and well documented in the literature.¹ Many African politicians have developed their own ideas of what African socialism is and should aim to do. Nyerere is no exception. Since one of the primary aims of this study is to give a greater understanding of the dynamics of the Tanzanian political system, it is necessary to analyze and evaluate the ideas and concepts on which such a system is based. This could hardly be achieved without examining the ideas of Nyerere, especially those relating to "ujamaa" or rural socialism. The transformation of Tanzanian society has been and continues to be guided by the principles he outlined in "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism", as far back as 1961.²

This study concentrates primarily on the building of socialism in Tanzania. It looks at the difficulties involved in trying to establish democratic institutions in a country still suffering from a colonial heritage, an entrenched traditionalism, and a lack of natural and financial resources.³ It is taken for granted that there is a strong

¹Many works have been compiled on socialism. The writings of Karl Marx are often referred to as scientific socialism. See for example, Capital and other Writings, Max Eastman: Random House, 1959. The socialists who preceeded Marx were given the collective title of "utopians" because their ideas, plans, and ventures seemed very far reaching. H.W. Laidler, A History of Socialist Thought (Thomas Y. Crowell, New York) 1927. For a good introduction to African Socialism refer to Paul E. Sigmund (ed) The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger) 1967. Part III Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy (eds) African Aims and Attitudes, (Cambridge University Press, 1974.).

²See J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press, 1966.

³Refer to John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization, (New York; John Wiley) 1972. See especially Chapters 3 and 5.

commitment on the part of the political leadership to lead the country toward the ideal they so commonly refer to as African communalism.⁴ In view of this, the study highlights some of the major problems involved in building a political system based on the equality and freedom of all men, but which must simultaneously lay down certain restrictions and limitations on individual freedom in order to succeed in its socio-economic development objectives.⁵

It is often stated that development poses many problems for a young independent state, but choosing a socialist path brings with it many additional difficulties. The policy of ujamaa requires mass support and participation for its fulfillment -- unity both in the population at large and in the political leadership itself is of the utmost importance if all the hopes of ujamaa are to be realized. The ways in which the political leaders secure the consent and support of the populace for development programs are not only important for the success of such programs, but also for the stability of the political system.⁶

⁴See Freedom and Unity, op.cit., pp. 165-166.

⁵This is one of the many paradoxes existing in developing countries today. The principles of democracy are clearly laid down in their constitutions and other political documents. Yet in reality these principles are seldom, if ever, practiced.

⁶Mobilization has long been a major problem for the developing countries and a variety of methods have been used to encourage or force people to participate in one form or another. In Tanzania, the leadership has spoken out against the use of force -- yet it has been noticeable in the implementation of rural policies.

In attempting to establish a socialist state, Nyerere has emphasized the use of persuasion rather than force and although the latter has been brought into play, the occasions have been very few. The idea of persuasion is not unique, but in the context of African politics, where many oppressive dictatorships and military regimes have come into being, Nyerere's ideas on conversion through persuasion merits further examination.⁷ It seemed important for this particular survey to establish the extent to which such ideas pervade the leadership, that is, the degree to which the political elite, both party and government officials, believe that the population can be mobilized through strong leadership and example. In addition, this study attempts to outline the basic difficulties and limitations involved in relying so heavily on such a strategy.

Essentially, this is a case study of the problems of development and the solutions which have been formulated to deal with them. It attempts to create an accurate picture of the ways in which a group of political leaders are fashioning the instruments which they hope will lead their relatively backward society to progress development and modernization. The popular idea of a "developed" country is one that is able to provide its citizens with goods and services that is roughly equivalent to the highest level of goods and services available in any country at that time. Indexes such as per capita income and GNP have

⁷Refer to African Institute Bulletin, II, 12, 1974. The article entitled "African Democracy" discusses the growth of military dictatorships and one-party states and their implications for democracy. See especially pp. 52-53.

been used as measurements for development. However, the best way to look at political development, and the way it will be examined in this study, is in terms of the role the political system must play if the society is to benefit from a higher standard of living. That is, the political system's ability to effectively control the population and resources of the state. It must bear the responsibility for the mobilization of the country's human and material resources and be able to accommodate the demands and stress caused by economic and social change.

The terms "modernization" and "development" are usually synonymous, except that modernization refers to the process of moving toward the objectives of the state posited by the social theorists.⁸ "Progress" generally means the degree of success attained in moving towards those stated ideals.

Ideology has been a weapon that has proved most useful in the hands of the governing elite. It has been a great asset in helping to change the attitudes and behavior patterns of the people towards development. In dealing with ideology as it has evolved in Tanzania, it is necessary to examine not only the practical, but also the theoretical aspects. This study aims to strike a balance between the "theory" and the "practice" by first examining the ideas behind such policies as "Education for Self-Reliance", "Nationalization", "Villagization", and "Decentralization". As the study progresses, a closer look will be

⁸See Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, Illinois: F. E. Peacock, 1973, pp. 1-4.

taken at the application of such policies to the various developmental problems that the country is presently facing. In no way can such a study of this nature and scope exhaust all the possibilities. For example, it would be nigh impossible to examine the whole gamut of problems thrown up, for example, by the nationalization policies. However, at the end of the survey, the reader, hopefully, should have a working knowledge of the way in which the Tanzanian political system operates, the norms and values that underlie it and the methods of conflict, resolution and problem solving used in it.

Although there will be elements in the study which could apply to many of the developing countries, every effort is made to illustrate their particular relevance to the Tanzanian situation. This is not to deny the assertion that developing countries have common problems or that common solutions can be found. On the contrary, one of the major defects of studies relating to developing areas is that they often begin with the false assumption that specific problems are unique to the country in question. Many of the problems dealt with here, e.g., political mobilization, communication, and representation, are common to the developing areas.⁹

In examining Tanzania's development problems, it will be necessary to present a brief historical background which will give a clearer understanding of the problems that the country now currently faces. An attempt will be made to discover the major changes that have occurred,

⁹See Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1960.

those which are presently occurring, and those likely to occur.

Evaluation of such changes takes place not on the basis of whether they are "good" or "bad", that is, not by normative criteria, but rather in terms of the relative benefits, past and present, which they have bestowed on the various groups within the society.

Economic and social changes occurring in any society cannot be divorced from or looked upon as independent from the overall functioning of the political system.¹⁰ All three systems constantly interact and interplay, yet, it is clearly evident that the political leaders are using the political system in order to achieve the economic and social goals which they have set themselves. Although political changes have been instituted as a result of economic and social changes, they have on the whole been less frequent.¹¹ But in order to understand the changes that are being sought, one should be familiar with the basic instruments, i.e., the bureaucracy -- The Party (TANU) and its various affiliates such as the Tanu Youth League (TYL), the Tanganyika Federation of Labor (TFL), which later became the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), and the Tanu Women's Organization, through

¹⁰Systems theorists have long held the view that the political system is influenced to a great extent by its social and economic environment. That is, not only does outputs from the political system affect and condition behavior in the social and economic spheres but in turn, these systems channel important inputs into the political system which have serious implications for policy making within that system.

¹¹Modernizing elites generally make use of all the available instruments and tools to innovate. In Tanzania, this is equally true but political instruments appear to be the major weapons for the initiation of change.

which the political leaders hope to effect such changes. An entire volume could be dedicated to the role and functions of the Party, but in this study it has to be discussed in the total political context -- meaning that other important variables have to be taken into account. It is hoped that an explanation of the type of party that exists within Tanzania can be adequately given without losing relevance in a discussion relating to party-types and systems.¹² Definitions and clarifications will be given wherever it is thought to be necessary. Once working definitions have been established, the organization and operation of the political party can be looked at more closely. As the main instrument for the execution of government policy, it is necessary to ascertain whether or not TANU is in fact carrying out the policies set forth by the political leaders, and how efficient it is in its work. Efficiency is taken to mean the satisfaction of wants and needs and TANU's achievements are examined and judged on the basis of whether or not people are satisfied by the performance of the government and the party.¹³ It is not unlikely that many problems of both a qualitative and quantitative nature will arise, but every effort is made to present the available data in the most objective way possible.

This survey attempts to identify and distinguish between the party

¹²For more information on the classification of party systems see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Trans. By Barbara and Robert North, (London: Methuen), 1964.

¹³First hand information was not gathered to test the assumptions made here. Rather analysis was conducted on the basis of survey and studies already completed, i.e. Hopkins, 1971 and Norman Miller, 1970.

leaders and the party followers, i.e., the rank and file members. Furthermore, an analysis and comparison of their values and attitudes is attempted in order to weigh its importance for the continued stability of the political system. The assumption is made that elite consensus is a pre-requisite for stability and thus it was necessary to pay greater attention to leadership functions and attitudes to see whether there was indeed consensus among them. Examining the behavior of decision-makers is important in a study of this type because it reveals the identity of the "real" from the "formal" decision-makers. The literature, which concerns the developing areas, documents well the futility and unprofitability of attempts to analyze formal decision making units in such countries.¹⁴ Often, they carry very little weight and are constantly by-passed or ignored by the major political actors. Their functions are often stated as being more "symbolic" than real. It was assumed that there existed in Tanzania a clearly defined set of decision makers who exercised a certain amount of power and authority and who established priorities according to their assessment (reached through discussion and consultation) of what would be more beneficial to the country considering the resources available to it. On the basis of that assumption, this group played a key role in the political system and clearly merited further analysis.

It became clear as more research was carried out that at certain

¹⁴See Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 1964. See especially pages 15-19.

periods in Tanzania's history, the leadership produced policies of major importance that were accepted without any great upsets in the day-to-day working of the political system. For example, the decision to transform Tanzania into a single-party state, the Arusha Declaration to speed up the movement towards the establishment of the socialist society, and the Decentralization Policies (to enable the people to participate to a greater extent in their own development) became the laws of the land with little or no disruption in political life. This study examines some of the major decisions and their importance in moving Tanzania towards its socialist objectives. They illustrated at one and the same time the continuity as well as the changes in government policy. It was, therefore, of great importance that this study should ascertain the reasons behind these changes and their implications for democracy and for socialism in Tanzania -- especially in the light of the government's stated intentions to involve the people in their own progress, development and modernization.

The political, economic and social changes that this study is concerned with cannot be easily observed. They take place over many decades. However, it was clear to see that the Tanzania that exists today (although retaining many of its past characteristics and elements of traditionalism) is very different from that which existed at the time of independence. Thus, although it is somewhat early to determine the major implications of some of the changes, it is not impossible to give an evaluation of the various policies that have influenced the government's development strategy. This study would be incomplete without a summation of the achievements in the political, economic and

social spheres. The areas of interests which are discussed were not chosen at random, but rather were selected because they appeared to be accurate indicators of progress and development.

To reiterate then, this study attempts to equip the reader with a basic understanding of the development of socialism in Tanzania and the important ways in which this ideology is being used to transform the society. At first glance, this appears to be a massive undertaking but it is narrowed down considerably by focusing primarily on the problems of development. Many of the projections made concerning ujamaa are little more than speculation because of the relatively short-space of time in which it has been functioning. Speculation relating to the aftermath of Nyerere centers primarily around the issues of "stability" and "instability". It was important to discuss the possibilities open to the Tanzania leadership after Nyerere steps down from power.

The conclusions that this study arrives at should not be taken as hard and fast rules, but merely as plausible statements with adequate supporting evidence. Accurate predictions are not easy to make -- especially for the political scientist whose subject matter does not easily lend itself to concrete analysis and quantification. It has often been stated that the study of politics or any other social science dealing with human behavior cannot be objective or scientific. This study may, no doubt, reinforce such claims. Yet in spite of the many shortcomings, which a case study of this nature may have, it is hoped that a better understanding of Tanzania's development problem and prospects will be obtained.

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND DEFINITIONS

The hypotheses which will be studied in this survey were generated from the literature consulted. Although differences existed between the various texts, it was clear that many had similar themes. Many of the important writings on Tanzania seemed to attest to the general belief that important steps had been made in establishing, or at least in creating an atmosphere which was conducive to the building of socialism. It is the intention of this study to examine the most important variables that have been responsible in leading to the transformation of Tanzanian society.

There are six hypotheses which will be examined. The first is based on the proposition that:

- I. Since independence, significant progress has been made toward establishing a socialist society in Tanzania, evidence of which can be found in the formulation and application of the national ideology.

By significant, we mean that major changes have occurred affecting the lives and well-being of the Tanzanian people. Significant events would include, for example, the change from a de facto one party system to a legal one party system. The events that are selected for analysis in this study are justified by the extent to which they have changed or influenced Tanzanian society. That is, events which have had an impact in the political, economic and social spheres. The significant variables that will be dealt with are those that have led Tanzania furthest along the road to socialism. This, however, should not be taken as a denial of the changes that have had little effect or those that have caused it to regress. Attention will be paid to all key variables enabling and

retarding Tanzania's efforts towards the achievement of its socialist objectives. However, since the purpose here is to prove rather than disprove that important advances have been made toward this end, the emphasis will most naturally be on those elements that have proved to be the most positive and dynamic.

The type of socialism that is currently being practiced in Tanzania will be elaborated on in the next chapter. Labels such as "communitarian", "fabian" and "egalitarian" have been attached to Nyerere's brand of socialism and though it may exhibit many or all of these tendencies, one should not attach such labels without caution. For among the many things that Tanzanian socialism has been named, it is essentially pragmatic. It is a doctrine which is still being formulated, adapted and re-adapted to suit the conditions which exist in that society.

Not only is it difficult to establish an acceptable definition of "socialism" or a "socialist state", it is also difficult to arrive at one that is both objective, e.g., scientific. Even in the writings of Marx, who is said to be the father of scientific socialism, one finds many brands of socialism.¹⁵ And many elements of Marxian Socialism, i.e., the class-conscious proletariat, finds no such counterpart in Tanzania. In fact, Nyerere's brand of African Socialism denies the existences of classes -- a phenomenon, he believes to be completely alien to Africa. He also denies the belief, held by many of the Marxist-Leninist School, that socialism can only take place in a highly developed, post-capitalist society. He maintains that Tanzania has never been a

¹⁵Refer to Max Eastman, op.cit., pp. 343-352.

capitalist society and refutes the idea that historic conditions have to be ripe before socialism can be established.¹⁶ Nyerere's own position is that, by seizing the initiative, exercising good leadership and judgement, making sound policies and working hard, Tanzania will move closer towards the realization of many of its socialist objectives.

When analyzing and assessing the growth of socialism in Tanzania, one must not approach it exclusively from a Marxian or a Leninist standpoint. There are, to be sure, certain elements that are comparable, but there are also many that are not. The Tanzanian leaders believe in large-scale public ownership and the abolition of exploitation, they also endorse the idea of building a socialist society based on the freedom and co-operation of the individual. However, there is little evidence to support the claim that they endorse an all out class war, and revolutionary methods to achieve their aims.¹⁷ By examining not only the goals, but the methods used to attain them, a clearer understanding of Tanzania's brand of socialism will be obtained.

The role that decision-makers play in any political system is always of great importance and in a developing country such as Tanzania they take on special significance. Decision-making is not as dispersed as one would imagine for several reasons. One of the most important is the low level of development and the general lack of resources which dictate that priorities be set and plans for their fulfillment clearly

¹⁶See J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, Dar-es-Salaam, (Oxford University Press), 1968, pp. 15-16.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 26.

worked out by government and administrative personnel. Thus, rather than building socialism through sponteneity,¹⁸ Tanzania's leaders are conciously fashioning certain policies designed to guide the country along the socialist path. This study will thus examine the assertion that:

II. The (national) political elite has been and continues to be the major decision-makers in the political system and that the decision-making powers of the (local) political leaders will increase with increases in the level of development and decision-making units.

The use of the term "political elite" should be taken to include not only those in the higher echelons of the government, but also leading party members and higher and middle level administrators, i.e., bureaucratic personnel. To define the Tanzanian political elite in terms similar to that of C. Wright-Mills would certainly lead to many difficulties especially when working from the assumption that Tanzania is essentially a socialist country. However, it would not be misleading to state as Mills that the members of the political elite are those members of society "... that have a greater share than other people of "the things and experiences that are most highly valued".¹⁹ Nonetheless, it should be borne in mind that although abuses of power and position

¹⁸Many socialists, especially Marxists-Leninists, believe that socialism can only be achieved through the spontaneous acts of the working class. The idea was that when the historic conditions were right, the masses would rebel spontaneously and take up arms against the capitalist. Lenin spent a great deal of time on the subject of sponteneity. See V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, New York: International Publishers, Vol. I, pp. 120-141.

¹⁹Refer to C. Wright-Mills, The Power Elite, (Oxford University Press), 1956. p. 9.

have occurred, strenuous efforts have been made by Nyerere and many of his colleagues to abide by the rules and principles which they consider to be necessary for the building of a socialist society. The political elite, without any doubt, could possibly be conceived of as a social class distinct and sperate from the others. Theoretically, they do not envisage themselves as members of a "social circle" acquiring and retaining wealth, status and prestige by virtue of the position and offices which they hold.

However, at this particular stage in Tanzania's development, there is a political elite that formulates policy, at any event, generates policy guidelines into which demands must be accommodated. However, it is felt that as the society becomes more complex and as demands increase, some of the power and authority of the political elite at the national level will be given to leaders at the local level.

In any developing country, policy execution must be carried out by a well organized and éfficient body if such policies are to be effective. In Tanzania, the decision makers have relied extensively on the political party (TANU: Tanganyika African National Union) and its various affiliates, i.e., the TYL: Tanu Youth League, and NUTA: National Union of Tanganyika Workers. The role of the party cannot be over-emphasised. In its pre-independence days, it was a mass-party calling for unity in opposition against the colonial government.²⁰ It appealed to the various groups within society because it had a single purpose with which

²⁰See G. Andrew Maguire, Toward 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation, (Cambridge University Press), 1969, part III, (ch. 6,7, & 8).

many could identify -- independence. It became evident to Nyerere after this goal was achieved, that serious thought now had to be given to the specific task of national integration. The party was unprepared for the monumental task of nation-building, but Nyerere set to work overhauling and reorganizing TANU, after which it was better able to deal with the problems which independence brought. We hope to test the statement that:

III. The political party (TANU) has been used by the political elite as the major instrument in (organizing, educating, persuading and mobilizing the people) the task of nation building.

It is necessary for the purposes of this particular study to examine and discuss the party system that exists and the democratic or non-democratic nature of such a structure. The very nature of the party and the pervasiveness of its activities in the political system merits deeper analysis.

Not only is Tanzania in the process of fashioning various instruments and creating various institutions and foundations on which to build socialism, it has also introduced various policies designed to hasten the progress towards socialism. Leaders are aware that development and growth can only be achieved with a judicious combination of enlightened leadership, sound policy choices, adequate financial and physical resources, and efficient planning and preparation. They realize the limitations and obstacles to development -- the low level of political awareness and consciousness, the relative poverty of an agricultural economy, and the persistence of strong traditional beliefs and attitudes. Tanzanian leaders believe that by bringing socialism to the people, at any event encouraging them to practice socialist principles in their

local habitat, they will be able to instil in them the values and discipline necessary to develop and modernize. Villagization or rural communalism is an attempt by the leaders to encourage socialism at the grass roots level. Not only is it an ambitious policy, it is also one that calls for mass support and participation in order to be successful. This study seeks to discover the importance of rural socialism in Tanzania. The fourth hypothesis is that:

IV. Rural socialism (ujamaa) will play a major role in Tanzania's development and that changes in rural attitudes and behavior will be determined largely by the success or failure of villagization policy.

Ujamaa has been translated to mean familyhood which, according to Nyerere, is an inherent feature of African society. He is not trying to return to the type of society or life that existed in the past. Nyerere claims that he is attempting to use the relevant principles, on which traditional society was based, to move his country along the path of development. Thus, to a great extent, ujamaa is based upon the concept of the extended family -- which insured all its members both spiritual and material comforts in return for their contribution of work. Every individual had a responsibility to the entire unit which, in return, satisfied his basic needs.²¹

Having established the policies they intend to follow, leaders have sought to devise strategies believed to be congruent with their basic aims. Goals and strategies have to be formulated within the framework of the same political, economic and social constraints. Grand

²¹See Freedom and Unity, op.cit., pp. 162-171.

designs on paper are unobtainable if realistic strategies are not developed to achieve them. Emphasising a rural socialist economy and community, especially with Tanzania's level of development, may appear to the onlooker to be somewhat impractical when agricultural communities appear to be incapable of generating sufficient investments for further development and growth.²² The leaders of Tanzania are aware of the difficulties involved in establishing a strong agricultural economy but they firmly believe that other alternatives would create even greater pressures forcing them to compromise their basic beliefs and principles. Industrialization on a large scale would have meant an initial heavy reliance on foreign aid which could have resulted in a loss of effective sovereignty as many developing countries today illustrate. The withholding of foreign aid by Britain and West Germany in the 1960's adversely affected Tanzania's development plans. Subsequently, the strategies of "self-help" and "self-reliance" were adopted to ensure that foreign aid played a less significant role in the achievement of development objectives. The fifth hypothesis can thus be written:

V. The strategies of self-help and self-reliance (considering the level of economic development and the emphasis given to an independent foreign policy) are not only necessary but practical measures for the implementation of ujamaa.

The Tanzanian leaders have not only mapped out the path for socialist transformation, but also the strategies to be used. It is still early to judge, but it is clearly evident that many of the variables

²²Refer to G. M. Meier, Leading Issues in Development Economics, (Oxford University Press), 1964, pp. 334-376.

which have been mentioned, e.g., strong leadership, elite consensus, mass participation and support and economic efficiency, will be of major significance in determining the outcome of the major policies. However, the relative stability that has characterised the political system in its pre- and post-independent years played an important role in facilitating the widespread adoption and acceptance of the outputs of the regime. We will examine the role that stability has played in the political system. The final hypothesis that will be tested is:

VI. The stability of the political system will greatly enhance the chances of success of the major development policies and will continue to be a major feature in the Tanzanian political system.

METHODOLOGY

There are many approaches to the study of politics -- nay to the study of development itself. It can take the form of an historical survey, a structural functional analysis, or it can be examined from the perspective of elite, group, systems, communications and other theories. In this particular study, no single theory or approach will be exclusively relied upon, rather use will be made of any of the differing approaches wherever they seem to be most valuable. Simply adopting one approach would pose severe problems in a study of this nature, hence the adoption of an eclectic methodology which will utilize some of the approaches mentioned above, i.e., elite, systems, groups, etc. This particular approach was used by Joel Samoff in his study of local government in Tanzania.²³ He warns against the dangers of such an

²³See Joel Samoff, Tanzania: Local Politics and the Structure of Power, (University of Wisconsin Press), 1974.

approach, pointing out that the assumptions of the theories presented should not be accepted without some reservation. Furthermore, he warns against using eclecticism in methodology as a substitute for coming squarely to grips with the major problems of analysis and interpretation.²⁴ But, by using this method, it is hoped that unnecessary theorizing will be avoided by enabling the author to use a particular theory where it seems to be the most appropriate. This study does not attempt to establish a rigorous methodology which may prove to be one of its many shortcomings. Clearly, every effort will be made to ensure that the data presented is intelligible to the reader by relating it to the relevant theory or theories. The analysis will not be highly statistical and will be based largely on information gathered from existing surveys and studies. There are many disadvantages in using such surveys but the collection of new information was not possible on this occasion. At any event, many of the studies reviewed contained recent and adequate data which proved useful in this analysis. Although the data emanated primarily from secondary sources, the analysis and interpretation came from the writer of this study. It is hoped that the secondary nature of the sources will not detract from the validity of the data or its application to the study of socialism and development politics.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The object of this very brief review is to familiarize the reader with some of the existing studies relating to Tanzanian socialism and

²⁴Ibid., p. 7.

development. This list is not exhaustive. The books and articles used cover a wide variety of subjects, some adopt a general macro-approach, while others take on a more specific micro-approach. It is simply intended here to outline their major areas of concentration, the specific contribution that each makes, and relevance to the hypothesis under examination.

In analysing and discussing the extent to which socialism or socialist principles are being practiced in Tanzania, it was first necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the theories behind the ideology. The writings of Nyerere were found to be most informative in this respect. The concept of "ujamaa" was first outlined by Nyerere in 1961 in an article entitled, Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism.²⁵ Here, the components of African socialism were clearly stated and Nyerere outlined the type of society that he believed should be established in Tanzania. The extended family unit, its various practices and characteristics, was looked upon as the focal point for socialist development. The family unit appealed to Nyerere for three basic reasons. Firstly, it commanded "respect" and instilled a sense of obligation within its members. Secondly, it fostered collectivist rather than individualistic attitudes by its common ownership of land; and thirdly, it demanded that all its members contribute to the well being of the community through hard work.²⁶

²⁵See Freedom and Unity, op.cit., p. 162-171.

²⁶Ibid., pp.164-168.

Freedom and Unity is a collection of Nyerere's early writings which, among other things, sums up not only the type of the political system that was desired, but also the principles and organizations which were to guide it. Nyerere saw the need for a single party structure that was well organized and active. Members of the community were to think of themselves as workers sharing their prosperity and co-operating together to build a better life for themselves. Freedom and Unity was a call to the nation to face up to the challenge of nationhood and to direct its efforts towards the establishment of a socialist society. Ujamaa thus became the watchword because it was based on a philosophy which was diametrically opposed to capitalism. According to Nyerere, ujamaa stood out in conflict with capitalist philosophy because the latter sought to build a society based on the exploitation of man by man. Equally, ujamaa was also opposed to the concept of doctrinaire socialism which seeks to establish its society on a belief of inevitable conflict between man and man.²⁷

In Freedom and Socialism, Nyerere's ideas on his country's chosen path to development were made even more explicit. Again, he stressed the importance of creating a socialist society. His major emphasis was, however, on the amount of work which remained to be done and the policies that were necessary in order to reach the stated objective. If there had been any doubt about Tanzania's socialist proposals and willingness of the leadership to work for their fulfilment, Nyerere's writings dispelled this. Among the collections in this work was The

²⁷Ibid., p. 170.

Arusha Declaration, a policy document which signaled the turning point in Tanzania's politics. It outlined more clearly the aims, policies, and strategies and gave greater insights into the directions in which the thoughts of the leaders were going. It demonstrated the existence of a strong commitment among them to continue working toward their socialist ideals.

The third of Nyerere's volumes, Freedom and Development, illustrated the continuity in his thoughts.²⁸ It emphasised that socialism was of little benefit to the country if it did not go hand in hand with development -- that is, the development of the people.²⁹ The measures that were proposed were consciously formulated to increase the participation of the people in their own development. But the onus was placed on the leaders themselves to encourage mass participation. One of the main themes throughout the book was that the establishment of socialism could not be achieved through force but rather through enlightened leadership, good planning, hard work and self-reliance.

Other works were used to give a well-rounded perspective of the role of ideology in Tanzania. A Theory of Ideology by John R. Nellis was found to be particularly useful in exploring the component parts of the ideology.³⁰ Large sections of this work were highly theoretical, but Nellis manages to give a lucid account of the major ideological

²⁸J. K. Nyerere, Freedom and Development, (Dar-es-Salaam, Oxford University Press), 1973.

²⁹Ibid., p. 59.

³⁰John R. Nellis, A Theory of Ideology, (Nairobi, Oxford University Press), 1972.

changes since independence. The various articles and documents in the volume Socialism in Tanzania edited by Lionel Cliffe and John A. Saul counterbalanced the theoretical study by Nellis.³¹ Rather than attempting to build or elaborate on theories, readings such as Ujamaa on the March, The Policy of Self-Reliance, and Rural Development Policy, dwelt more on the difficulties of putting the ideology into practice. This volume covered a variety of areas relating to the development of rural socialism. It discussed the major significance of the plans for action and dealt with the conflicts that would arise throughout the course of implementation. Many of the collections in this volume were useful for the information concerning the values and attitudes of rural population and the way in which they see themselves and their roles in the political system. This is very important for the survey because it enables comparison between what the ideology is intended to do and what it actually managed to achieve in terms of mobilizing the population for the development effort.

Ideological and Economic Development in Tanzania related the ideology primarily to the major economic rather than political events.³² It thus illustrated the ways in which the principles of ujamaa were being brought into play to bring about the various economic changes congruent with the notions of a socialist society. Socialism and

³¹See Lionel Cliffe and John A. Saul (eds), Socialism in Tanzania, (Dar-es-Salaam, East Africa Publishing House), 1972.

³²Ian C. Parker, "Ideological and Economic Development in Tanzania", African Studies Review, XV, 1, 1972.

Economic Development in Tanzania³³ further illustrates the role that ideology is playing in shaping national economic life. One of the strong points of both these papers was the balanced view they presented. Not only did they comment on the benefits, they also elaborated on the costs that continue to accrue from adopting a socialist model of development.

These are just a few of the studies that deal with ideology in Tanzania. Many simply document its growth and development. Others analyze its basic concepts and principles and still others demonstrate its impact in bringing or stimulating changes in the various aspects of Tanzanian life.

Specific works dealing with the leadership were more difficult to obtain. Quite often the discussions on ideology incorporated the values and principles of the political leaders which influenced the formulation of the ideology. However, two studies were particularly important -- both were carried out by the same author. Political Roles in a New State and The Role of the MP in Tanzania, helped considerably in understanding the background, beliefs and attitudes of Tanzanian rulers. The former is a useful study in political socialization and political behavior -- it gives an exquisite account of the role of the administrator, the legislator and the President not found in many of the current literature.³⁴ The Evolution of Tanzanian Political

³³G. K. Helleiner, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tanzania", Journal of Development Studies, VIII, 2, 1971-72.

³⁴Raymond F. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, (Yale University Press), 1971. Also, "The Role of the MP in Tanzania", American Political Science Review, LXIV, 2, 1970.

Leadership gave great insights into the "recruitment", "representativeness", and "circulation" of the leadership.³⁵ Like many studies of this nature it dwelt a great deal on the "National Leadership Formula", that is, the rules and principles on which behavior is based.

To a great extent, many of these studies concerned themselves with national leadership rather than with local leadership. The reasons for this are obvious but it is necessary to understand the differences and the levels of interaction between the national and local leaders. Several works were consulted. Among them, Joel Samoff's work on Local Politics in Tanzania,³⁶ Clyde Ingle's From Village to State in Tanzania,³⁷ and Stanley Dryden's Local Administration in Tanzania -- a penetrating study of local politics.³⁸ Writers on Tanzanian leadership, for the most part, seem preoccupied with the style and content of national leadership. This clearly is a reflection of their central position in the decision making system.

The importance of the party is clearly evident by the number of publications relating to its role and function within the political system. Henry Bienen's work, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development is a classic study on the nature of the party

³⁵P. J. McGowan and H. K. M. Wacirah, "The Evolution of Tanzanian Political Leadership", African Studies Review, XVII, 1, 1974.

³⁶Joel Samoff, op., cit..

³⁷Clyde R. Ingle, From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development, (Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press), 1967.

³⁸Stanley Dryden, Local Administration in Tanzania, (Nairobi, East African Publishing House), 1968.

system and the way in which it operates within various areas of the political, economic, and social spheres.³⁹ Great attention is focused on the evolution and development of the party in addition to its composition, organization, and activities. Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania (The Politics of Participation), makes a great contribution to the understanding of the party by its detailed documentation of the early years of indigeneous politics.⁴⁰ It is especially informative on the formation of TANU and its predecessors but a major drawback rests on the fact that this study does not go beyond 1965 -- the year when Tanzania officially became a one-party state. Since then, there have been many changes in the organization of the party. One Party Democracy goes a long way in making those changes intelligible to the observer.⁴¹ Primarily it deals with the first elections that occurred under the new system and presents many interesting case studies of the election activities of the party in regions as diverse as Kilimanjaro and Sukumaland. Norman Miller's paper, The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania, gave great insights into party activity at the grass-roots level.⁴² It conveyed a good understanding of the party's role in helping to achieve socialism in Tanzania and also the ways in which the party and

³⁹Henry Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press), 1967.

⁴⁰G. Andrew Maguire, op.cit..

⁴¹Lionel Cliffe (ed), One Party Democracy, (Nairobi, East African Publishing House), 1967.

⁴²Norman Miller, "The Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania", American Political Science Review, LXIV, 2, 1970.

its local leaders could hinder rather than help development objectives.

In looking at the role that rural socialism plays in Tanzania, use was made of numerous articles and manuscripts. The writings of Rene Dumont clearly demonstrated the importance of villagization and the development of a strong agricultural base to support it.⁴³ He pointed to many of the pitfalls and the problems, mostly agricultural, which had yet to be faced. Peter Temu's paper, Tanzania -- The Ujamaa Experiment, documents some of the more formidable obstacles, i.e., political, economic, and social, to development.⁴⁴ The afore-mentioned volume by Cliffe and Saul also contained some highly critical and thought provoking comments on rural socialism in development. Cliffe and Cunningham's, Ideology Organization and Settlement Experience in Tanzania, Svendsen's, General Problems of Rural Development Policy in Tanzania, and Kazimoto's, Prospects for the Building of Ujamaa Villages, are but a handful of the articles which deal with one or another problem of village socialism.⁴⁵

For the most part, the volumes of Nyerere, especially Freedom and Socialism and Freedom and Development were the most important in understanding the concepts of self-help and self-reliance.⁴⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein's article, Dependence in an Interdependent World: The

⁴³Rene Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration, (Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning), 1969.

⁴⁴Peter Temu, "The Ujamaa Experiment", Ceres, July-August, 1973.

⁴⁵Cliffe and Saul (eds), op.cit..

⁴⁶Freedom and Development, op.cit..

Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy, added another dimension to the evaluation of the principles of self-help and self-reliance.⁴⁷ These strategies were discussed in a national and international context and enabled the reader to grasp the complexities of the problems that such strategies can lead to in a capitalist world economy which is largely interdependent. Also important for the way in which dealt with self-reliance was Surendra Patel's article Collective Self-Reliance of Developing Countries.⁴⁸ Villagization is often discussed along with self-reliance, thus, many papers dealing with the former also include the latter. One example of this is Ichiro Inukai's article, African Socialism and Agricultural Development: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Tanzania.⁴⁹ It discussed the merits and demerits of applying a policy of self-reliance to the achievement of rural development.

Martin C. Needler's article, Stability and Instability, generated the idea of examining the permanence and durability of the Tanzanian regime.⁵⁰ Claude Ake's, A Definition of Political Stability and

⁴⁷Immanuel Wallerstein, "Dependence in an Interdependent World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation Within the Capitalist World Economy", African Studies Review, XVII, 1, 1974.

⁴⁸Surendra J. Patel, "Collective Self-Reliance of Developing Countries", Journal of Modern African Studies, XIII, 4, 1976.

⁴⁹Ichiro Inukai, "African Socialism and Agricultural Development Strategy: A Comparative Study of Kenya and Tanzania", Developing Economies, XII, 1, 1974.

⁵⁰Martin C. Needler, "Stability and Instability" in R. J. Jackson and M. B. Stein (eds), Issues in Comparative Politics, (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1971, pp. 212-221.

Explaining Political Instability in New States, provided further ideas on the "uniqueness" of the Tanzanian political system, in light of the current African political context.⁵¹

This list of reading materials is supplemented by further references. As stated at the outset, it is little more than a brief review of some of the current literature available. Materials were selected primarily for the areas which they covered, their research methods, and their potential in generating ideas. Many of the works quoted here are specifically concerned with the dynamics of Tanzanian development and modernization rather than its more general aspects. In order to obtain a broader perspective on modernization and development as it applies to many Third World Countries the works of John Kautsky and Almond and Coleman were most useful.⁵²

In chapter two we will examine more deeply the components of the Tanzanian ideology and changes that have been instituted in order to move towards the establishment of socialism.

⁵¹Claude Ake, "A Definition of Political Stability", Comparative Politics, VII, 2, 1975.

⁵²Almond and Coleman, op.cit.; John H. Kautsky, op.cit..

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY

In the first chapter it was stated that Tanzania had adopted a socialist path to development. If one traces the evolution of the ideology, it is clear to see that, since independence, the leadership has made a sustained effort to guide the country closer towards its socialist ideals. In order to ascertain the extent of achievement in this area, it is necessary to be acquainted with those ideas and beliefs which constitute the foundations on which socialism is now being built. Much of this chapter will emphasize the theoretical rather than the practical sides of ideology as the latter will be more fully elaborated on throughout the course of the discussion. Primarily, we will concern ourselves with the ways in which the ideology has acted as a guide to policy. The aim here is to marshall enough concrete evidence to test the hypothesis that ideologically, Tanzania has moved significantly towards socialism.

Before elaborating on the nature of Tanzanian socialism, it is necessary to present a definition of what is meant by the term ideology. One definition presents it as a, "more or less integrated system of values and norms noted in a society which individuals and groups project on the political plane in order to promote the aspirations they have come to value in social life",⁵³ According to Fred R. von der Mehden,

⁵³ See James A. McCain, "Ideology in Africa: Some Perceptual Types", African Studies Review, XVIII, 1, 1975, p. 61.

"an ideology may be a sincere belief or a political tool, but it usually appears to be a combination of both".⁵⁴ Similarly, F. LaMonde Tullis sums up ideology as a world view that provides an interpretation of the past, an explanation of the future, and charts a common course for the future.⁵⁵ Ian C. Parker believes that an effective ideology requires five basic elements. Firstly, "a teleology", that is, a vision of the ends and objectives of society. Secondly, "a mythology", that is, an analysis of society in relation to its surroundings. Thirdly, a program of action. Fourthly, the communication of what he terms "the ideological core" and finally, guidelines for the implementation of the plan.⁵⁶ These definitions convey an insight into what is meant by ideology in the context of this discussion. The term was given considerable prominence by Karl Marx, who used it to describe the distorted ideas selected by the capitalists to defend the status quo. However, ideologies can be and often are more analogous with doctrines of change than with doctrines of status quo. For example, the ideology that has evolved in Tanzania is not designed to maintain the status quo but rather to change society according to the socialist objectives embodied in it. On the whole, it would be true to say that developing ideologies are designed to enable many of the poorer countries to move forward more quickly and to justify the suffering and sacrifices that the majority are called upon to make.

⁵⁴Refer to Fred R. Von der Mehden, The Politics of the Developing Nations, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1964, p. 136.

⁵⁵See F. LaMond Tullis, Politics and Social Change in Third World Countries, New York, John Wiley, 1973, p. 75.

⁵⁶Refer to Ian C. Parker, op.cit., p. 46.

Ideologies have been consciously formed and articulated to meet certain needs. Although theory and practice may not often coincide, ideologies in developing countries are initially designed to put development tasks into perspective, to set priorities and ways of achieving them.

Leaders often rationalize the large sacrifices which development calls for in terms of the ideology which serves as the mechanism to overcome backwardness.⁵⁷ Ideology often lends meaning to political acts and gives the ordinary man a clearer understanding of what is going on around him. It raises social conflict and tension to a more sophisticated level of political dialogue while contributing to consensus and normative integration.⁵⁸ Ideology is often used to promote stability and unity and is often resorted to by political leaders in strengthening the national party and government. Ideologies are often broad in scope and general in wording, yet to be successful, they must be combined with organization in order to bestow some benefits on the population.⁵⁹

The credibility of developmentalist ideologies, therefore, rests on their promises of progress of "catching up" with the industrialized west. However, while many developing nations desire the benefits which emanate from the western political and economic systems, a sizeable proportion of the independent African states, reject capitalism as a political and economic model of development. In this respect Tanzania

⁵⁷Bienen, op.cit., p. 203.

⁵⁸McCain, op.cit., p. 61.

⁵⁹Von der Mehden, op.cit., p. 139.

is no exception.⁶⁰ Many African leaders have set forth their views and models of development which they believe to be relevant to Africa and to their own respective countries. The ideology generated by such writings and beliefs has become known as "African Socialism", though this should properly be seen as an umbrella under which many diverse beliefs and attitudes are accommodated.⁶¹ Although this study concerns itself with socialism in Tanzania, it is useful to spend a little time looking at socialism in wider perspective.

"African Socialism", according to James A. McCain, "is the ideology of Africa".⁶² It is clear from their rejections of certain dogmas and creeds associated with socialism in the western world that African leaders do not want to adopt a foreign ideology. This is not to deny their desire to establish socialism and practice various socialist principles. As John Kautsky pointed out, "All the ideologies that modernizers acquire from developed countries are, themselves, the product of industrialized societies".⁶³ Thus, it is not surprising that many African leaders reject such belief systems and their relevance to Africa's stage of development. The strong desire among African leaders to assert

⁶⁰There are notable exceptions to this. For example, the Ivory Coast comes most readily to mind. In fact many of the French and English speaking African countries have been accused of carrying on where the colonial capitalist governments left off.

⁶¹See Martin Minogue and Judith Malloy (eds) African Aims and Attitudes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. See especially Part II. "Philosophies and Problems" pp. 63-189.

⁶²McCain, op.cit., p. 61.

⁶³John Kautsky, op.cit., p. 140.

themselves and to project an image of Africa unique to that continent requires them to paint self-portraits as they see fit.⁶⁴ We should not, therefore, expect the various models of African Socialism to be identical to socialist models elsewhere.

Essentially three themes run through the literature pertaining to African Socialism; the problem of continental identity, the crisis of economic development, and the problems of control and class formation. The first need not detain us here but a few remarks are in order. African socialists adamantly believe that the socialistic tradition is an important feature of African life exemplified by the communal ownership of land. They view Africa as the birthplace of socialism. In search of their own identity, they have strongly rejected the European culture and have formulated a body of knowledge outlining their own cultural heritage. Leopold Senghor's philosophy of "Negritude" and Nkrumah's "African Personality" come most readily to mind.⁶⁵

The idea of socialism in many African countries, indeed in many developing countries, is intimately linked to the commitment of economic and social development. In one respect, socialism can be looked upon as a re-orientation of nationalism to meet the challenge of independence.⁶⁶

⁶⁴This discussion relates only to sub-Saharan Africa and, therefore, does not include Northern Africa -- though even there, one sees an attempt to formulate ideologies specific to those countries and relevant to their era of development.

⁶⁵See Paul Sigmund, op.cit., pp. 248-251.

⁶⁶Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden and Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 199.

There is the strong belief that the public sector will be the major decision-maker in questions regarding matters of production and distribution. To many African leaders, the party-state is the main vehicle for development and planning occupies a central position in many forms of developmental socialism.⁶⁷

In Tanzania, it is a popular belief among the leadership that the state should act positively to stimulate domestic sources of productivity and enterprise. Nyerere firmly believes that the state should create greater equality of opportunity and welfare, that development should not bestow benefits only on the minority but on as large a section of the population as possible, especially the more impoverished sectors. It should be borne in mind that at the outset, socialism was a philosophy of redistribution, not of development. Yet many African and other socialists have gradually linked growth with socialism. This appears to be more acceptable and relevant to their needs because as a philosophy of redistribution, socialism makes little sense in societies with little to distribute.⁶⁸

The problems of control and class formation form another major theme in the ideology of African Socialism. It is the belief that independence was not a totally integrating process and that what took place was the replacement of colonial elite by an indigeneous elite.⁶⁹ African

⁶⁷See Nyerere, Freedom and Development, op.cit., pp. 80-107.

⁶⁸See Anderson et.al., op.cit., p. 205.

⁶⁹See Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa, London: Andre Deutsch, 1966, p. 86.

Socialism has, therefore, been described as a smokescreen for the selfish desires of the elite, i.e., "... socialism for the poor and a form of protected bourgeois capitalism for the elite".⁷⁰ This is true of many African countries that want to prevent the rise of classes and at the same time promote economic development, more often than not ideals and reality are very far apart.

Against this general background of African Socialism, the ensuing discussion of socialism as it pertains to Tanzania takes on greater significance. Tanzania, like many developing nations, chose a socialist path but unlike many of them it has managed to pay more than simple lip service to its brand of socialism. Its political leaders have long begun formulating their ideology for development. The ideas of Nyerere alone does not constitute the entire ideology but he has been the outspoken ideologue for the country. He has, as Bienen points out, "presented an image of Tanzania to the outside world".⁷¹ Nyerere's appeal to Africans with a "socialist" orientation is not limited only to Tanzania, but to a wider audience. Many Africans view him as their ideal type of socialist leader. McCain described Nyerere as "a condensation symbol for persons of differing (socialist) ideological persuasion. (His) symbolic appeal is supported by a charismatic political style, an absence of ideological orthodoxy, and assertive leadership on issues of

⁷⁰McCain, op.cit., p. 66.

⁷¹Bienen, op.cit., p. 206.

importance to Africans".⁷²

"Ujamaa" or "familyhood" adequately sums up African Socialism as it is seen by Nyerere. He believed that the family was based on certain practices and attitudes which promoted "equality", "freedom" and "unity". In Freedom and Unity, he describes socialism as "an attitude of mind", an essential factor which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. According to Nyerere, the basic difference between a socialist society and a capitalist society rested not with their differing methods of production of wealth but with their varying methods of distribution of wealth. He believes that socialism is basically distributive because one of its primary concerns is to see that those who sow, reap a fair share from their efforts.⁷³

Nyerere adopted the ideas of ujamaa because it could be used as a guideline for the development of Tanzania and because it was rooted in the African tradition. As a philosophy of humanism, ujamaa strives to create a socialist society based on the equality of all men; a society where work is not only a right but a duty for everyone. Nyerere stresses throughout that "there can be no socialism without work", that, "idlers" and "loiterers" were unknown in traditional African family life.⁷⁴ Undoubtedly, ujamaa is a call to action. It is an ideological statement of the aims and objectives of Tanzanian society and the methods by which they should be achieved. Before independence, no program for development

⁷²McCain, op.cit., p. 75.

⁷³Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op.cit., p. 167.

⁷⁴Ibid, p. 168.

existed, only a strong desire for unity. After independence, the problems of nation building led Nyerere to formulate his ideas. Slogans of "freedom" and "work" were not uncommon and the primary aim was the elimination of "poverty", "ignorance" and "disease".⁷⁵

Ujamaa is a brand of socialism that is more gradual, less dynamic, and not opposed to traditional values where they prove useful in the development process. It involves rural development and community action programs with a definite emphasis on cooperation. Ujamaa has been referred to as "an ideology of production"⁷⁶ because it is a means whereby poverty can be eliminated and more wealth can be produced for the entire community. This is very important to Nyerere, who believes that societal wealth can be accumulated and distributed through cooperation rather than conflict. Ujamaa thus posits a peaceful transition to socialism; there is no class conflict inherent in this doctrine. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nyerere's socialism has been called "communitarian" as opposed to the "radical mobilization" socialism of Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah or the "moderate welfare socialism" of Kenyatta. Communitarian socialism, "is identified with the vision of a harmonious consequence of radical individualism and the furious competitiveness that seem to characterize the presently advanced nations".⁷⁷ Having already noted the wide variety of socialist attitudes

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 80-83.

⁷⁶Frances Hill, "Ujamaa: African Socialist Productionism in Tanzania", in Helen Desfosses and Jacques Levesque (eds), Socialism in the Third World, New York: Praeger, 1975.

⁷⁷Anderson, et.al., p. 191.

and aims that exist, it would be certainly surprising if Nyerere's ideas went unchallenged in Africa no less than in Tanzania. Believers of scientific socialism, e.g., Marxist-Leninist, especially the Zanzibaris have protested against ujamaa adamantly stating that only conflict can initiate rapid change, the type needed if Tanzania is to "catch up" with the rest of the developed world. Though he readily accepts that there are many ideological paths to African socialism, Nyerere has refused to accept that Marxism-Leninism has a role to play in the development of Tanzania. He believes that capitalistic and individualistic attitudes were never acquired during the colonial period and that Africans who persist in presenting a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Africa are certainly not to be commended on their grasp of the dynamics of African past, present or future. Nyerere's rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the class war -- the power of history as a force in itself, has led to cries of "revisionism" from the school of scientific socialism.⁷⁸ However, it should be borne in mind that Nyerere's thoughts are influenced to a great extent by his religion, i.e., Christianity, in fact Roman Catholicism, and it would not be erroneous to liken Tanzania socialism to Fabian socialism.

In Freedom and Socialism, Nyerere stated that there was not one pure socialism but that socialism was possible, "if the people as a whole are involved in their political and economic affairs".⁷⁹ Therefore,

⁷⁸Andre De La Rue, "Ujamaa on the March", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., p. 43.

⁷⁹Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., p. 310.

Tanzanians must seek to build a society "... in which all members have equal rights and opportunities; in which all can live at peace with their neighbors without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited or exploiting, and in which all have a gradually increasing level of material welfare before any individual lives in luxury."⁸⁰ This particular statement was made in a policy document of major importance in the political and economic life of Tanzania -- the Arusha Declaration.⁸¹ This Declaration ushered in a new era in Tanzanian politics and made the ideology more explicit, outlining rules guiding leadership behavior, measures for public ownership and various other socialist policies. The Declaration was not formulated in a vacuum. It had a relatively long history because Nyerere has always been committed to a policy of social change through socialism. That is, socialism not only in material terms, but socialism in human terms, e.g., human dignity and equality, should also be maintained.

The Arusha Declaration carried a more definite commitment than anything Africa had seen before. It was significant for its bid to achieve freedom from external control and to establish socialism in Africa.⁸² One writer stated that the importance of the document stemmed clearly from the stand it adopted concerning the concept of class. He believes that the Arusha Declaration was designed to promote a classless society governed and controlled by the workers and peasants. He states,

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 40.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 231-50.

⁸²De La Rue, op.cit., p. 40.

"the Arusha Declaration was an unmistakable manifestation of Nyerere's concept of a classless society..."⁸³

The Declaration provided a more coherent and specific set of guidelines that could be easily understood by the Tanzanians. It was important not only for its originality or consistency, but also for the course that it charted for Tanzanians and for Nyerere's accurate summary of the situation of development in Africa and the remedial steps to be followed. Bienen stated that "perhaps the most dramatic attempt to assert a unique Tanzanian solution to development problems has been the complex of assertions, policies, and ideological strands which has become known in the Arusha Declaration".⁸⁴

There are essentially five overlapping themes in the Declaration: self-reliance, rural development, equity, national economic control, and socialism. To be sure, Nyerere believed that socialism and equity were inseparable because it was inconceivable for one to be present without the other. The policy of self-reliance has taken on a whole new meaning in the context of Tanzanian politics. Nyerere saw the dangers of relying on outside help and rejected the idea. The Tanzanian people were made responsible for their own development through their own efforts and hard work. According to Nyerere, the people themselves must fight the war against poverty, ignorance and disease so that they may achieve their own freedom and subsequent prosperity. Money cannot be

⁸³Gas de Villiers, "Aspects of African Socialism", Africa Institute Bulletin, XIII, 6, 1975, p. 228.

⁸⁴Bienen, op.cit., p. 406.

used because Tanzania is a poor country and, therefore, financial capital cannot be the major instrument of development. Although foreign aid will be accepted, it will not be relied upon heavily.⁸⁵

The Declaration clearly de-emphasized the role of industrial development in Tanzania. Instead, attention was focused on the rural areas and agriculture became the basis for development. The country was declared a land of peasants and workers. Land was said to be commonly owned by the nation and that it was the duty of the government to ensure that it was used for the benefit of the population.

The themes of equity and socialism were given even greater emphasis. One of the primary reasons for declaring the nation a land of workers and peasants was to prevent the development of a class society. Nyerere realized that despite previous policies, the country was still not socialist. At the outset of Freedom and Socialism, he pointed out that, "Socialism is not built by government decisions, nor by acts of Parliament; a country does not become Socialist by nationalization or by grand designs on paper".⁸⁶ In fact, government decisions had been insufficient to prevent the growth of small rural capitalists or the accumulation of property and various assets by those holding high political and administrative offices. Hence, TANU was declared a Party of peasants and workers and strict leadership codes were outlined designed to halt, at any rate retard, the growth of capitalism and capitalist attitudes. Leaders had to be prepared to serve and guide

⁸⁵Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., pp. 237-241.

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 1-2.

the people, they had to be committed to the principles of socialism, i.e., ujamaa, and had to be of a high moral calibre. In addition, they had to identify themselves with the people as socialism required the efforts of both leaders and followers.

The realization that socialist transformation is a slow process has resulted in an emphasis on "persuasion" rather than force. Nyerere has constantly stressed that compulsion should not enter into the move from a nation of individual peasants to a nation of cooperative villages. He states that, "it is not a question of forcing people to change their habits. It is a question of providing leadership. It is a question of all of us together making a reality of the principles of equality and freedom which are enshrined in our policy of Tanzanian Socialism".⁸⁷

This foregoing discussion serves the purpose of illustrating the important aspects of the ideology. Before all of this can be evaluated in terms of the political and economic realities of Tanzania, it is necessary to examine the ideas relating to "Democracy", "The Party", and "The State". It seems most appropriate at this point in this discussion to elaborate on these ideas because they not only interplay and overlap with ideas relating to ujamaa but also form an integral part of the national ideology.

DEMOCRACY: THE PARTY AND THE STATE

According to Nyerere, democracy "... is government by the people. Ideally, it is a form of government whereby the people -- all the

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 365.

people -- settle their affairs through free discussion".⁸⁸ He recognized that socialism could not exist without democracy but that pure democracy was practical only in small communities. His ideas pertaining to a functioning democracy can be summed up as one in which there are no factions. Thus a two-party system could be undemocratic if it merely encourages the growth of factionalism. Nyerere believed that a one-party system could be democratic and in the light of Tanzanian political realities, he thought that such a system seemed to be the most practical. In order to achieve its basic socialist aims, Tanzania had to maintain a one-party system to ensure that a class structure did not emerge. For Nyerere, "the existence of two or more stable political parties implies a class structure of society..."⁸⁹ His thoughts about democracy and the party system progressed from the stage where he believed that the one-party system was as democratic as the two-party system to the stage where he firmly asserted that the former was clearly more democratic. He purports that "... where there is one party and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where (there are) two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community."⁹⁰

The rivalry that exists in two- or multi-party systems could be damaging to a newly independent polity like Tanzania. In Africa the two-party system has simply failed, to work or to deal adequately with

⁸⁸Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op.cit., p. 195.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 134.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 196.

the problems of such nations which are essentially different from those in Western democracies. Thus, the retention of a two party system can be considered to be not only impractical but also inimical to democracy. A one-party system can function democratically if provisions are made for freedom of discussion and expression. Party membership must be relatively open to everyone and each citizen should be allowed to participate to the fullest. According to Nyerere, there would then be little need for suspicion or the fear that comes from living with rivals, the fear of overthrow, that an excluded group is intent on replacing the government at the first given opportunity. As Nyerere states "... a national movement which is open to all, which is identified with the whole nation, has nothing to fear from the discontent of an excluded section of society, for there is then no such section of society, for there is then no such section".⁹¹

Accounts of traditional African life often stress the inclusiveness of the society and the settlement of disputes through discussion by all concerned -- none were excluded. Nyerere believes that by retaining a two-party system, Africans are unconsciously admitting to the existence of factions and classes. His comparison of European and African political parties illustrated that the two could not be equated in several aspects, e.g., origin, composition and functions. African political parties were established in opposition to the colonial powers. They represented the entire (indigenous) community and their primary

⁹¹Ibid., p. 201.

function was the destruction of that colonial regime. In contrast, European political parties originated to protect certain interests and were comprised of various classes either determined to change or retain the status quo. African political parties sought to unite the nation by appealing to their common interests while their European counterparts sought to divide the nation by appealing to the sectional interests. According to Bienen, Nyerere's negativism towards a multi- or two-party system is not simply an attack on factionalism, but a rather vehement anti-party ethic. He believes that "Democracy and The Party System expresses a desire to abolish politics from society in so far as politics means organized disagreement".⁹² This is not to say that disagreement is not tolerated; unorganized disagreement is permitted because it does not pose a great threat to society. Indeed, Nyerere accepted the individual's right to have his own opinion and to dissent from something which he believes is infinitely wrong but this dissent should in no way threaten the unity and existence of the political system. In view of this, it becomes clearly obvious that a two-party system, defined in Nyerere's terms, could only bring factionalism into play since it would be organized around various group interests. John Kautsky adequately illustrates the conflicts, ideological and non-ideological, that could lead to instability in developing countries, especially when one organized revolutionary group is excluded from power.⁹³ Nyerere's arguments for a national movement are, therefore, well-grounded in the

⁹² Bienen, op.cit., p. 231.

⁹³ Kautsky, op.cit., pp. 142-149.

logic of African politics yet this has often led to accusations of having a no-party system.

Tanzania has always maintained a dominant one-party status. During the pre-independence years no other party commanded so great a portion of the support or loyalty of the Tanzanian people as TANU. In 1964, Nyerere appointed a commission to consider the changes that were necessary in order to transform Tanzania into a de jure one-party state. The vital question that needed to be answered was this: How could freedom be maintained in the party while simultaneously commanding sufficient discipline to enable it to perform the necessary development tasks? In his Guide to the One-Party State Commission, Nyerere outlined certain principles that should be upheld. The state would remain a republic and the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary would be maintained; all citizens would have complete freedom and equality and maximum participation in government through the single national movement; all citizens would control the Government and would be free to choose their own representatives.⁹⁴

The Commission concluded that TANU should remain a mass party, not an elite corps. Thus, in 1965, TANU was open to all citizens irrespective of race or occupation. For the first time the party was open to the army, police, and civil service. Nyerere's stress on the maintenance of unity had not been taken lightly. It was evident that the Commission was conscious of the need to establish a party that was disciplined and

⁹⁴ See Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op.cit., pp. 261-262.

effective enough to perform development functions yet democratic enough to lead society. The widening of membership seemed to enhance the party in two ways. It allowed for a greater degree of democracy and a substantial increase of skilled personnel within the party. No persons were unduly restricted from joining, for as Bienen points out, "Nyerere's emphasis on unity is attached to a concept of nation-building which conceives of unity by amalgamation, not unity by cutting off offending parts".⁹⁵ There were those who disagreed with Nyerere's ideas and felt that the party system should be more disciplined and "tougher" ideologically. In fact, Nyerere came around to the idea that the party had to be more disciplined. In Freedom and Development, he stated that discipline was an essential part of freedom and democracy and that without it there would be anarchy.⁹⁶

The most important aspects of the ideology are essentially the views of Nyerere because there is a lack of "revolutionary intellectuals" among the leaders. Yet in the short space of time since independence the Tanzanian leadership has formulated an ideology of development which is essentially (at least in its theoretical aspects) both socialist and democratic. In the next chapter, the values, attitudes, style and form of leadership will be discussed at length but before so doing, it is necessary just to recap on some of the salient points made here and to assess, if only briefly, the effects of the ideology.

⁹⁵ Bienen, op.cit., p. 249.

⁹⁶ See Nyerere, Freedom and Development, pp. 64-65.

THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology in Tanzania, far from being a static and isolated element in national development, has functioned dynamically as an organic and evolving image of national direction and priorities in both the social and economic spheres. It is important that the style and content of the ideology be stressed. For one thing, ideology has provided the major guidelines for the transformation of society according to socialist principles. Ideology has been responsible for drawing the people at the periphery into contact with those at the center, yet the latter is very much restricted in the services that it can provide. The ideas held by the leaders affect the direction in which Tanzania develops. As Bienen points out, "... it matters whether or not development is less important to them than identifying their country as the socialist state in East and Central Africa which takes its place in the sun by virtue of this identification rather than by virtue of its economic growth."⁹⁷

Tanzania is still in its formative stages and it is still early to give a complete breakdown on the impact of the various policies because they embody long term goals such as nationalization, villagization, and economic self-reliance, etc. However, there is little doubt that "a real beginning" has been made in the efforts to achieve socialism. In 1967, Bienen stated that ujamaa was simply "a statement of ideals" which had really never taken hold. Future oriented revolutionaries found it difficult to accept ujamaa because it seemed inherently backward

⁹⁷Bienen, p. 250.

and lacking in any form of dynamism, and it was imprecise to the extent of justifying many different governmental policies.⁹⁸ Today, ujamaa is seen in a more positive light; events have given greater credence to the (ujamaa) idea. There are certainly many areas in the ideology that can be looked at as somewhat ambiguous but the Arusha Declaration provided a more specific program for socialist development.

The challenges of development in Tanzania are great -- it is one of the poorest countries in the World and among the U.N. listing of least developed countries. The annual income averages around \$85 per person -- roughly half the average for Africa. National resources are few and the country is predominantly agricultural. This particular economic sector accounted for 39% of GDP in 1971.⁹⁹ The persistence of colonial economic stratification and the migration to more populated towns resulted not only in a series of regional, but also urban and rural imbalances. The increasing gap between rich and poor has alerted Nyerere to the dangers of elitism. The Arusha Declaration was designed to eradicate this as well as meet specific political and economic problems. Ujamaa is, thus, an attempt to deal not only with the problems of the appearance of an exploitative elite and consequent instability, but also with the problems of development and the lack of government resources, the diversity of the regions, depressed population, the lack of information and the need for mass participation.

⁹⁸Ibid., pp. 252-254.

⁹⁹Hill, p. 222.

The objectives of the ideology are simple to understand and they are desirable, though not necessarily inevitable. There is constant emphasis on the participation of the entire people. It is an open rather than a closed ideology which has an anti-establishment bias. At present this poses no immediate problems for the leadership because of the widespread support which the political regime has secured. However, if such a bias becomes deeply ingrained within a substantial portion of the population over a lengthy period of time, it may be increasingly difficult to regulate behavior. In the long run, this may prove detrimental to national goals whose attainment depend primarily (but not exclusively) on government's capability to mobilize, control, and direct activity towards this end. There are many gaps in development and communication of ideology due primarily to the shortage of political education staff, especially those who combine ideological understanding and commitment with a solid technical background in the critical areas of policy implementation. There is great potential for further ideological development if the right type of personnel can be recruited and effectively trained.

The impact of the ideology has been felt in many areas and it has played a major role in enabling the presidential party state to move significantly toward achieving democracy and socialism. For example, within the framework of the one-party system, voters are able to elect the majority of their leaders including the President. They can involve themselves in the decision-making process through the operation of the party cell. In addition, the National Ethic and the creed of TANU calling

for individual freedom and also social solidarity are allowed to operate to a certain extent. However, it should be noted that despite the democratic nature of the decision-making machinery, the most important decisions, including goal formation and articulation, are carried out by the leaders, especially the President. Although such goals are justified by their representing the will of the people, there is yet very little evidence to substantiate this. Government decision, especially since Arusha, provides a good indication of the priorities and character of the transition to socialism and the major obstacles to change. There are two major socialist initiatives which must be briefly noted. Firstly, the large-scale nationalization in 1967, which produced large numbers of parastatal enterprises. Secondly, the large-scale mobilization for rural socialism in 1970 produced ujamaa villages, thereby reducing the number of individual small-holdings which previously existed. As this will be dealt with in greater detail in a subsequent chapter, little time will be spent on it here. However, although ujamaa villages do not guarantee that socialism will emerge, it does provide a base on which greater cooperation in the rural areas can be built.

Before nationalization, foreign corporations controlled and owned a great many industries and were allowed to operate relatively unhampered by restrictions. One of the great disadvantages arising from this state of affairs was the exportation of capital to the home country leaving Tanzania with insufficient capital for investments. Nationalization thus secured ownership of capital and offered greater opportunities for its use in accordance with Tanzania's needs by reversing the traditional income drain of the economy. Although the benefits that such a policy

brings continue to be debated, there is little doubt that it is a basic prerequisite for socialism.¹⁰⁰

It is still unclear whether nationalization has changed investment patterns significantly because Tanzania still relies heavily on foreign contractors to provide information, advice, and personnel for carrying out investments. More importantly, state ownership does not imply movement toward socialism because the state does not undergo any quantitative changes. In addition, it may even perpetuate a capitalistic bureaucratic class by making civil servants the guardians of public property. Nationalization does not mean workers control, which is the real meaning of socialism on the economic level, but it has opened the way to greater participation on the part of Tanzanians in the economic life of their country. However, it will be sometime before the people as a whole feel that they are working for "themselves" rather than for some alien entity. Foreign banks, insurance companies (British owned) and the food processing industries (Asian owned) were the main targets of Nationalization in 1967. The National Development Council, created in 1965 to formulate and coordinate national development plans, took majority shareholding in many national corporations. The government acquired 60 percent of the shares in the sisal industry and also in seven industrial firms (they were Kilimanjaro Breweries, Tanzanian Breweries, Tanzanian Metal Box Company, Tanganyika Extract Company, Tanzanian Portland Cement Company, British-American Tobacco, and Bata Shoe Company).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 230.

Major steps have also been taken towards the social control of the economy. Rented houses valued at more than \$10,000 (U.S.) have been socialized with compensation paid to the owners -- this is a bold attempt by the Tanzanian leadership to eliminate the "rentier class". Property ownership has also been transformed in accordance with ideological principles -- this is seen not only in the socialization of land but also in the legal status of land tenure. Other policies will be discussed in later chapters but the foregoing analysis illustrates some of the significant steps which have been made towards establishing socialism in Tanzania. Of course, there are areas where policy has been less influential. For example, the policy of self-reliance has not made Tanzania significantly less dependent. There is still much to be desired in the planning mechanism, especially in the allocation of scarce resources. Similarly, the problems of classes, especially in the rural areas, needs to be squarely tackled. But this should not negate the remarkable achievements that have been made in the areas of political and economic life.

The success of the policies will depend on the extent to which workers and peasants participate in decision-making and the extent to which such participation raises the social productivity of labor. Decentralization has thus become a key concept in the ujamaa ideology.¹⁰¹ This policy document produced by Nyerere outlines his ideals behind decentralization. It aims at nationalizing and improving the

¹⁰¹Nyerere, Freedom and Development, pp. 344-350.

administration while simultaneously extending to the populace a greater share of responsibilities in the development effort. Nyerere realizes that infinitely more power has to be exercised at the local level in order to bring development and democracy to the people and to solve various administrative problems. He believes that by decentralizing the administrative machine, "local democracy will become more real, even as the institutions of development will become more efficient".¹⁰² Whether or not the ideological objectives of decentralization, villagization, self-reliance, and other policies are fully realized remains to be seen but the ideology has had a direct impact in five major areas of the economy: organization of management and decision-making, property, education, labor, and the determination of national economic priorities.

Tanzania's program of ideological and economic development is, to say the least, most ambitious. It involves, among other things, the overcoming of basic challenges inherent in the decision to achieve socialist transformation by evolution rather than revolution. As Ian C. Parker states, "The policy of gradual transition to socialism ... represents a logical response to the relative strength of the government and party and the stability of the nation on the one hand and to extreme poverty, on the other".¹⁰³ In meeting these challenges, Tanzania has to experiment, formulate and reformulate ideas. Ujamaa has often been referred to as an experiment which, if successful, could serve as a

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 349.

¹⁰³ Parker, op.cit., p. 71.

guide for many developing countries. However, it depends on more than financial resources for its fulfillment. The active support and practical initiative of the peasants will be a deciding factor and also the effects of the political and administrative organs to provide the necessary leadership. This last factor is of the utmost importance. Nyerere has emphasised the high standards required of leaders and the important functions which they must perform. In the next two chapters, attention will focus primarily on the national political elite (both government and party) its role, attitude and function. Bearing in mind the basic principles and ideas of the ideology concerning the type of society that is to be established, it is important to ascertain whether the practical efforts of the leadership are congruent with the dominant ideology. It is also important in a study of this nature to isolate the major decision makers and to evaluate their behavior and its implications for the establishment of ujamaa.

CHAPTER III

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The ideology contains, among other things, a great deal of literature pertaining to the exercise of political leadership. For example, there are numerous references relating to the type of leadership, its role in the development process, its obligations, its scope of authority and influence and the limits of that power and authority.¹⁰⁴ In sum, the ideology spells out the type, nature and functions of the political elite.

The leaders of Tanzania are not only responsible for making their program of action intelligible to the masses by explanation and persuasion, they must also act upon those principles. Nyerere pointed out that both words and actions are important in the march towards freedom, development and socialism. While the population, too, must support the government and actively engage themselves in the development programs, the leadership must provide the necessary information, guidance and organization for the people.¹⁰⁵

Political leadership in developing countries is necessary at all levels of government, primarily to ensure the smooth functioning of the development machinery and the success of development objectives. It is, therefore, purported here that the importance of the national political

¹⁰⁴See J. K., Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., pp. 86-103, 136-142, 187-206, 394-397.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 395.

leadership in fashioning policies and outlining programs of action has greatly increased. It is the national political elite that has formulated the goals of the system, the methods by which to attain them and campaigned for their acceptance among the populace. This elite has also been responsible for shaping the instruments of development, e.g., TANU, NUTA and the TYL, controlling such organs and thereby dictating the direction and pace of development. In this chapter, the aim is to demonstrate the pivotal role which the national leadership plays in working towards the realization of a socialist society. At once the contradiction between the proclaimed objectives and the nature of the leadership can be seen and explanation will be offered as such problems arise.

The hypothesis that the national political leadership has been and continues to be the major decision-maker and that the initiative of local political leaders will increase with increases in the level of development clearly merits investigation. It brings into play key concepts that lie at the heart of the study of politics -- "power", "influence" and "authority".¹⁰⁶ These factors are of great importance in any analysis of the role and behavior of decision-makers, since leadership can be effective only if it possess "political Power" and the authority to change and influence behavior in the direction that it desires. Power, here, means the ability to command a change in behavior, influence can be synonymous with power, while authority implies the

¹⁰⁶Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (1973 ed.), trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

ability to change or influence behavior by virtue of commanding some office or position which confers power or legitimacy.¹⁰⁷ This is but a brief discussion of these key concepts, but necessary in order to make the succeeding discussion more fruitful.

There are many studies and theories relating to elite behavior or some aspect of it. Contemporary analysis ranges from specific studies in "Who Governos"¹⁰⁸ and "Small Town U. S. A."¹⁰⁹ to highly generalized analysis of the changing composition of national elites over broad time spans, e.g., Pareto. Some studies single out various groups such as the military, the legislators, the administrators¹¹⁰ and businessmen¹¹¹ for special analysis. Other studies are based primarily on the socio-economic characteristics of the elite, assuming that such factors influence the way in which the political elite behaves.

According to Beck et.al., there are three dimensions to elite studies -- the descriptive, the structure-function and the genetic or stage analysis dimension. The first identifies the elite and its socio-economic and political characteristics in any situation. The second deals with the structure of elites and the relationship of the structure to elite performance in government. The third dimension can be studied

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 299.

¹⁰⁸ R. A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

¹⁰⁹ Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.

¹¹⁰ Raymond F. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State, op.cit.

¹¹¹ C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, op.cit.

by utilizing the concepts of personnel circulation, social circulation, representiveness, and flexibility. The questions which such concepts would be used to answer would relate to the permanency of the elite, the entry of non-elite groups and the specific conditions for entry.¹¹²

Beck et.al., furnished their own concepts for the study of elite behavior, i.e., elite composition, elite structure, elite etiquette and elite techniques and mechanisms of control. The pattern of elite structure has two dimensions; elite-elite relationship, and elite-constituency relationship. Elite etiquette refers to the behavioral dimension of elite-elite relationships and elite-constituency relationships. It is a term borrowed from V. O. Key and refers specifically to the rules by which elites regulate their behavior. These are rules learned through the process of socialization and they are shaped by the views of the elite. Techniques of control are the methods by which an individual or a group asserts its eliteness. Elites will usually adopt a variety of techniques. However, Beck et.al., state that, "the particular technique adopted by an elite will react on the system and ramify throughout it."¹¹³

Using the concepts of elite structure, elite etiquette, and techniques and mechanisms of control, Beck et.al., constructed "four elite types". The constitutional democratic type,¹¹⁴ the totalitarian

¹¹²Carl Beck, James M. Malloy and William R. Campbell, A Survey of Elite Studies, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1965.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 17.

¹¹⁴Beck, et.al., pp. 19-22.

type;¹¹⁵ the authoritarian type;¹¹⁶ and non-crystallized societies.¹¹⁷

Much time need not be spent on the first three types except to state that the first could be correlated to the systems of Western Europe and North America; the second to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites; and the third would find counterparts in some Latin American and African countries. The fourth type, the non-crystallized societies pertains mainly to developing areas where no definite pattern of elite behavior has yet emerged. However, from the existing literature on developing countries, it is clearly evident that elites in such countries hold modernizing values and are strongly committed to rapid socio-economic development.¹¹⁸ Elite etiquette in such societies is difficult to analyze. Some analysts see the elites holding the view that the people are objects that must be led; others emphasise the leadership's commitment to a relationship of reciprocal responsibility between the elite and its constituency.

Mass manipulation and suppression of opposition are the main types of control devices found in non-crystallized societies.¹¹⁹ The study was less informative on the type of elites that will emerge in such countries -- although it presented many possibilities, e.g., intellectual,

¹¹⁵Ibid., pp. 22-25.

¹¹⁶Ibid., pp. 26-28.

¹¹⁷Ibid., pp. 28-31.

¹¹⁸See Karl Kautsky, op.cit., p. 106.

¹¹⁹Beck, et.al., op.cit., p.30.

political, bureaucratic and technical or military. Anyone or a mixture of all may predominate at any one time making prediction of the ultimate structure of the non-crystallized systems extremely difficult. However, the schema for analysing political elites, outlined by Beck, et.al., is useful in studying the nature of the political leadership in Tanzania. The three basic steps outlined by the authors will be followed, that is, (1) a description of the composite structure, etiquette and techniques and mechanisms of control; (2) an explanation of particular patterns and their persistence and (3) an explanation of pattern changes.¹²⁰ Primary emphasis will be given to the first two aspects. The third will be dealt with at greater length in the concluding chapters of this work. Before entering into that discussion, references to other studies pertaining to political leadership in developing countries should be cited to widen the general framework by providing other important variables.

LEADERSHIP: A STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

As a theory and method of approach to the study of political leadership functionalism offers several useful concepts. It is not intended here to elaborate on all the aspects of functionalism or on all the criticisms of this method. Structural functional analysis is useful here because it allows for a greater understanding of the roles and functions of the major decision makers within the political system. One of the basic tenets of functionalism is that there are certain

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 34.

functions which must be performed if any political system is to survive. Almond and Powell list five "capabilities" a "political system" should possess and four support functions that a society should perform.¹²¹ However, only three are useful in discussing the kind of capability every polity should have -- and for our purposes here, they are regulative, extractive and distributive capabilities.

A) THE REGULATION OF BEHAVIOR

Every government should be able to control the behavior of individuals and groups within society to ensure order. This means that government has to elicit positive support for the polity through feelings such as patriotism, respect and deference through such methods as education, communication and political participation. Secondly, government has to provide an effective network of laws and regulations concerning the behavior of individuals and groups. A government that is able to do this and act in congruence with the expectations, values and desires of society has an appropriate level of regulative capability. This would also have the effect of energizing and improving the political system, strengthening the regulative capability of government and in the context of developing nations, promote economic development.

B) THE EXTRACTION OF RESOURCES

The extractive aspect of governmental capability, refers to the ability of government to make available at its direct and indirect disposal the kinds and quantities of resources it needs and intends to

¹²¹Gabriel Almond, and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966.

manipulate and utilize for the development and stability of society.

C) DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES

This particular aspect of government capability refers to the ability to provide goods and services and other values such as status and to allocate rewards and punishments in a manner that society at large can accept. The distributive capability of a government can be said to be adequate when it is able to direct resources to the more critical needs of society at large.

The three basic components of governmental capability have been but briefly stated, but they are, ceteris paribus, essential to the maintenance of the political system. In many developing nations, the level of government capability is usually lower than that found in the developed countries. Government may be able to control the population but unable to distribute resources in a way that is acceptable to the majority of the people. The political and economic realities in many developing areas work against maximization of governmental capabilities. Thus, this discussion not only has to take into account important factors such as governmental capabilities, but also the very nature of political leadership. The type of leadership necessary for promoting and accelerating national development is clearly of great significance.

Taketsugu Tsurutani outlined three basic requirements of political leadership, e.g., commitment to modernization ideals, political intelligence and skill and dominance over sub-national political elites.¹²² Since

¹²² Taketsugu Tsurutani, The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transitional Societies, New York: Abelard Schuman, 1973, p. 92.

no political leadership can promote national development unless it wishes to do so, the first requirement of political leadership is commitment to modernization. Tsurutani did not specifically define what he meant by intelligence and skill but it involved creativity, foresight and manipulative capability. He looked upon intelligence as "... the knowledge and application of situational assets and avenues toward goal attainment." Skill was the tool that translated this commitment and understanding into a concrete program of action.¹²³

Leadership in developing countries should be independent from groups and individuals that resist their efforts towards development and modernization. Dominance over sub-national elites can be achieved if there is unity within the national elite and to a certain extent in other political elites; when the legal or political traditions permits national leadership control over local and administrative elites; by selective bribery; and through manipulation and integration of antagonistic elements into the total process of modernization.

From the leadership requirements Tsurutani constructed a typology. For our purposes here, a reproduction of that typology is useful insofar as it enables an analysis of Tanzanian leadership within the framework presented. (See following page) The characteristics of all the types listed are carefully outlined in the text and need not be elaborated here. The utility of this typology is that it allows for analysis and evaluation of various types of political leadership based on three

¹²³Ibid., p. 93.

TABLE 3.1

A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

LEADERSHIP TYPE		COMMITMENT	INTELLIGENCE & SKILL	DOMINANCE
A	Effective Modernizing	+	+	+
B	Attenuated Modernizing	+	+	-
C	Crude Modernizing	+	-	+
D	Visionary Modernizing	+	-	-
E	Stable Conservative	-	+	+
F	Stagnating	-	+	-
G	Extortionist	-	-	+
H	Revolving-Door	-	-	-

Source: Taketsugu Tsurutani, The Politics of National Development: Political Leadership in Transnational Societies, New York: Abelard-Shuman, 1973, p. 96.

important variables; commitment, intelligence and skill and dominance. It must be borne in mind, however, that the examples Tsurutani developed are ideal types but this does not detract from their usefulness in providing a broad, if not precise, means for assessing what a given political leadership may be capable of in terms of the manner and pace of national development.

Using the concepts outlined in the studies by Beck, et.al., (that is elite composition and structure, elite etiquette and techniques and mechanisms of control) and Tsurutani's leadership requirements, i.e., commitment, intelligence and skill and dominance, attention will now be turned to the dynamics of the Tanzanian political leadership and its role in the decision making process.

THE TANZANIA POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: DEFINITION AND COMPOSITION

The Tanzanian political elite, as Hopkins defines it, consists of two groups: members of the National Assembly and government administrators. He excluded "influential persons from other areas such as business, labor, military and education" because (1) only few Africans held such positions; (2) they did not play specifically political roles; (3) data relating to them was extremely hard to gather; (4) the relationship between high positions in the private sector and political influence is weak.¹²⁴ This definition serves the purpose of limiting those who can be included in the national political leadership.⁴ However, in the Arusha Declaration, leaders were said to include TANU executive committee, MP's, ministers,

¹²⁴Hopkins, op.cit., p. 64.

senior officials of TANU affiliated organizations, senior officials of parastatal organizations, anyone elected under any clause of the TANU constitution, councilors, and middle and upper-cadre civil servants.¹²⁵ Although this group collectively plays an important role in the decision-making process not all of them play specifically political roles. Therefore, in this particular discussion, the national elite will be defined as those intellectuals, technicians and managers in the highest political spheres, who formulate and ideology and translate it into action.¹²⁶

At the local level the political elite consists primarily of party members, i.e., the Regional Commissioners, regional department heads, members of the regional executive committee and the members of Regional Development Committee. Potential political elites are not identified because of the lack of information pertaining to them. But mention will be made throughout the discussion of groups or individuals who have the potential for political influence.

ELITE STRUCTURE

Beck, et.al., stated that there were two dimensions to the pattern of elite structure: elite-elite relationships and elite-constituency relationships. It would be difficult to discuss either of these aspects of behavior without relating them to the ideology for, to a great extent,

¹²⁵Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., p. 36.

¹²⁶See Lester G. Seligman, "Elite Recruitment and Political Development", in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (eds), Political Development and Social Change, New York: John Wiley, 1966.

elite behavior has been, at least theoretically, shaped by the dominant attitudes and values which exist in Tanzanian society. To summarize the arguments presented in the preceeding chapter, it can be stated that three recurring themes run through the politics and political thought of Tanzania: egalitarianism, mass participation and anti-elitism. The Arusha Declaration de-emphasises such values as wealth, formal education and skill in the recruitment of leaders in order to discourage elitism on the part of the leadership. However, the achievement of economic development and modernization usually depends on leadership by a skilled and educated elite. Thus, the Tanzanian ideology, while recognizing the importance of political leadership in the development process, attempts to provide a "political formula" for appropriate leadership behavior.¹²⁷

Colonial education instilled elitest attitudes in those that were privileged enough to attain an education of any kind. At the end of British rule only 0.2 per cent of the population had secondary education. The current generation of leaders are products of the colonial system and still retain many of the values which were instilled in them during that period. The Tanzanian formula was developed, in part, to insure the protection of the majority from a dominant minority, set apart by virtue of educational and/or occupational privilege. It tries to be consistent with the national ideology. Model leaders are those with a peasant or worker background or who strongly identify with one or the other. Leadership is intended to be open, freely circulating and

¹²⁷P. J. McGowan and H. M. K. Wacirah, "The Evolution of Tanzanian Political Leadership", African Studies Review, XVII, 1, 1974, p. 180,

representative of society at large. McGowan and Wacirah state that while every political system is run by a few individuals and obeyed or endured by many, the leaders of Tanzania are not intended to be "... a ruling class type of political elite -- closed; intermarrying; with common schooling, outlooks, and association". The Tanzanian formula attempts, in the face of Michels "Iron Law of Oligarchy" and other observed political regularities to make sure that the leaders become and remain a governing stratum -- not a crucial political elite or even worse a "ruling class".¹²⁸

ELITE RECRUITMENT

Political recruitment is important in any study of elite behavior. The method of selection defines the amount of authority that will be exercised, thus, elite recruitment can have far-reaching consequences for the political system.


From the table on the following page, one can see that the recruitment process is a fairly well structured one. According to Seligman, "... candidates emerge from a pool of eligible individuals who themselves are pre-selected segment of the prominent, politically active, skillful, motivated and resource-endowed members of the political family".¹²⁹ Status, wealth and education create greater opportunities for active political participation in decision-making; while the process of

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 184.

¹²⁹See Lester G. Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites, New York: General Learning Press, 1971, p. 4

TABLE 3.2

A GENERAL MODEL OF THE POLITICAL RECRUITMENT PROCESS



Source: Lester G. Seligman, Recruiting Political Elites, New York: General Learning Press, 1971, p. 3.

socialization instill certain values and attitudes into the aspirants.¹³⁰ Furthermore, if principal actors play a significant role in recruitment they will also play a significant role in decision-making.¹³¹ The point that came across clearly throughout Seligman's work is that the recruitment process selects elites primarily because of certain values which they hold and also for their skill and competence.

In view of these findings, it is most important to know whether these patterns of recruitment persist in Tanzania. If recruitment patterns correspond with the evidence presented by Seligman then an area of potential contradiction exists between the theory and practice of leadership behavior in Tanzania. Until World War II there were few leadership places available to Africans in Tanzania. Key positions were occupied by the white colonial elite. The recruitment of indigeneous people came during the drive for independence in the 1950's. Of the 705 Tanzanian leaders identified by McGowan and Bolland only 7.8 per cent had leadership positions by 1943. Between 1950 and 1960, the number of indigeneous leaders grew rapidly.¹³²

The political leadership of Tanzania is relatively young, 78 per cent of whom were in secondary schools prior to 1940. Clerical and teaching professions were found to be the most common occupation among

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 7.

¹³¹Ibid., p. 16.

¹³²Refer to McGowan and Wacirah, op.cit., pp. 184-185.

the educated. (See Table 3.3) By 1967, leaders with less prestigious occupations, i.e., farmers, semi-skilled and skilled workers, declined markedly. Thus, if Tanzania is described as a land of peasants and workers the leaders themselves are not peasants or workers, neither do they come from such socio-economic backgrounds. McGowan and Wacirah state that "... despite the fact that the vast majority of the population is comprised of peasant, farmers and workers, one does not become a leader by starting out as a farmer, a worker or even a trader".¹³³

The present political system clearly has a preference for white-collar workers. Post colonial patterns of recruitment have not diverged significantly from colonial patterns. Two-thirds of the leaders hold administrative, educational and clerical occupation thus, many are concentrated in positions that hold some future potential. Although government has de-emphasized occupational prestige, workers, traders and farmers are largely excluded from leadership positions; they only accounted for 4 per cent of the leadership between 1963-1968. (See Table 3.4) There is a great deal of difficulty involved in attempting to separate education and occupational status, especially when policies are designed to enhance modernization. It is not surprising then, that education and/or occupational status figure largely in the recruitment of national political leaders.

The elite has undergone various educational and personal experiences. They have different levels of education and ambition, different

¹³³Ibid., p. 186.

TABLE 3.3

TRENDS IN PRIMARY OCCUPATIONS AMONG TANZANIAN LEADERS 1900-1967

N=705 Occupations	To 1940	Percentages							
		1941- 1945	1946- 1950	1951- 1955	1956- 1960	1961	1963	1965	1967
Student or Youth ^a	74	60	47	18	1	^b	-	^c	
Agriculturalist	1	1	2	2	2	2	-	-	-
Trader/Worker	2	2	2	1	-	-			
Ranks M+P ^d	2	3	2	2	1	1			
Clerk ^e	6	10	20	25	15	10	2	-	
College Student	3	4	6	13	12	12	4	2	
Teacher	4	7	10	12	13	9	4	4	4
V. A. Leader	-	1	2	4	7	8	7	4	4
Business/Professional	1	1	2	4	7	9	10	9	8
Communications			-	-	1	2	3	2	2
University Staff				-	-	-	-	-	1
Officers M+P ^f			-	1	2	2	3	3	3
Civil Servant ^g	-	1	2	4	16	24	49	50	46
Politician ^h			-	5	14	14	15	20	19
Other	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unknown	8	8	9	8	7	8	3	5	13

a = Primary or secondary students or under 15 years.

b = "-", represents less than 1 per cent.

c = Blank space represents 0 per cent.

d = Military and police ranks and non-commissioned officers

e = Clerks represents clerical-level employees of business and government.

f = Military and police commissioned officers.

g = Civil Servants are executive class or higher.

h = Politicians represent elected office holders and full-time political party workers.

Descriptions

- 1) 75% of Tanzania's leadership were in elementary or secondary schools prior to 1946.
- 2) After formal education the most prevalent occupations of Tanzanian leaders were teaching or clerical prior to independence.
- 3) In 1950's other occupations were open to Africans. Therefore, the table shows increase in leaders holding high civil service positions.
- 4) There is also an increase in leaders among politicians and party activists.
- 5) By 1967 leaders in skilled, semi-skilled and non-university occupations had declined.

TABLE 3.4

TRENDS IN THE FIRST OCCUPATIONS OF TANZANIAN LEADERS

1st Occupation	(Percentages)	As reported in 1963-64	As reported in 1965-66	As reported in 1967-68	All Leaders
Trading		2	2	2	2
Party Trade Union		2	2	2	2
Worker		2	2	2	2
Agriculture		2	2	2	2
Commercial		3	4	4	4
Military/Police ^a		7	7	7	6
Professional		7	7	7	6
Clerical ^b		32	32	33	32
Education/Administration		35	35	36	
Unknown		10	9	7	9
Base N =		495	594	618	705

a) Military and police category combines all ranks

b) Clerical category represents ranks below executive officer level and clerical employees of private business

1) There are a number of professionals because few Africans were recruited in such areas before independence.

2) Asians and Europeans were the main actors in commercial activities.

Source: McGowan and Wacirah, op.cit., p. 188.

identification and ideologies and different expectations; yet they are engaged, with varying degrees of harmony, in the major tasks of government.¹³⁴ However, there is a noticeable amount of agreement among them concerning the goals of the system. For example, 92 per cent of the elite interviewed by Hopkins believed that democracy was the best form of government for Tanzania, and their support for democratic procedures was said to be very strong.¹³⁵

African Socialism is an important ideological concept among many of the elite. There is basic agreement that the political system should be arranged in such a manner that the goals and objectives of the polity are realized. Most of the elites admire Nyerere and his leadership capabilities. According to McGowan and Wacirah, Nyerere is well thought of not only because he shares the ideology of any elite member but because he has "... a direct down-to-earth approach to leadership and a strong, sometimes religious commitment to acting on principle".¹³⁶ Thus, support for Nyerere among the elite, is almost universal. He is a unifying figure within and without the political leadership and this has more than symbolic implications because it is also important in the resolving of conflict.

There is a strong disposition on the part of the elite members to view interrelations among the political elite in terms of hierarchy.

¹³⁴Hopkins, op.cit., p. 70.

¹³⁵Ibid., pp. 89-95.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 103.

Furthermore, there is also a firm commitment to viewing the elite (and society at large) as cohesive and psychologically homogeneous, even if ethnically and socially heterogeneous. This is most important in its implications for the stability of the Tanzanian political system.

ELITE CONSTITUENCY BEHAVIOR

The elite has certain views regarding the rights and duties of the citizens, which while not overtly undemocratic, express the desire to keep criticism to a minimum. Many see the role of the citizen in the nation-building process in terms of carrying out the policies outlined by the government. The citizen's role in the political process, e.g., voting, is given less emphasis because it seems less important in terms of the priorities of the system. The stress on nation-building functions then, seem hardly surprising and the level of participation in such activities is crucial to the success or failure of government programs. Without such participation, policies remain little more than paper commitments.

The elite expects its constituents to be obedient, defining a "good" citizen as one who shares in the burdens of national development. Many leaders, primarily administrators, share the view that the masses do not understand what they are trying to do, believing that only a few of their constituents are fully cognisant with what development entails. Even though they feel that the civil duties of the citizens are secondary they still expected him to be an important participant in the political process -- but largely on the output side.¹³⁷

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 106.

ELITE ETIQUETTE

The hallmark of elite-elite etiquette in Tanzania is the stress on co-operation, conformity and adherence to the official line, i.e., the "Party Line". The norms of the society rejects open competition among the leaders. Discussion and debate are the primary methods by which disagreement is resolved. Recourse to more drastic measures of settlement is often avoided by compromise and accommodation.

Conformity in elite-elite behavior has not always been easy to achieve primarily because of the variety of views and expectations found among those in top leadership positions. After the union with Zanzibar in 1964, the overall character of the leadership changed with the inclusion of the more revolutionary, Marxist-oriented Zanzibaris. However, the elite's emphasis on unity led it initially to accomodate many divergent points of view. When figures such as Abdul Rahman Mohammed (Bubu), a Marxist, threatened the unity and stability of the elite they were removed from office. Similarly, other Marxists and Maoists were put in detention for overtly deviant behavior. It should be said that such behavior does not constitute a regular pattern of elite-elite behavior. Rather than being permanent features of the Tanzanian political scene, measures such as dismissals and detentions have, according to Cranford Pratt, "waxed and waned in direct correlation with fluctuations in the tranquility of the political scene".¹³⁸

Interaction among the elite is governed primarily by the values and

¹³⁸ See Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 186-187.

norms acquired during socialization. They agree on the rules of the game and are more unified on questions pertaining to democracy than on questions of economic goals. There is a strong commitment to the ideals of socialism and a firm belief that development and modernization should be carried out according to such principles. In working to achieve this, the members of the political elite realize the need for unity and the importance of minimizing conflict within their ranks. Conflict has been relatively non-violent coup d'etats, political assassinations and the like have been noticeably absent in Tanzania compared to countries such as Nigeria or Uganda.

Elite consensus, that is, agreement among role expectations has been and continues to be strong. Such expectations are shared and valued highly by the national political elite. There is, however, some discrepancy in role consensus between administrators and legislators. The former view themselves as policy-makers when, in fact, they are not, which leads in some instances, to a conflict in roles. When Hopkins confronted a group of legislators with a hypothetical situation in which they disliked a proposed government measure, the responses were mixed, ranging from weak to strong. The weak respondent would accept, the moderate would criticize but accept, and the strong would block the measure. Despite the varied viewpoints, Hopkins collected enough evidence to prove that, to a large extent there was partial agreement among the elite on questions of important role aspects.¹³⁹

¹³⁹Ibid., pp. 168-171.

Elite-constituency behavior is largely regulated by the elite's view of its constituency. The elite believe its constituency needs to be led and guided so that it may at some future date participate more fully in the political process. Thus, to a certain degree, a kind of paternalism is evident in the relationship between the elite and the mass. While the elite feels a strong sense of responsibility to its constituents, it can hardly be said that they consider themselves responsible to the masses, despite Nyerere's statements that the "will" of the people must ultimately prevail.

Members of the constituency are, for the most part, onlookers in the political arena. Nyerere himself, in summing up the political and economic conditions of Tanzanian society, stated that the people were largely unable to govern themselves.¹⁴⁰ At best, the people would chose their leaders who, in turn, would be entrusted with serving the community thus, helping the people to help themselves.¹⁴¹ The authoritative allocation of values into concrete programs cannot be left up to the constituency for they have neither the political education, nor the political skill and intelligence required. Moreover, the need to translate certain dominant values into a common interest necessitates the growth of persons who can rise above particularistic considerations.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op.cit., pp. 195-196

¹⁴¹Nyerere, Freedom and Development, op.cit., passim.

¹⁴²G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elites and Non-Elites: The Possibilities and Their Side Effects, Massachusettes: Warner Modular Publication, 1973.

TECHNIQUES OF CONTROL

Unlike many developing countries, the use of violent techniques as a means of control has been infrequent in Tanzania. After events such as the army mutiny in 1964 and student protest in 1966 the level of political tolerance was relatively low and suppression of ideas did take place. Time and time again Nyerere stresses that Tanzanian society should not be built by violent methods but this does not mean that political leaders never use or threaten to use force. To be sure, the political regime has to demonstrate its regulative capability in order to retain its credibility but there is little evidence to show that totalitarian rule is coming. The commitment of the elite to democracy and democratic procedures is unquestioned. This has been reinforced, to a great degree, by the type of one-party system that has developed. TANU attempts to embrace all elements in society and thus, acts as the major mechanism of control. The civil service, the army and other important and potentially dangerous elements in society are all subsumed under the wings of the Party.

Although a certain amount of indoctrination is carried out by the Party and other organizations, e.g., NUTA and the TYL, generally speaking, the regime does not rely primarily on mass manipulation or suppression as primary methods of control though the occasional use of force has been demonstrated.

THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: AN OVERVIEW

Of the various types of elite systems outlined, Tanzania appears to fit into the non-crystallized category. However, there are certain features of this type, e.g., its totalitarian nature, that clearly fails to correspond with the reality of political leadership in Tanzania. In

analyzing the leadership according to the typology offered by Tsurutani there are problems in locating the category into which Tanzania falls. Clearly, there is a strong commitment to development and modernization. Moreover, achievements of the leadership illustrate a great degree of political intelligence and skill on their part. Policy pronouncements show a critical assessment of actual and potential obstacles to development, the resources available and the capabilities of existing socio-political values and institutions. However, the leadership has, thus far, been unable to fulfill many of its development objectives, e.g., significantly narrowing the gap between rich and poor. A lack of intellectuals, technicians and managers in the higher echelons of the political hierarchy has been a primary obstacle.

The level of development in Tanzania requires leaders of a high calibre and in great numbers to operate the decision-making machinery. Important decisions are not only difficult to make, but also dangerous because the decision-making process has not yet been fully institutionalized.¹⁴³ Thus, not only is the leadership concerned with the tasks of development and modernization, it is also involved with building and maintaining the political foundations on which the society must be built. These are, to be sure, formidable tasks and it will be sometime before one can assess their success in this field.

The dominance of the national elite relative to the local political elite and other sub-national groups is evident. The abolition of

¹⁴³See Hopkins, op.cit., Ch. 2

traditional sources of authority took place soon after independence, even though some elements of traditional political leadership still persists.¹⁴⁴ Although local political leaders such as field officers or party workers are given a great deal of scope and influence in certain areas of development policy their areas of jurisdiction are clearly outlined. For the most part, they lack the technical competence necessary to perform effectively in the decision-making process. Furthermore, the authority patterns in the society severely restrict their powers.¹⁴⁵ Duties and function are defined by law, which coupled with the frequent movement of local political leaders, blocks the possibility of developing local bases of power.¹⁴⁶ Thus, the dominance of the national elite in the decision-making process is almost complete. They command and monopolize political intelligence and skill and possess the ability to absorb sub-national political elites into various organizations, e.g., TANU, Development Committees and parastatal organizations, thus, providing outlets or "cushions" for frustrated or severed political careers.¹⁴⁷

Elite members come primarily from the well-to-do families. A somewhat surprising revelation in view of stated socialist intentions to make the country into a society of peasants and workers. This offers

¹⁴⁴N. N. Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., pp. 145-153.

¹⁴⁵Bienen, op.cit., p. 311.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 332.

¹⁴⁷Seligman, 1971, p. 3 (Refer to diagram).

support for the theories outlined in Field and Higley that elites arise because of inequalities in individual endowments or that elites come about because they are socially advantaged in the competition for power and influence.¹⁴⁸ Education and status have clearly influenced the recruitment of elites making for contradiction within the leadership formula.

At least 44, i.e., 37 per cent, of all ethnic groups in Tanzania are represented in the leadership. Thus, as far as ethnic composition is concerned, the leadership is representative. (Table 3.5 illustrates those that count for more than 1.5 per cent of the leaders). 7 of the 10 largest groups are represented in the leadership, but 100 or so groups are not included though they share 28 per cent of the leadership and make up 56 per cent of the population. Bondei, Ngoni, Arab and Mixed are slightly over-representative. Although there are strains in the leadership, it is not tribal but rather competition between the more developed and less developed groups and the regional homelands. Progressive regions such as Kilimanjaro and Tanga are over-represented relative to such areas like the Makonde in the South, which is relatively undeveloped.¹⁴⁹ The National Assembly reflects the tribal proportions found in the nation. However, the administrative elite are over-represented of such tribes as the Haya, Chagga, and Nyasuka, while

¹⁴⁸Field and Higley, op.cit., p. 6.

¹⁴⁹J. Gus Liebenow, Colonial Rule and Political Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, pp. 12-15.

TABLE 3.5

RANK ORDER COMPARISON OF THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE
TANZANIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE TOTAL TANZANIAN POPULATION

Leadership Rank Order	Percentage Leadership	Ethnic Group	Population Rank Order ^a	% of Population
1	11.6	Chagga	6	3.7
2	10.6	Haya	4	3.7
3	6.6	Pare/Sambae	5	3.7
4	6.4	Bondei	58	0.4
5	5.7	Sukuma	1	12.6
6	4.8	Nyamweri	2	4.2
7	4.5	Nyakyula	10	2.5
8	3.6	Ngoni	34	1.2
9	3.3	Zigna	19	1.5
10	3.2	Arab	74	0.2
11	2.5	Hehe	9	2.9
12	1.7	Zaramo	14	2.1
	4.0	Non-Tanzanian		2.8
	3.8	Mixed		0.02
	28.1	Other Groups		55.7

Base N=687

N = 8,686,681^b

(a) Calculated from the 1957 census data (See Tanganyika 1963) and Tanzania 1966.

(b) This total represents 8,665 Africans, 19,088 Arabs and 2,257 Coloureds.

Source: McGowan and Wacirah, op.cit., p. 193.

the Sukuma, Makonde and Hehe are under-represented. On the whole, tribalism is not a significant factor in reinforcing economic and social cleavages among the elite.¹⁵⁰ Religion, too, plays an insignificant part in elite behavior, though Christians are over-represented relative to Muslims.¹⁵¹ In summary, it can be said that the background characteristics of the elite and the emphasis on conformity works to downplay the differences between the groups. However, with increasing modernization the representativeness of the leadership may become an issue of great political importance.

The rate of circulation among the Tanzanian elite has been, for the greater part, relatively small. A negligible proportion of the current generation of leaders lost their status but similarly only a small proportion of them have retained their positions. 80 per cent of the leadership have changed roles at least three times within an 8 year time period. There is upward mobility, but the rate of leadership formation is slow. Furthermore, new top leadership positions tend to be filled with individuals from among the ranks of the leadership.¹⁵²

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing analysis of the Tanzanian political leadership it is possible to make the following remarks. Firstly, the norms which govern elite behavior work toward the maintenance of a relatively stable political system. The cohesiveness and integrity of the national

¹⁵⁰Hopkins, op.cit., pp 75-78.

¹⁵¹McGowan and Wacirah, op.cit., p. 195.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 199.

leadership ensures it full control of the decision-making process at the expense of local political and other elites. An examination of the elite background revealed that only those of a certain educational calibre and political persuasion are co-opted into the ranks of the governing elite. Thus, the elite national and sub-national, could be identified by a strong commitment to development and modernization and the establishment of socialist principles. The national elite provides the ideology and the methods to carry it out. The Tanzanian approach to socialism as McGowan and Wacirah state, "... is in many ways an embodiment of the high social and moral values of the President and his immediate aides".¹⁵³

The national political elite is the major force in the decision-making process not only for its strong commitment but also because it monopolizes the political intelligence and skill necessary to operate the decision-making machinery. The political party is instrumental in recruitment to elite positions because it channels the best recruits into the national executive and administration or into the party itself at the expense of other organizations and institutions. Furthermore, despite scattered pockets of resistance, the national elite has managed to control the population -- integrating and co-opting, wherever possible, sub-national groups into the development process.

The leadership has been relatively stable, avoiding frequent turnover of personnel in high political positions. The average age of the leadership

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 202.

is around 40-50 and can be expected to keep their positions, further slowing down the rate of creation of new leadership positions. This may well result in a widening gap between the leaders and the masses. In order to avoid such a situation and to further its socialist objectives, the national elite must seek to create more leadership positions at the local level. The extension of decision-making powers to sub-national political elites will eventually come about with the increase in demands on the political system. Increases in the level of development will result in a multiplication of problems at the center. Nyerere has already seen the need for this, hence the policy of "Decentralization" in 1972. However, for the time being, the national political elite continues to be the major decision-makers in the process of development and modernization. The value system, selection and recruitment process guarantees them a dominant position in the political system.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICAL PARTY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Political parties wherever they exist, often play a crucial role in the political process if permitted to perform their functions effectively. The overriding question which permeates many discussions relating to political parties concerns the degree of democracy which exists within their structure and the extent to which such parties facilitate or hinder the smooth functioning of the political system. This issue is especially relevant here because of the conflicting views regarding the existence (and non-existence) of democracy in single-party systems such as that found in Tanzania.

Although the hypothesis examined here primarily concerns the political elites use of the political party (TANU), as the main vehicle for national development the broader questions concerning definition and party types must be elaborated on in order that the discussion be more meaningful. Before it can be established that TANU is the major instrument in the development of the Tanzanian people, it is necessary to point out the problems surrounding any attempt at definition and classification of parties and party systems.

TOWARD A DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PARTY

A political party is most often described as a group which seeks to place its members at the head of government and thereby gain control, in contrast to an interest group which merely seeks to obtain or maintain certain desired values. Fred R. von der Mehden describes a political

party as "an organized group which seeks the control of the personnel and policies of government -- a group that pays at least lip service to a principle or a set of principles, including the electoral process".¹⁵⁴ Coleman and Rosberg strike a similar note in their study stating that "political parties are associations formally organized with the explicit and declared purpose of acquiring and/or maintaining legal control, either singularly or in coalition or electoral competition with other similar associations, over the personnel and the policy of the government of an actual or prospective sovereign state".¹⁵⁵ Although these two descriptions convey an idea of what is meant by a political party, they are but very narrow descriptions and do not illuminate the difficulties encountered in defining political parties in developing societies. Clement Moore comes much closer in outlining the obstacles in characterizing the Neo-Destour in Tunisia. He states, "The categories of Western political scientists ... cannot adequately explain Tunisia's dominant party. The Neo-Destour resembles the Congress Party of India, the CPP of Ghana, and various territorial offshoots of the RDA in French-speaking Black Africa more than it resembles European political parties. Political scientists have not yet devised a generally accepted model to characterize these newer but highly structured parties. However, they may be called "national" parties, and they have a number of traits in common. They all originated as elite and then as mass parties in reaction

¹⁵⁴Fred R. von der Mehden, op.cit., p. 54.

¹⁵⁵See James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., (eds), Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, Berkely: University of California Press, 1964, p. 2.

to a colonial situation. Their leaders assimilated the political culture of the colonial power which to a greater or lesser extent constituted the ground rules of the conflict between the two".¹⁵⁶

There appears to be a general consensus that a political party is an instrument to gain power and to govern but when talking about political parties in developing countries there are many additional factors which should be noted. The single-party system, which predominates in many developing countries, is seen both as an instrument of political education and as a means to build support for the governing elite.¹⁵⁷ In the previous chapter, it was stated that one of the major tasks of the decision-makers was that of national development. But in order to carry this out, the elite needs the backing and support of the population at large or some significant portion of it. In order to enlist such support the political party is seen as the main vehicle for the mobilization of the people.

Thus, when defining a political party, it should be borne in mind that in developing countries a party means more than an instrument through which the decision-makers govern. This may well be a consequence of the differences in origin. For as Macridis states, political parties in most of the ex-colonial countries emerged "in order to cope with a series of problems with which their Western counterparts were not directly involved; national emancipation and identity, the creation of a set of

¹⁵⁶Clement Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia", World Politics, XIV, April 1962, p. 463.

¹⁵⁷Refer to Roy C. Macridis, (ed) Political Parties: Contemporary Trends and Ideas, New York: Harper and Row, 1967, p. 16.

values within which political participation would be implemented, the creation of legitimized governmental institutions, the establishment of new norms conducive to industrialization, the creation of governmental institution to distribute benefits while inculcating support, and last but not least, the management of conflict..."¹⁵⁸

If, as Kenneth Janda states, definitions should be constructed in light of the purposes which they serve, then defining a political party as an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions is far from adequate, considering the stated intentions of this paper.¹⁵⁹ Still less satisfactory for purposes here would be Sigmund Neumann's description of what the crucial factors of political parties are. He states that:

"A definition of "party" might as well begin with its simple word derivation. To become a "party" to something always means identification with one group and differentiation from another. Every party in its very essence signifies partnership in a particular organization and separation from others by a specific program

Such an initial description, to be sure, indicates that the very definition of party presupposes a democratic climate and hence makes it a misnomer in every dictatorship. A one-party system (le parti unique) is a contradiction in itself."¹⁶⁰

However, Neumann's definition points out one of the problems of the one-party system which any discussion of such systems must take into

¹⁵⁸Ibid., pp.15-16.

¹⁵⁹Kenneth Janda, A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties, California: Sage Publications, 1970, p. 80.

¹⁶⁰Sigmund Neumann, Modern Political Parties, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 395.

account and which will be elaborated on. Here, it is necessary to point out the difficulties involved in attempting to present an adequate definition of political parties in modernizing societies. Not only is it hard to differentiate the development of such parties from the growth of the society and the state, it is also hard to define the role of the party because it is one that is constantly changing in line with the other changes that are taking place as the society becomes more complex and roles become more specific. This means that, to a great degree, the parties which now exist in developing countries are shaped by the entire socio-political framework of such societies. In such circumstances, although political parties can be looked upon as instruments by which socio-political forces are channeled into the task of nation-building, these same forces are also at work changing and in certain instances transforming the shape of the party.

PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS

The study of political parties has long been of interest because of their critical role in the political process. Studies like those of Michel,¹⁶¹ V. O. Key¹⁶² and Duverger,¹⁶³ to name but a few, have proved invaluable for the insights they have provided into the role, structure and functions of political parties even though the emphasis rested

¹⁶¹Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949.

¹⁶²V. O. Key, Jr., Political Parties and Pressure Groups, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1942.

¹⁶³Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, New York: John Wiley, 1954.

particularly with parties in Western societies -- perhaps less so in Duverger. Concentration on the roles of such parties in the functioning and the development of the new African societies (in this particular instance, Tanzania) is important not only because parties reveal much about the nature of African politics but also because they are important determinants of the unfolding African political scene.

Before dealing specifically with the party system in Tanzania it is useful to have a general idea of Africa's political systems because it sets the ensuing discussion in clearer perspective. Any meaningful classification of African party systems is almost impossible because of their relatively brief existence, the fluidity and change in the African political scene and the mixture of a multitude of elements which must be taken into consideration. Although the typology presented by Coleman is now somewhat outdated, it is still relevant to the study of African political parties in many ways. He divided such systems into four main categories; territories without political parties, one-party dominant systems, comprehensive nationalist and competitive-party systems.¹⁶⁴ The fluidity of the African political system is clearly borne out here, for at the time when Coleman presented this typology, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia were included in territories without political parties. Today, these former Portuguese colonies have won their independence and have established parties with a strong Marxist bias and military rule has been established in Ethiopia. In the light of recent events, one would

¹⁶⁴See James S. Coleman, "The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa", in Almond and Coleman (eds) op.cit., 1960, pp. 286-287.

not include Uganda or Zanzibar in the "competitive-party systems" category as Coleman did. Quite the contrary. Party politics is non-existent in Uganda where the whims of Amin and his menagerie of army officers have replaced the modicum of democratic decision-making that previously existed. Zanzibar united with Tanganyika in 1964 and thus formed the United Republic of Tanzania. But essentially, Zanzibar remains unchanged. It has pursued an independent foreign and domestic policy and the Marxist dominated Afro-Shirazi Party is now the only legal party on the island.

Coleman was clearly not unaware of the changes that such systems were undergoing by the number of observations and caveats that he made. At the time when he wrote, he stated that the existing political groups should be called a "party system" only with very considerable reservation, fully realizing that valid judgements relating to the character of a party system can only be made over a reasonable period of time. That his typologies should be accepted with some degree of flexibility is evidenced by his statement relating to the lack of permanency in the emerging party systems. He states, "At this stage in Africa's political development the pattern of political groups reflects the overriding fact that the systems themselves are indeterminate. This makes it necessary to emphasize again that the most rewarding mode of analysis is that which focuses upon trends rather than upon systems".¹⁶⁵

In addition, Coleman pointed out that his classification of countries according to "no-party", "one-party", and "competitive-party systems" were

¹⁶⁵Ibid., p. 294

no more than a "snap-shot" inventory of the patterning of parties at a single point in time. With the benefit of hindsight the validity of that statement holds true as much then as it does today. Writing a few years later, it was clear to see that Coleman and Rosberg focused primarily on trends rather than systems and thus, noted that the trend in sub-Saharan Africa was toward single-party systems.¹⁶⁶ However, in his earlier study, which concentrated primarily on the general characteristics and patterning of political parties, one of the most striking revelation was the diversity and complexity of African political systems along with the highly transitional character of political phenomena. The break-up of the old colonial system released certain forces which gave rise to new political systems and placed power in the hands of groups unaccustomed to its use. Thus, an atmosphere of instability and unpredictability developed especially in regard to political authority. In such a state of flux, political parties became little more than instruments of particular groups concerned not with policy but with the nature of the political system itself.¹⁶⁷ Since their concern is not primarily with the party politics but with their power positions within the new order, the study of party systems, per se, is of little worth in furthering greater understanding of the socio-political forces in developing nations.

An examination of the trends in party evolution in sub-Saharan Africa clearly shows as Coleman and Rosberg state that there "has been

¹⁶⁶Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p. 4.

¹⁶⁷Almond and Coleman, op.cit., pp. 312-313.

the progressive consolidation of one-party dominance after independence".¹⁶⁸ Although this trend has been disrupted in recent years with the predominance of the military in the political affairs of countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, and Uganda, wherever parties exist in tropical Africa they tend overwhelmingly to be of the one-party type. The difficulties involved in developing a classification scheme of African one-party systems are similar to those encountered in constructing a general typology. However, Coleman and Rosberg draw a distinction between two general tendencies in uni-party or one-party dominant states, (1) the "pragmatic-pluralistic" pattern, and (2) the "revolutionary-centralizing" trend.¹⁶⁹ Parties of the latter type tend to be, according to the analysis presented, overtly and compulsively preoccupied with ideology which is "programmatic and transformative" (in relation to the socio-economic modernization of present day African society) and militantly neutralist, Pan-Africanist, and nationalistic (as far as their relationships with other African states and the external world is concerned). Populism, egalitarianism and a strong commitment to development and participation feature strongly in such types. Their structures are monolithic and strongly centralized, usually managing complete fusion with other groups.

Pragmatic-pluralistic parties tend to place less emphasis on ideology and are less concerned about their relationship with former

¹⁶⁸Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p. 4.

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 6

colonial powers. Their commitment to the level of participation and mobilization is significantly less and they tolerate a looser relationship between the party and other associations in a climate of "tolerated but controlled pluralism".¹⁷⁰

The classificatory scheme outlined by Coleman and Rosberg is somewhat more sophisticated than that presented by Macridis. His more general schema enables him to group all one-party systems together on the basis of three factors, support, organization and modes of actions and functions.¹⁷¹ Using these three variables, he distinguished between competitive party systems (two or multi-party systems) and integrative party systems (one-party systems). The most glaring shortcoming of such a typology is its failure to illustrate the differences among party systems within the groupings themselves. Clearly, not all integrative party systems are alike and the typology is, thus, misleading insofar as it presupposes that party systems such as those found in the Soviet Union, Cuba and Tanzania are sufficiently similar to be grouped under one heading.

Even after making allowance for the period of time in which he wrote, faults can still be attributed to the classification scheme presented by von der Mehden.¹⁷² His survey of party systems led him to establish three categories which were further broken down. His first category

¹⁷⁰Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁷¹Macridis, op.cit. pp. 20-22.

¹⁷²F. R. von der Mehden, op.cit. His classification is based on the political systems which existed in 1964.

consisted of "non-competitive systems" comprising states that have no parties or in which parties do not play effective governmental roles, e.g., Haiti, Iran, Libya and Saudi Arabia; one-party or multi-party-proletariat states, e.g., China, North Korea and North Vietnam and one-party states, e.g., *Ghana, *Mali, Tunisia and Tanganyika (now Tanzania). His second category consisted of "semi-competitive systems" included one-party dominant states, e.g., Mexico, Gambia and India and; two-party dictatorial states, e.g., Morocco, Nicaragua and South Africa. The third category comprised the "competitive party system" which were two-party democratic states, e.g., *Jamaica, Kenya and; multi-party systems, e.g., Argentina, Chile and Lebanon.

From a cursory glance at this schema, it is clear that the degree of competition in the system is determined largely by the number of existing parties, than by the internal working of the party themselves. In other words, it seems that the greater the number of parties, the more competitive the system is thought to be. With the benefit of hindsight, this is clearly not the case though the adherents of pluralism would strongly disagree. It is not surprising that von der Mehden's classification should have taken such a form considering the relatively brief existence of many of the countries listed as independent states.¹⁷³ In view of

¹⁷³Ibid., p. 65.

*The party system has since ended in such countries.

*The contemporary political situation in Jamaica is still very fluid even though the constitutional two-party system formally exists.

this, the "high incidence of a lack of party competition" which he discovered should not come as a complete surprise.

In general, a plethora of definitions and typologies of political parties and party systems exist. Political parties may be authoritarian and democratic, integrative and representative, ideological and pragmatic, national and regional, democratic and revolutionary, mass and elite to name but a few. The most widely used classification for typologies seem, however, to be based on the number of parties; one-party, two-party and multi-party. Others include closed or competitive, aggregative and ideological, integrative and representative. It appears that for the purposes here, those classifications dealing specifically with one-party dominant states are particularly useful. It is believed that the Tanzanian political system can be analyzed using many of the criteria outlined by Coleman and Rosberg, i.e, ideology, popular participation, and organizational aspects. The aim will not be primarily to determine whether Tanzania should be classified as a "semi-competitive" or "competitive" system or whether it exhibits a "pragmatic-pluralistic pattern" or a "revolutionary-centralizing trend" albeit these are important aspects. The major purpose will be to determine the role that the political party plays in national integration. Some of the more important questions which will be examined will revolve around the origins of the party; its activities, composition organization, and structure; the conditions under which it operates, i.e. its political, social and economic environment, and, the goals and objectives which it seeks to bring about.

PARTIES AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

The Tanganyikan African National Union is the only legal party in Tanzania, but a single-party system does not mean the party is undemocratic, though some observers of politics in the Third World tend to equate democracy with the existence of two or more parties. There has not been much experience of a single ruling party until quite recently and the typologies formulated in the early 1960's such as those outlined earlier focused primarily on their dynamism. This is seen in the labeling of such party systems as "revolutionary-centralizing", "revolutionary mass movement regimes", etc. Parties were seen as more dynamic and tougher than they really were. These early typologies conveyed an inaccurate picture of newly formed parties because they were unable to fulfill many of their development programs. The literature on African politics, which highlighted such failures, tended to reduce the importance of political parties and after numerous military coups in the mid 1960's, Western scholars practically denied the relevance of political parties.

It was hardly surprising that the newly formed political parties failed to match up to the expectations of Western onlookers who assigned them impossible tasks.¹⁷⁴ The parties were made responsible for national integration because they were seen as the only modern organization capable of transcending tribal, racial and regional ties, thus, providing a nationwide input mechanism. It was strongly believed that

¹⁷⁴ See Macridis, op.cit., p. 16.

an effective party structure would greatly help to reduce separatist antagonisms.¹⁷⁵ Nowhere was this so forcefully stated as in Coleman and Rosberg, who believed that such groups "are destined, because of their central importance, to play a (major) role in the resolution of, or in the failure to solve, the problems of integration".¹⁷⁶ By national integration, they meant both political integration, i.e. ("... the progressive bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing an integrated political process and a participant political community...") and territorial integration, i.e. ("... the progressive reduction of cultural and regional tensions and discontinuities on the horizontal plane in the process of creating a homogeneous territorial political community.").¹⁷⁷

Even today the problem of national integration is still widespread in Africa where the majority has been and is often dominated by culturally and sometimes racially different minorities. This situation exists at all levels of African societies; in cities, e.g., the historically dominant positions of the Creoles in Freetown, or of the Coastal Swahili in Dar-es-Salaam, in regions of a country, e.g., the Fulani oligarchies in Northern Nigeria and the Bito oligarchies in East

¹⁷⁵Refer to Aristide R. Zolberg, "Mass Parties and National Integration: The Case of the Ivory Coast", Journal of Politics, XV, February, 1963, pp. 36-48. See also Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in Africa" in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds) Political Parties and Political Development, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 267-304.

¹⁷⁶Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p. 8.

¹⁷⁷Ibid., p. 9

Africa, and in entire countries, e.g., Liberia, European-dominated Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Although the situation has been gradually changing, for example, the supremacy of the Creoles in Sierra Leone has been questioned and challenged by the indigeneous groups and black majority rule may come to Rhodesia within the very near future, political parties in Africa have not overall enhanced national integration to any significant degree.

The political and economic failures of African political parties led to a reappraisal of their capabilities. In 1964, Aristide Zollberg stressed the positive functions of the political parties in the Ivory Coast, but later questioned the impact of such parties.

"An examination of political parties, the best studied feature of the African scene, reveals such a wide gap between the organizational model from which the leaders derived their inspiration and their capacity to implement such schemes, that the very use by observers of the word "party" to characterise such structures involves a dangerous reification."¹⁷⁸

The new focus on military leaders pushed political parties into the background. Their importance should not be so hastily dismissed. The example of modernizing countries such as Mexico and Tanzania indicate that political parties continue to be relevant outside the non-Western setting.¹⁷⁹ The major problem with early typologies of African political parties was that they were based primarily on formal structures. They related to

¹⁷⁸Aristide R. Zollberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa", American Political Science Review, LXII, September, 1968, pp. 70-87.

¹⁷⁹Mary B. Welfing, Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analysis of African Party Systems, California: Sage Publications, 1973, p. 16.

real phenomena but they were limited to an account of how such organs would work if they functioned according to the normative expectations of the elites. In many instances they made very little contribution to economic development, failed to extend their organizations to larger sections of the population and frequently hindered rather than furthered national integration. Inter-party competition seemed to exacerbate cleavages in countries such as Sierra Leone (SLPP versus APC) and Nigeria (NCNC versus NPC versus AG). In many countries the nationalist parties fizzled out or became government agencies and political participation declined. Observers began to talk of the creation of no-¹⁸⁰ party states instead of one-party regimes. Henry Bienen pointed out the inherent weaknesses of political parties even in a strong party system such as Tanzania but he does not deny the relevance that parties may have:

"The remaining ruling single parties have real roles to perform. Neither military forces nor civil services are likely to make up in performance and effectiveness what they lack in legitimacy and political know-how. Public order and political participation, which are preconditions for economic development and are the essence of politics are not going to be guaranteed by the removal of parties."¹⁸¹

THE TANZANIAN ONE-PARTY SYSTEM: ORIGINS

Despite the much documented decline of political parties in tropical Africa it is the thesis of this paper that far from declining in importance,

¹⁸⁰I. Wallerstein, "The Decline of the Party in Single-Party African States", in J. La Palombara and M. Weiner (eds), op.cit., pp. 201-214.

¹⁸¹H. Bienen, "The Ruling Party in the African One-Party State: TANU in Tanzania", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, V, 3, November 1967, p. 220.

the Tanganyikan African National Union continues to be the most important vehicle for national integration and development in Tanzania. Its importance is clearly manifested by the fact that politics in Tanzania has been characterized by attempts to define new roles for TANU, and to establish the identity of the ruling party. TANU is the only party in Tanzania and has been able to ensure that all organized politics falls within the framework which it sets. Political competition takes place within its institutions. The Party sets the rules for political participation and is the primary legitimizing agent within the political system. Functional organizations are linked to it, e.g., NUTA (National Union of Tanganyika Workers), its organization is hierarchical and it is led by a charismatic leader -- Nyerere.

TANU was the first party to be formed out of the Tanganyika African Association in July 1954, which was founded in Dar-es-Salaam "sometime between 1928 and 1929" but it remained more a social rather than a political organization. Its membership consisted primarily of civil servants, teachers and traders with activities centered in Dar-es-Salaam.¹⁸² Although the TAA had a respectable membership relative to other groups, its importance was not recognized and respected by many Africans. It was weak because it lacked paid officers and permanent headquarters. At the outset, the TAA had been a "tea-party politics" club for clerks and teachers, thus, many Africans were unaware of its existence. After 1945 and especially in the early 50's it gained new strength and militancy.

¹⁸²See G. Andrew Maguire, op.cit., pp. 64-75.

Its branches became infected by the new radicalism of local politics and demanded greater action from the center. The leadership was taken over by Makerere -- trained intellectuals in Dar-es-Salaam, first by Vedast Kyaruri in 1950 and then by Julius Nyerere in April 1953. In 1952, Nyerere stated that the TAA could become the focus of the mass nationalist movement. It was thus remodelled and given a new name -- TANU.¹⁸³

The major problem facing the leaders of TANU was how to expand the movement and use it to regain their independence. Freedom and unity became the slogan of the new movement. The early successes of TANU rested on three main factors; firstly, its simple message of national freedom; secondly, its use of existing TAA branches which were located throughout the country; and finally, the existing conflict between the people and their rulers. As Cliffe states, "the people felt the need for action; TANU had only to adapt itself to each local situation, either taking over an existing popular movement or by organizing the people against privilege".¹⁸⁴

In some areas, such as Buhaya, leaders of discontented people joined the organization, thus, making it easier for TANU to gain support. But in areas such as Kilimanjaro, where strong local leadership existed, TANU established itself through opposition to the political leaders. The party met with some initial resistance but it rapidly dominated local politics throughout the country. By 1955, 200,000 members held TANU cards.

¹⁸³ John Illife, "Tanzania Under German and British Rule", in Cliffe and Saul (eds), op.cit., p. 14.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 15.

Once sufficient numbers were incorporated into the Party, unity was maintained by concentrating on freedom though Nyerere never defined what he meant by "freedom".

TANU launched its attack on the British initially through the United Nations but the real battleground was in Tanganyika itself. By 1956, Nyerere had gained international support for the nationalist cause which now had to contend with the government-sponsored multiracial United Tanganyika Party (UTP). This opposition forced TANU to be a more disciplined movement. The Tabora Conference in 1958, probably one of the most important events in the Party's pre-independence days, debated the issue of TANU's participation in the forth-coming elections. The majority of the delegates opposed the idea but Nyerere persuaded them that only by participating would TANU have a fighting chance in the upcoming struggle for independence.¹⁸⁵ Overwhelming victory in the 1958/59 election enabled TANU representatives to take up ministerial positions in 1959. In the 1960 elections, the Party won 70 of the 71 seats in the National Assembly and Nyerere was called upon to form a government. In December 1961, Tanganyika regained its independence.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Despite the initial difficulties which the Party encountered, it was relatively easy for a national movement to develop. Unity within the Party and within the population at large has been greatly enhanced by the lack of exploitative groups. The large land mass and relatively low

¹⁸⁵William Edgett-Smith, We Must Run While They Walk, New York: Random House, 1971, p. 85.

population density lessened the incidence of conflict between groups over territorial concerns. The tribal situation proved conducive to the establishment of national unity because none were able to achieve a high level of dominance. The largest tribe, the Sukuma, comprises less than 12 per cent of the total population. The Eastern Bantu heritage of many tribes freed TANU from tribal quarrels which have plagued other African political parties.

Early consolidation of party rule was made possible by other factors such as poverty, the nature of imperialism and the spread of Swahili. In the first place, poverty bound the people together and the lack of exploitable resources reduced the degree of inequality between them. Imperialism was such that little permanent damage was inflicted upon the social or political structures of the country. After World War I, Tanzania was made a trusteeship of the League of Nations rather than a colony though still ruled by Britain. The restrictions on British policy, however, meant that they were unable to prevent transtribal organizations, or promote and intensify tribal hostility as they had done in many sub-Saharan countries.¹⁸⁶

The breaking up of the traditional social order and the spreading of Swahili were two important effects of the slave trade. Swahili was seen as a non-colonialist lingua-fraca and also as a basic national resource in relation to the demands of ideological communication. The breaking up of the old order enabled the mixing of different people, thus,

¹⁸⁶Coleman and Rosberg, op.cit., p. 10.

facilitating the acceptance of leadership by differing tribes.¹⁸⁷ TANU became a carrier and an expression of the Swahili political culture as it developed in the towns -- though it attempted to organize and represent the rural areas.¹⁸⁸

Contemporary political factors played a major role in establishing unity within TANU. The party's dominance in the pre-independence days later gave the one-party system a unity lacking in such multi-party systems as that of Zambia, Kenya and Uganda in the 1960's. The lack of opposition to TANU meant that it did not have to dominate the countryside to secure support nor did it need to develop a strong central organization because other political organizations did not often aspire to be national. TANU was never threatened by economic interest groups which were largely absent from the political scene.¹⁸⁹ This was one less obstacle that rulers had to confront but robbed them of valuable instruments through which to rule. The policy of a planned but decentralized path to socialism and the use of basic ideological documents to indicate broad policy shifts and guidelines for policy implementation (prior to the setting up of machinery or detailed tactics for long run objectives) have reinforced the underlying unity of the system. There has been a great reliance on the Party at all levels to explain and promote the policies of government.

THE ONE PARTY IDEOLOGY

TANU is greatly influenced, both in its structure and its goals by

¹⁸⁷Bienen, November, 1967, p. 219.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., p. 220.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 220.

the dominant ideology. In the immediate post-independence years, the problems of national integration led to a serious reconsideration of the purpose and organization of the national movement. TANU remained a de facto one-party system until the official institution of that system in 1965. The new party structure was clearly not democratic and caused a great deal of concern among the leaders. Nyerere appointed a Presidential Commission in 1964 to examine the one-party system. Prior to this, he had outlined his first proposal to make Tanzania an official one-party state in Democracy and the Party State. Nyerere believed that a one-party system could be more democratic than a two or multi-party system which he ruled out for Tanzania because, firstly, a new state required the combined efforts of all to maximize social and economic development; secondly, they were alien to the African culture -- they are luxuries which cannot be afforded; and, thirdly, they distort democracy and perpetuate class divisions.¹⁹⁰

The totalitarian organization of the communist state was also rejected by Nyerere, who stressed that the ideal of African socialism is communal and egalitarian, i.e., government by popular participation not by an elitist vanguard. However, after independence, TANU was more like the latter than the former. Its leaders were suspicious and prone to use force, many being motivated by their own selfish desires. They jealously guarded their newly won privileges, since loss of political office would have meant a return to farming or some other manual occupation. Even when the idea of competitive elections within the single party was

¹⁹⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, op.cit., pp. 196-199.

introduced, many did not offer their support for fear of being ousted at the upcoming elections.

Nyerere has never supported the idea of TANU as a vanguard party but rather has stressed a party structure that remains close to the people and representative of their interests. However, the immediate post-independence years saw the TANU leaders determined to enjoy the same living standards as their colonial predecessors, and to a great extent, they secured much of what they wanted. There was constant pressure from within TANU to obtain more highly paid political positions, which resulted in the creation of Regional and Area Commissioners. Moreover, in 1965, the TANU National Executive received salaries equivalent to that of MP's. It was not too long before the income of the middle and senior rank government officials stood high above that of the ordinary citizen. Thus, by 1967, it was noticeable that political leaders and bureaucrats formed an elite with a level of income that was vastly superior to the average Tanzanian.

The pre-Arusha years did not see the introduction of radical egalitarian policies by the ruling elite. There was no genuine socialist commitment from TANU, economic policies were not socialist, private and foreign investments were encouraged and there was little concern for rural socialism. Although Nyerere constantly reminded the Party of its socialist objectives, he lacked the popular support and cadres to enforce such policies. At that time, the country was in dire need of skilled and experienced party and bureaucratic personnel who would have been alienated by such policies. However, from 1961-1974, the government managed to hold down, without upward supervision, the salary scales for

top civil servants, while increasing the minimum wage and lower wage scales. Income tax increased in the higher wage brackets and many fringe benefits were cut. According to Cranford Pratt, ... the ratio of the purchasing power after direct taxation of the top civil service, compared to the minimum wages, has fallen from an estimated 80:1 in 1960 to 16:1 in 1971 and 11:1 in 1974. Although the ratio is still somewhat large the gap has decreased significantly.

TANU was not a party ruled by the people, but rather directed by a handful of men making key decisions, set apart from the masses by their education, wealth and status. Rweyemamu points out that the class of senior civil servants who inherited a "European" salary structure also received access to credit facilities and technical advice which enabled them to enter into property earning activities, resulting in great income inequalities in relation to workers who were unable to obtain similar credit facilities.¹⁹¹

Despite Nyerere's socialist intentions, inequalities persisted. Individual MP's became aware of growing elitism among many Ministers and Regional Commissioners, who secured large cars, expensive homes and servants for themselves. Thus, the Arusha Declaration, although directed at the growth of capitalistic attitudes in the rural areas, was also aimed at TANU leaders in the Party and bureaucracy, who were cutting themselves off from the people. Nyerere desired a narrowing of the gap between government and Party officials and the people and leaders were

¹⁹¹Justinian Rweyemamu, Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 52-53.

thus, given a year's grace to declare assets and divest themselves of interests they had acquired. However, prominent TANU officials such as A. S. Mtaki (MP) and Ms. Titi Mohamed failed to respond, but on the whole there was outward compliance by government and Party leaders, since regularities are easy to evade.

The leadership code has, thus far, been but half-heatedly acted on because of the lack of an effective enforcement mechanism. It was naively assumed that a signature guaranteed abandonment of all interests and class contradiction. This was not the case, and in April 1973, the Bunge passed a law establishing a permanent enforcement committee to deal with those leaders who were failing in their commitment to socialism.¹

The Arusha Declaration described TANU as a party of workers and peasants. The suggestion for the Party to become less of a mass organization and more an elite or vanguard type party with members schooled in socialist principles was not accepted as it ran counter to both the ideas of Nyerere and the Commission. The Declaration thus called upon TANU to build a socialist state based on equality and charged it with preserving the basic rights of the individual and the overseeing of development.¹⁹³ Although there were those who would have the Party rule with an iron hand, Nyerere's overwhelming concern with participation and democracy carried the day.

¹⁹²See Helge Kjekshus, "Parliament in a One-Party State - The Bunge of Tanzania, 1965-1970", Journal of Modern African Studies, XII, 1, 1974, p. 37.

¹⁹³Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., pp. 187-206.

PARTICIPATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

The role outlined for the Party in national development and the high power positions which its members hold gives it a dominant position in the decision-making process. Whenever outsiders point to the oligarchic nature of the Party, its members have been quick to point to the mass-based membership of TANU. The total membership has been quoted at one million, but this includes all card carrying members rather than those currently active.¹⁹⁴ From the outset, the educated elite were prominent in the national leadership but their civil service occupations excluded them from active politics. Teachers, small traders and co-operative workers were prominent in local leadership while the Party, on the whole, found widespread support in both urban and rural areas.

The mass membership of the Party has strengthened its claims of democratic decision-making. The various elements within it are kept together by a network of conferences and committees and at all levels there exists a system of checks and balances which limit the autonomy of the party-government machinery. Such organs reach down to the grass roots level, i.e., the cell, so that even these members are entitled to send their delegates to the village party committee. However, the rank and file find it difficult to make their voices heard at the top.¹⁹⁵ Once decisions are made they are handed down and very little can be done

¹⁹⁴Lionel Cliffe, "Democracy in a One-Party State: The Tanzanian Experience" in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., p. 246.

¹⁹⁵Emerson, 1967, p. 264.

by the village to change legislation not to their liking.

Although Nyerere has voiced his preference on the type of party that TANU should be and the degree of democracy which should exist within its ranks, developments have taken place over which he has had little control. To be sure, the mass membership nature of the Party is changing due in part to the Arusha Declaration but there is very little evidence to show that those now entering the Party are peasants and workers, apart from their own statements on the matter. There is, however, strong emphasis on a formal commitment to the goals and policies of TANU in the hope that truly dedicated socialists will emerge.¹⁹⁶ There are no guarantees that this objective will be fulfilled but the lack of discipline which unconditional entry permitted has been somewhat counteracted.

The leadership code intends to establish true socialists, yet recruitment patterns of political leaders have changed very little. The commitment to widen participation has, however, led to the taking of steps to provide a political educational program for Party leaders at all levels and to get over to them not only the basic ideology of socialism, but also the economic logic of self-reliance and rural development. Theoretically, TANU is said to be a Party of peasants and workers, excluding from entry those who fall outside these categories, but the vast majority of Tanzanians are workers and peasants, therefore, many remain eligible. Since the Declaration makes no distinction between manual and intellectual workers, the latter may enter the Party

¹⁹⁶ Samoff, op.cit., pp. 199-200.

even though his position and salary may place him very much above his manual counterpart.

If workers and peasants can be identified by their level of education, their occupation and their status, then in theory those who comprise the most educated and powerful elements in Tanzanian society are the ones excluded from the Party. However, if this were the case, TANU would lose the skilled manpower and expertise which it has acquired over the years. The incorporation of the civil service into the Party in 1965 provided the technocrats it so badly lacked. Many developed an esprit de corps with a sense of purpose and were identifiable by their education, prestige and wealth. Since many of the highly paid positions fall within the Party or government machinery, it would appear that those elements which the Arusha Declaration hopes to exclude from the Party are already within its ranks, hence the appeal to all leaders to divest themselves of their accumulated wealth.

The development of the single-party system is linked not only with the achievement of economic and social progress, but also with the absence of antagonistic classes.¹⁹⁷ Arusha was a candid admittance of the existence of classes in society evidenced most clearly in the government of TANU, i.e., a government of highly paid politicians and bureaucrats. Even today this still holds true. The demands of development for an educated and skilled elite, in effect, eliminates those with little or no skills to offer. Moreover, workers and peasants

¹⁹⁷See Cliffe, Democracy in a One-Party State: The Tanzania Experience, in Saul and Cliff, (eds), op.cit., p. 247.

rarely aspire to positions of power and wealth, and when they do, scarcely have the means by which to achieve it. Those who were privileged to become Party officials, by whatever virtue, obtained positions of power and prestige and perpetuated themselves behind a facade of democratic decision-making.

Scholars have commented on the bourgeoisie attitude which many political leaders of new states adopt on coming to power. This is no less true of TANU members in the higher echelons. However, the preoccupation with socialist practices by Nyerere and followers like Rashidi Kawawa leads Cranford Pratt to argue that such leaders were neither the allies of imperialism nor a vanguard committed to a socialist ideology. He apologetically accepted the advantageous positions in which members of the elite found themselves, for though their incomes were substantially high, it was "... not taken from a resisting society which rejected their legitimacy ... and ... leaders did not use their power to perpetuate their interests in ways which offended the wider Tanzanian society. They remained loyal members of TANU!"¹⁹⁸

Their loyalty to TANU did not, in effect, amount to very much. It was not put to the test because the Party was not an organization vigorously fighting for the establishment of socialist principles. Thus, loyalty to TANU did not mean the forgoing of the privileges to which

¹⁹⁸Cranford Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-68: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

they had become so accustomed. In general, the democratic nature of participation has been greatly curtailed by the development of oligarchical tendencies within the higher ranks of the Party.

TANU: STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

The post-independence era brought with it new pronouncements and new institutions but they have not miraculously turned Tanzania into a classless society or made it any less economically underdeveloped. Moreover, TANU, despite great efforts, remains an elitist organization often incapable of fulfilling its policy objectives. Many factors have worked against the development of the Party into a strong, centralized, monolithic organization capable of directing government agencies and the people towards their socialist goals. The heterogeneity of the elements which gave themselves a TANU label prevented strong central direction and made the Party little more than a conglomerate of various interests. The weakness of the structures were apparent to Bienen when he wrote that TANU, "... does not provide an institution which can transform the economy and make itself more effective in the process, it is too weak and too loose and has too few material and human resources to tackle development problems".¹⁹⁹

Local Party organizations in the pre-independence years consisted of disparate elements, reflecting the issues of their localities. Their pattern of growth made central penetration immensely difficult at first

¹⁹⁹Bienen, op.cit., 1967, p. 407.

but the central focus which they later developed, along with a certain degree of integration, provided the pre-conditions for central directives. The vigor of local political structures died down after independence but Nyerere's resignation in 1962 enabled his return to the local areas to strengthen TANU at the grass roots level. The Party was further strengthened at the local level by the appointment of Regional and Area Commissioners to replace the colonial authorities in the districts. This also had the added advantage of bringing the Party and the government closer together. At the village level both structures were merged while the chairman of TANU, at the district level, also became the chairman of the District Council.

The weakness of the Party and its central decision-making organs, which Bienen alluded to, is now being changed, though throughout the 1960's it was faced with severe problems. Prior to 1965, TANU lost many important members to the government and the bureaucracy. Its headquarters became disorganized and incompetent; finances declined because subscriptions dried up; there were no approved estimates for two years; no system of regular reporting from branches to headquarters and a falling off in enrollment. At the 1962 elections, the inability of TANU to mobilize the people was illustrated when only one-quarter of the potential voters actually voted.²⁰⁰ In 1964, the army mutiny further revealed the total absence of any capacity within the Party to mobilize mass support. Effective decision-making took place outside the Party

²⁰⁰Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., p. 29.

structures. The National Conference (whose current membership stands at over 15,000) did little but ratify government policies while the National Executive Committee (a much smaller but more vigorous body) rarely initiated policies or acted as an effective supervisor of government.²⁰¹

The Party's strength has gradually increased at the expense of the Cabinet and Parliament, i.e., National Assembly or Bunge. By 1967, the shift in power left the NEC of TANU as the chief beneficiary and major decisions were being taken outside the Cabinet. In 1965, the NEC acquired powers and salaries much like that of the National Assembly, e.g., power to summon witnesses, require production of documents, etc. The admittance of the civil service in 1964 and the changes in 1965 and 1966 at the national level, i.e., the Party's staff at headquarters was paid for by the government and now, expanded and upgraded jobs became available, added to the Party's strength. In addition, the President spent time each week at Party headquarters, adding to the character and role of TANU, not merely because of his position, but also by the very ideas he proclaimed.

Steps designed to strengthen the Party continued into the 70's. In November, 1974, the meeting of the NEC in Musoma approved a structural reorganization of Party headquarters to achieve a rationalization of its departments and to find more able people so that the Party could demonstrate its supremacy in policy-making functions over all other state institutions.²⁰² Although no detailed study has been carried out

²⁰¹See Pratt, op.cit., p. 212.

²⁰²Refer to Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, London: Rex Collings, 1974-1975. p. B.282.

of the 1974 Party elections, it is generally felt that the quality of the leadership has improved, especially in the Central Committee, where of the 20 officials elected by the National Conference, 10 were new faces, younger and better educated than their predecessors.

It is evident that over the years TANU has been steadily amassing strength relative to other organizations in society. The Declaration gave it an "ideological cutting edge", which resulted in clearer definition of its policies. The NEC, with many influential members within its ranks, has risen to a position of major importance in the processes of central decision-making and execution, while its role in explaining central policies has become increasingly crucial. According to Cliffe, the NEC, "... provides an invaluable forum for discussion between central TANU government leaders and more articulate non-official elements representative of at least some of the population".²⁰³

DEMOCRACY AND THE PARTY SYSTEM

From 1965-1975, TANU leaders quietly but effectively strengthened the Party's competence as an organization. So much so, that the most important phenomenon of the independence period has been the consolidation of power by TANU. Friedland pointed out that the Party has become, "a focal institution, which pervades and dominates all other institutions and society".²⁰⁴ This view stands in complete contrast to Bienen's statement that the structures of TANU are weak, with the center having little

²⁰³Cliffe, Democracy in a One-Party State: The Tanzanian Experience, op.cit., p. 274.

²⁰⁴See Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., p. 31.

power to affect decisions or behavior at the local level. These views are not contradictory if one assumes the first to be based on TANU's strength relative to other national organizations; and the second on the Party's strength and ability to effect change, especially of a developmental or integrative nature at the local level. Since the latter view will be examined in the concluding pages of the chapter, attention here will be focused on TANU's power relative to other organizations and groups and the implications this has for democracy in the party system.

While Nyerere has sought to make the Party a stronger institution, he has simultaneously sought to make it increasingly democratic, i.e., a maximization of popular electoral participation. To this end, he has effected a democratic revolution within the Party by introducing elections at all levels. The selection of all Party candidates coupled with greater scrutiny and discussion has led to an increase in the degree of democracy within the Party.²⁰⁵ The increased capacity on the part of TANU to cope with democratic pressures has also strengthened and consolidated its status as a national political organization. The 1965 elections saw a significant replacement of MP's (86 of the 107 elected members were new to The Assembly) and able men in the rank and file found places within the leadership, without any undermining of TANU's position. However, the strengthening of central party organs has often resulted in the overlooking of considerations of democracy. Despite the electoral system within the Party structure, the NEC or Central Committee has the

²⁰⁵See Pratt, op.cit., p. 259.

power to veto candidates for the Assembly and to any elected post within TANU. If these powers are used on a regular basis, they have the potential of making TANU a vanguard party, perpetuating the oligarchical tendencies already inherent in its structures.

As far back as 1965, there was widespread support to establish TANU as the only party but there was also a strong belief that effective democratic checks should be placed on those exercising power. There was little evidence of support for rule by an ideological elite. Yet the rise of the NEC over Parliament means that elections are no longer the democratic control over oligarchical tendencies they were designed to be. Power has indeed moved, as Pratt states, "... towards an institution whose members are selected in a more casual manner by a much less numerous electorate whose meetings are closed and whose open style of debate does not depend upon well-established procedures but upon the inclination of Nyerere as its chairman".²⁰⁶

A. TANU AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Since independence, the National Assembly has been losing ground to TANU. This has been greatly facilitated by the Commission, which reserved all policy-making for the Party. From 1960-1965, the Bunge acted in a timid and cautious manner, brushing over many important issues and playing a limited role in others, e.g., foreign policy. Quite often, it lacks the prestige and status to enable it to assert itself against the TANU leadership. Overall, government takes the

²⁰⁶Ibid., p. 215.

view that since members participate in Party policy at various levels, no policy-making arena outside the Party is desirable. Only a few MP's have consciously worked out a strategy to oppose the trend of subordination and they have achieved very little. In the latter part of the 60's, the government clarified the supremacy issue between TANU and the Bunge. The Arusha Declaration reasserted the central role of the Party while government statements left little doubt as to which institution was superior. For example, one Parliamentary extract stated:

"The Party picked you in nomination and the Party has the right to discipline you and dictate your tasks ... The Party is supreme and all MP's are working under the leadership of the Party. The time will come when an MP who is following his own head will be called to the Party headquarters to be warned. It is high time the MP's should know where they come from, and it is above any doubt that this Parliament belongs to TANU (Wambura)."207

The Bunge became more active and more critical of government policies in the early 1970's, but remains weak relative to TANU leaders. The expulsion of nine MP's by the NEC in 1968 demonstrated the weakness of the Bunge as an instrument of control of the political leadership. However, the loss of power and prestige has not made the Bunge significantly less elitist. The financial rewards for which an MP is eligible makes such a career attractive and sets him apart from the majority. An annual salary of \$1,500, \$750 extra for representing a constituency, travel and maintainance allowance together with a \$40 per annum postage allowance are no mean incentives where per capita income averages a little over \$85 per annum. Kjekshus points out that money,

²⁰⁷See Kjekshus, op.cit., p. 31.

"... is a powerful incentive for members of the Party to seek election; being also the most tangible reward to help bolster Party support among the aspiring elite".²⁰⁸

The elitism demonstrated in the Bunge, coupled with the lack of democracy in the power relationship between the latter and the Party, has important implications for the development of democracy and socialism in Tanzania. However, the leadership code is helping to avert elitism by acting as a power screening device. The requirement of TANU candidates to live and work in ujamaa villages further eliminates a number of otherwise eligible Party members from the election race. The Bunge remains an important element in the thrust towards socialism but at present it suffers from, "... a lack of real power at the legislative stage, and a noticeable, albeit understandable, reluctance by members to provide the regime with useful institutionalized self-criticism inside the Bunge".²⁰⁹ It is clearly not the primary locus of power at this time.

B. TANU: GROUPS AND CRITICISM

At present, there is little indication that power and prestige are gravitating away from the Party to other centers of power. In August 1974, the TANU Central Committee held a one month seminar and discussed the Party's role in national integration and the meaning of "party supremacy" in the nation. In October 1974, the President, along with

²⁰⁸Ibid., p. 37.

²⁰⁹Ibid., p. 43.

the NEC, issued clarifications on how to proceed with villagization, maximizing preparation and discussion and minimizing coercion and confusion. In addition, NEC members were sent out to explain and reassure peasants and to investigate, halt and redress grievances and abuses.²¹⁰

TANU remains the pre-eminent political organization and holds a dominant position relative to other groups. There are important groups within society, e.g., churches, schools, co-operatives, labor unions and business organizations, but they are not permitted to organize themselves or develop interests of their own. The official restrictions on their activities and their absorption into the Party serves to reduce their capacity to bring about significant changes. Teachers have been effectively alienated from politics while the University students who oppose the government were initially suspended and later affiliated with the Party via the TYL.²¹¹

Even the military has been subdued by the Party, making the threat of army takeover very unlikely. The army mutiny in 1964, led to a rethinking of the role of the military which resulted in army officers becoming liaison between the Party and the armed forces. The appointment of a political commissar of the Tanzanian Peoples Defence Forces (hereafter TDPF) also marked the beginning of institutionalized representation within the Party for the military. The political neutrality of the armed forces was rejected and there was a firm belief

²¹⁰See Colin Legum, op.cit., p. B283

²¹¹Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., pp. 31-32.

that soldiers should be committed on the side of the ruling party.²¹²

The biggest shake-up of the TPDF since the mutiny came in 1974. The number one in command, General Sam Sarakikya, was transferred to become Minister of National Culture and Sport. The second in command, Colonel Amin Kashmiri, posed problems because of his Asian origins and British wife and could not replace Sarakikya. The number three, Geoffrey Marealle, was no more eligible than his superior. He was the son of a Chagga Chief, a family not notable for their strong support of TANU policies. After careful consideration, Lt.-Col. Abdallah Twalipo was made the new commander and Colonel Mkwere became the second in command.

The total number of the armed forces stands at 14,600 which is small in relation to the population, and its defence expenditure for 1974-1975 was \$42 million. In March, July and November 1974, the TPDF publicly renewed its pledge of loyalty to the President, the Party and the people. This political commitment serves the purpose of helping to overcome military anomie while giving the soldiers some sense of purpose.

TANU manages to control, limit and guide the behavior of many groups in society. But in so doing, signs of illiberalism have entered into the operation of the one-party system. In 1967, A. K. Hanga, a former Minister and two MP's, Oscar Kambona and Eli Anangisiye, were detained on the grounds of subversive activities. In October 1968, the two MP's were officially expelled from the Party because of severe criticism of

²¹²See Ali A. Mazrui, Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1972, pp. 171-172.

government policies. The stress on containment of disagreement within the Party has long been a preoccupation of the political leaders. Their intolerance to criticism stems from the fear of disunity that opposition will produce factionalism, corruption and separatism.²¹³ Quite often national unity is perceived as a more desirable and real good than pluralistic political freedom.

The downplaying of criticism and conflict has resulted in the development of a closed system of politics in Tanzania. This has done very little to eradicate the authoritarian tendencies within the Party. Instances of illiberalism have been evident on several occasions where the desire to avoid criticism has led to the making of important decision outside the Cabinet, e.g., the ending of discrimination against non-Africans in the civil service, ending relations with Britain, decisions on commitment to socialism, the Union with Zanzibar etc. Increasing illiberalism can also be seen in the passing of the 1968 Newspaper Ordinance Amendment Bill, in the face of great opposition, which gave the President powers to stop publication of anything deemed subversive. However, these signs do not amount to a trend. The Party has reaffirmed its commitment to socialism and has avoided major purges within its ranks. In April 1970, its National Secretary said the movement was still open to all, but Nyerere continues to press for quality rather than quantity in the membership.

²¹³David E. Apter, "Some Reflections on the Role of a Political Opposition in New Nations", in George S. Masannat, (ed), The Dynamics of Modernization and Social Change: A Reader, California: Good Year Publishing Co., 1973, p. 423.

Today TANU is less obviously a Party "without specific function or definition" than when Bienen wrote. Steps taken to strengthen national and local organs and the increase in elected elements at all levels puts the Party in a dominant position vis-a-vis other groups. However, his conclusions on the structure and functioning of the Party still holds true, TANU does not fall within the revolutionary-centralizing category.

C. TANU AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TANU's structures may be strong when compared to those of other organizations but its inability to effect changes of a developmental nature is clearly evident. Its performance at the local level is handicapped by a bad communications network, limited finances, lack of organization and trained Party officers and staff.²¹⁴ TANU's lack of a strong central party bureaucracy restricts it in many ways. At present, it has been impossible for Tanzania to build up both a party and a bureaucratic hierarchy, but the Party needs to establish its own bases of independent expertise, e.g., in agriculture, marketing, administration, investment, employment, etc.. Bureaucrats and Party officials are now forced to work together but the antagonistic situation which developed between the two in Ghana under Nkrumah has been miraculously avoided in Tanzania. However, more precautions are needed in the bureaucracy's implementation of policy and more political stimulus is required from a better informed TANU.

²¹⁴Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., p. 30.

The efficient running of public enterprises, educational reform, application of leadership rules, and the mobilization of the rural population all imply a major role for the Party. At this point in time, the relationship between the Party and the economy becomes increasingly important because TANU seeks not merely to achieve economic growth, but to radically alter the structure of Tanzanian society.²¹⁵ The main thrust of this reorganization is directed primarily towards the rural areas, therefore, the main task of the Party is to reach the villages. Without so doing, the Party and government remain largely confined to a few urban centers and those institutional innovations, e.g., Village Development Committees (VDC's), Party cells and TANU associated groups, become mere form without any content.

Studies have illustrated the effectiveness of TANU at the local level and the overall satisfaction of the peasant with the Party but it still has much to achieve. It is seen as the carrier of both modern and traditional values, yet not all its members opt for modernity. As a single decision-making unit, TANU cannot impose its development ideology on all elements under its jurisdiction. But through a program of villagization, it has made considerable progress towards involving the people in their own development. It has been most fortunate in having a leader of the calibre of Nyerere, whose appeal is undoubtedly wide. Without him, it is inconceivable that the Party would have been as successful in mobilizing and institutionalizing mass support behind the

²¹⁵Cliffe, Party Development and Socialist Transformation, op.cit., p. 268.

regime.

CONCLUSION

Narrow Western definitions and labels of party systems in developing nations present an inaccurate picture of such parties. Tanzania stands out as an example of this. TANU is not a revolutionary-centralizing party in the same mold as the Soviet Communist Party; it clearly lacks the physical and human resources. However, TANU has gradually consolidated powers and established a strong NEC and Central Committee. The election of officials at all levels has helped to increase democratic participation but has not eradicated inherent authoritarianism.

The paramountcy of TANU and its NEC has resulted in a leading role in national integration but the Party is severely handicapped by its inability to mobilize sufficient resources. However, it remains the only institution capable of performing the tasks of national building. Its survival and effectiveness in this area has largely been determined by the extent to which its leaders have worked towards overcoming weaknesses in the Party's structure and organization. Despite continuing weakness in its organization, the relatively greater integrative capabilities of TANU and its associated structures make it inevitable that the Party should be the major organ for national development.

CHAPTER V

RURAL SOCIALISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Nation-building in developing countries is handicapped not only by the lack of viable political institutions capable of integrating society, but also restricted by an absence of attitudes and behavior patterns necessary for the promotion of economic development. Tanzania has been fortunate in having a political party which is capable of attracting large numbers of supporters and mobilizing such support for the task of national integration. However, there continues to be great concern about the way in which socialist principles and attitudes can be instilled into the population at large to enable quicker and smoother transformation into a fully socialist society. In this section the ways in which the political leaders are trying to instill socialist principles in the people and the results which have been brought about (especially in relation to the policies of self-reliance and ujamaa villages) will be examined. Essentially, this is a study of the development problems with which Tanzania is currently confronted and the various solutions that have been applied.

The relatively short time span which has elapsed since the implementation of ujamaa villages and self-help schemes makes it difficult to assess the outcomes of such actions. However, it is purported here that rural socialism and villagization will become increasingly important in the development of Tanzania and will be instrumental in changing rural attitudes and behavior. Moreover, the strategies of self-help and self-reliance are necessary and practical

measures for the implementation of ujamaa.

This particular survey will utilize two of the numerous approaches to the study of rural development.²¹⁶ They are, examination of particular problems arising from the implementation of policy and evaluation of specific development programs. However, before one can examine and evaluate present policies, it is necessary to give some idea of the economic background and condition of Tanzania.

THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Economic development is a major goal of many developing countries; they want to catch up with the more industrialized societies and to this end they have drawn upon Marxist-Leninist ideologies to explain their underdevelopment and to serve as a guide for action.²¹⁷ However, the adoption of a Marxist-Leninist ideology or any other value system does not guarantee economic development.²¹⁸ Development has proved particularly hazardous for many nations undergoing rapid economic and social change and Tanzania is no exception. Early failures in reaching planned objectives led not only to feelings of disillusionment among the masses, but also resulted in a growing gap between the population at

²¹⁶See Gelia T. Castillo, "Research and Rural Development Policy in the Philippines", Development Digest, XIV, 2, 1976. The writer points out that there are essentially six basic types of rural development oriented research. All could be utilized in this study but for simplicity and clarity the two selected seem appropriate.

²¹⁷Leaders of developing nations have found the ideas of Marx and Lenin, especially those dealing with colonialism and neo-colonialism, particularly useful in explaining their low level of development and continued dependency on former colonial powers.

²¹⁸Refer to Massanat, op.cit., p. 207.

large and the leaders. Political leaders have discovered that economic development is neither easy nor automatic.

Even before development could get underway or reach the take-off stage,²¹⁹ many changes had to be made. These included the breakdown of traditionalism, the development of new ways of doing things, the expansion of educational facilities, development of marketing and financial institutions, and the reorganization of the social and economic structure. This is particularly important in a country espousing a socialist doctrine where all previous restrictions on social mobility and equal opportunity must be eliminated to ensure that all share in the benefits which development brings. In addition, attitudes towards government must be molded in such a fashion that the people accept the new forms of government and new centers of social and political power.

The process of economic development and its consequences are far-reaching and calls for a great deal of sacrifice on the part of the masses which, all too often, tends to result in popular discontent. The situation is further aggravated by the vicious circle of poverty in which Tanzania finds itself.²²⁰ The economy has all the landmarks of an underdeveloped economy; 90 per cent of the population live in the rural areas. Their productivity is low and consequently their share of the GDP only amounts to 40 per cent. Much of the agricultural activity takes place outside the monetary sector, which itself is export-oriented, thus leaving production for local consumption a relatively

²¹⁹See Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, 2nd ed. England: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

²²⁰Massanat, op.cit., p. 209.

Tanzania is a very poor country; the UN listed it as one of the least developed countries in the world. Per capita income stands at \$85 and even under optimistic assumptions it is said that real per capita income is unlikely to grow more than \$180 by the year 2000. However, progress has been made since independence when per capita income was about \$56, the lowest in the whole of British East Africa. Capital resources are limited -- physical measures of capital stock, e.g., paved roads per square mile, hospital beds per capita and school places per capita, illustrate that Tanzania is very far behind her East African neighbors. Moreover, there are few institutions or individuals capable of generating sufficient savings vital for economic development. The National Development Plan of 1969-74 attempted to raise the investment rate from 22 per cent to 25 per cent but it still left Tanzania a capital starved country.²²³

One of the major problems of development in Tanzania has been the lack of skill and knowledge. In 1964, only 20 Tanzanian's (out of 630) graduate teachers were in secondary schools. Expansion in secondary education and teacher training programs has not yet produced enough school places for children and teachers to fill the gap left by expatriates. Managerial talent continues to be imported from abroad at very high costs and tends to create conflict, especially in the light of the Africanization policy. However, in 1968, nearly 80 per cent of senior middle-grade civil servants were Tanzanian's compared with 26 in 1964. Today, manpower needs are still on the increase and continues to

²²³ G. K. Helleiner, op.cit., p. 185.

pose a major obstacle in the path of economic development.

Many of the problems confronted by the political leaders were inherited from the colonial system of government and mode of production. For instance, the economic stratification which took place in colonial days still persists. The most developed regions continue to be those which provided the colonial government with something they valued, needed and were willing to pay for. These cash crop areas, e.g., Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, have also been important in producing the bulk of Tanzania's leaders. Not only does regional imbalances stand out as a major problem for government, but also the rural-urban imbalance has taken on increasing significance because of the resultant inequalities. Large cities such as Dar-es-Salaam, (with a population of 300,000) have long enjoyed greater services than the small villages. Changes have been made to redress this, but on the whole, the development effort still appears to be weighted more in favor of the urban areas. This has led to heavy migration from the rural to the urban areas causing overpopulation and widespread unemployment. Attempts have been made to round up vagrants in the cities and transport them back to the rural areas, but it is difficult to envisage such a policy going on indefinitely.²²⁴ The priority of the urban areas can clearly be seen in fiscal 1970-71. The development budget for such areas (which contained 7 per cent of the population) was estimated at 45 per cent, while that of the rural areas (containing 90 per cent of the population) was estimated at 48.3 per cent.²²⁵

²²⁴ Andre de la Rue, op.cit., p. 50.

²²⁵ Hill, op.cit., p. 224.

The emphasis on agricultural activity has persisted from the colonial period and no large scale industrialization has yet taken place. There were those, namely the more revolutionary Zanzibaris and other left-wing Tanzanian's who felt that a strong industrial base was necessary in order to bring about modernization. They consisted primarily of those subscribing to the Marxist-Leninist idea of socialist progression. Nyerere and his followers are somewhat less dogmatic in their ideological leanings but no less socialistic in their outlook. The ultimate goal is for all production to be obtained through co-operative effort or through government co-operatives. The dangers of relying on an agricultural economy have been well documented and need not be belabored here but it is a problem which will become increasingly important for Tanzanian political leaders in the future.

The sacrifices which the leaders have called upon the people to make in the name of development have been met with relatively few protests for the bulk of the people have not undergone severe hardships because of development. They have always been poor and were often bypassed by the colonial administration. Those who are deprived or feel a sense of deprivation are those in the top echelons who have been called upon to make certain sacrifices in the interest of the population at large. But on the whole, the response of the people toward government policies has been favorable. From the outset, great efforts have been made on the part of the leadership to secure and mobilize the support necessary to ensure policy implementation.

To recap then, in looking at the economic background, it is clear that many problems have been inherited from the colonial era, such as regional, urban and rural imbalances and dependence on an agricultural

economy. Agricultural activity is prevalent and 90 per cent of the population are rural. Tanzania lacks physical and financial resources and has found economic development to be a particularly hazardous venture.

IDEOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT

Ideology has been used by the political leaders to set the goals for economic development. Ian C. Parker states that, "ideology has not been a static and isolated element in national development but has functioned dynamically as an organic and evolving image of national direction and priorities in the social and economic spheres".²²⁶ Socialism and self-reliance, which make up the core of the ideology, reflect not only the strengths but the weaknesses of the country, for on the one hand, it has enabled Tanzania to develop in an economically and politically viable way, but also new demands have been created which the present system cannot adequately deal with, e.g., increased demands for goods and services.

The policy of self-reliance completes and justifies the call for "the building of ujamaa by Tanzania's own resources. However, as an instrument for the building of socialism, self-reliance does not mean each individual relying simply on his own resources. As K. Ngombale Mwiru points out, "Socialist self-reliance hinges upon the group. It means making the fullest use of ... life in society by co-opting in all

²²⁶ Ian C. Parker, op.cit., p. 45.

activities in the interest of all individual members."²²⁷ Self-reliance, thus, means accepting responsibility for one's own welfare and development and making the best of limited resources. It enables cuts in costs by doing away with foreign exports and facilitates mass participation for increased production -- in keeping with socialist objectives. The political leaders are aware that a policy of self-reliance cannot bring about development by itself but it can be useful in rehabilitating labor and in re-educating the people to produce favorable attitudes towards work.²²⁸

Failure to achieve necessary foreign aid played a major role in the adoption of a self-reliant strategy. The First Five Year Plan 1964-1969 failed miserably because principal donors of aid, i.e., Great Britain and Germany withdrew the aid Tanzania so badly needed. The Second Five Year Plan 1969-1974 incorporated the lessons of failure and thus, was based largely on self-reliance. Government was given the main role in mobilizing the people in the production effort to ensure the fullest use of domestic resources. The self-reliant strategy is designed primarily to make Tanzania increasingly independent of the outside world but there are severe limitations to the use of such a strategy. Immanuel Wallerstein points out that the modest success achieved by Tanzania with the policy of self-reliance is due primarily to the relatively few countries that have taken such a particular course of action. He believes that the countries of Eastern Europe illustrate

²²⁷K. Ngombale Mwiru, "The Policy of Self-Reliance", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., p. 66.

²²⁸Ibid., p. 70.

the limits of self-reliance. Moreover, pressures to comply with the world economy and the need for international cooperation leads to compromise and sacrifice in internal policies, eventually leading to a greater degree of dependence.²²⁹ Tanzania may be well on the way to real political independence but in the economic sphere it is still somewhat dependent on various countries in order to fulfill certain of its needs. Tanzania is far from sufficient in basic cereal production and in 1970 almost \$30 million was spent on food imports. By the end of the 1970's there will be approximately four million additional people to be fed and clothed, thus pointing to even greater economic dependence on the outside world.

In more ways than one, it has been difficult for Tanzania to pursue a policy of self-reliance. The eruption of the oil and foreign exchange crisis in 1973 and 1975 respectively, led to almost constant borrowing from the IMF and other sources to keep up with the balance of payments. Borrowing to finance various projects cannot go on indefinitely but with the limited expansion of official aid, there are very few alternatives available for financial assistance abroad or at home. If the situation worsens, Tanzania may find itself accepting help from whatever quarters it is being offered. This could have far reaching implications for the independent foreign policy which Tanzania has thus far pursued. Present trends in world economic patterns tend to support the idea that far from becoming more independent, countries, both large and small are becoming increasingly inter-dependent and even with a policy of self-reliance, Tanzania is no exception. Self-reliance seems to be working better at

²²⁹ Immanuel Wallerstein, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

home especially in its educational objectives than it is in the international arena,

EDUCATION FOR SELF-RELIANCE²³⁰

Attempts by Tanzania to be self-reliant in the international arena have been confounded by forces beyond its control but internally, numerous successes have been achieved through such a policy. Education for self-reliance is a policy measure designed to make every Tanzanian (from the top echelons of government to the peasant) participate equally in the country's development. Interim measures taken by Nyerere to bridge the gap between the rulers and the ruled proved ineffective in uniting the diverse elements. The elite continued to set itself apart from the masses and it was this elitism coupled with rising expectations which led to the Arusha Declaration, calling for a fresh start. Education for self-reliance came one month after the Arusha Declaration, rejecting the colonial system of education which reinforced individualist rather than group tendencies. The new system had to create a sense of commitment to the community and had to be geared towards the development of the rural community.

The elitist colonial system left many outside the school system while those on the inside, cut off from society, developed parasitic attitudes. They lived off the people without developing a commitment towards them. Most of the educated adopted white-collar attitudes, even those with humble beginnings. The leaders now see the necessity

²³⁰Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., pp. 267-290.

of integrating education with the needs of the society at all levels. Schools are now looked upon as an integral part of society, i.e., "communities which practice the precept of self-reliance".²³¹ If education for self-reliance is to have any impact on Tanzanian society, there must be as S. Toroka states, "... a complete overhaul of the attitudes of people towards education".²³² Elitism in the educational system is slowly being eradicated but still persists to a great degree because of the lack of school places available. Thus, the few who are lucky enough to attend school are still a privileged minority. Hopefully, the situation will change as implementation of policy progresses. There has never been enough schools at any level, thus, formal education has always been a privilege, never a right.

Education for self-reliance has now become an important objective in Tanzania. It has led to the altering of school curriculums and the establishment of communal agricultural activities within the schools themselves although their success rates are not too rapid.²³³ Output from such programs take time to be realized but self-reliance has helped to combat the shortage of trained teachers and administrators and alleviate the financial burdens of expanding education. Education for self-reliance is an ambitious program and government has encountered difficulties in an educational situation where implementation lags

²³¹J. Cameron and W. A. Dodd, Society, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, Pergamon Press, 1970, p. 225.

²³²S. Toroka, "Education for Self-Reliance: The Litowa Experiment" in Saul and Cliffe (eds) op.cit., p. 264.

²³³F. Branfman, "Some Suggestions Concerning the Teaching of Agriculture in the Tanzanian Primary School", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., pp. 259-263.

behind declared policy. In the First Five Year Plan 1964-69, education was given the role of providing the necessary manpower. An atmosphere of optimism surrounded the plan which projected high growth rates to be financed primarily by foreign aid. Approximately \$250 million out of a total of \$300 million was expected to emanate from foreign sources. Education's share in development was \$40 million. Although the Plan was racked with problems, educational development suffered little. Output from secondary schools increased from 3600 in 1964 to over 5500 in 1967 and the number of students in the University of East Africa for the 1966-67 academic year was 921, with 850 other students overseas. By 1970 the University College of Dar-es-Salaam had an enrollment of 1400 students.

Achievements in education have gone a long way to meet the needs of a developing agricultural society, despite the lack of available school places and the continued use of ex-patriates. Adult education is also expanding; in 1965 over 11,000 classes with a total enrollment of 6,000 learners could be accounted for. However, extension services are never enough to meet increasing demands in books and teachers.

"The emphasis on self-reliance", as Lionel Cliffe points out, "seems to warrant more investment in practical training, linking extension advice with literacy and a broader knowledge of society and its goals may have more immediate pay-offs than formal education".²³⁴

UJAMAA VILLAGES: A GENERAL BACKGROUND

Tanzania's leaders have not only concerned themselves with the

²³⁴Ibid., p. 218.

breaking up of elitist attitudes in the education system, but also within the population at large. This particular objective has led to a concerted effort on the part of the political leadership to establish a communal life style among the people. Ujamaa villages have been looked upon as the solution to both rapid economic development and social and political emancipation. Ujamaa is no longer seen as one among many alternatives to development. As Peter Temu states, "... rightly or wrongly, it is seen as the only logical path. And as far as rural development goes, the ujamaa village has become the focal point of the current approach to integrated rural development".²³⁵

The Arusha Declaration and other policy decisions since are good indications of the priorities and character of the transition to socialism, but ujamaa villages did not begin with Arusha. They go as far back as 1961 with Nyerere's "Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism". Essentially, Nyerere and his followers are attempting to show that modern development can take place without undue sacrifices in equality and humanity. However, the burdens of development are not felt equally by the various sections of society. Until the Arusha Declaration, it appeared that the wealth associated with development accrued to those who were particularly important in government and in the economic sectors. The lot of the peasant had not improved significantly. Thus, in order that such benefits be distributed to a wider cross-section of the people, Nyerere advocated the building of ujamaa villages at the grass-roots level with some degree of local autonomy. According to

²³⁵ Temu, op.cit., p. 72.

Nyerere, ujamaa villages, "...cannot be created from outside nor governed from the outside. No one can be forced into a ujamaa village and no official at any level can go and tell the members of a ujamaa village what they should do together and what they should do as individual farmers..."²³⁶

The Arusha Declaration calls for the building of socialism through villagization especially in the rural areas. However, any attempt to build socialist communities will be affected by the present settlement patterns which comprises extended family units, not villages, practicing farming on an individualist basis. Since the process has to be carried out on a voluntary basis, party leaders and officials will have to take it upon themselves to persuade the people that more benefits will be obtained through communal farming. Tanzanian peasants have been skeptical about communal living and farming because of the poor performance of such schemes. The history of settlement schemes dates back to 1953 with the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC), which administered the area occupied by the defunct Groundnut Scheme.²³⁷ After independence, such schemes were endorsed by the IBRD and incorporated into the First Five Year Plan 1964-69 which proposed to settle half a million people on 70 schemes costing over \$30 million by 1969. The "transformation approach" embodied in such schemes failed to bring about the necessary changes. Large quantities of financial and physical resources were channeled into these projects but the returns were

²³⁶See G. K. Helleiner, op.cit., p. 197.

²³⁷See Maguire, op.cit., p. 39.

negligible. Mechanization brought benefits in only a few areas, such as Upper Kiete and the Mbulu Districts; economics of scale were not obtained and settlers became disgruntled with their living conditions and with the performance of the government. Some even referred to themselves as "watumwe wa serikala" (slaves of the government).²³⁸

The TAC settlements were not socialist in any sense of the word. The main purpose was to promote a healthy and wealthy farmer class which could serve as a major force in the drive toward modernization. The schemes failed because they lacked good co-ordination and organization and reinforced rather than eliminated the individualistic attitudes held by many farmers who continued to regard their activities as their own holdings. Genuinely socialist communities were established in the early years but their results, too, were negligible. The most successful of them were the 15 settlements linked through the Ruvuma Development Association, and they illustrated quite candidly that the people could, by their own efforts, initiate and successfully maintain a development program.²³⁹ But on the whole, government's objectives of achieving a socialist society remained far from being accomplished. Conflict between the principles of ujamaa and the transformation approach became apparent for the latter created sharp differences between the economic opportunities enjoyed by a few spoon fed by government aid and the opportunities available to the rest of the farmers.

²³⁸ See L. Cliffe and G. L. Cunningham, "Ideology, Organization and the Settlement Experience in Tanzania", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., p. 136.

²³⁹ The Ruvuma Settlement has now been disbanded.

THE EMERGENCE OF A CLASS SYSTEM

In earlier chapters it was stated that Tanzania was relatively free from classes or a class structure. However, at this point in the discussion, greater clarification and elaboration becomes necessary even though the statement holds its validity. Unlike many former colonial nations, Tanzania escaped much of the seamier sides of colonialism. Its status as a UN trusteeship prevented the metropolitan country from embarking on widescale exploitation of resources like that associated with international capitalism. Colonial rule did not result in the perpetuation of classes on a major level, nor give rise to a powerful bourgeois with vested interest in the maintainance of that system. However, there existed a privileged class of educated and wealthy Tanzanians which clearly stood apart from the majority of the people. However, they remained small in numbers by virtue of the fact that educational and administrative career opportunities were only made available to the indigenous population towards the end of colonial rule.

To return to the subject of rural development, it becomes clearly noticeable that the influence of colonial development policy had, to a certain extent, perpetuated divisions within the rural country-side. Moreover, as Temu states, had the "transformation approach succeeded it would have created a privileged class of rural capitalist in the midst of a vast sea of poor and often landless peasants".²⁴⁰ Indeed, early development policies resulted in isolated pockets of rural capitalists,

²⁴⁰Temu, op.cit., p. 73.

e.g., the maize farmers in Iringa; tobacco growers in Tabora; coffee farmers in Moshi and Bukoba and wheat growers in the Mbulu District. It is in these areas that the establishment and progress of ujamaa is slowest. Thus, if the leaders link a socialist society to a classless society, which is clearly evident in the Arusha Declaration, then Tanzania is still a long way from being a socialist society.

Tanzanian leaders have often been accused of not facing up to "the fact of class" within their society.²⁴¹ Yet the Arusha Declaration stands out as a policy document recognizing the existence of classes (especially the rural capitalists) and inequalities within the system. The Declaration focused on the real or potential situations of exploitation found in the urban areas where the greater portion of people with high incomes, prestigious jobs and high education are found. However, Nyerere was nonetheless aware that the wealthier rural peasants could assume the attitudes and trappings of a social class, while the rest remain downtrodden and poverty stricken.²⁴²

A study made by Gary Thomas furnishes examples of inequalities in rural incomes and the development of classes, i.e., in terms of income differentials in the Mbulu District. In this region, land is rented out by the poorer to the wealthier farmers, who then increase their production by hiring labor. So much so, that in 1966 one Mbulu farmer was able to earn more money than the government pilot village settlement at Upper

²⁴¹Hill, op.cit., p. 226.

²⁴²Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, op.cit., p. 233.

Kietete.²⁴³ The Kiwere Village Settlement also showed evidence of income differentials where land is not communally owned. Progressive farmers can get ahead because the yields from their plots are exclusively theirs, while incomes are the same on communally owned land such as Kietete. Although the renting of land and contracting of labor is illegal, Thomas believes that such measures were significant factors in the increase of wheat production in the Mbulu area from 500 tons in 1959 to 1,000 tons in 1966. Looking collectively at the rural areas, he concluded that rural incomes will continue to differ substantially because people have varying access to the means of production and different motivation and skills.²⁴⁴

The major problem, according to Thomas, rested not with the farmers themselves but with the nature of the economy, which tended to encourage individualistic tendencies and acquisitiveness as well as dominant and subordinate roles. Such tendencies have now become so prevalent that they will be difficult to eliminate. It may be the case, as Thomas points out, that the elimination of such tendencies would prove detrimental to the Tanzanian economy but it would be inconsistent with their stated socialist objectives if the political leaders allow such attitudes to persist. Here lies the dilemma. Thomas states that the government's prime concern should be the elimination of social class rather than the elimination of income differential, albeit, an

²⁴³Garry Thomas, "Let Economic Strata Stay: Agricultural Capitalism and Rural Development in Tanzania", East Africa Journal, Nov. 1967, p. 30.

²⁴⁴Ibid., p. 31.

important objective. Since the two are inextricably bound together, or appear to be, the elimination of one would quite possibly lead to the elimination of the other. Thus, time spent eradicating economic classes and the disparities of wealth may also have the benefit of bringing about egalitarian attitudes in the minds of the people at large.

Efforts to regroup the rural masses into villages and socialize the agricultural sector are directed towards the prevention of social classes. The tradition of consensus at the national level has tended to make the desire for unity within the population at large even more desirable. Thus, it is not surprising that class conflict is downplayed and thought to be unimportant. However, problems concerning the correct strategy for ujamaa have led to conflict at the national level, particularly within government and party decision-making circles.

Problems have also resulted from the implementation of ujamaa itself. The Party has encountered great difficulty in persuading the wealthier farmers to join in such schemes. H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen in his study discovered that the wealthy peasants ("kulaks") formed a distinct elite in the rural areas together with the civil servant "they made up the "dominant coalition".²⁴⁵ Government officials tended to give kulaks preferential treatment; they owned the best land and occupied the most prestigious positions. During the period of study, 39 officials' functions were made available to Itumba peasants -- 26 were occupied by the wealthy peasants who made up 20 per cent of the

²⁴⁵See H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen, "Staff, Kulaks and Peasants: A Study of a Political Field", in Saul and Cliffe (eds), op.cit., p. 262.

population therefore, 20 per cent of the peasants occupy 66 per cent of the functions. Thoden Van Velzen concluded that wealthy peasants not only have a bigger share of official functions, but they also have a greater chance of becoming Party chairmen and assistants. (See Table on following page)

Wealthier peasants were found to have more political and economic clout, and their relationship with government officials often lends to the isolation of poorer peasants. This tendency to give preferential treatment to a restricted part of the population clearly runs against the grain of the Arusha Declaration and is clearly detrimental to the building of socialism in Tanzania. This type of behavior tends to make the poorer peasants hostile towards his wealthier counterpart and distrustful of party and government officials. Although equality remains one of the great pillars on which ujamaa rests, the poorer farmers are not unaware of the glaring inequalities that exist, e.g., in such areas as Ismani (an area of the Iringa District) where a sample of nine ujamaa villages revealed that 9 per cent of the households own 47 per cent of the cattle, 51 per cent of the sheep and goats, 53 per cent of the cultivated land and 96 per cent of the capital equipment.²⁴⁶

For a variety of reasons (colonialism, land ownership patterns, motivation, etc.) disparities in incomes have arisen in the rural (as well as urban) areas. The political leaders recognized the rising class of rural capitalist and devised a frontal approach, which allowed for the widespread mobilization effort in the building of socialism.

²⁴⁶ Temu, op.cit., p. 74.

TABLE 5.1

OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS OCCUPIED BY THE WEALTHIEST
20% OF PEASANT HOUSEHOLDS - ITUMBA

OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS	TOTAL NUMBER AVAILABLE	OCCUPIED BY THE WEALTHIEST 20%
1. Branch Chairman TANU	1	1
2. Secretary TANU	1	-
3. Chairman VDC 1967	1	1
4. Secretary VDC 1967	1	1
5. Chairman Self-Help Committee	1	1
6. Chairman Parent's Committee	1	1
7. Members VDC resident in Itumba	6	3
8. Recruited as wage laborers in government services	8	5
9. Assessors Primary Court	3	3
10. Chairman TANU cell	15	9
11. Representative District Council (Diwani)	1	1

Source: H. U. E. Thoden Van Velzen, "Staff, Kulaks and Peasant: A Study of a Political Field", in Saul and Cliffe, (eds), *op.cit.*, p.165.

But even this did not establish socialism, as such, though it led to the eradication of many of the ills associated with an underdeveloped agricultural economy.

UJAMAA VILLAGES IN NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Ujamaa villages are seen as the answers to combat the problems of class and exploitation, thus, the development of such communities are now a major preoccupation.²⁴⁷ Some accounts have given a favorable review to the government's rural development policy²⁴⁸ while others have been severely critical and quick to point out the shortcomings.²⁴⁹ However, any evaluation of ujamaa villages is difficult because of its relatively brief existence. It will be some time before the full implications of ujamaa is realized. Any study of rural socialism in Tanzania is somewhat handicapped by the unclear relationship of ujamaa villages to socialist transformation. The purpose of ujamaa could be to bring about change from an agrarian to an industrial society or it could be seen as the solution to problems in a predominantly agricultural society. However, the de-emphasis on industrialization has led to ujamaa being associated primarily with the latter and for this reason Hill purports that "peasantization" rather than "proletarianization" will result giving rural producers a greater share in the decision making process.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷See G. K. Helleiner, op.cit., p. 199.

²⁴⁸C. K. Omari, "Tanzania's Emerging Rural Development Policy", Africa Today, Vol. XXI, 3, 1974.

²⁴⁹See Ichiro Inukai, op.cit.

²⁵⁰Hill, op.cit., p. 253.

It was stated earlier that many of the rural peasants were excluded from the benefits of development and modernization. The Arusha Declaration and decentralization policy have made it clear that greater participation and self-help on the part of the masses is required if they are to share in the wealth of the nation. The question of local initiative is of great importance in the policy of socialist transformation. Quite often leaders do not deal with peasants as a group with their own legitimate interests as this would run contrary to many of their socialist principles. The overriding problem appears to be the degree to which local initiative should be permitted to go before it becomes inconsistent with the national control necessary to oversee efficient functioning of the entire national economy. Although Nyerere and his followers have devoted a great deal of time and literature to the place and importance of self-reliance and local initiative in the building of ujamaa villages, government action illustrates that in the implementation of ujamaa policy not everything will be left to the people to decide.

An element of compulsion seems to be entering into the implementation of ujamaa schemes, which may help to defeat the objective because such a policy calls for a great deal of flexibility and caution. If expansion is forced or rushed there is the danger that the system may become too bureaucratized and the foundations for village development may be lost. Thus, leaders are preoccupied with devising methods to bring about changes in individual behavior which will facilitate the achievement of national objectives. As Clyde R. Ingle accurately points out, "Any effort aimed at changing the behavior of citizens is a combination ... of persuasion on the one hand and coercion, or the threat of coercion

on the other".²⁵¹ It is stated in the Arusha Declaration and other policy documents that ujamaa could not be built through force or the threat of force. However, there are many inconsistencies between stated national intentions and the implementation of policy. Ingle clearly demonstrates that compulsion is present in Tanzania's rural development efforts. While Nyerere's commitment to human freedom cannot be questioned, Ingle maintains that, "... the hard practicalities of rural change have raised questions in his mind as to the limits of persuasion and reason".²⁵² In certain cases, Ingle notes that people are being "forced to be free" and that the use of force is "... tied to increasing frustration with the inability of the official to bring about the desired change by persuasion alone."²⁵³

Although the leaders emphasize the use of persuasion, there is a general acceptance of force by those in the upper echelons, but more remarkably, the legitimacy of force in development efforts is accepted by the people. This has far reaching significance for the future development in Tanzania. However, current implementation of rural development from Dar-es-Salaam proved impractical with or without the use of coercion -- decentralization was a necessary measure. Nevertheless, there are dangers within the measure itself, for as Ingle points out, the freedom of decision given to local communities could result

²⁵¹Clyde R. Ingle, "Compulsion and Rural Development in Tanzania" The Canadian Journal of African Studies, IV, 1, 1970, p. 77.

²⁵²Ibid., p. 82

²⁵³Ibid., p. 84.

in their deciding to do nothing.²⁵⁴ Not all Tanzanian's are willing to accept or participate in communal activities and there have been reported instances of over enthusiastic party officials using force to obtain participation. Often, ordinary farmers are forced to join development schemes, while village leaders do not participate but use hired labor to work their own plots. Thoden Van Velzen found that in Itumba, party officials escaped from working in the agricultural programs, while villagers were made to participate and were expected to build and maintain houses of officials.²⁵⁵

Since 1969, ujamaa villages have been the prime instrument in Tanzania's agricultural development. The Dodoma region became the area of central focus; it was to be a "showcase for the benefits of socialist transformation".²⁵⁶ In 1973, it was stated that 15 per cent of all Tanzanians lived in ujamaa villages but this figure tells very little about actual participation which tends to vary from region to region. For example, in the Kilimanjaro and Shinyanga regions, only 1 per cent of the population live in ujamaa villages, while 64 per cent of the population in the Mtwara region participated in such schemes. Such variations are related to the differences in customary land tenure patterns and the availability of new land in different areas for the ujamaa campaign. The larger and wealthier landowners such as the Chagga have offered severe resistance to ujamaa schemes, thus, making it

²⁵⁴Ibid., p. 100.

²⁵⁵Thoden Van Velzen, op.cit., p. 158.

²⁵⁶Hill, op.cit., p. 237.

difficult for government to enforce changes in land tenure patterns. Land is nationalized but areas of private holdings do persist outside and in spite of government efforts to integrate them into ujamaa programs.

TABLE 5.2

TOTAL NUMBER OF UJAMAA VILLAGES AND THEIR ESTIMATED POPULATION
ACCORDING TO REGION ON 31 MAY, 1973

REGION	NUMBER	POPULATION	AVERAGE POPULATION PER VILLAGE	PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION
Arusha	95	20,112	211	3
Coast	188	115,382	613	21
Dodoma	336	378,915	1,127	47
Iringa	659	243,527	369	29
Kigoma	129	114,391	886	22
Kilimanjaro	24	4,934	205	1
Mara	271	108,068	398	16
Mbeya	715	103,677	145	9
Morogoro	118	19,732	167	3
Lindi	589	169,093	287	36
Mtwara	1,103	466,098	422	64
Mwanza	284	49,846	175	4
Ruvuma	242	42,385	175	9
Shinyanga	108	12,052	111	1
Singida	263	59,420	225	12
Tabora	174	29,295	168	5
Tanga	245	77,957	318	7
West Lake	85	13,280	156	2
Total	5,628	2,028,168	360	15

Source: Peter Temu, "The Ujamaa Experiment", Ceres, July, August, CXCVII, p. 72.

The Dodoma scheme illustrates many problems that have to be faced in the establishment of ujamaa villages, such as the poverty of many regions. Although there is heavy dependence on government aid, all settlements cannot be financed in such manner, moreover, such dependence is damaging to the spirit of ujamaa.²⁵⁷ The main problem is that ujamaa

²⁵⁷Svenson, op.cit., p. 185.

of ujamaa villages in Tanzania, but it is too early to say categorically that rural development policy has failed. Some of the problems are technical and can be remedied with greater foresight and preparation, but others which are structural, e.g., traditionalism and paternalism, are more difficult to correct. Many wealthy farmers have taken advantages of loopholes found within the system and rural development has been complicated by the intractability of peasant farmers as a whole. A new farmer conservatism is said to be emerging which could be a drawback to the development of ujamaa villages and the spreading of socialist principles.²⁶⁰ However, the extent to which this attitude exists is still unclear but makes an additional problem which must be squarely faced.

The difficulties encountered in the immediate post-independent years made it impossible for government to deliver the promised goods and there was a great deal of similarity between the policies of the indigenous government and the old colonial administration. The threat of force continued in the effort to stimulate greater production in the rural areas, but the government also sought to use self-help techniques to increase economic development. However, citizens did not respond as the nationalist leaders thought they would and many assumptions on which early rural development policy was based had to be revised.

The leaders of Tanzania have been constantly changing and rearranging their ideas to cope with the problems of a society undergoing rapid social, economic and political change. There is still conflict over the type of

²⁶⁰ Inukai, op.cit., p. 23.

society to be built, between those who subscribe to a more revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist ideology and those, e.g., Nyerere, who believe in a less radical, less ideological model of economic development. It would be erroneous to think that Nyerere's ideas represent the whole gamut of beliefs in Tanzania. There are many shades of opinions but all are subsumed within the national ideology where they do not conflict with the basic tenets on which the system is based. Nyerere's ideas have been called idealistic because of his belief that the rural peasants can be led by reason and example. On the whole, there has been little spontaneity on the part of the masses; many are still attuned to the traditional way of life. Progress, thus far, has usually conformed to Nyerere's concept of villagization, while most villages have been formed in poor areas with very little potential. There have been few instances of conversion from individual to communal farming and development activities seem to benefit the more progressive farmers.

Education for self-reliance and the new emphasis on self-help in development projects are important measures to ensure a fairer distribution of the benefits of modernization. Moreover, the "frontal" attack on development, i.e., large-scale villagization, to transform rural society is important in mobilizing support for a socialist society. It is clearly evident that Tanzanian peasants are not averse to capitalist ideas, attitudes and values. Indeed, many are in favor of the capitalist mode of production and distribution. This is amply illustrated by the degree of competition, economic independence, seizure of land, concentration of production in a few hands and the hiring of laborers. Only with a successful policy of villagization, i.e., when all the people understand

and accept the goals of ujamaa, will capitalistic attitudes and values begin to disappear. Villagization will not eradicate all the ills with which Tanzania is faced, nor can it guarantee the establishment and maintenance of a socialist society.

At present, there seems to be a reluctance to confront the exploiters of labor and the existing system of capitalist production. Although the major means of production have been nationalized and limitations placed on foreign investments, Tanzania cannot be said to be a truly socialist economy.²⁶¹ Despite stated socialist objectives they are still producing for a world market on the same principles as any other producer, thus, collective ownership is clearly not enough to prevent the capitalist mode of production. In 1965, 1967, and 1968, large scale nationalization policies were implemented because leaders regarded such as a pre-requisite for socialism²⁶² and also a means to achieve socialism. The policy of nationalization created many problems, the most important being its relationship to socialism which remained very ambiguous. It is unclear whether nationalization undermined the Party's role by putting decision-making in the hands of experts for it created a "new class", "i.e., managers, who fall outside both state and Party structures. Parastatals are "states within a state", consuming scarce resources and retarding socialist transformation.

Issa G. Shivji holds the view that the economic bureaucracy actively

²⁶¹Wallerstein, op.cit., p. 23.

²⁶²Peter Temu, "Nationalization in Tanzania", East Africa Journal, June, 1967, p. 40.

resists socialist measures (such as worker participation) and perpetuates neo-colonial ties because it has a social base in the international bourgeoisie.²⁶³ Although this may be disputed, it is apparent that the ambiguous relationship of nationalization poses a threat to the building of socialism in Tanzania because parastatals involve elite interests. Neither nationalization nor villagization are guaranteed to wipe out elitism or inequalities, for the latter has yet to produce patterns of behavior conducive to socialist transformation. Rene Dumont pointed out that "... rural society in Tanzania is still hierarchical. The democratic principles in the co-operatives, for example, is scarcely respected except in appearance; it is not accepted in reality or in fact, nor in the depth of the people's minds".²⁶⁴

The building of socialism will no doubt take place in an atmosphere of constant struggle against those who are privileged. Shivji's call for a revolutionary vanguard to direct the process of socialist reconstruction seems redundant at this point in time because Nyerere and his followers are clearly in command of the situation. However, the "struggle" must be intelligently guided to ensure that the spirit of enterprise is not destroyed and that the number of progressive farmers is not decreased by restricting them from employing paid workers. Although this may be difficult to reconcile with progress to socialist equality, it should also be remembered that progress in agricultural

²⁶³ Issa G. Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle", in Saul and Cliffe, (eds), op.cit., p. 321.

²⁶⁴ Rene Dumont, "Tanzanian Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration", Dar-es-Salaam: The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, 1969, p. 36.

development has been effected largely by an increase in the numbers of progressive farmers. Inequalities must be recognized when working out the organization of production and the structure of incentives. Moreover, local strategies need to be worked out on the basis of a class analysis, which has been downplayed somewhat by the Tanzanian leaders.

The Tanzanian peasants are not revolutionary and it is necessary for the goals of socialist transformation to develop a socialist consciousness in the rural areas. Villagization will help towards this end, especially if trained cadres are brought within the scheme to work and live with the peasants. While villagization may be successful in influencing changes in behavior and attitudes of rural inhabitants, it may not fulfil the equally important function of promoting economic development. Studies have demonstrated time and time again that "modernizing elites" are necessary elements in the process of development in emerging nations. Dumont pointed out the necessity of having an elite in Tanzania for this very purpose and the possibility of social advance by work had to be present. A more accurate assessment of villagization and self-help policies will be necessary at some future date. Far-reaching goals have been set and it is too early to say whether Tanzania will become a genuine socialist state or repeat the steps taken by others such as Uganda or Kenya into a neo-colonialist state. Ultimately, the success of ujamaa villages will depend increasingly on industrialization; "They cannot be built on the hoe-economy for they would hold out no advantage whatsoever to its members vis-a-vis individual peasants".²⁶⁵

²⁶⁵ Issa G. Shivji, op.cit., p. 321.

CHAPTER VI

STABILITY AND INSTABILITY

Political stability has been a goal that has eluded many developing nations of Africa, Tanzania has managed to avoid major upheavals, with the exception of the army mutiny in 1964²⁶⁶ which has had lasting damage on the political system, To the extent that political stability has prevailed, economic development has been greatly enhanced. The existence of political stability does not guarantee success in development objectives, but in Tanzania it has facilitated the ease with which controversial economic and political measures have been introduced and accepted by the population at large.

The task of economic development enjoys the highest priority in many African states and is seen by the political leaders as the only means to prevent the return of colonialism in the disguised "neo-colonial" manner, However, political and economic development and modernization tends to bring about a certain amount of disorder and dislocation in the newly independent countries.²⁶⁷ Although development and modernization, in some instances, can be undertaken without massive amounts of instability and disorganization, there are still many instances in which instability must be controlled if a development elite is to survive the opening phases of its process of change and

²⁶⁶See Bienen, 1967, op.cit., pp. 363-381.

²⁶⁷Refer to Robert P. Clark, Development and Instability: Political Change in the Non-Western World, Dryden Press, (division of Holt, Rinehart & Winston), 1974, pp. 101-103.

reform.

Many African governments are faced with situations which, if left unattended, can lead to instability. This is due primarily to the fact that many such countries lack a unifying factor. The possibility of tribal animosity, the inherent weakness of the administrative framework and the rudimentary existence of a national identity all constitute threats to the new nation.

Tanzania's success in building a national identity has been made possible only by outlawing tribal parties, forbidding tribal agitation and ruling against the formation of religious political groups. Indeed, Tanzania "...promoted a vigorous socialization program and developed imaginative national goals, ideologies, slogans and symbols".²⁶⁸ Thus, the fear of secession and the threat of regional separatism, common to many sub-Saharan African countries is largely absent in Tanzania. This has enabled the government to direct greater attention and time towards the more pressing political and economic needs of the country, e.g., strengthening administrative and party structures and ameliorating some of the more unpleasant problems, e.g., income inequalities, especially in the rural areas.

Since independence, Tanzania has been faced with many economic crises which seemed to threaten the very fabric of society but the political leaders have retained control. A cursory glance at the countries of tropical Africa reveals that many one-party systems have been dissolved because they failed to cope adequately with various

²⁶⁸Benjamin Neuberger, "Has the Single Party Failed in Africa?", African Studies Review, Vol. XVII, No. 1, April 1974, p. 176.

economic crises. Attempts to introduce unpopular measures, e.g., taxation, have led to the downfall of many single-party governments.²⁶⁹ The lack of political stability in many developing nations has had detrimental effects on the efficiency of government action in the economic sphere.

Theories of instability in developing areas stress five or more related factors to account for such phenomenon. They are, cultural heterogeneity, low regime legitimacy, lack of coercive power, economic backwardness and structural simplicity.²⁷⁰ Some of these points have already been mentioned but to recap briefly, cultural heterogeneity of the developing nations results in a lack of shared values, therefore, loyalty rests with an entity other than the state. Political institutions are said to lack legitimacy both legally and morally and are thus, unable to enforce desired behavior patterns within its citizens. Economic backwardness results from the incapacity of the new state to provide goods and services which meet existing demands. Generally speaking, in new societies, blood ties tend by and large to be the basis of social organization with a predominance of primary groups in social interaction. Such a structure is said to reinforce and perpetuate the differences between groups in contrast to complex societies where overlapping membership in various organizations minimizes group disorder and conflict.²⁷¹

Having outlined the most common causes of disorder in new states,

²⁶⁹Ibid., p. 177.

²⁷⁰See Calude Ake, "Explaining Political Instability in New States", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. II, No. 3, 1973, p. 347.

²⁷¹Ibid., pp. 353-356.

a definition is required of the terms stability and instability. Claude Ake defines political instability as the frequency of the flow of exchanges. The more frequent the flow of political exchanges, the more stability there is.²⁷² Political instability can thus be described as irregularities or disturbances in the flow of political exchange. Whenever political exchanges deviate from the established pattern, political instability is likely to occur. Instability in one form or another is common in developing countries because of the "political anxiety" frequently associated with many of the new leaders. That is, the fear of not being in control of government tempered by a profound distrust of political opponents.²⁷³ In Tanzania, the operation of the single party system has worked to minimize fear of political opposition by extending membership to a substantial section of the population.

It has been stated that elites have been the major source of instability in developing nations and that military coups are likely to occur in almost any kind of conflict situation. However, elite behavior in Tanzania illustrates that the size and nature of the elite has reinforced conformity rather than perpetuate conflict within the political arena. Moreover, the relatively small army of little more than 14,000 men has insufficient power or support to enable it to play a major role in government if ever a crisis erupted.

There are many factors, social, economic and political which have helped the experiment in basic democracy by minimizing the degree of

²⁷²Ibid., p. 359.

²⁷³Ibid., p. 359.

conflict producing situations in Tanzania. To begin with, Europeans were but few in number; there was little land alienation; tribal, if not racial, tension was never intense and tribal authorities were severely limited in their area of jurisdiction; Swahili provided a common medium of communication; national poverty ensured a lack of socio-economic differentiation; and Nyerere provided the nation with astute leadership.

The fight to eradicate economic backwardness has taken on new dimensions in Tanzania. The call to make the entire state a land of peasants and workers and to regroup settlements into ujamaa villages can be realized only if the political system maintains its stability, i.e., if demands do not increase at a rate faster than which the government can fulfil them. Political stability has been derived from the extreme poverty of people and country and has enabled the government to deal with pressing economic problems (such as health, education and nutrition) which it would not otherwise be able to if scarce resources had to be deployed in the maintenance of national unity. Political stability in the face of extreme poverty runs contrary to the grain of popular thinking.²⁷⁴ Yet Tanzania clearly illustrates that a country does not have to be wealthy to be stable. However, political stability has made for easier and quicker relaying of development plans, and even more important, for wider acceptance of such goals and rapid mobilization towards their fulfilment.

²⁷⁴See Fred R. Von der Mehden, Comparative Political Violence, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1973, See especially Chapter 6.

The major developmental objectives of the Tanzanian government, i.e., building socialism via the establishment of ujamaa villages requires high levels of mobilization. Social mobilization brings with it increases in human expectations. The development program of the Tanzanian government hopes to increase the capacity of the society to satisfy these expectations and simultaneously reduce social frustrations and consequent political instability. While political stability is necessary if economic development is to take place,²⁷⁵ the latter tends to be an overwhelming de-stabilizing process in the developing countries. According to Huntington, economic development produces individuals who have lost their family ties; creates a class of "nouveaux riches" -- seeking power to match their new status; increases geographical mobility; widens the gap between rich and poor; requires restrictions in certain areas, e.g., consumption; increases literacy, education and exposure to the media; aggravates conflicts over distribution and consumption; and makes for group organization.²⁷⁶

Clearly social mobilization and economic development result in a great deal of social frustration to the individual and to society at large. The TANU government has taken a more active role in economic matters in recent years, thereby reducing conflict which would arise if key areas of the economy were left in private hands. Tanzania's history

²⁷⁵Until quite recently Lebanon was the most stable and prosperous country in the Middle East. When the political crisis erupted this had adverse effects on the level of savings and investments which consequently led to a decline in the levels of economic performance.

²⁷⁶See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, pp. 49-50.

of political stability and social cohesion has worked towards a greater acceptance of the burdens and sacrifices which rapid economic development calls for. Moreover, stability figures largely in the speed with which government has been able to take a controlling interest in many firms and totally nationalizing others, e.g., banks and insurance companies.

Although inequalities in land ownership and income are potentially dangerous to the economic system -- there is a widespread feeling that the government, working in concert with TANU, is capable of controlling the economic progress of the country and dividing the wealth in an equitable fashion. It is doubtful whether the population at large would hold the degree of confidence in the leadership for the management of the economy, if the political climate was less conducive to economic development. Northern Ireland furnishes a good example of the ruinous effects of political instability on the economy. Political stability has proved a positive advantage for Tanzania in the economic sphere. For instance, foreign investment, although comprising only a minor part in the total investment, continues to rise steadily and may be due, in part, to the predictability of the regime. One industry that has profited is that of tourism, although it has not yet been fully exploited. Overall, political stability has enabled the leadership to concentrate its efforts where it is most needed, in the rural areas, upgrading and improving the life of the poorer rural peasantry.

The foundations of political stability in Tanzania, at this point in time, seem to be, in contrast to other African states, relatively solid. Support for the regime is widespread among its citizens. The system of politics which has evolved in Tanzania is designed to provide

a democratic core which ensures and encourages meaningful and widespread participation.²⁷⁷ Surveys illustrate that there are high levels of political involvement and a strong belief in the efficacy of government action.²⁷⁸ Information and decision-making flow both upward and downward along government and party structures, though the important decisions are made by top government and party officials. There is little reason to assume that the existence of an organized formal opposition (which proved meaningless during 1961-1965) could ensure a more stable or more "democratic" functioning of the system. Imperfections within the system are obvious. The trend towards elitism within the leadership and a lack of appreciation of major policy decisions are but two areas of concern. More important, however, is the institutionalization of a Bill of Rights and other safeguards which would work toward enhancing the democratic nature and stability of the political system. However, in the light of the continuing erosion of democracy in developing countries, the achievements of Tanzania, especially in the areas of personal liberty and freedom, still remain noteworthy.²⁷⁹

Among developing nations, Tanzania is almost singularly fortunate in having a strong symbolic capability. Although lacking in national symbols in comparison to other African states, the President and TANU provide the nation with its most important symbols of national unity

²⁷⁷Christian P. Potholm, Four African Political Systems, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970, p. 154.

²⁷⁸See K. Prewitt and Goran Hayden, "Voters Look at the Elections", in Cliffe (ed), One Party Democracy, op.cit., p. 277

²⁷⁹Potholm, op.cit., p. 155.

and integration. As Potholm points out, "the system clearly enjoys a legitimacy based on a frugal, honest, almost humble style of national leadership".²⁸⁰ The credibility of the system is reinforced not only by the behavior of the national leadership, but also by behavior of the citizens. Students, often said to be alienated from society because of their position, are found to be trusting of government and interested in matters of state.

The symbolic capability of the regime is also reinforced by the national ideology which provides a basic, if unspecific, set of supports for the government. Tanzania's socialism is not a rigid doctrine -- subscribing to any one ideological position. It is at once flexible and pragmatic and many of its ideals strike a humanitarian note. Thus, it is relatively easy for most, if not all, to accept at least partially some of its objectives. Freedom, political development, democratic decision-making, welfare and economic development are the major goals of the political system. They are impressive, if not over ambitious, in the light of obstacles which cloud the chances of success. The leadership is confronted by staggering problems in the areas of literacy, communications, economic development and manpower. Moreover, the extractive capability of the system is relatively small. There are few resources to exploit while pressures of population continue to mount, e.g., in terms of providing sufficient food. The distributive capability of the system is similarly weak because of the lack of available goods and services. However, the leaders have committed

²⁸⁰Ibid., p. 170.

themselves to allocating rewards on the basis of equality and merit, speaking out against a society ordered by classes.

If, as Martin C. Needler points out, policies of government have a bearing on political stability, then the "egalitarianism" evident in Nyerere's proposals has considerable significance for Tanzania's political stability. Government has redistributed land, wealth and education and through its various village development schemes, encouraged communal farming in order to promote the "greatest good for the greatest number". Efforts have been directed toward mitigating inequalities between urban and rural areas, especially in the field of income. Restrictions have been placed on the economic behavior of party and government officials to ensure that they do not become a privileged class. This does not, however, mean that inequalities between all groups in society have been eradicated. For instance, there are still gaps between the life styles of a top level government official and a lower-level official, but laws do exist to ensure that officials do not use their positions for self-benefit at the expense of the people at large.

Groups are drawn into the political process and are permitted a degree of expression seldom found in newly developing African states. If one compares Tanzania with Ghana under the Convention Peoples' Party, it is clear that groups in the former country now enjoy a greater amount of autonomy. After the 1970 General Election the National Assembly became a more vigorous body, with MP's who were more critical of government policies than they had been in the past. However, the legislature remains a bastion of support for the TANU government. There

seems to be much room for improvement in the government's attitude toward groups. Although they are permitted to function, various restrictions are placed on their behavior for both economic and political reasons. The Tanzanian Students Union had 393 of its members expelled by Nyerere in 1966 when they staged a protest against National Service. In 1974, "stern warnings" were issued to workers who had caused industrial unrest.²⁸¹ Thus, while groups are permitted to exist, they do so only to the extent that they do not threaten the existing status quo. At every level unity is preserved by the maintenance of the one-party system, stress on broad-based policies and constant reminder of outside enemies attempting to divide the people.²⁸²

The single-party system has survived and shows every evidence of persisting in Tanzania even in the aftermath of Nyerere. Indicators of chronic instability are numerous in developing countries and have led many scholars to conclude that the single-party system simply cannot prevent instability. In fact, Benjamin Neuberger pointed out that the one-party state is inherently unstable because it forces its opponents into illegal activities.²⁸³ In light of this, it appears that the potential for political instability in Tanzania clearly exists. The style of politics is relatively closed and the decision-making arena is a small and exclusive one.²⁸⁴ Thus, while Tanzania has achieved one of

²⁸¹Refer to Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record, London: Rex-Collings, 1974-1975, p. B286.

²⁸²Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., p. 34.

²⁸³Neuberger, 1971, op.cit., p. 174.

²⁸⁴Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., p. 241.

the central goals of political development, i.e. stability, it cannot, however, be said to be a fully democratic country. The political elite continues to dominate the major decision-making organs of government with very little outside control or influence by the non-elite.

There exists, at present, a wide consensus among the elite on the rules for a closed system of politics and this is likely to be strengthened over time. The institutionalization of political roles, although still in its early stages, has led to greater predictability in political behavior. For instance, the powers of administrators were reduced without any major disruptions. In general, it is unlikely that deviant behavior of great magnitude will occur, if members of the elite accept and are satisfied with the rules for political action and think that deviant behavior is likely to be unsuccessful and result in great deprivation. However, if the system becomes sufficiently unresponsive, there is the possibility that individual elites may begin to develop interests outside the main arena, which could lead to conflict with the official ideology. In addition, failure to co-opt new elites and expand its membership may lead to severe dysfunctions and eventual collapse of the system.

There are relatively stable patterns in the growth and development of the Tanzania leadership but it remains essentially elitist. An expansion in the formation of leaders is necessary if Tanzania wishes to avoid alienation of its citizens from its rulers -- a situation loaded with potential instability. Moreover, while many high ideals are incorporated into the leadership rules, it is quite clear that many leaders are lacking in some of the socialist characteristics

popularized by the Arusha Declaration. Thus, not only are improvements needed in the quantity but also in the quality of the Tanzanian leadership.

Whatever potential or actual threat, elitism, and repression of opposition may pose to the system, it appears that the greatest danger to future stability will probably come from non-ideological sources. K. E. Svenson remarks that "the worst enemy of a socialist policy in any African country is bad economic performance. The expectations of the people cannot be removed by a higher political consciousness. Socialism must prove its case in the very short run".²⁸⁵ The weakness of Tanzania's economic base is clearly evident. Nyerere's attempt to introduce a new way of life for the rural inhabitants has met with less success than anticipated. In addition, attempts to change ingrained rural customs has proved problematic in areas steeped in traditionalism. Party workers and officials have found it increasingly difficult to persuade the peasants to voluntarily effect a social revolution.

The potential for political instability in government's efforts to resettle peasants into planned villages is apparent. While it has proved relatively easy to persuade poorer peasants to join ujamaa villages, the more wealthy peasants strongly resent the relinquishing of their possessions. The first political murder, that of a regional commission, Dr. Wilbert Klerruu, in December 1974 was said to have resulted from the resentment of wealthy peasants against collectivization of their land. Those involved in the assassination were accused of

²⁸⁵ W. Tordoff and Ali A. Mazrui, "The Left and The Super Left in Tanzania", Journal of Modern African Studies, X, 3, 1972, p. 439.

counter-revolutionary plotting, as it was believed that they had drawn up plans to murder several cabinet ministers. The incident gave rise for concern but did not lead to any significant degree of instability. However, opposition to government policy still occurs in Kilimanjaro, Tanga and other wealthy areas. In spite of this, efforts to bring about a socialist transformation of the rural areas continues. Success continues to be slow but notable achievements have been made, e.g., Dodoma. Nyerere believes that much of this is due to increased co-operation between political workers, agricultural workers and other civil servants following the implementation of decentralization policies. Although the full effects of such a strategy is not yet known, decentralization has thus far, helped to stimulate local participation while simultaneously establishing channels at various levels for the expression of discontent. The potential for conflict between center and periphery, albeit not completely eradicated, has been minimized by the introduction of decentralization. Yet in the final analysis, Tanzania's political stability will depend largely on whether the center can cope with the increasing demands of the periphery on national goals.

Tanzania's last population census in 1967 gave the total as 12,231,000. With an estimated population growth of 2.7 per annum, the total by the end of 1974 was c. 15,000,000. Population pressures coupled with the greatly increased cost of food and fertilizer prices dealt the country a severe blow. In 1974, a sufficient supply of grain was secured at the price of committing nearly half of Tanzania's reserves to paying for imported grain. As the cost of living rose and

food shortages became more common, government popularity decreased. Nyerere personally came under attack and there were painted signs calling for his resignation and for a new leader. Nyerere continues his call for hard work and constantly reminds his people of the objectives which they yet have to achieve. But there are indications from the rural areas that people are increasingly angry at the force being applied.

Low levels of economic performance appear to be the major threat to the stability of Tanzania, yet such stability is vital if increases in both industrial and agricultural production are to come about. The 1970's have shown that instability may be caused by discrepancies in the social and economic areas (despite massive government efforts to reduce inequality in living standards) in advancement opportunities and between urban and rural areas. If the rate of success of present government policies and social mobilization steadily increase bringing demands which do not overload the system, then political instability might be avoided. Indeed, more responsive policies are needed from the government in order to produce greater harmonization of the social processes and a greater balance between aspirations and opportunities, between political demands and political capabilities.

Overall, the areas for potential instability in Tanzania are many. They are at once political, social and economic. However, the social and economic policies of the government have reduced severe inequalities in living standards, in opportunities between urban and rural areas and between the public and private sectors. In order to stave off the more rampant ills associated with modernization and industrialization the

rate of urbanization has been deliberately slowed. In the political sphere, however, deviations in the military could lead to future instability. But the reorganization of the army and its politicization at all levels through the establishment of party cells, guarantees a degree of loyalty to the existing regime quite rare in the African context. Regular contact between high ranking officers and civil servants, the second Vice-President and the President lessens the likelihood of the military aspiring to the leadership role.

According to Hopkins, the Presidency has the greatest potential for instability. He states, "if Nyerere were to alter his style of behavior, act independently of the law, or fail to use the powers of his office to reinforce the currently emerging system norms, important changes could occur".²⁸⁶ However, it seems unlikely that Nyerere's future behavior will deviate significantly from that of the past or present. The system, to a great extent, draws much of its strength and importance from present presidential performance. The test for the Tanzanian political system will come when a changeover of power becomes necessary. Already, the ground rules for orderly change by established procedures have been laid. But it remains to be seen whether political authority and above all legitimacy can be retained and maintained by Nyerere's successor. Although the foundations of political stability seem fairly solid at this point in time, the fluidity of the African political scene works to defy hard and fast conclusions. However, in the foreseeable future, as long as Nyerere retains control, political

²⁸⁶Hopkins, 1971, op.cit., pp. 233-234.

stability seems likely to persist and will figure largely in Tanzania's efforts to achieve economic development and modernization. Throughout his period as leader, Nyerere has achieved a great deal of power both personal and in the office of the Presidency. If such an office can retain, "... it's authority and dominance in decision-making, fissiparous tendencies will somehow be checked, congruence among major political roles will be reinforced, and the system will likely remain stable".²⁸⁷

²⁸⁷Ibid., p. 234.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

As a developing country, Tanzania stands out not only for its efforts to achieve a higher standard of living for all its inhabitants, but also for its efforts to accomplish equality through socialism. In the immediate post-independence years, it was much like any other developing nation. The Parliamentary system of government operated without little effect on the lives of the rural masses while foreign and private investors continued to dominate economic life. TANU had no coherent philosophy and its leaders had not yet committed themselves to a policy of socialism. For the most part, they continued to enjoy the benefits of independence without great concern for the economic and social conditions of the rural and urban workers.

Today, this particular state of affairs no longer exists. Throughout the 60's a number of major socialist initiatives began to clear the way for the building of a socialist society. Ideological pronouncements became progressively socialist, culminating with the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which was immediately followed by large-scale nationalization and villagization. Such policies attacked the growth of capitalist attitudes and practices which were becoming ubiquitous, especially in the rural areas and within the Tanzanian leadership itself. However, the implementation of policy continues to lag behind intentions and capitalist attitudes and practices have not yet been completely eradicated.

Many peasants still do not understand or accept the ideological goals of the system and are unable or unwilling to make ujamaa a reality.

Villagization has taken place at a rate which many inside and outside Tanzania consider alarming and disastrous because of the lack of adequate planning and preparation. Complaints have most often rested on the pace of the movement and the lack of proper compensation for those leaving behind permanent houses and improvements to make a new beginning. Quite recently, the use of force in the development of ujamaa villages has become of great concern to leaders and observers of Tanzanian politics. Although its use has been somewhat checked, continued use could severely undermine government efforts.

The program of villagization has had moderate success but ujamaa remains a long way off. Villagization should not be mistaken as the establishment of ujamaa for the two are completely different. The former is only the first step that makes the next possible, i.e., the transformation of individuals living in a community into a co-operative socialist society. Ultimately, the success of villagization will figure largely in the building of socialist communities but at present, regrouping villages has done little to effect changes in individual farming habits.

Nationalization, too, has not miraculously led to the achievement of socialist relations in public industries and has, thus far, done little to advance the country towards its socialist objectives. However, nationalization remains a significant step in reaffirming the commitment to socialism, which is most important in maintaining the credibility of the leadership. At the same time, the continued dependence on foreign expertise in the making of economic decisions makes for the questioning of the socialist content of such policy formation.

Tanzania has a long road to travel before it becomes a fully fledged socialist society. In the leadership sphere, it has drawn strong criticism concerning its internal organization, structure and composition. Both at the national and local levels the political leaders form an elite set apart from the masses. The selection of leaders is based on their skill and competence and also on their beliefs and adherence to certain values. Moreover, despite the egalitarianism within the ideology, leaders are seldom chosen from a worker or peasant background. More often than not, they come from the best families and are usually well educated and professionally trained.

The national leadership dominates the decision-making process. Powers are delegated to local political leaders but these powers are severely circumscribed. The people play a minor role in setting goals and objectives of major importance although they participate more fully in day to day decisions affecting their lives. A strong, albeit not yet dangerous, element of paternalism is discernible in the relationship between the leaders and the masses. While leaders believe strongly in the democratic participation of the people via the franchise, they also believe that at this stage in Tanzania's history the people need to be guided with a firm but gentle hand. This led to the adoption of a superior attitude towards its constituency with the elite assuming, not necessarily correctly, that it knows what is in the best interest of the people. There is a noticeable lack of faith in the integrity of the people despite the emphasis on popular participation. Every important stage in the development of democratic institutions in Tanzania has witnessed an outpouring of literature devoted to the mobilization of

and participation by the people. In many instances, this had led to a likening of the ideology to a latent form of populism but in reality the government and its agents firmly control all executive decision-making.

Although the ethnic composition of the elite fairly represents the tribal makeup of the country, in social composition it is overrepresentative of the middle and upper echelons of society. Recruitment patterns have changed very little over the past decade and there has been but a slight expansion in the number of leadership positions open to aspiring Tanzanian's. This lack of upward mobility could become a situation of potential conflict if sufficient interests were left outside the main political arena.

Elites in Tanzania, especially those within the party and government bureaucracy, are still a privileged minority in a sea of poverty. Their incomes are substantially higher than the ordinary Tanzanian and will continue to be so if the skilled are to be financially tempted into promoting the development of all the people. Despite the ideological assumptions on which Nyerere's African Socialism is based, Tanzania has not overcome the fact of classes or the divisions caused by large income differentials. Several factors, e.g., the continued use of expatriates, the inherited salary structure, the bourgeoisie practices of neighboring bureaucracies, the demand for high salaries from skilled Tanzanians and the lack of support for an egalitarian ideology, have worked against this.

The lack of commitment to socialist ideals and the gradual accumulation of wealth by Tanzanian leaders remains a fact of the post-independent years. The gap between rich and poor steadily increased

despite rises in minimum wages. Towards the end of the 60's, Nyerere realized that drastic measures were in order and TANU officially pledged itself to effect socialist development. The dominant position of the leadership left them accountable to no one and led to the manifestation of oligarchical tendencies within the one-party system. The Party's gradual rise to supremacy resulted in the transferring of decision-making powers to party appointed bodies, i.e., the NEC and the Central Committee, from a popularly elected body, i.e., Parliament. The latter, along with the Cabinet, declined in importance and Nyerere and his immediate associates developed a closed system of politics in which some key decisions were privately arrived at.

In the wider political arena, the party leaders effected an almost complete neutralization of organized interest. Severe restrictions have been placed on the political activities of groups and their impact in decision-making has thus been negligible. Despite its claims of democratic practices and procedures there are often glaring contradictions in the operation of the one-party system. Public criticism and dissent are not tolerated and can result in expulsion from the Party (and subsequent ending of a career) or loss of personal liberty. Although Nyerere has spent much time and literature expressing the degree of freedom which the society guarantees the individual, the President has sweeping powers of preventive detention that cannot be challenged in any court. Evidently, there is the need for greater protection of the individual and firmer guarantees of his freedom and his rights.

Nyerere stands firmly on his commitment to socialism and the development of a party -- not an elitist vanguard -- capable of leading

his people. It would seem that the party leaders at this time do constitute a vanguard and can be likened somewhat to Plato's "guardians". The movement is no longer open to all, and domination from the top leaves little opportunity for influence from below. Paradoxes clearly exist. The elite's struggle for a party system receptive to views and ideas is somewhat negated by its intolerance to criticism and dissent. The leaders must squarely face the problem of criticism for TANU cannot accomodate and cater to all groups in society.

TANU has struggled to build and control institutions by which to rule yet it remains largely incapable of fulfilling many of its development objectives. Its extractive and distributive capabilities are noticeably weak and have not been enhanced by the poverty of the country. TANU's commitment to reduce inequalities still requires more sustained effort as there is a great reluctance to confront those who are most at fault.

There is little room for complacency within the elite in the ongoing struggle for political and economic development. Thus far, the political arrangements have proved instrumental in minimizing conflict and in settling disputes concerning the allocation and distribution of scarce resources. However, the system's capability to weather severe economic storms has not yet been fully tested. A history of stability and legitimacy have provided the foundations on which the institutionalization of political behavior can be built. Until the time that political leaders can turn their major focus away from national integration in the political arena the broader economic objectives will likely remain unfulfilled.

For the immediate future, political considerations are likely to take precedence over economic ones. But economic problems will increasingly occupy Tanzanian leaders for at this time the economic prospects of Tanzania are not too bright. The country has been unable to feed itself, while increases in world food prices and decreasing returns on export products have cut deeply into its foreign reserves and development prospects. Ujamaa policies have not increased production significantly, output on nationalized "capitalist" farms is down and the degree of commitment and mobilization by some of the leadership leaves much to be desired. The Party has made deliberate moves to improve the quality of its membership among the rank and file thus facing up to the challenge of producing members and leaders to establish a true commitment to its own socialist principles. TANU is also persisting in its efforts to persuade thousands of villages to emulate the present example of a score or so genuine socialist villages committed to socialist production. The obstacles to success are many and the time span since the initiation of such policies is much too short to allow detailed analysis at this stage. Long range effects are not yet clear but in the short run Tanzania will require a strong, committed and resilient leadership to guide it through the years ahead.

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APPENDIX A

TANZANIA: ECONOMIC ABSTRACT

SIZE: Tanzania is the tenth largest country in Africa south of the Sahara, the size of Germany and France combined, with a land area of 362,440 square miles, and a water area of 20,650 square miles, of which part of Lake Victoria comprises 13,450.

POPULATION: Tanzanian's last population census in 1967 gave the total as 12,231,000. With an estimated population growth of 2.7% per annum, the total by the end of 1974 is c. 15,000,000. The population is concentrated around the edges of the country; many areas in the dry central plateau are virtually uninhabited. There is a great deal of regional variation. Zanzibar, the coastal areas and the regions around Lake Victoria and Mount Kilimanjaro are from five to one hundred times more densely settled than central or southern districts. Population density is around 34 per square mile. Europeans number 15,000; Asians 85,000; and Arabs 26,000.

URBANIZATION: Urbanization in towns over 10,000 is about 5.5%. Dar-es-Salaam is the largest city with a population of 300,000. There is continuing rapid urban growth, but Tanzania will remain a predominantly rural country. Thus, overcrowding will not pose a great problem in the immediate future. Other principal towns beside Dar-es-Salaam are Zanzibar: 70,000, Tanga: 60,000 and Mwanza: 34,000.

INDICES OF DEVELOPMENT: Tanzania compares unfavorably to other

countries of tropical Africa in many respects. One survey ranked it 108th of 122 countries in gross national product per capita.

In 1967, the annual per capita income was about \$63 and in 1971 about \$80. National income has grown slowly because of the decline in prices for major exports, i.e., coffee, sisal and cotton.

Agriculture accounts for half the GDP. From 1960-1968 the economy grew at about 5.9% though earnings from major agricultural crops grew at a slower pace of 5.2%.

In 1970, there were 800,000 pupils in primary schools, and 28,000 in secondary schools and 600 students attending the University of Dar-es-Salaam. The number of doctors was listed at 650 -- one doctor per 20,000. In addition there were 180 medical assistants, over 100 health inspectors and over 1,000 nurses.

Licensed vehicles in 1966 stood around 36,000 for cars and 11,500 for commercial vehicles. Telephones numbered some 29,000 while radios stood at 125,000.

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTS (in millions of Tanzanian Shillings)

	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
GDP at current factor cost	10,090	11,257	13,749
GDP at constant (1966) prices	8,490	8,864	9,006
Increase (per cent)	5.9	4.4	2.1

PRINCIPAL EXPORTS (excluding those to Kenya and Uganda)

	1972'	1973'	1974'
Coffee	383	495	375
Cotton Lint	336	333	473
Sisal	145	222	463
Diamonds	88	170	107
Cashew Nuts	150	141	196
Meat and Preparations	42	18	n.a.
Cloves	240	233	88
Oil Seeds, Nuts, etc.	36	47	n.a.
Tea	54	54	69
Hides and Skins	42	47	n.a.
Pyrethrum Extract	22	17	n.a.
Petroleum Products	215	89	n.a.
Tobacco	49	56	n.a.
Other	225	316	n.a.
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	2,027	2,238	2,537

Provisional

MAIN IMPORTS (including those from Kenya and Uganda and for Zanzibar)

	1972'	1973'	1974'
Food and Live animals	313	275	1,053
Beverages and Tobacco	14	22	n.a.
Crude materials	40	59	n.a.
Crude petroleum	104	238	928
Other mineral fuels, etc.	193	157	n.a.
Oils and fats	46	46	n.a.

Provisional

Source: Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-1976, p. B341.

APPENDIX B

THE TANU GOVERNMENT (as at 31 January 1975)

President	Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere
First Vice-President	Aboude Jumbe
Second Vice-President and Prime Minister	Rashidi M. Kawawa

Other Ministers

Foreign Affairs	John Malecela
Finance	Cleopa Msuya
Commerce and Industries	Amir Jamal
Home Affairs	Omari Muhaji
Agriculture	Joseph Mungai
Economic Affairs and Development Planning	Wilbert Chagula
Defence and National Service	Edward Sokoine
Natural Resources and Tourism	Hansu Makame
National Education	Simon Chiwanga
Communications and Transport	Alfred Tandau (Previously Job Lusinde)
Minister in the First Vice-President's Office	Hassan Moyo
Lands, Housing and Urban Development	Musobi Mageni
Water Development and Power	Isaeli Elinewinga
Health	Hassan Mwenyi
Labor and Social Welfare	Gisler Mapunda (Previously Alfred Tandau)
Information and Broadcasting	Daudi Mwaicwago
Sport and National Culture (New Ministry)	Maj.-Gen. M. S. H. Sarakikya
Works (New Ministry)	Job Lusinde
Minister of State for Capital Development	Chief Adam Sapi
Minister of State in the President's Office	Peter Siyovelwa

Junior Ministers

Office of the Second-Vice President	Patrick Qorro and Mussa Masomo
Prime Minister	Tawakali Khamis Tawakali
Foreign Affairs	Geoffrey Mhagama
Defence and National Service	Mustafa Nyang'anyi
Health	Robert Ngitu
Communications and Transport	

Source: Africa Contemporary Record (ACR) 1974-1975, p. B290.

On 9 November, 1975, Nyerere announced a government reshuffle. John Malecela was transferred to the Agriculture Ministry and two New Ministries were established. Women ministers were included for the first time in the 26-member cabinet. Mrs. Julie Manning was appointed to the newly created Ministry of Justice while Mrs. Thabita Siwale became Minister of Land, Housing and Urban Development.

Ibrahim Kadume, formerly Director of Political Education at the University of Dar-es-Salaam became the new Foreign Minister. In addition a new department was created, i.e., Ministry of Manpower, which had previously existed under the Ministry of Finance.

* The Minister for Industries is now Mr. C. D. Msuya.

APPENDIX C

THE ARUSHA DECLARATION

Part One: THE TANU CREED

The policy of TANU is to build a socialist state. The principles of socialism are laid down in the TANU constitution and they are as follows.

Whereas TANU believes:

- a) That all human beings are equal;
- b) That every individual has a right to dignity and respect;
- c) That every citizen is an integral part of the nation and has the right to take an equal part in Government at local, regional and national level;
- d) That every citizen has the right of freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law;
- e) That every individual has the right to receive from society protection of his life and of property held according to law;
- f) That every individual has a right to receive a just return for his labor;
- g) That all citizens together possess all the natural resources of the state in trust for their descendants;
- h) That in order to ensure economic justice the state must have effective control over the principal means of production; and
- i) That it is the responsibility of the state to intervene actively in the economic life of the nation so as to ensure the well-being of all citizens, and so as to prevent the exploitation of one person

by another or one group by another, and so as to prevent the accumulation of wealth to an extent which is inconsistent with the existence of a classless society.

The principal aims and objects of TANU are:

- a) To consolidate and maintain the independence of this country and the freedom of its people;
- b) To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- c) To ensure that this country shall be governed by a democratic socialist government of the people;
- d) To co-operate with all the political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa;
- e) To see that the Government mobilizes all the resources of this country towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and disease;
- f) To see that the Government actively assists in the formation and maintainance of co-operative organizations;
- g) To see that wherever possible the Government itself directly participates in the economic development of this country;
- h) To see that the Government gives equal opportunity to all men and women irrespective of race, religion or status;
- i) To see that the Government eradicates all types of exploitation, intimidation, discrimination, bribery and corruption;
- j) To see that Government exercises effective control over the principal means of production and persue policies which facilitate the way to collective ownership of the resources of this country;

- k) To see that the Government co-operates with other states in Africa in bringing about African unity;
- 1) To see that the Government works tirelessly toward world peace and security through the United Nations Organization.

Part Two: THE POLICY OF SOCIALISM (Summarized)

a) Absence of Exploitation

- Nyerere speaks out against the existence of classes and exploitation of one class by another.
- Declares Tanzania a nation of peasants and workers.

b) Public control of the means of production and exchange

- Peasant and worker control of the means of production and exchange.

c) Existence of Democracy

- Democracy declared a necessary pre-requisite for socialism.

d) Socialism is a belief

- Socialism must be built by those who believe in it.

Part Three: THE POLICY OF SELF-RELIANCE (Summarized)

- TANU must fight the war against poverty, ignorance and disease.
- Money rejected as the chief weapon for development.
- Too much emphasis placed on industry; more attention must be paid to the peasant.
- Development must be achieved by people through hard work and intelligence.
- Land, people, good policies and good leadership major ingredients for development.

Part Four: TANU MEMBERSHIP

... The National Executive feels that the time has come when we should put more emphasis on the beliefs of our Party and its policies of socialism.

... if it is discovered that a man does not appear to accept the faith, the objects, and the rules and regulations of the Party, then he should not be accepted as a member ... TANU is a Party of peasants and workers.

Part Five: THE ARUSHA RESOLUTION

The National Executive Committee resolves:

a) The Leadership

1. Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism.
2. No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company.
3. No TANU or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned enterprise.
4. No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.
5. No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.
6. ... the term "leader" should comprise the following:
 Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers; MP's; senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU; senior officials of para-statal organizations; all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU Constitution; councillors; and civil servants in the high and middle cadres ...

b) The Government and Other Institutions (Summarized)

(deals primarily with Government and the practical implementation of socialism)

c) Membership

Members should get thorough teaching on Party ideology so that they may understand it, and they should always be reminded of the importance of living up to its principles.

Source: Nyerere, 1968, pp. 231-250.