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# Greece and NATO: A Study of Policy Divergence and Alliance Cohesion

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GREECE AND NATO:

A STUDY OF POLICY DIVERGENCE AND ALLIANCE COHESION  
(TITLE)

BY

JOHN G. HATZADONY

**THESIS**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Modern alliance theory is based on the assumption that states come together in defense against a common threat. However, these theories were developed early in the Cold War in an effort to explain how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed. Some member states do not fit into the neat theories suggested.

This thesis is an examination of the historical events that have shaped Greek relations with NATO and the United States. The thesis seeks to assess the usefulness of contemporary alliance theory in explaining divergent principles among alliance members and the effect this has had on the Atlantic Alliance and alliances in general. It also seeks to assess the influence of the US in Greek foreign policy from 1945 and the institution of the Truman Doctrine. The failure of the US and NATO to react to overt moves by Turkey against Greek sovereignty, the failure of the US and NATO to react to the 'Colonels' Coup,' or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus distanced Greeks from the common policy promoted by the US and NATO.

Alliance theory is far from complete. The theories developed during the Cold War lack fundamental concepts regarding intra-alliance relationships and cleavages that develop among member states, such as the problems between Greece and Turkey. This failure has hindered understanding of the true relationship between Greece and NATO to be understood.



*To Mom and Dad*

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

In the last forty years Greece's foreign policy landscape has undergone a tremendous metamorphosis. Yet, some of the strategies Greek foreign policy makers have used across different regime types remained strikingly similar. In 1970 the country was under a dictatorship of military colonels. By 1990 Greece belonged to the European Community and was generally considered among western Europe's consolidated democratic regimes. In 1970 Greece was dominated by the influence of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's security concerns. Neither the US nor NATO protested at the rise of a military government in Greece as long as Greece maintained her commitments to the Alliance. The populace of Greece elected a socialist-dominated government in the 1980's, more in protest against the lack of support that these two had shown Greece during the years of the junta. For most of the 1980's this government followed a foreign policy that essentially reversed years of traditional Greek security policy. By the end of the Cold War, though, Greece had ended the radical foreign policies of the eighties in favor of a pro-Europe/pro-Greek foreign policy.

Traditional theories of alliance cohesion and disintegration concentrate on the factors that hold security communities together in pursuit of a common goal. Nations enter into alliances for security, stability and status. They remain together in pursuit

of a common goal that is mapped out by this ideology by taking events of long past and recent memory and forming them into a future goal (Liska 1962, 61). Regardless of this esoteric explanation of ideological commitment among the members of this alliance, one thing remains firm: states come together for common defense from a perceived threat.

This basis of alliance cohesion can be considered the mainstream in alliance theory today. Lacking in the discussion of security alliances is the development of competing security policies among alliance member states, or more succinctly, what happens when two alliance members feel the other is a greater threat to security; perhaps even greater than the one they supposedly share together? What does the alliance do? Does it take sides at risk of losing a member? If the two members initiate conflict, how does the collective security arrangement deal with the conflict? Are the current theories that are concerned with alliance cohesion and dynamics adequate to answer these questions at all?

In the decades of NATO's existence, the Southern, Mediterranean Flank of the Alliance has been the least studied yet one of the most volatile and threatening to the organization's stability. With the main threat of the Cold War being situated in the Central European Theater, it is not a surprise to see that Greece has been relegated to the periphery. It is a consequence of geo-strategic politics. The NATO Alliance prioritized its perceived threat and consequently relegated what was considered an independent Greek security problem to a tertiary frame. However, Greece's concurrent security threat is another Alliance member.

The constant tensions between Greece and Turkey have threatened the

alliance's stability and cohesion a number of times throughout its history. The Greek perception has been that NATO, and consequently the United States, has seen Turkey as a greater and more important ally in the Cold War, and they feel they have suffered from this prioritization against them in their concurrent conflict with Turkey and with the Cyprus issue.

The lack of extensive research on the Southern Flank necessitates a reappraisal of the Greek-NATO relationship. What is needed is: 1) an evaluation of the strategic threat to Greece by the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War years and the simultaneous conflict with Turkey, 2) an evaluation of NATO and American policy toward Greece and Turkey during times of increased tension including the most recent in January/February 1996, 3) a re-evaluation of the evolution of Greek foreign policy and, 4) attention to the divergence of threat priorities between Greece and NATO from the period of accession to the present.

The reality of the Greek-NATO relationship was one of bilateral ties between the US and Greece. Greece did not suffer from a direct Warsaw Pact threat on the scale seen in the Central European Theater. In addition, it was not influential enough in the Middle East. This has led the US and NATO to conclude that the greater support go to Turkey, especially now with Turkey's ongoing internal difficulties and rising influence of Muslim fundamentalism in the Turkish political system. Legitimate Greek claims, including territorial and air space disputes in the Aegean, and the ongoing Cyprus problem have been bypassed in support of Turkey due to perceived threats to the strategic security of NATO and the US.

Greek foreign policy has been relatively consistent in the two decades since

the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus. It perceived Turkey as a greater threat to its security than that of the Warsaw Pact. Post-Cold War Greek foreign policy has not rectified the problems between the Greeks and Europeans. The cultivation of continued relations with the government of Serbia and the refusal to recognize the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have set Greek-European relations back years. Yet these are long standing relationships and difficulties not recognized or accepted by the rest of Europe. The lack of any European initiatives to recognize Greek claims against the Turks has also led to Greek intransigence concerning common European or NATO policies.

Unfortunately for Greece, the 1980's saw the worst period of relations with Europe and the US. The Government of Andreas Papandreou, under the guise of the Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), attempted to cultivate ties with the Communist states of Eastern Europe and at many times were at odds with mainstream West European foreign policies. In addition, Papandreou became associated with many so-called pariah states and statesmen, including Muamar Gadhafi and Manuel Noriega. He also provided verbal support for the Jarulzelski Government in Poland and would not condemn the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1980. Not surprisingly, these positions did nothing to endear Greece to American and European favor.

One parallel that we may draw from this is perhaps that of the French foreign policies from the 1950's onward. President de Gaulle attempted to place French policy in a position of independence, much the same as Papandreou attempted in the 1980's in Greece. Such was the inclination between France and Greece that Papandreou and Francois Mitterand were in fact close friends, a relationship cultivated in their mutual attempts to distance their states from perceived American



dominance in Europe. However, Greece's small size, relative lack of status and minor, independent military power did not provide it with the position and status Papandreou had hoped. Rather, Papandreou followed the French lead in developing an anti-, or perhaps non-American European coalition with France instead.

Returning to our opening questions then, what effect has this had on the divergence of Greek and NATO policies? From the Greek view, it seems certain that NATO was taking sides with Turkey in the Greco-Turkish bilateral disputes, and, as such, NATO did not aid Greece in the event of a crisis. The best example of this is the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. The weak NATO stance led to the Karamanlis Government withdrawing Greece from NATO's military wing for a number of years.

Greece was also extremely disconcerted at the *prima facie* support that the United States and NATO had given the military government of General Papagos from 1967-1974. The military government's involvement in the Cyprus War could have been averted, in Greek eyes, by stronger American and NATO pressure to end the junta.

The American-NATO view of Greece was one of a radical, populist foreign policy being pursued by Andreas Papandreou in an attempt to lessen American-NATO influence. At the same time, the Greeks were distanced from much of the world community because of some of the political cultivations they pursued. During the heightened tensions of the Cold War in the 1980's, NATO and American strategy necessitated a stronger Turkey as well. Such support for increasing and modernizing the Turkish military was also a direct threat to Greek national security. However, in

the interests and purposes of the Alliance, it became NATO first, and hence Turkey, and Greek national security concerning Turkey second.

### **Theory and Literature Review**

In the literature on the formation and maintenance of the pluralistic security community, we can see that some of the primary conditions necessary for such a community were, and perhaps still are, violated in the case of Greece and NATO. One of the main architects of collective security theory is George F. Liska. His theories evolved from an analysis of state alignment. In his view states align for varying reasons. However, it is in the dynamics of the alliance and pluralistic communities in the maintenance of such broad-based coalitions that Liska readily admits that there exist limits of interdependence among states.

Alliances are formed to enable their members to achieve a shared objective in addition to joining for security, stability, and status (Liska 1962, 61). The leaders of the member states must also weigh the costs and rewards of alignment. Therefore the perception must exist that entrance into or remaining in an alliance must outweigh other considerations, including retaining the total independence non-membership can provide (Liska 1962, 175).

Alliances also must have a common rationalization. This ideology is a primary cohesive bond that keeps the states bound together (Liska 1962, 61). In many cases national priorities must take second place for the greater good of the alliance. The decade after World War II saw the development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a bulwark against the new threat of Communism. The Berlin

Airlift, the Greek Civil War, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Korean War all provided evidence to many western European states that only by presenting a united front could they defend themselves from possible attack. The deterrence capability of such an alliance far outweighed any other disadvantages it may have brought about.

Alliance cohesiveness is related to the existence of a central, or 'core power.' NATO's core power has always been the United States, and it is with the US that alignment occurs in regard to NATO members. An increase in the relative power and influence of the 'core' also tends to increase alliance cohesion and efficiency (Daugherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971, 304). The dominance of the US in NATO cohesion goes a long way in explaining Greek-NATO relations. It is the dominance of the US-Greek bilateral relationship over Greek membership in NATO that has solidified Greece into the European security regime. By dominating Greek security policy separately as opposed to having the Alliance dominate it, the US gained concessions from Greece that could not be acquired from the collective. This included US bases that could be used for NATO or for separate US policy.

The end of the Cold War further emphasizes the problems of contemporary alliance theory. Collective, pluralistic security communities generally disband after their objectives have been achieved. That is where NATO stands now in the post-Cold War era. While we must assume that the current members must find some positive sum gain in the Alliance continuing if it is not based on a perceived, unifying threat. In the case of Greece, which has not conceded to the common threat of NATO since 1974, the Cold War ended earlier than NATO collectively. Greek

divergence from the common NATO policy can also be dated from the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, another NATO member, and the years immediately after. Greece has remained in NATO, though, and her position has been analogous to the NATO members that must deal with the Alliance in the post-Cold War now.

Despite the advances Liska's theory provides us with regarding the dynamics of alliances, he is unable to take account of the special considerations regarding the small state. It is with the small state that this thesis is most concerned. Often they are relegated to the periphery due to geo-strategic concerns or super-power priorities. Christopher Bladen provides a significant contribution to Cold War alliance theory. He points out that cleavages among the members cannot always be healed. While this may be a general indication of the possible dissolution of the alliance it also provides evidence that there is a limit to alliance action. It is generally confined to defense against a specific common external threat (Bladen 1970, 125).

Bladen's specifications on alliance theory provide the succinct statement that intra-alliance politics can conflict with alliance policy. This is what can be termed the 'diversity of interests' argument. Bladen ponders that, logically, nation-states of course have individual priorities in addition to the common alliance priority. Generally, though, and parallel with the theory postulated by Liska, individual policy does not conflict with or affect the common policy of the alliance.

One additional theorist on the dynamics of alliances is Robert L. Rothstein. Rothstein's theories concentrate on the relationship between small states and their foreign policies and their relationship with super-powers. This is especially useful in the relationship of Liska's 'core' state which dominates the alliance system and the

smaller states. Rothstein argues that small states can be pressured into membership or perceive threats that, at the proper time, will make them more amenable to 'advice' from the larger power (1970, 354).

The theoretical distinction between a great-power/small-power relationship and a multilateral alliance is still valid, but, Rothstein argues, in actual practice it has been severely diluted. The form of the alliance is based on the 'core' power's influence. Generally, the initiator of the alliance tends to promote a multilateral relationship in an effort to decrease the political losses alignment may bring about. It is the small power that generally prefers the bilateral relationship. This form, in favor of the small state, guarantees more aid, financial and material. The multilateral form also favors the small state in providing it with more intra-alliance leverage and the opportunities to present its views more regularly before other members of the alliance (Rothstein 1970, 354-355).

There is a comparative lack of academic study on modern Greek foreign policy in the United States, and very little on Greece and NATO specifically. The majority of researchers in the area are American trained but teaching in Greece or Europe, while the majority of English writers are in Great Britain. There is one notable American exception, Keith Legg's Politics in Modern Greece; unfortunately, even this book on contemporary Greek politics was written in 1969.

This is not to say that there are no researchers in the area. Many notable Greek academics, such as Nikolaos Stavrou at Howard, Van Coufoudakis at Indiana University-Purdue University-Fort Wayne, Christos Ioannides, director of the Speros Basil Vryonis Center for the Study of Hellenism, and Theodore Couloumbis at the

University of Athens have contributed much, in English and Greek, on Greek security, politics, and foreign policy. However, most of their writings have centered on Greek socialist foreign policy from the 1980's. While the goal of this paper is to investigate these areas as well, the Greek relationship with NATO presents a unique example of internal problems in collective security organizations. How does a state with conflicting security policies deal with these issues? How did this divergence of priorities develop? How does the organization deal with this state's problem collectively?

Excellent information on modern Greek foreign policy is available from the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy whose annual yearbook on South-East Europe provides many useful articles from Greek academics and professionals in Greek foreign policy and security. A recent interview with a member of the Greek Mission to NATO, Ms. Voula Panagiotithou, has provided 'official' confirmation of many of conclusions reached by researchers on Greek foreign policy.

Journals that deal with the Greek defense policy, and provide evidence of the Greek perception of its true enemy, include (in Greek) "Amyyna kai Diplomatia (Hellenic Diplomacy and Defence)," "Amyntika Themata (Greek Defence News)," and "Syngkronos Stratos (Modern Army)." In addition, the London based 'Economist' magazine has been utilized for recent political developments. It provides a unique coverage of Greece's domestic politics and international relations, much better than any American newspapers.

The thesis, then, will illustrate how and why Greek foreign policy has developed and how, given the current application of alliance theory dynamics, their

security policy has developed so differently from that of the NATO Alliance. By assessing the relationships that have dominated Greek foreign policy from independence to the present and the security threats that she has perceived, the study will analyze the expectations of the various Greek governments and the reactions of her allies. It will also consider whether the alliance theories analyzed and used as a basis for the discussion here are relevant in analyzing the relationship of NATO and Greece.

Four distinct periods of Greek foreign policy can be discerned. Chapter Two presents the historical development of Greek foreign relations based on her relationship with the power that dominates the Mediterranean. From independence until the end of World War II this was the United Kingdom. Developments after World War II brought about the United States as the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean and changed the security relationship for Greece. Chapter Three examines the development of the military coup in Greece and their relationship with the US and NATO from 1967 to 1974. It also focuses on the role of the Cypriot War with Turkey and the lack of involvement by the US and NATO. Chapter Four analyzes the immediate post-military government events in Greek policy and how they contributed to the election of the Socialist government of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. It goes on to explain how Papandreou dominated and changed Greek foreign policy in an attempt to distance Greece from the influence of the US and NATO. The following chapter will then chronologize developments of Greece in the post-Papandreou/post-Cold War era and the dominance of the Turkish threat in Greek national security concerns.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **GREEK SECURITY POLICY: 1821 - 1967**

The role of Greece in the cooperative security arena known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has changed through various eras of the Greek state. Since Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, Greece has had a long association with great powers that have served as her sponsor and protector. Initially it was Great Britain. With liberation from German occupation in 1944, Greece became even more concerned with its security posture, both internal and external. It was fighting a Communist guerrilla army that had the power to win, and was becoming surrounded by Communist powers on its northern borders in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Fortunately, relations with Italy slowly mended and those with Turkey remained relatively stable until the 1960's.

At the end of World War II, Great Britain was no longer able to continue supporting the Greek Kingdom. This led to the United States stepping in as the new power behind, not only Greece, but also Turkey and other European and Mediterranean states. Facing an ever belligerent Communist Europe, led by the Soviet Union, it was the entrance of the United States into the region that promoted Greek security and accession to the new security alliance being formed in Europe. It also reflected a lack of Greek independence in foreign policy which plagued the nation from independence and for decades to come.



The pages that follow will outline these developments by placing into perspective for the reader the outside influences that pressured the new Greek state for over a century and a half. These influences forced Greece into a subservient position to the greater players in world politics. This position as a close, yet subservient ally to the greater powers forced Greece to view threats to the larger allies as her own.

This chapter will also present the formative events that began to weaken the cohesion of the Southern Flank of the Atlantic Alliance. When, in the late 1950's and 1960's Greece began to see its security threatened by a so-called ally, Turkey, its security position began to alter away from that of the NATO allies and more towards an independent one. The development of an independent threat, a threat that soon began to take priority over the collective Alliance security threat, a threat from another NATO ally, was to become a major problem in maintaining the cohesiveness of NATO's Mediterranean members.

### **Great Power Intervention**

As one of the main states responsible for Greece's independence from the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain was able to maintain an era of influence over the new state that lasted for over 120 years. At the end of the 19th-century, the post-Napoleonic period, Great Britain, France and Russia had begun to consider the future of the southern Balkans. In reality, the question was not one of Greek independence. Few doubted that a Greek nation existed any longer. The true question was who would annex the area or whether it would return to the salvaged Ottoman Empire (Woodhouse 1991, 124).

Greek nationalists began appealing to the United States and Great Britain in early April 1821 after full fledged fighting broke out against the Ottomans. The Greeks were offering the Greek Kingdom to minor nobility throughout Europe, optimistically sure of their independence. The Great Powers had their own notions of the future monarch of the Kingdom of Greece, however. The recognition of this by the Great Powers was enough to ensure their eventual involvement in Greek independence and their choice of the Greek monarch (Woodhouse 1991, 138).

The Great Powers' involvement in the Greek independence movement was not without urging from the private sector. The rise of Philhellene, or pro-Greek, independence movements throughout Europe, especially in London, Paris, and St. Petersburg provided a romantic notion to many young adventurers of freeing the cradle of democracy and Western thought and ideals from the Ottoman Empire. The ultimate private adventurer was Lord Byron who arrived in Greece in April 1824, four years into the struggle (Woodhouse 1991, 141).

The French, British and Russians all rebuffed alternate attempts to seek an end to the fighting with some autonomy or independence for the Greeks. Each secretly suspected the other of maneuvering for dominance over the region. Of course this was entirely true. The various Greek parties that supported the French, British or Russians were also arguing with each other. However, by 1825-26 they were so strapped for aid that they jointly solicited support from anywhere. It was the British group that was noticeably gaining influence by this point (Woodhouse 1991, 143).

The rise in violence and anarchy in south-east Europe finally prompted the

Powers into direct intervention. The Sultan in Istanbul knew that he could no longer pacify the area and this ultimately led to the creation of the new Greek Kingdom that was finalized in April 1832 with the Great Powers' choice of Otto, the seventeen-year old son of King Ludwig I of Bavaria. Thus the Great Powers had not only guaranteed Greek independence and sovereignty, but they also proceeded to decide on her boundaries (see map in Appendix A). While certainly not sovereign in any real sense, after all Greece was under Bavarian regency and subject to arbitrary interference by Great Britain or France (the Russians having signed a treaty with the Sultan earlier and withdrawn from the region), they at least had their country (Woodhouse 1991, 155-156).

The Greeks were obviously not entirely happy with the results. They still wanted for more territory that were 'ancestral lands' and were displeased by the choice of Otto due to his Catholic origins when the Greeks had time and again requested an Orthodox monarch. However, the only place such a monarch could come from was Russia, and the powers had agreed not to have one of their family members on the throne (Woodhouse 1991, 161-162). Yet again the Great Powers had decided that the Greek interests were of secondary importance.

For the next one-hundred years, Greece would continue to be dominated by the greater powers that dominated Europe, the most influence being exhibited by Great Britain. Thus, what could be termed the British Century in Greece was born. Not only was this because of the influence that Great Britain had over Greece in their support against the Ottoman Empire, but it was also tied to various Greek policies that went out of line away from British interests. British power in the Mediterranean

also provided direct evidence to the continuing Greek governments that Great Britain was also the only power that Greece could turn to for real support if and when it was needed.

The fall of the Bavarian dynasty from the Greek monarchy was followed by a Greek plebiscite to invite Prince Alfred of Great Britain to be the King of the Hellenes. The British nixed this quickly and, with the other powers, invited Prince William George, the second son of the King of Denmark. Unlike the previous King, William George received the overwhelming support of the Greeks (Woodhouse 1991, 170). This provided much needed stability in the Greek political system since it was the first time in the new nation that the people had made a decision that was not changed or imposed by the outside. The fact that the new King George I was King of the Hellenes, meaning all Greeks, as opposed to just the King of Greece, like King Otto, was especially important later when the Greeks began to expand to encompass Greeks lands still under British and Ottoman control (Woodhouse 1991, 171).

As the Greeks began to expand under the nationalistic notion called the *Megali Idea*, or Great Idea, they constantly faced intervention by the Great Powers that wished to maintain the integrity of the diminishing Ottoman empire in an effort to balance power in the region. Russian Tsars had for years been pressing for the dismantling of the Empire, and thus the British and the French were bound to keep the Sultan's empire from falling to keep the Tsars in place.

The Greek Kingdom was constantly seeking *enosis*, or union, with the occupied Greek lands to the north, islands in the Aegean, and most of all Crete. Greece lost lands during the abortive military adventures in the late 19th century

under Crown Prince Constantine. This was the only severe setback suffered by the new King George I. The timing for this was a little ill-conceived on the Greek government's part. A few years later would have seen the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire that saw the independence given to many former subject peoples. Indeed, in 1908, the revolution of the Young Turks in Macedonia, in reaction to a century of nationalism in the Ottoman provinces, provided Greece with the first chance to become a pro-active player in the region as opposed to a reactive plaything of the Great Powers (Woodhouse 1991, 182-183).

Under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos the Balkan League was formed linking Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria in written and unwritten defense agreements and to take advantage of the fast dissolving Ottoman Empire. Rather than being forced to accept the Great Powers' plans, the Balkan League hoped to take advantage of the spoils of the end of an empire on their own terms. From 1908 to 1912, Venizelos had prepared Greece for war by inviting military missions into the country from France and Great Britain (Woodhouse 1991, 190).

Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire on October 18, 1912, following Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria. The Greek Government, under Venizelos, announced *enosis* with Crete and captured Thessaloniki in November. The League successes were so quick that the powers felt compelled to intervene. The British and the French were unwilling to allow the Aegean islands around the Dardanelles to fall into Greek hands, and the Russians were not willing to see the Ottoman Empire collapse just yet. In addition, all three powers did not want to see Constantinople fall. After two disastrous months, the Turks signed an armistice in December. Enver

Pasha, however, leader of the Young Turks, overthrew the standing government, and renewed the war. This ended in even worse terms for the Turks. The Greeks captured Ioannina, the Bulgarians and Serbs captured Adrianople and the allies captured the remaining Turkish forces in Albania and Macedonia by the end of May, 1913 (Woodhouse 1991, 191).

It was at this time that France and Great Britain were preoccupied with other matters, namely, Italian and Austrian power in the Mediterranean and German power in Central Europe. This was fully evident in the summer of 1914 when World War I broke out. The new King, Constantine I, favored neutrality, while Prime Minister Venizelos favored joining Germany in an effort to forestall any possible Bulgarian advances into Greek Macedonia. However, the German Kaiser had already positioned German policy in favor of Turkey and so informed his brother-in-law Constantine (Woodhouse 1991, 195). The British and French could not commit support to Greece either, although this changed later. Yet no support was possible materially and Greece remained caught in a conundrum. Finally, the allies decided to adhere to a Greek request to send troops to Thessaloniki when Bulgaria mobilized its troops in September 1915. Lack of support and a late Greek mobilization could not stem Bulgarian and Austrian forces from overrunning Serbia, whose remaining forces retreated to Corfu, off the coast of northern Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 198).

By this time, the differences in policy between King Constantine and Venizelos resulted in totally severed relations that the British and French, while fearing civil war, felt could be useful in forcing the Greek King to back down (Woodhouse 1991, 198-199). A violent incident between French naval forces in

Athens and Piraeus forced the allies to recognize a provisional Venizelist government, blockade Greece, and demand reparations from Constantine's government (Woodhouse 1991, 201).

In an attempt to gain stability and reunite the government, Constantine stepped down in favor of his son Alexander (yet not officially abdicating) in June 1917 and Venizelos continued as Prime Minister. By the spring of 1918, Greek forces were readied and reunited with allied ones in northern Greece, and they launched an offensive that drove enemy forces from Macedonia and entered Bulgaria and Serbia. Bulgaria surrendered and a month later Turkey capitulated. World War I ended a month after that in November (Woodhouse 1991, 202-203).

Greece emerged from the Balkan Wars and World War I in a stronger position than it had ever been. However, the Greeks and the Great Powers failed to recognize the revival of Turkey under Kemal Ataturk and failed to ratify the Treaty of Sevres (which in later years the Turks would use in their claims against Greece). As Kemal began organizing his troops to finally rid Constantinople of the Sultan, who remained in power because of the Great Powers, the Greek Government, still under Venizelos, began to organize its forces to attack Ataturk's army in the interior of Anatolia. Ataturk had made his new capital at Ankara, and this was the ultimate target for the Greeks. The Greeks stuttered forward against the Turks until August 1921 when the Turks finally achieved a major counter-attack and pushed the Greeks back (Woodhouse 1991, 205-206).

The Greeks, yet again, had to turn to the Great Powers to finalize a peace between the two. This was accomplished at Lausanne. While Greece lost most of

her territorial gains made under the Treaty of Sevres, she became more homogenous with the forced exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. While at the time certainly painful to all involved, it has benefited the Greeks. The Greeks also lost their claims to the Dodecanese Islands, which remained in the hands of the Italians, and also to Cyprus, which remained under British control (Woodhouse 1991, 207-209).

The appearance of the Italians on the scene in Greek affairs would have a major effect on Greece's entry into World War II. It was also another example of Greece's reliance on external support. In August 1923, an Italian official with the commission settling boundary disputes between Greece and Albania was murdered along with four members of his staff. Mussolini presented an impossible array of demands, followed by a naval bombardment of the island of Corfu and its occupation by Italian troops. Greece appealed to the League of Nations which favored Italy, owing to Greek security negligence (Woodhouse 1991, 211). The Great Powers congratulated themselves and Mussolini and Greece each learned something about the international community.

Despite Greek attempts at pursuing an independent foreign policy during the successive Balkan Wars, however, Greece had not yet achieved a true semblance of independence in her foreign policy. During her disastrous invasion of Turkish Anatolia she was forced to accept Great power dominated cease-fire terms at Lausanne and was forced to surrender all her territorial gains. Later, Great Power perception to appease the rising Mussolini forced Greece into a minority role under the Great Power-dominated League of Nations. Yet again Greek foreign policy was



subjugated to the benefit of the Great Powers' policies.

### **Great Britain As Protector**

The inter-war period was dominated in Greece by Great Britain. Despite a lack of support by Great Britain over the war in Anatolia and British pressure over the Corfu Incident, Greece and Great Britain maintained amicable relations throughout the inter-war period. This was out of practicality and necessity for the two. Greece recognized her extended position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Britain recognized the importance of having further support in the region to counterbalance Italian strength (Legg 1969, 71). Greek politicians have nearly always been practical. This is important in explaining the Metaxas regime's support for the British as opposed to the Axis. Strategic necessities and Greece's small size would have put her under the heel of Mussolini next door, as opposed to British involvement in Greek foreign affairs from London. After all Great Britain was also still the strongest power in the Mediterranean.

After Greece was overrun in World War II, the Greek Government in Exile, led by Emmanuel Tsouderos and King George II, still conducted policy to promote the resumption of British preponderance in Greece after the war (Legg 1969, 71). While the official Greek Government in Exile, a sovereign state under international law, was operating in conjunction with the British and Allies, the Greek Communist Party (KKE) was operating in conjunction with Soviet policy, a track they had followed since the inter-war period. During the resistance and the post-war era this would be a major problem and lead to the later civil war.

One main point that allowed Britain to maintain so much influence over wartime Greek policy was an Anglo-Greek agreement to place Greek government military units under the authority of the British High Command. The units were to maintain their national identity but be reorganized along British lines and equipped with British equipment (Legg 1969, 72). This would be extremely important in December 1944 when the Germans began to withdraw from Greece and the Civil War would break out in its place. Thus the British were technically given a free hand in dealing with Greek forces. This included the highly publicized events of the Greek mutinies in Egypt and the Middle East, which the British quelled. The power of the British over Greek forces many times left the Greek government-in-exile in the dark. Indeed British Intelligence activity and British support for the creation of guerrilla armies provoked heated calls from the King and his government. The Greeks ultimately blamed the British for creating armies that were dominated by the Communists and hostile to the returning government in 1945 (Legg 1969, 72).

The British also took responsibility for dealing with the uprisings that occurred at liberation in December 1944 and January 1945. The British were ill-informed as to the polarization of Greece between different factions (Close 1995, 132), thus when the British returned with the Mountain Brigade (a Greek unit) it was intended to form the nucleus of the new Greek Army. Unfortunately, the Communists were quite sure that the first thing this army would do would be to come after it. Indeed, liberation brought with it the openings for the Communists to lead a war for dominance in the country. The British had some 30,000 troops, as opposed to some 300,000 German, Italian, and Bulgarian troops during the occupation (Close

1995, 136).

The British were also involved in the creation of the new Greek government. The British leaned towards the "crowned republic" idea and the monarchy continued reflecting pure British interests. In addition, there was little popular support for the returning government, which by now was under the direction of Prime Minister George Papandreou, and a plebiscite and election was organized. The lack of any Greek individual or group power, other than the Communists, allowed the British to again dominate in Greece.

The British General in command of the Anglo-Greek Forces, Ronald Scobie, ordered the guerrilla forces to disband. With that, the Communists resigned from the unity government of Prime Minister George Papandreou, and prepared to fight. In the ensuing six weeks, Anglo-Greek Forces and ELAS (Communist) forces fought over the capital of Athens until Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden arrived to broker a truce, which they accomplished in January 1945.

### **Enter the United States**

By 1947, Great Britain could no longer maintain the support necessary to aid Greece financially and militarily. Fighting broke out again in 1946, bringing reconstruction to a standstill. Assistance was desperately needed not only to rebuild the war shattered economy but also to maintain Greece outside of the growing Communist orbit. When the British government informed the United States that it no longer could maintain its assistance, the United States finally entered Greek politics in earnest.

In January 1947 an American economic mission arrived in Greece to assess the needs of the country. Two months later, on March 12th, the U.S. announced that the Truman Doctrine would provide aid to Greece and Turkey in an effort to prevent their passing under the control of the Soviet-sponsored Communist bloc. In addition, it provided a firm foundation for the United States to establish itself as a power in Europe, as well as Greece in particular.

Greece, however, still had to deal with the Communist guerrillas. Despite massive influxes of American military and economic aid, the rebels remained active and the central government was very unstable. Coalition governments collapsed one after another. Successive governments attempted amnesty proposals, but to no avail. By the end of 1948, the United States was deeply rooted in Greece, and, according to Woodhouse, American military advisors came very close to combat in the mountains (1991, 259).

The only bright spot for Greece was in 1948, when relations with Italy were finally normalized. The Dodecanese Islands were returned to Greek control, an agreement was reached on Italian reparations, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation was signed between the two states. Within the country, thanks to massive American aid, the Corinth Canal was reopened as were many bridges and roads, but most were only available for military purposes (Woodhouse 1991, 259).

By the end of 1949, United States military aid to Greece amounted to over \$353.6 million and included 159,922 small arms weapons and 4,130 mortar and artillery pieces (Close 1995, 214). The massive support being received from the

United States was in stark contrast to the British support previously received. Not only was it a massive increase in pure economic terms, but the United States was much more zealous and optimistic than the British in pursuing the fight against the guerrillas (Close 1995, 214).

The Communists were finally broken in a nine-month whirlwind campaign from December 1948 to August 1949. The offensive forced the Communists across the borders into Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. For whatever reason, the Comintern Headquarters in Belgrade did not recognize the Greek Communist forces. The Greek Communist leader Zachariades announced the end of large-scale campaigns but that small operations would continue. This forced the Greek Army to remain in the field in the North of Greece, but, for all intents and purposes, the Civil War was over (Close 1995, 219).

### **The Range of American Influence**

The Truman Doctrine linked security for the United States and Greece. With the power and size of the United States behind it, Greece was very susceptible to American "advice." According to Legg, the American aid program required American approval of any Greek program receiving aid (1969, 73). Thus, since any Greek program went through the use of foreign exchange, the Americans had a dominating position in the Greek Government. It was assumed that American advice would be taken seriously and followed. Therefore, American 'advisors' were attached to Greek ministries (Legg 1969, 73).

The Greek military was also dominated by the United States. Military

operations were conducted by a joint Greek-American General Staff and American observers were assigned down to the divisional level. Greek forces were also totally re-equipped with American material and goods and reorganized along American lines. Indeed, as more than one writer has noted, decisions on weapons, organization and promotions were made by the United States (Legg 1969, 73).

The chronic instability in the internal Greek political system enforced American opinion of intervention into the Greek political society. Whenever a development was suspected, or a disruption in the economy occurred, or any instability within Greece arose, the United States intervened. Elections in 1950 and 1951, according to Legg, were at American insistence as it searched for stability in the Greek system. Despite this, the American Embassy regularly announced that it did not subscribe to interference in domestic affairs of another nation (1969, 74).

The United States was also in the position to withhold aid when certain policies it promoted were not followed by the Greeks. The problem was in the collection of Greek coalitions that attempted to run the governments. Each policy had its supporters and detractors. The coalitions so often forming Greek governments were very unstable when veiled threats were received from the United States. These pressures on the Greeks were exacerbated when one takes into account that the internal pressures in the American and British political systems then reflected on their Greek policies as well.

Greek foreign policy at the time was also securely attached to American and British pressures. While Greece had received the Dodecanese after World War II, it was only because the powers had agreed to it. Greek hopes towards Northern Epirus,

Thrace, and Cyprus were thwarted by Great Power pressures. Advances in Thrace were disallowed because of the friendship policy with Turkey. Advances into northern Epirus were not supported by any powers. Lastly, Cyprus was maintained as an open question because that was as far as any Greek government could get on the topic. Even after Cyprus received her independence from Great Britain, the US and Britain effectively shelved any further Greek action towards the island.

Greek security policy, while still moving towards some type of *enosis*, or union, with the other ethnic Greek areas became overshadowed in May 1950 with the outbreak of war in Korea. Greece immediately sent troops to support the United Nations action there. The Soviet sponsored coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Berlin Blockade of the same year, and the fears of continued Communist agitation in Greece pushed Greece and Turkey into the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1951. These security fears about Central Europe were also now applied to the client states of the peripheries in Northern and Southern Europe. Thus NATO and Greece began their long and troubled relationship.

### **NATO's Origins and the Accession of Greece - 1951**

The origins of collective security in Europe, as noted previously, were in European and American responses to Soviet moves in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe in the immediate post-War era. Alfred Grosser, in The Western Alliance, states that, "The official aim of NATO was a more rational organization of the joint defense efforts, though it was equally important to create compulsory structures which would entail the automatic participation of the United States in any response to

an attack on Europe (1982, 87)." While ensuring American involvement, the organization was also expanding to include Turkey and Greece, and later Germany. The latter became the foundation of NATO security policy which centered around Central Europe. Northern and Southern Europe ranked second and third respectively in order of priorities.

NATO was just beginning to turn itself from a paper organization and begin a process of militarization when Greece, along with Turkey, entered NATO in October 1951. The rate of militarization was rapid, with many states doubling previous defense expenditures between 1948 and 1952. Total NATO spending leapt from \$20 billion in 1950, to \$40 billion in 1951, to \$60 billion in 1952 (Kugler 1993, 59). Included in this was the necessary support infrastructure necessary to establish NATO's defense posture.

### **The Soviet Threat**

The Soviet threat to Central Europe, at the beginning of 1952, was made up of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), made up of six field armies, this implying a formal wartime stance. The GSFG's 22 divisions in East Germany were joined by 8 other Soviet divisions in other East European Communist states. They had begun a massive modernization and training program that included updates in command and control and logistical support and facilities. Updated tanks and the introduction of jet fighters and bombers were also deployed to the tactical air forces in Eastern Europe (Kugler 1993, 69-70).

At the same time, the Soviets were also attempting to update the forces in the



other Eastern European states. In 1948 the Soviets had begun signing separate mutual defense treaties with each of these nations. Armaments were sent to the states in an effort to upgrade their armed forces. By early 1954, efforts were under way to field some 65 to 80 East European divisions, half of which were to be maintained in combat-ready status. Of these divisions, 30 were in Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia (Kugler 1993, 70).

At the same time, the Soviets were signaling that they were willing to negotiate over the future developments in Europe, yet they were also conducting the massive military re-armaments campaign and modernization. The Europeans were feeling very vulnerable to the numbers they were facing. They knew that they could not maintain the necessary forces without resorting to a wartime economy. The array of forces in East Germany and the Soviet Union allowed for a surprise attack straight from East Germany into Central Europe or a more gradual buildup with reinforcements coming from the Soviet Union into East Europe.

### **The Accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO - October 1951**

Most of the members of NATO were not ready to admit Greece and Turkey to the Alliance in 1951. The expansion of already stretched security commitments could only be taken up by the United States, which indeed may have been considered before the Korean War as an extension of the Truman Doctrine. By May 1951 the North Koreans had invaded South Korea and events overtook the members of NATO. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in September of 1951 Greece and Turkey were unanimously invited to accede to the charter, though Norway and the

Netherlands still expressed reservations (Brown 1991, 4).

At the time, NATO military planners saw Korea as the opening Soviet gambit. Perhaps to be followed by Soviet pressure on Turkey or Northern Greece. The perceived threats thus outweighed fears of over extending their security commitments to two states that have a history of animosity and little desire to resolve them. For their part, Ankara and Athens regarded their accession to the Treaty as an extension of their relations with the US. Both sides agreed, in principle, to refrain from "stirring up" grievances (Brown 1991, 4-5). For its part, the United States adopted George Kennan's policy of 'long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment' of Moscow's expansionist policies (Bolles 1952, 15). The US officially declined to warn the two states from raising issues that could cause difficulties with other member states, as it did not wish to add any preconditions to their accession (Brown 1991, 4).

Despite this planning and agreement that Greece and Turkey were vulnerable to the Soviet onslaught, NATO planning did not reflect any real change in thinking during the 1950's. A policy statement encoded MC 14/1 in 1951 was the first combined NATO military strategy policy that, while relying heavily on nuclear weapons, incorporated many defensive aspects for the entire Alliance, not just the Central Region. Ninety divisions were called for (including reserves): 54 were for the AFCENT (Allied Forces Central), defined as the area from Denmark through West Germany and France, 14 divisions were for AFNORTH in Norway, 1 division for Iceland, and 21 divisions were for AFSOUTH to protect Italy, Greece, and Turkey (Kugler 1993, 60-61).

As evidenced by pure numbers, what was earmarked for the North and Central forces far outweighed forces assigned to the South. Even then, one third of the forces were in Italy, not the areas in Thrace where a Communist attack would be. Even fewer troops were available for the Turks who bordered the Soviet Union.

### **Greek Security Policy 1952-1967**

Greek security policy, then, should have been expected to change fundamentally. Under NATO doctrine, Greece should have concentrated her armed forces on the northern reaches in preparation for an impending Communist attack, from Bulgaria or perhaps Yugoslavia. Yet, in reality, Greek security policy continued to concentrate along the same track it always had. Greek forces remained along the Turkish border in Thrace and equipped mainly for internal security, should a Moscow-inspired Communist insurgency return.

NATO had no real contingency plans for reinforcing Greece should war break out. American military bases that were established after Greece's accession to the Alliance would support Greece, but this only confirms the thought that Greek membership was merely an extension of her relationship with the United States. Greece did participate in NATO planning and was generally on good terms with her neighbor and Alliance compatriot Turkey until 1955. Even then, however, Greece maintained her commitments to NATO.

Greece remained tied to the United States, and this was evident in the continued presence the United States had in Greek affairs. The early 1950's saw the new US Central Intelligence Agency establish its Greek equivalent, the Central

Service of Information, or KYP in its Greek acronym (Woodhouse 1985, 6). This would establish later, for most of the Greek populace anyway, that the US was responsible for all Greek troubles and provide later Greek governments with a useful scapegoat. One benefit of the increased US influence over the Greeks was the ability of the US to shelve, for a while at any rate, any Greek pretensions for enosis with Cyprus (Legg 1969, 75). Indeed it was only the United States' influence that prevented NATO's Southern Flank from breaking into all out war between Greece and Turkey, and possibly destroying the rest of the Alliance as well.

The problems in the Southern Flank stemmed from long standing animosities between Turkey and Greece. However, in the immediate post-World War II period, relations between the two were fairly cordial. Greece and Turkey were both aware of the threat that the Soviets presented to their borders and were quick to petition to join the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1950 when the Korean War broke out. After their accession to the Treaty, a new detente seemed to sweep over the Balkans. In common with Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia, the three states signed an interlocking political and defense alliance at Bled, Yugoslavia in August 1954. Needless to say, the western allies looked on the event with considerable approval (Woodhouse 1991, 268-269).

However, changes in foreign policy following Josef Stalin's death ended the need for the Balkan Pact as new Soviet policy sought cordial and normal relations with the three states. However, divisions between Greece and Turkey were again coming to the forefront, and the short period of cooperation was ending. Renewed agitation over Cyprus would bring the two to the brink of all out war.

Greek claims to Cyprus, justified or not, have been consistent since independence. The British, however, were not prepared to hand the island over to the Greeks or the Turks, who believed that the island should pass back to them when the British gave up their claim. British claims were that Cyprus was never part of Greece and that it was better off under British rule anyway. This may have been true, but it was rude to say it so blatantly and wounded the Greeks deeply. More realistically, the British were fearful of civil war between Greeks and Turks on the island, a possible major war between the two states over the island, or perhaps even a Cypriot Communist take-over (Woodhouse 1991, 270).

The Greeks were in no position to press the British for *enosis* nor did they receive any support in Washington on the subject. The government in Athens was actually embarrassed over the continuing campaign mounted on its behalf by various groups. Greece was in no condition to absorb the island. Recovery from the war was proceeding slowly, there were riots in Athens, and pressure from the national leader of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, forced the government to look on the campaign for *enosis* negatively (Woodhouse 1991, 271).

The Greek government felt obliged to take the Cyprus problem to the UN but were rebuffed when Britain and other states voted it to be an internal problem of the United Kingdom. This was exacerbated in April 1955 when a campaign for *enosis* was launched with a series of attacks on British installations and property. Led by Colonel George Grivas, the *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*-EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Combatants) began to violently oppose the continued British rule on the island.

An attempt by the British to invite the Turks and Greeks to London to settle the dispute was met by anti-Greek rioting in Istanbul and Smyrna on September 6, 1955. As a result, Greece withdrew from a number of allied and NATO training exercises in the eastern Mediterranean (Woodhouse 1991, 272-273). The British finally agreed to self-government of Cyprus if the Greeks and Turks could come up with an agreement, however the two were deadlocked.

Nineteen-Fifty-Five saw the arrival of Constantine Karamanlis to the premiership of Greece and the longest uninterrupted government in the history of the modern Greek Kingdom. Karamanlis wanted to end the crisis over Cyprus and with Turkey, but 1956 saw the eruption of the Suez Crisis, which strained an already bad situation. The British lost any popularity they may have maintained, and Karamanlis could not restrain the popular nationalism that was sweeping Greece in support of Greek Cypriots. Colonel Grivas' campaign against the British turned against Turkish-Cypriots and 'unpatriotic' Greeks on the island (Woodhouse 1991, 275-276).

The Turks would not tolerate *enosis* at any cost, and preferred no change at all, partition, or reversion of the island to Turkey itself. No one could agree on a common policy within the respective governments or among them. Greece, following the favorable reception Egypt received by the UN in its crisis over Suez, sought to return the issue to the Security Council, but were again rebuffed. US rejection of *enosis* forced the Greeks to begin to look to other anti-colonial states in the region for support, especially the Middle East. In addition the Greeks refused to allow American planes to land in the country during the Lebanon and Jordanian Crises in 1957 (Woodhouse 1991, 277).

After five years of rising tension, relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were finally resolved under an agreement that saw the emergence of the Republic of Cyprus within the British Commonwealth. Greece returned to normal relations with NATO, Britain, and the Americans, and seemed to show no bitterness at all. Greece began negotiations to secure a treaty of association with the European Economic Community (EEC) in an effort to forge closer relations with Europe. NATO maneuvers were held in Greek and Turkish Thrace and Krushchev threatened to rain rockets on the Acropolis (Woodhouse 1991, 280-281). Relatively, things were back to normal in the Cold War.

### **Summary**

The rise of the modern Greek state has been plagued with Great Power interference. The first 150 years of its independence saw attempts to maintain some semblance of independence while trying to bring all ethnic Greeks within one border. Greece suffered through separate wars plus a couple of its own instigation. Through this period, Greece was closely involved with two Great Powers that operated within Greece and affected Greek policy with relative impunity.

For the most part, relations with its neighbors remained relatively peaceful. The Italians were no longer enemies, and while still surrounded by Communist states, Greece was able to maintain cordial affairs with Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia. By virtue of its relationship with the United States, Greece was able to become a member of NATO. Such a security guarantee did not rely so much on collective European security but more on a guarantee of U.S. involvement.

The establishment of NATO provided the cornerstone of the international system for over 40 years. The bipolar system was ideological as well as geopolitical and forced the maintenance of the collective security system to be at the forefront of many states' national security policies, and, in some cases, it was forced on them as part of their security policy. For some of the larger states, this became an end rather than a means. For smaller states, independence from such institutions or larger states is more difficult. This is extremely important in the Greek case. For example, while Greece was following American 'advice' and followed a standard doctrine that supported American and central European security the relationship was fine. As Greece leaned more towards an anti-Turkish stance over the Cyprus issue, relations soured.

These events also affected the NATO Alliance as a whole. Despite pretensions to a common goal, NATO was faced with a situation it was never prepared to deal with. Two NATO allies were becoming more concerned with the security threat each posed to the other. Alliance cohesion in the south was beginning to buckle due to the inability of Greece to maintain NATO's threat assessment at the forefront of her national security policy.

The initiation of changes in Greek security policy and its effect on her international relations, with the U.S. and NATO, is of prime importance in understanding the problems of alliance cohesion. Greek security was not so much a reliance on collective security, but a maintenance of its traditional relationship with a Great Power. In exchange for relative freedom to affect Greek policy such a power would protect Greece. As nationalism began to pervade Greek domestic politics, and hence Greek foreign policy revolving around the Cyprus issue, the beginnings of a more independent



Greek policy appeared to be emerging, practical or not. The emergence of Greek policy over Cyprus and hence security from the Turks, as opposed to the Communists, would prove to be the overriding factor in an effort to gain independence in foreign policy and also diverge Greece from the principles of NATO ideology.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **GREEK FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT**

In May 1967, Greece fell to what has been its last military coup. This is essential in understanding not only modern Greek foreign policy, but also Greek relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United States. The failure of Washington and Brussels to offer any resistance to the coup was a seminal example of the two attempting to maintain Alliance cohesion in the region. The military government that came to power was strongly pro-Alliance and was fully expected to maintain Greece's NATO commitments. However, the continuity that the Alliance sought regarding Greek membership was short lived.

The coup ended the monarchy of Greece and brought Greece to the brink of war with Turkey over the Cyprus issue. It was not until the October 1981 elections that brought about a populist/socialist government that independence in Greek foreign policy was achieved. In 1981 the population went so far as to elect the anti-NATO/anti-American Andreas Papandreu and his Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) to power in protest. In essence, the military coup was the last straw of foreign interference in Greek affairs for the populace of Greece. In this sense, and with these factors in mind, it is relatively easy for us to understand the importance of the years Greece was under military rule and its effect on future Greek-NATO relations.

During its time in power, from 1967 to 1974, the rule of the military had no real

effect on its international relations as they had existed. Rather, the military government sought to continue close ties with the United States and gave the Americans free hand in Greece. The real effect was the change in attitude of the population. They saw that the United States and NATO were more concerned with far reaching, grandiose security rationales than with upholding democracy in Greece.

The military government's destructive relations with Ankara also solidified the ongoing problems between Greece and Turkey. It gave excuse to Turkey to invade Cyprus, which has been the source of constant friction between the two NATO 'allies.' Not only has this affected Greek and Turkish foreign policies but it has also formed the most dangerous relationship in the North Atlantic Alliance and has developed into a relationship that could sunder the entire southern flank of NATO.

### **The Origins of the 1967 Coup - The Political Players**

The origin of the April 1967 military coup in Greece is mainly one of traditional problems among the military, the monarch, the Left, and the relationship of each to Greek politics. In general, equilibrium existed. The military maintained foreign relationships, through NATO and the United States, ostensibly under the purview of the monarch. The King placated the traditional politicians and the military. The Left, while seeking to sever the traditional Western relationships and attempting to reduce the military and military expenditures, was normally content to be involved in the issueless Greek politics of the day. More to the point, all three actors were generally interested in maintaining the status quo as far as the Greek political system was concerned.

Legg states that the two most contentious issues of the day were the position of

the Left in national politics and the priority of military expenditure (1969, 214). The importance of these two issues lies in the strain in relations between the military establishment and the Left. The military did not really consider the Left to be a legitimate part of the Greek political system. They were considered traitorous and willing to sell out Greek independence to Communist/Socialism. Essentially, the military was certain that if the Communist/Left came to power then Greece would become dominated and influenced by the Soviet Union.

The Left, on the other hand, viewed the military as fascist. They saw the other more traditional aspects of Greek politics, such as the former conservative governments, as having sold-out Greek sovereignty to the West, particularly to the United States. The Left wanted to reduce defense expenditures, withdraw from NATO, and maintain cooperative relations with the other "peace-loving" socialist states bordering Greece.

A note here: the threat from Turkey was always a bipartisan issue and it was the only threat the Left viewed seriously and made allowances for in military expenditures. It should be no surprise that the main reasons for the disparate view of the Left from the rest of the political system stem from the position of the Left during the Civil War. The Left was not considered a national political force like the military, the King, or the traditional politicians.

The King, on the other hand, was a useful rallying point for national sentiment and proof of patriotism. Loyalty with the monarchy was associated with anti-communism, especially in the armed forces (Legg 1969, 215). The monarchy was very hostile to the Left throughout its history because of traditional feelings from the Civil War. Any change in stance by the monarchy could possibly turn the military away from

the King. Anything other than hostility toward the Left from the monarch could reduce the symbolic role of the King in the eyes of the military.

### **The Origins of the 1967 Coup - The Setting**

The Premiership of Constantine Karamanlis from 1955 to 1963 was a watershed in Greek politics. The longest serving Greek Prime Minister up to that time, Karamanlis served for eight consecutive years. However, by the time of his departure, events were beginning to unfold that would see Karamanlis in self-imposed exile in France and the rise of the military government.

Initially there was concern over the visit to London, in July 1963, by King Paul and Queen Frederika. Karamanlis was concerned about possible protests over the King's visit, as various human-rights groups were still clamoring over political prisoners in Greece still held from the Civil War. King Paul was adamant, however, as he had already been diagnosed with terminal cancer and felt that any delay in the visit to Queen Elizabeth II might result in offending the Queen. In addition, the visit was also heralded as a capstone to better relations with Great Britain since the 1960 independence of Cyprus (Woodhouse 1985, 1-2).

Karamanlis resigned over the incident. He cited constitutional requirements of the King to respect the decision of the Prime Minister in such cases as state visits by the King. He left for Zurich vowing to leave politics.

To ease the transition, however, Karamanlis acted as advisor to his National Radical Union (ERE) in selecting a replacement. The new Prime Minister was not to have any further inter-play in politics other than to accompany the King and Queen to

London. Panayiotis Pipinelis was chosen, a former Ambassador and Director of King George II's political office (Woodhouse 1985, 2).

Upon his return from London, King Paul dissolved the Parliament two years into its four year term. Woodhouse notes that this was generally accepted to disentangle the political situation in Greece that had seen 3 years of Field-Marshal Papagos (1952-1955) and 8 years of Constantine Karamanlis (1955-1963). The King was quite wary of George Papandreou's Center Union (EK) gaining power because of the latter's frequent vows to fight the institutionalized corruption of the ERE (Woodhouse 1985, 2-3).

Elections took place on November 3, 1963. Karamanlis returned from exile to lead his ERE, but was defeated by Papandreou for the first time. The results were: 138 seats for the EK, 132 seat for the reigning ERE, with the remaining going to the Union of the Democratic Left (EDA), thought by many to be a front for the outlawed Communist Party of Greece (KKE). Papandreou was asked to form a government but would be successful only with Communist support, and asked for a dissolution of the *Vouli* (parliament), which the King quickly granted. A new election, held on February 16, 1964, handily gave Papandreou's EK an overall majority of 171 seats. The ERE, now led by Panayiotis Kanellopoulos, was reduced to 107 seats. King Paul died a few days after swearing in Papandreou (Woodhouse 1985, 3).

Papandreou was faced with two immediate challenges. The first was the never ending dispute with Turkey over Cyprus. The second was the rise of clandestine groups, both right and left-wing, within the officer corps of the army. Cyprus had begun heating up again due to the failure of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and their leaders to implement satisfactorily the island's constitution. In December 1963, a

few days before Christmas, fighting broke out between the two communities. The Greeks initially maintained the upper hand, forcing the Turkish leader Raouf Denktash to flee to the mainland (Woodhouse 1985, 4).

In March, the UN Security Council successfully implemented a resolution establishing a peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) centered on British troops based in the two UK Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia. Turkish Cypriots established enclaves for their own protection and the Turkish government threatened to intervene but was warned off by a strongly worded diplomatic note from US President Lyndon Johnson (Woodhouse 1985, 4).

A plan to settle the dispute presented by former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson was accepted by the Turks but was rejected by the Greek-Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios on the grounds that he would not yield any territory to the Turks in a settlement. This was extremely disturbing to the US as it was desperately hoping for stability in the Eastern Mediterranean in an effort to shore up not only NATO security in the region, but, more importantly, Israeli security. The Government in Athens vacillated for a time on the Acheson plan, eventually coming down in support of Makarios (Woodhouse 1985, 5)

Fighting broke out again in August 1964 when Turkish aircraft bombed Greek positions in the north of the island. Conflict was a real possibility as Greece withdrew her forces from NATO command in expectation of an all-out war (Woodhouse 1991, 286). As quickly as the fighting began it subsided and a calm passed over the island. While both sides were permitted mainland regular forces, in addition to the island-based Cypriot National Guard, they were limited in number by signed convention. However,

during 1964 both sides secretly increased their contingents from the mainland (Woodhouse 1985, 5).

The second crisis that the new Papandreou government had to deal with was over the control of the armed forces. After eleven years of right-wing government, including three years under one of the army's own (Field Marshal Papagos), in retrospect, it is no surprise that the majority of the army felt sympathetic with the outgoing government. The rise of a left-leaning regime was anathema to the majority of the officer class. This was exacerbated as Papandreou sought to replace the upper echelon leadership with those of his own choosing (Woodhouse 1991, 287).

Any changes in the military structure were extremely difficult. There was little formal civilian control over military personnel. The defense budget could not be seriously altered and foreign policy areas that might alter the relationship between the military and NATO were closely guarded and never seriously broached. Indeed policy differences between the military and the government were never really serious and the Papandreou government never sought to reduce expenditures. While they were lowered some 10 percent to help pay for social and public works programs, defense expenditures were still 1/3 of the annual budget.

Despite international détente between East and West in the mid-to-late sixties, Greece was still preoccupied with Turkish moves over Cyprus. Therefore the military was never in any real danger of losing importance in the Greek national security apparatus. Rather, the draw down in forces in the post-Civil War period had left a large number of mid-level officers with little prospect for promotion (Veremis 1987, 220) creating a conspiratorial atmosphere among them.



In addition, the eleven years of close relations between the monarch and the prime minister had provided a stable atmosphere in which the military could exist and stay away from any potential disputes. Unfortunately, this did not mean the military was apolitical.

### **Military Politics in Greece**

The role of the Greek military in the internal politics of Greece is essential in understanding the changes in the relationship between Greece and her allies. However, this was not an independent internal development of Greece. Rather, the Great Powers, whether Great Britain or the United States, had always dominated the Greek military establishment and exerted a majority of their influence in Greece through the military. This was especially true of the United States.

The Americans assumed an initial position of influence after the British had announced they could no longer maintain support for the Greeks in their fight against the Communist insurgency that had erupted in late 1944. The Americans immediately reorganized the Greek military and exerted almost total dominance over strategy, organization, training, equipment, tactics, and advancement. In line with American strategic thinking at the time, the Greek military was integrated into NATO planning as a bulwark against the spreading Communist threat. The Greek military exerted a great amount of influence over the country's foreign relations. The military was staunchly pro-NATO and pro-American and would not allow any presumptuous domestic force to change that or lessen the cohesion of the Alliance in the region. However, because of the unilateral American dominance and the rise of the Turkish threat the military sought to

guarantee NATO cohesion through relations with the U.S. as opposed to her neighbor to the east.

The Greek military also has a long history of clandestine military officer organizations. The 'Royal Greek Middle East Forces,' under British command during World War II, formed a clandestine royalist/nationalist organization called *IDEA*, a Greek acronym for the 'Sacred Bond of Greek Officers', of which Field Marshal Papagos, the former Prime Minister, was a founding member. *IDEA* members attempted to stage a coup on May 31, 1951 after Papagos resigned as head of the Army over a disagreement with the government. Papagos prevented the coup and with his stature at the end of the Civil War rode to a resounding victory to Prime Minister in 1952. With the latter's climb to power, the clandestine organization dismantled, supposedly having achieved its goals (Veremis 1987, 218-219).

An offshoot of *IDEA*, the 'National Union of Young Officers (EENA),' was founded in 1958 by one Captain George Papadopoulos. The organization was fervently anti-Communist, highly nationalistic, and contemptuous of parliamentary democracy (Veremis 1987, 219). This group represented the growing factionalism in the army that is fairly surprising, considering that, ideologically at least, the military was very unified following the Civil War. Such groups represented more corporatist individuals concerned with advancement. Membership in such organizations was a virtual necessity for those who sought advancement through the officer corps.

In 1965, the Papandreou government was faced with evidence of yet another secret society in the ranks of the army officer class. Initially, reports came from Cyprus in the guise of General George Grivas, former head of EOKA terrorists in Cyprus, and

now commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Greek Army contingent on the island. As the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios realized that General Grivas had the real power in Cyprus. In turn, he attempted to build up the gendarmerie under his direct control (Legg 1969, 223). What became known as *ASPIDA* initially was an arrangement to undermine Grivas' powerbase in the military. Andreas Papandreou, the Prime Minister's son and a Minister in his cabinet, visited Makarios in an effort to find officers sympathetic to the Papandreou and Makarios governments. When Grivas found out about the visit, and realized his position could be threatened, he went public with the information in an attempt to damage the Papandreou administration (Woodhouse 1991, 287).

*ASPIDA* in Greek means 'shield' but it was an acronym for 'Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals, Democracy and Meritocracy.' It was represented as a left-wing plot, led by Andreas Papandreou to gain influence in the military, overthrow the King, and take control of Greece, forming a socialist state (Woodhouse 1985, 5). In reality, *ASPIDA* was probably nothing more than a group of mid-range officers concerned with career advancement. The real crisis came in the investigation of the organization.

George Papandreou's Minister of Defense was Petros Garofilias and technically the highest power over the military. At the time the *ASPIDA* affair went public, King Constantine II and opposition leaders in the *Vouli* wanted an immediate investigation. Garofilias, for whatever reasons, supported the King and was fired by the elder Papandreou. The Prime Minister then sought to take up the Defense portfolio himself, but then that would have left George Papandreou investigating his son, Andreas (Legg 1969, 223).

Prime Minister Papandreou resigned after threats from the King. Constantine then sent for the President of the Parliament and asked him to form a government based on the EK majority. After three weeks he failed. It was not until the King approached Stephanos Stephanopoulos that a government was formed lasting until December 1966 (Legg 1969, 224).

Around this time, massive demonstrations began to be held in the major cities of Athens and Thessaloniki. While the Left was considered the main instigators of the demonstrations, the EK was also prominent in their support. Politics in general degenerated. At least one fist fight erupted in the *Vouli*, violence erupted in the streets, and civility in general disappeared (Legg 1969, 224).

The EK split and various members from all parties began defecting to others. One new party was formed with 49 defectors from the centrist EK forming the Liberal Democratic Center. Further defections were prevented by party loyalty to George Papandreou. However, the Stephanopoulos government fell in December 1966. The Governor of the National Bank of Greece, Ioannis Paraskevopoulos, was named head of a caretaker government until new elections in the spring of 1967. It seemed that compromises were being attempted and that equilibrium was being restored to the political system (Legg 1969, 224).

During this time members of the alleged *ASPIDA* conspiracy were investigated and tried by military court. The elder Papandreou was noted in some allegations and the younger Papandreou, against a torrent of parliamentary anger, was kept out of court because of parliamentary immunity. Indictments were delayed and prolonged against the two Papandreous for their alleged involvement in the conspiracy (Legg 1969, 225). The

alleged ring-leader of the plot, Major A. Papaterpos, received 18 years in prison (Woodhouse 1985, 8). This only incensed the military even more against the traditional politicians. They were tired of such constant bickering especially against their own. The military felt "politicians and bureaucrats" were in no position to judge the officer corps, the true defenders of the nation.

The rise of tensions between the two was further increased by economic problems throughout 1966 and the early part of 1967. The extreme Left began to provoke the traditional parties and the military. Athens was in a state of turmoil. Increased strikes brought frequent clashes between demonstrators and the police. Paraskevopoulos' government was brought down in the collapse of the coalition. The King dissolved the parliament and the country prepared for elections for May 28, 1967. The government decided not to prosecute Andreas Papandreou over the *ASPIDA* affair, suggesting his role in the affair had been fabricated (Legg 1969, 225).

Most alarming to the stability of the political system was the real threat of an EK victory. Despite allegations against the Papandreous, they still possessed a great deal of popularity. In addition, given George Papandreou's age, it was likely that his son Andreas would soon take over as party leader. Many in the military and the Right viewed such an eventuality as the equivalent of a Communist victory considering Andreas' views on NATO, military expenditures and the Cyprus issue (Legg 1969, 225-226).

Andreas continued to criticize nearly all elements of the political system: the military, the monarch, even his father. On March 1, 1967 he made a speech to the Foreign Press Association in which he abused the US Government so offensively that two US diplomats walked out (Woodhouse 1985, 14). Information abounds of what Greeks

call *ektropi*, or 'deviations.' In essence this was the euphemism for a coup d'état.

Whether from the Left or the Right, a 'deviation' was expected after the elections. At one stage, in September 1966, it is reported that King Constantine sent a secret message to the exiled Constantine Karamanlis stating that if he would return to office, the King, under the right circumstances, would arrange a 'deviation' of his own (Woodhouse 1985, 14-15).

### **April 21, 1967 - The Colonels' Coup**

The early morning hours of April 21, 1967 saw the Greek government seized by Army units led by three previously unknown Army officers: Colonel George Papadopoulos, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos and Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos. Their justification was an alleged Communist plot to overthrow the King. In an effort to gain immediate favor with the population, the coup leaders claimed Royal approval for their actions, which, in reality, did not exist. Various articles of the constitution were suspended, and the extreme right-wing Constantine Kollias, senior Public Prosecutor to the Supreme Court (the *AreoPagus*), was sworn in by the King as Prime Minister. This civilian element was brought into being in response to the monarch's statement that he would have no dealings with a military Prime Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 290). The King expressed his wishes that full parliamentary government would soon be restored, but his apparent approval of the military's actions had already sealed his fate and that of the monarchy in Greece.

With a few minor exceptions the coup and subsequent dictatorship was an entirely Army affair. The Army's upsetting of the democratic process in Greece was not

new. It had happened before in Greece. What is important to note is that the populace remained fairly apathetic to the entire event. Seemingly they were tired of the lack of any qualitative developments by the professional politicians and welcomed any changes. Indeed the army was always mindful that it was going to restore democracy as soon as possible. The coup leaders always sought Royal approval for their actions, indicting the young King more and more as an accomplice to the events.

King Constantine, in seeing his success at demanding a civilian Prime Minister, sought to re-establish power for himself. On December 13, 1967, the King flew to Thessaloniki in an effort to rally support. However, Army units remained loyal to the new government. Within 24 hours the King fled to Rome with his family and Prime Minister Kollias. Colonel Papadopoulos then appointed a regent and had himself sworn in as Prime Minister, being careful not to abolish the monarchy. He stated that the King had voluntarily abstained from his duties for the time being. Further confident of their position, the leaders of the coup then ceremoniously retired from the military (Woodhouse 1991, 293-294). In essence, the era of 'crowned-democracy' in Greece had ended.

### **The Allies' Response to the Coup**

Initially it seemed that Greece's allies were emphatic in their denunciation of the coup. The United States slowed arms and aid to a trickle, the European Investment Bank of the EEC withheld a loan already agreed to, and the Council of Europe debated the expulsion of Greece as a member (Woodhouse 1991, 293).

Since the King had sworn in the Army government, or *khounta* as it came to be

known, recognition of the government came quickly. This was the first example of the allies' apathy towards the true state of internal Greek affairs, provided Greece remained loyal to the Western Alliance. With approval now being shown from the allies, Greece remained sure of her security and that the Western Allies would maintain their commitments.

The only exception to the tacit Western approval of the coup was by the Danish Government, not least because the King and his young Queen were of Danish descent. Denmark withdrew from a trade fair in Thessaloniki to further protest the 'abrogation of democracy and constitutional rights in Greece (Woodhouse 1985, 39).' Norway also gave support to the Danish position, going so far as to initiate a parliamentary debate on expelling Greece from NATO (Woodhouse 1985, 39).

Indeed the United States soon began to restore arms supplies to Greece in the interest of maintaining security on NATO's Southern Flank. However, despite this action, it must be noted that other allies that supplied arms, the French, Germans, and British, never did stop supplying arms, even in protest to the coup (Woodhouse 1985, 40).

Other external opposition to the military government was led by Constantine Karamanlis from Paris and Andreas Papandreou, who had escaped to London after a brief period of imprisonment in 1967. Andreas had taken over the leadership role from his father George Papandreou when the latter died on November 1, 1968 after being released from prison for health reasons. Last was the Communist leader Brillakis. Unfortunately none of the opposition were inclined to co-operate with each other (Woodhouse 1991, 296).



The reaction of the Communist party was unusual and surprising to the military government. Division and factionalism within the party (at one point some five groups were claiming overall leadership of the Communist Party of Greece) had defeated any strong show against the Army. This also defeated the Army's argument that they were saving the country from an imminent Communist coup or Communist threat (Woodhouse 1991, 297).

The ultimate point that saved the coup leaders from condemnation was the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, which closed the Suez Canal and seriously threatened US interests in the region. American bases in Greece became extremely important to US military operations in the area for resupplying Israeli forces and performing reconnaissance missions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The importance of the bases became more pronounced as the Soviets began expanding their Mediterranean operations. The Egyptians leaned more to the Soviets and the pro-Western Libyan monarchy was overthrown by the anti-Western coup of Colonel Muammar Gadhafi in 1971 (Woodhouse 1991, 298). With these mounting strategic pressures, the United States had little choice but to accept and cultivate relations with Greece, whatever type of government was in power.

### **Greek Foreign Policy Under the Military Government**

The leaders of the coup placed great emphasis on maintaining Greece's security relationship with the United States and NATO. With what seemed like tacit U.S. approval to the military government, it is no surprise that most Greeks developed the sense of American complicity in the coup. Indeed it is still thought generally that nothing

can happen without the prior approval of Greece's protecting power, in this case the United States.

The *khounta's* attempts to curry Western support lay in its fervent anti-Communist stance. As the military was already the most anti-Communist of political groups in Greece, this is only logical. However, because of its attempts to maintain close ties with the West and especially the United States, the military government became even more dependent on the US than previous governments. By the autumn of 1971 the Greek and American governments were negotiating the provisions of a treaty necessary to home port the US Navy's 6th Fleet. This was extremely important to the Army government in that it would prove Greece was an even more vital contributor to NATO than ever before. Logistically, according to the US Navy, the Bay of Elefsis, outside of Athens, was the most suitable place for the Fleet (Woodhouse 1985, 106). The latter was based entirely on security considerations rather than American support for the Greek government. The then American Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, stated it most clearly, "Our mutual security relationship with Greece has not implied in the past and does not now imply our support for any particular government in Greece (Woodhouse 1985, 106)."

Despite determined resistance in some quarters of the US Government, the US and Greece signed an agreement in September 1972 to home port the US 6th Fleet at Piraeus. Again the dictatorship was enjoying political victories externally. Relations were improved with the Communist states, and some African states as well. Relations with European states remained intact. Better still, the French Foreign Minister visited Athens and the Greek Foreign Minister was invited to London (Woodhouse 1991, 299).

However the Greek dictatorship suffered some setbacks as well. The economy began a slow downward spiral, as various groups, foreign and domestic, began backing out of investment dealings. Inflation increased, severely penalizing growth stimulated by tourism. By 1973 inflation was over 30 percent (Woodhouse 1991, 302).

Colonel George Papadopoulos, the Prime Minister and most visible of the original triumvirate, was increasing his power. In March 1972, he dismissed the King's Regent, whom he had appointed, and assumed the office himself. In May 1973, Papadopoulos had to deal with a mutiny in the Navy. He convinced himself that it had been inspired by the exiled King. Papadopoulos took the opportunity to abolish the monarchy, and introduced a 'Presidential-Republic' that was ratified by a trumped-up plebiscite at the end of July 1973 (Woodhouse 1991, 302-303). Papadopoulos occupied the Presidency and maintained all real power (Veremis 1987, 222).

In November 1973, however, the death knell of the dictatorship was felt by Papadopoulos and the Army. During the night of November 16-17, 1973 a sit-in was violently broken up by armed police and Army tanks at the Athens Polytechnic. More than twenty students died and Papadopoulos publicly congratulated the perpetrators, turning the stomachs of most professional officers. Among them was a group determined that Papadopoulos must go, however, the only available tool for such an operation was Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis, head of the Military Security Police (ESA) (Woodhouse 1991, 303).

Papadopoulos was arrested on November 25, 1973 by Brigadier Ioannidis. The Presidency was occupied by General Gizikis, who was under the control of Ioannidis. There was little improvement in Greece's prospects. Martial law was restored and

repression against the opposition resumed (Woodhouse 1991, 304). Again the military government was saved over magnification by yet another war in the Middle East when Egypt and Syria initiated war with Israel in October 1973. This being the greatest threat ever to Israel's security, American bases in Greece yet again became of prime importance for supporting Israel.

### **The Fall of the Military Government**

Greece's perennial security problem, her relationship with Turkey over the Cyprus issue, led to the final crisis of the military government and brought back a true democratic system of government. The true problem for the dictatorship began early in September 1967 when the Papadopoulos regime attempted to re-open negotiations over the Cyprus issue with little success. In November 1967 General Grivas, commander-in-chief of the Greek and Cypriot forces, launched an attack against the Turkish population in the north of the island. The Ankara government mobilized an invasion force but was forced to back down by allied pressure. War was narrowly averted but Greece had to dismiss General Grivas and remove all its forces sent to the island since 1963 (Woodhouse 1991, 293).

The Cyprus issue simmered between Greece and Turkey for the next 7 years until April 1974. Initially it was due to the discovery of petroleum deposits in the northern Aegean (Woodhouse 1991, 303). This had occurred at the end of 1973 and relations with Turkey had steadily deteriorated. In January 1974 a new Turkish Government was elected, under President Bulent Ecevit. On February 1, 1974, presenting his new government to the Turkish Parliament, Ecevit spoke in favor of a federal, unilateral

solution to the ongoing Cyprus problem. The new Greek government under General Ioannidis responded unfavorably. However, the situation concerning Cyprus had changed drastically a few days earlier. General Grivas, the constant thorn in the side of Greeks and Turks alike, died on January 27 (Woodhouse 1985, 148)

Diehard supporters of Grivas, however, fought to keep his power alive by reforming his old terrorist network, now renamed *EOKA-B*. Together with members of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, they would provide the point of General Ioannidis' ultimate plot. Looking for a way to score a major coup for his fast-crumbling position, Ioannidis looked outwards, and Cyprus was chosen (Woodhouse 1991, 304).

General Ioannidis sought to assassinate Archbishop Makarios and install a pro-*enosis* government precipitating the most sought after goal of most Greeks and Greek-Cypriots. Such a move would most probably have guaranteed his popularity, however, Greece was in no real position to deal with any Turkish response to a unilateral move. Fortunately, Makarios discovered the plot, and announced so publicly on July 6. However, 9 days later an attack on his Presidential Palace in Nicosia attempted to accomplish the plot. Makarios narrowly escaped, eventually arriving in London. General Ioannidis' mouthpiece in Cyprus was propped up in Nicosia as President. However, the Turkish military, mobilized for months for such a contingency, landed troops on the north of the island on July 20 (Woodhouse 1991, 304).

A Greek mobilization was mounted to counter the Turkish action, but was a total catastrophe. NATO and the US were strangely silent. The only international action against the erupting violence was by the United Nations which passed UN Security Council Resolution 353 calling for cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign troops from

the island (Brown 1991, 8).

NATO Secretary General Dr. Joseph Luns made no effort to initiate any type of peace between the two NATO members. The British and the United States both sent troops and aircraft to the island only to evacuate their respective nationals. No evidence exists of any pre-emptive action on the part of NATO or the United States to stem the spiral towards military action by the two countries (Woodhouse 1985, 156-157).

On July 24th General Ioannidis resigned at the 'urging' of other officers and prominent civilian leaders. Constantine Karamanlis was invited to return from his exile in Paris and assume office. He quickly formed a coalition government, suspended martial law, released all political prisoners, and legalized the Communist Party for the first time since 1947. The crisis was not yet over, however. Cyprus still had to be dealt with (Woodhouse 1991, 305).

The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee among Britain, Greece, and Turkey obliged them to consult together if the settlement that established an independent Cyprus was ever endangered. Each signatory had a right to act individually to restore the status quo if a joint action was not possible. Accordingly, two separate meetings were held in Geneva with the three powers to come to a decision. None was reached. On August 14, 1974, acting under her rights as a treaty signatory, Turkey advanced her forces further into Cyprus, eventually occupying 40% of the island and displacing thousands of Greek Cypriots. In turn, thousands of Turkish Cypriots, trapped in the south, fled to the British Sovereign Base Areas of Dhekelia and Akrotiri (Woodhouse 1991, 305).

Athens openly admitted that it could do nothing to help as its forces were totally unprepared and unable to go to war with Turkey. Most Greeks blamed their allies for the

blunders the Ioannidis' government had gotten Greece into. Britain had failed to act under her treaty obligations in Cyprus and the United States was accused of aiding and abetting the Ioannidis government. The first response of the new Karamanlis government was to withdraw Greek forces from NATO military command (Woodhouse 1991, 306). He also demanded the removal of all US military bases from Greek soil, except insofar as they served Greek interests. These two actions were in response to the failure of both NATO and the US to prevent the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. At home, Karamanlis announced that elections would take place in November, that a plebiscite would be held on the monarchy, and an updated constitution would be adopted. The only criticism from any quarter was from Andreas Papandreou, whose forces felt that Karamanlis was not showing great enough severity against the military officers involved in the former dictatorship (Woodhouse 1991, 306).

### **Summary**

The years of military rule in Greece had a major effect on the future conduct of Greek foreign policy. Foreign and Security policy under the dictatorship remained relatively stable because the Army sought to maintain a close relationship with Greece's traditional allies. However, because of the failure of the Western Alliance to respond against the military dictatorship, Greek civilians came to resent the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States. The latter, most Greeks believed, was the true master of Greece's destiny. It was impossible for most Greeks to believe that anything happened to Greece without the United States' approval or foreknowledge. Most felt that the US had been involved in the rise of the military dictatorship through an omnipotent force called

the Central Intelligence Agency.

The military government had ruined relations with Turkey, however. The end result was that by 1974 Cyprus was partitioned and Greece was saved from a disastrous war with Turkey. The only reason Greece did not go to war with Turkey was because of the military dictatorship. The military, during the seven years of Army rule, had developed severe morale and readiness problems, and when it came time for war with Turkey in 1974 Greece was unable to prosecute such a conflict.

Turkey now became the most important security concern for Greece. Greece had always placed Turkey high on her list of potential adversaries. However, Civil War and the influence of the United States had forced the two into an alliance against Communism. This lasted until the Cyprus crisis reared its head. While the United States had averted conflict before, it was unable to do so in 1974.

It was in this post-military government era now that Greece would begin to truly divert from Western Alliance policy and develop an independent foreign and security arrangement. This had begun under Constantine Karamanlis as one of his first acts upon returning from exile. He withdrew Greece from the combine NATO military structure, much like France, but was still careful to not withdraw Greece from the entire Alliance (Woodhouse 1991, 306).

The internal politics of Greece had thus far played an extremely important role in Greek relations with the Atlantic Alliance. The cohesion of the Alliance has always been presupposed on individual membership and a perceived threat against the Alliance. Changes in Greek domestic politics affected Greek foreign policy and forced NATO into an extremely uncomfortable position. While arrayed against a perceived Soviet threat,



NATO now had to deal with two member states that viewed each other as a greater threat. The possibility that Moscow could use the tension between the two and sunder the Southern Flank of NATO or that other NATO members would begin to follow individualistic, nationalistic foreign policies was becoming a major concern.

The most important effect that the military government had on future Greek foreign policy was the rise of Andreas Papandreou. Before the coup the military segment of Greek politics had viewed the rise of Andreas Papandreou as more of a problem than the Communists. Papandreou's views were radical for the more conservative forces in Greek politics: withdrawal of Greece from NATO, dominance of the Left in the political system, true civilian control of the military, and in essence the end of military control over military policy. The Army officers that led the dictatorship for seven years only delayed the rise of Andreas Papandreou. His role in reshaping Greek foreign policy will be discussed in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **THE PAPANDREOU DECADE**

The fall of the Colonels' Government in 1974 resulted in the return of Greece to Constitutional Government. For a time, the highly respected Constantine Karamanlis led Greece, and her foreign policy, through the immediate changes Greece was making. From 1974 to 1981 Greece's most obvious change was a gradual popular slide toward the left end of the political spectrum leading to the election of Andreas Papandreou and his Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK). This was the most drastic change that had occurred in Greece since the end of the Civil War. Fear of a Leftist-dominated government being elected in the 1960's was the reason that the military intervened in the internal Greek political process for seven years.

This is important in understanding Greek popular reaction to continuous Great Power intervention. In the case of the 1967 military coup it is important to note that there was little reaction from the Great Powers in Washington and Brussels to the military take over. As stated in the previous chapter, the US. and NATO were willing to ignore the failure of democratic institutions in Greece as long as the new government maintained its commitments to NATO and Alliance security policy. Alliance cohesion was and is the prime policy of NATO, and to a large extent the United States as well.

The effect on Greece, however, was to alienate her politically. The population sanctioned new Greek governmental policies when democracy returned in 1974, that

distanced Greece from the US and NATO. It is important to remember that these policies were not introduced by the Socialist or Democratic Parties, but by the conservative New Democracy Party. The need to distance Greek foreign policy from the influence of NATO and America was a bipartisan issue. However, the election of Andreas Papandreou and the introduction of his ideological views greatly distorted this issue in the years of his administration

The radical changes that Andreas Papandreou proposed were to be slowly implemented over the coming years. It was a democratic triumph for Greece that less than a decade after a right-wing military coup, a Socialist government was elected to dominate the Greek political scene. However, the left-wing ideology of Papandreou was anti-NATO and anti-American. He believed that Soviet power was necessary to counter American capitalist expansion, and he withdrew Greek forces from the military command structure of NATO, much like the French, with whom close relations were maintained.

Papandreou also cultivated relations with various international pariahs and other third-world leaders, including Muamar Gadhafi of Libya, Manuel Noriega of Panama, and Yassir Arafat of the PLO (the latter before it became fashionable to do so). Papandreou supported the Soviet shootdown of a Korean Air Lines passenger liner over Sakhalin Island and courted the Polish General/President Jarulzelski, to the consternation of the NATO allies.

Ultimately, Papandreou developed the most independent Greek foreign policy since the Premiership of Eleftherios Venizelos, who entered Greece in the Balkan Wars. For example, to balance the dominance of the US in NATO, he continued Greece's

entrance in the European Economic Community. In addition, he still maintained Greece in NATO. Papandreou's security concerns revolved around Turkey. Therefore, NATO, however bad relations between the two might be, still remained the best defense against a Greco-Turkish War.

The importance of this period in Greek foreign policy cannot be underestimated. While Papandreou, as we shall see in the coming pages, was more rhetorical than practical in his foreign policy, he still was tied to a close relationship with a great power. The rhetoric he used stirred popular support for his party. In the end he had returned Greek relations and image abroad into one almost worse than that of the military government.

### **The Return of Civilian Rule to Greece**

True changes in Greek foreign policy did not begin with Andreas Papandreou's socialist party, but with the return of democracy to Greece in 1974. On November 17, 1974 Constantine Karamanlis' New Democracy (ND) party won an overwhelming 54 percent and 220 of 300 seats in the *Vouli*. A few weeks later, the population held a plebiscite on the monarchy resulting in some 69 percent to 31 percent against the return of the King. A Presidential Republic was established, much along the lines of the French system of government. Papandreou denounced the power the President was given and haggling among the various groups eventually lowered the power of the Presidency, against the wishes of Karamanlis (Woodhouse 1991, 306-307).

In February 1975, yet another conspiracy of Army officers was discovered. Supposedly this was sponsored by General Ioannidis from his prison cell. For whatever

reason, the clumsy attempt was put down before it even started, and Greek democracy continued to be rebuilt (Woodhouse 1985, 172).

Externally, Karamanlis hoped to move Greece to a more mature stage, more on a par with other European states. This was necessary to gain acceptance from other European countries and to Karamanlis this could only be realized economically and politically by resuming negotiations with the EC and entering Greece on a full course towards integration with the rest of Europe. The Council of Europe soon welcomed Greece back and the EEC restarted its Treaty of Association, but negotiations were not begun for full Greek membership just yet. In addition, ministerial level relations were restored with Greece's neighbors, Eastern and Western European (Woodhouse 1991, 308).

Relations with NATO were initially terminated, in reaction to the lack of a NATO/US response to Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus. Greece was withdrawn from the military command only, further emphasizing Greece's security concerns as not being parallel with those of the Alliance. Relations were further strained when, in March 1976, the US began a defense co-operation agreement with Turkey that provided over \$1 billion in American military aid over four years in exchange for continued US use of military bases in Turkey. The Greek government quickly moved to secure a similar agreement with the Americans for \$700 million. This event established what became known as the 7 to 10 ratio among the US, Greece and Turkey. It was an unofficial measure of aid to Greece and Turkey that soon became a major political tool (Brown 1991, 33-34). By the end of the seventies, Karamanlis was renegotiating Greece's return to full membership with NATO. Talks were obstructed by the US and Turkey because of

continued problems with both countries (Woodhouse 1991, 315). The primary reason for continued US-Greek friction was Karamanlis' unilateral cancellation of the home porting agreement for the US 6th Fleet (Woodhouse 1985, 171). While not totally normalized, Greece's foreign policy and relations were returning to something more typical.

Attempts to maintain a more independent Greek foreign policy were begun by Karamanlis. He cultivated better relations with other Balkan states, culminating in two Balkan conferences on trade, tourism, communications and other technical-co-operation. He approached Communist states, allowing the Soviets port visits, and the Chinese to observe Greek military maneuvers. He also visited Prague, Budapest, and Peking (Woodhouse 1991, 314).

Karamanlis also resumed friendly relations with most of the Arab states. Greece was able to maintain close relations with countries in the Middle East due to her unofficial recognition of Israel, thus staying on the good side of relations with the Arabs. Around this time, Andreas Papandreou, as leader of one of the main opposition parties, began courting some of the more revolutionary Arab leaders including Arafat, Assad and Gadhafi (Woodhouse 1991, 314). Relations with these countries would later prove to be one of the main problems of Greek relations with the West and the US.

### **The Rise of Papandreou**

On November 20, 1977, a general election returned Constantine Karamanlis to power and brought Andreas Papandreou's Pan Hellenic Socialist Party as the official opposition. The rise in popularity of the socialist party was very disconcerting to Karamanlis. While he still had a mandate to continue negotiations to further Greek

interests, Papandreou also had a mandate to vigorously oppose Karamanlis' moves. Papandreou threatened to withdraw Greece from the EEC and NATO and promised a much tougher stance towards Turkey and the United States. Papandreou's rhetoric lightened as elections came nearer in October 1981 (Woodhouse 1991, 318).

Despite this rhetoric from Papandreou, Greece acceded as a full member to the European Economic Community on May 28, 1979. The ratification of the treaty in the Greek parliament was easy because Papandreou's party boycotted the debate. The treaty passed 191 votes in favor to 2 against accession (Woodhouse 1991, 318). In addition, Karamanlis continued to attempt to restore Greece to full NATO membership but was constantly blocked by the Turkish government. On September 12, 1980, a coup in Ankara by Chiefs of Staff of the Turkish military was welcomed in Turkey and abroad. The terms of Greece's re-entry into NATO were then quickly settled and no problems were heard from Ankara (Woodhouse 1991, 318-319).

One thing still remained in opposition to the rise of the socialists in Greece however. That was Karamanlis himself. His popularity was enough to maintain support for his New Democracy party despite the prevalence of support for Papandreou's socialists. In June 1980, Karamanlis stood for the Presidency and despite being bitterly opposed by PASOK, Karamanlis won. He resigned from the office of Prime Minister and assumed his new office on May 15, 1981. Succeeding him as Prime Minister was George Rallis, the Foreign Minister (Woodhouse 1991, 319).

On October 18, 1981 elections were held that commenced many major changes in Greek politics. First was the confirmation of democratic institutions in Greece. Less than 7 years after the fall of the military government, Greece had succeeded in two

peaceful transitions of power. Second, only seven years after a military coup designed to prevent the rise of Andreas Papandreou's socialist ideas from taking root in Greece, the Pan Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK) peacefully took over the reins of power and brought Andreas Papandreou to the Premiership of Greece. Last, it signified great changes in Greek foreign policy that were the basis of PASOK's election platform: *ALLAGI!* - or CHANGE! (Clogg 1993, viii).

### **Papandreou's Foreign and Security Policy**

Andreas Papandreou's foreign policy can be divided into two areas: rhetoric and reality. In general, it can be argued that his rhetoric in 1973-1974 was the main reason that the military feared a leftward shift in Greek policy. Such a shift was unacceptable to the traditionally conservative military. In reality none of what Papandreou argued would be carried out. Greece was not withdrawn from NATO, rather Greece joined the EEC in an attempt to balance the dominance of the United States over Greek foreign policy. The best example of the reality can be seen early in the Papandreou administration when Greece took her turn as President of the EEC Council of Ministers in July 1983 despite rhetoric that Greece would be withdrawn from the Community (Woodhouse 1991, 320).

Relations with NATO were additionally pragmatic. In the summer of 1982 Greece began high level talks with NATO and the US over the issue of bases in Greece. Many viewed this as a restoration of normal relations among the three. Furthermore, relations with Turkey were almost normalized. In July 1982 both the Greek and Turkish governments announced a moratorium on provocative acts and six months later Papandreou made a friendly reference to the Turkish role in the Aegean (Woodhouse



1991, 320).

Unfortunately Papandreou was not able to maintain ties with the West very well. This stemmed mostly from his relationship with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In addition Papandreou received very harsh reaction from the West concerning Greece's stance on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1981 and the Soviet shootdown of the Korean Air Lines 747 in August 1983. Athens initially condemned the invasion of Afghanistan but then ceased to say anything more on the subject. The 1983 Soviet shootdown of the KAL 747 provoked only 'regret' from Papandreou (Michalopoulos 1988, 363). Later in 1984, Papandreou made even more negative impact on Greek relations with the West when he stated, "...if such a plane came into Greece, we would have downed it (Pyrros 1988, 247)." In all fairness to Papandreou, though, his continued cultivation of relations with the East was started by Constantine Karamanlis in the years immediately after the end of the dictatorship in a spirit of détente any leader in Western Europe would have envied (Woodhouse 1991, 321).

In opposition to NATO, Papandreou criticized the deployment of nuclear-tipped Cruise and Pershing missiles (Verney 1993, 142) and he also blocked the creation of a new NATO command (the Seventh Allied Tactical Air Force) at the Greek Air Force Base in Larisa. War games were canceled with the United States and US Navy flights over the Aegean were protested. Voice of America broadcasts were restricted. Most importantly, Greece withdrew from a NATO exercise in September 1983 after the Alliance agreed with Turkey to exclude the Greek island of Limnos from the exercise (Kapsis 1988, 46). In response to perceived US siding with Turkey, the Athens government refused to allow a US warship to load ammunition at the Souda Bay Naval

Base. The ship was destined to resupply US Marines in Beirut (Snyder 1987, 54).

Continued Greek policy away from NATO doctrine made the US impatient. They threatened to hold up a sale of new fighter aircraft to Greece. The US even intimated that the 7 to 10 ratio between Greece and Turkey may be upset (Woodhouse 1991, 325). This did not deter Greece from initiating the 'New Defense Doctrine' of 1985. Essentially the new doctrine was a reorganization and redeployment of the armed forces in response to the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Before 1974, the Greek Army was stationed along the borders of Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, with one infantry division along the Turkish border in Thrace. The 1985 reorganization, however, deployed an entirely new Army Corps - 'D Corps' - along the Turkish border. It is the only corps in the Greek Army that is maintained at 100% combat readiness (Brown 1991, 94). In addition to Army redeployments, four new air bases were built in the Aegean for the Air Force, becoming operational in the late 1970's (Brown 1991, 96). The new doctrine was based on Turkey's new Fourth Army of the Aegean, deployed after 1974 (Kapsis 1988, 48). This new organization was responsible for mobilization and training of Turkish forces in case of war. It was also responsible for operations against Greece in the Aegean should the two ever go to war (Brown 1991, 97-99).

Such action on the part of the Greek government drew widespread reaction from other NATO members. Many felt that the new policy of treating Turkey as her main enemy would inhibit the supply of military aid from individual states, such as West Germany, or collectively from the EEC or NATO. NATO even had to omit Greece and Turkey from the Annual Defense Review in 1984 due to unresolved problems (Woodhouse 1991, 327)

Greco-Turkish relations had begun to deteriorate again in 1983. Rauf Denktash, leader of the Turkish community on Cyprus, declared that the northern portion of the island would henceforth be known as the sovereign Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The action was condemned by Greece, the United States and the UN Security council. Despite reports of anger from Ankara over the unilateral declaration, Turkey was and still is the only country to recognize the area. Ankara has also stated that it will guarantee the independence of the Turkish Cypriots with the 18,000 Turkish troops that are maintained on the island (Snyder 1987, 55-56). Greek and Turkish intractability over the issue nearly led to war again in March 1984 when Greek and Turkish naval vessels fired on each other (Woodhouse 1991, 326).

Papandreou continued to cultivate ties among the Eastern Bloc states. He visited Warsaw and Moscow and gave support to a Romanian initiative to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans, in total opposition to NATO policy. As a sign of the importance the Soviet Union placed on relations with Greece, the late Yuri Andropov's son was appointed the Soviet Ambassador to Greece (Woodhouse 1991, 324).

Papandreou also attempted to promote Greek relations in other areas of the world. In October 1983 he hosted the Socialist Prime Ministers of Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy in Athens. The next year he visited Scandinavia, Libya, Jordan, Syria, and India. As a result of these visits, Greece became a member of a six-nation club against nuclear weapons. The other states included Sweden, India, Argentina, Mexico, and Tanzania. Papandreou even tried to put a stop to the civil war in Chad by inviting Francois Mitterand of France and Muamar Gadhafi to Crete in an effort to settle their dispute (Woodhouse 1991, 325).

Papandreou's policies had proven very popular with the electorate. However, many on the Right felt that another PASOK victory could lead to another coup or possibly even civil war. In reality such Right-wing rhetoric was overblown. Elections were set for June 2, 1985 and Papandreou maintained his majority, though it was reduced by seven seats (Woodhouse 1991, 330-331).

With his mandate confirmed for the second time, Papandreou continued with his foreign policy changes. Greece came under severe fire from all quarters in June 1985 when TWA Flight 847, bound to New York from Athens and via Rome was hijacked in Greece by Shi'a Muslim extremists. Greece suffered another jolt to her tourist industry and international prestige as various unsolved political murders and other terrorist actions continuously rocked the country for the rest of the 1980's (Pyrros 1988, 245-246).

Greek prestige was coming under almost constant fire as Papandreou maintained close relations with many terrorist-sponsoring states in the Middle East. Papandreou continued to spurn the Western European governments as well. In 1984 Papandreou visited Poland, the first Western leader to visit since the imposition of martial law there in 1981. Papandreou attacked the sanctions the West had placed on the Polish military regime. In addition, he declared the West full of 'capitalist regimes' and denounced the anti-social actions of the 'Solidarity' movement (Pyrros 1988, 242-243).

Papandreou continued to expand relations with what could be termed socialist states. He visited Romania and Bulgaria, and the new President Sartzetakis visited East Germany. General Jarulzelski was invited to Athens, despite being shunned by the rest of Western Europe. Meanwhile, Papandreou limited relations with the Western Alliance to formal gatherings and meetings (Woodhouse 1991, 340).

One of the more important actions of the Papandreou government affected a uniquely Greek problem and represented one of the only true independent Greek foreign policy initiatives of the period. Since 1940, Greece and Albania had been officially at war with each other. Albania's relations with any state since the end of World War II had been anything but friendly. However, in November 1985 academics from Athens and Tirana began meeting and discussing co-operative ventures. Eight months later official diplomatic discussions were initiated. Unfortunately, relations between the two began to be hampered from the opposition in Greece. The cause was concern over the rights of ethnic Greeks in southern Albania, or what Greece refers to as northern Epirus. In exchange for guarantees of greater human rights and autonomy for the ethnic Greeks in Epirus a formal termination of war was signed by the leadership of both states in August 1987. This was followed by reciprocal visits by the Foreign Ministers of both countries in early 1988 (Brown 1991, 38-39).

The future of US bases in Greece was a continual thorn in relations between the Papandreou government and the various American administrations. In October 1985 the US announced that all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from Greece, although no one had ever admitted that they were there in the first place. Various reports indicate that nuclear weapons were based in Greece until much later indicating that a secret agreement on their basing was reached (Pranger 1988, 254).

After that, relations between the two revolved more around the purchase by Greece of 40 American F-16 Fighting Falcons to update the Greek Air Force. The sale was allowed in 1986 after an agreement by Greece to prevent technology leakage to the USSR (Woodhouse 1991, 344).

The current agreement was set to end in December 1988 and as that date approached, both sides seemed eager to begin discussions of the bases. Discussions were marred in 1987 by an attack on a bus carrying American military personnel to Hellenikon Air Base. Perpetrated by a Greek terrorist group calling itself "November 17," the act was condemned by all sides (Pranger 1988, 257). In either case, Hellenikon Air Base, and the nearby Nea Makri Communications Center were scheduled to be closed in 1989 and 1990 respectively as a result of worldwide reductions on the part of the US (Woodhouse 1991, 345).

Indecision was rampant on the part of the Greeks due to upcoming elections in June 1989. The Greeks were also looking for added safeguards in any future basing agreement. Between NATO and the United States, Greece has constantly looked for a safeguard of her frontiers to be guaranteed by one or both of these allies. However, neither was willing to accept it in the context of the North Atlantic Treaty. Greece felt that, due to unclear language in the charter, the Alliance should guarantee the defense of any Treaty signatory from attack from any quarter. This was obviously a reference to Turkey. All Alliance members objected (Pranger 1988, 258). Greece has concluded that such action on the part of the NATO members proves without a doubt that Turkey is judged more important to the Alliance. This was one of the first official Greek objections to NATO policy that considered Greek security concerns to be secondary to the Communist/Soviet threat NATO was arrayed against officially.

Near the end of Papandreou's second term in office, relations with Turkey again came to a head. The Cyprus issue was still a major source of friction, however, other areas of Greco-Turkish relations came to the forefront in 1986 and 1987. Yet again,

Greece and Turkey, two NATO 'allies,' were fighting more than co-operating.

December 1986 saw a crisis on the mutual border between Greece and Turkey in Thessaly/Thrace. On the 19th two Turkish soldiers and one Greek soldier died after an exchange of fire between border patrols on the Evros River (Pranger 1988, 262). Three months later, in March 1987, the situation became much worse. The Papandreou government had, since December 1981, continuously threatened to exercise Greece's right to extend her sovereignty claim to 12 miles over all two-thousand islands in the Aegean Archipelago. Essentially this would have made the Aegean a Greek lake, leaving only about 19 percent of the Aegean as international waters as opposed to the present 48.5 percent international waters. The real reason Greece wanted to extend her territorial sea rights was due to supposed petroleum deposits around the Greek island of Thasos. Greece and Turkey both immediately sent seismic research vessels to the area under naval escort. Tensions increased until NATO and the United States pressured Turkey to withdraw (Pranger 1988, 263).

Despite continued protestations from both sides, relations warmed between the two countries. In November 1987 Papandreou went so far as to congratulate the Turkish Prime Minister Ozal on his re-election. In January 1988 the two met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland. While nothing substantive came about, many procedural innovations were initiated. First, the two established a 'hot-line' phone system connecting the two capitals; second, two joint committees were created to handle political and economic relations between the two, and third, the two agreed to meet at least twice a year in each other's capital. The thaw in relations was marred, however, by riots between Greek police and ethnic Turks in the northern Greek city of

Komotini the same month (Woodhouse 1991, 348).

Relations between the two countries proceeded normally for the rest of Papandreou's term. The special committees set up at Davos achieved very little. The new President of Cyprus, George Vassiliou, met with the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. However, talks between the two ended abruptly when Denktash demanded the official recognition and independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. March 1988 saw Greece protesting yet again to airspace violations by US and Turkish aircraft on a NATO exercise. In May, two Turkish diplomatic automobiles were bombed by unknown assailants and in return the Turkish government stressed the violation of human rights by Greek police against the Turkish minority in Greek Thrace, sparked by more riots in the Greek city of Komotini in January 1990. But by that time, Papandreou and his Socialists were already out and a new Greek government was in place.

### **Summary**

The end result of Andreas Papandreou's Socialist Government from 1981 to 1989 was an increase in rhetorical hostility between the US and Greece. Little love was lost among the other NATO members either. It must be remembered, though, that Papandreou was not the initiator of many of the policies he condoned. Most were begun from 1974 to 1981 by Constantine Karamanlis in reaction to the failure of the US and NATO to react to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Rhetoric aside, Papandreou carried out a foreign policy very similar to that initiated by Karamanlis.

Papandreou's relations with the Eastern Bloc states and the USSR demonstrated a pragmatic approach to détente as well as one that he knew would balance the dominance



of NATO and the US in Greek foreign policy. No doubt his policies were appreciated by the Soviets who enjoyed any problems that NATO had to deal with. This was especially important where the USSR had dealings in the Eastern Mediterranean and her Middle East client states. In many cases these were the same states with which Papandreou was developing relations. It was certainly a feather in his cap to be courted by both super-powers, the NATO Alliance notwithstanding.

Relations with the US were also counter-balanced by the development of Greece's ties to the European Economic Community. Despite his pre-election rhetoric to the contrary, Papandreou never seriously considered withdrawing from the EEC. It was the only organization that Greece was a member of that did not include the US or Turkey. In addition it promoted closer relations between Papandreou and his Socialist ally Francois Mitterand of France. Close relations with one of the great leaders of European unity was another quiver for Papandreou's bow, and was another way of balancing US and NATO dominance over Greece.

These were major stepping stones in Greece's attempt to lessen foreign influence in her foreign policy. For the NATO Alliance, however, this was a drastic example of policy divergence by a member state. To make matters worse, the continued problems between Greece and Turkey were dominating their security policies at the expense of their NATO readiness commitments. Officially, NATO was still including the two in NATO planning as much as possible. Realistically, Greece was distancing herself from NATO policy.

In the Greek view the NATO threat assessment was not applicable to Greece. Withdrawing totally from NATO was never a real consideration for any Greek

administration, including Andreas Papandreou's. The advantages of remaining in NATO, intelligence, easier weapons procurement, and the prestige of membership in the Alliance. These advantages, which transcended traditional alliance foundations of combining against a common threat, began to transform the basis of NATO Alliance cohesion.

In essence, though, the Cold War ended for Greece in 1974. From then on she dealt with what she felt was a more immediate threat. Tensions with Turkey have flared up many times since 1974, continuing to cast a shadow over the region and reducing any possibility of dealing with the Cyprus issue.

The real issue revolves around the semblance of independence that Papandreou built up as opposed to any real socialist dogma that he preached. Greece still is forced to rely on NATO and the US for many defensive considerations. During any crisis between Greece and Turkey it is always NATO and the US that must settle the situation. This is as much a result of continued US influence with the Turkish governments as with its relations with the Papandreou government. However, Greece under Papandreou built up close relations with other powers and began to balance the influence of any single dominating country or organization. In the next chapter, the post-Papandreou era will be examined. There is where we shall see if dependence or independence of policy was maintained.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **GREECE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**

The end of the 1980's saw the return of Greek foreign policy to a more stable relationship with her allies. This was partly because of the end of the Cold War, which decreased allied antagonism against Greece's defensive stance in the Southern Flank. The end of the traditional threat against the Alliance decreased the influence Washington and Brussels had over Athens and other member states. However, the new government of Greece, as well as the rest of the Alliance, viewed the benefits of co-operation and good relations with the Alliance as more favorable than terminating NATO. Elections in 1989-90 brought about the end of the revolutionary changes that Andreas Papandreou made in attempting to bring about an independence of Greek foreign policy. In his place was the government of Constantinos Mitsotakis and rapprochement with the West.

The end of the Cold War had changed much about the relationship between Greece and her traditional allies. Greece was no longer a lonely outpost of the EC and NATO in the region. Turkey had proved itself a reliable ally in the Gulf War and was garnering prestige and aid for her role. Greece, however, was delaying peace in the former Yugoslavia over problems with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This threatened to expand the already bloody war in the area. Greece was failing to endear herself to Europe and the Americans over very nationalistic priorities once more.

Greece also continued to maintain that her primary security threat lay to the east

as opposed to the north and this was even more pronounced with the end of the Cold War. As recently as September 1995 the Greek military held a series of combined-arms maneuvers in Thrace and Cyprus ("Parmenion '95", "Philippos '95", and "Nikiphoros '95") which, based on the scenarios for each, were based on an 'eastern' threat (Blaveris 1995, 16-24). Crises with Turkey have occurred on and off and have become a staple of relations between the two. Incidents on the inter-Thracian border and Greek Air Force intercepts of stray Turkish fighters over the Aegean are common and increase the tension in the area, especially on the islands off the Turkish coast.

However, Greece has participated much more in recent years in NATO operations, sending troops to Bosnia and ships to the Adriatic. She supported the US in the Gulf War and reversed her formerly hostile stance that dominated her relations with the US and NATO in the 1980's. Most of these support operations have catered to general relations with her allies, but have not dominated her foreign policy.

### **The 1989-1990 Greek Elections**

The June 1989 elections in Greece brought about a defeat of Andreas Papandreou's revolutionary ideas of foreign policy and halted the Greek political process. The election resulted in Constantinos Mitsotakis' New Democracy gaining 44.2 percent, Papandreou's PASOK 39.1 percent, and the Alliance, a left-wing communist coalition, received 13.1 percent. Without a clear majority, an unorthodox partnership was formed between New Democracy and the Alliance. The coalition was formed specifically to prosecute a number of PASOK ministers over embezzlement scandals with the Bank of Crete and other misdeeds. Papandreou was also implicated and criminal charges were

brought forward. With this accomplished, the unorthodox coalition called for new elections set for November 5, 1989 (Brown 1991, 35-36).

The second round elections in November failed to produce a clear majority again. New Democracy increased its share of the vote to 46.2 percent as did PASOK, increasing to 40.6 percent. The Left Wing Coalition won 10.9 percent and independents won 2.3 percent. After some bickering, an all-party government was formed under Xenophon Zolotas, former governor of the Bank of Greece. The temporary government was formed to deal with domestic and economic issues only and to prepare for yet another election. Foreign and security policy matters were placed on the back-burner as elections were scheduled for April 8, 1990 (Brown 1991, 36).

Finally, Constantine Mitsotakis achieved a majority government in this third election in six months. His leadership was very fragile, though. Costas Stephanopoulos, a conservative independent, won a single seat and pledged it to New Democracy and Mitsotakis. The majority was one seat, giving Mitsotakis 151 seats (in the 300 seat *Vouli*). PASOK lost seats, dropping to 123, and the Alliance won 19. Two seats were acquired by Moslem representatives from the small Turkish minority in Western Thrace. A small 'Green' movement won a single seat, and four more were won by joint Socialist-Communist candidates (Brown 1991, 36).

With his victory, however weak, Mitsotakis was able to redress critical foreign policy issues that had been set aside for the previous six months. One of the first issues Mitsotakis had to deal with was the US bases agreement. However, before the June 1989 elections, New Democracy argued, the previous PASOK government had agreed to 80 percent of the new defense and co-operation agreement with the US (Couloumbis 1993,

119).

The drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union rendered many US bases and operational facilities redundant. However, the August 1989 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait again made the US bases in Greece extremely important as a transshipment point for military material headed for the Gulf from Europe and the US. Mitsotakis had also made amends with the US such that a Greek frigate, the *Ellis*, was sent to work in the Red Sea with French and US naval forces to enforce UN sanctions against Iraq ('Make friends...' 1991, 46). In August 1993, though, the United States announced that it would be returning its last bases in Greece (Iraklion Air Station and US Navy facilities at Souda Bay, both on Crete) to the host country ('USAF Overseas Operations' 1993, 10).

The post-Gulf War era found the US and Greece in conflict almost immediately. While Greece had allowed US bases to support troops throughout the Gulf War, Turkey had allowed US bases in that country to be staging areas for bombing missions over Iraq. To reward Turkey, the Bush administration wanted to increase aid from \$550 million to \$700 million US dollars while holding the Greek share to around \$350 million, the same as the previous year. This would have severely upset the 7:10 ratio that had for so long been a main point of US policy in the region after the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The ratio was seen by the Greek and American governments as necessary to the maintenance of the balance of power in the region. Greek-American pressure against the US congress tends to increase when the ratio is in jeopardy ('Make friends...' 1991, 46-47).

The Greek outcry at the proposal was also challenged by the European Community. Since 1984, Greece had been blocking an aid package to Turkey consisting

of 800 million US dollars. The EC was now trying to get Greece to back off in an effort to provide Turkey with a post-war aid package. However, Greece refused to back down on the issue until Turkey made progress on relations concerning Cyprus ('Make friends...' 1991, 47).

Mitsotakis also conflicted with the US (and Turkey) over the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty signed between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The disagreement hinged on the southern Turkish port of Mersin. The Turkish government wanted the area excluded; the Greeks wanted it included. Geographically the port is in the Middle East, therefore the Turks stated it fell totally outside the CFE boundaries. However, to the Greek government the port was the base from which the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was launched in 1974. It continues to be the primary resupply port for Turkish forces on the island as well. The 'Mersin' question was shelved by Greece after NATO and US opposition was announced. Neither wanted to see the CFE process bogged down over this single issue. Athens has not dropped the issue totally, however, contending that it is still open (Brown 1991, 36-37).

Greece and Turkey also conflicted over Turkey's unilateral enlargement of the region over which she claims search-and-rescue jurisdiction. The Turks unilaterally doubled the region's size in the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean. This essentially allowed her coverage over half of Greece's Aegean islands and was an affront to Greek sovereignty. Turkey backed off on the issue and the two countries agreed to discuss it in the future (Brown 1991, 36).

The Mitsotakis administration had thus far had its hands full in foreign affairs; but there were more problems to come. The collapse of the former federation of

Yugoslavia created difficulties for many surrounding states, Greece included. Many European governments considered the resulting problems ridiculous. It was not ridiculous for Mitsotakis and Greece, however, as it brought down the government.

### **The Macedonian Question**

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia saw a small country in the central Balkans come to independence in 1991. The future name of this small country has been the subject of a debate that ended only in 1996. When the ex-Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared its independence it opened a Pandora's box that affected international relations throughout Europe and brought down the Greek government.

The initial problems resulted when Greece vetoed a European Union initiative to recognize the new country. Greece, led by Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis and Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras refused to budge on the issue. They regarded the Macedonian use of the sunburst symbol on her flag, certain articles in her new constitution, and her name, affronts to the Greek nation. The main reason was Greek worries of future Macedonian irredentism. Greece's north-central province is called Macedonia. In addition, popular support against the new country's use of these 'clearly' Greek symbols, was forcing the Greek government to stand firm.

Greek intransigence on the issue lost her immediate favor with many Western governments. The EC and the US put immediate pressure on Greece to ease up its policy. The Greek government was split on what to do. The young Foreign Minister stated publicly that the issue was non-negotiable. The name and flag of the country had to be changed as well as the offending articles in the constitution. Prime Minister



Mitsotakis, on the other hand, was willing to compromise. Months of public bickering between the two led to Mitsotakis' firing of Samaras on April 13, 1992 ('Balkanised' 1992, 47-48).

Mitsotakis did not have public opinion on his side. Most Greeks supported Samaras' hard line stand on the issue. Almost immediately after firing Samaras Mitsotakis endorsed his former Foreign Minister's views referring to the area by the name of the capital, 'Skopje'. Mitsotakis continued to block EC recognition of the state. In fact, no states had recognized the Macedonians except for Turkey and Bulgaria. Greece was the linchpin to Macedonia. Being a land-locked state forced Macedonia to use the northern Greek port of Thessaloniki for trade. Greece instituted a unilateral trade-ban on the state, that, coupled with her veto of the EC motion, effectively isolated the Macedonian government and its economy. Macedonia was thought to be losing over \$1.3billion a year in trade to the Greek embargo. In an effort to curry favor with the EC, Macedonia applied sanctions against Serbia, formerly her largest trading partner. Rising ethnic tension in the country also worried Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov that without UN representation the fighting in the former-Yugoslavia could spread ('The price...' 1992, 39-40).

A May 1992 meeting in Lisbon of EC ministers brought no change between Greece and the Community, one minister being quoted as saying that the Greek policy toward Macedonia was "rubbish." Only Hans-Dietrich Genscher of Germany and Giulio Andreotti of Italy supported the Greeks, stating that the EC should not push any member on an issue of supreme national interest ('The sick man...' 1992, 55-56).

EC support turned around, however, when Mitsotakis, now acting as his own

Foreign Minister, called each of the other 11 leaders to change their minds and support Greece on the issue. Not only did Mitsotakis assure the others that his government would fall if he took a different stance on the issue, but the other 11 leaders realized that the only alternative to Mitsotakis would be the return of Andreas Papandreou's Socialist PASOK party. In exchange for support, Mitsotakis agreed to end Greece's long-time relationship with Serbia, apply sanctions against Serbia, and join in the UN flotilla enforcing sanctions in the Adriatic. This agreed to, the new president of the EC, Great Britain, quietly hinted to Skopje that the EC's position would be reviewed unless Macedonia changed her name ('Less prickly' 1992, 53-54).

August 1992 saw Mitsotakis announce that the former Minister of Justice, Michali Papaconstantinou, would be the new Foreign Minister, and Papaconstantinou appeared to be content to keep quiet. Greece also curried favor with the EC by passing the Maastricht Treaty quickly and overwhelmingly ('A new...' 1992, 40). The Macedonian problem still persisted for the Greeks and would crest in the next year.

In October 1992, Mitsotakis saw his majority fall to one seat, when Mikis Theodorakis, the Greek composer, decided to sit as an independent. Andonis Samaras also resigned from the New Democracy Party the same month after the majority of the party sided with Mitsotakis. Domestic policy of attempting to prosecute tax evaders was also lessening Mitsotakis' support at home and he continued to be surrounded by others who threatened to defect and end the ruling ND mandate ('With closed...' 1992, 60).

The following year, 1993, saw advances finally in the Greco-Macedonian debate. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was admitted to the United Nations

though President Gligorov disapproved of the formal name. This name was also used by Gligorov to join the International Monetary Fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and end Skopje's diplomatic and economic isolation. Mitsotakis and Gligorov both seemed eager to end the 15-month old dispute. The issue was getting desperate for Mitsotakis, however. At home, he had barely survived a vote of no confidence brought about by the Papandreou's PASOK party. And two days previously he had had to rebuff his own party at a caucus ('A country by...' 1993, 50-51).

July 1993 was the beginning of the end for the Mitsotakis government. Andonis Samaras formed his own party, Political Spring, and quickly gained much support from others in the New Democracy Party. On September 7 Stefanos Stephanopoulos defected to Political Spring followed by George Symbilidis on September 9th. Mitsotakis' majority was now at 150, and, true to an earlier pledge to call early elections if his majority fell to 150, Mitsotakis met with President Karamanlis. Parliament was dissolved and elections were scheduled six months early (Facts on File Sept.16, 1993: 695-696).

### **The Return of Papandreou**

The split and fall of the Mitsotakis government and the New Democracy Party gave Andreas Papandreou one last chance to return to power. Elections were scheduled for October 10, 1993 and resulted in Papandreou's PASOK gaining 46.88 percent of vote, but 170 seats in the *Vouli*, a substantial majority in the 300-seat parliament. New Democracy, now led by Miltiades Evert, garnered only 39.30 percent of the vote and 109 seats. Andonis Samaras' defecting Political Spring gained only 4.87 percent of the vote

and 11 seats. The remainder was carried by the Communist/Socialist alliance and one independent (Apostolou 1995, 380-381).

Papandreou's election was not greeted with any enthusiasm outside of Greece. Papandreou's immediate halt of the previous government's privatization program upset the EC and just the fact that Papandreou was re-elected was enough to worry the United States. Many expected a return to his former rhetoric of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism, and a return to a left-wing nationalist view of the world. However, when Greece assumed the Presidency of the EC in January 1994 Greece promised that it would continue to honor the terms of the Maastricht Treaty and to continue to reform the economy. Relations with the US were stable. The only problem was with Macedonia. Papandreou promised not to recognize the state under any title bearing 'Macedonia' in it ('Can you...' 1993, 19-20). Papandreou also slapped unilateral sanctions on the small country which had thought that it was past that with the previous government.

Papandreou was also able to get a new President elected when the aging, but still respected, Constantinos Karamanlis' term was up in the Spring of 1995. PASOK had enough of a majority to have its own candidate, Constantinos Stephanopoulos, elected President in March 1995 and solidify its position for the next four years. To guarantee Stephanopoulos' election PASOK made an alliance with Samaras' Political Spring Party to gain the necessary 180 parliamentary votes ('End of term...' 1995, 60).

Papandreou, meanwhile, was continuing Greek foreign policy that was much different from his previous years in office. For example, Greece agreed to a Turkish-EU Customs Union finally in return for agreements from the EU on making Cyprus a full member. Relations with Albania were civilized ('End of term...' 1995, 60).

Greece recognized Macedonia, ended the trade blockade on the country, and endorsed her membership in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and other international organizations ('In the name...' 1995, 64).

Papandreou's health was failing him. In Greece's personality-dominated political system this brought the country to a standstill. Papandreou had open-heart surgery in 1988 and was urged by his doctors to have another. He was able to work only half days and was put in the hospital at the end of November 1995 (Stathos 1996,1).

For five weeks he was reported near death suffering from pneumonia, a pulmonary infection and respiratory problems (Anastasi 1995, 13). Greek politics, internal and external, were brought to a halt as Papandreou teetered on the brink of death. Others in PASOK were scrambling for position in an effort to promote themselves as potential successors. There was bipartisan pressure for Papandreou to resign from his office. Rumors abounded that Papandreou's young wife, nicknamed 'Mimi,' was preventing him from doing so. Supposedly she was trying to solidify her position in the Party upon her husband's death. However, as director of the Prime Minister's Office she had more power than many would have liked (Papadopoulos 1996, 3).

Despite continued worsening health problems Papandreou would not resign his post. Meanwhile, the country had come to such a standstill that almost nothing replaced news reports from the Onassis Cardiosurgical Center, where Papandreou was in intensive care. It was not until January 1996 that Papandreou finally resigned from the Premiership. Papandreou's replacement was a complete surprise in many quarters. The dominance of the succession process in Greek news was such that the new Prime Minister was faced with his first major crisis immediately upon taking office.

### **Enter Simitis**

When Andreas Papandreou finally announced his resignation from his post in early January 1996, the PASOK party immediately called for an internal vote to occupy the position. The result was Costas Simitis, a founder of the PASOK Party in 1974 and an expert on commercial law. Compared to Papandreou, Simitis is boring. He is mild-mannered, efficient, and much more centrist in the PASOK Party. He quickly dismissed many Papandreou loyalists, but left Papandreou's son George in his position as Minister of Education. He also promised to continue the privatization program, yet left Papandreou's economic team intact, to the surprise of many in the European Union. Simitis is very pro-European and as such is expected to make many moves toward aligning the Greek economy more with EU guidelines. Simitis also hoped to strengthen ties with the US, Turkey and Macedonia, three states that were normally opposed to Socialist dominance of Greek politics ('Looking...' 1996: 44-45).

National security was also a top priority for Mr. Simitis. Relations with NATO and the US were expected to be strengthened under his leadership as were relations with Greece's perennial enemy, Turkey. Relations among the four had proceeded normally for most of the time that Papandreou was in office. Greece had contributed 1000 troops to the NATO operation in Bosnia as well as the anti-sanction operations in the Adriatic. In return, Greece continued to receive increases in aid from the US, around \$315.2 million in 1995, and arms transfers under the Cascade Program from other NATO states that were downsizing. This is noteworthy in that while most other NATO states felt they could reduce their armed forces without any potential decrease in security, Greece continued to maintain her defense spending at around 5.5 percent of GDP, the highest of

any EU or NATO member (Dokos 1995, 412). Defense priorities for Greece were still directed east. The end of January 1996 provides us with yet another example of Greek-Turkish problems. To many the crisis was over a small rock in the Aegean that should have been left to the goats. To Greece and Turkey it is a question of sovereignty that has the potential to drag the rest of Europe into a conflict it neither wants nor can afford. It is a continuing problem that could tear asunder NATO's Southern Flank at a time when the eastern Mediterranean is becoming more important to NATO/US operations.

### **The Imia Crisis - January 28-31, 1996**

The Imia crisis, or Kardak Crisis as it is known in Turkey, in the greater scheme of Greco-Turkish relations, was but another example of the hostility and underlying tension that pervades the relationship between the two. Unfortunately, the end result was dominated by the intervention of the United States and the indomitable Richard Holbrooke.

The origins of the Imia crisis began on December 26, 1995 when the Turkish flagged merchant vessel 'Fiket Arket' was found moored off the island by local Greeks from the nearby island of Kalymnos. Dialogue revealed that the Turkish transport had moored off the islet for minor repairs. The Greek delegation, satisfied with the answer, returned home. Little was heard of the incident at the time due to Andreas Papandreou's ailing health dominating the news ('To kroniko...' 1996, 13).

Two days later, the small vessel was still there and it was determined that the boat would have to be towed to port. With the help of two local Greek tugboats, the 'Fiket Arket' was towed across the small channel to the Turkish harbor of Boulouk. At that

time in Athens, it was announced that the PASOK government would have a vote on January 20, 1996 to find a replacement for the ailing Papandreou. Locals on the island of Kalymnos were worried about the action of the Turkish vessel, and, in a fit of paranoia, sent a small delegation of children led by a local priest to place a Greek flag on the island that was otherwise used to graze some goats ('To kroniko...' 1996, 13).

On December 25, 1995 Turkish reporters from the newspaper 'Houriet' went to the island of Imia/Kardak and replaced the Greek flag on the island with a Turkish flag amid great publicity on local Turkish television. Sunday, January 28, 1996, Greek news reported that the Greek Ministry of Defense had heard of the action. The Greek MND ordered Naval ships to replace the Turkish flag with a Greek one in response ('To kroniko...' 1996, 13).

Gerasimos Arsenis, Minister of National Defense, announced on the evening of January 28 that the Greek Armed Forces were ready to defend the country if events warranted. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodore Pangalos, called the Turkish Ambassador to lodge a formal complaint against his government. He then informed the ambassadors of the United States and Russia of the Greek response (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).

By Monday morning, January 29, Greek and Turkish Air and Naval Forces were converging in large numbers around the small island. In the *Vouli*, Prime Minister Simitis declared Greek sovereignty over the island and that no one would touch 'a handful of Greek land.' Monday afternoon Gerasimos Arsenis and Theodore Pangalos supported the Prime Minister's statement with the action that was being taken by the Greek military (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).



Within the hour, Ankara warned Greek military units to withdraw from the island and continued to operate military units in the area. The Turkish Foreign Minister stated that the 1932 treaty between Italy and Turkey and the 1947 Italian Treaty, which returned the Dodecanese islands to Greece, were not valid and also asked that Greek military units withdraw from the island. The Turkish Foreign Ministry also announced that it would begin challenging the treaties in legal arenas (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).

The morning of January 30th, Turkish troops appeared near the islet. Tansu Ciller, the Turkish Prime Minister, stated that the Greek flag should be removed and the the Greek Navy withdraw from the area surrounding the island. The Greek Prime Minister responded before the Parliament: "The Government has taken measures diplomatically and strategically to defuse the crisis and guarantee the territorial sovereignty of our borders. The armed forces remain in the area to balance Turkish forces in the area and to remain if the Turkish forces remain (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996)."

Tragedy struck, however, when a Greek Navy helicopter conducting a surveillance of Turkish forces in the area crashed into the Aegean with three personnel on board. All three military personnel perished in the incident. The accident seemed to have warned off both sides as cooler heads then prevailed ('To kroniko...' 1996, 13).

Like the incident in 1987, the United States was forced to get involved to aid in defusing the crisis. US President Bill Clinton called Simitis and Ciller and urged both to refrain from the use of force and to reach an agreement through dialogue. However, the night of January 30 saw Greek and Turkish forces within extremely close range of one another (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan.1996).

Wednesday, January 31st, the US State Department, represented by Richard Holbrooke, announced that the crisis in the Aegean would defuse within the next 48 hours. Holbrooke was initially to help begin talks between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus problem. The Imia incident forced Holbrooke to change the focus to the Aegean. US remarks and neutrality on the issue gave Simitis a political dilemma that fueled public sentiment against the US. The US publicly stated that it did not recognize either state's sovereignty over the 10-acre island. US Ambassador to Greece Thomas Niles stated, "The State Department has taken no position on the issue and as I say, the position of the United States is irrelevant. We have no standing. We are not signatories, we are not the people, the country, the instance that decides ('US remarks...' 1996: 3). The lack of a US position on the issue incensed the Greek government. Such a position was tantamount to supporting the Turkish position.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana waited to see what continued American action would look like before involving NATO officially in the crisis. In the end NATO took no role in the crisis. Support for Greece came from an unusual area, when Russia came out in full support of the Greek position and firmly against the Turkish actions. Reports speculate this was in return for unwavering Greek support for Russian operations in Chechnya which the Greeks insisted was a strictly internal Russian matter (Etheiseis Elliniki Teleorasi 31 Jan. 1996).

Firm support also came down from the European Union. In a strongly worded resolution, the European Parliament stressed that Greek borders were EU borders, expressed concern over Turkey's provocative military moves and accused it of trying to destabilize the Aegean. The resolution declared that Turkey was violating its agreements

with the EU and declared that Imia was a part of Greece. In response, the Turkish Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal began an immediate tour of European Union capitals in an effort to lobby for neutrality ('Simitis gets...' 1996, 1).

Finally the two sides stopped sparring with one another. The crisis was defused and Greece and Turkey returned to disagreeing.

### Summary

The post-Cold war era has not been easy for any country to get used to. However, for Greece, the years since 1989 have not been so much about redressing the balance of power in Europe, but reforming Greek foreign policy in the years after Andreas Papandreou's years in office. They have been dominated by rapprochement with the Europeans and the Americans. Greece has restored its relationship with NATO insofar as it does not interfere with Greek security concerning the Aegean and Thrace.

The short-lived government of Constantinos Mitsotakis was able to begin briefly bringing Greek foreign policy back into the mainstream but popular nationalism soon took hold of the foreign policy arena. The question of Macedonia was an emotional one for the Greek people that the government could not avoid. Later, when Andonis Samaras left the New Democracy Party over the issue, it can be said that the Macedonian question caused the collapse of the Mitsotakis government. It is but one example of how popular nationalism and intra-governmental politics in Greece play a major role in Greek foreign policy. Elections later brought about the return of Papandreou when Mitsotakis' majority collapsed due to further defections over the Macedonian issue.

Despite fears from many sides, the return of Andreas Papandreou to the helm of

the Greek political machine was not as detrimental as was initially anticipated. In reality there was not much Papandreou could do. Gone were the days of playing close relations with the Eastern bloc against his allies in the West. Instead, Greece improved relations with the European Union as a counter-balance to the influence of the US and NATO. However, US-Greek relations remained fairly stable.

The centerpiece of Greek foreign policy still revolves around the perceived Turkish threat. The relationship is becoming more antagonistic over other areas in the Aegean besides Cyprus. This is perhaps more dangerous. In effect, now Greece and Turkey have more opportunities to disagree, and more opportunities for full-fledged conflict. Added to that is the fact that neither has decreased its defense spending. Such a combination has increased the threat in the post-Cold War eastern Mediterranean.

The effect on the relationship between Greece and her allies is still ambiguous. With firm support from the European Union, Greece is less reliant on NATO, so it appears that Greek policy in balancing the two organizations is paying off. However, it has yet to gain any firm US and NATO support for its positions vis-a-vis Turkey. If such a track continues it could see an even greater distance develop between Greece and the US. The only relationship between the two that remains is US and NATO arms transfers to modernize the Greek military. Unfortunately, the new weapons are being used to upgrade the Greek position in relation to Turkey instead of improving Greece's potential to help combat a threat to the alliance.

Without the common threat that dominated NATO ideology for over 40 years, domestic and regional conflicts that are between one or a few members of the alliance will begin dominating member nation foreign policies. NATO defense policy in the post-

Cold War era is some vague notion of defending its European members from an outside threat. Yet it still does not take a stance on the Greek-Turkish problem. Brussels still will not guarantee the defense of Greece from a potential Turkish threat, only from an outside one. NATO influence over the Greeks has decreased dramatically in return.

The unilateral withdrawal of American bases in Greece has also ended the massive dominance of that country in Greece as well. Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus the 'core' power of the Atlantic Alliance, Washington, has slowly lost its commandeering position over the various Greek administrations. The final base closures are a testament to that.

The issues that have dominated Greek domestic and international relations for so long provide excellent examples of a new trend in theories of alliance cohesion as well as the effect domestic politics and regional priorities have on intra-alliance dynamics in general. Existing theories were developed at the height of the Cold War to explain how NATO had formed and remained in existence. While these theories are still useful in examining how and why states form multilateral defensive partnerships, the theories are not entirely applicable to the Greek example and have only been applied generally.

The application of the Greek case to these theories presents many variables not previously entertained in alliance theory. These theories need to be altered to account for regional priorities and the effect domestic political dynamics have on individual alliance members in the context of the entire alliance as well as, when applicable, the dominating 'core' power of such an alliance. As the Greek case has demonstrated, domestic politics can develop resentment aimed at the alliance or 'core' due to a lack of action by these forces when it concerns individual members of the alliance. Alliance cohesion can suffer

as individual members concentrate on regional priorities as opposed to alliance priorities.

In the Greek case, US/NATO priorities have become secondary considerations as she concentrates on a regional threat from the east. As this threat is also a NATO member, it must be admitted that NATO cohesion is nonexistent in the Southern Flank. Before 1974 the US may have been able to guarantee the commitment of Greek and Turkish forces to their alliance roles. However, lack of US action against the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and frequent violations of Greek territorial waters and airspace has severely lessened Washington's influence in Athens.

Alliance theory does not account for such multilateral problems among alliance members. Both the Greeks and the Turks perceive the US as favoring the other. In addition, both sides see US neutrality over the continued Greco-Turkish issues as an affront and a firm example of US support for the other.

In conclusion, present theories of alliance cohesion simply lack any application of the effect domestic politics, intra-alliance dynamics and the development of threats between alliance members have on alliance cohesion. Existing theories must be revised to include these important factors effecting alliance cohesion.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The relationship between the Greek government and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not been a stable one. The independence of Greece in the early 19th century brought about the Kingdom of Greece and at the same time institutionalized Greek reliance on outside power for its protection. Initially Greece relied on Great Britain, the power of the Mediterranean. The end of World War II and the severity of the Civil War that was to come brought in the United States. The US role in Greek security became the most prevalent.

Because of Greece's reliance on outside power for protection she was forced into a security stance that promoted and protected US policy in its anti-Communist defense. When Greece did accede to NATO in 1951 she was prepared to provide the United States with an outpost against Communism in the eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. However, the objectives of the Alliance and the United States were able to dominate Greek policy to such an extent that, when the coup of 1967 took place, neither was really interested in guaranteeing democratic values as long as Greece continued its NATO commitments.

However, NATO and the US also failed to recognize changing patterns in Greek security and rhetoric. By 1955 Turkey and Greece had begun sparring over issues that by 1974 nearly led to war between the two over the issue of Cyprus. Neither NATO nor the

US was prepared for such an eventuality of war between two member states and adopted a posture of Alliance policy first and Greek and Turkish problems second. Mainly this was an effort to provide the two countries with a common ground and basis for mutual security. Unfortunately, by 1974 it was too late. Greece altered its entire security strategy, moving from a northern defensive doctrine to an eastern threat. By the 1980's Greece was almost totally independent of NATO strategy, especially since the latter policy favored the Turks. The threats Greece and NATO were arrayed against were simply not the same.

Even as recently as January 1996 Greece and Turkey nearly came to blows over the rocky islet of Imia in the eastern Aegean. The post-Cold War era had not changed defense policy for Greece. NATO was looking to reform itself in the new era, but Greece is still forced to concentrate on the potential Turkish threat until such time as the two can come to terms of peaceful co-existence.

### **Review of the Theoretical Literature**

The literature that has evolved around the development of alliances and alliance cohesion all maintain one common theme: that alliances, both international and domestic, are formed to enable their members to achieve a shared objective. Collective security communities generally disband after the objectives for which they were created have been achieved. Alternately, it is a political community that maintains its cohesion over more varied collaborative efforts.

The response of the alliance to conflict is an integral part of this discussion. The alliance must at times be forced to deal with crises that are out of its scope or mandate.



Certain members may disagree over the mandate of the organization to deal with a potential or current crisis. However, unlike the potential external conflict that the alliance is formed to deal with, and that existing theories are based on, the discussion here is concerned with the development of intra-alliance conflict and its effect on the stability and goals of the collective, especially in light of the Greek experience.

One of the main architects of alliance theory is George F. Liska. His main theories postulate that alliances are formed against and for someone or something. Each member considers the utility that can be gained from alliance membership, or, as in the case of NATO, a dominant alliance member may pressure or suggest to others that joining may be of benefit to both. The positive utility of joining then must normally outweigh the stress of unilateral action. This also provides the basis of alliance cohesiveness, integral to the relationship between Greece and NATO. This cohesiveness, Liska maintains, is based on the balance of internal and external pressures against the ratio of gains to liabilities for individual allies (1962, 175).

Nations join alliances for security, stability, and status. Liska notes that another primary reason for alliance cohesion is the development of an alliance ideology (Liska 1962, 61). This provides the rationalization of an alliance. The NATO rationalization for years was the threat of the Warsaw Pact. Now it is searching for a new rationalization. However, it is presently being bombarded with differing views. Enlargement to the east is to guarantee the security of those states from a resurgent Russia. The US, Great Britain, Germany and France are also seeking to maintain the alliance but for differing but well known reasons. The alliance condition is based on a perceived, unifying threat. When members of the alliance lessen the necessity of the

formation or have a quite different view of the utility of the alliance it creates greater stress for those members that still rely on NATO for defensive guarantees (Bladen 1970, 124).

According to Liska, "A dogmatic interest in alliance is qualitatively different from the particular interests which an alliance is to serve." Essentially the differences are further exacerbated when only some allies develop or lose interest in alliance leaving others to maintain the structure (Liska 1962, 139).

One of the few qualitative explanations of the effect of particularities in alliance membership interest is from Christopher Bladen. In summary he states:

In the case of NATO it seems likely that intra-group cleavages cannot always be patched over. Failure of the Multilateral Force proposal and France's effective withdrawal from membership are but two indications of this and may be symbolic precursors of a gradual but general dissolution. If this should turn out to be the case it will prove once again that allies' diversity of interests limits alliance to defense against a fairly specific common external threat. On the whole the *ad hoc* nature of the coalition has frustrated attempts to use NATO for other than the military tasks for which it was created (1970, 125).

While the above is unable to include the current NATO IFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia due to its date, Bladen's statement is significant in his contribution to Cold War alliance theory. It provides us with a succinct statement that intra-alliance politics can take over and become more important for some states than overall alliance policy of the time. The diversity of interests argument, however, is still lacking in application to the Greek study. Greek security policy was not just diversified in the sense that it had other threats in addition to the potential Soviet/Communist. By 1974 Greece had ceased to see the north as a primary threat at all and viewed NATO as a co-

conspirator in the 1967 Colonel's Coup and the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

Cold War theories on small state foreign policies and relationships with the super-powers are more adequate in explaining the Greek case. As a member of the Western Alliance, Greece was interested in the survival of its member bloc *and* its self-interest within the bi-polar system that existed at the time. Postulated by Robert L. Rothstein, for the small state membership in an alliance can constitute a major psychological increase or decrease in status and prestige as well as concurrent perceptions and actual amounts of independence (1970, 354).

Small states that have entered into alliances dominated by one of the super-powers, Rothstein goes on to state, end up doing so reluctantly and only under perception of a major threat. The theoretical distinctions between a great-power/small-power relationship and a mixed multilateral alliance is still valid, but in practice the distinction has been diluted. It is the superior or dominant power that insists on the form of the relationship, normally espousing multilateral relationships in an effort to decrease the political losses alignment generally brings about. The small powers, on the other hand, may generally prefer a bilateral agreement. The bilateral form guarantees more aid, financial and material, to the smaller state. Of course, the multilateral alliance can also provide the smaller state more intra-alliance leverage and the chance to espouse its own views. Form, Rothstein says, is based on perceptions concerning the degree of danger. If high, a bilateral relationship is wiser and faster (1970, 354-355).

In general the theoretical aspects reviewed here cannot be evaluated within the context of Greek-NATO security relations without reviewing the historical developments between the two. The context can then be related based on the specifics of

Greek security policy and its relationship with the NATO and the United States.

### **Re-examining the Historical Developments**

In attempting to apply the historical background of Greek-NATO relations to the theoretical developments of alliance cohesion, it is necessary to begin with the early Greek kingdom's relationship with the Great Powers. As Greek independence developed, its security was guaranteed by the powers provided it did not make claims on Ottoman territories. Initially the British dominated an essentially bilateral relationship. This relationship continued to the end of World War II.

Various personalities have also emerged throughout Greek history to bring about a period of independence to Greek foreign policy. The first was Eleftherios Venizelos, the Prime Minister who led Greece into the Balkan Pact and World War I. He helped Greece retain much of its traditional lands and solidified Greek relations with the British as opposed to the monarchy's desire to side with Imperial Germany.

The inter-war period saw Greece attempting to maintain some semblance of independence of foreign policy. Unfortunately for Greece, Venizelos, long respected throughout Europe, was no longer in Greek politics. Instead Greece had become embroiled in yet another power struggle between the Prime Minister, the King, and the military. General Ioannis Metaxas had taken full dictatorial powers of Greece in the face of a collapsing domestic political system. He led Greece through the entrance of World War II and the defeat of Italy pushing the fascist forces of Mussolini back into Albania.

The preceding years had also seen the rise of a very organized and well equipped Communist Party within Greece. During the German occupation from 1941 to 1944 the

Communists fought valiantly against the Germans side by side with the Royalists and Republicans. However, at the same time they took the pains to gain overall power in Greece when the occupation ended. If not for the immediate occupation by British forces, and the unrelenting support Britain had for the Greek Monarchy, the Communist Party would have had a victory in Greece.

The British were not able to maintain their support for Greece, however. Like the rest of Europe the British had to rebuild a war-shattered economy and still deal with the remains of its colonial empire. The Greek problem was then taken over by the United States. The Americans declared an all-out campaign against the rising forces of Communism throughout eastern Europe. The Truman Doctrine, providing aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent their falling under Communist control, eventually helped the Greek monarchy defeat the Communist forces.

The Truman Doctrine not only provided aid to the Greeks but brought the US pervasively into all aspects of Greek politics and the military. Greece acceded to NATO, along with Turkey, in 1951 at the encouragement of the Americans. The possible resurgence of the Communists, the start of the Korean War, and the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia provided the impetus for Greece and being backed up by the US gave Greece a large amount of prestige in the region. Unfortunately for the Greeks and Americans, their relationship almost immediately began a downward spiral.

While NATO and the US concentrated on the Central European theater of NATO, where any expected Soviet attack into Europe was expected to come from, Greece was left to provide support to the US throughout the 1950's and 1960's. This was especially important as the US increased aid to Israel. The Middle East wars made US bases in

Greece extremely important, as well as providing important strategic listening posts for US intelligence into the southern flank of the Warsaw Pact. This further enhanced the idea that Greece was more a bilateral partner of the US rather than a full fledged member of NATO.

Relations between Greece and Turkey also began to take precedence over the Greek relationship with NATO or any other multilateral collective defense. Various crises between the two and the ethnic problems on the island of Cyprus endangered relations between the two throughout the 1960's.

In 1967 the Greek military led a coup that brought about eight years of military rule to Greece. During this period the populace began to change many ideas of Greece's relations with the so-called powers. The US and NATO made no effort, as perceived by the Greeks, to oppose the dictatorship. As long as Greece carried out her commitments to the Alliance, the internal situation in Greece mattered little to the Western powers

The military government in Greece, overthrown in 1974 by yet another General, faced with growing internal opposition attempted to stage a coup on the island of Cyprus in an attempt to unite the island with Greece. This led to a Turkish invasion of the northern third of the island that no amount of foreign influence could prevent. It also forever changed the security relationship between Greece and the Western Alliance.

The return of a democratically elected government to Greece brought about major changes in Greek foreign policy vis-à-vis NATO. The Greeks felt that the Alliance should have taken a more active role in the Cyprus invasion rather than allow the de facto Turkish occupation of the island. Then Prime Minister Constantinos Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military wing of NATO in response, an action parallel to the

stance of De Gaulle in the 1960's. Karamanlis also brought Greece into the European Economic Community. In addition to the economic benefits from such association, Karamanlis also hoped to enter Greece into a more independent policy from that provided with the US and NATO alliance. Greece also proceeded to reform its military and security policy. The government maintained that the most urgent threat was the one from the east as opposed to the NATO policy of protecting the European allies from a potential Soviet invasion into central Europe.

A more radical change was yet to come with the arrival of the Socialist Andreas Papandreou to the premiership. While not forthcoming in his threats to withdraw Greece from the EEC, NATO, and to cancel the bases agreement with the US, Papandreou's radical ideology and relations with various pariah states was a major concern to the West. Papandreou became yet another example of a populist leader that dominated the Greek political scene.

While he failed to follow through on his campaign rhetoric Papandreou did initiate a fairly independent foreign policy. Unfortunately, his policies alienated him politically from the West except for other Socialist leaders. He cultivated relations with many states politically and socially unacceptable to the majority of the world. He maintained close relations with Libya, the dictatorship of Panama, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and other terrorist states. He also continued an increasing rapprochement with the Eastern Bloc, including the Soviet Union. It was his goal to limit the traditional dominance of the US and NATO as much as possible.

However, Papandreou is universally considered to have gone too far in his policies. He refused to condemn the USSR for the 1982 downing of the Korean Air

Lines 747 over Sakhalin Island maintaining that it was a US spy plane and stating that he would have done the same. He publicly supported the military regime of Poland under General Jarulzelski and continued to argue that the US was a purely imperialistic capitalist enemy of the world.

The 1990's have seen little change in Greek foreign policy. It has attempted to balance the influence of NATO and the US with membership in the EU. Relations with Turkey have remained constant. Unfortunately they have generally alternated between cool and a near-war footing. The recent crisis over the islet of Imia, in the eastern Aegean, has maintained for Greece that its security policy should still be focused by the Turkish threat. The failure of the US and NATO to condemn the Turks over that incident, and other actions, has further confirmed to the Greeks that it is correct in its policy.

### **The Changing Nature of Greek-NATO Relations in the post-Cold War era**

The post-Cold War era has seen NATO searching for a new mandate. The member states have continued in alliance and have begun considering enlargement to the east. Greece has also sought to maintain its links with the alliance. It is participating in the NATO IFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia and is benefiting from the continued membership in any way that it can. It continues to receive military material from other states downsizing their armed forces. Greece on the other hand has maintained the strength of its military in constant anxiety of the Turkish threat.

Unlike the Cold War, during which NATO policy dominated the overall alliance structure, Greece included, the current era does not have a common NATO policy. After



1974 Greece had already begun a separation from collective NATO policy. Instead, the Greeks initiated a defensive policy from a perceived Turkish threat. This diversion of policy between member and alliance created a significantly different situation for the alliance as a whole. For the first time, one member state found another member state to be a greater security threat than the common threat.

In reality, Greece had always had a closer relationship with US security policy in the region than collective security in central Europe. American bases in Greece were essential for the maintenance of a US presence in the Mediterranean and in support of Israel. This relationship was far more important than any potential threat from Albania, Yugoslavia, or Bulgaria. While it may be considered that US/NATO policy leans towards a slight favor of Turkey in strategic terms, the constant tension between the Greeks and Turks is hardly favorable to anyone.

If a common security policy develops in the future it will not matter in the least to Greece if the Turkish threat is still existent. The closing of US bases in Greece has lessened her importance for US operations in the Mediterranean. However, until the stability of the Middle East is ensured, or the situation in Yugoslavia is terminated, Greece has the potential to be an important player in the region. Thus far its role has been limited to reaction to the independence of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Greek policy over the issue of Macedonia's name was misunderstood by most of the Western allies. The policy was dominated by knee-jerk nationalists in the government and the population. Its role in the downfall of the Mitsotakis government initiated concern among the Western governments that finally gave support to the Greek

position. Unfortunately it was too late to save his government.

Relations with the European Union have allowed Greece to pursue a foreign policy independent of the US and Turkey for the first time since the end of World War II. It has also given Greece much more status and power as opposed to her membership in NATO. In addition it has relatively balanced the priority in policy NATO has given Turkey.

It falls to perception. NATO members, Greece included, must still see a positive sum gain of remaining in NATO and the organization continuing in an evolving role. Greece itself gains by the open information policy NATO requires of all members. In reality it is gaining excellent intelligence on the Turkish military. Greece is also able to veto moves by the Alliance that would favor Turkey or moves by Turkey that would allow it to influence the alliance, another major benefit of remaining within NATO. The Alliance continues to provide Greece with a forum to voice its concerns to the major European players that are also, in most cases, members of the European Union. In addition, and as in Europe as a whole, Greece's continued involvement has guaranteed US involvement and a say in European and Greek security. The most recent incident in the Aegean attests to that. Lastly, NATO is of prime importance to the financially strapped Greek military. The Cascade and PHARE programs provide Greece with next-generation military equipment at virtually no cost and help it to maintain parity with the Turkish armed forces.

### **Conclusions**

The theories presented earlier in the chapter have shown that an alliance, as any

other community, remains together through the perception of its member states receiving some gain from continued membership. Greece has sought to maintain her ties with NATO. It is assumed that she perceives membership more advantageous than non-membership. Collectively this is the same for the other states as well. NATO is still in existence because its member states find it beneficial to reform the Alliance rather than begin again or end their collective relationship. The theories fail in one aspect, though. They are outdated. Now the alliance lacks a shared mission unless we look at reform of the Alliance as that objective.

Based on existing formal theory NATO should have disbanded yet it is still in existence and looking to gain new members as well. Greece has remained a member despite unilateral withdrawals from NATO's military command a number of times over the previous 4 decades. Indeed it is evident that Greece has developed a significantly different security threat from that of the Alliance as a whole since at least 1974. To explain this requires a new theory on small state security within a collective security organization.

There is no contemporary theory yet available to explain the relationship between Greece and NATO. The theories currently existing, all developed in the middle of the Cold War, suggest that no matter what internal problems or intra-alliance rivalries arise among member states, the formal policy of the alliance takes over-riding importance, especially if the alliance is to survive. In the case of Greek-NATO relations, though, what exists, and what has existed since 1974, is a member state whose continued membership is based not on a shared alliance objective, but on the other benefits obtained from the collective security organization. These benefits are then channeled

into a separate Greek defense policy directed against Turkey, another NATO member.

While formal theory accepts that there will and do exist internecine problems, it is lacking in the consideration of the diverging policies of smaller member states like Greece. The post-Cold War era has thrown alliance theory for a curve. NATO exists, but is lacking in a shared threat or purpose, other than to continue its existence.

Greece is still a member, but its security policy is much different than will be developed by the alliance as a whole. If NATO begins a transformation into a security community it will become much more flexible in dealing with rising security threats against its European members. Whether it will be able to deal with conflicting members like Greece and Turkey, however, will remain to be seen.

## Appendix A



THE GROWTH OF THE GREEK KINGDOM 1832-1947

(Woodhouse 1991, 174)

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