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NEWSLETTER

NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE PROFESSIONS

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SALARY AND COMPENSATION METHODOLOGY IN ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

"America believes in education . . . the average professor earns more money in a year than the professional athlete earns in a whole week."

—Unknown

Editor's Note: It was at the Ninth Annual Conference that we first examined the issue of salary and compensation methodology. Previous conferences had addressed the question of the impact of unionization on salary, however, the thrust of this project was not on what professors earn but instead, on how salary structure was organized. Our preliminary conference findings led us to embark upon a detailed survey in this area, the results of which are set forth in this special edition of the Newsletter.

The primary data gathering was done by research associates of the Center. The task of organizing the data and preparation of the tables was performed by Lorraine DeBona, a research associate with the Center. We apologize for any errors or omissions.

INTRODUCTION

During the Middle Ages, the professor wore his academic robe to class, the prime reason, weather notwithstanding, was to collect contributions from students at the end of the lecture. In more recent times, public discussion of salary and compensation for academics was uncommon for it was assumed that one properly credentialed in the academy would receive remuneration commensurate with status and rank. Professors were, after all, not interested in the mundane subject of money. Furthermore, it has been argued that academics, perhaps more than any other professional within our industrial society, have come closest to effectuating the long sought after goal of combining avocation with vocation. While other professionals are free to challenge this claim, professors have often subordinated their economic interests in order to take part in a profession where rewards are based, in part, on a quality of life derived from "psychic" income. Historically, economic remuneration was of little consequence to college professors. In large, their ranks consisted of the very wealthy who could afford to teach or members of the clergy who devoted their lives to a religious calling.

Membership in the academy today has changed drastically since the colonial college and along with these changes came a growing realization that academics had the same economic needs as other professionals. Those that argued that increased job satisfacation was a valid tradeoff against salary, soon found that although one may have achieved self-actualization, as defined by Maslow, economic pressures remain.

Although we acknowledge the presence of a large historical gap in this introduction, we now move to the advent of the unionized campus concomitant with the large-scale growth of public sector collective bargaining in the early 1970's. Professors organized for a multiplicity of reasons, not the least of which was a desire to increase their levels of compensation. Those entering the academy believe that they should be adequately compensated for their educational investment and opportunity costs. What's more, in some cases, they are willing to strike for it. While it may be too simplistic to claim that unionization of the professoriate was due solely to the compensation issue, those who have chosen to minimize its importance and focus instead on professional issues may have misread American bread and butter unionism.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

"Do unionized faculty receive greater salaries than non-unionized faculty?" This question is one of the most often asked concerning academic collective bargaining and, perhaps, one of the most difficult to answer. The question ignores the multiplicity of variables that must be considered when costing compensation packages and cannot be reduced to a simple "yes" or "no." Perhaps the question should be further refined to include: what role has unions played in the overall determination of faculty salaries? One additional and highly significant component must be the impact collective bargaining has had on non-unionized campuses concerning salary determination. In many instances, employers have been forced to raise salary levels to meet or even exceed newly established union negotiated rate or run the risk of either losing faculty to higher paying unionized institutions or giving support to union organizing drives on their own campus.

The contract sample used in this survey was selected from NCSCBHEP's Databank. Of the nearly 400 collective bargaining agreements in existence, those that were in full force and effect as of June 1981 constituted the 207 agreements in this sample. This eliminated the nearly 200 other agreements which had either expired or were being renegotiated. Those agreements identified for sample inclusion were representative of both two-year and four-year colleges. Statewide systems that incorporated both two-year and four-year institutions into a single contract were classified as four-year colleges. Two-year colleges numbered 134 with 126 in the public sector and 8 in the private sector. Among the 73 four-year colleges, 31 were public and 42 private.

Sixty-two percent of the contracts sampled were affiliated with the NEA, 25% with the AFT, 16% with the AAUP and 6% with independent agents. Additionally, 2% were contracts in which two agents shared a joint affiliation. As expected, the majority of the contracts were from the most heavily unionized areas in the country. (See NCSCBHEP *Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents* for a complete listing of all unionized institutions in the United States and Canada.)

Six structural components of salary were selected for study: a payment method, salary structure, faculty typology, chairperson's compensation, adjunct compensation and summer compensation. For purposes of consistency, the same sample was used for all six areas.

No longitudinal analysis was attempted, that being beyond the immediate scope of this study. However, it is hoped that portions of this survey can be replicated using a longitudinal component. In addition to the comparative data set forth in this report, a cross-tabular analysis was provided between each of the salary structural components analyzed. Thus, once it was established that certain institutions awarded an across-the-board increase, these agreements were then examined with respect to cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) and wage reopener provisions. Thus while only six charts are presented, each of them contains multiple variables.

As part of our research design we compiled a listing of bibliographic citations related to salary and compensation in higher education collective bargaining. Due to space limitations that selected bibliography will appear in the next issue of the *Newsletter*.

Each of the structural components selected is analyzed in both tabular and narrative form. No value judgments were made as to structural preference. Analysis and observations were done consistent with our research objectives.

Returning to our original question of unionized faculties receiving greater salaries than non-unionized a survey of the existing literature suggests that the results are thus far inconclusive. Proponents of unionization submit that salaries have risen in both organized and unorganized institutions and that credit must be given to faculty unionization. Those who represent different points of view claim that unionization is but one variable and that salaries have risen due to labor market forces other than the collective bargaining process. Thus, the debate goes on. However, what is crucial is that while the compensation issues has been widely addressed in economic terms, little, if anything, has been written on the structural aspect of compensation. The prime purpose of this research project was to ascertain the varied methods utilized in collective bargaining agreements to compensate members of the academy. No attempt was made to study wage levels or salary increases; for this the reader is referred to the annual AAUP, CUPA, and the *Chronicle of Higher Education* Salary Studies. Furthermore, no attempt was made to include non-unionized institutions in our study although, we clearly acknowledge the importance of this component in the overall framework.

I. PAYMENT METHOD

Salary is one of the most basic concerns of collective bargaining agreements and, therefore, it is not surprising that only two contracts in the sample provided no such provision. Of the agreements surveyed, the most popular method for salary increases was a percent or dollar amount increase negotiated on the base salary. This provision, found in 42% of all collective agreements in our sample, provides for an adjustment in the base which then translates into gains throughout the entire salary schedule.

Percentage increases applied to base salaries are often used as an equitable means of awarding salary raises; however, the percentage translates into a series of progressively higher dollar amounts as it is placed on the schedule due to rank and longevity differentials. An increase of 8% on a hypothetical salary of an assistant professor might generate an increase of $1,440 ($18,000 x .08% = $1,440) while that same increase awarded to a full professor earning $40,000 a year would be worth more than twice that amount or $3,200. Constant dollar increases applied to the base have the opposite results when translated into percentages as an increase of $2,000 yields a greater percentage increase to the assistant professor than to the full professor.

Next in frequency was a system that provided for movement on steps and lanes (26%). Under this system each unit member, absent any contractual restriction, advances one step on the salary schedule. No mention is made of any general increases to the schedule itself although it is generally assumed that the salary schedule also increases. Traditionally, salary schedules or grids were designed for the purpose of providing compensation plans where new hires could see their overall compensation plan with respect to their future. However, with the relatively short duration of collective bargaining agreements there are now those who argue that this method of payment is superfluous because the grid itself is subject to constant change.

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Opponents of increases on the base as well as specified lane movement argue that the system is artificial inasmuch as the majority of college faculties have now "topped out" due to longevity and the lack of hiring. Furthermore, the existence of an elongated scale is often misleading since there are numerous positions on the grid that do not adequately represent individual placement. Whether or not salary grids in which increases are placed on the base in addition to step and lane movement still remain a viable salary structure for compensation purposes is problematic.

Across-the-board increases were found in 17% of the sample. In this system, the base salary of each bargaining unit member is increased equally, reflected in either a dollar or percentage amount. Although this method is frequently used in the absence of a salary schedule, it is not mandated that this be so. Some collective agreements provide for across-the-board increases with no specified movement which, in essence, freezes faculty on their current step. Analagous to an across-the-board increase would be a situation in which all faculty received a raise of $1,000 with no other compensation structural changes.

II. STRUCTURAL PROVISIONS

Using the four payment methods identified in Table One, we measured whether or not those contracts contained cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) clauses and/or wage reopener provisions. Each structural provision identified on the vertical axis in Table Two can be compared with either the accompanying horizontal payment method from Table One or COLA/Reopener clauses. Care must be taken to distinguish between the various payment methods set forth in Table One and repeated on the horizontal axis in Table Two and the salary structural methods identified on the vertical axis in Table Two. Thus, it was possible for institutions to be identified as having no structural provisions for salary and yet having negotiated a payment method.

Of the four structural provisions set forth, salary grids were by far the most prevalent. Nearly half of the contracts in the sample provided for a gird system with both vertical experiential/longevity steps and horizontal lanes related to degrees and rank. Of the 101 contracts in this group, 49 provided for movement on steps and lanes, 12 have COLA provisions, while 16 contain wage reopeners. Several of the contracts included all the aforementioned provisions. It should be noted that the number of steps and lanes provided for on salary schedule vary with no statutory significance being attached to any one grouping.

Next in frequency were agreements which provided for minima and maxima salaries. For purposes of this study, minima salary was defined as the least amount of compensation allowed to be granted while maxima was the greatest amount specified in the contract. Neither minima or maxima clauses made any reference to structural design or grid plans. Although not quantified, it appears that contracts in this grouping allowed for individual salary negotiations within a specified range.

COLA clauses and wage reopeners were commonly found in multi-year agreements where the parties preferred to negotiate for a period in excess of one year yet are uncertain as to the specifics of the future economic climate. The COLA clause provides for a method of salary indexing to changes in the cost-of-living. Most COLAs are indexed to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As

TABLE ONE — PAYMENT METHOD

		PAYMENT METHOD				
LEVEL AND CONTROL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROVISION	ACROSS THE BOARD INCREASE	% OR $ AMOUNT INCREASE ON BASE	% OR $ AMOUNT INCREASE ON BASE W/ SPECIFIED MVMT ON GRID	MVMT STEPS & LANES
2-YEAR PUBLIC	n=126	0	14	43	26	43
2-YEAR PRIVATE	n= 8	1	0	2	1	4
4-YEAR PUBLIC	n= 32	1	9	17	1	4
4-YEAR PRIVATE	n= 41	0	12	24	2	3
TOTAL	T=207	2	35	86	30	54

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

Some 14% of the survey provided for both increases on the base and specified lane movement. Although we suspect that the majority of the 86 contracts that provided for an increase on the base and were silent about lane movment also implied lane movement as a past practice or non-contractual item.

Table One sets forth the various payment methods found in our survey. Movement on steps and lanes was the most popular method of compensation in two-year colleges (35%) while percentage or dollar amount increases on base salaries was the most frequently specified payment method in four-year agreements.

The negotiation of payment method clauses has remained fairly traditional during the past two decades. Over 82% of the sample makes reference to salary grids which incorporate horizontal and/or vertical movement. The remaining 18% did not expressly exclude grids from their agreements. Raises were awarded in systems with or without grids. Thus, it appears that salary grids will continue to be utilized as the primary vehicle to distribute salaries in academe. We now turn our attention to the various concepts upon which the grids are built.

TABLE TWO — SALARY STRUCTURE PROVISIONS

PAYMENT METHOD											
CONTRACT CLAUSE	LEVEL & CONTROL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROVISION	ACROSS THE BD INCREASE	% OR $ AMT INCREASE ON BASE	% OR $ AMT. INCREASE W/SPECIFIED MVMT ON GRID	MVMT ON STEPS & LANES	COLA YES	PROVISION NO	REOPENER YES	PROVISION NO
NO STRUCTURAL PROVISION	2-YR PUB.	n=8	0	4	4	0	0	2	6	1	7
	2-YR PRIV.	n=2	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	2
	4-YR PUB.	n=4	1	1	2	0	0	0	4	0	4
	4-YR PRIV.	n=7	0	2	5	0	0	1	6	1	6
	TOTAL	t=21	2	7	12	0	0	3	18	2	19
GRID SYSTEM STEPS & LANES	2-YR PUB.	n=82	0	6	14	23	39	8	74	14	68
	2-YR PRIV.	n=5	0	0	0	1	4	1	4	0	5
	4-YR PUB.	n=7	0	0	3	1	3	1	6	2	5
	4-YR PRIV.	n=7	0	2	0	2	3	2	5	0	7
	TOTAL	t=101	0	8	17	27	49	12	89	16	85
MINIMA NO STEPS OR LANES	2-YR PUB.	n=18	0	0	15	2	1	2	16	4	14
	2-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=15	0	5	9	0	1	5	10	3	12
	4-YR PRIV.	n=22	0	8	14	0	0	4	18	3	19
	TOTAL	t=55	0	13	38	2	2	11	44	10	45
MIN. AND MAX. NO STEPS OR LANES	2-YR PUB.	n=16	0	4	8	1	3	5	11	1	15
	2-YR PRIV.	n=1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
	4-YR PUB.	n=2	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	2
	4-YR PRIV.	n=5	0	0	5	0	0	3	2	1	4
	TOTAL	t=24	0	5	15	1	3	9	15	2	22
MAXIMA NO STEPS OR LANES	2-YR PUB.	n=2	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	2
	2-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=4	0	2	2	0	0	0	4	1	3
	4-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=6	0	2	4	0	0	0	6	1	5
	TOTAL	T=207	2	35	86	30	54	35	172	31	176

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

increases occur in the CPI, COLA adjustments are implemented as a means to protect income against inflation.

Numerous types of COLA formulas were found, most of which protected salaries against a certain percentage of inflation and rarely matched the CPI point for point. Examples included clauses which provided for salaries to be adjusted by a percentage of the CPI raise or by changes in the CPI minus X amount. COLAs, also referred to as escalator clauses, can have a downward effect by reducing salaries in those cases in which the CPI declines. However, recent economic indicators, while showing a decline in the rate of CPI growth have not shown an actual decrease in the CPI.

While COLAs were found in less than 15% of the agreements surveyed, their use in salary indexing will most likely increase as the concept of indexing gains in American fiscal policy. Similarly, wage reopeners were found in approximately the same number of agreements. This indicates that the parties appear to have a preference in negotiating *de novo* instead of locking into any prior commitments.

III. FACULTY TYPOLOGY

Unit inclusion and faculty ranking are described in Table Three. While the number of recognized adjunct bargaining units as of the date of this report is approximately 12, far more prevalent are units of full-time faculty or combinations of full-time and adjunct faculties. While not specifically the subject of this study, the information related to unit recognition clauses is significant when one explores the overall dimension of academic collective bargaining. Of the contracts surveyed, our sample shows a modest preference for recognition units of full-time faculty members as 114 contracts or 55% of the agreements were in this category. Forty-three percent of the contracts contained both full-time and adjuncts in the same bargaining units, while less than 1% of the contracts surveyed covered adjunct units only. Those contracts in which only full-time faculty were represented appeared primarily in the two-year public college group.

Against this data, we compared academic rank differential. Assuming the existence of the traditional professoriate grouping of instructor, assistant professor, associate professor and full professor, we examined that delineation against the recognition clause. In those contracts where rank was not specifically referred to but credit hours were we superimposed the following: instructor-BA/BS plus 15 credits, assistant professor-MA/MS plus 30 credits, associate professor-MA plus 60 credits, full professor-earned doctorate.

For those colleges with recognized bargaining units of full-time faculty only, the traditional four-rank method was preferred 61% to 28% over calculation by degree. In those agreements containing both full-time and adjunct faculty, this preference evaporates into an insignificant difference of one percent.

Of the 17 colleges where no provisions appear for professoriate ranking, 13 are in two-year colleges. These schools generally utilized extensive step schedules and enumerate lanes and categories based primarily on longevity. In some cases, a complex weighted point system was used as a criterion for establishing salary.

Some faculty union leaders have had difficulty with the traditional academic ranking systems claiming that the concept of rank differential is highly subjective. From a traditional institutional union viewpoint, they claim that the only objective system is one based on seniority; however, this form of union scale appears to have been widely rejected in faculty contracts.

One additional problem related to faculty typology and compensation structure concerns the growing number of professionals who do not fit into the traditional professoriate classification system. Included are research fellows, project directors and other non-teaching professionals. Arrangements must be made within salary structures in order to accommodate these groups if a vast and unnecessary proliferation of salary schedules is to be avoided.

IV. CHAIRPERSONS COMPENSATION

After a decade of litigation over the question of unit status, supervisory duties and collective bargaining rights, the role of the department chairperson in academic collective bargaining continues to be a perplexing one. There are those who suggest that perhaps faculty unions might be willing to exclude chairpersons from the bargaining unit in order to avoid future *Yeshiva* claims pertaining to the managerial status of faculty. Additionally, chairpersons are often presented with the dual loyalty issue as they try to resolve conflicts between their administrative positions and their role as peer faculty. In an attempt to segregate and reward chairpersons, collective bargaining agreements have specific provisions negotiated on this topic.

Table Four examines the various methods by which chairpersons are compensated via the collective bargaining agreement. As was done in Table Three, the chairperson compensation variables were measured against contract recognition clauses. Thirty-four percent of the samples contained no provision whatsoever for chairpersons compensation. Of those contracts with specified compensation arrangements, reduced load, coupled with a stipend, was the most popular provision (17%), followed by a stipend alone (15%).

Seven percent of the contracts surveyed offered department chairpersons a reduced teaching load. Thus,payment in this category must be considered an imputed wage. Department chairpersons were specifically excluded from bargaining units in 15% of the sample, while 11% of the colleges included the chairperson in the bargaining unit but offered no specified provisions in terms of compensation and/or reduced load. Thirty-four percent of the sample made no reference to

TABLE THREE: FACULTY TYPOLOGY

			FACULTY RANKS				
RECOGNITION CLAUSE	CONTROL & LEVEL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROVISION	ONE RANK	TWO/THREE RANKS	FOUR RANKS	CALCULATED BY DEGREE: NO RANK
FULL-TIME FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=63	5	2	0	26	30
	2-YR PRIV.	n=6	1	1	0	2	2
	4-YR PUB.	n=18	1	0	0	17	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=27	1	0	0	25	1
	TOTAL	t=114	8	3	0	70	33
FULL-TIME & ADJUNCT FACULTY	2-YR PUB.	n=62	6	1	0	15	40
	2-YR PRIV.	n=2	0	0	0	2	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=13	0	0	0	13	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=13	1	0	0	12	0
	TOTAL	t=90	7	1	0	42	40
ADJUNCT FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=1	1	0	0	0	0
	2-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=1	0	0	0	1	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=1	1	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=3	2	0	0	1	0
	TOTAL	t=207	17	4	0	113	73

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

TABLE FOUR — CHAIRPERSON'S COMPENSATION

			PAYMENT METHOD				UNIT STATUS	
RECOGNITION CLAUSE	CONTROL & LEVEL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROV.	STIPEND	REDUCED COURSE LOAD	REDUCED LOAD & STIPEND	EXCLUDED	INCLUDED BUT NO OTHER PROVISIONS
FULL-TIME FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=63	18	8	4	14	13	6
	2-YR PRIV.	n=6	4	2	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=18	6	1	0	3	5	3
	4-YR PRIV.	n=27	9	4	3	6	3	2
	TOTAL	t=114	37	15	7	23	21	11
FULL-TIME & ADJUNCT FACULTY	2-YR PUB.	n=62	25	14	5	9	3	6
	2-YR PRIV.	n=2	0	0	1	0	1	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=13	2	2	3	2	2	2
	4-YR PRIV.	n=13	4	0	0	1	4	4
	TOTAL	t=90	31	16	9	12	10	12
ADJUNCT FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=1	1	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=3	3	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=207	71	31	16	35	31	23

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

department chairpersons by either including or excluding them from the unit. The extent of the colleges, recognition clauses for faculty seems to have little effect on compensation policy.

V. ADJUNCT COMPENSATION

The question of alleged adjunct exploitation is continuously raised in the bargaining process. Indeed, such terms as "freeway gypsies," "subway gypsies," "slave labor," and "academic troubadours" have been used at the bargaining table to describe the role of the adjunct in higher education. While most of the innuendos and accusations revolve around the perception that adjuncts are cheap labor and are used to eliminate full-time positions, the question of how they are paid has rarely been discussed. Table Five sets forth the various types of compensation arrangements found in our sample. Forty-eight percent of the contracts had no provision for adjunct faculty compensation, however, we acknowledge that this statistic is a bit skewed since the majority of our samples contain contracts in which the bargaining unit consists of full-time faculty members only.

The six approaches listed in Table Five describe a myriad of payment methods. Seventeen percent of the contracts pro-rated adjunct salaries based on full-time faculty schedules, while an additional four contracts used the pro-rata formula for hourly rates. Nine percent of the agreements contained a published adjunct salary schedule, while 10% offered a fixed rate per course credit.

Although we acknowledge that only three contracts in which adjuncts comprised the entire bargaining unit were used in this survey, the entire total of separate adjunct units how only totals 12. Although it is too soon to predict a trend in adjunct organizing, considerable interest exists in this area.

VI. SUMMER COMPENSATION

Several reasons have been advanced for the renewed interest in compensation methodology for summer school teaching. Among these are a desire to obtain a greater return on capital investment by not allowing the physical plant to remain idle, experimentation with year-round teaching programs and a desire to ease both financial exigency and retrenchment problems by mainstreaming the summer session. Table Six sets forth eight structural components identified in our survey that are used to compensate faculty for summer teaching when such teaching is not part of the annual teaching load. Thirty-one percent of the sample contained no summer salary provisions, while 21% provided for a fixed dollar amount related to each credit or contact hour taught. Eighteen percent mandated a percentage of annual pay while an additional 12% provided for a fixed amount or a separate summer compensation schedule. The remaining five categories exhibited a declining range of usage from six to one percent.

Among two-year colleges that contained summer compensation provisions, the most frequently employed system was that of the fixed amount negotiated for each credit or contact hour taught. The same applied to four-year institutions.

One additional observation with respect to this area is worth noting. As teaching schedules become more difficult to assign within the traditional two-semester academic year, several institutions reported that the summer session is sometimes treated as a third semester, with faculty being given teaching responsibilities in two out of the three semesters. While Table Six only refers to those situations in which summer teaching is not considered a part of the regular teaching load, it will be interersting to observe what new structural components emerge in this area.

TABLE FIVE — ADJUNCT FACULTY COMPENSATION

			PAYMENT METHOD						
RECOGNITION CLAUSE	CONTROL & LEVEL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROV.	SALARY SCHEDULE	HOURLY RATE	FIXED-RATE PER COURSE/CREDIT	NEGOTIATED BY INDIV.	PRO RATA FULL TIME	PRO RATA HOURLY RATE
FULL-TIME FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=63	46	3	4	5	1	2	2
	2-YR PRIV.	n=6	4	1	1	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=18	11	0	0	4	0	3	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=27	27	0	0	0	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=114	88	4	5	9	1	5	2
FULL-TIME & ADJUNCT FACULTY	2-YR PUB.	n=62	4	10	19	6	2	20	1
	2-YR PRIV.	n=2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=13	2	0	0	1	0	9	1
	4-YR PRIV.	n=13	3	4	1	4	0	1	0
	TOTAL	t=90	11	14	20	11	2	30	2
ADJUNCT FACULTY ONLY	2-YR PUB.	n=1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2-YR PRIV.	n=0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4-YR PUB.	n=1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	4-YR PRIV.	n=1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	TOTAL	t=3	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
	TOTAL	t=207	99	19	25	21	3	36	4

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

TABLE SIX — SUMMER COMPENSATION

		SUMMER COMPENSATION METHOD								
LEVEL & CONTROL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	NO PROV.	FIXED AMT. OR SEPARATE SCHEDULE	% ANNUAL PAY	FIXED HOURLY AMT.	FIXED AMT. PER CREDIT/ CONTACT HR.	% ANNUAL PAY PER CREDIT	% ANNUAL PAY PER HOUR	AMT. PER STUDENT CREDIT HR.	PRO RATA ANNUAL SALARY
2-YR PUB.	n=126	36	15	21	9	25	6	3	2	9
2-YR PRIV.	n= 8	3	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
4-YR PUB.	n= 32	12	3	12	1	3	1	0	0	0
4-YR PRIV.	n= 41	14	4	3	2	15	1	2	0	0
TOTAL	t=207	65	24	37	12	43	9	5	2	10

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

TABLE SEVEN

COMPENSATION METHODOLOGY PROVISIONS IDENTIFIED IN CBA'S										
LEVEL & CONTROL	NO. OF SCHOOLS	PAYMENT METHOD	GRID SYSTEM STEPS & LANES	TYPOLOGY/ FAC. RANKS	CHAIRPERSON'S COMPENSATION	ADJUNCT FAC. COMP.	SUMMER COMP.	OVERLOAD COMP.	MERIT PAY	LONGEVITY
2-YR PUB.	n=126	126	82	49	54	76	90	97	13	32
2-YR PRIV.	n= 8	7	5	5	3	2	5	6	1	1
4-YR PUB.	n= 32	31	7	31	11	19	20	16	20	3
4-YR PRIV.	n= 41	41	7	37	14	11	27	25	8	3
TOTALS	T=207	205	101	122	82	108	142	144	42	39

SOURCE: NCSCBHEP RESEARCH

MISCELLANEOUS

Throughout the course of this research project several additional variables were identified for study and while the results were not set forth in tabular form, we do provide a brief summary of our findings in each area.

A. Merit Pay

Eighteen percent of the contracts surveyed contained some reference to merit pay plans. Using the broadest and most sweeping definition of merit pay, we identified plans that provided for the following: merit pay being added to or not being added to base salaries, merit pay distributed to entire bargaining units as opposed to selected individuals, and merit being used as the criteria for annual incremental raises. Most contracts which contained any form of merit pay linked it to consideration of individual performance. Other qualifiers included availability of funds and the need to achieve equity funding to ensure non-discrimination in salary plans. Some contracts excluded merit pay from the grievance and arbitration process, while others specified internal adjustment and appeal procedures.

Over 80% of the sample contained no reference whatsoever, lending support to those who claim that merit pay is still too controversial and subjective to be widely accepted by faculty organizations.

B. Overload Compensation

Overload compensation consists of payment for courses taught beyond specified contract workload requirements. Assignments were most frequently by a seniority bid system. In some instances, overload provisions were also encountered for additional administrative responsibilities beyond regular duties and for a greater number of students taught beyond a specified class size. Evening, weekend and summer teaching were also cited as assignments which mandated overload differentials.

The frequencies for the overload compensation variables virtually mirrored those for summer compensation. Thirty-one percent of the contracts contained no overload compensation provision; furthermore, 31% provided the same compensation for overload as they did for summer teaching. Fifteen percent provided for a fixed amount per credit or contact hour, while 8% established either a fixed amount per course or a separate overload schedule.

The issue of overload compensation continues to be a problem in collective bargaining in higher education as faculty organizations who are seeking a reduction in course load must counter the desires of their own members for increased opportunities to earn overload dollars. Inconsistencies further abound as administrators who support reasonable workload standards are forced into using full-time faculty for overload assignments rather than hire new full-time faculty or adjuncts. Unit cost containment shows a preference for overload compensation as opposed to hiring any additional personnel. As academic mobility diminishes, it will be interesting to see what direction overload compensation may take.

C. Longevity Payments

Longevity payments refers to compensation designed for those on the salary grid who have exhausted vertical movement. This was generally achieved by completion of a specified number of years of service and was found primarily among two-year public colleges. Seventeen percent of the sample contained such provisions, the majority of which appear to relate to salary schedules normally found in secondary education.

Virtually all longevity payments were found at the upper levels of the salary grid indicating that faculty members had reached the "top of the scale" and would not otherwise receive raises. These payments were of two types. One stipulated the number of years of service required before longevity increments could be received while the other superimposed a hypothetical step system and awarded longevity payments every five years.

Numerous administrators have expressed a desire to compact salary schedules and if this is achieved, the expected quid pro quo will be a greater emphasis on longevity payments.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Salary and compensation methodology remains a critical issue in academic collective bargaining. While virtually all collective bargaining agreements in our sample contain payment methods, no one system emerged as definitive. Salary grids exist in approximately half of the contracts surveyed, however, the grid designs contained multi-dimensional approaches. There appeared to be no consensus within the grids as to what criteria were adjudged to be significant in the determination of faculty compensation. Some appeared to reward longevity and experience at the expense of all other criteria, while others were more concerned with the achievement of rank and degrees. It appears that salary structures have been used in an attempt to resolve many of the problems currently facing the academic community. Examples of this include negotiations over such issues as adjuncts, summer compensation, overload compensation and rewarding department chairpersons. Further study is needed into the question of designing salary structure as an incentive device.

Table Seven summarizes our findings with respect to the threshold issue of contract inclusion for specific compensation issues. Also included is the institutional breakdown for merit and longevity payments although these items were not addressed in tabular form in the main body of this report. In one additional area we found that the data concerning overload compensation paralleled that for summer compensation.

Traditional faculty ranks appeared in the vast majority of four-year contracts (93%). Among two-year public institutions the findings were substantially different as the professorial rank system was only found in 40% of the sample.

The question of compensating department chairpersons is one area in which structural design has been used as an incentive. The 82 contracts cited in this category represent institutions that provide for stipends and/or released time. However, recent court decisions upholding the managerial status of faculty suggest that perhaps chairpersons will eventually not be part of collective bargaining units.

We acknowledge the complexity of salary and compensation methodology and do not make any claims that this report is all inclusive. However, we believe that the results of this contract content analysis project is significant and will be of assistance to those engaged in collective bargaining in higher education.